PaTaNi RiVeR

‘Safety zone’ in South only a pipe dream without BRN agreement

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Fri, 03 Mar 2017 04:39:00 +0000

IT WAS billed as a significant step – some even called it a breakthrough – but the announcement on Tuesday that the Thai government and Malay Muslim separatists from the far South has agreed on a “safety zone” is still a pipe dream because the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the group that controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground, is not onboard.

If the recent past is any lesson, the BRN stands ready to discredit any so-called progress made by the two sides – Thai government negotiators and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation made up of long-standing separatist movements besides the BRN.

For example, just a year ago, when a Thai official leaked to the local press that the two sides had agreed to designate Narathiwat’s Joh I Rong district as a “safety zone”, BRN combatants dispatched about 40 combatants to take over the district hospital and launched an assault on the Paramilitary Ranger camp next door. CCTV cameras captured the group’s movements, which was exactly what it wanted – to send a stern warning to the government and MARA Patani of its capabilities.

Government and MARA Patani lead negotiators came together this past Tuesday to rubber stamp the work of senior officials from both sides who had been working on various technical issues such as the scope, definition, mechanism and framework for formal talks.

The task at this point is to set the stage for formal negotiations that will take place if and when the two sides decide the time is right. For now, they have agreed in principle to bring five districts – one in Pattani, two in Yala and two in Narathiwat – under a “safety zone”. But they have yet to designate the specific districts.

It’s a small step forward and it was done in a way that MARA Patani would not suffer humiliation in the same manner as after the Joh I Rong retaliation.

But the right time to elevate this ongoing dialogue into formal negotiations may not depend on the preparations of the technical team. It has more to do with the BRN’s willingness to come to the table.

Discussion on how to bring the real BRN to the table has been carried out in back channels. But, so far, the BRN has not budged. One of the factions within the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) led by Samsudine Khan, who is based in Sweden, is taking the same wait-and-see approach.

One month after the Joh I Rong operation, MARA Patani was forced to swallow its pride in April 2016 when Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha said he could not formally recognise the umbrella organisation because it was associated with “criminals”.

Some officials say it was Prayut’s way of keeping MARA Patani at bay until the real BRN comes to the table. Others think Prayut realised that it is virtually impossible to reach any sort of formal agreement with the rebels during his time in office and he was not willing to make any meaningful concession because he was concerned about his legacy. He did not want to be remembered as the leader who gave away Patani, they said.

MARA Patani wants the dialogue process it conducts to be official and binding, as well as assurances that its negotiators and technicians will be granted legal immunity. Such demands are understandable in any conflict resolution process.

The rejection only reinforces the belief among BRN leaders that the Thai government side is not willing to make concessions and that coming to the table at this juncture would be a waste of time.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/national/30307667

** March 02, 2017 01:00
By DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
YALA

Southern Conflicts: Spiritual leader of Thailand's southern insurgents dies

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Tue, 24 Jan 2017 10:26:00 +0000

More than a decade ago, Sapae-ing Basor was one of Thailand's most wanted, his face

plastered on posters around the south offering 10 million baht, more than $250,000, for his capture. But when the spiritual leader of many Muslims in insurgency-torn southern Thailand died at 81 in self-imposed exile in Malaysia Jan. 10, it wasn't just thousands of his followers mourning in mosques that noted his passing.

Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha expressed his condolences. So did Thawee Sodsong, the officer who signed Sapae-ing's arrest warrant, meeting relatives in Pattani, the insurgency's epicenter.

The government's careful treading indicates how large Sapae-ing loomed in the imagination of southern Thailand, where a grinding insurgency has killed some 7,000 people since 2004. Several separatist groups are active in the three provinces closest to the Malaysian border, and Sapae-ing was associated with the most powerful, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional or BRN. Malay Muslims who make up the majority in of the three provinces have resented what they see as an imposition of Buddhist culture for decades. After a nationalist military junta seized power in 1932, Thailand passed the "National Culture Act" to press a uniform culture on the country. Lessons taught in local Jawi script were switched to Thai, and Muslim courts were replaced by civil courts, sparking resistance. Sapae-ing was educated in local Islamic schools before departing for Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to study Islamic law in 1964. After his return, he swiftly established himself as a charismatic theologian with a potent authority. He became headmaster at Thamma Witthaya, a prominent Islamic school. He "was not only leader of his family, but was also the leader of a family of tens of thousands," the school said in a statement. "He was not just headmaster of the school, but the headmaster of society in general." Over the 1960s and 70s, the rebellion was sporadic and fractured among dozens of separatist groups. Violence waned in the 1990s, as Thailand allowed limited cultural rights.

In the early 2000s, attacks escalated dramatically, led by the BRN. Sapae-ing was senior in the BRN but his official role in the organization is unclear. Don Pathan, a southern Thailand security analyst, said that although was little proof Sapae-ing was involved organizing day-to-day fighting, he served as a "one-man religious police.""It was enough to build a new generation of separatists," Don said. Sapae-ing urged southerners to hold fast to their Malay Muslim identity and values while decrying the Thai government as a corrupting influence. "He would go around the pubs and bars and look for his students, and if he'd see them he'd beat them," Don said. "They look at the rest of the country and see that 'This isn't what we want for our kids.'"

Then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched a bloody crackdown on separatists in 2004. Lawyers disappeared. Imams were shot. An army roundup on a single October day left 85 protesters dead; seven were shot to death and the rest suffocated in overcrowded trucks taking them away to be detained. Police suspected Thamma Witthaya to be a "hotbed of recruitment for the militants." Accusing Sapae-ing of spearheading the insurgency, police issued a warrant for his arrest, and he fled to Malaysia in 2004. Don said that although Sapae-ing said little publicly after leaving Thailand, he remained an influential figure in the south."He has moral authority, but he's not a politician," Don said. "He's like a pope without a church."

After a decade of violence, the Thai government reached out to Sapae-ing. Jaded, he balked but eventually sent representatives calling for greater autonomy instead of outright independence, a reconciliatory step that took insurgents by surprise. But he refused to meet Thai officials and talks went nowhere. Sapae-ing died after suffering from stomach illnesses and complications from diabetes, said Srisompob Jitpiromsri, director of the independent monitoring group Deep South Watch, who has been in touch with Sapae-ing's relatives. His death comes as new rounds of peace talks are underway. But the BRN has opted out and few think things will change. "For now, they do not trust the military government," Srisompob said. "It depends on the progress of the peace dialogues. Just wait and see."

Credit: FoxNews world 23/11/2017

Thailand ‘Not Ready’ to Accept Reference Terms for Peace: Southern Rebels

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Fri, 29 Apr 2016 07:55:00 +0000

Efforts to restart peace talks in Thailand’s Deep South ground to a halt when the Thai government this week declined to endorse ground rules for formal negotiations, the rebel side said Thursday.

Negotiators for the two sides had “mutually agreed” to terms of reference (TOR) in earlier meetings, and expected the full delegations to endorse them at talks in Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday, sources among the rebels told BenarNews. But the meeting lasted only an hour and 15 minutes, according to the insurgents.

“[T]he Thai side was not ready to endorse the TOR,” said Abu Hafez Al-Hakim, a spokesman for MARA Patani, a panel representing southern rebel groups and factions in negotiations with Thailand’s junta.

“We are however unsure if party A wants to review the TOR, draft a new one or suspend the process altogether,” he said, referring to the Thai delegation. “We were informed that the Thai Prime Minister has not yet approved it.”

The setback to the Malaysia-brokered peace efforts occurred a week after Lt. Gen. Nakrob Boonbuathong, Thailand’s top negotiator with southern rebels since 2013, told BenarNews that he had been removed from that duty.

In comments to reporters the next day, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha called the change of personnel a “normal reshuffle.”

Thai delegation members and military officials in Bangkok could not be reached for comment about the talks on Wednesday or Thursday.

Ahmad Zamzamin, the Malaysian facilitator of talks aimed at re-opening formal peace negotiations for the first time since December 2013, declined requests for comment.

‘A set of rules’

The contents of the TOR have not been revealed to the public, and a statement released by MARA Patani on Thursday did not make clear what the Thai side had objected to in the terms.

A MARA Patani steering committee had approved the terms earlier in April, and a technical team from the Thai side, led by Nakrob, had agreed to them as well after multiple meetings since last year, Abu Hafez said.

“The TOR is like a set of rules and regulations without which a match could not be played,” Abu Hafez said.

“Whatever reasons they have (for not endorsing the TOR), we will give them ample time to reconsider and reverse that decision,” he added.

The MARA spokesman also alluded to Nakrob’s absence at Wednesday’s short meeting.

“He was the ‘engine’ of the Thai team who is knowledgeable and well-versed of the peace process,” Abu Hafez said.

“Prior to his removal, he was optimistic that the Party A would endorse the TOR. His absence was felt and has considerably affected the process.”

‘Not a good sign’

In Thailand, some analysts and NGO leaders reacted with consternation to news of the setback to the peace talks.

“This is certainly not a good sign for the peace dialogue,” Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, an expert on the Deep South, told BenarNews.

Rungrawee said that Prime Minister Prayuth should publicly explain why Thailand did not back the terms, which government representatives had been hammering out with the rebel side for months.

“At the moment, the prospect for the government to proceed with the dialogue is apparently grim,” Rungrawee said, calling the process “vital to the search for a long-term solution to the protracted southern conflict.”

In Yala province, Rukchart Suwan, president of the Buddhist Network for Peace, said he was not surprised that Prayuth had not endorsed the reference terms. He urged negotiators to communicate with the public about the way forward.

“Is a new TOR needed? How long will this take to be done? These [questions] are hanging in the minds of the people, and they have an uncomfortable feeling toward the way the government has worked,” Rukchart said.

Rebel ranks split

Thursday was the 12th anniversary of the Krue Se mosque incident. On April 28, 2004, armed separatists launched attacks across the Deep South that culminated in a military raid on a 400-year-old mosque that killed 32 suspected rebels holed up inside.

More than 6,000 people have died since then in violence associated with the separatist insurgency in Thailand's predominantly Muslim and Malay-speaking Deep South region. Since early February alone, at least 35 people have been killed in shootings and bombings carried out by suspected insurgents.

On Thursday, a Thai paramilitary was killed and five others were injured in a bomb attack in Yala – one of the provinces in the Deep South – as they were helping to build houses for poor people, police said.

Commenting on the latest twist in the peace process, Malaysian analyst Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani told BenarNews that talks could not take place amid such violence.

In his view, rebels who oppose the peace process spearheaded by MARA Patani were behind the recent surge in regional violence. A sticking point in the peace process has been demands by hardcore rebels for total independence from Thailand, he noted.

“The failure of agreeing to the TOR also comes from the disagreement among the rebel groups themselves. Although MARA Patani has been formed, there are rebel groups who, at the moment, feel left out in the peace talks,” said Azizuddin, a political science and international relations expert at Universiti Utara Malaysia.

Hata Wahari in Kuala Lumpur, Nasueroh in Pattani, Thailand, and Nani Yusof in Washington contributed to this report.

Thanks: http://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/Deep-South-peace-04282016070504.html

Joint statement: Armed violence in the Cho-airong Hospital, Narathiwat: All parties urged to protect public health system

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Tue, 15 Mar 2016 02:37:00 +0000

For immediate release on 14 March 2016

A joint statement by

Duayjai Group, Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF) and Patani Human Rights Organization

Armed violence in the Cho-airong Hospital, Narathiwat: All parties urged to protect public health system

In pursuance to the violence in the Cho-airong Hospital on 13 March 2016, the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Public Health, Dr Sophon Mekthon said that the siege by the insurgents did not last so long and none of the health personnel was harmed, though damages have been inflicted on property including computers, desks, doors, etc. All medical personnel, nurses and doctors, are fine as well as the patients. High ranking officers will be dispatched there to inspect the situation and will report more information to the Ministry later.

According to security agencies, the incidence in the Cho-airong Hospital was related to the attack on the Military Ranger Company base TP 4816, the 48^th Ranger Regiment, Tambon Chuab, Cho-airong District, Narathiwat, which is located just in front of the hospital. The Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Public Health extended his appreciation to all military personnel who have carefully performed their duties without using excessive force and have been able to suppress the incidence without causing any fallouts on medical personnel, the patients and their relatives and other people and their property.

It is unacceptable that the acts of the insurgents have caused damages to the medical equipment and other facilities since it will render direct impact on the lives of the patients and the injured persons and may deprive them of the life-saving services.

“Any armed operation aiming to kill the medical personnel, the patients and the injured persons, as well as to damage the medical facilities and equipment as well as ambulances is a breach to international humanitarian law and is thoroughly unacceptable. The state and non-state armed groups and all other parties are urged to help protect and ensure that the operation of the medical personnel be minimally affected. Any act intended to obstruct or impede the performance of duties among the medical personnel is grossly condemned” said Anchana Heemmina, Leader of the Duayjai Group.

Even though the Southern Border Provinces have not been accepted as internal armed conflict or non-international armed conflict, and thus it has been invoked as a reason to not act in compliance with international humanitarian law, but since the law provides for protection of the public, therefore, both parties, the state and non-state armed forces, should commit themselves to upholding the law and accepting its implications.

The human rights organizations based in the local area and working to protect human rights and legal protection in the Southern Border Provinces have the following demands;

All forces, the state and non-state armed groups, must act in strict compliance with international humanitarian law for the benefit of local people.
The state and armed groups must review their military tactics and strategies considering the safety of public, and particularly attention should be given to maintaining the public health system.
Whichever armed groups must refrain from attacking medical and public health facilities or refrain from laying siege and using the facilities as a base for their armed operation or to act in anyway which would impede or obstruct the performance of duties of medical and public personnel. This should include the attack of educational institutions, religious sites and prayer sites, and other public facilities.
All concerned parties must make the effort to investigate the incidence and to bring to justice the perpetrators involved with the infringement of international humanitarian law.

Contact: Anchana Heemmina, Duay Jai Group, phone 081-8098609

Isama-ae Tae, Patani Human Rights Organization, phone 085-2527824

Pornpen Khongkachonkiet, phone 086-7093000

Govt needs to show it really wants PEACE in the South

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Mon, 04 Jan 2016 07:45:00 +0000

Signs do not look good before the re-start of peace talk

It is somewhat strange for the chief negotiator for Thailand's peace talks with the Patani Malay separatists, known as MARA Patani, to be revealing what is on the table before securing a buy-in and understanding with the other side.

Through his spokesperson, retired General Aksara Kerdpol revealed the idea of a "safety zone" being drafted for discussion with the separatist groups.

Colonel Banphot Phunphien, spokesman for the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), quoted Aksara as saying the delineation of a safety zone was among three proposals that the Thai team would try to present at the dialogue process.

The last time talk of putting two districts in a "safety zone" became news - a few weeks ago - a member of the MARA Patani was forced to go public and dismiss the idea, saying it was not something they backed.

"Safety zone" is another term used in reference to areas where a ceasefire is to be implemented.

Currently, the two sides are operating under an official "pre-talk" mode where confidence-building measures are explored.

Aksara's notion of a "safety zone" reads like something out of a school textbook. Needless to say, reality on the ground speaks differently.

The appointment of a hawkish commander for the Fourth Army, for example, goes against the government's stated attempt to create an atmosphere conducive to peace and talks.

Moreover, the recent decision to seize the property of a well-known traditional Islamic boarding school in Pattani - the Jihad Withaya - also sent a wrong message to people of the region and separatist groups who the government often referred to as "people who think differently" from the state.

And let's not forget the culture of impunity or questionable death of suspects while in detention.

If the state can seize property on grounds that it is allegedly being used to promote separatist tendency or indoctrination, then nowhere is safe - not the teashops in remote villages or the community football team - as sep

aratism has long been very much part of the region's historical narrative.

Banphot said it was hoped that successful implementation of a "safety zone" could first reduce the number of violent incidents in the designated area and then humanitarian law would be applied.

Does that mean humanitarian principle can only be applied in areas were violence has ended? Why wait? State security agencies should be making humanitarian principles their utmost priority, especially in such conflict in which the name of the game is to win hearts and minds of the local residents.

Sadly, one only has to ask government's troops on the ground whether they know what the rules of engagement are. Most likely, one will get a blank stare. Shoot to kill would probably be a common answer. After all, the Emergency Law functions very much like a licence to do just that.

In fact, not one official working in the region has been convicted for any wrong doing over this past 12 years in spite of obvious evidence linking them to crimes.

When the government of Yingluck Shinawatra was overseeing the peace process, her point man on the ground for the process - Thawee Sodsong - was not able to end the practice of targeted killings.

Needless to say, it spoiled the atmosphere that was supposed to be conducive for peace.

Today, with the army in full control, not only have violations continued unabated, but the atmosphere is still years away from being conducive for peace talks.

And to show that they are not exactly in a peace-talking mode, at least not in an environment full of intimidation, insurgents this past week burnt down a public school in Pattani's Thung Yang Daeng district. This happened at the same school they burnt down in late 2014 to send a stern warning over the alleged torture of young men in the area.

No doubt about it, there is blood on the hands of both sides, not to mention violations of humanitarian principles. If we can't graduate and move beyond beyond this situation on the ground, we have little chance of success at any formal peace process.

Thanks: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Govt-needs-to-show-it-really-wants-PEACE-in-the-So-30276034.html

BRN call for foreign observers at peace talks a key test for Bangkok

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Tue, 20 Oct 2015 03:57:00 +0000

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

October 19, 2015 1:00 am

Insurgent group says it is willing to negotiate if Thailand follows international norms

For an organisation whose leadership is very secretive, Barisan Revolusi Nasional is drifting into uncharted territory as its "Information Department" reaches out to foreign media to make their case about Thailand's questionable effort to secure peace in its southernmost provinces.

