POLiS

1984 vs 1776

2011-09-16T18:32:00.000-07:00

I have listened to enough of Alex Jones' show on Prison Planet Radio that I'm afraid I might begin to sound a lot like him. Or it may be the latter coupled with the fact that the reason his show resonates with me is because its themes are appropriate for our time.

Recently, he talked about the conflicting currents of the fictional world of George Orwell's 1984 and the revolutionary philosophy of the founders (1776), concluding that the subtle co-option of individuals and their tacit obedience to authority run contrary to the spirit of the American Revolution.

One point he so eloquently made was that the more we resign to the stripping of our constitutional rights, the less authoritarian the government would seem to us, as what used to be reprehensible would seem tolerable and acceptable, attracting less and less opposition.

If a repugnant and abusive act by a government agent provokes little or no emotion, or if many are quick to justify it, then you'll know we are already in 1984...

Bureaucracy and the Future of American Political Thought

2011-08-29T12:02:00.000-07:00

America is a nation whose foundation is deeply rooted in liberal ideals. Its ontological and normative horizons are set and defined by liberalism. In spite of this consistent liberal theme, the American polity has experienced several changes, chief among which is its transformation from a heavily decentralized confederacy to a massively centralized union. What informs this transformation? And what effect does this change have on American political thought? The answers to these questions will be the focus of this discussion. I will draw attention to the nature of our current bureaucratic culture. I will argue that the transformation of our liberal culture, which tends increasingly toward centralization, is fast changing our political landscape and that this change is likely to pose a monumental threat to American political liberalism.

The Ontological and Normative Horizons of the American Polity

The ontology of the American polity, America’s conception of what constitutes a “person,” is one that is hinged on the liberal notion of autonomy. Persons are persons if they are autonomous and self-determining individuals. A person may be truly autonomous if he has the independence and capacity to make moral judgments and act on them. Implicit in this definition is the requirement for the individual’s action to be free from coercion or undue restraint.

From this ontological perspective springs a fundamental liberal ideal - equality. If A has the right to live a happy, unencumbered life, so does B; it is a right they both share because of their shared person-hood. Liberal ontology, therefore, “implies a kind of equality in spite of actual differences.” But how does a society of autonomous beings get to be truly autonomous? This is a question to be resolved by another important liberal concept, freedom. This brings us to the normative constituent of the American polity.

America's conception of the individual as being autonomous behooves of it to ensure that its citizens actually have the opportunity to be self-determining. This moral imperative is necessary if individuals must be free, and it is this - more than anything else - that informs the need for a well-managed, bureaucratic culture. Unfortunately, the greater the centralization (I will be using this term interchangeably with "bureaucracy") the less autonomous individuals become. The paradox embedded in the necessity for centralization and its unintended effect on individual freedom is well highlighted by Frederick Jackson Turner in his critical look at the significance of the Western frontiers on American political thought. Turner noted that the free, egalitarian, and autonomous colonist, who was at first disposed to the importance of government, had to confront the challenges government posed to individual liberty. But Craig Carr, in his book Polity, puts it more succinctly when explaining the potential effects of bureaucratic power he posits, “If government is necessary as an enforcing agent to make sure that rights relationships are honored … it also poses a threat to these relationships itself.”

There is, however, a striking difference between the two observations; while Turner argues that the demands and challenges of the frontiers made centralization inevitable, Carr’s assertion is rooted in the necessity of centralization as a mechanism for the protection and enforcement of individual rights. The former sees government as an inevitable social construct; the latter sees it as the inevitable and indispensable guardian of law and order, serving principally to deter crimes and protect individual liberties. In spite of this difference, they both agree that centralization, as good as the rationale behind its existence may be, is something to be feared.

Bureaucracy and Liberalism

In a bureaucratic society - although freedom may be a little constrained, limiting options available to individuals, the actions of the individual could still in a sense depend on rational choice. So it would appear that a bureaucratic society, despite the limitations it imposes on individual liberty, is (just like liberal polity) based on the free exercise of one‘s will. There is yet a subtle difference between the two. Does the individual do what he wants to do, or does he do what the society wants him to do? If he chose the former, his choices might be limitless but personally daunting. On the other hand, if he chose the latter option, he would be confronted with limited choices but the consequences might prove to be satisfying because the society has reduced his options to a list of socially optimal choices. The larger implication, however, is that such choices are defined solely by means of his/her social obligations.

This happens in our lives all the time. Students are taught skills in schools, skills which make it easier for them to fit into specific social roles. But do the kids go to school only so they could fill those social roles, or are the roles available only because there are people in the society with the right set of skills? This question highlights the interplay of consciousness and reality and is best summed up by Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am ” -- the shaping in one's consciousness of a perceived reality whose existence can only be ascertained on the plains of the subjective mind. If the potentials of a student are limited by the availability of specific job types for which specific training was obtained, it goes without saying that the student's career option is socially limited.

The logical conclusion from the above is that although the individual is free to exercise his will, his actions are predetermined by the society, roles over which the individual has no control. He is conscious of his actions, but his actions are not the result of his conscious thoughts, so the perceived reality is, in fact, something else. His consciousness is being determined by social realities. This plays well into the freedom or happiness debate, one explored at great length by Carr.

If the end of freedom is happiness, then the individual and the society have the same goal in sight. The difference is in the path they choose to pursue it (happiness). To decide which of the two options is better will depend on whether we consider freedom to be an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Deontological philosophers like Emmanuel Kant have toyed with this question, arguing that freedom is an intrinsic good which is sufficiently satisfying and must be sought as an end. But utilitarians argue the opposite. Freedom, to them, is a means to an end; the action that leads to happiness should be that which produces the greatest happiness for the most people. It would seem, then, from the latter argument, that the current bureaucratic culture is liberal only to the extent that it affords a greater proportion of the society a satisfactory, happy life, one in which happiness becomes the ultimate good and freedom merely a means of getting there.

If on the other hand, what it means to be free is tantamount to being happy, the individual would prefer this choice to any other choice. But this could be fraught with problems. Let's assume that every educator decided to establish a medical school and nothing else. From the point of view of the individual who sees the exercise of freedom as an intrinsic good, the exercise of this free will by the respective educators would lead to happiness. But while this might be fine from the individual perspective, social reality might prove otherwise. The individual is still a member of the society, and if the society were to suffer from a dearth of lawyers, or accountants, or teachers, his/her happiness will be short-lived, as the need for people with the scarce skills is likely to offset his happiness. But this is the kind of freedom that the liberal political culture contemplates - one set in a decentralized, relatively anarchic polity - and it is what makes centralization all the more attractive and unfortunately inevitable. However, this does not mean that life is doomed under a centralized system; the happiness of the whole is and does translate into the happiness of the individual. For people living under a bureaucracy, “they are free because they are happy.” This perspective changes the meaning of what it means to be free, since freedom is weighed in terms of the quality of happiness it produces. Freedom and happiness are thus taken to be synonymous to each other. Carr is aware of the impact of this confusion on liberal thought, pointing out that the substitution of words (rich with liberal meanings) with words describing a bureaucracy is tremendous; the individual is less likely to find bureaucracies objectionable if he internalized liberal values with bureaucratic rationale. Carr calls this “subtle co-option," and it is, I believe, the single, biggest threat to American liberal idealism.

Our complacency with bureaucracy has equally transformed our view of "American individualism" and its place in our polity. In our pop-culture, we are infatuated with the image of the individual with unencumbered freedom whose strength and self-determining capacity we are too willing to admire. At the same time, we more readily sympathize with such characters when they eventually meet their tragic end. We do this because of our awareness of the fact that these characters represent who we are at heart, they remind us of whom we'd love to be. At the same time, we are also aware of the improbability of realizing that goal in the contemporary society that demands cooperation rather than self-serving individualism.

