WTO AND CHINA 世贸组织与中国

Can International Law Keep Up with the Internet? Presentation @ the 2014 ASIL 108th Annual Meeting/ILA 76th Biennial Conference

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sat, 20 Sep 2014 03:49:00 +0000

My research featured in Economist and Financial Times

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Wed, 11 Dec 2013 13:41:00 +0000

On Dec 10th, 2011, my research on China and WTO was featured in an article in the Economist. This article discusses both the economic and political impacts of China's WTO accession. An interesting quote in the article is from former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, who notes 4 months after China had joined the WTO that "[w]estern hostile forces are continuing to promote their strategy of Westernising and breaking up our country". In the eyes of some Chinese officials, the WTO is a key part of such Westernising conspiracy. Fortunately, the CCP officials can take comfort in the fact that the WTO has not been able to bring about any meaningful political change in China. As I have argued in my paper on the Audio-Visual Case, it is naive to think that the WTO can effect political changes in China.

As I said in another article that was recently featured in the famed Lex Column of the Financial Times, China has been "shaking" existing rules and even started "making" new rules in the WTO since its accession. However, it seems that the WTO has not been able to "shake" loose the current political system in China.

China’s economy and the WTO

All change

In two articles, we examine how China has been altered by its entry into the WTO ten years ago. First, the economy. Second, the political impact

Dec 10th 2011 | HONG KONG | from the print edition

THE World Trade Organisation (WTO), like many clubs, denies patrons the right of automatic readmission. Having quit the organisation’s predecessor shortly after the Communist revolution of 1949, China had to wait 15 long years to gain entry after reapplying in the 1980s. The doors finally opened on December 11th 2001, ten years ago this week.

The price of re-entry was as steep as the wait was long. China had to relax over 7,000 tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers. Some feared that foreign competition would uproot farmers and upend rusty state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as to some extent it did. But China, overall, has enjoyed one of the best decades in global economic history. Its dollar GDP has quadrupled, its exports almost quintupled.

Many foreigners also prospered. American foreign direct investment reaps returns of 13.5% in China, compared with 9.7% worldwide, according to K.C. Fung of the University of California, Santa Cruz. China imposes lower tariffs on average than Brazil or India. The gap between what it can charge, under WTO rules, and what it does charge is also unusually small. So unlike its peers, China could not raise tariffs much even if it wanted to (see chart).

Yet in America, China’s single biggest trading partner, sentiment towards the country has turned starkly negative. In a recent poll, 61% of Americans said that China’s recent economic expansion had been bad for America; just 15% thought it had been good. This partly reflects China’s controversial currency regime. By keeping the exchange rate down, China’s critics allege, it has gained a substitute for the mercantilist measures it gave up to join the WTO.

Foreign frustration is partly a sign of China’s success. As its economy has grown and matured, the stakes have risen. Foreign firms lament losing trade battles they might not bother to wage in a less lucrative market. They also face competition from local upstarts in markets where no such rivals previously existed.

Electronic payments are one example. China’s first ever payment card was issued in 1986 by MasterCard. Foreign brands remained dominant at the time of China’s WTO entry. But shortly afterwards, China’s central bank established a domestic competitor, China UnionPay, and gave it a de facto monopoly over the handling of local-currency payments between merchants and banks. This setback might have been easier to take for foreign companies had the market not since grown tenfold, to $1.6 trillion, according to The Nilson Report, an industry newsletter.

China’s economy has evolved faster than anyone hoped. But its economic philosophy has not. Long Yongtu, who helped China win admission to the WTO, recently said that China is now moving further away from the organisation’s principles. To modernise its economy, it has remained wedded to industrial policies, state-owned enterprises, and a “techno-nationalism” that protects and promotes home-grown technologies.

Many foreign companies feel they must compete not with Chinese firms but with the Chinese state. Between them, China’s central and local governments own over 100,000 companies and implicitly favour many more. Thanks to the WTO, foreign firms are no longer required to hand over technology in exchange for entry to China’s market. But many still feel an informal pressure to do so. China is also keen to promote its own firms by enforcing its own technological standards, such as for 3G mobile phones.

Many of these interventions violate the spirit, if not always the letter of WTO rules. In response, America often pushes back bilaterally rather than in Geneva, according to a former American trade negotiator. This is partly because companies worry they will face retribution from China’s government if they provide evidence against it in a trade case. It is also because much of what China does falls into a grey area that is not easy for the WTO to police.

China, on the other hand, is growing more comfortable with the WTO machinery. In its early years as a member, it shied away from confrontation, points out Henry Gao of Singapore Management University. In 2006, for example, America threatened to file a complaint over China’s duties on kraft linerboard. China lifted the duties the next working day. But now the Chinese have learned the ropes, they have also become more proactive. “Now they defend themselves,” says Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute, a Washington think-tank. “They initiate cases. And when they lose, they comply.”

In some cases the discrimination is no worse than before, it is simply more visible. As part of its WTO agreement, China now circulates draft laws and regulations for 30 days to collect comments. That has made it easier for foreigners to spot foul play. America recently complained that China had failed to notify the WTO of nearly 200 subsidy programmes, such as those supporting green-energy technology. It knew this in part because China, following its newly transparent practice, had disclosed many such programmes online, the former negotiator said: “Similar policy announcements wereneibu (for limited distribution) in the past.”

China’s trade policies may look a little uglier than WTO members had hoped when they opened the club’s doors ten years ago. But that is partly because the lights have been turned on.

2011年09月19日 06:09 AM

Lex_China and the WTO: a good thing

Lex

字号

背景

中文评论[18条]打印电邮收藏腾讯微博新浪微博

It is exactly 10 years since China concluded negotiations to join the World Trade Organisation, after a decade and a half of demurring. Commerce minister Chen Deming chaired a celebratory forum in Xiamen this week entitled “Openness, co-operation and win-win”.

Not quite. Yes, China is co-operating. After a diffident start, it has evolved from a passive taker of the existing rules to a member that will “shake” the rules for its own interests or even make new ones, notes Henry Gao of Singapore Management University. That is a good thing. And if “openness” implies compliance with the commitments China made in its accession package, here, too, the record is broadly positive.

Granted, China is better at complying with rules that require a specific action, such as scrapping or reducing tariffs, than those that require adherence to principles, such as not favouring domestic enterprises, or treating all WTO members equally. No nation has entered into bilateral trade agreements over the past 10 years quite as enthusiastically as China.