Reaching out to foreign media may have come out of a desire to remind the world that

BRN's leadership has yet to endorse Thailand's current peace initiative.
Nevertheless, it was a step in a more conventional direction - one that could force the Thai government to rethink its own information strategy, according to a Thai government official working on the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

What was interesting, noted the Thai official and Artef Sohko, a youth activist and member of a political action group, the Academy of Patani Raya for Peace and Development (Lempar), was that the
BRN Information Department had reached out to Anthony Davis, a veteran writer who has for decades written on security issues and conflicts around Asia for Jane's Defence Weekly and other major publications.
For years, much of the information about the conflict in Thailand's southernmost provinces had been provided by the state, making any reporting lopsided.

But the Thai government will no longer enjoy a monopoly on the flow of information should groups like theBRN, which controls a vast majority of the insurgents on the ground, begin to seriously exercise their communication strategy.

A
BRN source said the leadership in the movement, namely the Dewan Pimpinan Party, or DPP, agreed to the interview because they wanted to set the record straight regarding the peace initiative of Thailand, the Malaysian government and MARA Patani, the recently established umbrella organisation.
Whether this was a one-time thing remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it was enough to get Thais to seriously think about what the future holds in the realm of communication strategy.

Besides the recent interview with Davis,
BRN's leadership also issued a four-page statement slamming Thailand for deceiving the world with the initiative but not being willing to make any meaningful concession.
BRN
said they are willing to negotiate for peace but the process must be carried out along international norms and the talks must be witnessed by foreign states.
As expected, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan rejected the demand that foreign governments observe the peace talks.

Bangkok has never liked the idea of foreign mediation for fear of "internationalising" the conflict, which they feel would give too much legitimacy to the separatists.

BRN
sources said the DPP would only endorse the peace talks if their negotiators are properly prepared and their political wings receive the needed immunity.
Earlier last month, just 10 days after the August 27 launch of MARA Patani in Kuala Lumpur, the DPP reminded the world about their feeling about the Thai state through a statement read out by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of the movement's youth wing who's also part of the
BRN Information Department.
In the video statement, he

criticised the Thai state for

being insincere and lacking

legitimacy in Malays' historical homeland, which is today's

southern border provinces.

It was hard to dismiss Abdulkarim's statement as irrelevant because he was not an unknown entity. The man was at the negotiating table at the previous round of talks launched by the Yingluck government in February 2013.

Abdulkarim was sent to the talks by the DPP under a very strict mandate. He could not negotiate - as theBRN's DPP did not officially endorse the Yingluck initiative - but would observe and report back to the top leaders.

That initiative ended in late 2013 when the designated "BRN
liaison", Hasan Taib, threw in the towel and went incommunicado. Street protests in Bangkok also sent the Yingluck government into survival mode until her administration was ousted in May of last year by a military coup.
Seven months after the putsch, the junta decided to pick up where the Yingluck team had left off, but with conditions. Prime Minister
Prayut Chan-o-cha demanded that the separatist leaders develop a common platform and implement "a period of peace".
Thai officials said "the period of peace", or ceasefire, was to demonstrate that MARA Patani members had adequate command-and-control over the militants on the ground.

Bangkok did not get their "period of peace" but the separatists did form the MARA Patani, a platform for their common strategy and for dealing with the Thais collectively.

Prayut
rejected the idea of granting MARA Patani formal recognition and legal immunity but said talks could continue - in an unofficial capacity.
MARA Patani was a sideshow, or Track 1.5, to the Yingluck official Track 1 initiative that has Malaysia as designated facilitator.

Today, with Hasan and Abdulkarim abandoning the initiative, the sideshow was elevated to a formal Track 1. But being on Track 1 does not guarantee MARA Patani members formal or meaningful recognition as Bangkok does not want to give away too much too soon to the Patani Malay groups.

But if MARA Patani could secure a buy-in from the DPP, Bangkok just might take them more seriously and grant them the recognition they want, security officials said.

For the time being, MARA Patani, Thailand's dialogue panel (negotiators) and the Malaysian facilitators are pinning their hopes on a small group of young
BRN members who broke ranks and joined the peace talks.
Two of these individuals - Sukree Hari and Ahmad Chuwo - were paraded to the press in Kuala Lumpur with other MARA Patani representatives. They still called themselves "BRN" but combatants on the ground said, "Who cares?" What matters, in today's context, is who has command-and-control on the ground.

The Thai negotiators, MARA Patani and Kuala Lumpur were hoping that these former teachers from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala could bridge the gap between them and the
BRN ruling council.
But the recently released four-page statement, along with Abdulkarim's statement on YouTube, not to mention the interview with Davis, was
BRN's way of telling all stakeholders that there is no shortcut to peace.
Thai officials have quietly acknowledged that parading the pair to the media in late August along with the MARA Patani may have been a premature move.

Perhaps all sides should have waited until they are certain that these former teachers have secured the needed endorsement from the
BRN's ruling council.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com

Mara Patani : A New Hope of Peace?

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Sat, 29 Aug 2015 15:47:00 +0000

In a historic press conference, the representatives of MARA PATANI( Majlis Syura Patani -Patani consultative council)spoke toThai reporters at the Premiera Hotel in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on August 27, 2015 to lay out their aims and expectations after wrapping up talks there with negotiators from Thailand’s military government.

The Mara Patani is a new umbrella group of six freedom movements, consisting of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), three factions of the Patani Liberation Organisation (Pulo), the Gerakan Mujahidee (GMIP) and Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP)

“We formed Mara Patani to make our struggle a peaceful one,” said Awang Jabal, chairman of Mara Patani, an umbrella organization. “The use of violence and weapons has to go through steps to end violence from both sides. It depends on mutual understanding and trust.”

The Mara Patani delegation was comprised of representatives from the six groups which have been struggling for the secession of Thailand’s three southern border provinces for the past decade. Awang Jabat representing the BRN and the head of Mara Patani , said he invited Thai media so they could “understand the true ways of Mara Patani, which are transparent matters,” and to help support a dialogue to bring peace to the three southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat

Sukree, a representative e of BRN said Mara Patani submitted three preliminary proposals as a condition for peace. Firstly, the Thai government must place the negotiations on the national agenda, which would bring them to the parliament, thus ensuring changes in Thailand’s government would not disrupt the process, as happened the last time talks were brokered. They also asked for recognition of Mara Patani as the legitimate negotiating party and legal immunity for its negotiating leaders.

An array of shadowy militant groups are currently battling to separate the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala from Bangkok’s rule. The Muslim-majority region, known as the Deep South, was an independent Islamic nation called Patani before it was annexed by Siam in the early 20th century. Nearly 6,500 people have died since the latest wave of secessionist violence broke out in January 2004, according to data compiled officially by rights groups.

In 2013 the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra set up a dialogue with the BRN. However, the discussion was never declared a national agenda – as demanded by BRN at the time – and the two parties failed to reach any substantial conclusion. Issues about autonomy and possible independence of Patani were hardly discussed. Further dialogue was quitted when anti-government protests broke out in Bangkok in November 2013. The military later seized power from in a coup d’etat in May 2014.

The military junta later expressed its willingness to restart talks and on Tuesday dispatched a team of negotiators to the meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

Speaking in Kuala Lumpur Thursday, Mr Awang stressed the umbrella group's main purpose was to "ensure the rights and interests of the people of Patani are heard, considered, discussed and fought for, consistently, systematically and concretely, it's about self-determination, not secession or separation," said Mr Awang.

Meanwhile, Thailand Prime Minister's Office Minister Suwaphan Tanyuvardhana said he believes the peace discussion by the joint working group has made significant progress.

A Thai House Divided

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Tue, 21 Jul 2015 11:02:00 +0000

By PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

A rift is growing within Thailand’s military-royalist establishment, threatening the country’s stability and undermining prospects that the upcoming royal succession will unfold smoothly.

On one side is an old guard of senior officers who gradually consolidated power during the long reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. On the other is a new guard from a semi-autonomous elite military unit at the service of Queen Sirikit, which includes the leaders of last year’s coup against the elected government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, the current prime minister, is a former commander of the 21st Infantry regiment, better known as the Queen’s Guard. Founded in 1950 to fight in the Korean War, it was later assigned to protect Sirikit. After rising to eminence within the regiment, in recent years General Prayuth has sought to increase his political power, and now is challenging other military-royalist factions.

The army has been an indispensable actor in Thai politics for decades, thanks largely to its close connection with the monarchy. Together the military and the royal family have worked to keep civilian governments weak in order to maintain more power themselves. During the Cold War, they joined forces to ward off Communist influence. Their alliance was reinforced in the 1980s, after King Bhumibol appointed Prem Tinsulanonda, a general, to be prime minister. With that nomination, Mr. Prem became the head of what the political scientist Duncan McCargo has called the “network monarchy”: a political consortium of pro-monarchy groups that includes the military, conservative royalists, senior bureaucrats and big business.

Mr. Prem stepped down in 1988, largely because of infighting within his government, but he remained influential behind the scenes. Notably, he is said to have advised Bhumibol during the turbulent period of 1991-92. After Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon, a member of the junta then in power, reneged on a promise not to become prime minister, there were pro-democracy protests, and then the military killed some demonstrators. Bhumibol stepped in, calling for a truce while keeping his distance from the army, and earning a reputation as a stabilizing force and for being neutral. In 1998 Bhumibol appointed Mr. Prem to preside over the Privy Council, an advisory body that protects the monarchy’s interests and propagates its views. By that time, non-elected institutions like the Privy Council and the courts were exerting more and more influence in Thai politics.

The power of Mr. Prem and his supporters in the network monarchy continued to grow until 2001. That year, the telecommunications tycoonThaksin Shinawatra won the election by a landslide, thanks to a populist platform vowing to reduce rural poverty. Tensions between elected and non-elected institutions became an open conflict, as Mr. Thaksin threatened to recast the political landscape and challenge the domination of the monarchy and the military. He was ousted in 2006 in a coup widely believed to have been masterminded by Mr. Prem. (He has denied this.)

Thaksin was not the only loser, however. Soon the Prem faction found itself weakened by the emergence of an anti-coup movement, the so-called red-shirts, as well as anti-monarchist sentiment, which was growing as Bhumibol’s health deteriorated. Queen Sirikit, meanwhile, was becoming more politically active, partly to compensate for Bhumibol’s fading authority.

Sirikit’s position has been reinforced in recent years with the promotion of men from the Queen’s Guard to key positions in the army. General Prayuth was deputy army chief in May 2010 when the army cracked down on red-shirt protesters in Bangkok’s business district; a few months later, he became army chief. Most leaders of the 2014 coup are members of the Queen’s Guard.

Although Sirikit suffered a severe stroke in 2012, her loyalists remain powerful, and now seem ready to influence the royal succession. The Prayuth government apparently supports Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, whom Bhumibol designated as his heir apparent in 1972. Vajiralongkorn, for his part, seems to have endorsed General Prayuth’s coup — by, for example, presiding over the inaugural session of the National Legislative Assembly in August 2014.

But the old guard within the network monarchy finds Vajiralongkorn lacking in gravitas. According to a 2010 U.S. diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks, Mr. Prem, the Privy Councilor Siddhi Savetsila and former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun expressed misgivings to the U.S. ambassador to Thailand about the prince becoming king. A note by the ambassador says Mr. Siddhi and Mr. Anand “implied the country would be better off if other arrangements could be made.” Mr. Siddhi suggested that Vajiralongkorn’s sister Princess Sirindhorn, who is well liked by the public, be made heir apparent instead.

Conservative royalists have also become increasingly critical of the military government. Mr. Prem told the media in January, “this country does not belong to Prayuth.” Mr. Anand recently declared in public that General Prayuth should “not to extend his rule too long.” Rumors of a countercoup are growing louder in Bangkok.

General Prayuth has responded by placing more members of the Queen’s Guard in major positions: His brother General Preecha is rumored to become the next army chief. General Prayuth has reportedly been orchestrating this promotion without consulting the Privy Council, even though it traditionally has had a say in important military appointments.

But Mr. Prem is not yet out of the picture. When Bhumibol passes, it will be up to the Privy Council to formally recommend the heir apparent to Parliament for approval and then appointment to the throne. At that point it could nominate Sirindhorn instead of Vajiralongkorn. Even if it did endorse the prince, simply delaying that decision by a day would do great damage to his legitimacy as king.

Fragmentation within the military-royalist complex is complicating the upcoming royal succession in Thailand. With the factions of General Prayuth and Mr. Prem apparently favoring different candidates to the throne, the two men’s struggle could translate into power plays within the government, the army and the palace itself. And should the camp of the Queen’s Guard prevail and Vajiralongkorn accede to the throne, both the military and the monarchy would become even more politicized — and Thailand even less democratic.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

Thanks:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/opinion/a-thai-house-divided.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore-ipad&_r=0

UNHCR shocked over Thailand's deportation of some 100 persons of Turkic origin

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Thu, 09 Jul 2015 23:48:00 +0000

UNHCR - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

09/07/2015 | Press release

distributed by noodls on 09/07/2015 08:15

Press Releases, 9 July 2015

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is alarmed at today's deportation of some 100 persons of Turkic origin by Thailand. It is believed that they were taken to China on two flights early on Thursday morning (July 10), despite having indicated that they did not wish to be deported to China. The group may have included women and children.

UNHCR has been aware of these cases for several months, and made numerous interventions on their behalf to the Royal Thai Government. In response, the agency was given assurances that the matter would be handled in accordance with international legal standards, and that the group would continue to receive protection.

A third country solution was identified and a group of 172 women and children benefitted from this solution last week.

"While we are seeking further clarifications on what happened exactly, we are shocked by this deportation of some 100 people and consider it a flagrant violation of international law," said Volker Türk, UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, who is currently in the region.

"I strongly urge the Thai authorities to investigate this matter and appeal to Thailand to honor its fundamental international obligations, notably the principle of non-refoulement, and to refrain from such deportations in the future," he added.

UNHCR urges the Royal Thai Government in the strongest possible terms to allow those remaining to depart voluntarily and as soon as possible to a country of their choice which is willing to receive them.

- See more at: http://www.noodls.com/view/5FD011D675F06682D34E8E13608DEA1482830885?

7968xxx1436434527#sthash.fCl4BL7S.dpuf

US condemns Thailand for Uighur deportation Washington (AFP) - The United States condemned Thailand on Thursday for its deportation of 100 ethnic Uighurs to China and warned they could face "harsh treatment," as the international incident inflames diplomatic tensions.The US "expressed our grave disappointment to Thailand," State Department spokesman John Kirby said."We condemn Thailand's forced deportation on July 9 of over 100 ethnic Uighurs to China, where they could face harsh treatment and a lack of due process," the department said in a statement. The fate of a group of Uighurs in Thailand had been in doubt after Thailand sentenced them for illegal entry to the country in 2014.Thailand announced the deportation Thursday of the Uighurs, a Muslim minority in China's northwest who speak Turkic and have often opposed Chinese control.It was also revealed that some of the group had been sent to Turkey in June. Anti-Chinese protesters stormed the Thai consulate in Istanbul in protest of the controversial deportation, the latest demonstration in the country over China's treatment of Uighurs. Human rights groups say Uighurs who flee China face possible torture and other abuses if returned. There are around 10 million Uighurs in China's northwest Xinjiang region and many say they face cultural and religious repression. "This action runs counter to Thailand’s international obligations as well as its long-standing practice of providing safe haven to vulnerable persons," the State Department said in the statement, urging the country to halt further deportations.Aid organizations should have "unfettered" access to the Uighurs and Thailand should respect its international obligations not to expel refugees, the US said. "We urge Thailand to allow those remaining ethnic Uighurs to depart voluntarily to a country of their choice."

Car Bomb in Samui Island: The expand of Operation Out Side Patani Land!

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Tue, 14 Apr 2015 05:28:00 +0000

Police said on Saturday (Apr 11) that car bomb on a resort Island of Samui(Thailand) has wounded seven people, including one Italian girl, The bomb placed inside a Mazda pick-up truck with false plates, was detonated remotely by mobile phone late on Friday( 22.30pm) in the underground car park of the Central Festival mall.
Police said the car had been stolen on Mar 31, 2015 from Yaha district, Yala province, one of Thailand's three southernmost Muslim-majority provinces that have been scorched by a more than 10 years armed struggle in which more than 6,500 people have been killed and ten of thousand injured.
Thai national police spokesman Lieutenant General Prawut Thavornsiri said that It's a car bomb but we cannot confirm what type of explosive materials they used, the bomb was hidden in Mazda pick-up truck stolen from Yala province without specifying whether the blast was believed to be linked to the conflict hundreds of kilometres away further south but the bomb could negatively impact tourists destination.
Colonel Banphot Phunphien, spokesman for the military's Internal Security Operation Command said that there had been no confirmation to suggest the rebels were planning to expand their sphere of operations but it's possible that insurgents with bomb-making skills were hired to make an attack. The government has blamed anti-coup groups for a series of small bomb attacks in Bangkok this year, using them to justify the imposition of martial law and the arrest of political leaders and activists. Government critics have suggested that some of the bombings may have been carried out by the military government to justify its continued suppression of basic rights and liberties but the government denies such allegation.

Experts say that if any link to the unrest in the south is established, it would be an unexpected development. because the insurgents, who are seeking independence of Patani state, have not launched an attacks in Thailand's better-known tourist areas outside of the south but the blasts have occasionally struck Hat Yai, the main commercial city in the southern part of the country. Recently the Thai military government says it is trying to reboot peace talks with Patani Muslim liberation groups but yet no date for the talks has been announced.
Meanwhile Bomb squad experts(EOD) said that the same kind of bombs had been placed in district of Haat Yai, district of Sadao, Songkhla province( 2013) and in Phuket province(2013) believed that operated by Patani Independence fighters.
On April 14, 2015 Major General Kongcheep Tantrawanich, speaker of Defence ministry concluded that the aim of this blast is 1) political interest 2) business interest and 3) the expand of sphere of influence of Patani or southern conflicts while the experts believed that after the blast the junta likely to claim legitimacy to operate section 44 dictator law all over the country despite harsh criticism.

Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 : The End of Patani Kingdom as a Sovereign state

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Wed, 11 Feb 2015 06:45:00 +0000

Patani 1837

Present day Patani

The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 or Bangkok Treaty of 1909 was a treaty between the United Kingdom

and Thailand signed on March 10, 1909, in Bangkok .[1] Ratification were exchanged in London on July 9, 1909.[2]

The agreement, in which the Malay people were not represented, effectively dissected the northern Malay states into two parts. The area around modern Pattani (Malay Patani), Narathiwat(Malay Menara),Songkhla(MalaySinggora), Satun (Malay:Setul ) andYala (Malay: Jala) remained under Thaicontrol,while Thailand relinquished its claims to sovereignty over Kedah (Thai: ไทรบุรี(Saiburi)),Kelantan(Thai:กลันตัน(Kalantan)), Perlis(Thai: ปะลิส(Palit)) and Terengganu(Thai: ตรังกานู (Trangkanu))which integrated the British sphere of influence’ s protectorates. These four states, along with Johor , later became known as the Unfederated Malay States

Originally Satun and Perlis were part of the Malay Sultanate of Kedah but only Satun remained withThailand. Patani, Narathiwat, Songkhla and Yala were historically ruled by the Malay Sultanate of Patani.The British logic for sanctioning the continued Thai occupation of the remaining northern half of the Malaya was the perceived value of Thailand as a friendly buffer against the French in Indochina. Both signatories of the 1909 treaty had previously agreed to the Burney Treaty in 1826. The BurneyTreaty stated that Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu were Thai provinces while Penang and Province Wellesley belonged to the British while Thailand would not interfere with British trade in Kelantan and Terengganu.This agreement has had a long lasting effect on both Thailand and the Federation of Malaysia. The border between them was mainly drawn by this treaty.
The incremental tide of discontent generated by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 may have, in part laid the foundations for the South Thailand insurgency in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat from 2004 to the present.

Notes

1. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer,"International Boundary Study: Malaysia - Thailand Boundary," No. 57 15 November 1965.

2. Great Britain,Treaty Series, No. 19 (1909)

Malay lands affirmed as Siamese territory by Great Britain in the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty:-1) The four Monthon Pattani districts of Patani, Jala (Siamised as Yala), Teluban (Saiburi) andMenara (Narathiwat);2) The old Patani districts of Tiba (Thepha) and Cenak (Chana) in Monthon Nakhon SiThammarat (old Ligor);3) The Kelantan district of Tabal (Takbai) and slivers of Kelantan territory on the northwest

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

11th Year Statistic of Sothern Unrest (Patani Conflicts)

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Sun, 04 Jan 2015 10:42:00 +0000

Translated from สถิติในวาระ 11 ปีไฟใต้ By Isra News Team 03 Jan 2015 isranews.org.

The latest violence in the southern border provinces of Thailand reached its 11 years old

Isra NEWs team has collected difference statistics related to southern unrest (Patani Conflicts) such as quantity of incidences, security cases, up and down of red village, the stolen weapons and follow up, the practice of justice and the budget which already up to 2.3 hundred million Thai Baht.

1.Every kind of Incidences

2004 -1,154 times

2005 -2,078 times

2006 -1,934 times

2007 -2,475 times

2008 -1,370 times

2009 -1,348 times

2010 -1,165 times

2011 -1085 times

2012 -1,465 times

2013 -1,823 times

2014 -1,072 times

Total 16,969 times

2. Security Incidences
2004-601 times
2005-1,006 times
2006-1,249 times

2007-1,669 times
2008-769 times
2009- 757 times

2010-652 times
2011-680 times
2012-542 times

2013-614 times
2014 -461 time

Total 9,000 times

3. Categorizing Incidences

  Shooting 8,027 times
  Bombing   3,022 times
  Arson        1,647 times
  Brutal Killing 102 times
  Weapon Grabbing 172 times
  Attack 339 times
Demonstration 65 times
  Disturbances 3,315 times
  Encounter 258 times
  Others 22 times
  Total 16,969 times

  4. Numbers of Bomb Explosion
2004 -103 times
  2005 -242 times
  2006- 344 times
   2007- 471 times
2008 -250 times
  2009 -284 times
2010 -266 times
2011 -333 times
   2012 -276 times
  2013 -320 times
  2014- 232 times
  Total 3,121 times

5. Casualty( Security cases)
   Dead 3,929 persons as follow:-
People   2,610 persons(66.43%)
Military 509 persons(12.95%)
Police 365 persons (9.29%)
   Teacher and education personnel 138 Persons( 2.70%)
Monks 18 persons(0.46%)
Militant(Independence fighter)   321 persons
   Injured 9,602 persons as follow:-
People   5,548 persons(57.78%)
Military 2,453 persons(25.55%)
Police 1,422 persons (14.81%)
  Teacher and education personnel 147 Persons( 1.29%)
   Monk 24 persons(0.25%)
Militant(Independence fighter)   31 persons

6. Number of Weapons robbed
Total 2,004 pieces
Get back 751 pieces

7. Status of village

Red zone- origin 319 present day 136 villages
Yellow Zone- origin 517 present day 234 villages
Green Zone origin- 1,160 present day 1,600 villages
Total 1,970 villages

8. The net work of southern unrest(Independence fighter) approved
   Total   11,000 persons
  Scholar 315 persons
    core leader of command 208 persons
   RKK (commando unit) 2,314 persons
   Active member and sympathizer   6,075 persons
  Other core leaders      1,123 persons

9. Percentage of security and criminal cases
Criminal cases 147,049
Security cases 9,755 (6.63%)

10. The out come of security case

Total 9,755 cases as follow:-
Case with identified offenders 2,264 cases
Case with no identified offenders 7,491 cases
702 security cases was sentenced Offenders 453 persons
Sentences to conviction 272 cases(38.75%) Offenders 453 persons
Dismissed 430 cases (61.25%) Offenders 1,041 persons

11. Budget
2004 -13,450 million Thai baht
2005- 13,674 million Thai baht
2006 -14,207 million Thai baht
2007-17,526 million Thai baht
2008-22,988 million Thai baht
2009-27,547 million Thai baht
2010-16,507 million Thai baht
2011-19,102 million Thai baht
2012-16,277 million Thai baht
2013-21,124 million Thai baht
2014-25,921 million Thai bah

2015 -25,744.3 million Thai baht

Total 234,067 million Thai baht

*** 1 Us dollar approximately 30 Thai Baht

Southern Thailand’s New Activists

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Tue, 18 Nov 2014 15:52:00 +0000

The peace process slowly moves forward, while younger activists opt for Facebook over guns.

By James Bean

Tuwaedaniya leads a protest outside the Malaysian Consulate in Southern Thailand in August

For years, Thailand has been engaged in a little-known war in its Malay-speaking southern provinces (or “Patani,” as the locals call it), the origins of which lie in the country’s sustained policy of assimilation that started with the annexation of the region by Siam in 1909. Both sides in this conflict are dug in. While statistics have not been kept throughout this century-long conflict, since 2004 – when data started being systematically collected – more than 10,000 people have been injured and nearly 6,000 killed.

It has only been this year with the commencement of formal bilateral peace talks in February that the resistance movement has been able to learn just how far the Thai government is willing to go to secure peace along its southernmost borders. There are positive signs that Bangkok is willing to discuss the full scope of the prickly issues that epitomize the resistance movement’s complaints and demands. However, one of the challenges that beset these talks is the degree to which the parties at the table are able to look beyond their own set of concerns and represent the voices and perspectives of civil society in Patani.

What has begun to emerge amidst the peace talks is a resistance movement that is gradually shifting from a purely militant-led strategy to political action led by civil society. Activists I have spoken to in Southern Thailand, who are as fluent in Thai as they are in their native Malay, like to point out that they have over 5,000 friends on Facebook and, “will not remain silent on the issues.” Contrary to the widely held assumptions about resistance indoctrination in Patani, this civilian-led movement is not emerging from unregulated Islamicboarding schools – long accused of being the breeding ground for radicalization – but from Thailand’s own public education system.

The current bilateral dialogue process is the first time that the government has formally acknowledged the armed resistance movement led by the highly secretive National Resistance Front, or BRN. Another first for these talks is the formal participation of the Malaysian government, in this case as a facilitator, which is seen by seasoned Patani-watchers as a crucial development given the historical tendency of resistance groups to use peninsular Malaysia as a safe haven from which to mount attacks and more recently seek refuge. In April, BRN for the first time publicized its preliminary demands, which included an expanded role for the Malay facilitator, the inclusion of external observers, release of political prisoners, and – perhaps most vexing of all for Bangkok – the complex question of Patani-Malay indigenous rights. Barely nine months in, this tentative peace process has already succumbed to hubris, best illustrated by an abortive ceasefire episode that collapsed within days of its announcement.

Young people inclined to political action have started to quietly question the logic of an overwhelmingly militant struggle in Southern Thailand. Pointing out the intrinsic limitations of this approach, one former member of BRN’s political wing, Aziz, recalls the early days of the conflict in 2004; “In areas where the population provided strong support, BRN carried out too many political activities and military operations…The battle intensity exhausted communities and put them at risk of retaliation from the Thai military.” Thus, instead of protecting the population, BRN shot itself in the foot by actually inviting insecurity in those areas it controlled. Aziz, a university graduate from Ramkamhaeng University in Bangkok, claims that he complained internally at the time and urged BRN to adopt a more politically savvy approach. He explained that only when BRN found itself on the ropes during the last ten years did it reluctantly lift its injunction on members operating – or hiding in plain sight as it were – within local government, security services, or joining political parties .

Finally, with the peace talks afoot, it seems that BRN has rediscovered politics and negotiation. In September, at the request of the Thai delegation, the BRN-led delegation transmitted what the media has described as a 38 page report or “clarification.” This document has elements of “bait and switch” – in this case, baiting members of the Thai delegation with a relatively straightforward set of issues, and, when they show interest, pressuring them to consider a more onerous set of “clarified” demands. Compared to the “roadmap” document prepared by the Thai delegation and widely circulated in March-April this year, BRN’s submission is by far the most detailed and thorough proposal for sequencing the current and future negotiations. A key demand is a proposed joint drawdown of forces, which has agitated the Thai military and no doubt accounted for the delay in the response from Bangkok. In late October, the Thai delegation finally responded, agreeing to further discussion of BRN’s demands, adding two agenda items of their own concerning a reduction in violence and respecting the co-existence of different religious groups in what it refers to as Southern Thailand’s “pluralistic society.”

Both despite and because of the talks, violence on the ground has intensified and BRN has shifted its focus from targeting local collaborators to assassinating security officials and representatives of the state. There are, however, signs of hope. Central among them is the emergence of civil society groups and activists who have started asking just how responsive peace talks are to local perspectives and expectations. New BOOKS with titles like Patani Merdeka (i.e. “Independent Patani”) are being published by young activists, local media is blossoming, and the boundaries for political expression in Southern Thailand are being routinely tested and expanded. Some observers claim that this rise of political activism is nothing more than the rejuvenation of BRN’s political wing. But in fact, these mostly young civil society activists are exercising freedoms that the broader Thai polity has been exploring since the most recent coup d’état in 2006.

In 2004, the war in Southern Thailand made international headlines when several thousand Patani-Malays confronted the Thai army in the seaside town of Tak Bai seeking the release of six men detained by authorities on accusations of providing weapons to insurgents. On that day protesters assembled in what the government claimed was a political action orchestrated by BRN. Kandar (not his real name), a teacher who was among the approximately 1,300 men arrested that day in Tak Bai, recalls, “On the way to the site we heard shots, but everyone thought, ‘whatever, let’s keep pushing on!’ Initially soldiers had started using tear-gas and water cannons to disperse the crowd, but when I retreated to the river’s edge, a live round hit a steel railing just near me. At this point I realized that the army had switched to live ammunition.”

Not long after being shot at, Kandar and many other men were arrested and loaded onto a truck. Kandar was forced to lie down in the third row of men stacked four rows high. He estimated that the entire trip lasted over ten hours before they arrived at a military camp in the province of Pattani. During this time he described how he had to move around and allow for the men in lower rows to breathe and get the circulation going in their limbs. Upon arrival, three unconscious men were removed from the truck bed, one of them found to have severe swelling in his legs and testicles. Out of the estimated 1,300 men arrested that day, some 80 men died from asphyxiation and organ failure. But this, according to an implausible and widely derided Supreme Court reviewconcluded in August, was not due to any wrongdoing on the part of the Thai security personnel.

Tak Bai should have marked the beginning of stepped-up political action by the resistance movement, but the heavy-handed response by the Thai military was devastating. Hasan (not his real name), a field coordinator working with a community-based organization providing outreach assistance to a prominent legal aid provider, explained to me that it took nearly three years for civil society activism to muster up the courage to challenge the government after the tragic events at Tak Bai in 2004. In June 2007, a four-day strike and sit-in at the Pattani Central Mosque brought 10,000 people together to raise awareness of human rights abuses in southern Thailand. Older activists claim that this protest and the silent protests preceding it (i.e. short demonstrations by performers wearing tape over their mouths) were the result of lessons learned at Tak Bai

Tuwaedaniya, a prominent activist, decries the paucity of reliable information in southern Thailand “especially at the start of the peace talks, when we really wanted to know what was going on!” Tuwaedaniya shot to prominence this year by spearheading a series of rallies designed to publicly confront both the government andBRN with the costs of war and the need for a “representative peace”.

Sadly, Tuwaedaniya’s notoriety also stems from a smear campaign on Facebook and through the Thai media, accusing him and others of being BRN sympathizers. This campaign started when a primary school teacher was arrested in April, accused of aiding insurgents, and detained at a camp in the province of Yala. Two grassroots organizations – a teacher’s union and Tuwaedaniya’s own activist group – organized a demonstration outside the camp that gathered around 500 protesters, mostly primary school teachers. The demonstration lasted five hours, and after protracted negotiations, the military camp authorities relented and allowed the teacher to leave the camp to address the 500-strong crowd. Along with the protest organizers she warned the camp administrators that unless she was released in seven days (the time limit for detention without charge under the martial law in force across Thailand’s southernmost provinces) a bigger demonstration would follow.

Tuwaedaniya played a significant role in this protest. After it was over, he and his colleagues became the targets of “trolls” on a Facebook page entitled “South Dark” whom some believe to hail from the same security agency as the camp authorities they confronted in Yala. The choice of means for attacking activists, in this case Facebook, was particularly significant because activists like Tuwaedaniya have been using exactly this medium, along with town-hall style meetings, to engage civil society in exploring what peace in Patani means for people who have been living with guerrilla war all their lives.

BRN’s apparent shift in strategy from revolution to negotiation has taken civil society groups by surprise. “We wanted to pressure BRN to disclose their strategy, the direction of their thinking…we had almost no information in the beginning,” explains Tuwaedaniya. “At the time BRN was putting up banners around Patani, reproducing their demands at the village-level. The Thai media were accusing us of being a division of BRN! So, we came up with ‘Talking Patani’ as a way of putting peace squarely in the public domain.”

Although under-reported, ‘Talking Patani’ has become a popular development in southern Thailand, precisely because it pre-empts the common mistake made in many peace processes that leave the “middle” out by focusing on the leaders of the opposing sides. Nearly 40 town hall events have been held in towns and trading centers across the region, with attendance ranging from 300 to 10,000 people per event. Eschewing the conventional discussion forums and protections offered by nearby university-based think tank Deep South Watch, the format of “Talking Patani” engages people living with the conflict at the community-level in exploring indigenous rights and the dynamics of the ongoing peace talks in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

According to activists working on the ground, local authorities arbitrarily charge and arrest Patani-Malay civilians thought to be giving aid and comfort to the insurgents. Tuwaedaniya feels that the “violence committed against soft targets has increased as a result of the peace talks” – he believes that the vast majority of this violence is perpetrated by Thai security forces. During the writing of this article, I was informed of the assassination of two young civil society activists in August and September.

Each of the two warring parties tends to assume that civil society groups are actually collaborating with the other side and this justifies targeting civilians. During the course of my fieldwork in October, I spoke to the families of two ex-combatants, who were part of a large group of 93 alleged “insurgents” that surrendered to the Royal Thai Army in September last year. Under this program, known as “Bring People Home,” individuals with outstanding arrest warrants or bounties for security-related crimes are induced to resume “normal” lives providing that they report to the authorities and renounce rebellion. Despite the safety assurances provided by local security actors to participants of the scheme, two of the 93 that surrendered in September 2012 were shot dead during the last two months. Family members of the victims believe that these killings were carried out by death squads supported by the Thai military, despite allegations by local Thai security forces that BRN in fact carried out the killings because the victims were “snitches.” Commenting on the killings, one of the remaining 91 returnees under the same program said, “The military is not sincere…they refuse to trust us and leave us alone.”

Ustaz Duloh (not his real name), a senior member of BRN’s religious wing, depicts the people of Patani as easily manipulated and anxious to throw their lot in with the strongest side. Senior resistance fighters like Duloh, who typically represent a less compromising stance, view the political action led by activists like Tuwaedaniya through the prism of their own participation in protest movements back in the1970s. “My friends and colleagues were killed,” he says, “I was so angry…The Thai government is cruel, they provide us no freedom to think, to express our culture… They should have caught who did it, but the government failed.”