In the movie, A Thousand clowns, this image is embodied in the character Murray. Murray is independent, jobless, and irresponsible (at least, from the perspective of the society). He is "his own man" and does not like to be told what to do. He mocks the outside world, and views it as essentially monolithic with individuals subservient to the dictates of the society. Murray is convinced that those who have conformed to living within such societal confines have lost their freedom, and he is not ready to do the same. The dramatic irony is that Murray soon learns what his brother and others have tacitly accepted - that to be truly satisfied and happy, conformity is essential. Faced with the choice of losing his nephew Nick to the Bureau of Child Welfare, Murray is left with no real option other than capitulating. He finds a job, and like everyone else, loses his freedom. We fantasize with characters like Murray and then come to terms with the inevitability of the transformation from a decentralized polity to a centralized one. Such characters serve as comic reliefs in helping us deal with the realities of social life; they also remind us of the liberal ideals we so tenaciously cling to. But how tight is our grip? Does it loosen with increased bureaucratization?

The Future of American Political Thought

If we must contemplate the future of our polity and the effect bureaucratic culture would have on our political culture, we must start by analyzing what effects (if any) this change has already had on our political thought.

Our founding fathers were essentially driven by liberal ideals - freedom, equality, fairness, independence - to overthrow the British colonial power, and in its place they established a government to ensure and protect the same ideals. The case for independence from Britain was eloquently made in numerous pamphlets, but most notably in Thomas Paine’s Common Sense so that many colonists were convinced that their fates, and indeed that of their nation, needed to be in their own hands. This notion of political self-determination was one of the catch-phrases of the 1776 revolution and was the precursor to the representative government the founders would later form. Interestingly, most of the accusations against Britain tenable in the revolutionary years could be made against America today. It is my opinion that America is gradually shifting from its liberal ideals, and the reason is attributable to the transition from a once decentralized state, which is perfect for such ideals to flourish, to a more centralized political system.

In his writing about the Western frontiers, Turner alludes to this point. He observes that the Western frontiers created the need for centralization, a need which made its conquest by the colonists easy. But when “all the free lands were gone and the continent was crossed,” Americans looked to something else to conquer. Turner, in conclusion, hints on what the government might do to divest itself of all that power: imperialism. During the quest to conquer the West, America was essentially in isolation, but after the conquest, it turned to imperialism for a way to fill that void.

This imperialistic culture, a product of the bureaucratic culture, is still very much intact today, and it was the very impulse the colonists opposed in their resistance of the British imperial power. If Lord Acton is right (and there is no reason to doubt he is) there is no system of government which amasses power and in the process corrupts itself the way a bureaucracy does. (Acton's notion that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely" may well embody the absolutism of bureaucratic power which is evident in the latter's desire for efficient management, an unending desire that only craves for more power in order to be more efficient).

Compelled by this desire, we have grown from a nation which sought to manage its political affairs to one who seeks and to some extent does manage the affairs of other nations. This transformation in our polity is a product of our compulsion with bureaucracy, a product of the “bureaucratic mentality” - an attitude which expresses an acquiescence to and tolerance for bureaucracy, believing in its ability to solve all of our problems. Our bureaucratic mentality gives rise to an imperialistic impulse which in turn creates a dissonance in our political thought. When we think of freedom, we are immediately reminded of freedom of choice and the right to political self determination - key fundamental ideals of liberalism. But a look at the United States and its actions abroad would reveal the opposite. Our government is notorious for stage-managing the political affairs of other states.

The United States currently has a number of territories under its control. These territories, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and their like are politically semi-autonomous; Technically, they (just like the US under British colonial rule) have some of their rights determined by a foreign power, an unnecessary bureaucratic hierarchy created merely for American convenience and satisfaction. Our acquiescence to the continued exertion of US power over these states may well be an example of how our political thought has been transformed by our bureaucratic culture; our liberal mindset has been replaced with its bureaucratic counterpart so that what may have been objectionable now seems acceptable and inevitable. Having so “subtly co-opted” to this arrangement, it is little wonder then that the invasion and occupation of Iraq has drawn very little American opposition.

The same trend is visible on the domestic front. Bureaucracies seem to have taken over the management of people‘s lives. Every conceivable aspect of the American society has been affected by the culture of centralization. Schools are largely bureaucratized. They are fields for the training of students who would be tomorrow’s bureaucrats. The corporate world is also bureaucratized. The concentration of companies, and the expansion of hierarchies within them, has led to massive corporate bureaucracies, and because of the nature of bureaucracies, the larger a bureaucracy gets, the more layers it craves; supervisors are needed to ensure that the subordinates perform efficiently, and more supervisors would be needed to supervise the lower tier supervisors.

As a result of all the above transformations, the individual’s concept of individualism is lost. It is replaced by the mores of cooperation and social responsibilities. Even if the individual retains some notion of liberalism, these notions will be replaced by the social realities of centralization. No longer does the individual see himself as the liberated individual in Murray, he now acts in accordance with the dictates of the society; his industriousness is equally eviscerated. We are fast losing our individualistic attitudes. But how could we make sure that we never lose them completely?

Conclusion

The concept of individualism in America is not doomed forever; it could still be revived. Carr suggests this could be done by focusing on social justice, since social justice is the end of liberal ideals. This takes us back to where we began: ontological horizon. We have to extend our ontological horizon in order to bring the ideals of liberalism into the clear view of our psyche. But this needs to be a conscious effort.

The Hegelian model for change is predicated on the claim that historical progress is the product of reason. Following this model, therefore, it would seem plausible that consciousness shapes social reality. So to be successful, we must first be aware of who we are and how and why the liberal ideals we hold so dear are important to us. Consciously thinking about this will ultimately help us preserve liberalism in our political thoughts. When we fail to do this, then the radical transformation we fear will prove to be inevitable and the reality of our social life will precipitously lead us away from our most cherished ideals.

The Racial Conundrum

2011-03-22T20:37:00.000-07:00

One reason often cited in justification of racial profiling is the assertion that minorities have a greater propensity toward crime. To answer their critics, proponents of this argument simply point to the prevalence of crime among minorities, and especially in the inner cities where minority population is known to be high and on the rise. While statistics could be useful in measuring crime trends, numbers alone do not provide, and can not be used as proof that a particular demographic has a natural inclination to commit crime.

It is my contention that were minorities to be treated equally by law enforcement officials, their inmate population would decline, and with it would go the "propensity" argument.

There is no gainsaying the fact that individuals prone to racial profiling by law enforcement officials are more likely to be arrested and incarcerated. If a minority citizen were profiled mainly because of the color of his skin and in the process illegal substances were found on him, he would be arrested nonetheless. On the other hand, if similar substances were in the possession of a non-minority citizen, that individual might never be arrested for the same crime because her chances of being searched and ultimately arrested are very very slim.

Whites are not less likely to commit crimes; they are merely less likely to be arrested even if the same actions would necessarily lead to the arrest of minorities, and as jrank.org finds, they are also more likely to be placed on probation than incarcerated.

It thus beg the question why anyone would be surprised at the high number of minority inmates in US prisons. It is racial prejudice, stupid!

Chase them Dictators!

