Dr Samuel Chindaro' s Blog

Using Biometrics to eliminate “Ghost Workers” in the Civil Service in Zimbabwe

2018-12-10T15:57:00.000-08:00

Dr Samuel Chindaro

In his 2019 budget speech, the Minister of Finance Mr Mthuli Ncube lamented the continuous existence of “ghost workers” in the Civil Service and made a proposal to introduce biometric registration to weed them out. According to the Minister, the existence of “ghost workers” is contributing to the “the burgeoning public service wage bill which accounts for over 90% of total revenues.”

The introduction of technology to stamp out economic sabotage, malpractices and corruption is in tandem with the call by President ED Mnangagwa in his maiden speech for the use of “e-government programme not only as a means to keep in step with the ICT revolution, but also to fight corruption.” It is a refreshing acknowledgement, that when it comes to tackling corruption, we need to critically engage with the role of technology.

Despite Civil Service audits undertaken by Government in 2011 and 2015 which revealed the possible existence of ghost workers, minimal effort has been put towards eliminating this menace in the public service and the practice has remained unabated with millions of tax payer money pumped out annually from the government treasury through salary payments to non-existing employees. While corruption takes different forms in the public service, ghost workers fraud inflates the cost of governance to the detriment of overall development. Not only does the incidence of ghost workers fraud bloat the wage bill, it reduces employment opportunities for qualified applicants.

Ghost workers are people who are on the payroll while not doing any work; this includes people who claim a salary for people who have died, retired civil servants, relatives who do not work for the public service, or even people who never existed in the first place. Therefore, a ghost can be a real person who knowingly or not is placed on the payroll, or a fictitious person invented by the fraudster. This is payroll fraud, the government paying for employees who no longer work for the public service or who were never employed.

Other forms of ghost workers include staff that receive unearned salaries through false means; for example, staff who have multiple jobs in the civil service, receives multiple salaries using different names, staff who collect pay or allowances that is above their entitled right, staff who still receive full salary while on leave of absence, and employees who have been transferred or retired yet their names are in the payroll. There are also workers who are duly employed but have absconded and never report to work. Many of them have other means of livelihood outside their workplace, but still collect their government salaries and allowances by working with other corrupt “insiders”.

Another fraudulent activity similar to ghost workers is “time theft”. Time theft at works occurs when an employee accepts pay from their employer for time they have not actually put in. It occurs in different ways such as “buddy punching” (your friend clocks you in), over extended breaks and excessive personal time. On a small scale, this might seem insignificant, but once you look at the big picture attendance fraud can have serious repercussions on government expenditure.

The high occurrence of ghost workers’ syndrome in Zimbabwe is obviously a worrisome situation in which cost of governance is high and annually, budgetary provision for government’s recurrent expenditure is excessive. This leads to paucity of fund which is required by State and Local Government for provision of critical infrastructure in education, health, power, water, roads etc.

Ghost workers’ fraud impact government and governance negatively by compensating idleness; that is government is paying for inactivity. It is a form of economic sabotage and drain to scarce resources of different tiers of government. Funds lost to this fraud are potentially huge and capable of derailing and distorting government’s developmental plans.

As the technology world evolves, challenges to implement secure personal identification protocols with biometric technology are increasing and the need for accurate human identification is higher than ever. As more governments around the world try to figure out a solution to the ghost worker issue, many are adopting biometrics for identification of employees. Biometric technology isolates and captures unique human physiological characteristics to identify a person. The main advantages of using a biometric system is that it identifies a person by who the person is rather than what the person has, unlike most traditional authorization systems such as personal identification numbers or ID cards. Unlike these solutions that rely on “what you have,” biometric credentials such as a fingerprint or facial image cannot be lost, forgotten, guessed, or easily cloned. It thus eliminates fake employee registration into the payroll system.

In Kenya biometric registration of employees uncovered 12,500 ‘ghost workers’. In Nigeria the government used fingerprint based biometric identification to eliminate an astonishing 43,000 ghost workers from the public payroll, for a saving more than $75 million dollars. In India, within a week of introducing the system, employee attendance rose from 60 to 96 per cent. These examples prove the effectiveness of implementing biometric technology to establish accountability and punctuality.

The Zimbabwe government should therefore be commended for their plan to adopt biometrics to

establish accountability and eliminate ghost worker fraud. The country is already using biometrics ID and voter registration (to eliminate among others “ghost voters”); so its implementation for eliminating ghost workers should not present major challenges. Zimbabwe should draw lessons from these various experiences and take advantage of the latest biometric technological advances to improve efficiency and obtain higher rates of success.

If biometric attendance is implemented, the chance of fake time sheets or clocking for a friend will be reduced to zero. Also, during salary and benefit distribution, biometric identification will ensure accurate disbursement to the right employee and additionally create clear audit trails for employee punctuality which will in turn, improve service quality.

Biometric identification technology should also be embedded in the government workplaces’ practice to combat time theft and increase productivity of the workforce. A biometric attendance solution integrated with a workforce management system improves the efficiency and accuracy of timekeeping systems while saving payroll costs.

It is acknowledged that technology by itself cannot eliminate corruption. It would therefore be folly to conclude that the issue of ghost workers can be eliminated by biometric technology alone. In a multi-faceted issue like corruption technology alone cannot be a panacea. It is political will and transparency, rather than biometrics, that will exorcise corruption in general and ghost workers in particular. However, adopting biometric registration for civil servants will go a long way in eliminating this vice.

Dr Samuel Chindaro is an Electronics Engineer, biometrics expert and researcher, trained at NUST in Zimbabwe, the University of Birmingham and the University of Kent in the UK. At Kent, he was part of a specialist research group on biometrics technology. He can be contacted at S.Chindaro@gmail.com

Social Media and Zimbabwe Politics

2018-12-10T15:17:00.004-08:00

By Dr Samuel Chindaro

The 2018 Zimbabwe elections saw an unprecedented use of social media for political campaigns, debates, discussions, disseminating of information, and news provision. The internet and social media, supported by the revitalised democratic approach by the new dispensation, created a level of transparency in the election process that has never existed in Zimbabwe before. It was evident that social media will continue to play an important role in the future political discourse of the country.

Zimbabwe’s political landscape has changed significantly in the last year with the exit from the political field of the two main actors, Mugabe and Tsvangirai, and the fresh approach by President Mnangagwa; and the internet has played a significant role in this transformation. Social media is now a serious factor in political campaigns in the country and in the way people think about issues.

Taking the lead, in an unprecedented move by a Zimbabwean President, was the President himself who interacted directly with people via his official Facebook page and Twitter handle. He took time to respond to questions posted on his page; providing previously unimaginable access to the country’s leadership. The opposition leader, Nelson Chamisa was also active in this respect, using the platforms to mobilise his support.

Zimbabweans embraced the opportunity to interact more easily with candidates and officials without attending live events which were streamed live by different online media outlets, individuals and organisations. Some politicians availed themselves temporarily on various Whatssupp groups in question-and-answer sessions. It was proof that the availability of alternative ways to ensure coverage of political parties have evolved so much that access to “state media” as a judgement of election fairness is not only retrogressive and unreasonable, but also irrelevant in this digital age!

For political leaders, it was an incredibly efficient way to quickly explain events, ideals and plans. Unfortunately, at the same time, social media offered false comfort to some politicians; as evidenced by events that unfolded. Several candidates were lured into a false sense of comfort and popularity by the number of followers, number of re-tweets and ‘likes’ neglecting the high likelihood that most these were from either diasporans, people outside their constituencies or simply unregistered voters, and got the shock of their lives when elections came around! Additionally; there were also several politicians and activists who were caught “offside” by the unforgiving digital footprint; as their previous posts came back to haunt them when they shifted positions or contradicted themselves.

The unprecedented attention given to the Zimbabwe elections under the new dispensation brought with it a mixture of participants which included international observers, self-exiled politicians and self-appointed political commentators, experts and armchair critics, most of whom were very active in social media. It was apparent that even though social media platforms are extremely powerful with a huge reach, they also have the potential to be used by political mis-contents and criminals to cause political harm and social disturbances.

Even though social media can enrich the political process, it also comes with dangerous possibilities. Following in the footsteps of the Trump-Russia-Facebook fake news scandal; it was evident that political and social harm could be inflicted on Zimbabwe by the misuse of social media to spread fake news. The election process witnessed a flurry of fake news, sensationalisation of issues and incitement of violence among other vices. It was proof that Facebook and Twitter are no longer just social networks, but information media that is dangerously easy to use as a weapon.

The platforms offered a rich environment for those who wanted to increase polarisation and incite violence; with self-exiled politicians who had fallen out with the new dispensation, and opposition activists playing a prominent role. For example, social media activists; whilst hiding behind their keyboards and/or their diaspora bases, were able to abet the incitement of some people to start violent protests in the guise of “defending their vote” even though the election results had not yet been announced.

Nothing online is always exactly as it seems and Whatssupp, Facebook and Twitter platforms were the most prevalent source of fake news before, during and after the elections in Zimbabwe. Like accusations of witchcraft, some of the fake stories got repeated often enough that they appeared to be legitimate. It was often difficult to distinguish articles that were misinformed from those that had been carefully researched on fact. The constant stream of links and rumours about political leaders and candidates was a mixture of truth, lies, satire and speculation with several of them being based on pure fabrications.