As for “win-win”, well, China is certainly winning. In 2000 it was the world’s seventh largest exporter and eighth largest importer of merchandise; in 2010 it was number one and two, respectively. (It has leapt to four and three in services, from 10 and 12.) As ING points out, accession to the WTO marked an acceleration of real annual gross domestic product growth from 9 per cent (1992-2001) to 11 per cent (2002-2008). Two-way trade for most nations in China’s orbit has also risen dramatically. But, as America’s increasingly critical assessments of China’s WTO compliance suggests, those trading partners do not always feel like winners. During its relatively brief membership, the world’s second-largest economy has responded to 22 complaints – more than the next three put together.

European Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation 2012/2013

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Wed, 21 Mar 2012 16:14:00 +0000

Dear Friends,

The European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC) is proud to launch the 16th edition of its European Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation (E.MA) 2012/2013.

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While studying in a multicultural environment, students have the opportunity to share knowledge and skills with leading academics, representing the 41 European universities participating in the programme, as well as officials of international organisations (including the European Union, the United Nations and the Council of Europe), NGO experts and human rights activists.

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EIUC
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www.eiuc.org

The other shoe has finally dropped: now MOFCOM can have a better sleep

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Wed, 14 Mar 2012 06:01:00 +0000

Fight against China on rare earths - FT.com:

'via Blog this'

AFP: China's reality lost in translation, Davos told

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sat, 28 Jan 2012 13:53:00 +0000

AFP: China's reality lost in translation, Davos told:

'via Blog this'

Another paper in Top Ten on SSRN

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 13:39:00 +0000

In addition to my paper on China and global trade governance, which has stayed in the Top Ten list of SSRN for more than a month in a row, my paper on Google's possible WTO case against China has also been listed in the Top Ten. As I mentioned in my earlier post, my paper on the Google case was written long before the recent USTR request for info from China. The recent USTR move has made the case different from the previous one, but many of the arguments in my paper still holds. Enjoy the paper!

Google's China Problem is now USTR's China problem

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sun, 25 Dec 2011 13:26:00 +0000

I just posted on SSRN my recently published paper on a possible WTO case against China's internet censorship regime. I first wrote this article in 2010 in the wake of the Google controversy when I was invited to speak at the World Trade Forum 2010.My conclusion in the article was that a WTO case is unlikely to succeed if we only consider Google's problems. That's probably why the USTR reportedly turned down Google's request for a WTO case against China last year. However, the USTR has changed strategy by shifting its focus to some wider issues, which seems to have higher chance of success.

Will we see an "internet freedom" case in WTO against China next year?

My Paper Makes SSRN Top Ten List

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sat, 24 Dec 2011 15:57:00 +0000

I was informed that my paper on China's Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker, and Maybe Rule Maker? just made SSRN Top Ten List. Interested readers can download the paper here.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: management@ssrn.com <management@ssrn.com>
Date: Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 11:38 PM
Subject: Your Paper Makes SSRN Top Ten List
To: gaohenry@gmail.com

Dear Henry S. Gao:

Your paper, "CHINA'S ASCENT IN GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: FROM RULE TAKER TO RULE SHAKER, AND MAYBE RULE MAKER?", was recently listed on SSRN's Top Ten download list for Asian Law eJournal. As of 12/24/2011, your paper has been downloaded 42 times. You may view the abstract and download statistics at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1941771.

Top Ten Lists are updated on a daily basis. Click on the following link to view the Top Ten list for the journal Asian Law eJournal Top Ten.

Click on the following link to view all the papers in the journal Asian Law eJournal All Papers.

To view any of the Top Downloaded lists, click the "i" information icon on any network, subnetwork, journal or topic in the Browse list reachable through the following link: http://www.ssrn.com/Browse

Your paper may be listed in the Top Ten for other networks or journals and, if so, you will receive additional notices at that time.

If you have any questions regarding this notification or any other matter, please email AuthorSupport@SSRN.com or call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435 toll free). Outside of the United States, call +1 585 442 8170.

SSRN Announcement:
SSRN has again been named the Number 1 Open Access Repository in the World (for January, 2011) by the Ranking Web of World Repositories (http://repositories.webometrics.info/toprep.asp). Our thanks to all of the SSRN authors who helped make this happen.

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Search the SSRN eLibrary | Browse SSRN | Top Papers

China: A Decade in the WTO

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sun, 18 Dec 2011 15:35:00 +0000

A Decade in the WTO

China's White Paper on Foreign Trade Policy

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sat, 10 Dec 2011 15:05:00 +0000

The Chinese government issued its first White Paper on Foreign Trade Policy. There are some interesting paragraphs on China's trade balance and its partition in the WTO.

四、促进对外贸易基本平衡增长

一个国家对外贸易是顺差还是逆差，主要由其经济结构以及产品或服务的国际竞争力决定。中国并不刻意追求对外贸易的顺差。中国服务贸易长期以来一直存在一定逆差。中国货物贸易在１９９０年以前多数年份都是逆差。１９９０年以后，随着大规模承接国际产业转移，工业制成品竞争力增强，出口增长速度超过进口，中国的货物贸易由总体逆差转变为总体顺差。２００５年中国货物贸易顺差首次突破１０００亿美元，并持续４年大幅攀升。２００８年中国货物贸易顺差达到２９８１亿美元历史高点，此后逐渐收窄。２００９年和２０１０年，中国货物贸易顺差分别为１９５７亿美元和１８１６亿美元，比上年分别下降３４．４％和７．２％。２０１０年，中国货物贸易顺差占进出口总额的６．１％，占国内生产总值的３．１％。在全球贸易差额（顺差或逆差）最大的９个国家中，中国的这两个比值并不处在偏高水平。

图表：表2.2010年货物贸易差额最大的9个国家比较新华社发

中国的货物贸易顺差反映了现阶段中国的国际分工地位。中国目前在工业制成品加工组装环节具有较大优势，是最大的工业品生产国和出口国。美国、欧盟等是最主要的终端消费市场。由于大量劳动密集型加工组装环节由日本、韩国、新加坡、中国台湾、中国香港等转移到中国，这些国家和地区原来对美、欧的顺差也转移到中国。其结果是，目前中国货物贸易顺差主要存在于中美贸易、中欧贸易之间，而中国与日本、韩国、东盟等工业中间品主要生产国则长期存在贸易逆差。２０１０年，中国对美国、欧盟的货物贸易顺差分别为１８１３亿美元和１４２８亿美元，对日本、韩国及东盟的货物贸易逆差共计１４１６亿美元；中国大陆对台湾地区货物贸易逆差８６０亿美元。中国生产和出口工业制成品需要大量进口初级产品，因此与一些初级产品出口国的货物贸易呈现逆差。正是现阶段中国制造业和服务业参与国际分工的水平和地位不同，所以中国货物贸易存在着大量顺差，而服务贸易则长期逆差。