2011-03-01T20:55:00.000-08:00

Like many, I have watched with great interest the wave of revolutionary decent sweeping the Middle East over the past few weeks and have wondered if this youth-engendered craving for democracy is genuine or merely a prelude to the Iranian-style democracy borne out of similar uprisings three decades ago. I have watched with great frustration how the Obama administration is dealing with this - first with its tacit approval of Hosni Mubarak followed by a half-hearted and muffled support for the people's yearnings for freedom (the same thing the American revolutionaries fought and indeed accomplished in 1776). I think rather than gamble, the administration chose to play it safe (not knowing what might ensue from the protests), and I think in doing so, Obama missed a huge opportunity to reaffirm US commitment to freedom and democracy.

Revolutions, by their very nature, produce unpredictable outcomes. But this is not necessarily a bad thing. The American Revolution, for instance, though a fairly organized and well articulated movement sought a different form of government, one both novel and audacious, but it was a chance Americans were willing to take in search of "a more perfect Union." See where that has taken us today; gradual evolution of the polity has seen more and more minority rights protected so that what many European powers feared in 1776 has become the cynosure of many around the world.

In spite of the above example, revolution can be a people's worst nightmare, if the result of the Russian Revolution is anything to go by. The latter showed how a revolution could easily be hijacked. In the early 20th century Russia, there was a rift in the Soviet Socialist Party resulting in two major factions the Mensheviks who were more inclined toward moderate political reforms and the Bolsheviks who took Karl Marx's Proletariat philosophy to heart and would welcome nothing other than the complete overthrow of the prevailing political system. The first of the Russian Revolutions, which occurred in February 1917, had the support of the Menshevik, but the Bolsheviks orchestrated the October Revolution and thus set the stage for the total entrenchment of the Socialist Party in Russian politics.

But should uncertainty be a source of concern for observers interested in the spread of Democracy? The answer is no. America was not a true democracy for many years after 1776, but the true aspirations of its people reflected in the revolutionary wars (and later the Civil War) have moved the nation increasingly toward a more equal and democratic state. This kind of transformation is possible in countries like Iran and Russia where their respective revolutions produced a less democratic polity. The people's aspirations will ultimately prevail; if one revolution does not create the necessary changes, then maybe the next one will. The yearning for change will only cease when the people get what they want. And this this is what Obama and his advisers have failed to realize. Dressing up a crony-cum-dictator in the cloak of "stability" will only hasten the need for another revolution.

A few pundits (Chris Mathews of MSNBC easily comes to mind) have got it right; when the choice is between the people and an oppressive regime, the US must do well to side with the people without any equivocation, not only because the people will surely outlive the regime, but especially since the American Revolutionaries and their Arab counterparts share a common aspiration - a desire to be free. If America no longer stands for freedom, what then does it stand for?

Your comments are welcomed, as always. Feel free to express your thoughts.

Democracy and Religion

2010-11-02T09:17:00.000-07:00

The more I observe the changing political scene in western democracies, the more I become certain that democracy will eventually be the victim of its own doing.

What makes democracy better than the other forms of government is its philosophy of good governance based on the will of the majority. And the will of the majority has always been guided by such ideals as freedom and tolerance. But it is the unchecked insistence on freedom and the need to respect one's religious freedom and that of his conscience that is seriously threatening the very existence of democracy.

I have always had my fears about majority rule. Any political system that makes it possible for the majority to impose its will on the minority only paves the way for its own fall. The concept of freedom of worship is increasingly becoming incompatible with its twin principle of tolerance in the face of a growing number of religious conservatives.

The growth of religious conservatism in western politics is changing the face of democracy in these countries. It is inconceivable that religious conservatives would deny others the same benefits that made it possible for them to thrive as a formidable political force in the first place.

The intense debate on gay rights and abortion largely on the basis of "social values" is one that has been perpetrated by the religious right. The religious right often engages in double standards; whenever they are in the minority, they vociferously demand their first amendment rights, but when they are the majority, they make it practically impossible for the minority to enjoy the same constitutional rights. As religious organizations, they wouldn't like to be discriminated against, but they discriminate against others who deserve equal protection under the law.

In Utah for instance, where the religious conservatives are the overwhelming majority, one can hardly imagine a state free from religious interference because the line between god and state is blurred. Some residents in the state are forced to accept certain practices which may be offensive to their respective faiths. For example, I hear it is mandatory that prayers be offered at the commencement of public meetings at some city halls .

Here, in the United States, the coalition of the Religious Right with the Republican party has consolidated the former's position as the strongest critic of secularism. This coalition is thus very influential, and the Republican party is, unfortunately, at its beck and call.

Democracy has over the years emphasized "freedom" above all else. But sadly religious fundamentalists are using the same freedom to deny others their constitutional rights. That's what happens when people vote, not for tolerance and peaceful coexistence, but in accordance with their religious consciences. The result of this is bigotry - the very thing democracy seeks to prevent.

Advertising and Free Will

2009-02-16T15:59:00.000-08:00

I think the concept of forced advertising is gradually creeping into the Internet, and it shouldn't be tolerated. This concept is the reason many viewers are abandoning television for online entertainment options. To rely on the same strategy that online users despise is to betray advertisers' myopic perception about what their online audience really want.

Traffic online is driven by individual choice. An Internet audience looks for a website with specific information, finds numerous ads on the website, and then chooses the ads to click on; the ads, in the process, are guaranteed subsequent repeated hits by this unique and issue-specific audience. This strategy is based on the concept of freedom and on the idea that the audience is the one that can best be trusted to determine and choose what she wants for herself. The effectiveness of this method of advertising underlies the success of Internet advertising on such sites as Yahoo, Google and the like.

If I am watching TV and an ad comes on, there's no guarantee that I'll sit back and watch it. I might do one of several things; I might watch it, mute it, switch channels for the duration of the commercials, or simply just choose not to watch TV all together. TV advertising, which relies on forcing the audience to watch a commercial, can be a nuisance. Traditional online advertising on the other hand, which gives the audience freedom to click on the ads they want is more effective and less repugnant.

For instance, I love MSNBC.COM and enjoy their political commentaries, but the fact that I have to be forced to wait 15 to 30 seconds to watch a video is a real drag for me. Even more irritating is the way the videos are edited (less than 2 minutes in some cases) so as to make room for more ads. CNN.COM on the other hand, has a better web ad strategy. On their website, a viewer has the option to elect watching an ad before watching a video clip or simply skip the ad and move right on to the clip. That is how Internet advertising should be. If your ad is good enough, people will watch it, no matter what, but when you force them to watch it, you stand the risk of losing your audience.

When a society, whose paramount ideals are free will and free choice, relies on force in driving sales, only one conclusion can be reasonably contemplated - audience backlash. Make no mistakes about it, it happened to television, it could also happen to the Internet.

Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism by Elliot Sober - a critique

2009-01-07T16:43:00.000-08:00

Elliot Sober's article Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism examines the traditional theories of ethics; in evaluating these theories, Sober seeks to reveal the weakness imbedded in them. He argues that the main problem for environmentalism stems from its effort to ascribe value to nature beyond nature's known instrumental worth. In place of the traditional environmental theories, therefore, Sober proposes a different approach - an ascription of value based on aesthetics.

First, Sober accuses environmentalists of engaging in the ignorance argument. According to him, the ignorance argument is used by environmentalists as a justification for preserving species and protecting the ecosystem. Sober sums up the argument thus: "Although we might not now know what use a particular endangered species might be to us, allowing it to go extinct forever closes off the possibility of discovering and exploiting a future use." He proceeds to reject this claim simply on the reason that if we don't know anything about the value of particular species, then we are incapable of advancing any rationale for preserving them. Using the analogy of airplanes, he argues that humans are accustomed to accepting a small chance of a greater disaster in return for the high probability of a rather modest benefit." Again, he contends that since we are ignorant about the potential value of the species, we are equally ignorant of their potential harmful effect. Third, he reasons that were the environmentalists to argue that the species are vital for the sustenance of the ecosystem, even that argument would be untenable because science has shown that some species are so insignificant to the sustainability of our ecosystem that they are dispensable.