Typical examples of fake news were a video purporting to prove ballot stuffing, which was letter identified to be one from Kenya; and another one which was being promoted to prove post-election violence which was letter discovered to have originated from Nigeria! A lot of fake pictures and videos were also circulated and shared with the various observers and organisations through tagging, mostly of violent scenes from incidents far away from Zimbabwe, which formulated opinions of some of the gullible individuals, especially those that had pre-conceived perceptions of Zimbabwe. The opposition were caught in this web of fake news and fabrications to an extent that they tried to unwisely use it as evidence in their election challenge!

This brings us to one of the hidden forces that operated on social media; which was “confirmation bias”. “Confirmation bias” is defined as the tendency of people to seek out only information they agree with. It limits people’s ability to question information that confirms or upholds their beliefs and people are inclined to interpret new evidence in light of beliefs associated with their social groups.

Listening to one Georgina Godwin on Sky News presenting opinions based on her Twitter feed as facts reinforced the “confirmation bias” phenomenon. Some of the observer reports were also based on unverified reports from their Twitter feeds which they accepted as facts most likely based on the “confirmation bias” syndrome. They became part of small, deeply polarised groups of individuals who tended to believe everything they heard, no matter how divorced from reality. Surely how would you expect an observer from a country that had pre-judged the elections by imposing sanctions on the country before the elections not to suffer from “confirmation bias”?

The majority of followers on social media probably share common outlooks with the majority of feeds within these groups tending to express the same point of view. Inevitably some people became fuelled by the belief that only their views existed as they were never exposed to contradictory ones. Confirmation bias limited people’s ability to question information that confirmed or upheld their beliefs, unfriending and blocking people who posted contradictory opinions, creating an echo chamber. It was common to be told “to go and play with your friends” if you did not echo the views of the group. It is this pre-selection and confirmation bias that fake news exploited with precision!

For this reason, social media reinforced opinions and made it more difficult for people to entertain

alternative points of view. It helped to make people more opinionated and less tolerant of others. The result was social media with a political discourse that was devoid of real ideas and broken into several polarised groups, which were deeply divided on partisan grounds, even on fundamental political issues.

The Zimbabwean experience reinforced the notion that social media can be a threat to the public’s political knowledge by constraining contact with diverse viewpoints and alternative beliefs. To overcome some of the negatives of using social media, one should make an effort to connect with an assortment of people with diverse viewpoints. Politicians should continue to embrace the opportunities that social media brings as a valuable source of information and use it to manage their own campaigns, publicise and initiate important socio-economic issues. It is incumbent upon everyone involved in the political process to make sure social media power is used to harness everything good about the Zimbabwean political system, rather than to hasten political trends that are hurting the country.

Without sufficient regulation, there is a clear danger as social media can be powerful enough to brainwash, incite, misinform and polarise Zimbabweans. This should of cause be carefully balanced with allowing open debate and protecting the freedom of expression.

Despite concern about this new information warfare and its potential negative impact on Zimbabwean politics, there are reasons for optimism. Knowledge of how fake news and confirmation bias affects us can ultimately change behaviour, helps us to not succumb to the manipulation, which ultimately strengthens democracy. It is easy to be influenced by misinformation posted by friends, leaders and followers, even if they do not intend to mislead you. It is therefore necessary to use a great deal of discernment before believing anything you read on social media.

We can use social media as a medium for common ground on important issues plaguing the country and as a place of healing. At the very least, we should use social media to better understand those who voted differently than we did. However, this requires commitment to civility and tolerance of disagreement and self-control.

If we use our social networks to promote objectivity and civility, instead of partisanship and volatility, then we turn social media into truly one of our most important and powerful tools. If your posts are expressions of ridicule for those who support opposition politicians, ask yourself how much value you are getting from the time spent writing those tweets or comments.

Dr Samuel Chindaro holds a PhD in Electronics (University of Kent), MSc in Electronics and IT (University of Birmingham) and a B.Eng. Hons in Electronic Engineering (NUST). He is also a Chartered Engineer (Institution of Engineering and Technology). He can be contacted on S.Chindaro@gmail.com

Of the Voters’ Roll, Transparency and Right to Privacy

2018-09-15T19:08:00.000-07:00

The recent demands by stakeholders in the upcoming Zimbabwe elections for copies of the Voters’ Roll have brought about an interesting dimension – that of transparency versus data protection and the right to privacy. When someone registers to vote, their voter registration record becomes a public record and available to individuals, political parties and other political stakeholders. The voter registration records that ZEC (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission) holds include personally identifying information such as home address, age and gender. With BVR (Biometric Voter Registration); sensitive biometric information which includes fingerprints and facial images is also held by ZEC.

The conflict between privacy and transparency began to emerge and could be clearly seen in the exchanges that have taken place between different parties. So, are the rights to transparency and privacy incompatible? Do we have to sacrifice one right to enforce the other? What became apparent is that the two information rights; the right to privacy and right to information (transparency) must be balanced and work in tandem if the impacts from greater transparency in the upcoming Zimbabwe elections are to be meaningful.

Privacy is a fundamental human right which is central to the protection of human dignity and forms the basis of any democratic society. The right to privacy embodies the presumption that individuals should have an area free from arbitrary state intervention and from unsolicited intervention by uninvited individuals. Section 57 of Zimbabwe’s constitution explicitly recognises the right to privacy. However, Zimbabwe still lacks data protection legislation and is yet to establish a data protection authority. This is unfortunate, because advances in information technology have introduced innovative ways of collecting, storing, and sharing personal data which require relevant and up-to-date legislation.

Other countries, for example the UK, have just implemented tougher and stricter data protection laws. These laws ensure that personal data is “used fairly, lawfully and transparently”, “used for specified, explicit purposes” and “used in a way that is adequate, relevant and limited to only what is necessary”. There is stronger legal protection for more sensitive information, such as biometrics. The right to privacy has therefore, now evolved to include state obligations related to the protection of personal data.

The furore surrounding the publication and availability of the electoral register has brought into fore the need for public debate and reform on issues regarding the legality of the disclosure of full voter registration data online or in electronic format and related ethical issues. The Zimbabwean government and ZEC need to rethink how they are approaching the digital age in a way that both respects the public’s right to access information and simultaneously acknowledges how privacy and security issues have evolved with increasing connectivity and access to the internet and other electronic data sharing platforms.

The potential of open data for electoral processes must be balanced with an understanding of some of the sensitivities and risks related to data release. Some personal data is sensitive and need to remain closed, to be shared with only a few parties or to be disclosed only to a certain level. Biometric information collected via BVR should only be used for the specified purpose of automatic de-duplication of the register, and should not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose. The released information must not be excessive in relation to the purpose of verifying the voters’ roll. Released electoral data should not be used for any personal, private, or commercial purpose, including, harassment of any voter or voter’s household, or marketing of products or services to any voter or voter’s household, or reproduction in print or electronic media.

The release of private information into the public domain carries with it several risks. These risks are especially important in the context of vulnerable populations. A full voter file could also be used for harmful purposes, for example when combined with other knowledge, to target individuals in their homes based on party affiliations. Already some stakeholders have already shockingly indicated that they would use biometric information (facial images) to knock on people’s doors! Not only is there a risk of individual harm, but the possibility of significant damage to broader public trust in ZEC and the government as a custodians of people’s data.

The releasing of electoral data also bears other risks. The data may be misinterpreted or misrepresented. Mis-representation of the electoral data may occur when the data is taken out of context or falsely attributed. This may result in misleading news items undermining ZEC or the mis-attribution of falsehoods, such as statistics. It is therefore imperative that ZEC ensures that every effort is taken to provide accurate information to counter misinterpretation and impose sanctions against those misleading the public.

One of the biggest threat to personal data in the public domain is identity theft; scams in which personal details are stolen. Several illegal/criminal activities can be perpetrated by an individual using the stolen identity. Imagine an identity theft criminal in possession of an individual’s biometrics, date of birth and address! Besides financial fraud (for example using your ID to obtain a loan in your name), identity thieves can commit crimes, such as drug-trafficking, smuggling and terrorism, among many other criminal activities whilst posing as other people.

While the electoral register is in principle available to anybody, analyzing it requires skills; hence data intermediaries such as data journalists or data scientists who turn the data into insights, reports and analysis should play an important role. This data is useless in the hands of a person who lacks data analysis skills – indeed this has been proven so; with people who are now in possession of the voters’ register appearing confused about what to do with it!

At this point it is important that those receiving and inspecting the voters’ roll understand that no voter register is perfect. Voter lists represent a “snapshot” of a part of the population at a given moment in time. As changes in civil status or residency occur, the snapshot changes, and time is needed to reflect these events in the registers. For example, names of deceased persons who have registered may still be on the list, or internal and external migration might also have occurred since registration took place. It should also be noted that there are no international standards used to measure the accuracy, or the acceptable margin of error of voter lists; therefore, this issue is subjective.