The way old grievances calcify in people like Ustaz Duloh should be instructive for the Thai government as it considers how to deal with this new crop of bright, passionate activists who, for now at any rate, have chosen to build political strongholds for nonviolent resistance rather than pursuing armed resistance. These groups are working together to form a critical mass of support across a broad cross-section of young Patani-Malays, and calling for people to learn from regional attempts at achieving peace in places like Indonesia and the Philippines. Unlike previous generations of activists, this new generation of civil society advocates is focused on sustaining longer-term efforts to educate and mobilize communities in order to give meaning and longevity to an eventual peace process. The rise of civilian-led political action in Southern Thailand is a milestone and signal from the Facebook generation that people living in southern Thailand are determined to become stakeholders instead of distant spectators to any eventual peace process. It is yet to be seen whether the parties now at the table are prepared to listen to them and see their efforts to invigorate civil society as a constructive part of the broader process of dialogue.

James Bean is a PhD candidate with The Australian National University’s School of International, Political, and Strategic Studies. Email: beanjamesp@gmail.com

Thanks: http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/southern-thailands-new-activists/?allpages=yes

Thailand loses bid to join UN rights body

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Thu, 23 Oct 2014 08:20:00 +0000

Nearly 5 months since its military declared martial rule, Thailand fails to win a seat at the UN Human Rights Council

Prayuth Jan-ocha, Junta leader and now the Prime Minister of Thailand

UNITED NATIONS – Junta-ruled Thailand lost its controversial bid to join the top United Nations body in charge of promoting and protecting human rights.

Thailand was among 5 Asian countries that vied for seats on the UN Human Rights Council but got the least number of votes compared to India, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Qatar.

The UN General Assembly elected 15 new members of the 47-member Council on Tuesday, October 21, at the UN Headquarters here in New York. The new members will serve a 3-year term starting on January 1, 2015.

With only 4 Asian seats available, Qatar edged out Thailand with 142 votes compared to Bangkok’s 136. India got the most votes with 162, Indonesia with 152, and Bangladesh with 149.

A majority of 97 votes was the minimum requirement. The UN has 193 member states.

Last week, Malaysia won the Asian seat on the UN Security Council.

Ahead of the elections, human rights groups pressed Thailand to improve its human rights record by lifting martial law, ending censorship, and ceasing arbitrary and secret detention.

The New York-based Human Rights Watch, the Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights, and the Bangkok-based Union for Civil Liberty all called on the Thai government to end martial rule to be a “credible and influential member” of the Council.

Martial law has been in place in Thailand for nearly 5 months since the military grabbed power from the government in a May 22 coup.

At the UN General Debate in September, Foreign Minister General Tanasak Patimapragorn justified the coup as necessary because the opposing political parties were “unwilling to compromise for the sake of the country” and caused a political impasse.

In a letter to Thai Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha on October 18, Human Rights Watch said Thailand’s pledges to promote human rights cannot be taken seriously so long as the country is under “abusive military rule.”

“Thailand’s declarations supporting rights without action to revoke military law and end the repression of speech, association, and peaceful protest will be easily ignored,” said Human Rights Watch Asia director Brad Adams.
Human rights groups pointed out that the junta ordered the media not to criticize the military, censored critical stories, and banned public gatherings of more than 5 people.
Rights activists also noted that the junta even arrested protesters who peacefully expressed dissent by showing a 3-finger Hunger Games-inspired salute, and read George Orwell’s 1984 novel in public, or played the French national anthem “La Marseillaise.”
Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the UN Human Rights Council addresses human rights violations and makes recommendations on them. It discusses thematic human rights issues, reviews countries’ rights records, and acts on complaints.
Members are elected to a 3-year term, and are not eligible for re-election after two consecutive terms.
India, Indonesia re-elected
India and Indonesia won their bids for re-election. The Philippines got one vote, even if it did not campaign for re-election. Manila is already a member of the Council and will end its term this year.
In its campaign, Indonesia pledged to promote religious freedom and tolerance as the world’s third largest democracy, and the biggest Muslim-majority nation. Jakarta is also a key player in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
“Indonesia is living proof that democracy and Islam can coexist peacefully, harmoniously and productively. Indonesia also continues to actively promote genuine dialogue to advance human rights causes,” Indonesia said in a note verbale to the UN General Assembly.
Indonesia cited its initiatives in the region including the Bali Democracy Forum, the Asia-Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogues, the International Conference of Islamic Scholars and the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership Ministerial Conference on Capacity-Building for Palestine.
Yet human rights groups have also expressed concern about Indonesia’s rights record, drawing attention to growing violence and discrimination against religious minorities, local decrees that violate women’s rights, corruption, and mistreatment of refugees and migrants.
Qatar has also not escaped criticism.
UN Watch, an observer NGO at the Council, said Qatar poorly treated migrant workers, denies basic rights to women like being elected to the Shura legislative council, and allegedly finances terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Hamas.
This is not the first time countries with questionable human rights records were elected to the Council. In the past, nations like Cuba, Saudi Arabia, China and Russia won seats to the body.
Costa Rica also loses polls
Besides Thailand, Costa Rica was the other candidate that lost a seat but for the Latin America and Caribbean States group.
The other regional groups agreed on their candidates, presenting a so-called “clean state.”
The 15 new members of the Council are:

Albania
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Botswana
Congo
El Salvador
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Latvia
Netherlands
Nigeria
Paraguay
Portugal
Qatar Thabks to Rapler ...Rappler multimedia reporter Ayee Macaraig is a 2014 fellow of the Dag Hammarskjöld Fund for Journalists. She is in New York to cover the UN General Assembly, foreign policy, diplomacy, and world events

Thailand's war-weary southerners fear coup will erode new freedoms

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Thu, 19 Jun 2014 01:06:00 +0000

Article from Reuters
BY ANDREW R.C. MARSHALL

They talked about corruption and politics, about healthcare and women's rights, about the anxiety of bringing up children in a corner of Thailand where war has killed 6,000 people in the last decade.

Then they fell silent.

For years, Media Selatan was one of the most popular community radio stations in Thailand's three southernmost provinces, where Muslim separatists have fought government troops since 2004. But when the Thai military seized power in a May 22 coup, it ordered the closure of thousands of independent stations nationwide - Media Selatan among them.

The Malay-language station - its name means "Southern Media" - was more than a public forum for a war-weary people. It had also come to symbolize a flowering of political expression among the south's Malay-speaking Muslims, who live in a country dominated by Thai-speaking Buddhists, since abortive peace talks last year.

Many southerners now fear the military will use the coup to roll back hard-won freedoms. "It's like closing the eyes and ears of the people," said Wanahmad Wankuejik, director of Media Selatan, of his station's closure.

Civil society groups also voiced concerns that a recent purge of senior officials and the arrival of a hardline military commander could exacerbate what is already one of Southeast Asia's deadliest unresolved conflicts.

On May 24, a rare series of bombings in Pattani's provincial capital, also called Pattani, killed three people, wounded dozens and triggered fears that post-coup violence might soar.

BANGKOK PREOCCUPIED

Annexed by Thailand a century ago, the south has long simmered under the neglectful rule of distant Bangkok. The latest and most serious violence erupted in the early 2000s, with a thousands-strong network of elusive militants battling at least 60,000 soldiers, police and paramilitary forces.

Reports of gunfights, drive-by shootings, beheadings and bombings are near-daily events. Martial law, declared last month in the rest of Thailand, has been in place in Pattani and neighboring Narathiwat and Yala provinces for almost a decade.

Most governments - and most Thais - have been too preoccupied by political unrest elsewhere in their country to pay much attention to the so-called Deep South.

The military staged its May coup after six months of sometimes deadly street protests, the latest flare-up in a 10-year conflict between the Bangkok-based royalist establishment and mostly rural "red-shirt" supporters of ousted premier Yingluck Shinawatra and her brother Thaksin.

Before the crisis erupted, Yingluck's government had last year began peace talks with the insurgent group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front, or BRN) in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur.

The talks soon foundered, but not before fostering an increasingly assertive civil society of activists, journalists, students and lawyers. They have spoken out against human rights abuses and pushed for greater recognition for the Malay language, culture and religion.

REVIVAL OF PEACE TALKS "UNLIKELY"

Since taking power, the military has carried out what one senior police officer described to Reuters as a "systematic purge" of officials considered loyal to Thaksin or Yingluck.

One was Thawee Sodsong, the ex-director of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), which oversees civilian administration in the region. Thawee was popular among Malay Muslims for handing out cash to conflict victims and investigating suspected abuses by Thai security forces.

Just two days after the coup, he was transferred to an inactive post and replaced with Panu Uthairat, a former SBPAC chief with close ties to Thailand's royalist and military establishment.

Of more concern to civil society groups is Lieutenant General Walit Rojanaphakdee, the new commander of the Fourth Army, which controls southern Thailand. Walit was appointed in a military reshuffle almost two months before the coup.

Like junta chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, he belongs to the military's "Eastern Tigers" or Queens Guard faction, which was instrumental in both last month's coup and the one in 2006 that removed Thaksin.

In 2010, Walit was wounded - and his aide killed - in an April 10 clash with red-shirt protesters in Bangkok. He then commanded the Second Infantry Division, which played a central role in a military crackdown in which more than 90 people were killed.

Walit was likely to "reinforce the military's current playbook" by boosting intelligence-gathering and launching more frequent raids on insurgent hideouts, said Anthony Davis, a Thailand-based analyst at security consulting firm IHS-Jane's.

Or he could resurrect "more aggressive counter-insurgency methods" last deployed in 2007 and 2008, said Davis. Back then, hundreds of Malay Muslim suspects were detained in large-scale military operations that fueled local grievances but had little long-term impact on the violence.

"Either way, it will not be business as usual," said Davis. The junta was highly unlikely to revive peace talks with BRN insurgents in the coming months, he added.

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

Aggressive methods could escalate the conflict beyond the southern region to tourist areas. Hat Yai, the closest major city to the three southernmost provinces at the heart of the conflict, has already endured many deadly bomb attacks. Police on the resort island of Phuket found and disarmed a car-bomb in December.

"Peace talks are still on our agenda," said deputy army spokesman Colonel Weerachon Sukondhapatipak, adding the military government was devising a plan to "bring all stakeholders together".

"We still believe that to solve the problem of the Deep South we must win hearts and minds," he said.

Even so, many journalists and activists are braced for the worst.

A week after the coup, General Walit summoned journalists to his army base and warned them that publishing "negative" stories about the military carried a two-year jail sentence.

Many actions taken by the coupmakers to suppress political dissent in Thailand are grimly familiar to southern Muslims.

In the past month, hundreds of politicians and activists have been detained without charge at army camps, with some undergoing what the authorities call "attitude adjustment".

In the past decade, thousands of Malay Muslims have been detained and sometimes tortured by the military for suspected insurgent links, or forced to attend "re-education" programs.

The army's post-coup campaign to "bring back happiness to the Thai people" by staging festivals elicits groans of recognition in the south, where a bid to win hearts and minds has been undermined by human rights abuses by security forces.

"The military is now using the Pattani model against all Thais," said a Malay-Muslim reporter who, fearing military harassment, requested anonymity. "My friends in Bangkok tell me, 'Now we know what it's like to live there."

(Editing by Alex Richardson)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/17/us-thailand-pattani-insight-idUSKBN0ES2TQ20140617

The Situation of Saiburi Royal Family Escape to take Refuge in Kelantan

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Sun, 04 May 2014 05:20:00 +0000

Translated from เหตุการณ์กลุ่มราขินิกุลเมืองสายบุรีหนีราขภัยไปเมืองกลันตัน

By รัศมินทร์ นิติธรรม

มูลนิธิลเล็ก-ประไพ วิริยะพัน (http://lek-prapai.org/index.php)

Tengku Abd.Kadir Kamaruddin Raja of Patani

After the dead of Phraya Saiburi Tengku Abdulkadir(Ni-Lamai) King Chulalongkorn or Rama V of Siam (1868 -1910) appointed Ni-Pae son of Phraya Saiburi((Ni-Lamai) as Phraya-suriya-sunthorn-baworn-phakdee Sri-maharaja Matta-abdulwibul-kobkate-prated-malayu the governor of Saiburi, appointed Ni-pi younger brother of Phraya Saiburi((Ni-Lamai) as Phra-Ratana-Montri-the assistant governor and Ni-Hitam younger brother of Phra-Ratana-Montri (Ni-pi) as Phra-wiset- wangsa-assistant governor of Saiburi.

When Phraya Saiburi (Ni-Pae) was appointed the governor of Saiburi, he moved out from Nyiringa(Nyigno) palace to construct a new palace at Salingdongbayu now situated in Taluban Su-District , Saiburi district, Pattani province.

After Phraya Saiburi (Ni-Pae) moving out from Nyiringa(Nyigno) palace and resided at Taluban Salingdongbayu palace, left a huge Nyirigna people and community behind with out any leader, the Siamese government then appointed Ni-kuechi(Ni-Kari) from Bumae village(now in village No.1 ,Nyigno district, Narathiwat province) as Mae-Kong- titled Muen-sawek -Amat or people called Tok Mae-Kong.

Ni-kuechi(Ni-Kari) or Tok Mae-Kong Muen-sawek-Amat married to Ni-Putih, a relative of Ni-Bongsu- the royal guard of Phraya Saiburi(Ni-Pae), governor of Saiburi. Originally, Ni-Bongsu is resided in Nyiringa(Nyigno)but came to live with the governor in Saiburi because of duty. Tok Mae-Kong Muen-sawek -Amat born one son to Ni-Putih, name Ni- Wae Ni-kuechi( later received royal title as Khun-Lahan Pracha-Chet)

Mean while Bangkok government had sent down Khunluang-Sukhumwinit as commissioner of Patani and had adopted a new collection of opium and liquor tax by divided percentage of 50-50 between Patani and Bangkok, later he had collected land tax from people with out given any receipt, this in turn had given him an opportunity to collect land tax many times a year.

In 1900 the Siamese government had imposed the new collection system of import and export tax in Patani by given 12.5 percent of revenue received from the collection to Patani while another 77.5 percent was sent to Bangkok. The Patani Rajas opposed the new tax system of Siamese government by saying that the authority of tax collection was belong to them not Siamese government, the Patani Rajas feel uneasy with the situation and started to oppose the Siamese government, this led to an arrested of Tengku Abd. Kadir Kamarudin, Patani Raja in the morning of Friday, 21 February 1902 by Phraya Sri Sahathep, deputy interior minister. After the arrest, Tengku Kamarudin Abd. Kadir was deported to Songkhla and Pitsanulok respectively, he was charged with treason(disobeyed an order of Siamese King) and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment in Pitsanulok.

Tengku Abd. Muttalib Raja of Saiburi

In March 18,1902 Khunluang-Sukhumwinit, the commissioner of Nakornsrithammarat arrested Tebgku Ngoh Shamsuddin, Raja of Legeh with 8 of his men and at the same time Tengku Abd. Muttalib, Raja of Saiburi was also arrested. The situation at the time was insecure for the royal family of Saiburi then they decided to send their family to take refuge in Kelantan.

Ni-Bongsu was one of the royal guard with 5 or 6 others had the order to protect 10 Saiburi royal family during travelling to take refuge in Kelantan .

In this adventure, Ni-Bongsu had arrested Ni- Wae Ni-kuechi son of Muen-Sawek-Amat as the hostage because his father, Muen-Sawek-Amat was a Siamese official and better known about the rout to Kelantan, Muen-Sawek-Amat had a lot of relative all the way long to Kelantan , starting from Legeh, Boango, Joh-Irong until Sungai Padi because he was originated from Baenu(Yaning ) village, Joh-Irong. The Saiburi royal guards better known that with out his son in the company as hostage there will be a negative threat to the security of Saiburi royal family.

Tengku Ngoh Shamsuddin Raja of Legeh

During the travelling of Saiburi royal family to seek refuge in Kelantan , they faced a lot of difficulties, they ate very simple food, slept in simple places, sometimes people were given food to eat but people along the way pay much attention and respect when they knew that the company belong to the royal family. At last the company reached Tok Ra-Weng village situated between Legeh and Kelantan and probably out Siamese government influence.

When reached Tok Ra-Weng village, Ni-Bongsu the chief of Royal guard had a serious sickness and had to stay at Tok Ra-Weng house for treatment, Tok Ra-Weng was a man who migrated from Raweng village,(Jerang(Yarang), Patani) and establishing himself there.

Tok Ra-Weng village was a pier, transporting merchandise to Tok Mo’ village(gold mine) thus had a bit of development. Ni-Bongsu was treated at Tok Ra-Weng house for many days but not yet better, the royal family then had decided to left him for further treatment at Tok Ra-Weng house and they went further crossing the river to seek refuge in Kelantan.

After recover from sickness, Ni- Bongsu did not travel to Kelantan to join the royal family there but established himself at this village by married the woman in this village and born one son, Ni-Hae bin Ni-Bongsu.

Ni- Wae Ni-kuechi, the hostage of Saiburi royal family feel insecure with out his close relative(Ni-Bongsu) joining the company of Saiburi royal family, in the night he escaped himself from the royal company, until morning the Saiburi royal family knew the story of Ni- Wae Ni-kuechi but did not pay any interest to get him back because they were too tired and now they feel safe in Kelantan dominion. The royal company traveled further to Pasir Puteh village, Kelantan and established their family until this day and they never come back again to Saiburi.