The second argument examined by Sober is the slippery slope argument. Slippery slope is a tricky precarious situation, especially one that leads gradually but inexorably to disaster. The slippery slope here is in respect of where to draw the line regarding the importance of species. Sober is of the opinion that each species matters only a little. But the environmentalists are afraid of conceding to that fact because if they did they would open up the floodgate to the gradual extinction of all species, one that they may be unable to stop once it gets started. But Sober thinks environmentalists do not have to draw a line. He claims that the importance of species could be successfully advanced on the basis of diversity, that if value is placed on diversity, then the value of each species would increase as the overall diversity declines.

Third, Sober considers the appeal to what is natural. Under this argument, Sober explores the concept and definition of the word "natural." He notes that at the core of this debate sits a major disagreement between environmentalists and animal liberationists. Are houses (like anthills) natural components of the environment? Since humans are part of nature, Sober thinks it is a logical deduction to conclude that "everything we do" is part of nature, including the houses we build and the animals we domesticate. Although animal liberationists think that domesticated animals merit ethical consideration, environmentalists disagree. Environmentalists claim that since domesticated animals are products of human creation, they are, as a consequence, "artificial" beings. Sober thus conclude that the old theories of development, which environmentalists still rely on in making their assertions about "natural state" and the "interfering force," are no longer useful. He therefore urges a search for new norms that would better articulate the concept of what is "natural."

As an alternative to the environmental theories he condemns, Sober proposes a new approach, one that focuses on the aesthetic value of nature. He said the path toward ascribing value to nature is often fraught with the difficulty of drawing a line between what is "natural" and what is "artificial," and that if we could determine such value based on aesthetics, this difficulty would be avoided. Comparing nature to a piece of art, he claims that it is the rarity and originality of a species that ultimately determines its value. Sober is certain that if value in nature is based on aesthetics, the problem with the ignorance argument may also be resolved by avoiding the difficulty of proving that a particular species may in future prove useful.

Sober's approach is itself fraught with difficulty. Although aesthetics could be used to ascribe value to organisms, it is not a panacea. Neither does it appropriately resolve the flaws Sober picks with the other theories. If we were to ascribe value to nature solely by means of aesthetics, where do we draw the line on what is beautiful and what isn't? If we say the zebra is beautiful and should be preserved, what grounds might we advance in excluding the mosquito? This, no doubt, would lead us down the same slippery slope Sober acknowledges in the other arguments.

Aesthetics is largely based on the subjective mind. If nature, like art, is valuable only when one can evaluate and appreciate it, then it is a subjective test. If it is subjective, then not everyone may have the same view about its "value." The same is true of art. When discussing the appeal to nature, Sober asks, "Why do environmentalists discriminate between domesticated animals and those in the wild?" A method that values nature solely by reason of aesthetics will lead many to ask, "Why does the animal liberationist discriminate between the penguin and the cockroach?" Sadly, we would be confronted with similar questions and fewer answers.

Ideas of Human Excellence... by Thomas E. Hill Jr.

2009-01-07T15:28:00.000-08:00

In Ideas of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments, Thomas E. Hill Jr. argues that in conserving nature, it is irrelevant to focus on its "rights" or "values." He says it is more important to focus on the character of the person who is indifferent toward nature. According to him, such an examination is likely to reveal the absence of certain basic qualities necessary for human excellence and essential in the proper appreciation of not only sentient beings but also non-sentient beings of nature.

The above approach to environmental ethics stems from the branch of "Virtue Ethics." The fundamental concern of ethics is the search for universal principles of behavior, rules that guide individuals into doing what is right. While utilitarianism is concerned with the consequences of one's actions, deontology prescribes and encourages adherence to ethical rules that respect the dignity and moral rights of all persons. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, insists that the essential question to ask is not "what shall I do?" or "how shall I act?" But "what kind of person should I be?" To the virtue philosopher, the latter question, rather than tell us what to do or set a number of rules for us to follow, urges us to strive toward excellence by acting in ways that would improve and refine our characters as moral agents.

In other words, virtue ethics seems to suggest that to ascertain if an individual is good or bad, we need only to concentrate on his actions. This view is more in tune with the cliché, "action speaks louder..." because it assumes one's character and action to be the central focal point of analysis. Everything else matters not. A critique of this view would be offered at the end of this essay.

Hill holds that sometimes one can be immoral without doing an immoral act. In his view, a given act may be neither good nor bad but yet reveal the absence of some good qualities necessary for the actor to be a moral agent. For instance, if an individual were to spit on his grandmother's grave, nothing in his action attests to the action's goodness or badness. Our moral uneasiness about the action, however, is likely to shape our perception of the person in question, rather than reinforce any moral conviction. There is nothing bad about spitting on graves, but it is not something people would normally do. So a reflection on the character of the person, rather than the act, is vital in helping us appreciate the quality of the act. This kind of reflection, Hill believes, can help us understand why some individuals may be indifferent to non-sentient beings of nature.

Hill's argument is simple: those indifferent and destructive toward non-sentient nature do so because they lack some basic human qualities. These essential qualities - ignorance, self- importance, and a lack of self-acceptance - are often indicative of human excellence, and those who appreciate non-sentient nature normally possess them. Therefore, Hill considers them a precondition for developing true respect for nature. His proposition is worthy of further evaluation.

First, Hill claims that those indifferent toward nature are ignorant of humans' place in the ecosystem. Humans, he said are but a "speck on the cosmic scene." Thus a profound understanding of the intricacies of nature and the close similarities we share with other living things - including non-sentient beings - will lead us to treat them with respect. This prompts him to ask, "Could one who have a broad ... understanding of his place in nature really be indifferent to the destruction of the natural environment?" In reply, he insists that “nature-haters” are not necessarily ignorant of particular information. Their ignorance is one that springs from their inability to reflect on the broader perspective of the natural environment as a whole.

Another reason adduced by Hill to explain the indifference of some to non-sentient beings is self-importance. By self-importance Hill refers to any objectionable attitude which selfishly ascribes importance to organisms based only on what matters to humans. For instance, some people assume plants should not be accorded any moral consideration because they lack the ability to feel, that is, they are non-sentient beings. This attitude may arise largely from the fact that those people consider the ability to feel very important because it is an important attribute possessed by humans. Hill holds that if someone, in spite of understanding his place in nature, holds that the only things important in nature are sentient beings, then that person is just "like a racist who, aware of other races, treats all races but his own as insignificant." That person would undoubtedly be living in denial, but that denial would not change the fact that the race he is excluding is just as important as the others.

Finally, Hill explains that the destruction of, and indifference to, non-sentient beings could be deeply rooted in the lack of self-acceptance. This lack stems from the failure of one to "accept oneself when the patterns of behavior and emotion are rooted in a desire to disown and deny features of oneself, to pretend to oneself that they are not there." This situation, Hill reminds us, results when we fail to recognize that we are part of nature by our unwillingness to accept that we share many of the needs, limits, and liabilities of both sentient and non-sentient beings of nature. By accepting our affinities with "lower" living creatures, we show our humble side. If we are humble, we would refrain from "replacing the natural environment with artificial ones."