Given the complications that might arise in interpretation and usage of the electoral register, it might be necessary to restrict full access to the full file only to nominated candidates and people with a demonstrated use of data in the public interest. It is argued here that people with criminal records relating to misuse of public information, interfering with electoral materials (one Morgan Komichi comes to mind!) or who have demonstrated their ignorance of the importance of data protection (such as those demanding publications of biometric information, for example Mr. Chalton Hwende!) should ideally not be allowed possession and/or access to the full electoral roll.

The responsibility of the government, leadership and institutions as custodians of people’s data cannot be over-emphasised. It is therefore surprising and disappointing at the same time, that those aspiring for leadership and their advisors are clamoring for, and making demands that would compromise people’s privacy and data, wrongly hiding behind “the law”. Most surprising is that Advocate Nelson Chamisa, a former minister of ICT who should know better, and should be on the forefront of fighting for public data protection, is also caught up in making these dangerous demands.

Demands such as those made for publication of people’s biometrics (facial images) alongside their names and addresses are unreasonable, reckless and irresponsible from people who are asking the electorate for a mandate to rule the country; especially based on the claims that they are young and techno-savvy! It must also be noted that even though the Electoral Act does specify that a photograph of the registrant is required in the register it does not compel the electoral body to release this as part of the publicised electoral register – which would be irresponsible and impractical (due to file size) anyway! ZEC should therefore be applauded for sticking to their guns on this issue.

Protection of biometrics is critical in their usage to such an extent that there has been a lot of research in biometric template protection, a process whereby biometric data is encoded such that no one can reconstruct the original biometrics from the code. The issue of privacy in biometrics usage was a show-stopper in the introduction of biometric IDs in the UK. It should therefore not be treated lightly by those in leadership or aspiring to lead the country.

The Electoral Act as it stands gives ZEC the power to release the electoral register in a format that

would not compromise people’s data; but it is argued here that the law does not go far enough. It however, does cover issues surrounding the possible mis-use, corruption and manipulation of the data from the electoral register and the resulting penalties (up to 5 years’ imprisonment – be warned!). However, once data is in the public domain it is difficult to control in this digital age, therefore measures, supported by the relevant laws should have been in place before the electorate’s data was released.

It brings to the fore a point raised before by this author, that legislature relevant to biometrics usage in the electoral process should be explicitly put in place. Carefully calibrated deterrence measures should be implemented to ensure that the negative impacts of election transparency are minimized. This is Zimbabwe’s opportunity to create a modern transparency regime which encapsulates data protection and citizens’ privacy, as well as ensuring public confidence in election outcomes.

Fighting Corruption Using E-Governance

2018-01-08T07:11:00.000-08:00

In his first state of the nation address, the president, Cde E D Mnangagwa told a joint sitting of the country’s two houses of parliament; “Corruption remains the major source of some of the problems we face as a country and its retarding impact on national development cannot be overemphasized. We need to use the e-government programme not only as a means to keep in step with the ICT revolution, but also to fight corruption. This is being complemented by the concurrent drive to boost internet connectivity throughout the country."

Before delving further into the article, e-governance or e-government is defined as the use of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) to provide information to citizens and to connect citizens and government. E-governance has gained popularity in recent years, with many countries resorting to ICTs to modernise government, increase efficiency and improve public service delivery.

The above statement was a refreshing acknowledgement of the depth of the problem by the President as Zimbabwe continues to struggle with systemic corruption. In the same breath, the President also pointed out that part of the solution lies in ICT and in particular e-governance. This was significant as it signals a fresh approach which targets the utilisation of technological advancements to fight some of the social ills.

The President rightly pointed out that corruption is probably the most prevalent and persistent challenge Zimbabwe is facing in enhancing economic growth and improving the quality of life. The World Bank’s 2011 guide identifies corruption as “one of the single greatest obstacles to economic and social development”. It involves the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud or embezzlement. Evidence is beginning to emerge of corrupt activities that have contributed to the economic challenges Zimbabwe is facing, as some of the culprits are now being exposed or arrested.

Corrupt activities by individuals and companies contribute to a rise in public expenditure and reduction in the amount of tax received by governments, thus less money is available for essential government services. Zimbabwe has not been spared, with such activities having had the adverse effect of discouraging investment, limiting economic growth and retarding improvement in the quality of life for the rural and poor segments of the country. Corruption led to mistrust between Zimbabwean citizens and public officials with the traffic police being cited as the most unprincipled. The wealth exhibited by some public officials, exemplified by the ownership of asserts which are disproportionate to their official sources of income, have further put a wedge between public servants and the general public.

Corruption in Zimbabwe has been fueled by a number of issues. The monopoly of power, where public officials have absolute authority to enforce regulations and policies is one such factor. Other drivers include the misuse of the power of discretion, lack of accountability and transparency. Although the cases of corruption in Zimbabwe which have been publicized so far have involved abuse of public power for private benefit, it goes without saying that it is also prevalent in the private sector, where for example issues in procurement and hiring have been highlighted in allegations surrounding a local businessman and a parastatal. It is hoped the government will continue to pursue such cases and bring the perpetrators to justice.

The fight against corruption in Zimbabwe has taken different forms such as the establishment of anti-graft agencies like the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) and the waging of massive campaigns against corruption by other governmental agencies. Despite these measures by government, the corruption virus strain keeps spreading. In this respect, the proposal and intention to fight this scourge using Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) tools, in particular e-governance by the President, has to be applauded as this can be an effective tool to increase transparency and combat corruption.

A considerable amount of corruption cases involve the participation of a “middle man” in service delivery processes. As an example when one wants to apply for land, a birth certificate, or a passport or some other documentation, a paper based application is used and handled by a “middle man” who may demand a bribe to facilitate the service. Electronic delivery of services (e.g., submitting internet applications and tax returns for computer processing) can reduce corruption by reducing interactions with officials, thus eliminating the “middle man”. This eliminates discretion from the equation by removing intermediary services and allowing citizens to conduct transactions themselves. It eliminates unnecessary human intervention in government work processes, which also reduces the need to monitor corrupt behaviour.

E-governance makes face-to-face interactions between government and citizens unnecessary through online communication. The contents and procedures of all work are disclosed, and the administrative agency responds to questions and inquiries of the complainants through online channels; reducing the possibility of unfair treatment (or corruption) by public officials. The entire tax system for example, must be restructured with the specific purpose of reducing direct contact between citizens and tax officials to reduce opportunities for requests for bribes.

E-governance can reduce the need for citizens to use bribes to obtain information by making essential information publicly available. The President has highlighted the importance of transparency and accountability in his New Year message: “I urge you fellow Zimbabweans to engage with Government, its institutions and agencies for more transparent, just, accountable and responsible governance. Let us equally commit to honesty, transparency, accountability and discipline to ensure accelerated national development and progress.”

Greater access to information will promote greater transparency and accountability which will contribute to the government’s anti-corruption goals. Implementation of e-governance will greatly reduce the cost of collecting, distributing, and accessing government information. Additionally, the more open the government, the bigger the chance of discovering corrupt behaviours; resulting in public officials being accountable to the citizens. This will lead to the satisfaction of citizens and the development of a closer and trustworthy relationship between the government and citizens.

The monopoly of power and exercise of discretion, if not supported by high professional or ethical standards, may result in increased corruption. E–governance can be designed to make government processes more rule-based and objective; reducing the possibility of public officials deciding and interpreting disagreements. In an “If the computer says no - it means no” culture an individual’s discretional powers will be eroded thereby reducing chances of corruption.

Corruption is often caused by competition restrictions and information monopolies. The Herald 01/01/2018 pointed out how corruption in procurement has manifested: “It is believed that Government has been losing public funds through inefficient and ineffective procurement processes, which often resulted in the acquisition of sub-standard goods. In some instances, procurement officers have been accused of inflating the cost of goods and services.”

The effects of corruption control through competition can be significant, especially in government procurement. The implementation of e-procurement has been prioritised by the government as reflected in the statement by Ambassador Chidyausiku after the dissolution of the State Procurement Board: “There will be a new authority with new faces, which is expected to bring the much-needed efficiency and technology such as e-procurement.”

The e-governance's disclosure of information will make it possible to compete fairly. It will provide an environment in which all private operators participate in open competition in procurement contracts. Fair distribution of information will suppress corruption by eliminating opportunities for officials in charge to provide beneficial information to specific operators or to apply special criteria. E-procurement will also prevent price fixing in addition to providing transparency and accountability.

The government faces a lot of challenges in implementing e-governance. At the heart of these is poor ICT infrastructure. The development of a robust ICT infrastructure is a requirement for successful e-governance implementation in which the government should play a leading role. It should create an enabling environment for the adoption of ICT in everyday lives of citizens as a starting point of e-governance. Policies should be developed that aim to improve penetration, increase uptake and bridge the digital divide. Internet diffusion is still low due to the fact that local phone calls are expensive. The telecommunications infrastructure is still inaccessible to most parts of Zimbabwe. In places where it is accessible, cost is usually a barrier.

Lack of computer literacy among the citizens, businesses, and government sectors themselves has been proven to be a barrier in implementing e-governance. A lot of training and capacity building will be required in both government institutions and the general public. The majority of those who have ICT skills are young citizens thus the elders might be left out in adopting e-governance.

The government needs to set up an institutional framework supporting e-governance initiatives. It is important to define clear mandates and responsibilities to ensure e-governance development and proper co-ordination across government agencies. For sustainability, local expertise should be developed thus eliminating the need for costly foreign consultants. E-governance systems require considerable financial resources and these must be allocated to build and manage systems, upgrade and construct relevant infrastructure.

