Bobby S. Gulshan

Debate this, not this . . .

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 19:14:00 +0000

In his recent book, The Twilight War, David Crist recounts the story of Suq al-Gharb, a town located south of the Lebanese capital, Beirut.

Militias of all stripes - Christian, Druze and Shia - moved into the void . . . General Tammous ordered the Lebanese army into the fray to reassert Lebanese government control and also tp protect the routed Phalange. He committed his best unit, the 8th Brigade, a multiconfessional unit (though its were majority Christians) trained by American special forces and under the command of an indecisive and panicky Francophile general named Michel Aoun. (p. 118)

Up until this crucial moment in 1983, the United States had committed to a limited, peacekeeping posture in the Lebanese Civil War. The battle for Suq-al Gharb changed the calculus. Then special Presidential envoy to the Middle East, Robert McFarlane sent a panicked cable to Washington urging tacit and immediate U.S. military support for the 8th Brigade, fearing that the Syrian faction would win the battle, and that the Soviet hand would extend to Lebanon via it's "client" in Syria. Not only had McFarlane under estimated the Lebanese army's ability to repulse the attack, he wrongly envisioned the entire conflict as a field in the Great Game of the Cold War. It wasn't, it was essentially a local conflict, granted that the "local" refers to the entire Levant.

Crist goes on to describe how the final decision was shifted to the local Marine Commander, Colonel Timothy Geraghty. Geraghty eventually sided with McFarlane, and the U.S. launched naval artillery attacks in support of the - primarily Christian - Lebanese Army. Any pretense to neutrality was lost. Writers such as Crist and Thomas Friedman believe that the attack on the U.S. Marines barracks, and the death of 241 Marines, was a direct result of that fateful decision in Suq al-Gharb.

It's important to remember this tumultuous moment in history when thinking about the contemporary Middle East, and particularly the remarks made by Presidential hopeful Mitt Romney. Romney has accused Obama of not doing enough in Syria. I am sure there are people who support Obama who do not think he has done enough in Syria. The question that remains conspicuously absent is, of course, what would you have Obama do? I have written on this blog before that, at risk of sounding like minimizing the challenges in Libya and Egypt, Syria remains a completely different beast. To understand just what sort of fray we are talking about here, we must first view the problem through the right lens. The Arab Spring and subsequent uprisings is not simply the Arab people yearning for freedom, it is the undoing of a system of borders and political arrangements that are unsustainable in the absence of dictatorships. This is the final undoing of the colonial legacy in the Middle East. The fact is, simply stated, that the endgame in Syria will affect every country in the Levant, and will have consequences for Israel, Iran and potentially Saudi Arabia.

So, is my recommendation to say "Its too complicated, so we should do nothing"? No. However, I actually do think that we are wiser to wait and see. Direct support for the Syrian opposition will embolden the Hezbollah and Iran, who have both chosen to sink or swim with Assad. The potential for disastrous mission creep looms large, considering that the combination of refugees, foreign fighters and popular revolts in neighboring countries (and increasing friction with Turkey)would inflame the tinderbox that is the Levant, and would likely draw the U.S. into a protracted and costly endeavor.

Regan pulled out of Lebanon after the bombing of the Barracks. The god-like Republican president also lost an Ambassador on his watch, along with several top-flight intelligence experts. I am curious as to what Romney thinks he could accomplish. I will gladly stand accused of being "soft" when suggesting there is nothing we can do to make this situation better. However, I think Romney is debating from the wrong side of this thing. He says that the Iranian people, for example, long for freedom from an oppressive regime. Is this true? We all saw the Green Revolution and its infant steps towards dissent. However, how often do we forget that beyond the northern suburbs of Tehran, Iran is a very conservative country, and for most Iranians, the biggest gripe is the economy, while the nuclear program provides a sense of pride in a nation that inherits a history that includes imperial glory and playing the fanatical underdog.

We need a debate on the Middle East that faces the uncomfortable facts, that sometimes there is no winning to be done. We must face the fact that in the decades-long absence of effective national narratives, Islam powerfully fills the vacuum. Despite our greatest aspirations, we need to accept the Middle East that is, and not the one we want.

Why I'm addicted to HuffPost Live . . .

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Fri, 05 Oct 2012 18:39:00 +0000

The simple reason that I keep logging on to HuffPost Live remains that it is a wildly exciting experiment in webby, social, user-generated media. For anyone who works in tech and new media - like myself - certain concepts and ideas have assumed the place of gospel: make it social, make the user a part of the thing, not an observer of the thing, curate but don't editorialize. HuffPost Live gets this, and embraces it, warts and all.

At our startup, we have people working in numerous locations in the country. The Google + hangout is our conference room. Its not always perfect, you get slowdown, dropped connections and of course, you can hear when the trash trucks pull up just outside my "office" window. HPL's embrace of the hangout is bold, both as an embrace of an imperfect technology, and of tech that more people - both media and tech professionals, and everyone else - are quickly adopting. HPL has its finger in the pulse.

Of course, the big sell with HPL is the participation of the audience, whether as community "pundits" who make their way through the screening process onto one of the discussion hangouts, or via the chatbox and tweet features. The big debate in the world of the user-generated web centers on those who question whether or not the wisdom of the crowd is actually all that wise. HPL's is selective enough, they are curating on air contributors that provide intelligent, broad and passionate discussion. There is a sense that while these people aren't "professional" pundits - like the usual suspects on the cable news shows - they are people who are perhaps more in touch with the nitty gritty of the issues they discuss.

Its not perfect. I am not particularly enamored of the tone of some of the hosts. I don't want to call out anyone in particular, but sometimes you get a sense you are watching college kids who are well versed in the Simpsons/Conan O'Brien school of humor. Not a bad thing in and of itself, but it comes off as distracting and slightly amateurish. millennials probably won't care (for me, electronic music is the Chemical Brothers, not Skrillex, so sort that out). It may be a deliberate effort on the part of the staff to make it fun and young and irreverent. I believe its possible to be serious and intelligent without being elitist and stuffy, but I will admit that perhaps this criticism is based on affectation more than anything else.

When I finally try to get on the air, and hopefully succeed, perhaps I can drop a Family Guy reference. In the meantime, I will watch HuffPost Live with an eye towards its bold embrace of innovation in an industry that desperately needs it.

My Broken Heart

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Mon, 06 Aug 2012 13:54:00 +0000

I have a daily routine that involves reading several news sources, both foreign and domestic. Its part from professional necessity and part out of a natural curiosity about the world, a habit I probably picked up by watching my father read his newspaper daily with rapt attention, as if for a small span of time, nothing was more important than what was in the paper. Usually, I will pick through the headlines and take notes on anything of interest, particularly as it may relate to a future blog post or topic for further research. Today, I am shocked and pained to see familiar images and read familiar words from my life used in connection with senseless tragedy.

A lot of commenting on articles being written about the shooting at the Sikh Gurdwara in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, mention how peaceful the Sikhs are as a people, and I couldn't agree more. Our faith demands of us a certain kind of gentleness. Our first guru, Guru Nanak Dev Ji, was a mystic and he revealed to the world that the true revolution in human life came from understanding that it wasn't the worldly forms that matter, but the underlying unity. We are all the same, we are all children of the same creation, and to it we would return when our soul's journey came to its end.

Of course, like many religious minorities, our history too often is framed in violence. Growing up, we attended a gurdwara in the Los Angeles suburb of Alhambra. As kids, my cousins and I would go to the small library - no more than a broom closet back then - and make jokes and generally act like kids do. On the walls above our pre-adolescent covered heads hung paintings depicting some of the darker moments in our history: the torture and martyrdom of guru Arjan Dev, the great sacrifice of Guru Tegh Bahadur, the murder of the sons of our beloved Guru Gobind Singh.

As I got older, I did what a lot of teenagers do; I rebelled. I stop going to the gurudwara and basically gave up any connection I had to Sikhism. It became a sort of minor footnote in my life; I was Indian, and yeah, my parents were Sikhs, whatever. It wasn't until I got to college and tried to get "back to my roots" did I really come to understand Sikhism. Besides the spiritual and philosophical dimensions, I learned about glorious - and often violently bloody - times in our history. I read about the great admiration with which British military leaders often spoke regarding the warrior spirit of the Sikhs during the Imperial period. I learned the true meaning of our symbols, how the kirpan - a small ceremonial sword - stood for justice and defending those who had no means of defending themselves. I realized that being Sikh wasn't simply a religious identity, it is a quasi-ethnic identity, which I think can best be compared to being Jewish. You may not go to synagogue, you may not keep the Sabbath, but for the most part, you don't stop being Jewish.

The apex of my first trip to India as an adult came when we visited the Golden Temple, the holiest shrine in Sikhism. A powerful, gracious and beautiful humbling. In the presence of the devout who variously hope that prayers of supplication come true, to those who seek nothing but to stand in the light of divine truth, something deep inside you feels as if an alchemy takes place, making a part of you shine like the domes of the sacred shrine.

And of course, there the museum dedicated to the 1984 massacre by the Indian Government - Operation Bluestar - that sought to overthrow an alleged separatist guerrilla movement. Images depicted the damage done to the shrine and the surrounding structures, the corpses of many heroic Sikh Shaheeds who died in defense of the faith. Another bloody frame for the hall of historical remembrance.

Today it all comes back to me. Not even 24 hours from the shooting, it is too soon to make sense of things. Too soon after Aurora to perhaps ever make sense of either tragedy. Aurora made me angry and confused; why does this keep happening in this country? Oak Creek brings with it a different kind of sadness. I can't help it, I know I am supposed to be a global citizen, and regard any human loss of life as a tragedy for all of us. But sometimes its hard to shake the sounds, the colors, the scents and the experiences that are in fact the very content that has defined your own existence as an immigrant or a minority. Its too close to home, precisely for the reason that for so many immigrant communities, it is in our homes and places of worship that we can truly express and practice the culture from "back home," as we struggle to assimilate and become part of the "broader American family," as our president called it.