But does Hill succeed in making his case for the preservation of nature through human excellence? My answer to this question is no. There is hardly any correlation between one's character and one's actions. The fact that I consider non-sentient beings less important does not explain why I have to cut down an oak to make a house for myself. One's needs, rather than some character trait, are likely to say more about one's actions. It is not enough to show that the individual lacks certain "fundamental" qualities of human excellence. More is required to prove that he is indifferent primarily because he lacks those qualities, whatever those qualities may be.

There is also the problem of cognitive dissonance. This psychological dilemma sometimes forces us to act in ways quite contrary to our belief systems or principles. Most of what we do or say may be borne out of necessity rather than the presence or lack of certain character traits. Therefore, ignorance, lack of self-acceptance, and self-importance do not explain why we do what we do. Additionally, before resolving whether a particular behavior is good or bad, we must first decide what makes that behavior good or bad. This is one issue virtue ethics has a hard time addressing. Why is it vital that I recognize the importance of non-sentient beings? What is wrong in destroying the natural environment anyway?

Unfortunately, these are questions Hill himself fails to answer. Certainly, Hill's argument that indifference to nature is the result of a derogation of human excellence is rather weak.

Sharia Law and the Nigerian Constitution

2009-01-07T00:38:00.000-08:00

The introduction of Islamic Penal Codes by a few states in Northern Nigeria is one of the many controversies confronting the present dispensation and threatening our fledgling democracy. Since its inception, Sharia law (as it is widely known) has been criticized as being unconstitutional. The political stage has witnessed varying passionate arguments for and against its continued existence in a multi - cultural and diverse nation like ours. The inability of our leaders to tactfully resolve this issue has led to many violent clashes between adherents of rival religions. Thousands of lives have been lost as a result, and property worth millions of dollars have been destroyed. Against this back drop, many have continued to ask the same questions -- questions whose answers have proved elusive. Is there any legal or constitutional foundation for the enactment of sharia law in Nigeria? Does the House of Assembly of any state in the federation have the legislative competence to make such a law? And if the answer to the latter is no, then what ought to become of a law so passed? It is answers to these questions that will be the focus of this paper. I will argue that the sharia codes in enacted in these northern states are unconstitutional and should, by their very nature, be null and void.

So much has been debated on the constitutional justification for the legal enforcement of the Islamic Legal code in parts of the country. On the one hand, proponents of the Sharia (such as Governor Yerima of Zamfara State, the first state to pass the Sharia Code) claim that the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria ( hereinafter simply referred to as "the constitution" ) provides the legal foundation for its introduction. They aver that such inference complies with the wordings of Section 38 (1) & Section 275 (1) regarding the right and freedom to "manifest and propagate one's religious beliefs, teachings, practices, and observances." They further argue that these sections of the constitution grant any state of the federation exclusive discretion in establishing a Sharia Court of Appeal. Most of their critics strongly disagree, albeit with little recourse to the constitution, the grund norm of our legal system.

The failure of past discussants in finding answers to the above questions, arguably the greatest legal challenge facing our generation, is likely to complicate an already difficult discourse. Emotions have often skewed the debates into further complexities, forcing members on either side of the aisles to reject astute legal reasoning and rely solely on subjective, sometimes religiously biased reasoning. For instance, while some proponents of the Sharia refer to the constitution in justifying their position, they are quick to reject the same constitution where the meanings of certain sections in the constitution run contrary to the provisions supporting their earlier claims. Whereas, the sections being overlooked, when read together with the other sections, readily dispel the false inference a layman would necessarily draw with respect to the actual intent of the Constitution.

The reasoning of opponents of the Sharia, just like that of their counterparts, is shallow; they often engage in what legal logicians call inductive reasoning. Their arguments are often based on spurious assertions, often generalised, with no cogent premise supporting their claims. Such arguments are not deductively valid; nevertheless, it is improbable that their conclusions are false. These are arguments based on selective reasoning which may be logical but false.

I beg to keep a safe distance from both sides of the debate. By steering a middle course, I hope to make up for the inherent prejudices and deficiencies of the two contending groups. I will use the Constitution as a guide in my attempt to accomplish this feat.

Because this issue borders on the legitimacy of a law passed by the House of Assembly of a state, it is important that we explore the subject of the supremacy of the Constitution, the document from which all 36 states of the Federation get their powers. Section 1(1) of the Constitution declares the supremacy of the 1999 Federal Constitution, stating, in no equivocal terms, that its supremacy is over and above all persons and authorities. In subsection (3) of the same section, the Constitution emphasizes the effect of any law found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, warning that: "...that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void." Therefore, the joint effect of Section 1(1) and Section 1(3) is to render void, and of no legal effect, any law that contradicts the spirit and intent of the Constitution. But when, and how can a law like the Sharia code which was passed by a competent legislature, be annulled to keep with the spirit of the constitution?

A law can be ultra vi res (literally, beyond the law) and also a nullity by virtue of either its content or by the procedure of its passage. In the case of the former, it is called substantive ultra vi res while in the latter case, it is procedural ultra vi res. Procedural ultra vi res occurs when a bill being deliberated by the National Assembly or by the House of Assembly of a state is declared null and void by the court because the procedure stipulated for the successful passage of the bill is ignored. The court could also take such actions even after the bill has been passed into law and the court is satisfied that the procedure of its passage is not in accordance with the law. In the same vain, a bill already passed into law may be impugned based on its content, in which case the court, after finding that such a law is in pari materia with relevant provisions of the Constitution or other enabling law, declares it null and void (substantive ultra vi res). It therefore behooves the legislative arm, which under a democratic milieu is responsible for making laws, to discharge that function with the utmost diligence and care without recourse to any ancillary considerations.

On the question of the constitutionality of the Sharia, it should be pointed out that Sharia is given some recognition in the Constitution. Section 6 which defines judicial powers also establishes Sharia Courts of Appeal among other courts of the federation. By this provision, it bares mention that there cannot be a Sharia Court of Appeal ( an appellate court ) without Sharia courts at the state level from which appeals might rise to the former. Following this logic, therefore, it is safe to say that the Constitution, by creating the Sharia Court of Appeal, has, though not explicitly, reserved a discretion for states to create their own Sharia courts since the appellate court lacks original jurisdiction to hear most of the cases to be brought before it, and also because the cases are of such a nature that they cannot be entertained in a regular court (Magistrate or High Courts). Thus on the face, the Constitution upholds the application of the Islamic Legal Code. But to what extent? This we shall explore further.

Section 6(5)(f) & (g)(replicated in sections 260, 275, 262, and 277) state in clear and unambiguous terms the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal, which by implication applies to all state Sharia courts.
A close study of Section 277(2) (a) - (e) reveals that Sharia courts shall be competent to decide only questions of Islamic personal law which cases were extensively enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (e) to include, among other things, marriage, guardianship of infants and persons of unsound mind, foundling, wakf, gift, will, and succession. However, Section 277 (2) (e) requires that for that provision to apply, the parties must be Muslims and they must have requested the court at first instance to determine their case in accordance with Islamic personal law. The inference to be drawn from this is that the ultimate question of jurisdiction and application rests with the parties who must first determine whether or not they intend their trial to be by Sharia. Interestingly, nothing in the above section or the accompanying subsections suggests that members of other faiths are mandated to appear before a Sharia court (the only exception is when such a party, in spite of his religious beliefs, voluntarily opts to be tried under Sharia law), neither is a Muslim so obligated if he or she indicated to the contrary.