图表：图5.2006-2010年中国对主要贸易伙伴顺差及逆差情况新华社发

中国的货物贸易顺差主要来源于外商投资企业和加工贸易。在经济全球化不断深化过程中，由于分工的细化和规模经济的要求，越来越多的国际贸易由跨国公司主导，是基于价值链分工的产业内贸易或加工贸易。改革开放以来，中国吸收外商直接投资迅速增长。在相当长的时间里，外商投资企业进出口和主要由外商投资企业经营的加工贸易在中国货物贸易中的比重都保持在50％左右。外商投资企业进出口和加工贸易是中国货物贸易顺差的主要来源。2009年和2010年，外商投资企业货物贸易顺差分别为1270亿美元和1243亿美元，占同期中国货物贸易顺差总额的64.8％和68.4％，加工贸易顺差分别高达2646亿美元和3229亿美元，大大高于同期中国顺差总额。在外商投资企业进出口和加工贸易存在大量顺差的同时，国有企业进出口、一般贸易和其他贸易方式则存在逆差。

发达国家对部分高新技术贸易设限也影响中国与一些贸易伙伴的贸易平衡。中国正处在工业化加速发展时期，对发达国家的先进设备和高新技术有着较大的进口需求。但是一些发达国家却仍然坚持旧有思维，对向中国出口高端装备和高新技术产品设置了诸多限制，导致其相关产品对中国出口增长缓慢。这在一定程度上阻碍了中国自这些国家的进口，不利于双边贸易的平衡。

中国货物贸易由逆差转变为顺差改善了中国的国际收支状况，增强了中国抵御外部风险的能力。但是顺差急剧扩大也给中国经济带来困扰。出口结汇人民币大量投放增加了宏观经济调控的难度和复杂性。货物贸易顺差急剧扩大还使得中国与一些贸易伙伴摩擦增多，对人民币形成了持续和较大的升值压力。

中国政府高度重视对外贸易发展中的不平衡问题，采取了一系列政策措施抑制顺差过快增长。第一，积极调整经济结构，努力扩大内需，尤其是增加改善民生投资，刺激居民消费增长。第二，出台一系列扩大进口政策，简化进口管理和进口付汇手续，降低部分商品进口暂定税率，完善进口促进体系，提高进口便利化程度。第三，调整出口退税政策，先后降低或取消部分高耗能、高污染和资源性商品的出口退税。第四，修改加工贸易禁止类和限制类目录，扩大禁止类的范围，促进加工贸易转型升级。第五，改变自亚洲金融危机以后人民币兑美元变动区间收窄的状况，从2005年7月21日起实行以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度。自2005年7月汇率机制改革至2011年8月末，人民币兑美元名义汇率升值了约30％。

中国促进对外贸易平衡增长的措施取得了明显成效。货物贸易顺差自2009年以来持续减少，顺差与进出口总值和国内生产总值之比自2008年起逐渐下降，对外贸易正在趋于平衡。中国的这些努力既是中国自身经济发展的需要，也是推动世界经济结构调整和再平衡的具体行动。

五、构建全方位互利合作经贸关系

中国的对外贸易是全方位发展的对外贸易。中国坚持不分大小、贫富，与所有贸易伙伴发展务实合作和互利共赢的经贸关系。

中国与发达国家贸易持续稳定增长，实现了优势互补和互惠互利。中国与欧盟贸易近年来稳步发展。欧盟对中国出口商品主要是工业制成品，其中技术领先的机械、电子产品、运输车辆、成套设备、核心零部件和精密元器件等在中国市场颇具竞争力。中国与美国贸易有着坚实的发展基础。中国出口丰富多样的消费品适应了美国消费者的需求，同时不断扩大自美国的电子、航空、生物、医药、农产品以及服务贸易进口，也满足了中国自身发展的需要。中国与日本贸易具有地缘相近的有利条件。中日贸易促进了两国产业的持续合作和进步，也带动了东亚区域经济分工与合作的深入发展。中国与加拿大、澳大利亚、瑞士、新西兰等发达国家的贸易及投资合作均保持良好发展势头。

中国与新兴市场和发展中国家贸易增长强劲，发展潜力巨大。2010年，中国与东盟自由贸易协定全面实施，90％的商品实现零关税，有力地推动了中国东盟双边贸易迅速增长。中国与东盟各自有特色和竞争力的商品自由进入对方市场，适应了双方多方面的需求。中国与韩国贸易保持持续稳定增长，两国相互投资和经济合作领域十分宽广。中国与其他金砖国家的贸易近年来快速增长，带动了各自优势产业的强劲发展，显示了新兴经济市场具有广阔的发展前景。近年来，中国与其他发展中国家贸易也以较快速度增长，与阿拉伯国家源远流长的贸易进一步发展，与拉美国家经济贸易合作领域不断拓宽，与非洲国家的贸易充分发挥双方资源条件和经济结构的互补性优势，促进了各自发展。

中国十分重视双边和区域经贸合作的机制化建设。目前与中国签订双边贸易协定或经济合作协定的国家和地区已超过150个。中国与美、欧、日、英、俄等主要经济体均建立和保持着经济高层对话机制。中国积极参与亚太经济合作组织、东盟与中日韩(10＋3)领导人会议、东亚峰会、中非合作论坛、大湄公河次区域经济合作、中亚区域经济合作、“大图们倡议”等区域和次区域经济合作机制。中国坚持“与邻为善、以邻为伴”方针，与周边国家和地区建立和发展多种形式的边境经济贸易合作。

中国积极主动参与并推动区域经济一体化进程。截至2010年底，中国已经与五大洲28个国家和地区进行了15个自由贸易安排或紧密经贸关系安排谈判，签订和实施了10个自由贸易协定或紧密经贸关系安排。正在进行的自由贸易协定谈判5个。中国倡议建立东亚自由贸易区。2010年，中国与10个自由贸易协定或紧密经贸关系安排伙伴(东盟、巴基斯坦、智利、新加坡、新西兰、秘鲁、哥斯达黎加、中国香港、中国澳门、中国台湾)的双边货物贸易总额达到7826亿美元，超过了中国进出口总额的四分之一。

中国深入参与和推动世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判，努力维护多边贸易体制的权威性。中国强调谈判要有利于贯彻落实多边贸易体制的公平、公正原则，体现多哈回合作为发展回合的目标。中国全面参与了多哈回合的农业、非农产品、服务、规则等议题的谈判，独立提交谈判案文40多份，联合其他成员提交案文100多份。为推进多哈回合谈判，中国多次表示愿意为谈判作出建设性的、与自身发展水平相适应的贡献。

中国在解决与贸易伙伴的争议时兼顾各方利益，求同存异。加入世界贸易组织以来，随着进出口持续增长，中国与贸易伙伴的争端和摩擦有所增多。涉案产品主要集中在纺织品、鞋类、轮胎、汽车零部件、钢铁和化工产品，争议问题主要涉及知识产权、贸易平衡、公平贸易、食品安全、环境保护等领域。中国始终认为对话比对抗好，合作比施压好，应当努力通过协商谈判解决贸易伙伴之间的争议。中国坚持兼顾和平衡各方利益，在世界贸易组织规则和体制内，利用多双边渠道，通过对话、协商和谈判来解决争议。近年来，中国在扩大市场开放、保护知识产权、促进贸易平衡、改革人民币汇率形成机制、规范进出口经营秩序等方面采取了许多措施，充分照顾到贸易伙伴的关切。在协商不能解决争端的情况下，中国通过世界贸易组织争端解决机制，妥善处理与贸易伙伴的贸易争端，维护了多边贸易体制的稳定。

If you don't believe in the 2012 myth, do you believe in the 2016 myth?