Another picture on the wall, another moment to remind us of the wisdom and sacrifice of those who came before, and those will have yet to be born. Waheguru ji ki Khalsa, Waheguru ji ki Fateh.

The Syrian Knot

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Wed, 30 May 2012 21:18:00 +0000

With the massacre in Houla, and the discovery of 13 people who had been apparently bound and executed near Deir az-Zour, the grim reality of the deteriorating situation in Syria has taken center stage across the globe. The diplomatic isolation induced by the expulsion of Syrian diplomats in numerous countries also seems to suggest a turning point in the conflict. Even the Russians couldn't stay silent. Meanwhile, many commentators now openly speak of the failure of Special Envoy Annan's Six-Point Plan. With the brutality coming to life - and diplomatic channels being closed - the question looms with a long and stark shadow, what is the way forward in Syria?

The problem with Syria is that its not just a problem with Syria. I wouldn't try and suggest that Libya or Tunisia present "simple versions" of post-Arab Spring situations. That would begin to trivialize the struggle, the sacrifice, made by the citizens of those nations in their resistance to and success over tyranny. Furthermore, I am confident that a detailed study of either case would prove that the implications of whatever comes next in Tunisia and Libya impacts other nations, particularly in the Maghreb, and perhaps ultimately in Southern Europe. The problem with Syria, however, rests in the fact that any outcome will change the strategic calculus for the entire region.

Its no wonder that Turkey's Erdogan was quick to make a pronouncement and condemn Assad, urging him to move quickly to reform his country and address the will of the people. It is similarly no wonder that Hezbollah chief Nasralllah's unusually tone-deaf and miscalculated appeal for patience from the Syrian people was met with such criticism; the Shia leader doesn't usually get these things wrong, and his public support for Assad fell completely flat. Turkey will have to deal with a refugee problem at best, and an emboldened Kurdish Movement at worst, but more on that below. In the case of Lebanon, recent reports indicate that the turmoil in Syria has already reached across the border. The countries fates are inextricably linked, and it is more than likely that Nasrallah will lose his patron in Damascus. Its hard to tell how that may affect the balance of power in Beirut, but clearly Hezbollah showed its hand when Nasrallah asked the Syrian people to give the dictator Assad more time..

And its not just the Hezbollah that has benefited from the graciousness of Assad. Already, there are reports of Hamas leaders fleeing Syria for Egypt and backing away from Assad, while perhaps strategically positioning themselves with a future Ikhwan government and president in Cairo.

The Arab Spring had previously pressed Jordan into reform, though some feel it has come too slowly and without significant result. Refugees will be a problem for Amman, as well as a renewed push for democratization. The refugee issue will likely spread to Western Iraq as well. However, for Iraq and Turkey, the question of the Kurds presents perhaps the greatest challenge. A good friend who works with representatives in the Kurdish Government in Iraq makes the point that despite expressions of pan-Kurdish unity and national aspiration, the reality is often more splintered and complex. Syrian Kurds often consider themselves simply Syrian Kurds, with little to do with Kurds in Turkey or in Irbil. However, that doesn't mean that a transnational Kurdish moment could not arise, especially given that what we may ultimately be seeing in the region now is the slow dismantling of the colonial legacy, including its stilted dictatorships and national boundaries.

Not a Dark Age, maybe just a dim one.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Wed, 14 Mar 2012 16:10:00 +0000

The digerati believe that we don't need to memorize things anymore. Well, maybe some things, but not most things. The reason should be apparent to anyone from my generation, and perhaps just taken for granted by kids. Its because the machine will do it for you. Think Wikipedia. As the apostles of the new age have said, its not vital to know the date of the Battle of Hastings. you can just look that up. What is important, is that the Norman Conquest influenced English culture by bringing in a permanent French influence etc. Just Google it.

Similarly, it has been argued that we should stop teaching algebra in high schools. The rational here is that whatever simple operations algebra helps us with in everyday life - like paying a tip perhaps - can be done on a smartphone. Instead, what we should be teaching kids to do is to program to design and develop the tools (software and hardware) that are going to continue to power innovation, efficiency and productivity.

It seems to me that the implication of this is two fold. First, we are talking about basically abandoning certain assumptions about education, that have hitherto been thought of as "classical education." In the case of algebra, the refrain from students for decades has been "why do I need to learn how to do this. I am never going to use it." And while that was most likely true, there were some good reasons for it. the most important of which is that perhaps as a freshman in highs school, you just don't know any better. You may find after a year that you have a knack for math and science and that you in fact want to become an engineer. The education system was designed in some ways to allow for that self-discovery. Of course, others argue that it also made students suffer for struggling with subjects for which they simply had no affinity (this is a subject I will tackle in a future post).

This is the other aspect of the classical education that we assumed valuable on its face for so long. And that is, simply put, that learning for learning's sake is a fundamental good. You learn about literature, not because the school expect you to become a writer, but they expect you to be able to make sense of all the artifacts of culture you may encounter in the world. I think that this assumption is now threatened and its continued influence may be crumbling.

What I don't know is whether or not its a bad thing. The second implication contained in the idea of essentially uploading vast areas of human experience to the machine is that we may end up living in a world that is not dark, but at least dim. I am delving into the realm of the speculative, but bear with me. The idea I am trying to express is that we will still have civilization, we will still have individuals with highly technical expertise, but we will lose a lot as well. What we consider great and good is simply a product of a particular moment in time. In one hundred years, the idea of a Beethoven or a Picasso or a Frank Lloyd Wright may seem quaint, when the value system, language and discourse of that future is considered. I use the examples of artists because I think that a society based on instrumentalist, individually adapted education and the economic system that it seeks to support, would likely reduce the artistic bandwidth of the population overall. Artists, writer and composers will still exist, but most likely only through a system of patronage, or more likely will be more akin to designers of various technical products.

Those who see the change coming, who can read the writing on the wall that signals the end of the classical education system will lament the loss of a certain kind of human ingenuity, and may well look back at the industrial age as a golden age. Civilization will go on, but some human knowledge will be lost. Not lost because we have forgotten, but lost because we had turned our responsibility for it over to the machines.

Left, Right and De-centered

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Tue, 13 Mar 2012 15:22:00 +0000

Making sense of the world always presents certain dangers. Last night my partner and I discussed various philosophical frameworks that use the word "post" in their primary formulations. Post-modernism, post-materialism, post-liberalism; each carries with it some notion of both a break from what they proceed from, as well as containing the challenge of preventing. or at least eschewing, totalizing views. We are told, on the surface at least, that we must always remain vigilant regarding essentialist statements, and must constantly maintain that anything we can say about the world is contingent, and never to be assumed as taken for granted.

The style of post-modern analysis, of course, extends beyond the jargon of the ivory tower, and allowed for the emerging multiplicities of various minoritarian narratives and subsequent political and social movements. However, the great challenge has been, and remains, how to integrate these positions into a more comprehensive worldview, or system of worldviews that negotiates the position of the minor with the power of the major. The problem is two fold; on the one hand, there is the problem of an infinite regress of contingent propositions, the "nihilistic" tendency that post-meta narrative has oft been accused of. On the other hand, there is the problem of relevance, where by novel formulations of "oppressed" groups remain fully embedded in hegemonic capitalist discourse.

At this point you well may be accusing me of useless jargon, so let me try and put some of this in terms of "real-world" examples (forgive me that this is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis, but a starting point, this is a blog post after all). A simple example of the regress problem can be seen in large scale in the idea of Balkanization. It is not simply the historical and political process of the breakup of the Balkan states, but the notion of fragmentation. Its a question that will undoubtedly emerge (if its not already) in the ongoing breakup of oppressive regimes in the Arab world. Balkanization gained momentum from the notion of discrete groups emerging as communitarian movements arrayed in opposition to "totalizing" constructions (Yugoslavia). Similarly, one can view Iraq, and other Arab nations, as artificial political constructions based on post war geopolitical considerations rather than natural affinity of the various communities contained therein. To paraphrase Dr. Asad Ghanem of Haifa University, there is no Arab state, it simply is not there. What we find instead is a strategy against imposed discourse - the idea of "Iraq" or "Syria" - and instead a sectarian vision with shifting allegiances that more often than not transcend literal national boundaries.

Of course, in the case of the Middle East, the urge to "make sense" imposes a new meta-narrative on the situation. As I have written here and elsewhere before, one can view the emerging situation in the Middle East as the aligning of forces into two major camps: The Saudi-directed Sunni world, and the Iranian-led Shi'a world. This of course, helps us to make sense of the top-down geopolitical machinations of regional competitors, but it fails to account for further fragmented communities. How many countries should there be in the Middle East? Surely the Kurds deserve their own homeland, but what about the Marsh Arabs, or Alawites? Does the hyper-communitarianism of the post-modern age have any rational basis for limitations on self-determination?

The Western Liberal response generally comes down to projecting onto these fragmentations the idea of totalizing liberal systems. In other words, as long as all of these communities have access to the major democratic institutions - electoral, legal, socialistic - then no one should fear for their liberty. However, even we progressive minded liberals often neglect the implicit ideology present in our own nobly regarded institutions. For the liberal West, the problem isn't the totality of the system, its that occasionally it goes bad, and it requires reform. the Occupy Movement surely isn't a monolithic thing, and I know that some within it have spoken about socialism or anarchism as ways forward. However, in its early inceptions, some elements within Occupy resisted the temptation to declare the movement "anti-capitalist," and held to a more modest proposal of reform of the lobbying system, the electoral system and tax law. Thus emerges the question of relevance; the 99% may not be the 99% because of certain practices within an otherwise egalitarian narrative, but precisely because the system requires that there be a 99%. In this case the movement has simply identified the structural relationship that defines its existence, but it remains embedded in the political economy and logic of late capitalism, and perhaps this is because the temptation to reassert an alternative meta-narrative (Marxism, anarchism) is resisted in favor of respect and tolerance for liberal institutions that simple require some tinkering.