Further more, the constitution provides for the creation of a Customary Court of Appeal for any state that so desires (the definition of "states" here also includes the Federal Capital Territory ). The effect of this is to equate Sharia Courts of Appeal with Customary Courts of Appeal. Since the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal is limited to Islamic personal law - religious and moral laws which guide the social relations of Muslims - it becomes clear that Sharia courts are to Muslims what Customary courts are to non-Muslims, their jurisdictions are limited to civil matters, to the social and customary aspects of the lives of the disputing parties.

It is contestable, therefore, for the House of Assembly of a state to ascribe criminal jurisdictions to its Sharia courts. This is a clear act of affront on the Federal Constitution and can not even be justified by the opening words of Section 277 (1): "The Sharia Court of Appeal of a state shall, in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of the state ... exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil procedures ..." It is submitted that it is false to assert that the constitution empowers the states to expand the jurisdiction of their respective Sharia courts ( beyond and above that ascribed to them in civil matters ) to include criminal matters; it also bares mention that the "other jurisdiction" to be so conferred must be such that could be exercised in proceedings regarding Islamic personal law ( which the court is competent to adjudicate in the first place in accordance with subsection (2) of Section 277. Evidently, subsection (1) does not extend the jurisdiction of the Sharia courts beyond the limits of subsection (2). The wording of Section 277 is clear, unequivocal, and ought to be given a literal interpretation. An important rule of constitutional interpretation states that wherever particular words are accompanied by general words, the general words (in this case " in addition to ") must be limited to the same kind as the particular (or enumerated ) words. The legal maxim for this principle is ejusdem jeneris (of the same kind or nature). Thus when the constitution says: "...in addition to such other jurisdiction," it refers to the particular, original jurisdiction conferred on the Sharia courts in matters enumerated in subsection (2). Since all the enumerated cases are civil in nature, by implication Sharia courts are exempt from criminal proceedings and incompetent to hear any criminal suit.

The legality of Sharia courts to participate in criminal proceedings could also be evaluated from the stand-point of the principle of federalism. Federalism is a system that upholds and recognizes the legislative supremacy of the National Assembly over the Houses of Assembly of the respective states, ensuring the smooth running of the various governments in the polity and also preventing conflicts that may arise between federal and state legislatures. The latter is achieved through the provision of two legislative lists known under the constitution as the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists. The position of the constitution on a law that may be the subject of conflict between the two legislative bodies is very clear. Section 4(5) provides: "If any law enacted by the House of Assembly of a state is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly,the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. "Such a law therefore, will have the same effect as one made contrary to Section 4 (7) (c), that is to say matters with respect to which a House of Assembly is not empowered to legislate in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.

Additionally, under federalism, legislative practice is guided by the doctrine of covering the field. Under this doctrine, where the federal legislature makes a law whose wording is so wide as to be construed as covering an entire subject, it should be understood that the legislative body intends to " cover the whole field, " that is extending its power to all matters incidental and supplemental to the subject in question, and this precludes any state House of Assembly from legislating on the same subject. It is thus important to note that where this is breached, Section 4(5) will apply, rendering such a law null and void. However, if the law by a state House of Assembly is merely repeating the provision of an earlier law passed by the National Assembly, the former shall be suspended and will cease to be of any legal effect as both laws can not operate concurrently.

In the states that the Sharia Code is being enforced today, there appears to be an obvious conflict between the Penal Code and the Sharia Penal code. Since the Sharia Code acknowledges the free will of non-Muslim parties to resent the application of Sharia in the course of their trial, it goes without saying that the Penal Code, which was in operation long before the Sharia came into force, is still applicable. As a result, there are two separate sets of laws for the residents of those states. While it is applauded that non-Muslims can exercise their free will in this regard, it would be better appreciated if the same right is extended to Muslims who are, by virtue of their religious affiliations, compelled to trials by Sharia. This obvious discrimination runs contrary to both the intent and spirit of the constitution and certainly in contradistinction with a major tenet of federalism - equality before the law.

Additionally, many have argued that Section 38 (1) which provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion clearly justifies the enactment of the Sharia penal code. According to those supporting this claim, since the constitution gives some latitude to an individual to freely practice his religion, it is right for the same individual to elect to be guided by the Sharia code because true Islamic virtues can only be attained through the Sharia. This reasoning has led them to criticize Section 10 which they say contradicts Section 38 (1). The present writer humbly disagrees with this view.

Section (10) which prohibits state religion is designed to prevent the imposition of one religion or religious belief on the adherents of other religions; a breach of this section would necessarily deny the spirit and intent of Section 38(1). Additionally, Section 38 (1) seeks to promote freedom of worship, and this includes the freedom to change one's religion or belief, either alone or in community with others. This is the true meaning of Section 38 (1) and no contradiction should be read into Section 10 as a result.

Based on its inconsistency with relevant sections of the 1999 Constitution, and considering its glaring incompatibility with basic rules of constitutional interpretation, it is safe to conclude that the Sharia'a legal code is null and void. In addition, the basic principles of federalism dispels any doubt that when it comes to criminal trials, residents in states in which Shari'a is upheld to be the law of the land can not be bound by it - and yes, this includes Muslims.

Liberalism vs Realism

2008-07-16T14:07:00.000-07:00

Definitions

1. When realists observe the world system, they primarily see states struggling for power, each trying to consolidate its relative gain in a zero-sum game. The structure of the international system is thus rooted in this struggle, which is why realists contemplate little or no change in the structure of the international system.

2. A liberal, on the other hand, sees interdependence in the world system, a system in which every state cooperates on some level with other states. This cooperation is facilitated by institutions and established norms and ensures that every state maximizes its gain. Absolute gains, therefore, rather than relative gains, are the focus of liberals.

Question

Is there really such thing as "mutual gain" or "cooperation" in IR? Can a system or institution created primarily to benefit some states, in this case the big powers, be a viable framework for achieving mutual benefits?

Analysis

In spite of the level of cooperation and interdependence existing between Nigeria and the United States, for instance, nothing in terms of the benefits accruing to both states could rightly be construed as "mutual." Nigeria's goal may be to try as much as possible to make the most of its oil wealth, even if it means producing below its prescribed OPEC quotas in order to sell at a higher price - a situation many strategists in Nigeria would welcome. America, on its part, may use its leverage as a global power to block any attempt by Nigeria to procure any form of debt relief from IMF as payback for Nigeria's unfavorable oil policy.

The above hypothetical underlies my difficulty in truly appreciating the liberal analysis of the world system. It would seem that cooperation is only a veil used by states to conceal their struggle for power and security. Giant Multinational corporations are, in the same measure, indistinguishable from the world powers; they largely represent the economic interests of their parent states, and the states use their votes (or veto power) in international institutions, such as the UN and WTO, to return the favor.

In the end, in my opinion, cooperation would seem pretty much like a zero-sum game. States would cooperate when they contemplate a potential gain, refuse to cooperate if there is nothing in it for them, cooperate (and in the process lose) because they were fooled into thinking they stood to gain something (as is the case with most countries in Africa and the developing world), or forced into cooperating because they are too weak to resist the super-powers (for example, the nuclear non-proliferation treaties). In each of these scenarios, the powers who determine the nature and terms of the cooperation are rewarded in disproportionately huge ratios.

I don't know, maybe it's the Marxist in me, but international relations can't be simply construed as "international cooperation" when one group of nations pay lip service to the others only because they are too weak and poor to say "NO." Liberalism is Realism in disguise. Simpliciter.