It is however acknowledged that e-governance in itself is not a silver bullet in the fight against corruption. Corruption and accountability involve complex economic, cultural, and governance issues. It is the summation of the various approaches that makes up the ethical infrastructure that we must all reaffirm commitment to preserving. The President’s resolve to eliminate corruption has been unwavering and e-governance with the right implementation can make a huge difference in eliminating this evil vice from the Zimbabwean society.

Zimbabwe Operation Restore Legacy: Digital Footprint Lessons

2018-01-04T11:11:00.000-08:00

Consistent with a global trend, Zimbabwe has experienced a marked growth in the use of social media and the internet in the past ten years. Recent developments with regards to the adoption and application of social media and the internet, have demonstrated that individuals and organisations need to carefully consider any content before publishing or dissipating it onto social media universe or uploading it on the internet platform. One has to be wary that it may just come back to haunt them at a later stage! The game-changing operation in Zimbabwe demonstrated politicians’ and social media activists’ ghosts of their former selves boomeranging to haunt them.

As the cornerstone of any democracy, freedom of speech empowers the general populace with the ability to freely express themselves in various forms; verbally or via electronic media in platforms including online. However, in today’s digital world any individual or organisation partaking in online activities leaves a permanent digital footprint, a trail which will be visible for generations to come. The pace of the changes that swept across Zimbabwe in the past month has demonstrated that going with the wind and having an irresistible urge to publish your thoughts and opinions online for the sake of re-tweets and “likes” can have a disastrous effect on your person. The internet is unforgiving.

A digital footprint is all of the information online about a person either posted by that person or others, intentionally or unintentionally. It is your online history, pertaining to all the stuff you leave behind as you use and surf the Internet. As the world moves increasingly online, most of our daily lives are recorded on some sort of electronic database. However what happens online is beyond our control!

Unlike footprints in the sand, which can be washed away by the wind or wave tides in the ocean or sea, digital footprints can be permanent. With the passing of every day, files, images and videos including pre-internet articles, are being uploaded; thus reincarnating historical footprints. Through your digital footprint; you are broadcasting what you look like, where you work, where you have been, who you know, your hobbies, and of course, your opinions on a variety of topics. This is accessible to anyone, including strangers!

In November this year, with the rapidly changing scenario in Zimbabwe, a lot of politicians, activists and “clikivists” (the internet politicians and analysts) found themselves flip-flopping on their analysis and commentary of the situation faster than the Karate Kid’s punches. They found themselves navigating from the murky waters of “the Crocodile is finished” to the “return of the Crocodile”. Whilst this has been the norm in the political world before the digital age, the meandering path was not captured and it was easier for turncoats to shift positions and deny occupation of their previous ones. A lot of analysts were caught out; and embarrassingly so.

Philip Chiyangwa’s recordings for example, should provide lessons for figures of public prominence on the damage that the digital world can wreak on a reputation. Whilst he frantically tried to disassociate himself with the old order, the digital evidence was embarrassingly overwhelming. The way he is now being torn to shreds in the media gives an indication of what we can expect to see more of, as more politicians and political commentators of the digital age come into the spotlight as they try to flip-flop and change positions. Prof Moyo’s fall from grace, for example, is well documented on Twitter, thanks to his Twitter-activism and publicly available digital publications.

Prominent leaders of the MDC Alliance where also caught-up in the digital footprint unforgiving nature. After openly praising Operation Restore Legacy and the installation of President Mnangagwa on their Twitter and Facebook accounts; a number of them attempted to make a U-turn (apparently after failing to make it into government as they had hoped), but their digital activity was thrown back onto their faces, exposing them as hypocrites. It is only a matter of time before our future leaders or even presidents find their teenage antics on Instagram, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube back-spinning to haunt them.

Whilst every individual could be the victim of his or her own digital footprint, it is public figures such as politicians who are most at risk. For such groups, even seemingly harmless information can be misinterpreted, spun and used by hostile third parties to expose private activity, attack reputations, and even do serious harm. However, counterintuitively, digital space remains overlooked by naïve public figures who venture into it without carrying out risk assessments. This was so prominent before, during and after the Zimbabwean events, where for example, the social media acts of the former President’s sons ignited and added heaps of fuel to the resentment towards the former first family. The bragging on social media by one Chivayo also came back to haunt him.

Known elements of a digital profile exist in the open for any unauthorised party to view indiscriminately. News stories, profile pieces and social media accounts offer a wealth of data that may reveal an individual’s interests, whereabouts and extended social circle. The social media accounts unwittingly divulge sensitive information, even where the target individuals themselves refrain from social media activity. Family members are often the prime information targets of hostile third parties. It does not take much effort to assemble a family tree and then to track down and monitor the circle’s digital activities. Investigative journalists are also increasingly turning to new tech-powered tools to source family-related stories.

As well as drawing negative press attention, some posts expose information which can pose physical risks too and can be used to track down the individuals themselves; such as license plate numbers and hotel locations.

Deviating from Zimbabwe, in the UK, the case of the burglary at the house of the millionaire footballer, John Terry in March this year is a typical example of how social postings can expose information which can be harmful. Terry’s mansion was targeted after the player posted pictures from the slopes of the French Alps with his wife, telling his 3.4 million Instagram followers that he was having a ‘great few days away skiing with the family’. A gang of four used the posted information to steal more than £400,000 worth of designer goods from the mansion of the former England captain whilst he was away!

It is difficult to permanently erase anything from the internet, and therefore it is critical to be aware of what is being circulated about an individual, their business or family. In this digital age these articles can become prominent features of an individual’s first page of internet search results; becoming a person’s virtual “business card”. Such content can have an especially enduring effect, appearing on the digital profiles of spouses, siblings and children due to a shared family name, creating an online reputation crisis.

Some websites build a list of the various devices one has used to visit them. While this can often be applicable as a means of helping to secure your account, it is important to understand the information being collected about your habits. Make no mistake about it – the web is listening every time you use it! It’s important that you understand what you’re leaving behind when you visit any website.

Social networking opens the door to the possibility of being cybervetted when applying for a job. Cybervetting or online vetting is the practice of using information found on the Internet to determine whether a person is a viable candidate for employment. It is just another tool in the box to gather information about the person’s behaviour to verify whether the applicant’s behaviour online is the same as in real life.

With one google search of your name prospective clients, employers, and co-workers can get a snapshot of your history. Most employers are using this snapshot to screen their applicants and eliminate candidates for consideration based on what they find. We should expect cybervetting to be used more and more by organisations, first to avoid surprises, and more as a digital background and fact checking tool. It is therefore critical now, more-so than ever, to be aware that what you say or do online is permanent. It can be a great opportunity for you to build your brand or conversely prove to be the easiest method of self-destruction.

There is also a flip side to this coin that suggests if you decide to go off the radar and remove your online trail you will cease to exist in a world where individuals are increasingly judged on their number of followers, online engagement or influence. Even employers already routinely check a candidate’s online profiles to see if they are a suitable fit for their organization and some are even hired as a result of their high Twitter following. The days of being digitally invisible are over, and anecdotally the lack of an online presence is starting to be viewed with suspicion in some circles. As the world increasingly turns online for information, digital silence can be obstructive in conducting effective due diligence or establishing a reputation.

Every day we contribute to a growing portrait of who we are online; a portrait that is probably more public than most of us assume. So no matter what you do online it is important that you know what kind of trail you are leaving, being aware of what the possible effects can be. Lessons should be drawn from the much-changed face of Zimbabwe and the speed of change, which saw a number of individuals scampering, trying to re-align themselves in vain, as the digital evidence was unforgiving.

Your digital footprint paints a picture of who you are. Before posting online, ask yourself whether the content portrays how you really want to be perceived. On the other hand creating a delusional online version of yourself is possibly the worst thing you can do; trying to be someone else is a waste of the person you are.

Social media and the internet are enablers that when used correctly can offer each and every one of us a wealth of opportunities with no side effects as long as we act responsibly. However, the internet is unforgiving, before texting, tweeting or sharing, consider how you would feel if the material went viral. Is your human need for approval for eliciting re-tweets and likes driving you to share questionable material? You should have zero expectation of privacy in cyberspace.

Thanks to screen capture; even a deleted post can still be retrieved and shared. Therefore, before you click ‘post’ on socio-economic and political topics think about your digital legacy! Unlike the Zimbabwean story, you cannot launch an “Operation Restore Legacy” in the digital world.

Zimbabwe: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity

2017-12-17T04:45:00.001-08:00

The appointment of a fully-fledged Minister of Cyber Security, Threat Detection and Mitigation has been met with a lot of scepticism. This has been mainly driven by the perceived duplication of responsibilities among ministries, and also by the lack of public understanding of the real threat cybercrime poses. Such a perception threatens to downplay one of the fastest growing threats to technological development, not only affecting Zimbabwe but globally.