Patani Soldiers

Statistic Summary of Conflict Incidences in southern Thailand(Patani) From 1-31 March 2014

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Sun, 20 Apr 2014 15:40:00 +0000

From Deep South Watch

(Translated from Thai Language)

Statistic of Death and Injured Persons classified according religion

Dead 35 Persons			Injured 38 persons
Not Specify	Buddhists	Muslims	Not Specify	Buddhists	Muslims
2	16	17	0	20	18

Statistic classified according to Type of Incidences

Type of Incidences	Number of Incidences
Grenade throwing	2
Spreading nails	1
Tyr burning	1
Shooting	37
Shooting and Burn	2
Bombing	16
Bombing and Shooting	1
Total	60

Statistic classified according to Background(Occupation)

Occupation	Dead	Injured		Total
citizen	16	20		36
Police	3	7		10
Army	2	7		9
Para Military	1	1		2
Teacher/Education Personnel	2	0		2
Politician	1	0		1
Head Village/Headman /assist. Head village/man	3	1		4
Private employee	2	1	3
Islamic Religious Leaders	1	0	1
Foreigners	2	0	2
Youth age 15 down	0	1	1
Movement fighters	2	0	2
Total	35	38	73

Statistic classified according to Provinces in March 2014

Provinces	Incidences		Dead		Injured
Provinces	Numbers	Percentage	Numbers	Percentage	Numbers	Percentage
Narathiwat	20	33.33	9	25.71	15	39.47
Pattani	23	38.33	17	48.57	17	44.74
Yala	15	25.00	9	25.71	6	15.79
Songkhla	2	3.33	0	0.00	0	0.00
Total	50	100.00	35	100.00	38	100.00

Thailand: The bloody civil war in Patani and the way to achieve peace

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Thu, 20 Mar 2014 15:02:00 +0000

Written By Giles Ji Ungpakorn[1] from Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal

October 2013 – This article is an attempt to analyse the political situation surrounding the bloody civil war in “Patani-Southern Thailand” from the perspective of those who seek freedom, justice and self-determination. Unlike most academic papers or books on the subject, this article is not aimed at top politicians, military generals or officials of foreign powers, all of whom seek to maintain their own class interests by stressing “stability” or measures to “contain” the situation without any regard to the wishes of ordinary people.

According to the internal security organisation of the Thai state, since January 1, 2004, 5105 people have been killed and 9372 injured in the civil war in the South.[2] More than half of those killed were local ethnic Malays, which indicates that Thai security forces, in and out of uniform, are doing most of the killing.

In this paper, I refer to “Patani” or “Patani-Southern Thailand” as an historical unit covering the three most southern provinces which the Thai state created out of the destruction of the Patani sultanate. These are the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Naratiwart. The majority of the population in these provinces are Malay Muslims with their own language and culture.

Thai state as an obstacle to peace and self-determination

The violent conflict in Patani is caused by the process of Thai nation building and the subsequent colonisation of ethnically diverse communities into a centralised state, ruled directly from Bangkok, in the late 19th century. Thai nation building can be understood as an attempt by the rulers of Bangkok to create a modern centralised capitalist state, mirroring the colonial capitalist states which were being created by the British, Dutch and French in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China.[3] Most of these nation-building projects have led to conflicts between the periphery and the centre, since the new centralised political order destroyed previous forms of pre-capitalist regional autonomy.[4] The conflict in Patani is no exception.

Conflicts which are rooted in history need to be re-fuelled by continuing grievances and these grievances are the factors which explain why the people of Patani have little faith in the Thai state today. In comparison, these factors are missing in north or north-east Thailand, which though colonised by Bangkok in the same period of capitalist nation building, are not involved in a similar civil war. More will be said on these local grievances in Patani, but for the moment it is necessary to point out that unlike the north and north-east, the old Patani rulers and the entire Malay Muslim population of the area have been systematically excluded from mainstream Thai society, in terms of politics, culture and economic development. This explains the antagonism towards the Thai ruling class in Patani.

It will not come as a surprise to know that the Thai ruling class who control the Thai state have a political, economic and social interest in maintaining the present borders and preventing any separatist movements from splitting off areas which are currently within these borders. States always exists in relation to other states in the world, with more powerful states dominating weaker states in an “imperialist” fashion.[5] States also exist to control and rule over ordinary working people who make up the bulk of its citizens. As Lenin wrote in “State and Revolution”, the state is an instrument of class rule used to suppress other classes within society. Thus any sign of weakness, where a particular ruling class is seen to have to devolve power to others, or seen to lose control over certain areas, puts that ruling class at a disadvantage in relation to its international rivals and those who seek to challenge its rule from within. The Thai state is not a superpower, but it is jealous of its power over the population and resources within the present borders and it is also keen to act as a mini-imperialist with regard to weaker neighbouring states such as Lao and Cambodia.

Those states that rival Thailand in the region are the stronger states which are members of ASEAN, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, Vietnam and the Philippines.

For this reason, the main obstacle to the self-determination for the people of Patani, is the Thai state and its various constituents, especially the military. The Thai ruling class will not concede autonomy or independence for the people of Patani without a struggle.

Political struggles by mass movements, whether or not they are involved in armed struggles, strikes or mass protests, can be successful in forcing ruling classes to concede changes in the structure and the shape of the state. But ultimately change will be conceded by political decisions taken by politicians in consultation with other members of the ruling class. If these politicians are subjected to democratic elections and are accountable to the population it can be easier to change their minds.

The Thai military

The Thai military, in its present form, is a particularly powerful and intransigent component of the ruling class in terms of progress to peace and self-determination in Patani.

Many people have suggested that the military creates violent incidents in Patani in order to justify asking for an ever-increasing budget. As a body of men, the military benefit from this, often in a corrupt manner. Approximately 160 billion baht is being spent by the Thai state in Patani and 70% of this goes to counter-insurgency. The local economy of Patani, at 120 billion baht, is worth less than this bloated military budget. Even so-called “development projects” in Patani, such as road building, are given to military construction units.[6] Few local jobs for local people are created.

However, the main reason why the Thai military has an entrenched interest in opposing self-determination by the people of Patani is a “political interest”.

The military constantly intervene in politics, by staging coup d'états and changing constitutions. The latest coup d'état was in 2006, when the democratically elected and popular Thai Rak Thai government headed by Taksin Shinawat [also referred to as Thaksin Shinawatra] was overthrown.[7] The present army commander, General Prayut Junocha, feels able to state his political opinion in public, as though he was a leading elected politician, on many matters ranging from the war in Patani, to voting in elections and political reform. In 2010 he was responsible, alongside the military-appointed Prime Minsiter Abhisit Vejjajiva, for gunning down nearly 90 unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators in Bangkok.

Because of the long struggle for democracy in Thai society, undemocratic military intervention in politics needs to be specially legitimised. The Thai military does this by claiming that it alone is capable of protecting the monarchy and the unitary Thai state. Both the monarchy and nationalism are used by the military to justify its actions, with a myth created by the military that it serves the monarchy, when in reality it is the other way round.

The military gains from the fact that it can intervene in politics and commit state crimes against the people with impunity. Military economic interests include owning large sections of lucrative media outlets and having influence in state enterprises.

For this reason it is especially worrying that the Thai side in so-called “peace talks”, held between the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Thai authorities in early 2013, was headed and controlled by the military. The top Thai negotiator was Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, secretary-general of the National Security Council, and General Prayut Junocha rejected out of hand the BRN demand for self-rule, by stating that he would “never accept” any change to the unitary Thai state. Meanwhile, elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawat [or Shinawatra] kept quiet about the whole process. She is Taksin’s sister and the new head of Taksin’s Pua Thai [often also referred to as thePheu Thai] party. Since the election victory of Pua Thai in 2011, the government has gone out of its way to bow to the wishes of the military. One consequence of this is that it has accepted the military’s veto on any change to the draconian lèse majesté law and any release of prisoners of conscience who are in prison under this law for opposing the military coup of 2006.[8]

The hawks in the Thai state hope that the insurgents will surrender and that talks between the Thai and Malaysian governments, and between the Thai government and BRN “separatist leaders” will help towards this stabilisation. Afterwards they claim to want to attract business investment into the area. This policy is supported by top army generals, Yingluck’s Pua Thai government, the pro-military Democrat Party and it is similar to policies pursued by the Taksin administration before the 2006. These hawks talk in an abstract manner about the need for a “political settlement”, but because they refuse to consider the underlying root causes of the civil war, in practice they are only prepared to consider a military or security type solution.

General Sonti Boonyaratgalin, leader of the 2006 coup and Matupum Party leader, argued in November 2009 that “the pooling of resources and responsibilities of relevant agencies with a clear chain of command will create a breakthrough in the South”.[9] It did not and will never solve the problem of Patani. The Matupum Party counts among its members some Muslim politicians in the Wadah faction who were originally inside Thai Rak Thai, and before that, part of the Chawalit Yongjaiyut’s New Aspirations Party. Despite being co-opted into the mainstream Thai polity by people like retired general and Privy Council chair Prem Tinsulanon in the 1980s, they are now distant from the local population.

Of course, there is a contradiction in the position of the military towards the war in Patani. Most military commanders know deep down that they cannot beat the insurgents because they have local support and are able to carry out many operations freely.[10] The only strategy that they have is to try to contain the violent situation so that it does not get any worse. These people can only talk about making Thai state “command structures” more efficient. Meanwhile, ordinary soldiers, many of whom are recruited from the poor villages of the north-east, have no will to fight. They care nothing about “the protection of the nation” and try just to survive their tour of duty. However, some more intelligent military commanders with field experience, like retired General Chawalit Yongjaiyut, have supported the idea of special political autonomy for Patani.[11] Chawalit gained experience from the conflict with the Communist Party of Thailand in the late 1970s and understands that a political solution is necessary.

No political solution can be achieved while Patani is flooded by men with guns. Forty-five per cent of the Thai military is currently occupying Patani and added to this are the thousands of villagers who have been armed by the Thai state in so-called “village protection squads”. Apart from the army, paramilitary rangers and police, there are 3300 members of the Volunteer Defence Corps, 47,000 Village Defence Volunteers and 24,000 Village Protection Volunteers.[12] The Village Protection Volunteers are an exclusively Buddhist force, under the queen’s patronage.

The local population cannot possibly participate in political discussions about their future in this atmosphere of war, violence and fear. No political solution can be achieved while negotiations with the separatists are not run by elected politicians instead of the military.

In order to achieve a political solution and self-determination in Patani, the power and influence of the military in all aspects of Thai politics and society needs to be drastically reduced. The military budget needs to be cut to the bone and military officers removed from the media and state enterprises. Those who ordered the shooting of civilians in Bangkok and in Patani and those who staged coup d'états need to be brought to justice. These are the exact same factors required to build democracy, freedom and social justice in the rest of Thailand.

We can see that freedom in Patani is closely linked to freedom in Bangkok or other areas of the Thai state.

The question of violence

As a Marxist, I firmly believe that we have to side with all those who are oppressed by the Thai state. In practice, this means supporting the right of the insurgents to bear arms against the Thai state which has a long history of violent oppression in the Patani. Abstract calls for both sides to use “non-violence”, often voiced by NGOs, are not the solution. They merely end up by equating the Thai state’s violence with that of the insurgents and fail to question the legitimacy of the state to govern Thailand’s “colony” in Patani. Nevertheless, as a Marxist, I also believe that armed struggle is not the solution. The answer is mass mobilisations of people against the state. This must be encouraged whenever it happens in Patani.

The anti-war writer Arundhati Roy[13] once wrote that any government’s condemnation of “terrorism” is only justified if the government can prove that it is responsive to non-violent dissent. The Thai government has ignored the feelings of local people in the Patani for decades. It turns a deaf ear to their pleas that they want respect. It laughs in the face of those who advocate human rights when people are tortured. Taksin’s campaign to get people to fold paper birds to “forgive” the Patani people, whom he had just murdered at Takbai in 2004, and the farce of “returning” a copy of the Patani cannon, which was originally stolen by Thais, to the area, are some examples of the insults which originate from the Thai state.[14]

Under the emergency laws, no one in the South has the democratic space to hold political discussions. What choice do people have other than turning to violent resistance?

In another article, Arundhati Roy explained that we in the social movements cannot condemn terrorism if we do nothing to campaign against state terror ourselves. The Thai social movements have for far too long been engrossed in single-issue campaigns and people’s minds are made smaller by Thai nationalism.

Many talk about the need to involve “civil society” and NGOs in building peace in Patani. Yet who are these civil society actors? Are they those who wish for independence? Are they middle-class academics? Or are they NGO activists who constantly call for “peace” without challenging the nationalism of the Thai state?

Thai NGOs have an appalling history of siding with the military which staged the coup d'état in 2006. They attacked what they called the “dictatorship of the majority” in parliament and justified their alliance with royalists and the military by claiming that the majority of poor people who voted for the Taksin government “lacked knowledge and education”.[15] Thai NGOs cannot possibly have a positive role in solving the conflict in Patani.

History of Thai state repression in the South[16]

The nation state of “Thailand” was created by Bangkok’s colonisation of the north, north-east and south. However, what was special about the South was that the Patani ruling class was never co-opted or assimilated into the Thai ruling elite and the Muslim Malay population have never been respected or seen as fellow citizens since then. Bangkok and London destroyed and divided up the Patani Sultanate between them and Bangkok has ruled the area like a colony ever since.

1890s King Chulalongkorn (Rama 5) seized half of the Patani Sultanate. The Sultanate was divided between London and Bangkok under the Treaty of 1909.

1921 Enforced “Siamification” via primary education. Locals forced to pay tax to Bangkok.

1923 Belukar Semak rebellion forced King Rama 6 to make concessions to local culture.

1938 More enforced “Siamification” under the ultra-nationalist dictator Field Marshall Pibun.

1946 Pridi Panomyong promoted local culture and in 1947 accepted demands by Muslim religious leaders for a form of autonomy, but he was soon driven from power by a coup led by Thai nationalist military leaders.

Haji Sulong proposed an autonomous state for Patani within Siam.

1948 Haji Sulong arrested.

April 1948 police massacre innocent villagers at Dusun Nyior, Naratiwat.

1954 Haji Sulong killed by police under orders from police strongman Pao Siyanond.

1960-1970 Thai state policy of “diluting” the Malay population by resettling Thai-Lao Buddhists from thenorth east of Thailand in the Patani area. This was carried out under various military regimes, starting with Field Marshall Sarit Tanarat. Ban on the use of the Yawee Malay language in state institutions including schools.

State crime at Takbai

On October 25, 2004, Thai government security forces broke up a demonstration at Takbai in the southern province of Naratiwat. Apart from using water cannon and tear gas, troops opened fire with live ammunition above the heads of protesters, but some fired directly into the crowd, killing seven people and wounding many others, including a 14-year-old boy. There were villagers of all ages and sexes in the crowd. After this, the troops moved in to capture young Muslim Malay men. While women and children huddled in one corner, the men were stripped to the waist and their hands were tied behind their backs. The prisoners were made to crawl along the ground while troops rained kicks down upon their heads and bodies and beat them with sticks. Many of the prisoners were roped together in a long line and made to lie face down on the ground. The local military commander of the 4th Area Army[17] told a reporter on television that this action should be a lesson to anyone who dared to defy the government. “We will do this again every time”, he said. The whole event was captured on video, which only goes to show how arrogant and self-confident the security forces were.[18]

Finally, the bound prisoners were thrown into the backs of open-top army lorries, and made to lie, layer upon layer, on top of each other. Troops stood on top of their human cargo occasionally stamping on those who cried out for water or air and telling them that soon they would “know what real hell was like”.

Many hours later the first lorry arrived at its destination, Inkayut Army Camp. A number of prisoners who had been at the bottom of this lorry were found to have died in transit, probably from suffocation and kidney damage. Six hours later the last lorry arrived with almost all those on the bottom layers found to be dead. During those six hours between the arrival of the first lorry and the last one, no attempt was made by the authorities to change the methods of transporting prisoners. In total nearly 80 prisoners died. We must agree with a Senate report[19] on the incident which concluded that this amounted to “deliberate criminal actions likely to cause deaths” by the security forces. Prime Minister Taksin’s first response to the incident was to praise the security forces for their “good work”. Later the government claimed that the deaths were a regretful “accident”. Four years later on February 9, 2008, Prime Minister Samak Suntarawej told Al Jazeera television that the men who died at Takbai “just fell on top of each other”… “what was wrong with that?” Later in the same interview he lied about the October 6, 1976, massacre, saying that “Only one guy died”.

From October 6 to Takbai: Thai state’s culture of violent crimes

The lies told by Samak about Takbai and October 6 are clearly connected. Anyone watching the Takbaiincident would be reminded of October 6, 1976, massacre of students in Thammasart University.[20] In 1976, after attacking a peaceful gathering of students with automatic weapons, men and women were stripped to the waist and made by the police to crawl along the ground under a hail of kicks and beatings. Some students were dragged out of the campus and hung from trees, others were burnt alive in make-shift bonfires, mainly by right-wing thugs, some of whom were members of the ultra-right-wing Village Scout Movement.[21]

After both Takbai 2004 and October 6, 1976, government spokespersons told deliberate lies. One lie was that the security forces were “forced to act as the situation was getting out of hand”. In fact this was never the case. At Takbai, Senator Chermsak Pintong reported that the security forces admitted to a team of investigating senators that they broke up the demonstration in order to arrest 100 ring leaders, the names and photographs of whom were on a government blacklist. Under the 1997 constitution, Thai citizens were supposed to have the right to peaceful protest and were supposed to be innocent before trial. The actions of the police and army at Takbai show that they did not regard the local villagers as citizens. The demonstration was more or less peaceful until it was broken up violently by security forces. In the minds of the troops and their commanders, the Takbai prisoners were captured prisoners of war, “nasty foreigners” or “enemies of the state” who needed to be punished. So were the students at Thammasart in 1976.