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Wed, 30 Nov 2011 10:53:00 +0000

I've been asked by a colleague to comment on this post by Bernard O'Connor at VoxEU. In the post, he claims that the view that China will automatically get market economy status (MES) after 2016 is "an urban myth that seems to have gone global. It has gone viral even in a world were the underlying agreements are freely available to all on the Internet."

His key message is this:

"The 2016 myth seems to have been born in paragraph (d) of Article 15. This paragraph provides that China must establish whether it is a market economy according to the law of the importing WTO member. If it can establish that it is a market economy then some of the transitional provisions on comparison methodologies will terminate. However, there are no dates in relation to China establishing that it is a market economy.

The paragraph further provides that one specific comparison methodology set out in one subparagraph of the Article will expire, in any event, fifteen years after Chinese accession. China became a WTO member in Doha in December 2001. Add fifteen years and you get 2016.

This provision does not say that China will get market-economy status. It just says that a very specific provision of Article 15 will cease to apply. The other parts of Article 15 continue to apply. And to interpret the expiry of one subparagraph as a deadline for the granting of market-economy status is not only to read into the Article something that is not there, but it is also to negate all the other provisions, something that international treaty interpretation simply does not allow. The expiry of one subparagraph does not change the rest of the law."

This is what Art 15 of China's Accession Protocol says:

"Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") and the SCM Agreement shall apply in proceedings involving imports of Chinese origin into a WTO Member consistent with the following:

(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the following rules:

(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that product, the importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation in determining price comparability;

(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product.

(b) In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM Agreement, when addressing subsidies described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement shall apply; however, if there are special difficulties in that application, the importing WTO Member may then use methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit which take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks. In applying such methodologies, where practicable, the importing WTO Member should adjust such prevailing terms and conditions before considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside China.

(c) The importing WTO Member shall notify methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph (a) to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices and shall notify methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph (b) to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

(d) Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector."

Basically, para (a) contains 2 scenarios:
i. if producers can prove market economy conditions, then the importing country has to use China's own costs;
ii. if the producers cannot prove market economy conditions, then the investigating authority may use a surrogate price, say price in India or Singapore.

By stating that "the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession", para (d) basically states that (a.ii) will not apply after 2016. Instead, only (a.i) will apply, which means that the investigating authorities have to use China;s own costs NO MATTER WHETHER the producers can prove market economy conditions. THIS MEANS CHINA WILL GET MARKET ECONOMY STATUS POST 2016.

Of course, O'Connor is technically correct as Art 15 NEVER EXPLICITLY state that WTO Members have to GRANT China market economy status. Instead, it only states that they MAY NOT CONTINUE TO APPLY THE NON-MARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY post 2016. O'Connor's theory could be correct is there are 3 possibilities, i.e., ME, NME, & something else. Is there a "something else" category? No. Because para (a) only list 2 scenarios, i.e, (i) & (ii). Furthermore, para (a) starts by stating that the importing WTO Member shall use "either Chinese prices OR [the NME] methodology". Thus, there are ONLY TWO scenarios. By excluding the NME scenario through para (d), the only conclusion we can draw is that China will be treated as a ME post 2016.

O'Connor further states that "to interpret the expiry of one subparagraph as a deadline for the granting of market-economy status is not only to read into the Article something that is not there, but it is also to negate all the other provisions, something that international treaty interpretation simply does not allow. The expiry of one subparagraph does not change the rest of the law." My responses are:

1. Technically speaking, the EU can still refuse to grant China MES post 2016. However, doing that would be in violation of EU's WTO obligations, as Art 15(d) has expired, and the EU cannot continue to use it as justification for refusal to grant China MES.

2. The EU might cite to the 2nd supplementary provision to para 1 of GATT Art. VI as the basis for its denial of MES to China, but this provision requires the exporting country to have "a COMPLETE or substantial complete monopoly of its trade AND where ALL domestic prices are fixed by the State". This has not been the case in China since the mid-90s, and it is unlikely that it will be the case in 2016. Thus EU cannot cite this article.

3. In essence, while I agree with O'Connor that the expiry of this provision doesn't mandate the granting of MES to China by the EU, I do not agree that this means that China shall not be treated as a ME post 2016. The truth is that, whether the EU grants MES or not post 2016, the EU IS OBLIGED to treat China as a ME, otherwise it will be found in violation of its WTO obligation. While O'Connor is technically correct by stating that "to interpret the expiry of one subparagraph as a deadline for the granting of market-economy status is ... to read into the Article something that is not there", by refusing to acknowledge the de facto (and de jure as well) automatic MES China is entitled to post 2016, he made an even bigger mistake by "omitting something which is there" or failing to interpret the treaty language in its ordinary meaning and proper context.

4. O'Conner also claims that the interpretation of automatic MES post 2016 "negates all the other provisions" and attempts to "change the rest of the law". Again this claim is flawed because the other paras in Art 15 DO NOT MENTION the NME issue and thus are IRRELEVANT TO THE QUESTION. For example, if I say:

I. The sun has different temperatures in a day:
a. it is hot in the daytime
b. it is cold in the nighttime
II. The sun is big
III. The sun is round.

If we discover that I.b is wrong because the sun is hot even in the night, how can you say that II and III has also been negated by the discovery of this mistake?

RTAs: do they matter?

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sun, 27 Mar 2011 13:57:00 +0000

Theresa Carpenter & Andreas Lendle posted an interesting article on preferential trade agreements (PTAs) at VoxEU. The question they are trying to answer is: we all know that PTAs are annoying for the multilateral trading system, but do they matter in reality?