This has not been helped by the fact that this appointment was made following the tabling of the Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill (2017) which addresses the associated issues whilst allocating the responsibilities to the already existing Ministry of ICT. Several announcements by senior government officials relating to the use and perceived abuse of social media have also raised fears about what the new ministry will mean for civil liberties; especially those related to freedom of speech but most crucially, also adversely masking the real threat posed by cybercrime. It is indeed unfortunate that the general message coming from the government and the minister himself has an over-emphasis on stopping social media political activism at the expense of real cybercrime. Issues surrounding cybercrime and cybersecurity should not be trivialised by the government’s perceived motive or the reaction of the media and social commentators.

Cybercrime includes a broad range of illegal activities committed by means of a computer system or network. Unfortunately, most cybercrime exploits the poor knowledge and lax security habits of the general public. Cybercrime is no longer confined to fake e-mails “from the son of a dead African King”, but has become much more sophisticated and threatens to derail the economic benefits being achieved through technological advancements. It is the duty of the government to dispel the public perception, and convince the populace that this ministry was not created to instil fear on social media users, but rather to deal with the ever-growing threat from cybercrime. For the country to be adequately protected there needs to be more public sensitisation, education and training to increase awareness of the threats.

The general public is familiar with the usual physical burglary and theft, but the nature of cybercrime is such that the majority of people and businesses will not necessarily realise when digital burglary has taken place. Even though cyber-crime comes in different forms; it can be categorised into attacks against individuals, companies/organisations or other countries.

Personal crimes mainly involve identity-theft related scams in which personal details are stolen. A number of illegal/criminal activities can be perpetrated by an individual using the stolen identity. Besides financial fraud (for example using your ID to obtain a loan in your name), identity thieves commit crimes, such as drug-trafficking, smuggling and terrorism, among many other criminal activities whilst posing as other people.

A range of scams targeting individuals have been identified, with Zimbabwe having its fair share. A

number of people can testify to being lured online into depositing money to buy goods such as cars, clothing, groceries or services such as shipping, with companies and individuals disappearing from the cyber-world after collecting the money. There have also been reports of individuals lured into depositing money to secure non-existent job opportunities among other scams.

Attacks against organisations are becoming common and have recently manifested themselves in the form of Ransomware. This is comparable to real life kidnapping experiences, whereby criminals demand money for the return of kidnapped persons or seized precious items. In the cybercrime world the criminals use a malware or a “dangerous” computer programme to prevent or limit the usage of company services, stopping users from accessing the system/services unless a ransom is paid. Imagine an attack on the EcoCash mobile banking system which disables all associated services such as mobile money transfers even just for a day or disrupts/cuts off Econet, Telecel or TelOne mobile communication! The disruption that can occur and the damage to the economy could be quite substantial! The outcry that accompanied the disruption of WhatsApp services for a few hours last year around the world is a taster of the potential effect of cybercrime on everyday life.

In Zimbabwe, there have been reports of malware attacks on educational institutions and companies’ websites; with the Herald, the government, NUST and the Harare Institute of Technology reportedly affected, reflecting the reality of the threat on Zimbabwe’s doorstep. Companies and banking systems have also been subject to hacking (illegal penetration and use of computer systems) thus being defrauded by individuals of large amounts of money. The case of a Chitungwiza man who hacked OK Zimbabwe’s Money Wave System before stealing $70 000 reported widely, is a typical example of such cybercrime activities.

Another form of attack is one organised by a state against another state's institutions or infrastructure; a form of cyber-warfare. This involves one nation penetrating another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage, disruption or to obtain sensitive security information. In these types of attacks, one nation attempts to disrupt the activities of organizations or other nations for strategic or military purposes and cyber-espionage. Attacks may also be carried out by terrorist groups. Increasingly, cybercriminals are attacking governments through their critical infrastructure, including transportation systems, banking systems, power grids, hospitals and critical manufacturing.

Numerous incidents of cyber-warfare have been reported, for example, in March 2014; the Russian government allegedly disrupted the internet in Ukraine, enabling pro-Russian rebels to take control of Crimea. North Korea was blamed for the 2014 cyberattack on Sony Pictures after they released the film “The Interview”, which depicted the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in what the country regarded as negative light. In December 2016, Ukraine experienced a blackout as a result of cyber-attacks on electric power distribution companies. Most recently, and still ongoing are allegations of Russian interference in the USA elections through cyber activities. The WikiLeaks case which also affected Zimbabwe is a typical highlight of another form of cyber-espionage. These incidents have brought into light, situations which used to be viewed as science fiction!

Social media remains a favoured target of scammers, as criminals seek to leverage the trust people have in their own social circles. Social media is quickly becoming a daily part of life in Zimbabwe; following a global trend. In social media generated cyber-crimes, criminals take advantage of the sharing facilities and present fake products, video links and “like” buttons which they use to spread their scams. Users are also lured into clicking fake website buttons that install malware with some posting updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.

Terror groups have also been taking advantage of social media to further their goals and spread their message presenting governments with another frontier for cybersecurity. Investigations into attacks such as that of the Kenya Westgate Mall have revealed the use of social media and computer networks in planning and co-ordinating the attacks.

Cyber criminals continue to take advantage of vulnerabilities in poorly secured legitimate websites to infect users. Cyber criminals exploit the design weakness to gain access and manipulate these sites for their own purposes. For instance, cyber criminals can penetrate websites and acquire user data, compromising visitors to the affected websites. Attacks on websites and replacing contents are also common, with some websites content replaced by for example, extremist material or pornography.

To safeguard the country against cyber-crime, it is vital to promote the culture of cybersecurity among stakeholders, notably government, companies and cooperatives, civil society organisations and international organisations operating in the country to develop, manage and use information systems. It is important to engage industry, the civil society, and academia in the promotion and enhancement of a culture of cybersecurity. The government must also, on its part, mobilise resources to develop cyber security skills.

The government has to sensitise and provide education and training to the public. Law enforcement powers must be trained so that they execute their cybersecurity duties whilst maintaining the rule of law and meeting human rights requirements. Conditions and safeguards limiting law enforcement powers should be established. Since cybercrime is borderless; the Zimbabwe laws must be compatible with the laws of other countries to permit international cooperation. It should avoid over-criminalisation of social media-content, if it is to stop the stigmatisation associated with the newly created ministry.

The government must ensure that critical information infrastructure is protected, to safeguard data and sensitive information. Data protection legislation should be put in place to safeguard the general public (critical with the ongoing biometric electoral registration which acquires sensitive individual data such as fingerprints; taking place).

Zimbabwe like other nations has been experiencing various types of cybercrimes including credit card theft, hacking, identity theft, phishing, unauthorised access according to police reports, but these have not received publicity in contrast with social media activism. One of the biggest impediments in advancing cyber security readiness is changing of mindsets to raise awareness about the potential risks of cybercrime; and publicity of ongoing cyber-crimes can go a long way in achieving this. All national stakeholders and citizens must work together in order to change the mindset and public perception of matters relating to cybersecurity.

Cybercrime not only derails the technological advancements but is an attack on economic, social and political advancement of societies. It is therefore important for the new ministry to create greater awareness and capacity building programs to facilitate cyber resilience in the future whilst ensuring good governance and respect of human rights.

Note: Cybersecurity was rightly incorporated into the Ministry of ICT (and Cybersecurity) - After this article was written ...not because of this article.

BVR in Zimbabwe Elections : Going Forward

2017-12-17T04:20:00.000-08:00

The arrival of the first batch of Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) kits is a landmark occasion and very significant to the voter registration process in Zimbabwe. It officially marks the shift to a technology-based voter registration system for the first time in Zimbabwe. Credit should go to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and the government of Zimbabwe, for embracing biometrics technology in order to enhance the registration and voting process. Handled in the right way, the introduction of this technology to elections in Zimbabwe will go a long way in eliminating one of the major causes of controversy which has accompanied previous elections.

To carry out a credible election, we have to start with credible voter registration. Issues surrounding the state of the voters roll have been at the heart of most election disputes in Zimbabwe. The main benefit which will be derived from the use of biometrics for voter registration will be the production of a new clean voters’ roll which contains unique individual information based on the physical characteristic (face image and fingerprints) of each voter. It is important to emphasise this point as there have been a lot of misconception regarding the usage of biometrics in the upcoming elections. In the planned BVR process, a voter’s details (name date of birth, address etc.) will be digitally captured and stored alongside their biometric features (face and fingerprints) on a computer. This is very similar to the process we go through when we apply for National IDs (zvitupa) and passports. These will then be input into a single database where software will be used to clean up the voters roll by eliminating voters who would have registered multiple times. This is because the software will not only compare names but will also compare the fingerprints. So a person who registers multiple times under different names will be picked out by the system.

The second part of the process, if it was to be implemented, would be biometrics-based voter verification or authentication which happens on voting day. This is whereby a person appears on voting day, presents an ID or provides a name. The person’s biometrics face and/or fingerprints are then captured and compared to those in the database. If there is a match, the person would be verified, gets a ballot paper and continues to vote (manually) in the normal way! The person’s details are then digitally marked as having voted and cannot be used for repeat voting. This is NOT electronic or biometric voting, but manual voting as we are used to!