To the right of this, is the totalitarianism of God's kingdom. I believe that we are living in a moment that is defined by the ascendancy of a sort of global conservative ideology that is rising from the ashes of the current (though perhaps not complete) failure of the left to make sense of the world. The vacuum has been filled by the God Men, whether Christian, Muslim, Jewish or Hindu. This class of power excels at making sense of the world, and in a time when many feel that the end of the world is easier to achieve than the healing of the world, God Men have a ready audience. It is thus incumbent on the left to not only represent the needs of ever fragmenting communities, but to envision a world in which common values can unite disparate groups without a top-down reductionist narrative that forces affinities, rather than nurtures affinities that already exist.

Chirping into the Aether

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Sun, 04 Mar 2012 20:51:00 +0000

I signed up for Twittter awhile ago, used it briefly, and then sort of abandoned it. I suppose I just didn't "get it." Lately, my motivation to engage with it has returned and I find myself once again chirping away. I am still not sure, however, that I get it. In fact, I am almost certain I don't.

I suppose the first problem is I don't actually have anything to sell. I would love it if I could use Twitter to bring readers to this blog, but I am afraid of the success. Now, you might think it an insane notion. However, my suspicion is that I would end up being forced to feed the Twitter beast just to sustain followers and redirect them to my blog. I want to blog, not be my own social media marketer. If I produce a couple of blog posts per week, I suspect I would have to fill the rest of the time with tweets about my shoes, or the neighbor's dog, or even -god forbid- how great a turkey sandwich that was. Otherwise, the followers would forget about me.

Maybe not. Maybe my writing is so wonderful, people are so eager to read what I have to say that they wait with bated breath for my twice a week tweet and link. Its possible. But it seems more likely that - given the crowded attention span of modern life - I would have to work to elbow into your mind-space at every opportunity.

I am not a celebrity, obviously, and so I am not going to use twitter to sell myself, or to practice the thinly veiled conceit that social media makes fans feel closer to celebrities. I don't know where this comes from. What do you think is going to happen, that your shining wit and charm is going to come through on clever status comments, or tweet replies, and the celeb in question is going to follow you? I am sure somewhere, someone will come out of the virtual woodwork and object with a vociferous "I've done it." At which point they will describe the strategy by which they convinced some celeb to follow them on twitter. And I, of course, will reply with "Perhaps you should spend that energy on a productive hobby, like wood-working or badminton."

I think the problem is not so much that I don't "get" twitter. Its just I don't care. That is to say, I am not interested in the lives of celebrities. My favorite celebrities are people whom I admire precisely because they seem like working people whose jobs happen to be entertainment. I am not interested in "brands" per se. I buy stuff I need, and I try to get a good price. I could care less about the web presence of my q-tip manufacturer. Your product is going to clean my earwax, let's just keep it real.

I am not giving up on it. I may yet figure twitter out, and if nothing else, it is a fascinating sociological artifact. Its value in grassroots political organizing has been made more than evident. There may be something to all this chipping and chirping. Who knows?

Thanks for reading. If you enjoyed this article, feel free to retweet!

Waiting for Andre

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Thu, 01 Mar 2012 06:41:00 +0000

By the time Andre the Giant reached the age of twelve, I suspect he was still called Andre Rousimoff. However, its possible that the moniker that would carry him to fame had already been applied. At the tender age of 12, Andre stood a towering 6'3" and weighed in at a svelte 240 lbs. Life being generally cruel, this meant poor Andre was too big to ride the school bus. Fortunately, his father had a dear friend who had a flexible work schedule, and offered to drive Andre to school. This is a picture of that man:

For those who read caricature, that is indeed Samuel Beckett. You can't make this kind of stuff up (oh yes you can, people do it all the time). What you can make up, however, is a dialogue between them. So, let's have at it:

ATG: Hey Sam, how are you today? Sam?

SB: Every word is like an unnecessary stain on silence and nothingness.

ATG: Yes, yes, some of the time.

SB: Oh, you’ve got a gift for rhyme?

ATG: I prefer wine

SB: If I had use of my body, I would throw it out the window

ATG: Is that how you would like to go?

SB: I shall state silences more competently than ever a better man spangled the butterflies of vertigo.

ATG: That is very good Samuel!

SB: Enough. Habit is a great Deadener. I mean it.

ATG: Anybody want a peanut?

SB: I can’t go on. I’ll go on.

OK, so its just a mash-up of Fezzik and Beckett quotes. But admit it, it reads a bit like Endgame, no?

Why I Write

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Thu, 01 Mar 2012 05:58:00 +0000

I have had many jobs. More than I care to count, frankly. It runs the gamut, of course, from running the till at coffee shops and dry cleaning establishments, to basically professional positions dealing with real clients and real money. The real money was theirs of course, I got paid significantly less than real money. I have even had professional writing work, both as a proper editor and as a feature writer. My greatest journalistic moment remains my interview with Dave Lombardo of Slayer fame. I considered framing a copy and sticking it on the wall above my desk, but I didn't want it to become an epitaph or an "in memoriam." I still have plenty of writing to do.

So why write? Clearly, its not for the money. I would be better sorted being some kind of account coordinator or a plumber, or anything for that matter. Of course, those inclined to credulous optimism always chant the refrain, "Follow your passions, and the money will follow." It may be true, I just wish I was passionate about something for which money could more easily pick up the scent. I would love to tell you that I write because I have a deep passion and desire for self-expression, and that communication knows no higher or more noble form than the eloquent filigree of an elegant sentence. But, of course, that is bullshit. My inner Diogenes knows full well that the choir at that church is getting smaller each week, and that indeed what people want to read is more often than not represented most ubiquitously by banal and instrumental constructions that invite readers to "relate" to and "really feel" what the writer is saying. Oh yes, we must connect with readers, don't get me wrong. But let's face it, one of the reasons I write is because I simply have far much to say, and I unfortunately pursued an academic discipline that helped me develop the tools to spew my inner world onto the page, virtual or otherwise. So, it turns out, that I write because I am primarily selfish and think entirely too hard about things, while I should be playing basketball and forming shallow, but entertaining friendships or something. Xbox maybe?

This is not to say that I don't believe that I have something of value to offer as a writer. However, it is useful to make the distinction between believing and knowing. In any event, for me writing as a process and act involves more of a neurotic tick than a lofty pursuit. It is a compulsion born from a moment of reckoning with a Kierkegaardian sense of dread. And if that sounds like a bit of pretension, it is. But what, in the end is writing other than embracing a certain kind of self-delusion that attempts to make of the moment something grander than perhaps is called for? I don't know, I barely understand the question myself.

In the meantime, I will continue because I see no other way forward. It seems, as they say, the thing has chosen me, and not the other way around.

All best.

Dunk this

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Mon, 27 Feb 2012 03:52:00 +0000

I have learned recently that Mormons can actually baptize people who are already dead. This stunning revelation first came to me in the form of a blurb about some enterprising Mormons taking it upon themselves to baptize Anne Frank - yes, she of the holocaust diary - and thus ensuring that her gentle soul could indeed gain entry into the heaven that she deserves. Though one wonders what her soul has been doing in the meantime, short of sitting in her living room in purgatory waiting for some Mormons to knock on the door and actually intending to let them in.

Now don't get me wrong, the purpose of this particular screed isn't (solely) to pick on a curious religious practices of a curious religion. Although, I certainly won't pass on the opportunity. No, the purpose of this screed is to pick on someone who believes in this practice - and has in fact practiced it - and is simultaneously running for the highest office in the land.

As it happens, Mitt Romney allegedly baptized his dead, atheist father in law. When pressed recently about the practice of "proxy baptism," Mitt's reply essentially amounted to "Sure, but not recently." Comforting. However, the real outcry, and reason Romney now has to face it, involves the proxy baptism and conversion of Frank and deceased members of the Wiesenthal family. This has led Nobel Prize winner Elie Wiesel to declare that Mitt's co-religionists should, well, stop it.

So in an effort to suss out the nature of the hullabaloo, I began to research the whole concept. Being the intrepid and responsible inquiring mind that I am, I looked it up on Wikipedia. However, within seconds of reading the article, I was so struck by the sheer bullshit of the notion that I stopped. I don't need to know the details. Look, it is utter nonsense, no matter how you slice it. It is no more important or valid a practice than stoning one's disrespectful son or painting your door frame with lamb's blood. It strikes me that to think that baptizing anyone, dead or alive, for any reason other than that person being in need of a quick rinse is nothing more than the persistence of superstitious beliefs that is bogging our nation down in ridiculous cultural conflicts while real problems continue to loom.

Look, people are allowed to believe what they want. If it comforts you to believe in talking snakes, or magic stones that decipher golden tablets, have at it. However, if you choose to run for arguably the most important job in the world, expect some derision, if not flat out ridicule. But perhaps more importantly, I want to say to those who are offended by proxy baptism, the people like Wiesel. I beg you, don't allow yourself to be offended by this utter tripe, this fantasy built upon fairy tale. It is as many historians have done regarding Holocaust denial. Scholars who have spent careers studying the subject will often decide simply not to engage in debate with the deniers, because to do so would give the appearance of legitimating views which, for legitimate historians are farcical at best, venal and hateful at worst.

Then again, I suppose its quite possible that Wiesel is invested in his own fantasies, and really does believe that the souls of these posthumously converted Jews are in point of fact, subject to contention. Heaven help us all . . .

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:40:00 +0000

From the Outside in

About a year ago, I wrote a piece for Maximum Rock and Roll, talking about what it was like being an Indian kid in the hardcore and punk scene in Southern California. In that article, I discussed how most Desi kids gravitated towards hip hop and bhangra. I eventually came to appreciate both styles, but they have never been as close to me. I was always on the outside looking in, both within the punk and metal communities, and within my own immigrant community. However, over the years I discovered many musicians who inspired me and left a profound impression. These Desi artists took chances, did their own thing, and dared to stand on the outside. This post is a tribute to them.

Have you ever watched the video for Hey Jude? Dig that during the big chorus there is a turbaned Sikh in the crowd singing the "na na na naaa." The true "fifth Beatle?" The Rock and Roll Panj Pyare? Well, it was pretty cool to see when I was a kid. It said "you belong here too."