The answers are:

1. They don't matter for the big guys. According to them, for the top 20 importers in 2008, which accounts for almost 90% of world trade, only 16% of the trade is conducted on a preferential basis. Personally I don't think this to be a surprising result for the following reasons:

A. Much of world trade is already trading at very low or zero tariff rates (noted in their paper);

B. There're typically no PTAs among the big players (with the exception of NAFTA and intra-EU trade).

2. They matter a lot for the small players. According to their study, the 25 countries that receive the highest preferential margins on their exports are mostly African, Caribbean and Pacific countries who export items with high MFN tariffs duty-free to the EU (and to a lesser extent to the US).

Tow lessons we can draw from the study:

1. For smaller countries, multilateral trade negotiation at the WTO doesn't mean much, at least with regard to market access;

2. For big countries, their optimal strategy should be multilateralism rather than regionalism. But why do we still see all these aggressive PTA pushes from the big players? Mainly due to the lobbying from industries which are A. particularly affected by high tariffs in a few sectors (textiles, etc); B. more concerned with rules/regulatory issues rather than MA issues (IPR, etc).

New book: WTO Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Wed, 19 Jan 2011 05:49:00 +0000

Dispute Settlement at the WTO:

The Developing Country Experience

edited by

Gregory C. Shaffer and Ricardo Meléndez Ortiz

The book provides a bottom-up assessment of the strategies that individual developing countries have developed to enhance their ability to make use of WTO dispute settlement. The nine country studies cover Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Egypt, South Africa and Kenya. The publication concludes with a comprehensive list of recommendations.

Excerpts, reviews and a video interview are available here

To purchase a book please click here

For further information please contact Marie Wilke at mwilke@ictsd.ch

Chinese Professor - from Citizens Against Government Waste

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 07:54:00 +0000

This is really impressive! It would be interesting to see a similar commercial on China in trade negotiations.

Another WTO dispute looming against China?

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Fri, 08 Oct 2010 12:26:00 +0000

While foreign companies have long complained against China's indigenous innovation strategy, the USTR has tried to be patient on the issue. However, the wind might be changing with this new article in the Foreign Affairs.

STRATEGI CHINA DALAM FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: PERTARUNGAN POLITIS ATAS NAMA PERDAGANGAN

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Mon, 20 Sep 2010 14:14:00 +0000

My article on China's FTA strategy has been translated into Indonesian. Interested readers can find the Indonesian version here.

How difficult is it to get Visa into China?

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Fri, 17 Sep 2010 15:09:00 +0000

The USTR has just announced two cases filed against China in the WTO. One of them concerns the long-standing dispute between Visa and Union Pay. Another interesting case to watch.

Chinese version of the USTR established

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Thu, 19 Aug 2010 13:38:00 +0000

The MOFCOM has established a new post: China International Trade Representative, which will be responsible for conducting bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. The rank of the post is at full ministerial level, and will be held by a Vice Minister of MOFCOM. The current Representative is Vice Minister Gao Hucheng.

中央批准设立国际贸易谈判代表明确为正部长级

2010年08月16日16:31 来源：中国共产党新闻网

　　中国共产党新闻网北京8月16日电（记者董宇）今日，记者从商务部网站上获悉，经中央批准，商务部设立国际贸易谈判代表（正部长级，兼任商务部副部长）1名、副部长级国际贸易谈判副代表2名（其中1名由商务部副部长兼任）。日前，国务院任命高虎城为商务部国际贸易谈判代表（正部长级），钟山兼任商务部国际贸易谈判副代表，崇泉为商务部国际贸易谈判副代表（副部长级）。

　　根据中央机构编制委员会办公室的有关批复，国际贸易谈判代表（“China International Trade Representative”）主要职责是：根据国务院授权，负责对外经济贸易领域的重大多、双边谈判工作，协调国内谈判立场并签署有关文件。国际贸易谈判副代表协助国际贸易谈判代表工作。

　　根据《国务院办公厅关于印发商务部主要职责内设机构和人员编制规定的通知》（国办发[2008]77号）有关“商务部在对外谈判和国内协调时使用国际贸易谈判代表办公室名义”及中央编办相关规定，商务部将同时启用“国际贸易谈判代表办公室”名义，对外开展工作。

　　据商务部网站上刊登的简历显示，高虎城于2003年11月任商务部副部长、党组成员，2009年4月至2010年7月任商务部副部长、党组副书记，今7月起任商务部国际贸易谈判代表（正部长级）兼副部长、党组副书记。钟山和崇泉两位商务部国际贸易谈判副代表（副部长级）此前分别担任任商务部副部长和部长助理职务。

Minister Chen in FT

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 13:48:00 +0000

Minister Chen Deming of MOFCOM recently published an op-ed piece in the FT. This is apparently in response to the earlier criticisms against China's indigenous innovation policies (which has been changed) and its offer in the GPA accession negotiation, which has been perceived as insufficient.

商务部部长陈德铭在英国《金融时报》上发表署名文章：繁荣的中国将更加开放

2010-07-28 15:21 文章来源：商务部新闻办公室
文章类型：原创内容分类：新闻

　　近日，商务部部长陈德铭在英国《金融时报》上发表署名文章《繁荣的中国将更加开放》（英文标题为"Thriving China is ever more open for business"），全文如下：

Thriving China is ever more open for business

　　For the last year, China has expanded domestic demand and worked to attract foreign investment, contributing to the global recovery. However, concerns have recently been floated, not least among foreign businesses, that China is now less welcoming of foreign investment. In fact, China will open wider in the future.

　　China has kept its market open throughout the financial crisis. In late 2008, we adopted a Rmb4,000bn stimulus package, along with readjustment programs in sectors such as information communication technology, logistics and equipment manufacturing. Companies have followed strict tender rules to ensure a level playing field for all businesses – Chinese or foreign. In 2009, of 12,439 tenders for procurement of electromechanical products, 55 per cent went to foreign investment enterprises.

　　Over the last three decades, foreign direct investment has brought capital, advanced technologies and business know-how to China. We understand that FDI fosters innovation. That is why, in April, we held a public consultation to review the criteria we use to accredit "innovation products". The results emphasized that all foreign enterprises are given equal treatment and that all their products are considered to be "made in China", while the same rules of origin are applied to them as to Chinese products.

　　Since joining the World Trade Organization, China has continually lowered the entry threshold for foreign investment. We have revised our catalogue for the guidance of foreign investment industries – the official list of industries in which FDI is encouraged or restricted – four times since 1997. Each time we have provided greater market access. Writers such as Thomas Friedman, author of The World Is Flat, and Robert Shapiro, former US undersecretary of commerce under President Bill Clinton, have spoken highly of our efforts to open up.