Propaganda and the Democratic Illusion

2008-04-23T17:23:00.000-07:00

Propaganda
"A measure of propaganda is necessary to maintain a stable polity, yes even in democratic societies" - Murna Gilbert

Labeling
In democratic societies, one of the means of stifling debates and framing agenda is "labeling." An issue is given a label whose symbol resonates with the public and any debate on the issue is thus nipped in the bud. Take the "universal healthcare plan," for instance. The political Right has succeeded in giving it a socialist label, a ploy that has mustered critics against Obama. This is because critics of socialism need no elaborate definition of the term; they already know what socialism is. All that is left is for them to throw the universal healthcare plan into a heuristic basket for socialist relics. Yes, labeling is an effective means of preventing a reasonable debate on an issue affecting the society. It is fruitless debating what the public thinks it is already convinced of - and especially so when debates no longer rely on objective reasoning but on the subjectivity of the debaters. Something about this reminds me of Karl Marx's warning regarding manipulation and "false consciousness."

Responsibility for State Actions
If a democratic state derives its legitimacy from the people, shouldn't the people, then, be responsible, although vicariously, for its actions? If this is true, then the notion that Americans are good and their government bad begs the question, since the government derives its political will from the people. In no other form of government are the citizenry more liable for their their country's foreign policy objectives than in a democracy. The very definition of democracy itself implies that the people are not distinguishable from their government - the people are the government, and the government is the people. Implicit in the nature of its construct is the notion that a democratic government is the reflection of its people. Thus the government is, to a large extent, what the people are, or what they want it to be. A democratic government is therefore imbued with a moral quality which is either similar to that of its citizenry or tolerated by them.

On Violence, Manipulation, and their Moral Value
Suffice it to say that dictatorships maintain their hold on power through violence, it would be safe to assume that democracies achieve the same feat through manipulation. And suppose you ask, "What is wrong with manipulation?" I would like to know, "What is wrong with violence?" It would seem that the question of the rightness or wrongness of the use of violence and manipulation as effective means of obtaining specific political outcomes is a moral one. So to suggest that one is wrong may necessarily imply that the other is right. If one were to suggest, for instance, that it is wrong to use violence to maintain the status quo, then one would need to show - through normative analogies - why it is wrong. And if manipulation were to fail the same test used to evaluate violence, then a dictatorship would be no less moral than its democratic counterpart.

Fiction - My Book

2008-03-31T13:01:00.001-07:00

An excerpt

Prologue

Before concluding his closing argument, Brandon pauses for a few seconds, takes a deep breath, studying the jury closely in the process. Essential to a successful closing is the ability to understand and manipulate the jury's emotion. In law school, that is "trial basics 101," and Brandon knows it too well. Eye contact is key in accomplishing this task. So having raised their expectations in the opening part of his argument, Brandon would love to see how the seven men and five women sitting in the jury dock are reacting thus far.

His gaze shifts from one juror to the other. When he finally sets his eyes upon the last one, he is convinced that it is time to wrap up his closing.

He takes a few steps back and then stands erect as he has been known to do a hundred times before, his eyes all the time focused on the jury.

“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,” Brandon resumes, “this case is not about whether or not a crime was committed; it is whether my client, Mr. Klan Hearingsforth, committed the crime in question. The prosecution could not find one shred of physical evidence linking Mr. Hearincsforth either to the crime or to the crime scene, which is why it built its case largely on circumstantial evidence.

"A recent study published in the latest edition of Crime Watch finds that fifteen percent of all felony convictions, and about 85 percent of all convictions based on circumstantial evidence, have been overturned with the help of forensic evidence. Fifteen percent, ladies and gentlemen, is a huge number; especially so in a country where 1 in 142 residents is a convict. Nothing can sufficiently compensate an innocent man for a wrongful conviction. But we are certain of one thing. We can prevent it from ever happening, and none other has the constitution given that power to do so than you, eminent members of the jury.

"A famous jurist once said that it is better for ten guilty men to go free than for one innocent man to be convicted. An innocent man is on trial here today, and it is your duty to affirm his innocence. I know how painful it must be for the family of the deceased; I share their grief and loss. But what could be more painful is seeing the wrong person convicted for this heinous crime. Mr. Hearingsforth is a loving father of two beautiful kids. If he is wrongly convicted, it would mean throwing one more family into grief. Our legal system is designed to protect the innocent from illicit, frivolous prosecutions, but when convictions are hinged on the tenuous suspicions of the District Attorney, we can be sure that our legal system is due for a major change. And who better to send that message and demand such change than private, honest-minded citizens like you. All Mr. Hearingsforth asks for is justice, and you owe it to him, his family, and the family of the deceased to return a verdict of 'Not Guilty.'"

As Brandon makes his way back to his seat, he looks straight in the eyes of his partner and co - counsel. He knows Troy can't wait for both of them to analyze the effectiveness of his closing later in a post- verdict chat back in the chambers. It is a trial ritual, a time they use in contemplating the Jury's decision. The verdicts in the past have been true to prediction. James Brandon is certain that this is not going to be any different.

The man dressed in a neatly-cut French suit, sitting a few rows behind Brandon in the far right of the aisle, is equally optimistic. And he is satisfied that Brandon, one of the best criminal attorneys in town, is the right guy for the job.
Chapter 1

If there is one thing Burgens hates about Portland, it is the rain. It rains year round. It is too much rain for a city without enough people to soak it up. They said it will rain today. Eight hours of rain is in the forecast. Eight hours. Whenever it rains this much, he is quickly reminded of just how much he misses the beautiful, warm sun of Phoenix.

Sitting in a corner of a popular neighborhood ice-cream franchise, he watches as two young employees from a coffee shop in the adjoing building race to get the make-shift gazebos before they get blown away by the approaching wind. The rain is just minutes away, he sighs. A part of him laughs at how the rain has just wasted what should have been another beautiful summer day. Where else does it rain in summer but Portland!

Wearing a pair of brown shorts and a white golf t-shirt, Burgens is almost lost in the crowd inside. White, he mutters, the color of summer. Brown -- a popular choice for outdoor lovers. It is as if everyone is following a script for a zombie movie in which a bunch of spooky characters, all dressed in similar costumes, embark on a haunting quest in strict uniformity. Uniformity. Burgens doesn't mind it; it makes him feel a little more secure -- not that he has anything to be worried about.

As he chews on his rasberry-layered ice-cream, he flips his left arm for a quick time check. Twelve-fourty-five. She is always late.

Scouring the food court for some fun, Burgens spots a lady sitting on the far side of the hall. Her thighs are carelessly spread wide, revealing part of her pink lingerie. A slim Blonde, with a pretty round face. A beautiful tan covers her sleek skin. Her nose is symetrically positioned between her adorned cheeks. What a beauty. Again his mind darts back to Phoenix. Beauties like this, he sighs, should only be in Phoenix.

As he looks straight at the lady, she smiles at him invitingly. But before he could return her courtesy in his old fashioned irresistible girl-you-are-hot smile, he feels a gentle touch on his left shoulder.

"Hi Blake, are you expecting someone?" He relaxes as he recognizes the quip from the familiar voice.

"Hi Claire," replies Burgens, turning around with a broad, wrinkled smile toward his date. So much for the wait.

A Search for Lost Values - Book Review

2007-12-16T09:09:00.000-08:00

A Book Review

In "The Idea That is America," Anne-Marie Slaughter examines America's founding principles: liberty, democracy, equality, justice, tolerance, humility, and faith. She cautions that if America must succeed, it must remain true to these values which, since its founding, have guided it to this day. In a stream of liberal entreaties running through the entire book, Slaughter vociferously calls for America to reignite its sincerity to those vital principles. She warns that America's true strength lies not in how much power it could garner in the world system, but in its ability to lead by example, insisting: " if we don't, we would lose our way in the world."