When I was in high school, my older sister's friend told me that I should go and buy a record by a band called the Southern Death Cult. I did, and I loved it. I knew about Ian Astbury of the Cult, but when I bought the record I was struck by another name: Aki Nawaz. I knew he was one of us. And he was playing in a Goth band of all things. I loved goth, but what the hell kind of Indian kid with a stubbly beard and dark skin tries to dress up as a lithe, alabaster skinned Rice-ian Vampire? But it was OK, Aki was in the Southern Death Cult, so I wasn't completely on the outs.

I found Aki again years later, and he was still doing it his way. This time around, it was with the experimental hip-hop/rock/fusion group Fun-da-Mental. Now, it seemed, Aki was scaring people, embodying the outsider as threat, the digital jihadi straddling a line between radical and fundamentalist. Though I don't always agree with Aki, his very presence gives Desi kids permission to set the world to rights, or just as well tell it to fuck off.

I've always been a bit of an Anglophile (if that isn't obvious) and I fell in love with Britpop. It was intelligent (Oasis notwithstanding), stylish, and often embraced the margin. So how happy was I when my friends came to me to help them understand Brimful of Asha? Tajinder Singh, in his round faced glory, fronting a rather smart band that used Indian elements in the music, but not like some orientalist obsessed Kula Shaker garbage. I often wondered if Singh's parents were like mine:

"Vhy don't you study the Medicine?"

"I want to play Rock and Roll."

"Vell, at least you can play the Bhangra."

Talvin Singh didn't play bhangra either, though he could play tabla with the best of them. Talvin came at just the right time. I was attending raves, getting way too high, and indulging deeply into drum and bass. DnB was grittier, it expressed a street-level spirituality, while trance was just ear candy. Then came Singh, who took drum and bass and mounted it on a rocket ship blasting off from the Deccan Plateau. The Asian Underground wasn't big in the states, but I used to imagine that if I was in London at the time, I would have finally been on the inside for a change.

There are others, many others. Nitin Sawhney, for example, remains one of the most unique artists I know, Desi or otherwise. The Asian Dub Foundation not only created a once in-an-immigrant generation sound, but they used the money they made as musicians to teach kids music.

And now there is a new generation. I was fortunate enough to meet an incredibly talented cat called Mandeep Sethi, an emcee with an agile tongue and a deep soul. I know I said I didn't ever really get into hip-hop, but Sethi is doing things his way, he isn't out there talking about blingin' his whip with his thug bitches or however it goes. My latest favorite band is the Kominas, a band that emerged from the taqwacore scene and seems to be the fulfillment of what I and a couple other lonely brown kids thought might be possible almost 20 years ago.

Here's to you. Keep on rockin' in the brown world . . .

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Tue, 03 Jan 2012 21:44:00 +0000

Dire Straits

So what happens if the Iranians try and close the Strait of Hormuz? In light of the recent threats emerging from Tehran, the question begs examination. How likely are the Iranians to attempt such a provocative action, and how effectively can they actually execute such an operation?

Lots of questions. And since we are talking about the Mullah Regime, we will end up relying on speculation for many of our answers. There is something in the Hormuz threat that reminds one of the recent rhetorical storm raging in Pyongyang, as if Tehran is attempting to let the world know exactly what cards its holding, lest someone make a hasty Security Council vote. Of course, the Iranians didn't just realize last week that the Strait is strategic, so one imagines that whether it is internal or external, the regime is feeling pressure from somewhere. Many observers have been waiting for the Persian version of the Arab Spring, but more pressing than the possibility of street eruptions are the divisions internal to the regime. Ayatollah Khamenei finds himself in the unenviable position of dealing with a conflict between economic reformers loyal to Ahmadinejad on one hand, and the Revolutionary Guard and its wealthy, merchant class patrons on the other. While the major figures of 2009's Green Revolt are largely incapacitated, popular uprising is not beyond the realm of possibility. So the regime heads towards a critical, perhaps historical moment, with elections set to be held in March of this year. The stakes are incredibly high, and it may well prove a transformative moment for Iran.

Hence the threat to close the Strait; a regime being backed into a corner, looking for an enemy to rally the reluctant, and severely underfed and underpaid masses. Heavy sanctions could cripple a regime that is already suffering from economic stangnation and a currency, the rial, in virtual freefall. Khamenei views this as an act of war, and would attempt to the close the Strait in response. Of course, it is important to remember that this would be more of a severe nuisance than an actual crippling blow. In a paper for the journal International Security, Caitlin Talmadge discussed in 2008 the potential outcomes of an Iranian military closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Talmadge presents a detailed analysis that explores best and worst case scenarios, and her analysis benefitted from a dialogue with William O'Neil, a former Defense Department official and Navy officer. Both Talmadge's original paper, as well as the subsequent O'Neil correspondance, warrants attention, as it detail the actual logistics and material concerns of a Hormuz closure. However, the take-away from the discussion is that any closure of the Strait would be, again, more of a temporary nuisance to the US and the West than a decisive strategic blow. Furthermore, it would likely cause great exposure, and ultimately great cost to Iranian command and control infrastructure on its Gulf flank, and possibly further inward.

Would Khamenei risk such costs in order to rally the nation around a crumbling regime? Thus far, the consensus seems to be that the Iranian people are nothing if not proud, and that as with so many nations, the external enemy always takes precedence. However, such a gambit on the regime's part may finally galvanize a revolutionary moment, if a group or groups can convince the Iranian people that the mullahs are simply using them as pawns in a game of self-preservation. As stated before, the threat of the closure reveals a desperate moment, what remains to be seen is who will best capitalize and seize the day.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Thu, 01 Dec 2011 16:57:00 +0000

The Art of 12 Bars

When I first read Howard Zinn's "A People's History of the United States" I became acutely aware of the fact that American history teems with alternative narratives, the narratives of struggles and movements that get shuffled underfoot by the sanctity of a mainstream mythology that provides the defining values of our society and civilization. Zinn's work to remains vital, and perhaps is most significant, not because it supplants the mainstream American meta-narrative, but because it compliments it, problamtizing our collective assumptions and reintegrating into the mythology the conflicts and contradictions that comprise the essential American experience.

I reflect on this while listening to BB King's "Lucille," the song named after the guitar that delivered King from the plantation. Watch an old performance of any of the greats - BB, Buddy Guy, Muddy Waters - and you will see in the style, the dress, the attitude, the sound and the setting, something that is a quintessentially American art form. The myth of the blues begins in the deep south. It emerges as reflection both of the reality of sharecropping and Jim Crow, and the yearning to create an actualized alternative narrative to the minstrel show. The progress of the blues, from the Delta to the industrial north, its electrification and increasing sophistication, is the history of African American migration, displacement and perpetual marginalization. And to the degree that the Black experience as expressed in 12 bars reflects a deep contradiction within American Civilization - the myth of all persons being created equal - the blues itself is rife with telling internal conflicts. On the one hand, blues owes much to the spiritual and work song, expressions of a communal ritual reflecting an a religious configuration used to express life of exile. On the other hand, we find the blues man as the essential outsider: Robert Johnson selling his soul at the crossroads, bargaining with the Devil himself in exchange for preternatural musical abilities.

In reckoning with Rock and Roll and all its iterative forms and dispersions, we always return to the blues, gospel, and audacity of the outsider.The form and context remains based in tension and opposition. This remains true through the main sequence life Rock and Roll from Little Richard through Hendrix and indeed to Chuck D and Ice Cube. This tension urges us to face the American experience through the lens of the 12 bar progression, the constitution that provides the basic outline for improvisation and individual expression and innovation.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Wed, 24 Aug 2011 21:43:00 +0000

Next in Line

With the fall of Tripoli imminent and another Arab state pressing forth into the anxious experiment of self-rule, it is important to turn our focus again to one of the states that represents the fulcrum upon which events in the region turn. As has been discussed and developed on this site, much of our understanding of the dynamics of the Middle East emerge from a structural paradigm which posits Saudi Arabia and Iran as bipolar powers in conflict for regional hegemony – what I have called in the past the “Arab Cold War” (The Iranians aren’t Arabs, but this is being played out in the Arab world, and to an extent, South Asia).

The House Al Saud built

The Saudi royal family, styled the “House of Al-Saud,” uses what is called agnatic seniority to determine ascendancy to the thrown of the kingdom. This means that the throne is passed to the oldest brother of the current king. This differs of course from what most in the west are familiar with, the system found in most European monarchies whereby the crown is passed from father to eldest child(typically, though not necessarily, a son), the technical term being agnatic primogeniture. Thus, Abdullah is currently the eldest son of the original king, Abdul-Aziz. Of his other sons, Sultan would be next in line, however, he will likely step aside due to health reasons. This leaves the probably heir to the Saudi throne as Crown Prince Nayef, former Minister of the Interior and current Second Deputy Prime Minister. Nayef is considered to be among the most conservative members of Al-Saud. As Reuters reported in 2010, most diplomats say Nayef is unlikely to pursue meaningful social reform. In fact, the crown prince was once quoted as saying that the Kingdom has “no need for elections or women in government.” Others argue that reform is inevitable and that continued foreign investment depends on Nayef being able to portray some sense of social and political progress in the Kingdom.