After October 6, 1976, and Takbai 2004, government spokespeople also claimed that the trouble makers were foreigners and couldn’t speak Thai. In 1976 they were supposed to be Vietnamese.[22] In 2004 the state claimed that they were Arabs or Malays. All prisoners killed or captured in 1976, and at Takbai in 2004, were Thai-speaking Thai citizens. Government spokespeople also told lies that the students in 1976 and the demonstrators at Takbai in 2004 were well armed and posed a threat to security forces. There is no evidence to support this. No weapons were found at either site. At Takbai a rusty rifle, which had been lying in the river for years, was paraded as “evidence”.

After Takbai, the queen spoke of her concern for Thai Buddhists in the South. No mention was made of our Muslim Malay brothers or sisters. No mention was made of Takbai and worse still, the queen called on the Village Scout Movement to mobilise once again to save the country.[23] Luckily most village scouts are in their sixties and unlikely to commit violent acts anymore.

After the military coup of September 19, 2006, the junta’s prime minister travelled down to the Patani to “apologise” for what the Taksin government had done.[24] He announced that charges against some demonstrators would be lifted. Yet, his government, and the previous Taksin government, did not prosecute a single member of the security forces for the Takbai incident. No holder of political office has been punished either. To this day Thai officials can kill with total impunity. In 2007 the junta continued to emphasise the military “solution” in the South with a troop surge. In January 2007 the junta renewed the Taksin government’s southern emergency decree, which gives all security forces sweeping powers and immunity from prosecution.

Takbai was not the only violent incident to capture the news headlines. In April 2004, about 100 youths wearing “magical” Islamic headbands attacked police stations in various locations. But they were only armed with swords and rusty knives. They were shot down with automatic fire. Discontent was being articulated through a religious self-sacrifice. In one of the worst incidents that day, the army attacked the ancient Krue-Sa mosque with heavy weapons after the youths fled into the building. Ex-Senator Kraisak Choonhawan maintained that apart from the excessive force shown by the government, some prisoners in this event were bound and then executed in cold blood. He was referring to a group of youths from a local football team who were shot at point-blank range at Saba Yoi. The army officer in charge of the bloodbath at Krue-Sa was General Punlop Pinmanee. In 2002 he told a local newspaper that in the old days the army simply used to shoot rural dissidents and Communists. Now they send people round to intimidate their wives.[25] No state official has been punished for the events at Krue-Sa.

Torture and detention without trial

The military push in the South under the junta’s government, which started in June 2007, resulted in 1000 detentions without trial in the first two months. The military spokesperson for the “joint civilian, military and police command” in the South, General Uk Tiproj, claimed that those detained were people with “misguided beliefs who needed to be re-educated”.[26]

The Southern Lawyers’ Centre reported that between July 2007 and February 2008 there were 59 documented cases of torture by the security forces. In two incidents the torture resulted in death. In late January 2008 seven activist students from Yala were arrested and tortured.[27] Torture methods included beatings, being imprisoned, wet and cold, in air-conditioned rooms and the use of electric shocks.[28] According to the Lawyers’ Centre, most of the torture occurred in the first three days of detention, when prisoners were not allowed any visitors. The places where torture occurred were the Yala Special Unit 11section of the Yala Army Rangers camp and the Inkayut Army Camp in Patani. Needless to say, no one has been punished for killing and torturing detainees.

Violence and co-option

The root cause of today’s violence can be traced back to the creation of “Thailand” as a nation state in the 19th century. But the historical causes alone are not enough to explain the present civil war. Continuous repressive policies towards the local inhabitants by the Thai state over the years have refuelled resentment.

Duncan McCargo points out that the southern conflict is not a religious conflict between Muslims and Buddhists and that the Thai state has a tradition of murder, massacre and mayhem in the region. McCargo also shows that the Thai state has used a “dual track” policy of repression and co-opting local religious leaders and politicians in order to control the area, the latter especially in the period when Prem Tinsulanon was prime minister in the early 1980s[29] but also for a short time between 2004 and 2005 under Taksin Shinawat.[30]

By 1988 Thailand had become much more democratic with a fully elected prime minister and government. Local Muslim politicians were encouraged to join mainstream political parties, especially retired General Chawalit Yongjaiyut’s New Aspirations Party, where they formed a group known as the Wadah Faction.[31]

By the late 1990s Prem’s policy of co-opting local leaders was beginning to fall apart because it did little to solve the marginalisation of the majority of the Muslim Malay population and resulted in a gap opening up between grassroots people and their official leaders or representatives.

Those who wish to pin the blame for the violence on the Taksin government alone claim that he meddled in the security structures which were controlling the peace in the region. This is both unhistorical and completely ignores the fact that the unrest has been going on in various forms for over a century and that “peace deals” made by the Thai state in the mid-1980s with local elites were failing to address real grievances. Nevertheless, the Takbai and Krue-Sa massacres under the Taksin government had a big impact on the rise of the insurgency.

Unhelpful explanations about the violence in Patani

There are a number of irrelevant or unhelpful explanations for the violence in Patani. They all share a common thread which ignores and dismisses the oppression of the Muslim Malays by the Thai state. They also share the belief that the locals are somehow “incapable” of conducting a home-grown insurgency without outside instigation and support. As with most “elite theories”, history and conflict are confined to actions of the ruling elites while the general population are regarded as mainly ignorant passive spectators. Those who promote such theories wish to ignore the political and social causes of the civil war and concentrate on using military and diplomatic solutions to “end” the conflict while retaining existing state structures.

One theory claims that the violence is created by disgruntled army officers, afraid of losing a share of the lucrative cross-border black-market trade. According to the theory, these soldiers sponsor the violence in order to “prove” that the army is still needed. It is true that the military is involved in illegal cross-border trading and that if they were withdrawn from the area they would lose this lucrative activity. But this theory begs the important question about why soldiers occupy Patani as a colony in the first place, unlike the situation in the north or the north-east. It is also quite clear that there has been an insurgent movement throughout recent history and it enjoys support from important sections of the local population for real reasons.

Another theory claims that it is just the work of “foreign Islamic fanatics”, who have managed to brainwash some local youths into supporting a separatist movement. George Bush and Tony Blair’s encouragement of Islamophobia to support their invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq stirred-up such views and allowed human rights abuses against Muslims worldwide. But why would local youths just allow themselves to be brainwashed if there was not just cause? There is every indication that the insurgency is home grown for good reasons: there has been a history of state repression. Nevertheless, local insurgents and separatist movements have built links with sympathetic foreign governments and organisations.[32] This does not, however, indicate that the civil war is somehow instigated from abroad by “international Muslim extremists”.

Some academics have maintained that the violence started as a “patch war” between the royal palace, with the support of the army, and the Taksin government. Duncan McCargo[33] suggests that the southern violence can be explained as conflict between “Network Monarchy” and “Network Taksin”. McCargo also expanded this network conflict theory to include the conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in other regions of Thailand after the 2006 coup d'état.

This is similar to the attempts to explain the September 19 coup d'état as a conflict between “feudalism” and “capitalism”, along old Stalinist lines. It is true that the Taksin government wanted to reduce the role of the military in controlling Patani and transfer many powers to the police. But this was more about his attempts to “regularise” governance in the region and also to stamp out the black market, a policy pursued in other parts of the country. This undoubtedly caused resentment among the army, but it does not explain the main underlying causes of the civil war.

The “network conflict” is an elite, top-down view of events which denies any role by ordinary people. It denies any reason for Malay Muslims to be antagonistic to the Thai state. Neither can it explain the general political crisis and conflict between Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts following the 2006 coup d'état.[34]

Who are the insurgents?

Back in the 1970s a clear separatist movement existed, cooperating in its struggle against the Thai state with the Communist parties of Thailand and Malaysia. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) was established in 1963 and the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) was founded in 1968.

PULO are not in a position to control much of what is happening on the ground today. One PULO activist admitted to the BBC that, “Right now there is a group which has a lot of young blood. They're quick and fast and they don't worry what will happen after they do something. They don't care because they want the Government to have a big reaction, which will cause more problems.”[35]

By 1984 the BRN had split into three. One organisation which originated from the BRN is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C). By 2005 the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK or Patani State Restoration Unit) was becoming more prominent in the insurgency. It is believed to be a loose grouping of people from the BRN-C who trained in Indonesia. There seem to be many organisations operating today. They do not claim responsibility for their actions because by deliberately not claiming responsibility they make it extremely hard for the Thai Intelligence services to understand who is who and which of the various organisations is taking what action.[36] This has been described by journalists as a “war between the Thai army and ghosts”.

The Patani insurgency follows the patterns of many Middle-Eastern struggles against Western imperialism and local despotic ruling classes. In the 1960s and 1970s they were secular movements allied to Communist parties. But with the decline of the Communist parties, partly as a result of their collaboration with local despots, especially in the Middle East, rebels and insurgents turned to new forms of ideology, mainly radical Islam.[37] This explains why radical Islam is the banner under which the present day insurgents fight. It is not the rise of radical Islam which has caused the violence. The brutal actions of Thai governments and the failure of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) have pushed radicals into adopting Islam.

Listen to local people

When considering the violence in Patani, we need to listen to what local people are saying. Local Muslim people do not generally hate their Buddhist neighbours. The civil war never started as “communal violence” between people of differing religions. This is still the case now, despite the counter-productive efforts by Thai governments in saturating the region with arms, including the arming of local villagers.

Public spaces such as Buddhist temples and schools have also been militarised by the Thai state. Some Buddhist monks have been brutally killed and in June 2009 armed Buddhists gunned down praying Muslims at the Al Furqan Mosque. It is thought that they were led by an ex-military ranger. Apart from soldiers and rebels, local traders, rubber tappers, priests, Imams, ordinary villagers, school teachers and government officials have all been victims of violence. Most of those killed have died at the hands of the security forces.

In the late 1990s most local people were not really demanding a separate state. Thai government violence may now have pushed people towards supporting separation. Patani has been neglected economically and when there has been development it has not been the majority of local Malay Muslims who have benefited. There is a high level of unemployment in the area and many people seek work in neighbouring Malaysia. Nevertheless, economic development alone cannot solve the violence.

What local people are saying more than anything is that they want respect. Their religion, language and culture are not respected by the Thai state. The state education system emphasises Thai, Buddhist and Bangkok history and culture. This is why schools are often burnt. In the past 60 years successive Thai governments have arrested religious leaders, banned the teaching of yawee (the local dialect of Malay spoken in the area), closed religious schools, forced students to learn the Thai language, forced students to wear Thai-style clothes, encouraged people to change their names to “Thai” names and forcibly changed the names of local districts to “Thai-sounding” names. All this has been carried out by Bangkok governments which maintain an occupying army in the southern border provinces.[38]

In the 1960s and 1970s the military dictatorships settled some Buddhist north-easterners in the South in order to “strengthen” the occupation.[39] It reminds one of the British policy in Northern Ireland or Palestine. Buddhist temples were built in predominantly Muslim areas. In this period there were times when Muslims were made to bow down before Buddha images. Even now they are made to bow down before pictures of the king, which is an offence to their religion. There are house searches by troops using dogs. Again this is an insult to Muslims. Recently soldiers were conscripted to become monks in southern temples and the temples have army guards.

The occupying army and the police are feared and hated. Local people know that their sons, brothers and fathers have been taken away at night, then tortured and killed by the Thai army and police, often in plain clothes.[40] In 2004, the defence lawyer Somchai Nilapaichit, who was a key human rights activist on this issue of torture, was kidnapped in Bangkok and killed by police from different units. He was trying to expose police tactics in torturing suspects into confessions about stealing guns from an army camp in early 2004. The involvement of police from different units in his murder indicates a green light from above: from Prime Minister Taksin and others in his government. To date, no one has been punished for Somchai’s murder and his body has not been found.

It isn’t hard to find green lights, right at the top, for Thai state violence. No one has been punished for the 1976 bloodbath at Thammasart, the May 1992 massacre or for the killings at Takbai or Krue-Sa in 2004. The Taksin government also sanctioned the extrajudicial murder of over 3000 “drug suspects” in its war on drugs. Many were killed in Patani, others killed were among northern ethnic minorities. The king approved of the war on drugs and the October 6 massacre. The military-installed Democrat Party government contributed to further state crimes in 2010 and together with the army generals, sanctioned the shooting of pro-democracy civilians in Bangkok. The courts have always protected those in power and offer no justice.

After the February 2005 election Taksin’s party lost almost all seats in the South because of its policies, especially the Takbai incident. But it gained a huge overall majority nationally. The government established the National Reconciliation Commission under ex-prime minister Anand Panyarachun. He had served as a civilian PM under a military junta in 1991. Most people in the Patani doubted whether this commission would solve their problems. Anand was quoted in the press as saying that self-rule and autonomy were “out of the question” and that people should “forget” the Takbai massacre.[41]

Despite Anand’s remarks, the report of the National Reconciliation Commission came up with some progressive statements and suggestions.[42] First, it stated that the problems in the South stemmed from the fact that there was a lack of justice and respect and that various governments had not pursued a peaceful solution. It went on to describe how the Thai Rak Thai government had systematically abused human rights and was engaged in extrajudicial killings. The commission suggested that local communities in Patani be empowered to control their own natural resources, that civil society play a central part in creating justice and that the local Yawee language be used as a working language, alongside Thai, in all government departments.

The latter suggestion on language is vital if local people are not to be discriminated against, especially by government bodies.[43] Yet it was quickly rejected by both Taksin and Privy Council chair General Prem Tinsulanon.[44]

The weakness of the ‘armed-struggle’ strategy

The insurgent strategy of using “ghosts” to attack the Thai security forces and then not claiming responsibility might have some military advantages, but such advantages are massively out-weighed by the political disadvantages. By not claiming responsibility for attacks on “legitimate military targets” and confining attacks to such targets, the insurgents allow the Thai military to use death squads, usually out of uniform, to attack and kill local activists and ordinary civilians who are on government blacklists. The government and mainstream media can then paint a picture of the insurgents as “armed gangsters” who kill people indiscriminately. This spreads fear among the local civilian population and is counter-productive to building real mass support among local villagers and also among the general Thai population in other regions. The ghost war strategy plays into the hands of the Thai state’s dirty war.

The Patani insurgents cannot hope to beat the Thai military in a military struggle. They are significantly less well armed and funded and the local population which might support the insurgency is a small minority of the population within the current Thai state.

To make any political progress towards liberation and self-determination, the Patani movement needs to build a mass political party which can operate legally and put forward political demands which go beyond just “Patani nationalism”. The party would have to address economic and social issues and be capable of winning support from local Thai Buddhists and also capable of winning solidarity from social movements in the central, north and north-eastern regions of Thailand.

Mass political action is the answer

The resistance today is not just about planting bombs and shooting state officials. Communities act in a united way to protect themselves from the security forces who constantly abduct and kill people. Women and children block the roads and stop soldiers or police from entering villagers. On September 4, 2005, they blocked the entrance to Ban Lahan in Naratiwat and told the provincial governor that he and his soldiers were not welcome in their village.[45] Two weeks later villagers blocked the road to Tanyong Limo. Earlier two marines had been captured by villagers and then killed by unknown militants. Villagers suspect that the marines were members of a death squad sent in to kill local people.[46] The villagers held up posters aimed at the authorities, saying: “You are the real terrorists.” In November 2006, villagers protested at a school in Yala, demanding that troops leave the area. One of their posters read: “All you wicked soldiers … get out of our village. You come here and destroy our village by killing innocent people. Get out!”[47]

Many slogans against the military are painted on roads. In August 2007 “Darika”[48] made a note of some:

“Peace will come when there are no soldiers.”

“We don’t want the soldiers in our village. We are afraid.”

“Without the soldiers, the people will be happy.”

“The curfew is unjust. They are killing innocents.”

Such protests in villages continue to occur today after various incidents involving the security forces.

On May 31, 2007, the Student Network to Defend the People organised a mass rally of 3000 at the Patani Central Mosque. The rally started because of four murders and one rape carried out by Army Rangers at a village in Yala. The demands of this peaceful protest were for a total review of government policy in the South and a withdrawal of soldiers from the area.[49]

Assistant professor Dr Srisompop Jitpiromsri from Songkla University reported that between 2005 and 2008 there were a total of 26 mass demonstrations in the Patani. Thirteen of them were to demand the release of detainees and another five demanded that troops and police leave the area. These mass actions by villagers and students are the real hope for freedom and peace in the South. Yet the Thai state and the mainstream media brand these mobilisations as “violent”. They make no distinction between peaceful social movements and the armed insurgency. The arrest and torture of seven Yala student activists in 2008 confirms this point.[50]

If the mass action of these social movements is to succeed, we must give them every encouragement and support.

Conclusion

It should be obvious that the struggle for self-determination in Patani is closely connected to the struggle for democracy and freedom in Thailand as a whole. For both to be achieved, the power and influence of the Thai military needs to be reduced and draconian laws which limit freedom of expression, such as the emergency law and the lèse majesté law, must be repealed. Social movements with mass support and a willingness to engage in solidarity between issues and struggles will be crucial. Unfortunately the Red Shirt movement, which was Thailand’s largest social movement for democracy in recent years, has fallen in behind the Pua Thai government which is reconciled with the military. The UDD leadership of the Red Shirts must take much responsibility for this betrayal.

Unless a new pro-democracy movement which is independent from Pua Thai and the military and is willing to reject conservative Thai nationalism can arise, the path towards self-determination in Patani and freedom and democracy in the other regions of Thailand will be a long one.

In the short term, we must demand the removal of Thai troops from Patani and a general demilitarisation of the area. Emergency security laws should also be repealed and standards of human rights have to be established in Patani and regions of Thailand to the north, by punishing state crimes and releasing political prisoners.

Change may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Unlike present-day constitutions, Thailand’s first constitution after the 1932 revolution against the absolute monarchy did not stress the unitary Thai state. It stressed the political sovereignty of the people. Pridi Panomyong’s government in 1947 also accepted the principle of autonomy for Patani. We need to fight for those principles today.