　　China remains a top destination for investment by multinational companies, particularly in services and outsourcing. In 2009, global FDI dropped by nearly 40 per cent, but investment into China fell by only 2.6 per cent. Reacting to worries in the west, China has also strengthened intellectual property protection with new laws and a "double-track" system of administrative and criminal enforcement.

Crisis-hit multinationals have found new sources of profit growth in China. In 2009, General Motors filed for bankruptcy in the US, but its sales in China grew by 67 per cent. It sold more than 1m vehicles in China in the first five months of this year, meeting half of its 2010 target of 2m ahead of schedule. Siemens will invest €1bn ($1.29bn, £843m) in the next three years, with Volkswagen adding €1.6bn by 2011. In 2010, there were 690,000 registered foreign companies in China, investing more than $1,000bn.

　　These companies drive growth abroad through their Chinese operations. They create valuable trade surpluses for neighbouring countries by importing intermediate goods, and create jobs in developed countries by buying capital goods and services.

　　Such growth will continue as China expands its internal market. Sales of consumer goods rose in 2009 to Rmb12,530bn, contributing more than half of gross domestic product. This year China's domestic market will grow by Rmb2,000bn ($295bn, £193bn, €229bn), outstripping exports. The US is set to gain in particular. The independent American Chamber of Commerce in China recently published a report arguing that in the next 30 years the US can achieve "three trillion-dollar goals": $1,000bn for annual US exports to China, $1,000bn for revenues of US businesses in China producing goods and services for the Chinese market, and $1,000bn for cumulative Chinese FDI in the US.

　　Coming out of crisis, China must now work to upgrade its own industries in areas such as high-end manufacturing and environmental goods and services. To do this, China wants to make better use of the knowledge and expertise of multinationals. German carmaker Daimler's success in forming a joint venture in China to develop next-generation electric vehicles is only one example of how more foreign investment can help.

　　The world economy is at a crucial stage of restructuring. As China works with others to push the global recovery, tremendous opportunities will open up for foreign companies. China remains open for business, and the rest of the world can benefit.

繁荣的中国将更加开放

　　过去一年多来，中国政府努力扩大国内消费，积极吸收外商来华投资，为世界经济复苏做出了贡献。然而，近来出现了一些担忧，特别是在外企中间，认为中国不再像以前那样重视和欢迎外资了。事实上，中国今后将更加开放，中国市场的大门始终对外资敞开。

　　在金融危机期间，中国政府坚持对外开放政策不动摇。2008年末，我们推出了规模为4万亿的一揽子刺激方案，同时启动了电子信息业、物流、装备制造等产业的调整和振兴规划。在一些重点领域投资和建设项目招标过程中，我们为所有企业（不管是中国企业还是外国企业）创造公平的竞争环境。例如，在2009年中国开展的12439个机电产品国际招标采购项目中，外资企业中标数占项目总数的55.4%。

　　30多年来，外商直接投资的引入不仅带来了资金，更带来了先进的技术设备、管理和经营理念，有力地促进了中国经济制度、技术和管理创新。正因如此，我们在今年4月公开征求意见，对"自主创新"产品的认定标准进行了调整，上述结果说明，所有外国企业都得到了一视同仁的对待，他们的产品被视为"中国制造"，和中国企业的产品适用同样的原产地规则。

　　自从加入世界贸易组织以来，中国不断降低外资准入门槛。1997年以来，我们4次修订《外商投资产业指导目录》——该目录是鼓励或限制外国直接投资进入的行业的官方名录，每次修订我们都会进一步扩大市场准入范围。《世界是平的》一书的作者托马斯•弗里德曼，以及曾在美国总统比尔•克林顿时期担任商务部副部长的罗伯特•夏皮罗等众多专家均高度肯定中国的对外开放。

　　目前，中国仍是跨国公司投资的首选目的地，特别是在服务业和外包行业。2009年，全球外国直接投资下降近40%，但对华投资仅下降2.6%。作为对西方担忧的回应，中国不断加大保护知识产权力度，制定了一系列比较完整、在世界上也比较先进的保护知识产权法律体系和行政执法、刑事执法双轨的执法机制。

　　在危机中遭遇巨大冲击的跨国公司，在中国找到了新的发展空间和增长点。2009年，通用汽车在美国申请破产，但该公司在华销售却增长了67%。今年头5个月，该公司在华销量超过100万辆，提前完成了今年目标（200万辆）的一半。西门子计划未来三年在华投资10亿欧元（合12.9亿美元)，而2011年之前，大众将在华追加16亿欧元的投资。截至今年5月底，在华注册外资企业数量累计近69万家，实际利用外资总额超过了1万亿美元。

　　这些跨国公司通过在华经营带动了其海外发展，同时也通过大量的中间品进口为周边国家和地区创造了贸易顺差，通过资本品、奢侈品和服务贸易进口为发达国家创造了大量的就业机会。

　　随着中国扩大其国内市场，这种增长势头仍将继续。中国2009年实现社会消费品零售总额12.53万亿元人民币，对国内生产总值的贡献率达到50%以上。今年，预计今年国内市场规模将超过2万亿美元，远远超出中国的出口总额。美国将肯定从中获益。中国美国商会日前发布报告称，在未来30年的中美关系中，美国可以实现"三个1万亿"目标，即美国对华商品和服务年出口额1万亿美元、美国企业在华产值1万亿美元和中国对美累计投资1万亿美元。

　　在走出危机的同时，中国必须致力于自身的产业结构调整和升级，积极发展高端制造业以及环境产品和服务等领域。中国政府希望继续发挥跨国公司在这些领域的人才、技术、管理优势，促进中国加快转变经济发展方式。近日德国戴姆勒公司在华设立合资企业开发新一代电动汽车，这是外国投资将在中国发挥更大作用的一个很好例证。

　　世界经济正处在结构深化调整的关键时期。随着中国与其它国家共同推动全球复苏，将会给外国企业带来巨大的商机。中国将继续坚持对外开放，全球其它国家将因此受益。

In Remembrance of Mr. S. Tiwari, 20 Dec 1945 – 26 Jul 2010

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Wed, 28 Jul 2010 08:02:00 +0000

Mr Sivakant Tiwari, a former senior official in the Singapore government, passed away on July 26. He had a long and interesting career, which included drafting the TRIPS Agreement during the Uruguay Round (hammering our details on difficult issues such as compulsory licensing and parallel imports), working on the establishment of diplomatic relations with PRC (trying to find language that is acceptable to both China and Taiwan, a long-time friend of Singapore), negotiating the Singapore-US FTA (again IPR issues became key), working on the Pedra Branca case at the ICJ, and last but certainly not least, working as a Panelist in the China - IPR case.