The book states a number of historical facts underlying the very importance of the American ideals - many of the anecdotes encapsulate and highlight the progress the country has made in some areas and, in other areas, they are indicative of how far the nation has retreated from its values. In the final section, Slaughter, in a voice as eloquent and optimistic as it is forceful, urges America to embark on introspection in order to repair the damage to its polity. She also suggests that America examines the trade-offs it makes regarding its values; this, she hopes, would resolve the dissonance that exists in the nation's foreign policy initiatives. She is particularly confident that success could be achieved through "sincere and open debates" in which issues, rather than sentiments, reign supreme. A similar debate with other nations, Slaughter believes, will make America a much more formidable force in the world:

Launching and helping to lead such a global
debate will make us stronger and safer
... We will be a far more effective advocate
for our own values if we invite questions
rather than dictate answers (p.229).

In the book, Slaughter is very critical of America’s foreign policy which she claims sometimes reflects the opposite of its ideals. Some of her suggestions regarding how this discordance could be resolved, however, need to be evaluated. Thus I hope to examine her recommendations about reforming the United Nations Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the UN") and her proposal for America to address the domestic impediments to the true attainment of its values.

When discussing "Liberty" and the importance of constraint in ensuring ordered liberty in the world system, Slaughter urges America to take the lead in introducing a reform at the UN, one which would increase the number of members with veto power. She believes this would help stabilize the Security Council and enhance its function as the world's security watchdog. It is brilliant to suggest a reform of this nature; what is suspect, however, is the manner in which she suggests this reform should be accomplished -- by “bringing (in) additional important countries (p.41)." It is a little unsettling that Slaughter would make such a suggestion. It is even more troubling if the reader must take her liberal stance more seriously. Although the list of the so-called "important countries" -- Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, and South Africa -- is not exhaustive, the mere listing is prejudicial and a strong indication of an American bias (one which her book seeks to correct).

In a world where states are largely interdependent, one in which even the industrialized countries depend on the "poor" countries for resources and also for "cheap labor," it is difficult to understand how Slaughter could hold some states more important than others. On what basis are they important? Is it on the basis of their power? If so, wouldn't this realist view counter her liberal argument that America's ideals, rather that its military clout, should dictate what role it plays in the world system? Or does she define "importance" by how democratic a state is? Again, wouldn't this be insinuating, as is often typified by most Americans, that only countries who share this American ideal are relevant? It is unfortunate that Slaughter leaves us with no viable reasons for her classification, and the best we could do is to engage in seemingly futile assumptions.

In my opinion, a true reform at the UN, if it must be attained by means of the American ideals, which Slaughter agrees is universal, should be sought in a manner that ensures equality and respect for all nations. If the West must be true to its democratic ideals, it should lead a reform for the authoritarian use of the veto to be discarded altogether? Why shouldn't a majority vote in the General Assembly, on issues affecting all states, be the rational medium for decision making in the world body? The ability of some states to use the veto in disregarding issues they may consider to be in contradistinction to their foreign policies -- as was often the case during the cold war -- or their tendency to circumvent a veto by another permanent member -- a case exemplified in the ongoing US invasion of Iraq -- makes it more likely for any one of the permanent members or its ally, to arbitrarily exercise its preemptive right to the use of force against a weaker nation.

Commenting on the historical importance of the veto power as a balance of power mechanism, Professor David Kinsella of Portland State University notes that the structure of the Security Council and the inclusion of the veto power was a design by the emerging powers after WW II, one which was deliberately intended to prevent these powers from going to war with one another. This is so that an attempt by a permanent member to fight another could and would be conveniently vetoed by the others. This may be the reason why since WW II, although there have been a number of wars -- Vietnam, Korea, Arab-Israeli et cetera -- none of them directly pitted one superpower against the other.

It would thus appear that the superpowers, in using the veto, are only concerned about their powers and status in the world system to the detriment of the less powerful states, who often suffer the most in the superpowers' struggle for consolidation and dominance. This is a realist argument which severely weakens Slaughter's liberal contention. America, as a superpower wielding an unprecedented amount of power, disproportionately in its advantage, would do anything to maintain that status. Its ideals are only important in so far as they are relevant in the attainment of that goal. Slaughter doesn't deny this fact, neither does she deny that a truly representative UN -- one in which all member states would be entitled to equal votes -- would ensure equality among nations (p. 104). However, she falls short of making, in my view, a bold and radical proposal of curtailing the use of the veto power or of its eradication altogether, a situation that would necessarily create a forum for the peaceful debate of the ideals she speaks of. It is in this sense, therefore, that I find her conclusion incompatible with most of her observations and recommendations in the book.

Slaughter strongly believes that the entrenchment of American ideals domestically is key to the nation's success abroad. She is confident that this is attainable, and she recommends a number of remedies that would make this possible. She calls for the expansion of debates on the nation's values to include not only "politicians and pundits," but also the citizenry. She also urges Americans to condemn the assertion by some to be "values voters," a term she insists applies to all Americans and not just the exclusive preserve of any one political party. An involvement of the American people in this all American debate, Slaughter claims, would welcome disagreements and foster tolerance in the search for an appropriate means of realizing an equitable distribution of these values (among all races and between genders) and will also ensure a balance in the trade offs the country makes in realizing its foreign policy objectives (p.227).

The foregoing proposition is thought-provoking, but it is, nevertheless, true. A scrutiny of the American polity is not only necessary, it is urgent. Slaughter puts it more succinctly when she said that to change other countries' negative perception of America, " we need to face and answer hard questions about why we make the trade-offs we do, and when and whether we are practicing what we preach (p. 225)." This is relevant if America must continue to lay claim to any moral preeminence in its relations with other nations. At no time in contemporary history has the need for America to lead by example been greater than the present because, worry of the enormous power the collapse of the Soviet Union has left it to occupy, many countries are more critical now of its moral assertions than they have ever been, a situation that is likely to cause instability in the world system and thus threaten the American "hegemony."

Another important effect of the introspection Slaughter calls for is evident in the ongoing discussion of what constitutes torture, and whether or not water-boarding -- an interrogation technique condoned by the present Bush administration -- is indeed torture. The United States is alleged to have used various torture techniques in extracting evidence from detainees in Guantanamo Bay and Iraq.1- Although the administration has denied repeatedly that "America does not torture war prisoners,” whenever it is directly posed a question on whether water-boarding is torture, it is usually evasive in its answers (avoiding the "hard questions," so to speak). Debates on the subject in the media are often skewed by the “ratings war” in which each network seeks to out rate the other.

If Americans understood that excusing practices such as this would only increase the likelihood of their adoption by other countries, the seriousness of the subject would not be lost on the public.

Therefore, rather than strengthen America's intelligence in the fight against terrorism, torture actually weakens America's ability to promote its cherished ideals universally, undermines America's faith in those values, and ultimately sabotages its position as a hegemonic power in the world system. This point, more than anything else, underlies Slaughter's success in the book.

The Victims - a Poem

2007-12-15T18:07:00.000-08:00

The victims are not only the indigent

who, in want of a better job
Make a living
spreading the virus
The victims are not only the carriers
No, they could live with it
Spending their entire fortune
nurturing the virus
The victims are not only the bed-ridden
who, shrunk to their bones
Nurse their eternal wounds
knowing they've not long to live
The victims are you and I
Husbands and wives
Siblings and offspring -- all of us
who, faithful to our vows
Are honored most viciously

with the virus of death.