The future of the House of Al Saud may depend on it. With a huge majority of Saudis under the age of thirty watching Tunisia/Egypt/Libya/Syria on Al Jazeera with the rest of us, Nayef will have to chart a careful course if Al Saud expects to remain the dominant institution in the country. And if the notion of a monarchy maintaining control of its populace in midst of democratic revolutions sounds a bit medieval, well, that’s because it is. The Saudi Monarchy, as well as those of other Gulf Emirates, is a throwback to some political-evolutionary past, an atavistic transitional form in the flesh. The regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya represent a much more recent form - that of the post-colonial dictatorship – and indeed that has been proven to have outlived its usefulness. The Saudis, the Gulf Emirs and Nayef understand this full well. That’s why they participate in counterrevolution through its primary institutional instrument, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Council of Kings

The GCC consists of six states, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. All of these states can be described as Absolute Monarchies, excepting the UAE which is a federal monarchy. Jordan requested membership, and Morocco has been invited. The GCC operates on many levels, fostering economic, social and political cooperation through the creation of consensus based objectives for advancing interests of the monarchies in the gulf. One of the critical pieces of the GCC is the Peninsula Shield Force. This is effectively the military wing of the GCC and is intended to respond to military aggression against GCC states. It was deployed in both Gulf Wars, both times against Iraq. However, the most recent deployment of the Peninsula shield is perhaps the most crucial, and disturbing. In March of this year, the Peninsula Shield moved across the causeway that connects Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and, at the request of the Bahraini government, attempted to quell popular demonstrations for reform on the island. This set a precedent of the GCC using its military wing to oppose an internal threat against a GCC regime. This is important, because it shows us that not only is Saudi Arabia not moving towards reform within its own borders, but it is acting with increasing urgency and risk-taking with regards its GCC compatriots. One senses that the Saudi Monarchy views its co-royalists as dominoes in a game of survival against both democratic minded revolutionaries and Iranian-backed Shi’a insurgents. For Nayef and the other leaders of the GCC, history is at the doorstep, and only active counterrevolution can turn back the tide.

Going forward

This all, of course, has major implications for the United States, with our particularly special relationship to the Kingdom. What side of history will our leaders stand on when the yearning for democracy grips the streets of Riyadh? It is difficult to speculate at this point how far America will go to support the Saudi monarchy, but we must assume at the very least that if the US abandons Nayef and his coterie, it will only be on the guarantee that a deal exists between the US and the presumptive future leaders of the Saudi Arabia. There is too much at stake in the earth beneath the sands of the desert.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Wed, 17 Aug 2011 19:50:00 +0000

The State of Iraq

Iraq re-emerged in the news recently, as terror attacks left scores dead in Baghdad, Kut and other areas of the country. Though the sudden spark of violence certainly presents reason for concern, all indications seem to suggest a that the country has turned a corner, and that while the security situation may not return to pre-invasion status for some time, there is reason to be optimistic. It is vital to get a grip on the overall picture in Iraq as we approach the December 2011 deadline for the final wihdrawal of US forces from the country.

Business, and business as usual

Recently, Hassan Hadifh of the Wall Street Journal reported that Royal Dutch Shell reached an agreement with the Iraqi Oil Minitry that would yield 2 billion cubic feet/day of natural gas. Some of this quantity would be used for export in a liquified form, while some would be piped for local and regional use. The Ministry estimates that the project expects to generate 31 billion dollars in government revenues over the 25 year lifespan of the project. This is just one of many large scale foreign investment projects taking hold throughout Iraq at the moment. According to an article on "The National" website, total foreign investment is expected to reach around 90 billion dollars this year, with Turkish interests leading the way, and with investment taking place not only in the energy sector, but also in housing and urban infrastructure development.

Of course, oil and natural gas still dominate. As Josie Esnor reports in the Telegraph, "Look outside the oil sector, however, and high operational risk continues to discourage all but the most daring investor." Moreover, a greater proportion of investment inquiries remain focused on the areas in and around the Kurdish regions, like Arbil, where the security situation differs dramatically from both the Sunni heartland and the Shi'a dominated south.

Investors remain optimistic about Iraq, at least for the moment. With this in mind, it is difficult to dismiss the sense that cries of collusion weren't entirely correct; that one positive outcome in invading a country and laying waste to a great many parts of it, is the opportunity to go back in and rebuild it and thus reap the spoils of destruction. However, let's lay the most cynical readings aside for the moment. Instead, let's try and examine how the current state of things affects the average Iraqi.

Keep the Lights on

Acording the most recent "Iraq Index" produced by the Saban Institute/Brookings Institution, by virtually any measure, life in Iraq is improving. In regards the economic and investment activity discussed above, The Saban report indicates an estimated 2011 GDP growth of above 9%, with an IMF estimate that 2012 may show as much as 12.5%. From about 2008 until now, there has been steady increases in electrical kilowatt hours generated and delivered. Cellphone subscriptions are up, internet access is on the climb, and while the overall unemployment picture remains discouraging, jobs are being created in certain sectors and in certain municipalities.

Security

Furthermore, despite the most recent spate of attacks, Iraqi civilian deaths are at an all time low per annum. through July '11, the total amounted to around 800, less than one-half from 2010, and less than one-third from 2009. In addition, US military fatalities also attain to significantly lower levels than at any time during the invasion and occupation. Despite small spikes in the period from March to June of this year, US fatalities are on track to be equal or less than last years total of 60, which remains to date the lowest per annum of the war. The number of wounded will likely end up at less than half of last years total number of 389.

While the issue of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons remains significant, most of the indicators in the Saban report Index paint the piture of a ountry on the right track.

So why is Seymour Hersh so worried?

During a June 11th interview on Democracy Now, Investigative Journalist Seymour Hersh said the following:

Whatever you are hearing, Iraq is going bad. Sunnis killing Shi'as, it's sectarian war.

Hersh goes on to state that certain Baathist Sunni groups, with potential operators in the UK, are planning on declaring a provisional government, perhaps something like a shadow government, with the aim of casting the Shi'a dominated government of overtly tied to Iran. Hersh doesn't get any further into it, but there are definitely hints of the ongoing structure of support by Saudi Arabia for Sunni groups to be propped up as proxies against "Iranian Influence." Furthermore, Hersh's claim that the situation in Iraq may be used to put more pressure on the Iranians seems to correspond with recent comments made by Adm. Mike Mullen. As quoted in the Telegraph on 7/7/11, Mullen indicates that "Iran is very directly supporting extremist Shi'a groups which are killing our troops." The Admiral goes on to say that any final decision on US troops remaining in country past the December deadline "has to be done with control of Iran in that regard." Mullen doesn't provide any evidence for the claim of Iranian support, and the most recent attacks suggest that the most active groups are in fact Sunni extremists, not Shi'a groups. However, in general, this seems to point to a coming moment that will decide the immediate future stability of the country.

Hersh believes that Iraq will prove a thorn in Obama's side next year. Human Rights Watch, in its most recent report on Iraq details continued human rights abuses, including targeting Women's rights advocates and female politicians, forced female genital mutilation in the Kurdish regions, torture and severe disruptions of due process for prisoners, and severe curbs to freedom of expression. Clearly, things aren't better for everyone.

Time will tell.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Thu, 28 Jul 2011 18:49:00 +0000

Some thoughts on terror and violent resistance

Last night I spent some time talking with some friends about the subject of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli Occupation. Inevitably, despite the absence of such actions in the recent past, we came to the concept of the suicide bomber and more specifically, the attack on innocent civilian targets. In asking whether or not this stood as a legitimate weapon of resistance, it occurred to me that we may suffer from asking the wrong question. Now let me be clear, explaining the psycho-social mechanism from whence the suicide bomber arises - as opposed to condoning his activity – remains a common and well-worn strategy for those sympathetic to the Palestinian Resistance. I don’t know that I will be proposing anything different than the usual “explication” thesis. However, I like to think that my position is one step beyond explication, yet still one step short of justification.

Israel comprises an area of land approximately equivalent to the state of New Jersey. Yet, by most credible accounts possesses the 4th most powerful military on the planet, including unknown nuclear assets. To suggest that the Palestinians stand at the vanguard of some vast Islamic horde poised to push the Israelis into the Mediterranean is to abandon reality. What support the Palestinian resistance does receive from its coreligionists is nominal at best and negligible at worst. Meanwhile, the Palestinians themselves battle AH^$ Apache gunships (made in the USA) and the second largest fleet of F-16 jet fighters with homemade rockets and Kalashnikov rifles. To even suggest that the conflict is a war between two armies fails to account for the most basic facts. David and Goliath fails as an accurate analogy; rather it is as if an army of ants, is confronting a stamped of elephants. And no one is coming to the aid of the Palestinians. They are all but abandoned, save for facile “diplomatic” solidarity from governments, and plenty of rhetorical support from Arab demagogues. So what are these people to do?

There will never be a time, if the current conditions persist, when a Palestinian resistance could take on the IDF with any hope of achieving success. The best analogy for the situation can be found in American history. The Native Americans never stood a chance, mainly because the United States never regarded them as anything but a people to be conquered, and that bringing to bear the full might of the United States army provided the best means of success. The suicide bombing of innocent bus riders or café goers in Tel-Aviv, or attacks on homes in Sderot by means of katyusha rockets are desperate acts of a desperate people. And in fact, if they were able to persist, it is likely that large portions of the Israel population would encourage their government to end the occupation. Thus it is necessary for the Israeli establishment to relegate this tactic to the category of the morally reprehensible, the terroristic. The Palestinians aren’t playing by the rules, and it is evidence of their barbarism. In fact, what it reveals is the complete moral failing of the Zionist project, which regards the Palestinians, not as negotiating partners for peace, but as a conquered people with whom the details of the final capitulation (the shape and size of their reservations) must be hammered out for public consumption.

The irony is of course that Israel celebrates its own “terrorists” of the past. In July of 1946, The Irgun – Zionist nationalist militant group – bombed the King David hotel Jerusalem, killing 91 people, most of them hotel staff and British clerical workers. The group, led by future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, killed innocent civilians in order to achieve the political end of forcing the British to quit mandate Palestine and declare independence for Israel. Today, the episode would be unequivocally characterized as a terrorist attack. Today, the Irgun and the men who perpetrated the attack are regarded as national heroes in the liberation struggle for Israel.

More later . . .

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Wed, 20 Jul 2011 18:03:00 +0000

Chaos in Kandahar

An old friend asked me whether or not I might share a few lines on the recent assassination of Wali Karzai. I hesitated to remark on the event until I got a chance to have brunch with a new friend, someone who has spent a lot of time in Afghanistan, and Kandahar specifically. In fact, he should be arriving there as I write this. In the interim, another key Kandahar official, Jan Mohammad Khan, also fell to assassins. The sudden power vacuum in the south generates far more questions than answers, and there is no doubt that they way forward remains intensely opaque.