More info about Mr. Tiwari, including tributes to Mr. Tiwari by Senior Minister Prof. S. Jayakumar and Prof Tommy Koh, can be found at the website of the Centre for International Law of NUS.

MOFCOM statement on WTO Honor Day at Shanghai Expo

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Fri, 23 Jul 2010 08:03:00 +0000

On the occasion of the "WTO Honor Day" at the Shanghai Expo 2010, MOFCOM issued a statement on "China and WTO: Retrospect and Prospect". Part 3 includes some interesting info on China's participation in the DDA:

三、中国积极推动多哈谈判，全面参与WTO各项活动

　　多哈回合谈判是WTO发起的第九轮多边贸易谈判，是迄今涉及范围最广、参加成员最多的一轮谈判，其成功将有助于创造更加开放、公平的国际贸易环境、推动世界经济的复苏和可持续增长。

　　中国始终积极推动多哈谈判，与世贸组织所有成员一道，密切合作，推动谈判取得公平、平衡的结果，实现发展目标。中国积极参与了世界贸易组织部长级和高官级的谈判和磋商，举办了2005年大连WTO小型部长会，在同年12月香港举行的WTO第六届部长会上发挥了桥梁作用。在2008年7月小型部长会上，中国受邀参与"七方"（G7）部长小范围磋商，首次进入多边贸易谈判核心决策圈。中国从大局出发，努力弥合各方分歧，始终不放弃推动谈判达成共识的努力。虽然谈判最终破裂，但中国所发挥的作用有目共睹。2009年，为打破僵局，推动谈判。中国及时提出"尊重授权，锁定成果，多边谈判为基础"的三项谈判原则，得到了大多数成员的认可和支持，并体现在二十国集团峰会宣言中。2009年底的WTO第七届部长级会议上，中国呼吁改善和加强以世界贸易组织为代表的多边贸易体制，推动成员共同向世界发出"开放、前行、改革"的积极信号。

　　中国全面参与各个领域的谈判，提交了100多份提案，在技术层面为推动谈判做出了实质性贡献，并做出了实质性的关税削减承诺，按照目前谈判达成的结果，中国的农业和工业品的关税将削减30%左右；中国的服务业部门也做出了一些新的开放承诺。

　　在贸易政策审议方面，中国加入WTO九年来，分别于2006、2008和2010年接受了WTO的三次贸易政策审议，回答了60余个成员提出的近3700个问题。通过审议，展示了中国坚定实行开放的经贸政策，参与多边贸易体制的负责大国形象。

　　在发展方面，中国积极响应WTO"促贸援助"倡议，多次向促贸援助框架下的多哈发展议程全球信托基金进行捐助，帮助其他发展中成员，特别是最不发达成员，从多边贸易体制中全面获益，并更好地融入世界经济。

　　中国一贯遵守WTO规则和加入WTO承诺，并积极通过WTO争端解决机制化解与成员间的贸易争端。按照事项统计，中国加入世贸组织以来，起诉案件有7起，被诉案件有8起。中方愿意与其他WTO成员一道，维护多边贸易体制的严肃性和权威性。

　　中国还积极支持WTO机制建设，先后向WTO推荐了上诉机构成员人选以及相关委员会主席人选，支持WTO能力建设活动，多次为促贸援助捐款，支持最不发达国家提高参与多边贸易体制的能力，还为越南、老挝、白俄罗斯等正在加入WTO的国家提供了官员培训等。

　　加入WTO九年的历程再次证明加入世贸组织决策是符合中国国情的，是高瞻远瞩的历史性决策。中国有效利用世贸组织这个多边舞台，抓住经济全球化的历史机遇，成为发展中国家积极融入全球化进程的一个典范。中国负责守信地履行承诺，积极为加强多边贸易体制做贡献，不仅为自身的经济社会发展注入了强大的活力，也赢得了世贸组织成员和国际社会的广泛肯定和赞赏。

The WTO gets lyrical

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Fri, 23 Jul 2010 07:42:00 +0000

The WTO has just posted an invitation to take part in the poetry competition "The WTO: A Vision in Verse". I'm not sure how many young poetic minds end up in the WTO Secretariat or trade ministries, but many anti-WTO protesters are certainly masters in creating slogans, poems, posters and live shows. Now it's the time for the aspiring poets at Centre William Rappard to fight back.

Pro-tradians of all countries, unite!

The WTO Speaks (in Double Speak)

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Thu, 03 Jun 2010 16:33:00 +0000

In a keynote speech to the World Input-Output Database Conference in Vienna on 26 May 2010, DDG Alejandro Jara spoke in defense of China. Here are a few punch lines from his interesting speech:

Nowadays, in international trade of manufactures, what you see is no longer what you get: the label "made in ... " can be misleading. Let's take for example the new gadget launched by Apple, the iPad. According to a recent report, the imported cost of a mid-range iPad imported from China into the US is about US$ 290. But the Chinese content is only 5 per cent of the commercial value registered by customs, while most of the electronic content actually comes from South Korea, Japan and the US while batteries are manufactured in Honk Kong, China, by a Japanese company.

......

Trade in tasks calls for a new measurement of international trade: The Value Added Content, or domestic content of trade. To take one of my examples, if we want to assign to each country of origin the value added imbedded in an iPad imported by the U.S. we must be able to measure how much comes from China, Japan or Korea, and, of course, from the US.

......

To illustrate the usefulness of the new global statistics that can be derived from interconnecting national productive and financial accounts, let me mention one of the most heated debated issues among economists nowadays: the rebalancing of the global economy.

The large imbalances accumulated during the 2000s are often blamed for the 2008-2009 crisis. And most analysts highlight the large bilateral imbalance between the existing super-power, the US, and the new world manufacturer, China.

But relying on conventional trade statistics gives a distorted picture of trade imbalances between countries. As we saw when looking at the Chinese content of the iPad, what counts is not the imbalances as measured by gross values of exports and imports, but how much valued added is embedded in these flows. The WTO estimate, based on IDE-Jetro data, estimates that 80 per cent of the value of the goods exported by the US had a domestic content. The comparable figure was 77 per cent in the case of Japan, 56 per cent for Korea. It was about 50 per cent for Malaysia and Chinese Taipei, meaning that half the value exported by these countries originated from other countries.

Using conventional trade statistics would overestimate the US bilateral deficit vis-à-vis China by around 30 per cent as compared to measuring in value added content based on input-out matrices. The official figures for the bilateral deficit would be cut by 50 per cent when the activity of export processing zones in China and Hong Kong, China, re-exports are fully taken into account. By the same token, measured in domestic value added content, the bilateral deficit of the US with Korea or Japan, the main providers of electronic parts in our iPad example, would increase in proportion to the reduction of the US — China deficit.
This implies also that traditional exchange rate policies won't fully help in rebalancing apparent bilateral imbalances. If the Chinese value added in US imports from China is just half its commercial value, a revaluation of the Chinese Yuan will increase the costs of Chinese goods by only half the rate of the revaluation. In the case of consumer electronics, the impact will be even less than that, and only 20 per cent of the variation in the exchange rate will pass through the price paid by importers.