Notes

[1] Giles Ji Ungpakorn is a political commentator and dissident. In February 2009 he had to leave Thailand for exile in Britain because he was charged with lèse majesté for writing a book criticising the 2006 military coup. He is a member of Left Turn Thailand, a socialist organisation. His book, Thailand’s Crisis and the Fight for Democracy, will be of interest to activists, academics and journalists who watch Thai politics, democratisation and NGOs. His website is at http://redthaisocialist.com/. Email:ji.ungpakorn@gmail.com.

[2] Kom Chat Luk newspaper, May 1, 2013.

[3] Giles Ji Ungpakorn (2010)“Thailand’s Crisis and the Struggle for Democracy” (2010). WD Press, U.K.available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/47097266/Thailand-s-Crisis-and-the-fight-for-Democracy.

[4] Martin Smith (1999), Burma. Insurgency and the politics of Ethnicity. Zed Books, London; David Bourchier & Vedi Hadiz Eds (2003), Indonesian Politics and Society. A Reader. Routledge-Curzon; Christopher Duncan (2004), Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities. Cornell University Press.

[5] Alex Callinicos (2009), Imperialism and the Global Political Economy. Polity Press, Cambridge, U.K.

[6] Rough figures from Adam John, PhD economics candidate at the Agricultural and Food Policy Studies Institute at Universiti Putra Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, given at “To understand the conflict; Patani-Thailand South" seminar in Lund August 31, 2013, organised by the Peace Innovation Forum, Focus Southeast Asia.

[7] Giles Ji Ungpakorn (2010), already quoted.

[8] See Giles Ji Ungpakorn (2011)“Lèse Majesté, the Monarchy, and the Military in Thailand”. Paper given at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies (Pax et Bellum), University of Uppsala, Sweden, April 29, 2011. Available at: http://redthaisocialist.com/english-article/72-academic-papers/187-lese-majeste-the-monarchy-and-the-military-in-thailand.html, or http://www.scribd.com/doc/54529804/Lese-majeste-the-Monarchy-and-the-Military-in-Thailand

[9] Bangkok Post 19/11/2009.

[10] Poldej Binprateep, an under-secretary at the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security in the junta’s government, admitted this. http://www.prachatai.com/15/1/2007 (in Thai).

[11] http://www.prachatai.com/15/10/2009 (in Thai).

[12] International Crisis Group (2009), “Southern Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solutions?” Asia Report N°181 –December 8, 2009.http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/181_southern_thailand___moving_towards_political_solutions.pdf.

[13] Arundhati Roy (2004), The ordinary Person’s Guide to Empire. Harper Perennial.

[14] The cannon was promptly blown up by insurgents.

[15] Giles Ji Ungpakorn (2009), “Why have most Thai NGOs chosen to side with the conservative royalists, against democracy and the poor?”. Interface: a journal for and about social movements. Volume 1 (2): 233-237 (November 2009). http://groups.google.com/group/interface-articles/web/ungpakorn.pdf.

[16] Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud (2006) The Malays of Patani. The search for security and independence.School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia; Tengku Ismail C. Denudom (2013), Politics, Economy, Identity or Religious Striving for the Malay Patani. A case study of the conflicts: Thailand-Pattani. Peace Innovation Forum, Focus Southeast Asia, Lund, Sweden.

[17] Lt-General Pisarn Wattanawongkiri was the Fourth Army Region Commander at the time.

[18] See the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=seSIT8nfPg0

[19] Thai Senate Committee on Social Development and Human Security, December 2004.

[20] See the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jWaZExPSmKk andhttp://www.youtube.com/user/Giles53#p/u/5/cZn3qJ5MMGQ

[21] Katherine Bowie (1997), Rituals of National Loyalty. An Anthropology of the State and Village Scout Movement in Thailand. Columbia University Press. Giles Ji Ungpakorn ed. (2003), Radicalising Thailand: New Political Perspectives. Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.

[22] A claim made by Samak Suntarawej and others.

[23] Post Today 17/11/2004 (in Thai).

[24] Prime Minister Surayud needs to apologise for what he did back in the May 1992 crack-down on unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators in Bangkok!

[25] See Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker (2004), Thaksin. The business of politics in Thailand.Silkworm. Page 19.

[26]http://www.prachatai.com/9/10/2007 (in Thai).

[27]http://www.prachatai.com/18/2/2008 (in Thai).

[28] Turn Left, March 2008, www.pcpthai.org/ (in Thai).

[29] Duncan McCargo (2008), "What’s Really Happening in Southern Thailand?" ISEAS Regional Forum, Singapore, January 8, 2008; Duncan McCargo (2009), "Thai Buddhism, Thai southern conflict". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40(1): 1-10; Duncan McCargo (2009), "The Politics of Buddhist identity in Thailand’s deep south: The Demise of civil religion?"Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40(1): 11-32.

[30] Duncan McCargo (2012), Mapping National Anxieties. Thailand’s Southern Conflict. NIAS Press.

[31] Carlyle A. Thayer (2007), Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Literature Review.http://www.scribd.com/doc/17965033/Thayer-Insurgency-in-Southern-Thailand

[32] Carlyle A. Thayer (2007). Already quoted.

[33] Duncan McCargo (2005), “Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand”. The Pacific Review18 (4) December, 499-519; Duncan McCargo (2012), already quoted.

[34] For an explanation of the Thai crisis, see: Giles Ji Ungpakorn (2011), “Thai Spring?” Paper given at the 5th Annual Nordic NIAS Council Conference organised by the Forum for Asian Studies/NIAS. November 21-23, 2011, Stockholm University, Sweden. http://redthaisocialist.com/english-article/72-academic-papers/296-thai-spring.html or http://www.scribd.com/doc/73908759/Thai-Spring

[35] Interview with the BBC’s Kate McGeown, 7/8/2006. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/.

[36] Zachary Abuza, “Terrorism Monitor”, 8/9/2006 James Town Foundation.

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370.

[37]Chris Harman (1994), “The Profit and the Proletariat”. International Socialism Journal 64.

[38] Ahmad Somboon Bualuang (2006), “Malay, the basic culture”. In The situation on the Southern border. The views of Civil Society. Published by the Coordinating Committee of the Peoples Sector for the Southern Border Provinces (in Thai).

[39] There have been some Buddhists living in the region for centuries.

[40] Akerin Tuansiri (2006), “Student activities in the violent areas of the Southern border provinces”. InThe situation on the Southern border. The views of Civil Society. Already quoted (in Thai).

[41] Bangkok Post, 10/8/2005 and 9/5/2005.

[42] National Reconciliation Commission, 16/5/2006 (in Thai).

[43] This proposal was supported by the Malaysian politician Anwar Ibrahim.http://www.prachatai.com/5/5/2009 (in Thai).

[44] Bangkok Post, 26/6/2006 and 27/6/2006.

[45] Bangkok Post, 5/9/2005.

[46] Bangkok Post, 22/9/2005.

[47]The Nation, 6/11/2006.

[48] Darika (2008), “Records from Kollo Balay village. A Village in the Red Zone”. South See 5, Social Research Centre, Chulalongkorn University (in Thai).

[49] http://www.prachatai.com/ 4/6/2007 and http://www.prachatai.com/17/6/2007 (in Thai).

[50] http://www.prachatai.com/2/2/2008 (in Thai).

Global Terrorism & Insurgency Attacks Rapidly Increase in Five Years

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Tue, 04 Mar 2014 08:48:00 +0000





According to IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre

Terrorism spike seen in Arab Spring countries;
Attacks in Syria almost double in one year

Business Wire

LONDON -- February 13, 2014

The number of attacks by non-state armed groups around the world has rapidly
increased in just five years, according to the IHS Jane’s 2013 Global
Terrorism & Insurgency Attack Index from IHS Inc. (NYSE: IHS), a leading
global source of critical information and insight. “In 2009, a worldwide total
of 7,217 attacks were recorded from open sources. In 2013, that number
increased by more than 150% to 18,524,” said Matthew Henman, manager of IHS
Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre  (JTIC), which carried out the study.

Key highlights from the IHS Jane’s 2013 Global Terrorism & Insurgency Attack
Index:

  * Global: Significant rises in global militant and non-militant fatalities
  * Arab Spring countries see attacks spike
  * Syria: Attacks almost double between 2012 and 2013
  * Iraq: Suicide attacks quadruple and Al-Qaeda in Iraq re-enters the top
    five most active non-state armed groups in the world
  * Sub-Saharan Africa: Terrorism fatalities rise

Global Trends

“The epicenter of 2013 activity was in the Middle East, with significant
pockets of violence radiating out to neighboring regions in Africa and South
Asia. We have also seen a dramatic rise in the number of militant and
non-militant casualties. In 2012, 13,872 militants and 10,562 non-militants
deaths were recorded from open sources. In 2013, non-militants fatalities
almost doubled to 17,554 and militant fatalities numbered 21,490. These are
some of the largest rises we have recorded in the past several years,” Henman
said.

Arab Spring countries see attack spike

“In 2013, JTIC recorded a spike in activity by non-state armed groups in
Tunisia and Egypt. Attacks in Tunisia grew from 21 in 2012 to 72 in 2013. In
Egypt, the number of attacks recorded jumped from 63 in 2012 to 431 in 2013.
In Libya, there were 237 attacks recorded in 2013 and 81 in 2012. While the
increases in Egypt and Tunisia were both somewhat attributable to the
emergence of Islamist militant groups, violent protests following the deposing
of President Muhammad Morsi in Egypt accounted for the majority of sub-state
violence recorded by JTIC,” Henman said.

Syria’s attack count almost doubles between 2012 and 2013

Henman added that “due to a plurality of factors, the anti-government
insurgency in Syria intensified notably in 2013. Between 2012 and 2013, the
number of attacks recorded by JTIC almost doubled. In 2012, we recorded 2,670
attacks. In 2013, that number jumped to 4,694.”

Suicide attacks quadruple in Iraq; Al-Qaeda in Iraq re-enters the Top 5

“A key indication of the intensifying level of violence in Iraq was that the
number of suicide attacks in the country quadrupled from 2012 to 2013, with
the 2013 total almost triple that recorded in neighboring Syria and almost
double that recorded in Afghanistan,” Henman continued.

“In 2013, 207 attacks were claimed by or attributed to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
This is a 160% increase from the 79 recorded in open sources in 2012,” he
said. “Despite this increase, it does not fully reflect AQI’s predominant role
in driving the 52% increase in the recorded number of attacks in Iraq and the
148% increase in non-militant fatalities. In 2012 there were 2,297 attacks in
Iraq. At the end of 2013, that figure stands at 3,499.”

Sub-Saharan Africa’s rising terrorism risks

Henman concluded that “while the number of recorded attacks has only slightly
increased in sub-Saharan Africa, we are seeing more lethal attacks claiming a
higher number of fatalities. In 2012, JTIC recorded 1,370 attacks in
sub-Saharan Africa with 3,434 fatalities. In 2013, JTIC recorded 1,391 attacks
with 3,903 fatalities. When we look at Nigeria specifically, attacks decreased
from 305 in 2012 to 137 in 2013, but fatalities rose from 1,351 in 2012 to
1,447 in 2013. This was partly due to an intensification of violence by
militant Islamist group Boko Haram, but also a consequence of several
high-profile instances of inter-communal violence across the country.”

Top 10 most active non-state armed groups in 2013

1. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (Thailand)
2. Taliban
3. Islami Chhatra Shibir (Bangladesh)
4. Communist Party of India – Maoist
5. Al-Qaeda in Iraq
6. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab)
7. FARC (Colombia)
8. New People’s Army (Philippines)
9. Jabhat al-Nusra (Syria)
10. Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist

Credit: http://www.bloomberg.com/article/2014-02-13/ajz_yofpII78.html

Why They Kill the Children?

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Fri, 21 Feb 2014 10:32:00 +0000

Kampong Bluka Perak (Baluka Perak) is a Malay village lie about 65 km. from Patani provincial town and about 30 Km. from Narathiwat province, in the sub-district of Bluka Samak, district of Bacho, Narathiwat province, Thailand South. Kampong Bluka Perak is lie about 5 km. from high way(Patani -Narahiwat )No. 42 on the right side from Patani direction, as another villages around , people living in simple life and modesty. Kampong Bluka Perak is unknown to many before this tragic killing of 3 boys of Maman family age 11, 9 and 6 respectively.

The brutal killing happened on February 3, 2014 at about 21 pm. by about 10 black uniform gunmen when Mr. Jehmu and his 3 boys came back from mosque in the village after Isha(last evening) prayer and about to enter their house. His youngest son Ilyas Maman, 6 years old was shot dead at the front door, Mujahid Maman, 11 years old was shot dead inside of the house and Bahari Maman, 9 years old was shot dead in the house while Jehmu Maman who was shot at the leg escaped himself by jumping down from the kitchen of the house and his wife Fadilah was shot at elbow seriously injured and now in the hospital.

Before the tragic Killing

Mr. Jehmu Maman and his wife, Fadilah are the Islamic kindergarten(TADIKA) teacher in the Bluka Perak village and active in the village activities, he loved by all villagers cause of his good characteristic, modesty and helping people, he has no any disputed cases in or out side the village. He has been arrested many times by the Thai state on the security charged according to emergency decree (when the attack happened to the state security forces in the surrounding area), one month before the tragic killing happen-he won the case in the provincial court, come home and stay peacefully with his family.

After the Tragic killing

The brutal killing in this way is not new that happen to the Malay in this conflict area, on November, 16, 2005 at Kathong village, Rangae district, Narathiwat province , 9 members of Aware Buesa family had been killed during they were sleeping peacefully in the house including 8 months old baby. After the killing of both events, the Thai state voiced that the killing were done by the separatist movement because they were disclosed the information of the movement to the Thai state but people in and outside the village never agree with the Thai security statement , they believed that this dirty crime were done by the security forces(death squad) ofthe state.

Why they kill the children?

The killing of this kind is not new to the Thai state, during fighting with communist party of Thailand in 70s and 80’s, this tactic had been used successfully in order to terrorized and blocked the increasing members of communist party in the southern part of Thailand. In whatever reason this tragic killing for, Jehmu Maman questioning that why they killed the children? and said “ I hope that this going to be the last case happen to the children”

Press release

Thailand: UNICEF expresses ‘deep concern’ about violence against children in the far south

BANGKOK, 5 February 2014 – UNICEF today said it was deeply concerned about the continuing violence against children in Thailand’s restive southernmost provinces, including the killing of three young boys in Narathiwat Province on Monday night.

According to Thai media reports, the boys aged 3, 5 and 9 were shot dead in front of their house by a group of gunmen who opened fire on the family as they returned from prayers at a village mosque. The father and pregnant mother were also injured. Local authorities are investigating whether the incident is related to the conflict in the region.

“UNICEF strongly condemns this attack against innocent children,” said Bijaya Rajbhandari, UNICEF Representative for Thailand. “We are deeply concerned about the continuing violence against children in the far south of Thailand. This must stop. We call upon all parties involved to do everything to ensure that all children do not fall victim to violence.”

According to Deep South Watch, 62 children below the age of 15 have been killed, and 387 others injured, since the current conflict began in January 2004.

***

About UNICEF
UNICEF promotes the rights and wellbeing of every child, in everything we do. Together with our partners, we work in 190 countries and territories to translate that commitment into practical action, focusing special effort on reaching the most vulnerable and excluded children, to the benefit of all children, everywhere.

Death Toll of Security Personnel in Southern Conflict Doubles in 2013

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Thu, 02 Jan 2014 14:24:00 +0000

Military and police killed from southern conflicts are more than double that is from 60 in the year 2012 to 129 in the year 2013 , despite the series of peace talks with BRN and the truce in the month of Ramadan, according to a police report.

The numbers of 267 deaths both officials and civilians due to separatist violence in 2013, 93 were soldiers;36 were police rangers and marines; 132 were civilians; five were teachers and one was a monk, said the report by the Police Operational Center in the Southern Provinces. Rising toll are also the among militants 51 militants were killed, which was more than the previous year's unspecified figure due to an increase in raids and blockades to 45 occasions, which saw 18 of them killed after firefights.

In 2012, the death toll was 21 police, 39 military personnel and 223 civilians, with no details about other people, according to the Police Operational Center.

There were 1,539 incidents as of December 23, up from 1,465. They were broken down into 514 shootings, 87 arson attacks, three brutal murders, eight assaults, 24 ambushes, 714 disturbances of the peace and one protest.

Injuries were inflicted on 70 police officers, 352 military personnel, 265 civilians and eight teachers, for a total of 695 cases.

At present , fake bombs were planted every where in the conflict area of south, likely by insurgents intent on causing a commotion. .

In many locations, banners made from clothe and sheets of paper with "Patani Merdeka" (Independence to Patani) written on them hung and places in a high places every where in the conflict area of 4 southern border provinces.

Malay in South Africa

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Sat, 16 Nov 2013 12:48:00 +0000

Map of South Africa, The Malay Community in Cape Town

The Cape of Malay

The very first Malays in

South Africa

are thought to have arrived in the Cape with Jan van Riebeeck in 1652. A short while later, even more arrived in the form of slaves, political prisoners and criminals, who were brought to the country to perform involuntary labour. By 1799 the Cape Malay community had grown sufficiently for the government to send an entire regiment – known as the Malay Regiment – of soldiers to the Eastern Cape to help the colonial army fight against the Xhosas. In 1846, the Malay Corps arrived in the Port Elizabeth area to fight in what eventually became known as the ‘Battle of the Axe’. Once the fighting subsided, many of these soldiers chose to stay on in the area that became known as Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth (now Nelson Mandela Bay) and build lives for themselves.