My question to my friend was simple: "What happened to Wali?" Of course, I didn't expect him to point out the guilty party, but his response made me question his otherwise optimistic outlook on the overall stability in Kandahar and Helmand. The fact that the assassin was one of Karzai's own - his bodyguard, Sardar Mohammad - meant that the likelihood of discovering the true motive and intent of the assassination remains low. The Taliban taking responsibility means little, and it is unlikely that the Taliban would have much motivation for killing Karzai. As the most powerful official in Kandahar, there is no doubt that Karzai's sudden wealth stems from his play in the poppy trade, and this could only happen with coordination, and probably a direct buy in from the Talibs. More likely, the killing of Karzai, and subsequently Jan Mohammad, is the result of internecine conflict, which may well have been festering for some time.

It is tempting of course to perceive the moment as a Taliban takeover, an opportunistic venture to create a power vacuum in the south ahead of deeper US and ISAF troop withdrawal. However, it would seem a strategic blunder on the part of the Taliban to play their hand this early, when they have shown so much patience before. I suspect rather, that someone within the establishment - the corrupt and compromised establishment - felt slighted and is making there move to assert their own presence. It may even be from within the Popalzai tribe itself. An excellent Asia Times article provides some crucial background to this, and I highly recommend a read.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Mon, 20 Jun 2011 16:47:00 +0000

Turkey’s way forward

It has become a global mantra, and perhaps the most telling gauge of national elections on the planet: It’s the economy, stupid. Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and his AKP have presided over the most successful economic boom in the history of the Turkish Republic, and the electorate has rewarded them accordingly. The total growth of the Turkish economy reached 8.9% for 2010, and the ruling AKP and Erdogan received the credit for raising the living standards of many of Turkey’s rural poor as well as improving the profile of Turkey in the eyes of the global investment community.

Significant challenges remain for the Turkish people, and for its status as a truly democratic state. A recently released report from Reporters without Borders states that “It is worrying to note that all journalists are under threat, no longer just those who cover the army or Kurdish issues as was the case 15 years ago.” According to a New York Times article from March of this year, 61 journalists are currently imprisoned in Turkish. Hopefully, the improvements in the economy have resulted in improved prison conditions, lest these journalists suffer in scenes from Midnight Express. The recent case of Ahmet Sik reveals the attitude of Turkish government to critical journalists, and may even implicate the AKP in state repression on behalf of its own interests. Sik was arrested and imprisoned as part of an investigation of a group called Ergoneken, which the Turkish government and the AKP in particular accuse of attempting an overthrow of the ruling party and the government. Sik, as well as others journalists and writers arrested in this supposed action against Ergoneken, denies any affiliation with any such group, suggesting rather that the AKP led government’s attempts to silence him stem from implications Sik has made regarding the AKP’s connection to various fringe Islamist groups. Sik has produced a book called “Army of the Imam,” in which he allegedly suggests that Fethullah Gulen, a leading Conservative Islamic Cleric, exerts significant - if not total - control over the Turkish Police. Presumably this is being done with the consent of the central government. In any event, copies of the book were seized and subsequently burned by the government. Conjecture still rules the day in regards to the reliable facts in this case. However, burning books – whether they contain legitimate criticisms or unfounded conspiracy theories – is not the hallmark of a democratic state. Neither is jailing journalists.

Allowing press freedom is a necessary condition if Turkey aspires to the kind of democratic institutions that would allow it to continue its ascent on the world stage. And in some sense, it’s a simple fix: Stop arresting journalists, stupid. Secure and transparent institutions can withstand criticism and respond best to the will of the people. However, it is difficult to be secure when more complex problems loom at the door.

No problems with neighbors, except the problematic ones.

Syrian security forces, under the direction of President’s Assad’s cousin, arrested 15 children – aged 10 to 13 - in city of Deraa. When the fathers attempted to confront the security forces over the fate of the detained children, they were met with an inhuman response:

Forget them, go back to your women and make some more.
If you can’t, we will do it for you.

Erdogan and his Foreign Minister have stated clearly that Assad must make changes and accommodate the revolutionary spirit that has taken over much of Syria. Indeed, if Turkey wishes to perpetuate its momentum towards increased regional soft-power, it must stand squarely with its Arab neighbors now seeking justice and participatory governance, and facing brutal repression in the streets. Again, this may be a relatively simple thing; the AKP up to this point has welcomed the change in the region and actively presents itself as a viable Moderate Islamist party working within the framework of democratic institutions. The greater challenge - Turkey’s jihad al asghar – is with its internal neighbors.

To Kurd, or not to Kurd . . .

For Turkey, the Kurdish question often feels like an existential question. The modern nation state that Kemal Ataturk crafted from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire depended on “Turkishness” as its foundation. This notion required that anyone residing within Turkey, regardless of their actual ethnic origin declared themselves a Turk. This was not meant to suggest that someone gave up there identity, but rather identified first with the state. In some sense, the idea is similar to Americans who believe that the first allegiance of the citizen is to the United States, and only after to any nation of ethnic origin.

However, this notion of Turkishness has proved problematic for the Kurds, who have for various reasons maintained a distinct cultural identity and a yearning for a continuity of that cultural experience within either their own home land, or through a more integral experience within Turkey itself. With this in mind, it is vital that Erdogan and the Turkish establishment in general make a clear distinction between the PKK and the extreme wing of Kurdish nationalism, and the mainstream Kurdish aspirations and reflect this in national policy. The PKK must be combated, but not at the expense of Kurdish civil rights. The current debate concerning the teaching of Kurdish to Kurdish school children in the southeast provides an excellent place for Turkey to move towards practical pluralism that would integrate Kurds into the national framework. The Kurdish language instruction should accompany, and not replace, Turkish instruction, as it is vital that Kurdish school children be able to participate in the economic and civic life of the country. However, if the government allows and sponsors Kurdish language instruction, it signals to the Kurds a willingness to accept into the polity Turkish Citizens of Kurdish origin.

If becoming part of the EU remains a priority, this move towards progressive pluralism must emerge. Furthermore, the increased regional soft power now exhibited by Turkey will require that it is viewed as a state that embodies the democratic spirit that its Arab neighbors are now fighting to gain themselves.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Tue, 07 Jun 2011 18:29:00 +0000

The Arab Cold War

As complex events unfold within a complex region, it may prove instructive to view the Middle East of the moment through a wide angle lens. Libya remains a critical site, as the NATO response to Gaddafi increasingly runs the risk of rapid scope creep. Indeed, Tunisia and Egypt loom a great distance from "resolution," and the question of "what next" burns hot on all onlookers lips. In this state of liminal transiton, accompanied by myriad speculations and occasional paranoias, focusing our sights on Saudi Arabia and Iran may reveal some future trends that will aid in the making-sense process.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran represent opposite poles in a regional struggle. One major question enlivened by the Arab spring asks how much influence either nation exerts in the moment to moment development of events in the countries involved, and indeed the future of the Middle East at large. Though the analogy is far from perfect, what we are witnessing is an effective "cold war" between two states that extend influence through confessional affiliation, arms, money, and regional proxies.

King Abdullah is rather well regarded among the Saudi People. Generally, the King is viewed as a reformer, and though many aspects of his agenda fail to satisfy many constituents - particularly his reluctance to extend civil rights to women - there remains in Saudi Arabia a sense that Abdullah is bringing the country along in the right direction. This includes the ever crucial question of the economy; Saudis generally enjoy a rather high standard of living and efforts on the part of Abdullah to diversify the economy have been met with welcome arms. However, the decision to assist the regime in Bahrain with cracking down on popular protests put him square in the sights of an emerging generation that rightly demands the end of the old order from Gibraltar to the Hindu Kush. Abdullah expressed great disappointment with the US decision to let Mubarak (as if they had a choice) fall. Increasingly obvious is Abdullah's two pronged agenda; on the one hand, insulate the Kingdom from internal strife by working - however tentatively - towards reform, while also pursuing a pro-active engagement in places like Bahrain and Yemen on the basis of ensuring security. On the other hand, intervention in Bahrain and the continued stability in the Kingdom are vital to keep in check the influence of Shi'a proxies, and ultimately the only true regional rival, Iran.

Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrullah, is known as being a savvy and widely loved leader in the Arab world. That is why his recent support for Assad looms as a rather large miscalculation. Despite the brutal repression conducted by Assad's regime - including the horrific torture and murder of a 13 year old boy - Nasrullah urged the Syrians to give Assad a chance to make meaningful reforms. The call fell flat, and exposed the Hezbollah chief's nervousness and lack of foresight. It also reveals that Nasrullah and Hezbollah clearly envision a "resistance front" that runs from Tehran, through Damascus and Beirut. The stability of the Syrian regime constitutes a vital strategic component for the continued emergence of Iran as regional hegemon and beacon of the Shi'a revival. In the end, however, whatever emerges in post-Assad Syria will likely be so weak that Hezbollah's influence may even increase.

The proxies are clearly lining up, however, and at this point the future of the Iranian regime remains uncertain. Conflict between Ahmadinejad and Khamanei may not in itself signal a revolutionary moment, but the situation begs the question of how long the young people of Iran will suffer under the mullahs. What is most likely is that Khamenei will emerge triumphant from his skirmish with his suddenly rebellious president and will steer the country to the right in order to protect the Islamic Revolution while continuing to provide regional leadership to the regions Shi'a multitudes. However, as in Saudi Arabia, their exists among the youth - the exceeding majority demographic in both countries - a burning desire to bring their respective nations fully into the light of Democratic modernity. Iran's regime rushes headlong to a crucial moment, one in which its rise to greater prominence in the wake of the Iraq invasion approaches a confluence of forces that threaten its momentum. As long as both Iran and Saudi Arabia are left to deal with their external interests, the bi-polar structure of the regional power distribution allows for a relatively well organized trajectory of events.