This shows that, as DG Pascal Lamy said recently at the Paris School of Economics, it is time to start measuring trade in value added rather than on gross value as is the case today!

I guess DDG Jara must be holding a copy of the joint US-China Report on Statistical Discrepancy during the speech. At the same time, in its TPR Report issued on Monday, the Secretariat criticized China for its export restrictions on raw materials, an extremely rare move as the Secretariat has in general avoided commenting on on-going DS cases before the WTO.

Which one is the true voice of the WTO?

New article in the JWT on the Chinese Section 301

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sun, 30 May 2010 13:01:00 +0000

The abstract is provided below. Interested readers can find the article at http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=TRAD2010023

Henry Gao, 'Taking Justice into Your Own Hand: The TBI Mechanism in China' (2010) 44 Journal of World Trade pp. 633–659

Summary:
To protect the trade interests of their firms in foreign markets, several countries have established various institutional arrangements. For example, the United States has the section 301 procedure, while the EU has the Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR). Learning from their experiences, China also established its own Foreign Trade Barrier Investigation (TBI) mechanism in 2002. This article starts with a discussion on the background for its establishment as well as the substantive and procedural requirements for investigations under TBI. In the next part, the article discusses how TBI has worked in practice by reviewing the Japan – Quantitative Restrictions on Laver case (hereinafter 'Japan–Laver case'), the only case that has ever been brought under the mechanism. Drawing from the lessons learnt from the Japan–Laver case, the article then offers suggestions on how the TBI might be improved in the future. The article concludes with observations on the possible implications of the TBI on China's trade partners and the multilateral trading system as a whole.

Official Launch of the WTO Chairs Program in Geneva

noreply@blogger.com (Henry Gao 高树超) — Sun, 30 May 2010 12:57:00 +0000

I was in Geneva last week for the launch of the WTO Chairs Program at the WTO Secretariat. Among the 14 institutions selected, three are from Asia countries, i.e., China, Indonesia and Viet Nam. Below is the speech by Lamy at the opening ceremony.

Lamy congratulates the 14 institutions selected for the WTO Chairs Programme

At the formal launch of the WTO Chairs Programme for developing countries, held at the WTO on 25 May 2010, Director-General Pascal Lamy welcomed the chairholders from 14 universities from around the world selected to participate in the first phase of the programme. "The award of a Chair is an acknowledgement of the competence of the selected institutions and the dedication of its scholars," said Mr Lamy, as he wished them every success in developing their partnership with the WTO. This is what he said:

Good morning. I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you on the occasion of this formal launch of the WTO Chairs Programme. I should particularly like to welcome those of you from out of town, both the Chairholders from 14 universities around the world, and those members of the Advisory Board who were able to find the time to come to Geneva. It is also good to see some of the Geneva trade community here in support of their national WTO Chairholders.

As many of you know, the WTO Secretariat has been entrusted by the WTO membership to cooperate with governments in developing countries to enhance knowledge and understanding of the multilateral trading system and to facilitate more effective participation in its work. This is the raison d'être of our technical cooperation programme. Our efforts in this area have expanded considerably since the beginning of the Doha Round in 2001. We take this mandate very seriously and we are always on the lookout for ways of improving our game. We care about this because we believe that trade is an essential accompaniment of growth and development, and in order to benefit fully from the opportunities offered by trade, countries must be expert in identifying their trade interests, articulating them, and negotiating with trading partners for mutually beneficial outcomes.

For some time now, starting with our regional trade policy courses with which some of you may be familiar, we have sought partnerships with academic communities in developing countries. Since our mandate is to support governments, one might ask why, then, do we seek to work with universities? The answer is simple. We believe that the scholarly community is a source of valuable knowledge in any country. It brings to the table insights, understanding and a legitimacy that outside specialists can only partly hope to offer.

The WTO Chairs Programme, then, is an important plank of the Secretariat's strategy for academic support on capacity building, as reflected in our Technical Assistance and Training Plan. We believe in the particular contribution of national universities and research centres to the discussion and analysis of issues of public interest, including trade policy. Most governments around the world rely on those contributions and analytical capacities to formulate sound policies.

I should like to congratulate the 14 institutions that have been selected in this first phase of the programme. The award of a Chair is an acknowledgment of the competence of the selected institutions and the dedication of its scholars. It is also an encouragement to your researchers and students to take an interest in multilateral trade matters, a cornerstone of international global governance.

As you well know, trade issues by nature require a framework that takes a holistic view of the world economy. This is not only because of inter-linkages among the various sectors in any economy, but also because of the relationships between sectors in one economy and the economies of the rest of the world. Through your analytical contribution, you can help explain the workings, benefits and challenges of the trading system. Academics can help citizens understand and cope with the complexities of international business and globalization. They can also foster greater awareness and informed debate on international trade issues.

The ultimate objective of the WTO Chairs Programme is to strengthen the human and institutional capacities of universities from developing countries to support governments in the formulation of sound trade policies. The programme also seeks, through the Chairs, to support and facilitate the involvement in the process of other relevant stakeholders, such as the private sector, non-state actors and civil society. Policies that are understood and supported by the public at large are far more likely to succeed than those that are simply imposed, whether by internal or external decision-makers.

Each one of the universities selected for the programme has put forward its own work plan, specifying the intended output. I understand that you will be discussing these projects amongst yourselves over the next couple of days. The projects generally comprise a mixture of elements — increased course offerings on trade, policy-relevant research, and outreach activities aimed at raising awareness of trade-related policy issues. These are your proposals, and your projects. You own them. We are here to help, not to lead.

It is in this spirit that we have designated counterparts from the Secretariat to work with the Chairholders. It is for you, the Chairholders, to indicate what you need from us. As I have said, we stand ready to help in whatever way we can, obviously bearing in mind our own resource constraints.

We look forward to seeing progress. I believe that the first two years of the programme are crucial in terms of demonstrating to the WTO membership, and in particular the contributors to the Global Trust Fund, that this is a good way to use their resources. Some concrete output early on in the programme will serve to demonstrate the relevance of this approach, and that will be essential if we are to continue with, and expand, the programme.

Let me, finally, thank the Secretariat staff for their hard work on this programme, which was efficiently steered by Deputy Directors-General Valentine Rugwabiza and Alejandro Jara.

I wish you every success in your endeavours. Thank you for your attention.