However it is important to emphasise that ZEC has clearly indicated that biometrics are going to be used for voter registration ONLY. However with the biometric register in place; in future elections, ZEC can take the next step of using biometrics for voter verification on polling day. It is therefore important to recognise that biometrics are not going to be used on polling day and identification documents will remain critical for identifying voters. On polling day; voters will still be required to present identification documents which will then be cross-checked manually with information in the system before one is allowed to vote. Therefore the current exercise by the Registrar General’s office of issuing IDs should be viewed and judged with this in perspective.

The availability of the BVR kits means the BVR registration exercise can now be kick-started. However, there are a number of issues that ZEC should now be diligently looking into in order to ensure that this process is a success.

It is essential that ZEC ensures that staff who are going to be handling these kits are adequately trained and skilled. It is unfortunate that the training of the “BVR Master Trainers and Technicians” could not be started earlier; the 5 days allocated for the training may not be adequate. Technology is only as good as the way it is deployed. In order to identify multiple registrations; which is the main benefit of the system, clean data must be submitted. Finger prints and photographs must be clearly captured in the right way, which requires trained and capable staff. Essential skills for staff operating biometric voter registration (BVR) include basic computer skills, with an emphasis on data capture, processing and administration on top of planning and logistical skills. Staff should also be trained to repair and maintain the equipment, so that they do not rely solely on the supplier for maintenance and support issues. The timelines are tight, but the preparedness of the registration team is crucial to the success of the process.

Since election technology has the potential to directly affect the political process, it is important to engender a sense of ownership in its users. In order to achieve this, ZEC should provide sufficient information to the public to enable them to feel included in the process. In addition, accessibility, versatility and equality considerations are to be taken into account when deploying these kits to ensure that people with special needs (the old, and disabled for example) are included. Challenges that may occur during data capture include unreadable prints of old people and physical workers (for example miners), people with missing fingers and software bugs. Contingency measures should be in place to make sure that none of the affected people are disenfranchised.

There are a number of technical issues associated with the use of BVR which ZEC must be aware of and mitigate against. The use of technology has associated data security risks which occur as data is collected from individual registration centres to the central registry. Safeguards should be in place to prevent corruption or manipulation of the data. Corrupted data may result in “false rejection” of valid voters. It is therefore important that data security gaps are eliminated from this process.

ZEC has to ensure that there are measures in place for the biometric data collected to be securely transported from registration centres to data centres. There must be mitigating control measures to protect the mobile registration kits and data storage devices from theft, manipulation or destruction during storage and transportation from registration centres.

ZEC must also clarify the issue of the Data Centre (Central Server) which will host the AFIS software (de-duplication software), the centralised biometric data and related systems. There have been conflicting reports emerging from ZEC which ranged from a separate tender process for the central system, provision from existing facilities and recently UN sponsored upgrading of an existing system. Such conflicting statements emanating from ZEC are not helpful. It should be noted that the Central Server will only be required once all the data from the various registration centres has been gathered; so ZEC has got time to resolve this issue.

Once the Central Server is in place, adequate security measures must be put in place; with defined data access privileges (who has permission to access and make amendments to the database?), recovery and back-up procedures. The processes to identify any security breaches and the audit to track any changes to the database to the satisfaction of all stakeholders should be outlined. These security issues are crucial and must be addressed in a transparent manner to avoid post-registration or post-election disputes.

The challenges to ZEC are not only restricted to technology and procurement. Advanced technology alone cannot guarantee the integrity of elections without corresponding legal and administrative protective mechanisms. It is therefore important for ZEC to ensure that the legal framework is compatible with the introduction and use of BVR technology. With all due respect to the legal expertise of Justice Rita Makarau (the ZEC Chairperson), the Kenyan electoral dispute has highlighted that failures to adhere to constitutional and other legal requirements can occur and may be challenged.

Associated with acquisition of biometric data is the issue of data protection and right to privacy. While there is a need for electoral data to be in the public domain, the balance between, on one hand, the reasonable demands for transparency in electoral processes and the right to privacy of the citizen on the other is a delicate exercise which requires careful handling.

In spite of all the challenges, the introduction of biometrics in the compilation of voter registers should improve the accuracy of the voter registers and provide the foundation for clean, violence-free, fair and credible elections. The biggest benefit of BVR ; as has already been stated is the production of a clean, credible and reliable voters’ register which is at the heart of conducting a fair and credible election. The integrity of the voters’ roll is one of the basic principles on which the legitimacy of an election is founded; and BVR implemented in the right way is a giant step forward.

Biometric Voter Registration (BVR): Dispelling the Myths

2017-03-18T08:47:00.003-07:00

By Dr Samuel Chindaro

There have been a number of publications in the local media, quoting comments from various ‘experts’, and citing developments elsewhere, using these to cast aspersions on the use of biometrics in the upcoming Zimbabwe elections. Examples of these publications are “Red Flag over Biometric Registration” (The Herald, 11 March 20017), “France’s Cancellation of e-voting: Eye-opener for Zim” (The Herald 9 March 2017), “BVR, A Luxury We Cannot Afford” (The Herald, 13 March 2017 – Editorial Comment) and most recently “More Thumbs Down for Biometric Voting” (The Herald, 15 March 2017). This effort has been systematic and sustained, culminating into a Newsday publication (16 March 2017) screaming “2018 Polls Hang in Balance”. All this comes after the tender process has commenced and a shortlist of companies compiled - maybe just a coincidence. This however is the political side of the process which the author will leave to political analysts.

What these publications revealed was a clear lack of understanding of the BVR process. This lack of understanding and “mis-information” is being used to discredit the process culminating in the set-up of an agenda giving cues to the abandonment of the biometrics project. This article is intended to correct some of this mis-information and mis-interpretation of developments elsewhere. It also aims to clarify the proposed Biometric Voter Registration and Verification process (BVR) which Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is proposing, and has been successfully used in other countries.

The common theme in these publications has been the misconception that ZEC is going to implement ‘biometric voting or electronic voting’. This then set the basis for the claim that the system would be susceptible to ‘cyber-attacks’ and ‘hacking’ which would derail the voting process and dis-enfranchise voters, citing France’s abandonment of electronic voting as an example. ZEC is not proposing to implement ‘biometric or electronic voting’; it is proposing a model of BVR which is very different from electronic voting (even though it can be used as a launch pad for electronic voting). Additionally, the process being proposed is not more vulnerable to cyber-attacks or hacking than any other electronic voter’s register or database. This will be further explained in this article.

The call for the employment of technology in Zimbabwe for both voter registration and facilitation of the electoral process is not new. The issue has been raised in parliament several times (Tongai Matutu, 2010, Pishai Muchauraya and Nelson Chamisa, 2012 for example). The author of this article also advocated for biometrics to be used in a 2012 publication and in a number of follow-up articles thereafter.

The intention to introduce biometrics in Zimbabwe for the 2018 elections has enhanced ZEC’s credibility, and should be applauded as a step in the right direction. Zimbabwe is not re-inventing the wheel, but is following in the footsteps of other countries including Ghana, Benin, Tanzania, Togo, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, DRC and Nigeria among others, which have successfully pioneered this technology.

Before, dealing with the issues that are being raised in the recent publications, a brief explanation of biometrics is given here. Biometrics refers to human physical and behavioural characteristics such as fingerprints, the iris, signature, face etc. These can be used to uniquely identify an individual. This concept is definitely not new! Zimbabwe has been collecting people’s biometrics for decades; everyone has to have a picture taken and fingerprints captured to obtain a national identity (ID) or passport. This background and reference is important because BVR is just similar to this process. In BVR, a voter’s details (name date of birth, address etc) are digitally captured and stored alongside their biometric features (face and fingerprints) on a computer– that’s it. Nothing more nothing less! The advantage of this system is that these biometric features can be used to uniquely identify an individual in a computerised way and additionally , there is inbuilt software to identify and eliminate duplicate voters/registrants; leading to a clean voters roll.

The deployment of personnel for the purpose of collecting BVR information is not different to that done in order to register people in the “old way”. Personnel will be trained and equipped with mobile voter registration kits. These are portable devices designed to create electoral rolls; equipment that is reusable, extensible and resistant to adverse conditions. These devices are self-contained, autonomous units supported by long-life batteries and can be used in remote areas for registration, even within homesteads. In the end, what is compiled is a normal database or electoral register which includes biometrics information.

The second part of the process is voter verification or authentication which happens on voting day. This is whereby a person appears on voting day, presents an ID or provides a name. The person’s biometrics face and/or fingerprints are then captured and compared to those in the computer database (biometric voters’ register). Again mobile biometric kits/stations are available to achieve this, enabling penetration of remote areas. If there is a match, the person is verified, gets a ballot paper and continues to vote (manually) in the normal way! The person’s details are then digitally marked as having voted and cannot be used for repeat voting (no need for ink). This is NOT electronic or biometric voting, but manual voting as we are used to!

At first ZEC had indicated that biometric verification would not be done (thus just creating Biometric Voter Register – or simply an electoral register which contains a person’s face and fingerprints which would not improve the voting process itself but provide a clean and credible voters’ roll). However Vice President Mnangagwa in response to a question by MP Chamisa in parliament regarding use of biometrics on voting day had this to say; “Hon. Chamisa has forgotten that we agreed that we need BVR. We never said it would not go full throttle. We agreed that the biometric system would be used in coming up with a Voters Roll up until the actual voting.” So, it is expected that biometric verification will be used on voting day.