When these two nations face their own "spring" revolutionary moments, all bets are off.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Mon, 02 May 2011 21:00:00 +0000

The head of the serpent

The emir of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, is dead. The crowds in Washington and New York City celebrate with good reason. The raid that eventually located and killed the murderous jihadi leader represents a major success, and indeed an incredibly bright light in an otherwise dim decade of war. At the time of this writing, the infinity loop of media omnipresence rehearses and rehashes the debate about the ultimate meaning of Bin Laden’s death. To be sure, this is a major victory. While Bin Laden long ago ceased to be a major tactical target, his death looms large on the symbolic front. Al Qaeda suffered a massive blow with this raid, even if Bin Laden no longer “runs” this thing called “the Base.” In some sense, this may well be the death blow for the organization that Bin Laden and Zawahiri started during the Afghan resistance in the 80’s.

Of course, that view must stand in the light of the wider context, specifically of the world in 2011 rather than the world of 2001. Reflecting on the Islamic world, and particularly the Arab world, the contemporary scene presents very interesting shifts and frantic dynamism. At the beginning of the millennium, Reza Aslan suggested that the Islamic world found itself in a moment of vital transition which he compared to the Christian Protestant Reformation. In Aslan’s estimation, the “soul” and future of Islam stood in the balance, tugged between the forces of secularism, moderation and extremism. The seismic shifts that Aslan presciently presented now emerge more starkly than ever. In some sense, the Al Qaeda project failed, Not simply because of the death of its Emir, but because its virulent violence mostly fell upon the heads of Muslims. In the meantime ordinary Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemeni’s and Syrians continue to struggle for freedom and rule of law. Not a Bin Laden to be found among them. Indeed, even the legalist and largely mainstream Muslim Brotherhood was late to the revolutionary show. The Arab world moved on from the extreme Salafi-Wahhabi violence of Bin Laden, and the young people of the aforementioned countries are embracing a vision that aspires towards greater integration with the rest of the globe, rather than some obscurantist vision of a global Wahabbi Khalifate.

Of course, the “beardy-weirdies,” (to quote one of my favorite recent films) are not simply going to disappear. In fact, it is safe to assume that the various local franchises of The Base will carry on, and continue to spread mayhem and violence. And mayhem is perhaps the key here. One suspects the strong possibility of local groups – in Yemen, the Caucasus, and South Asia in particular - devolving into tactics and strategies which emphasize the “love of death” over the love of life. Some noted that the Joker in the Dark Knight represented contemporary terrorism. However, Bin Laden and Zawahiri never suffered a lack of ideological vision. The Joker was simply an agent of chaos, an actor for whom mayhem was an end in itself. He is not Bin Laden, but he is Zarqawi, the figure who embodies chaos as a physical and brute force. This is perhaps the immediate future of the global jihad. With the visionary Emir buried at sea, the mujahedeen will be pushed to the fringes of the wilderness.

The moment is indeed historic. One can say that we are entering the second phase of the Islamic reformation, a version 2.0. And while secularists have achieved much in the street while the barbarians have been pushed further from the gate, hybrid and culturally promiscuous strategies such as those of Tariq Ramadan and other liberal Muslims further add depth to the field. With critical questions regarding Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab Spring remaining unanswered, the death of Al Qaeda’s emir signals a beginning as much as an end.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 19:47:00 +0000

Some Cursory Thoughts

When I was a freshman at UCLA, I took a class on International Relations with one Dr. Steven Spiegel. At the outset of the course, Professor Spiegel told us that one of the overarching themes in contemporary international politics was the existence of the twin forces of fragmentation and integration. I was perhaps too young to understand whether the good professor was suggesting something about the world beyond international politics, and if he was perhaps suggesting something of a metaphor for the general trajectory of civilization or the species. Nonetheless, his words ring particularly prescient to me at this particular historical moment.

Fragmentation, as Spiegel described it, could be understood as the breakup of previous constructs. Examples abound, but in the late 90’s, the experience of the war in the Balkans and the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia loomed foremost on the topical horizon. In Africa, Eritrea declared itself an independent state, breaking away from Ethiopia. And in Asia, East Timor broke from Indonesia. Peoples in Chechnya, Kurdistan, and in the Indian Punjab sought independent homelands in the midst of a major reorganizing of the global structure.

The opposing force, as Spiegel described, is integration. In this context, integration refers to the process of creating increasing interdependence's between states, and thus creating institutions and instruments that reinforce stability within these interdependent relationships. This process has come to be generally termed “globalization.” This process integrates states into larger systems, be they political, economic or geostrategic. The creation of market “blocs,” such as the European Union and the North American free trade zone, trend towards bringing the functions of individual state political-economies into uniformity, inasmuch as that uniformity and the instruments by which it is created increase political cooperation and produce efficiencies in trade and economies of scale. The dramatic decrease in transportation and communication costs at the end of the 20th and into the beginning of the 21st centuries accelerated this process of integration, which perhaps represents the greatest re-organizing of human affairs in our species history.

If integration and fragmentation describe general global processes present in the post-cold war period, then another buzz word of the 21st century may well describe the looming multi-polar moment, and the diminished global hegemony of The United States. This word is sustainability. Of course, we typically think of sustainability as a way of describing the relationship between economic growth and environmental concerns. However, increasingly, sustainability can be turned to understand the process by which the post-colonial world was generally ordered and maintained during the cold-war period. There is very little debate about the role that the United States and the Soviet Union played in supporting non-democratically elected leaders throughout the world. These dictators and juntas were justified as being necessary to hold back the oncoming “red-wave” (or the powers of the capitalist imperialists). In many cases, these dictators were also supported in their efforts to control artificially constructed nation states, countries carved from post-colonial concerns with little or no thought given to existing demographic realities.

In the emerging multi polar moment, we increasingly see the word “sustainability” used to describe foreign policy. Since the revolutionary spirit first took hold in the streets of Cairo, the question of Israel emerged at the forefront of many minds. While Israeli fears of a Muslim Brotherhood dominated government in Cairo warrant consideration, the real question is one of sustainability. What does it say about the position of both Israel and the United States in the Middle East if the Israeli status quo can only be maintained by having a ring of dictatorships surround it? Clearly, this is not sustainable, and is in fact a relic of an older, diminishing world order.
This is particularly true in light of the other global forces described earlier. In a very real sense, we are seeing a potentially new moment of fragmentation; the breaking up of the unsustainable power structures that defined the geo-strategies of the cold-war and subsequent American global hegemony. While it may be soon to declare the twilight of the empire, it is clear that the international standing of the US has diminished and we are moving into a multipolar world. Furthermore, integration very much plays a role I defining the new sustainability. Those very same forces that drive globalization – cheap transportation and cheap communication – are connecting people all over the world in new venues of exchange, new communities that can share experiences of freedom, experiences of repression, yearnings and hopes. In a simple way, it means that young people in the Arab world can see what life is like in North America and Europe and say “We want that.” There are fewer blind spots, and while propaganda and information wars are still very much real, the truth is out there, and its available in a highly integrated and fast moving global culture.

This Arab Spring may well signal a historic moment, not just for Egypt, but for an emerging global order.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Fri, 04 Feb 2011 01:56:00 +0000

The Coming Storm

As events continue to unfold in Egypt, the million dollar question remains, "What's next?" The future shape of Egypt, and indeed the entire region is receiving a proper going over by the information machine. One topic in particular - the role of the Muslim Brotherhood - highlights the vast range of opinion and analysis and the inability to forecast when so much remains uncertain.

One thing is clear: there exists a momentum for change that does not appear to be abating anytime soon. Given Egypt's proximity to Gaza and its historical relationship to Israel, there is a strong sense that the outcome of the events in Tahrir Square will have cascading effects beyond the Rafah Crossing.

A confluence of forces, a perfect storm of sorts, may be bringing the plight of the Palestinian people to another significant historical moment. I had written on this very blog about the futility of the Obama administration's desire to jump start the peace process when it did. There were simply too many obstacles, and the momentum was towards a deepening divide between the sides, rather than rapprochement. As was to be expected, the peace talks fell flat. In December of the past year, Mahmoud Abbas threatened to dissolve the Palestinian Authority, placing the responsibility for administering the territories in Israel's hands. While this was seen by many as a bluff or an act of desperation, it did indeed signal the continued futility with which the PA attempted to steward the Palestinian cause.

At that time, many observers believed that dissolving the PA represented the best outcome for the Palestinians, as it may allow the resistance to enter a new phase, and press the UN directly for state recognition, or else move towards the One-State solution as both a practical and ideological matter. The recent release and dissemination of the "Palestinian Papers" put the final nail in the coffin of the PA. As Abdul Hadi, Palestinian rights advocate in Israel recently said, the papers revealed what the Palestinians had long feared: that the occupation was nothing more than imprisonment, and that the "PA Leaders are there only to negotiate the terms of imprisonment."

The idea of a rudderless resistance, without the PA, and with Fatah and Hamas still locked in seemingly intractable conflict would have potentially deadly consequences for the Palestinian cause. However, with the "Arab Spring" apparently upon us, it is possible that progressive and leftists elements in Palestine seize the moment to usher forth a third Intifada. Indeed, it may happen spontaneously and in populist fashion, as did the first Intifada. The PA leadership in general and Fatah in particular are suffering a deep crisis of perception, and it is likely that Hamas will align with the Muslim Brotherhood, from whence it was originally spawned. The MB may not be the winning horse in this race towards a free Egypt, and it is clear that groups like the PFLP, which had up till now operated largely in the shadow of Fatah, are siding with the "people of Egypt" and their democratic aspirations above all else.

A momentous shift in Palestinian affairs is likely for a lot of obvious reasons, and the protests in Egypt and Tunisia (Yemen, Jordan, Libya?) simply add to the probability of the Palestinians seizing the moment. It may not pretty. The Palestinians are among the most repressed and harassed people on Earth, and Israel may well use the opportunity of a shifting balance to pre-emptively punish the Palestinians to prevent the mobilization of their aspirations. Indeed, the schism between Hamas and Fatah may flair into a conflagration of dire proportion if a spontaneous rebellion emerges with no clear leadership.