A photo taken in a Javanese madrassah in the Dutch Colonial period. Left hand corner of the picture shows two pairs of wooden Javanese clogs. In Cape Town, these were called kaparangs and could be found in many old masjids in cape town. Also notice the manner of teaching and learning the holy Quran, using a 'kalam' (wooden stick) to point. this method still used in many old-school madrassahs in cape town. Also the usage of melayu terms for arabic vowels - fat'ha = dettis (di atas), Kasrah = bawah, Dommah = dapan, tanween = dua dettis, dua dapan, dua bawah, Shaddah = saptu.

The Sword and sheild above belonged to Tuan Guru Imam Abdullah ibn Qadi Abdussalaam, the first Imam of the Awal Masjid in Bo-Kaap, Cape Town.

As is to be expected, religion was a very important part of life for the Cape Malays. The first mosque to have been built in the Cape Colony was erected in 1846 in Uitenhage and is known as the Masjid-Al-Qudama mosque. It was followed by the Majied-Ul-Abkbar mosque in Grace Street, which was the first mosque to be built in Port Elizabeth. Built in 1855, the Grace Street mosque is more than 150 years old. It is interesting to note that the original members of the congregation ran out of funds halfway through construction and it was only through the grace of the Sultan of Turkey that the building was finished. The building of this mosque was seen as being of great importance since, prior to this, Cape Malays had been forced to leave on Thursday for Uitenhage in order to attend services on Friday.

The Cape-Malay Quarter in Cape Town, with Lion's Head in the background.

Mosque with Table Mountain in Cape Town

Later, more mosques were built in Rudolph Street and Pier Street, making them an easily accessible centre of the Muslim community. Unfortunately, most of the mosques were no longer in walking distance for many Muslims after their forced relocation under the Group Areas Act. Furthermore, the Malay people had to fight efforts to have their sacred places of worship bulldozed on more than one occasion. In the first instance, the United Nations spoke up against the regime’s efforts to destroy one of these historical landmarks. Just 5 years later, the same mosque was almost bulldozed to make way for a new freeway. Its dome and minaret were removed as part of the demolition before proceedings came to a grinding halt. Today, a truncated piece of freeway stops just short of the mosque as a reminder of past events. Thus, the mosques in Port Elizabeth are a fitting symbol of the tenacity, courage and resolution that the members of the Muslim faith in South End share.

The colored houses

The kids from school

Originally, the entire area that is now known as South End was once part of a farm called Papenbietjiesfontein. In time, it was given to the municipality and, shortly thereafter, the bulk of it was divided into plots and sold to the Malays. Before long, the flourishing community of South End started to develop. The earliest Cape Malays who had helped to establish the

community here were not noteworthy in themselves. However, as a people, their role as pioneers and their devotion to the Islamic faith were of the utmost importance. These early pioneers maintained the religious practices of the Cape and these have passed down over the generations regardless of where their descendants chose to settle.

Credit: The cape Malay Community, South End Museum

http://www.southendmuseum.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10&Itemid=9

: Rurousha 流浪者, http://rurousha.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-cape-malay-community-of-cape-town.html

An open letter to Thai media

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Thu, 07 Nov 2013 11:59:00 +0000

By Abu Hafez Al-Hakim | Mon, 2013-11-04 15:51
(Translated from a Malay article : Surat terbuka kepada media Thai )
Read Malay Text : http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/ms/node/4909

Greetings

The major influence a media has in a society is undeniable. Its role is not just to deliver news and information to the public but also to influence the views or attitude of the society, through reporting and writing. Thus journalists are considered to be agents of change in a society.

In the context of political conflict in the South (Patani) the main-stream Thai media has long been responsible for propagation of news and information . We, the freedom fighters of Patani, view the general opinion and the way information and news being disseminated by Thai media and journalists as outdated . In spite of the rapid progress in the field of information technology nothing much has changed . The Thai media HAS NEVER or RARELY been fair to the Patani freedom movements in its reports. Since 50 years or so until now the situation has not improved.

In the Thai media, Patani freedom fighters are often negatively portrait as "Southern Villains or Terrorists " . This attitude reflects extreme prejudice and biased reporting. What is the justification to label persons who fight for the rights of their own people as such, only because they violently oppose Thai suppression ? If that is the case, King Naresuan and the King Taksin could also be called terrorists because they also rose up ,using violence, against the Burmese occupation of Ayutthaya in the past.

When the late Tuan Guru Haji Sulong submitted his infamous 7 petitions in 1953 , not only was he arrested and imprisoned on “revolt” charge , but was also eventually murdered . Against whom did he revolt ? Was his intention to topple the regime in Bangkok or just simply to demand rights and justice for the Malay Muslims in the South? This unjust Label remains until today and continues to be propagated by certain media in Thailand , disregarding the sensitivity of the people of Patani Muslims who revere him as a great ‘Ulama’( religious scholar).

The freedom fighters groups are also called "Separatist Movements ". It is important to stress here that all Patani freedom fighters groups are LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, not SEPARATISTS. By political science definition there is a great difference between a liberation movement and a separatist movement. All those labels or terms were intentionally created by the Thai Government to paint negative picture of the fighters. Unfortunately, the Thai media blindly adopted the label without profound consideration nor objective research of the fighters' true intention , thus putting them in a disadvantage position in the eyes of Thai general public and world community.

The main principle of journalism states that : "The main task of a journalist is to report the truth and to respect the rights of people to obtain the correct information." Apparently in the context of Patani reporting , it is not so. Thai journalists are often seen tagging the security forces , or government personnel to a location for news coverage. This is sufficient for general public to view them as "government people" and therefore become uncooperative and denied them vital and accurate information they badly need. With language barrier , unprofessional attitude and laziness , they are easily satisfied with the "second-hand" information readily provided and “spoon-fed “ by the security forces. Thus many news reports are seen concluding typically in a “stereotype “ manner : the authorities are still investigating the incident, believed to be carried out by the Southern terrorists from the area.

Perhaps they have forgotten about this another principle: To seek out and disseminate competing perspectives without being unduly influenced by those who would use their power or position counter to the public interest, that is to find and present different views without being influenced by those who abuse power or office contrary to the interest of people in this area. In carrying out his duties, a journalist believes in freedom to gather information and publish his reports honestly and reserves the right to make fair reviews and criticism.

Thai media also rarely provides space and opportunity for the freedom fighters to voice their opinion or to communicate with the general public throughout Thailand, to address some important issues . Perhaps they would be thinking : why must they give space and coverage to villains and terrorists ? Until now the general Thai public are still wondering : Why are the Malays in the South resisting the Government? Why resort to violence ? Why do they want to secede from Thailand? Why are there bomb explosions everywhere, involving not only the armed forces but also the public lives and properties ? Why are teachers being targeted ? ...and so on.

Another important Principle of Journalism is “To give voice to the voiceless; document the unseen” . It urges the media to open space and opportunity for those who are oppressed to highlight and make their voice heard. The Thai media is expected to document things that are intentionally “hidden” by the authorities , so that the truth will be investigated and exposed . Otherwise the Thai general public will forever be denied true information and the Malay Patani people , particularly the freedom fighters, will continue to be regarded as villains, rebels or worse as terrorists, while in reality they struggle to restore their deprived rights.

The situation is however different with foreign journalists and media. They are very professional, with a proactive approach and produce unbiased reports. They do not expect information to be fed, but work hard to extract information by adopting the "Engaging the community" approach. Though they also face constraints of language and culture like their Thai counterparts, but the professionalism and ethics they strongly adhere to in journalism, provides them easy access to information from reliable and original source (authentic). The Patani Malays , especially villagers, are more comfortable with foreign journalists compared to Thai journalists.

That's why we find news reports and information posted by foreign media are much better and more trustworthy compared to the Thai media. Sometimes there are great differences of facts and information between both or even contradicting to those reported in the Thai media. A considerable number of people throughout the world, as well as over 300 millions of Malays of the Nusantara now have a better understanding of Patani people's suffering, plight and their struggle , in comparison to 60 million Thai people who have yet to understand the true nature of the conflict in the South.

Another important issue in Thai media reporting is HISTORICAL FACTS. In the context of the history of Patani, beginning from the era of Langkasuka Empire to the present day, Thai media are more likely to adhere fanatically to the historical version that is written by their own people . The position and relationship of nation-states in the past, particularly the Patani-Siamese political conflict, is only seen from the Thai historical point of view. This resulted in wrong assumption that Patani and the Northern States of Malaysia (Kelantan, Kedah, Terengganu and Perlis) were initially owned by Siam. Thai history claims that some territories that are now part of the neighboring countries such as Laos, Malaysia, Khmer and Myanmar were originally theirs. On the contrary if we refer to the histories of the countries involved we will find that they also claim that all the mentioned areas were historically theirs but subjected to Thai domination and expansion during certain periods.

If we study the records written by foreign historians and travelers who had had contact with Patani in the past such as the Chinese, the Japanese, the Dutch, the Portuguese, the English and the Arabs, we will discover detailed records that are very much different to the ones written by the Thais. These facts are often ignored and overlooked by Thai media.

Thai media has always labeled the Patani freedom fighter as bandits, villains, separatists, rebels or terrorists . Since the Patani Malays did not have proper channels to voice their opinions, the feelings of dissatisfaction remained unheard for years. Ironically, when the Patani freedom fighters call the Thais “PENJAJAH” (colonialist), they turn surprised and angry . Then we find the Thai media begin to exploit the issue in their news reports, adding more fuel to the fire. They find it hard to accept the fact that they were also a " colonial" power, or conquerer in the region. The history of the people in the Malay world of Nusantara has, without doubt, regarded Siam as one of the colonialist along-side with the European powers of the previous centuries.

The Kuala Lumpur peace initiative through the General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process dated 28 February 2013 gave a new and acceptable recognition to the fighters. They are no longer considered as villains nor terrorists but as "people who have different opinion and ideologies from the (Thai) State " Almost all of the world's leading foreign media pay serious attention and are optimistic for the success of the process towards peace. Some Thai media ,on the other hand, not only turn a cold shoulder to the peace process, disregarding their own government's effort for a peaceful solution, posing a lot of questions discrediting the process , they go as far as turning themselves into a bunch of anti-peace group, or peace spoilers. If they do not want this conflict be settled by peaceful means, are there any other alternatives ? Or does the Thai media share the same sentiment with certain parties who prefer to see the situation as status quo, where unrest and instability rules the day, resulting in countless casualties in lives and properties ? This is similar to the attitude of certain people, the opponent of peace ,who will lose influence and material gains from certain unlawful dealings in the event of peace. Is that their hidden agenda ?

Lately ,we find a small number of Thai journalists and media start opening their eyes and make an effort to seek the truth to present the general public. They no longer rely on biased " script" dictated to them by the authorities. They are independent , hard working, doing research and thorough investigation, at the same time engaging the community of different language, race and culture. What they get in return is people's trust who are ready to open their hearts for them, providing whatever information deemed necessary. For that reason we can now read several different reports from them ,including some video documentaries, about certain important events such as the "Tak Bai Tragedy" (rewritten) report, the death of Mat Rosol, the stand-off involving Ustaz Rahim or " Black Pele", and the latest shooting incidence at Paku, Thung Yang Deng District . All those writings create an alternative perspective and balanced news presentation and narratives for reporting in the South. Through this the voice and views of the fighters are heard. Unfortunately these journalists are cynically referred to as the "voice" of BRN.

Indeed, there is no other option for Thai media and journalists other than making a "Paradigm Shift" in their reporting career , uphold The Universal Principles of Journalism and the Guiding Principles for Journalists, without fear or favour. That is the only way people's voice will be heard , the truth will prevail ,and justice will be served. The Thai media and journalists will be respected for being trustworthy and reliable , not only by the local community, but the general public throughout Thailand and the world.

With regards.

Vinegar and Honey - from outside the fence of Patani

Muharram/November 2013

Credit: http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4913

9th Year of Tak Bai Massacre :Thailand massive payout to Tak Bai and Deep South victims: Is it the Way to Peace?

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Thu, 24 Oct 2013 10:44:00 +0000

After years of pain, family members of those who died in a 2004 incident in Tak Bai, Thailand received compensation packages from the government. The move has been praised by locals as important to the reconciliation process in the strife-torn provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala.

"Villagers now believe that the government can be relied upon to see that justice in being served in their communities," said the director of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), Director Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong.

Eighty-five people are known to have died in the incident, in which government forces sought to quell a local demonstration over the arrest of six local men. Hundreds were handcuffed, crammed into military trucks and transported three hours to a military camp in neighbouring Pattani. The result, for many, was death by suffocation.

The tragedy is widely viewed as a catalyst for an upsurge in Deep South unrest, which has since left over 5,000 dead.

On June 12th, survivors and victims' families met with Thawee and members of a government committee, led by Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, which approved the compensation packages. For the Tak Bai victims, this amounts to 4 million-7.5 million baht ($127,000-238,345) per life lost, for a total of 637.5 million baht (more than $20.25m).

According to Thawee, it is important for the government to work to heal psychological wounds by providing justice.

"Today's announcement that the government will distribute compensation is just a part of the healing process. The most important thing is to maintain a good quality of life for them in the long term and help them live happy, productive lives," he told Khabar.

'Acknowledge and address the injustice'

One family member on hand was Massata Jahauma, who has lost two sons to Deep South violence. One, Muhammad Subre Abukari, was among those who died in Tak Bai. He was only 14 at the time.

A second son, arrested for alleged involvement in a gun robbery, vanished in December 2009 after being enrolled in a witness protection programme. He is presumed dead.

Massata, who lives in Narathiwat with her seven surviving children, told Khabar she remains haunted by what happened.

"The psychological pain can never be cured, but when I heard the news today that the government had approved compensation payments to victims' families I was glad," she said.

"Of course this will never compensate for our losses, but at least it is an attempt to acknowledge and address the injustice," she said. "I would like to thank SBPAC director Thawee Sodsong for bringing fairness to the local people.

"Although my sons are gone forever, I at least know that we can and will continue to stay in the area."

Yana Salaemae, a representative of the families of those killed in the Tak Bai incident, told Khabar: "The local people who have come today do so with pure hearts to say 'thank you' to Colonel Thawee for bringing us some justice. We have lived under a cloud of doubt and isolation for the past eight years. The answer we got today gives us great encouragement, making our fight for justice feel worthwhile, and at least lets us know that we have not been neglected or forgotten."

Wadueramae Mamingji, chairman of the Provincial Islamic Committee of Pattani, told Khabar that the people of the Deep South appreciate the help SBPAC does for the region in the areas of education, employment opportunities and religious affairs.

"We are ready and willing to co-operate in all aspects in restoring peace to the core of our society," the cleric said.

Victims, survivors of other incidents to receive compensation

Families of victims from two other high-profile incidents will also receive compensation under packages approved by the SBPAC. In April 2004, 32 suspected militants died during a shootout with soldiers at Krue Se Mosque in Pattani.

In another incident the very same day, 19 members of a championship-winning soccer team in the Saba Yoi district of Songkhla Province were shot to death as they staged an assault on a local police station. Authorities were blamed for excessive use of force against the attackers.

According to a summary of the compensation agreement provided by SBPAC to Khabar, families of the 32 militants who died at Krue Se Mosque, along with those of three slain government officers, will each be paid 4 million baht ($127,092) "for humanitarian reasons" and "as a step towards reconciliation".

In this case, a lower compensation amount was chosen – compared to the 7.5 million baht for the Tak Bai and Saba Yoi victims – because there is "basic evidence" indicating that government officials were at fault for using excessive force. The higher payments were reserved for cases where government culpability has been deemed "proven".

The size of the payouts is significant in a country where the average per capita annual income is well under $5,000, and even lower in the Deep South.

The amount of compensation of Takbai victims from the Thai government is approximately 666, 451.200 Thai Baht divided as follow:-

- The death victims 85 cases total payment 561.101,000 Thai baht

- The injured victims 449 cases total payment 60,455,000 Thai Baht

-The disabled victims 1 case 6,380,000 Thai Baht

-With draw a legal charge victims 58 cases total payment 2,025,200 Thai Baht

- Remand victims 1,280 cases Paid only 766 cases total amount 11, 490,000 Thaibaht

Credit:http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2012/06/20/feature-02

:http://thailand.ahrchk.net/takbai/

:http://www.isranews.org/south-news/scoop/item/24623-takbai_24623.html

Army Chief: Thailand Authorities and The BRN Demands

noreply@blogger.com (Kantang Merah) — Wed, 25 Sep 2013 11:00:00 +0000

Thai Army commander-in-chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha strongly resist the autonomy or special ruling area in the far south proposed by the BRN(Patani Malay National Liberation Front) group in the peace talks between Thailand authority and the BRN representative, he said on September 24, 2013 that there's no sufficient budget and finance to self supporting and he also threatened the head men, head villagers and other lower government officials to cut off the regular monthly salary.

Thai authorities are still considering the 5-point demands made by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) militant group but if there was no conclusion yet, the issue should be later aired at the peace dialogue, according to Thai Army commander-in-chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha.

Gen Prayuth said that the Thai authorities have officially received the BRN demands and the agencies concerned -- including the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) -- were studying and analysing the context cautiously to determine the practicality of each point, that is whether they should be accepted and implemented or not.

The army chief would not say whether a solution had been found or not but he reiterated that the security agencies would decide on the basis of national benefit as their priority.

He said there was no need to hurry in bringing the proposals to any final decision before the next round of peace dialogue with the BRN scheduled on the third week of October.

Paradorn Pattanatabut, secretary general of the National Security Council, said that the BRN demands were under the deliberation of security, civic and academic groups and it would need more time to make any conclusion.

He said the next round of talks would touch on the BRN's demands, reducing violence in the southernmost provinces and violent attacks during the holy month of Ramadan.

Thai authorities and BRN representatives have already held three rounds of talks with Malaysia acting as facilitator.

The next round of talks is scheduled in October 2013