The other dominant theme of the publications attacking the BVR process was the ‘susceptibility to hacking and cyber-attacks’. A biometric voter register, as mentioned before, is no different from any electoral register (as prescribed by the Electoral Act) or any other database. Therefore it’s susceptibility to hacking and cyber-attacks should just be at the same level; but this is not even the case as these biometric databases are more robust and designed to protect the sensitive personal information they contain.

The issue of data privacy features dominantly in the development of biometric processes. Consequently, the BVR process has inbuilt protection included in the software packages (for example, template protection) which makes it more robust than the current electronic register which has been used in the previous elections. It is difficult to hack, and even if the data is somehow stolen it would be in an unusable format for the perpetrator. It is accepted that the outcry might have been based on the misconception that “electronic voting” and automatic tallying of votes would be carried out; an assumption which is very wrong.

Another debate and negative concept being cast about the BVR process is its perceived cost, but before delving into the intricacies of financial cost, it is important to look at why Zimbabwe has embarked on this path. It is not by accident that ZEC has embarked on the Biometrics project. The history of disputed elections and unclean/suspicious voter registers is a known political burden to Zimbabwe. This has damaged the credibility of Zimbabwe elections leading to violence, leading to loss of lives, people being displaced and some fleeing the country. The cost in terms of human lives and the country’s economy has been monumental and cannot be quantified. It is clear that the current scenario cannot be sustained, and an improvement/change in the electoral process is crucial. Reverting to the use of national IDs or licences will create the same cycle of rigging accusations and discrediting of the electoral process – a vicious circle which needs to be avoided.

In 2012, ZEC said they would need about US$20 million to spruce up the widely-condemned roll after which constituency boundaries would be drawn up for general elections(The Herald 21/12/12). It is on record that a proposal for biometrics registration was made at that time, detailing that the exercise could be carried out within 3 months, costing USD20 Million; the same figure that ZEC had said it needed to clean up the voters’ roll!

The current proposal for BVR is based on a budget of US$29 million; to produce a NEW clean and credible voters’ roll – surely not an expensive exercise especially if put into context of what it will achieve. The cost of acquiring the equipment needed is no more than US$15 million. Therefore the “unaffordability” claim is unfounded. Furthermore UNDP had offered to fund the BVR procurement process through their structures to ensure transparency, a proposal which has now been rejected for ‘sovereignty’ reasons. However the government has now made US$17 million available to fund the process. In addition, this process is sustainable, and will be much cheaper in the next elections (no/low procurement cost) in addition to the bonus of sustainable dispute free elections.

Having said all that, BVR in itself does not guarantee successful, fair or credible elections. The author does not propose the use of biometrics as a "silver bullet" capable overcoming all obstacles Zimbabwe faces in ensuring a level playing field in which all eligible voices have their say in the political future of the country. Its effectiveness can only be recognised if applied in tandem with the political-will and sincerity of authorities in charge, who are tasked with guaranteeing fairness and ensuring inclusion of all citizens. Biometric technology cannot solve problems rooted in issues such as mistrust among stakeholders or lack of political freedoms. Elections, at the end of the day, are a political process.

In spite of all the challenges, the introduction of biometrics in the compilation of voter registers should improve the accuracy of the voter registers and provide the foundation for clean and violence free elections. Ghana has used biometric registration and verification in three consecutive elections (the latest occasion being in 2016) proving that the process can be reliable and sustainable. It is therefore urged that ZEC and all stakeholders embrace biometrics technology to ensure integrity, inclusiveness, accuracy, transparency and accessibility in the coming elections. The media should act responsibly and report facts accurately, and ZEC should take a pro-active role in explaining the BVR process and educating the public.

This article first appeared at: http://www.techzim.co.zw

Biometric Elections in Zimbabwe – Managing the Risks

2016-11-25T05:28:00.001-08:00

The intention to introduce a Biometric Voting System (BVS) in Zimbabwe for the 2018 elections by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) should be applauded as a step in the right direction. The fact that the introduction of the system has been done after calls from the opposition and other experts including this author, for introduction of this technology should also additionally boost the credibility of ZEC which has responded positively to these calls. ZEC is following in the footsteps of other countries including Benin, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Togo, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, DRC and Nigeria among others, which have either implemented or trialled this technology.

Even though, the biometrics technology itself is now mature, tried and tested; its implementation in an electoral system; especially in Zimbabwe’s current state requires careful management of risks if it is to achieve its desired goals. Handled in the right way, the introduction of this technology to elections in Zimbabwe will go a long way in eliminating the controversy which has accompanied previous elections. The advantages of using biometrics technology and the process involved have been covered previously by this author.

The frequency at which ICT projects run late and over-budget, makes it clear that Zimbabwe’s BVS project is at a high risk of failure if it’s not adequately planned. As with any major technological project, the introduction of a BVS, especially in the challenging Zimbabwean environment must be done with a full understanding and overview of the requirements and the risks involved. Fundamental to the success of such a project is an appreciation of the procurement and running costs, and thereafter the sustainability of the technology.

Ideally, the preparations for introduction of advanced technology in elections should start soon after the preceding elections, in order to maximise the time for system testing, procedural development, training, etc. Procuring major systems at the last minute increases costs reduces benefits and undermines the sustainability of the technology. Procurement of election materials is among the most costly part of the electoral process and any delay or shortfall in the procurement or distribution of materials could have serious implications on the rest of the electoral schedule.

The minimum requirements to implement a BVS are the acquisition of voter registration kits (cameras, laptops, power supply, and accessories), registration and database software, duplicate analysis software for fingerprints or face recognition (software to identify and eliminate duplicate entries). This should be accompanied by training of operators and providers of on-site technical support. A BVS requires properly trained staff and effective operational support and maintenance structures to have a chance to succeed. It is important for the success of the project that the electoral body hires experienced experts to lead the project implementation and not rely on political appointees.

The choice of technology which ZEC is going to adopt for the BVS will have a big impact on the procurement process. The choice of the appropriate level of technology to implement should be backed by a comprehensive and properly resourced feasibility study. It is vital the electoral board carries out adequate validation tests for biometric voter registration, identification and verification (proving that the registrant is who they are claiming to be). ZEC should therefore allocate adequate time for the procurement and validation process, integrating the necessary buffers to reduce impacts of potential delays.

The sustainability of the Biometric Voting System is another important aspect when choosing and acquiring the technology. The system should be re-usable and be able to be sustained locally without relying on external experts, technicians and vendors. There are high risks related to lack of local technical service, backup support and spares for high-end technological solutions. ZEC should be able to attract and retain local staff with appropriate levels of skills. The University of Zimbabwe, National University of Science and Technology and Chinhoyi University of Technology (among others) have been steadily churning out graduates and researchers in this field. Maximising on local expertise will ensure that the technology survives beyond one election cycle and can also potentially be expanded to other institutions other than ZEC.

Planning for a Biometric Election:Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Chairperson;
Justice Rita Makarau

Relying on external vendors and technological experts will challenge the integrity of the electoral process and the confidence in ZEC, and raise the question of legal responsibility, national ownership and sovereignty (remember the NIKUV controversy?). Relying on external expertise and suppliers will land the country in the hands of organisations/companies who have little interest in capacity building, who may retain intellectual property rights and therefore challenge the sustainability of the technology resulting in both donor dependency and vendor lock-in. Therefore, alongside recruitment of appropriate local staff, it is vital that the BVS acquired should be one meeting specific standardisation of practices and processes to avoid the process being locked to one vendor, which additionally, minimises competition and drives up costs through monopolisation.

The frequent and unpredictable power cuts which take place in Zimbabwe make it important that contingency planning is prioritised by ZEC for the implementation of the BVS. Alternative power supply sources such as standby generators or Uninterruptable Supplies (UPS) should be in place for the duration of the voting process. Associated with power cut risks are data loss, data corruption and equipment loss which will require appropriate back-up servers and other disaster recovery strategies.

There are other general issues which ZEC should be considering as they build up to the introduction of a BVS. It is crucial to the acceptance of the process that ZEC manages the perceptions of voters and other stakeholders. Electoral technology must generally empower local stakeholders and therefore decisions on the choice of technology should, where practical, involve stakeholder participation and reflect their input. The relevance of any technology applied to electoral administration significantly determines the overall credibility and quality of the entire electoral process. It is therefore important to involve all stakeholders, presenting the benefits clearly, and being transparent about procurement procedures, time of deliveries, costs and risks. ZEC must also carry out transparent pilot and evaluation tests which it can use for civic education and public outreach.

It is advisable for ZEC to organize a consultation process with those users or their representatives to ensure that their needs are met, they are satisfied and that the BVS is acceptable and reliable. It is important to provide sufficient information to users to enable them to feel included in the process and therefore increase the likelihood that the new technology will be successfully accepted and implemented. Since election technology has the potential to directly affect the political process, it is important to engender a sense of ownership in its users. In addition, accessibility, versatility and equality considerations are to be taken into account when adopting new technology to ensure that people with special needs are included.

The challenges to ZEC are not only restricted to technology and procurement. Advanced technology alone cannot guarantee the integrity of elections without corresponding legal and administrative protective mechanisms. ZEC must ensure that the legal framework is compatible with the introduction and use of BVS technology. Associated with acquisition of biometric data is the issue of data protection and right to privacy. While there is a need for electoral data to be in the public domain, the balance between, on one hand, the reasonable demands for transparency in electoral processes and the right to privacy of the citizen on the other is a delicate exercise which requires careful handling.