Its clear change is upon us, and this change will undoubtedly change the face of the region for some time to come.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Wed, 26 Jan 2011 20:31:00 +0000

The Shape of Things to Come

Are we witnessing an "Arab Spring?" Events in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories are capturing the world's attention, as it seems that many people of the region are turning a corner. The sudden outbreak of democratic sentiment in the region is at once inspiring and disquieting. So many questions remain unanswered, and undoubtedly, only time will reveal the final form that these events will take.

Already, in Tunisia, we are witnessing the infant stages of post-revolutionary schism. While some of those involved in the movement to oust Ben Ali are prepared to proceed with an interim unity government, others demand that all remnants of the former regime be cleared from the government before any diminution of the revolutionary spirit begins. Whatever the final outcome, it seems - at least for the moment - that the Tunisian people are determining their destiny themselves.

With the fall of the March 14th led government in Beirut, Walid Jumblatt and Hezbollah have installed a new president and are in the process of forming a new government. Hezbollah appears to have significant popular support, and the Druze leader Jumblatt seems to have finally sided with the pan-Arabist aspirations of his forefathers. These recent events seem to repudiate March 14th's Pro-Western orientation. What remains to be seen is how Hariri will react; is this a time for entrenchment or engagement?

Events in Egypt continue to unfold. Even if Mubarak does not step down, his son possesses neither the support nor savvy to actually retain dynastic succession. Again, it is too early to know what will become of the protests currently erupting in the Egyptian street. However, there will no doubt be a fear-mongering campaign sponsored by Mubarak's regime suggesting that the fall of the government will automatically result in the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. This is a false dichotomy to be sure. While the Ikhwan has significant support, the Kefaya movement is by and large a secular movement that would likely throw significant support behind someone like Mohammad el Baradei. However, whatever the choice of Egyptian people in a post Mubarak age, for the first time in a long time it will be their choice alone.

The leaking of the now infamous "Palestinian Papers" is a significant, and perhaps historic event. I want to take a separate post to talk about them, as they contain much information, with still more being revealed everyday. However, one point must be made. Abu Mazen had very recently suggested that if Israeli concessions could not be made during the most recent round of negotiations, that the PA would dissolve and Israel would be made responsible for the administration of the territories. The release of these papers will hasten this reality, as popular support for the PA, and probably for Fatah, will wane to next to nothing.

More later . . .

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Tue, 11 Jan 2011 00:46:00 +0000

Making Sense of the Senseless

So, the question now is how did this happen? In the wake of the tragic and senseless shooting in Arizona, the urge to make sense of, and create meaning out of the events rises to the surface and quite frankly, troubles the collective consciousness. Within minutes of the shooting, facebook was littered with links reminding me of Palin’s now infamous “targeted districts” map. Coming close on the heels of the words of the Pima county Sheriff, media pundits immediately pointed to the “vitriol” present in contemporary political discourse as - if not a direct motivation of violence – a strong background factor in pushing someone over the edge.

And this is where it gets complicated. The fact of the matter is, I believe, that an incident like this defies an easy explanation. The fear, and sense of unease that the shooting in Arizona evokes is directly proportionate to our inability to integrate the spectacularly disruptive nature of the crime into our collective psyche. Furthermore, I think this explains the immediate desire to attempt to frame the incident in terms of binary oppositional structures. Now, before I lose you to theoretical jargon, let me try and explain.

It’s clear to everyone paying attention that the American political scene has recently suffered from a deterioration of civility. I’m immediately reminded of the outburst during Obama’s State of the Union address. The State of the Union is not meant to be a debate; it is not Prime Minister’s Questions. Of course, besides the halls of Washington themselves, the major site of “vitriol” is the mainstream media, which seems to magnify difference and divisiveness at every turn. While O’Reilly, Beck, Palin and Fox News trade on attacks, bullying and fear-mongering, the so called “liberal” side of the medium is often no better. In fact, the only real call for calm in the media storm came from comedians.

Believe me, I am no fan of Beck, Palin and their conservative/tea party cohorts. I think that putting gun sight crosshairs on a map of embattled districts is in seriously poor taste. However, this is not Palin’s fault. As john McCain rightly pointed out while reacting to the Arizona shooting, the rhetoric of violence and military metaphors is nothing new in politics. Both sides use terms like “targeted districts” and “battleground states.” Beck and Palin, among others, barely veil their extreme ideology, and their blatant appeals to popular fears coupled with an “us versus them” worldview and pro-gun advocacy certainly don’t help their case. However, they are not responsible for Congresswoman Giffords’ shooting. Jared Loughner alone is responsible for that.

And maybe no one is trying to force culpability on the Republican right. What we are trying to do is figure out why this happened. It reminds me in some ways of Columbine and Virginia Tech. The most troubling thing about those incidents is not that they don’t make sense; there is no convenient and easily understood structure by which we can integrate those events into our worldview. Blame Marilyn Manson, blame our gun culture, our violent history. Even in sum, the apparent forces at play do not account for a complete and rational vision. The troubling notion is that the conditions that lead to the tragedy in Arizona precede Palin and Beck. At this point is not clear that Loughner had any particular political sympathy. It is more likely that he exists, like the perpetrators of Columbine, and the gun man at Virginia Tech, in a fringe parameter of our contemporary society that does not conform to any 20th century notion of motivated violence. Gang bangers and drug dealers make sense, Islamic terrorism makes sense, and far right wing militia violence makes sense. As cynical as it may sound these are phenomena that still function along traditional, modern concepts of structural violence. This is not to accept or excuse these things; it is to point to the relative ease with which we integrate such spectacles into our understanding of the world.

Ultimately, I must confess that I write this because I myself cannot understand incidents like what took place in Arizona. It is too easy to point to nebulous factors like the influence of vitriolic rhetoric from the right, or guns or whatever else we can dredge up. It is ultimately more dangerous to lay blame for the sake of comfort and then attempt to regulate speech or behavior that cannot be proved to be causal. For it is imminently apparent that doing so would not reduce the amount of vitriol in our public discourse, but in fact increase it by holding to account those who are not ultimately responsible.

The trouble is that we have to do the hard thing, which is look at ourselves. We have to ask deeper questions, the kind where the answers may threaten cherished opinions and our comfortable intellectual refuges. Why is it that the right is winning so many to its cause? Why is it that the left cannot win over people who will ultimately benefit from the general ideological bent of the Democratic Party and its progressive adherents? There is a tendency to dismiss the followers of the Tea Party as ignorant or narrow minded, even plain old stupid. And this may well be why they continue to vote for those who manipulate their fears and insecurities. This self-reflection and criticality is, I believe the only thing we have to gain from this tragedy, and the only means to reducing the rhetoric of violence in our public debate.

And of course, I have strayed from the cause of explaining the shooting of Giffords. It is because in the end, there may be no explanation other than it is the act of a sick, and deeply troubled young man, living in a society that does not offer easy solutions to despair, to confusion or to desperation.

The great fear that accompanies incidents like this is that we have turned a corner, that we have entered a new and potentially grisly era of violent cynicism. In the end, we may have nothing left but to point to the actions of a troubled and deeply misguided young man that we can punish and hold solely responsible for the crime. This does not, however, mean that we should not remain vigilant in our attempts to maintain civility in our social and political discourse. It is too easy to take for granted the openness and accessibility of our civil society. We must remember that our democracy depends on education, access to information, and the ability to debate –without fear – the challenges that face us, and we must remember furthermore, that this system is not a given, and is not present in much of the world. We must fight to maintain this, even when that means reflecting critically on ourselves rather than just our political enemies, while resisting the urge to hunker down and prepare for some coming dark age of an ever-deteriorating social and political landscape.

noreply@blogger.com (Bobby S. Gulshan) — Thu, 02 Dec 2010 07:15:00 +0000

Switching to Dead Prez featuring Jay Z, Hell Yeah.

The track that justifies criminal activity as a form of reparations, or more probably as a means of resistance against a form of economic oppression that has left the inner city of America bereft of hope. “Ain’t you hungry my nigga, don’t you wanna get paid my nigga?” The chorus functions as revolutionary sloganeering: an inducement to embrace the post-revolutionary moment and take up arms in the name of preventing the complete effacement of a people. Dead Prez inhabits the space left by the Malcolm X/ Black Panther vision of the African American predicament. In some sense, it is possible to say that more mainstream rappers, such as Jay Z, Kanye West and 50 Cent present us with an accelerated version of minstrelsy, though not particularly buffoonish, as much as capitalizing and intensifying the ultraviolent and hyper-sexualized vision of the African American male as a caricature of white projections of the end of the civil rights project. As has often been said, the majority of the consumers of hip-hop and rap are white, suburbanites. The glorification of violence, misogyny and materialism found in mainstream rap music not only reflects the lack of developed economic systems in the inner city, but simultaneously reveals the hunger that the white mainstream culture has for sensational images of the other. In some perverse sense of order, the foregrounding of the “ghetto” as a signifier of authenticity reinforces in the minds of the white mainstream consumer the economic and cultural “arrival” of the African Americans in the post-civil rights moment.

The fact that this description conveys a colonized/colonizer dynamic should come as no surprise; rather than seeing the inner city as an important index of intentional and specific political and economic processes, it becomes a field of economic exploitation for the colonizer, and a field of desperation and perpetual conflict for the colonized. In this case, the product isn’t a material good, like a vital crop or mineral, but a set of cultural indicators and experiences whose initial vitality has been reduced to its most banal and libidinal elements.

And unless this set of dynamic interactions is understood, a track like W4 seems parodic at best and potentially absurd at worst.

“My J.O.B is just like a plantation.”

The critic charges that this is the worst sort of “complaint rap,” a parody of genuine revolutionary urge, transmuted into triviality and base simplicity. However, once the situation is perceived in terms of the near total economic disenfranchisement of the inner city (and thus, black and Hispanics) coupled with the simultaneous rigid codification and subsequent commodification of “street cred” and the extremely cynical and oppressive image of the “authentic OG,” the inner city street suddenly is more easily understood as being a kind of post-material plantation, a plantation of information and disembodied signification.