The biggest challenge is how to ensure a sustainable, appropriate, cost effective and transparent use of technology, particularly in Zimbabwe’s fragile political environment. Provided the BVS is operationally appropriate, cost-effective, timely implemented, transparent and sustainable, it can build credibility by improving the speed and efficiency of the electoral process. It is however important to be realistic about the associated risks and their sources. In some cases risks develop because there are participants who may want the process to fail for their own selfish reasons, including those who are deriving benefits from the status quo. It is hoped that ZEC will be taking appropriate measures to mitigate any risks associated with the implementation of the proposed BVS.

This article was first published by TechZim. Reproduction of this article is permissible as long as this fact is acknowledged.

Call for Focus on ICT in Education for Zimbabwe

2013-09-09T12:26:00.000-07:00

The release of ‘O’ Level results from last year examinations was met with an unprecedented outcry across the nation. Now that the dust has settled and emotions have calmed down, and the nation is preparing for a new government, it is time to take a sober look at this vital aspect of the nation’s future. The majority of the reactions were peddled with blame finding and finger-pointing with a number of prominent figures playing political gymnastics with the results. This was evidenced by various headlines such as : “O’Level results ; who is to blame”, “Education in free-fall, “Pass Rate increased from 2009”, “Coltart admits O’ Level Results Crisis” , “Fall in O Level Results blamed on de-motivated teachers” and “Coltart making a bad situation worse” , to name a few.

It was apparent that some of these statements were based on mis-information, hidden/political-motives or just irresponsibility and recklessness. It is not acceptable for prominent figures to play political games with the country’s biggest asset – education. Instead of throwing mud at each other and burying our heads in the sand, the nation should now do some serious soul-searching and try and find ways in which this situation can be arrested and improved. It is irresponsible, to say the least, to play political gymnastics with the welfare of future generations. Education and human capital are fundamental to the socio-economic development of Zimbabwe.

It was evident that the outcry was a reflection of the high standards in Education that

Zimbabwe

has set since independence, and consequently the high expectations. Despite the sanctions-inspired crisis in the education sector Zimbabwe’s literacy rate remains the best in Africa as reported in the most recent survey; and this is credit to the government which made education on government schools free at independence, built thousands of schools, trained thousands of teachers and availed opportunities for higher education studies previously unavailable to the majority pre-independence. Historically Zimbabwe has always prioritized education and training at all levels as the government rightly considered it as the foundation for social, economic and national development as reflected in the highly successful ‘Education for all’ policy launched at independence, which is set to be reinforced as indicated by the incoming government in its manifesto. The Presidential Scholarship Programme has been a glowing example of how much advancement of education is prioritised at the highest level. Further evidence of this is in that Education has consistently received the highest budgetary allocation since 1980 until the GNU when the MDCs took over the Finance and Education ministries.

Complex, multi-faceted challenges being faced by the Education sector in

Zimbabwe

can be linked to the socio-economic conditions that the country finds itself in which were exacerbated by the illegal sanctions. These range from brain drain to lack of basic infrastructure. Despite these challenges, it is the belief of this author that prioritising the utilisation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in education will go a long way in addressing them. ICT includes radio, television, and digital technologies such as computers and the Internet which are powerful enabling tools for educational change and reform. When used appropriately, different ICTs can help in expanding access to education, strengthen the relevance of education to the increasingly digital world, and raise educational quality by, among others, helping make teaching and learning into an engaging, active process connected to real life. It can be utilised to resolve structural problems and deficits in the education system such as enhancing administrative and teaching efficiency, alleviating under-resourcing and supporting teachers who may be under-equipped.

The government is well aware of the potential of ICTs to help address some of the above challenges. The recognition of the prominent role which ICT can play in improving Education in Zimbabwe was signified by the establishment of a fully-fledged Ministry of ICT. Most recently, the National University of Science and Technology hosted the 5^th Annual Conference for ICT for Africa 2013. Awareness at the highest level has been demonstrated by the launching of programmes such as the “Presidential e-Learning Programme”, “Presidential Computerisation Programme” and opening of E-Learning Centres across the country. This trend is set to continue with the incoming government pledging to develop a national communications grid for ICT based on fibre optic network linked to the submarine cables located along the eastern seaboard of Africa. Anecdotal evidence has demonstrated that the availability of such tools has helped to bridge the ICT gap, although more could still be done by the relevant ministries to complement these efforts.

Despite numerous benefits of ICT there are many varied issues and challenges countries face when integrating ICT in Education. Overreaching all of them is the need for an ICT Policy in Education. Embarking on ICT projects without clear policy directions will result in stunted development. It is argued here that, the lack of a clear and dedicated body that specifically deals with ICT in Education in Zimbabwe has been hindering the government’s noble objectives, and will continue to do so if not addressed by the incoming government. Any significant ICT-enabling education initiative has to integrate within the national education systems and needs to be developed on a national scale, for it to work sustainably. Efficient integration of ICT in Education requires a unified strategy for the whole sector. This is in view of the fact that each system of education leads into the other and the skills accumulated at one level of education could provide gains in the next level. University computer science students, for example, could be integrated to assist in the development of ICT in schools. A harmonized strategy and implementation framework would accelerate progress, complement other initiatives and maximise impact.

The fundamental purpose of producing a specific policy would be to articulate and clarify goals and to provide a conceptual framework to guide progress towards these ‘ICT in Education’ goals. Only a systematic approach can ensure that ICT educational goals are met in the best possible way, and the hard to reach are educated in an effective way. If appropriate objectives are set to meet the overall goals, the outcome of this strategy will become realistic and measurable resulting in people involved getting a clearer picture of the steps to follow and the rationale behind doing so. The current lack of a coherent policy is likely to contribute to the development or prolonged existence of ineffective infrastructure and a waste of resources if not addressed.

ICT in itself is not going to radically change education systems for the better. An overall view of what education should be seeking to achieve is needed for ICTs to be utilized to their full potential within education systems. In Zimbabwe, the outgoing ministries of ICT and education between them failed to incorporate ICT in the curricula; and therefore the integration of ICT in education and learning remains largely un-initiated. There are no frameworks in place to guide the integration of ICTs into teaching and learning and the curriculum in its entirety has not been reviewed. Without review and overhaul of curriculum to integrate ICTs, their integration will only be an “add-on” and may consequently not have the desired transformational impact. The primary reasons for this were a lack of awareness, understanding, requisite skills and specific institutional or sectoral policy that would support the integration of ICTs in education.

The fundamental issues of ICT in Education development and integration cannot be resolved in isolation and therefore require a coordinated framework that establishes clear goals and priorities for reform. Zimbabwe does not have a dedicated National Policy on ICTs in Education. ICT in education is loosely dealt with in the “Revised ICT Policy 2012” from the Ministry of ICT as a subsection on ‘E-education’. It features in the Science and Technology Policy from the Ministry of Science and Technology on a paragraph on ICTs. In the Ministry of Education and Culture Medium Term Plan (2011 – 2015) the use of ICT in Education is dealt with in a subsection on E-Learning and appears on various sections of the plan where it is captured via provision of computers etc to schools. It is not clear from these current policies, who institutionally cater for the programme of ICT in Education. It is therefore not surprising that the country is populated by a number of NGOs claiming to be spearheading ICT development in education in one way or another. However, without the shared vision of a dedicated national ICT in Education Policy, and a dedicated body to oversee its implementation, the efforts of NGOs and corporations may very well go in divergent directions or work at cross-purposes and their contributions to the nation’s education effort are more likely to be marginalized or even neutralized.

A targeted ICT in Education policy can open ways in which the sector can strategise and explore alternate affordable solutions. The country is faced with a situation where computer equipment is costly and electricity and connectivity coverage is limited, and it would be prudent to explore all available ICT options to determine the most feasible options to meeting the educational objectives set. The way forward would be to start by utilising the technology that we have, know how to use and can afford. For example, with the prevalence of mobile phones and radios in Zimbabwe, ways could be explored to determine how these could be used as an educational tool.

The development and integration of ICT in Education needs to be spear-headed by staff equipped with the specific skills for the role. It is clear that the skills and experiences in the areas of educational technology, ICT policy formulation and planning, e-learning, and digital content creation are a pre-requisite if education is going to benefit from this technology. Without these specific skills, critical areas in ICT integration are not attended to or insufficiently attended to, causing skewed development. Without education experts (with ICT and ICT integration knowledge and experience) in charge, ICT in Education initiatives are likely to be technology driven rather than being leveraged as tools to address specific education challenges. A dedicated ICT in Education Policy can focus on acquisition and development of these skills. Guidance and support to educational institutions can be clearly set up to enable them to make efficient use of ICT through implementation of plans to meet set targets. Even simple guidelines like standards are critical. In the absence of uniform standards and specifications institutions may acquire sub-standard equipment.

There is also a danger of lack of a clear policy and specific body for ICT in Education resulting in the issue becoming politicised or personalised at the expense of genuine development in the education sector, as was evidenced during the life of the GNU. The quest for political scores at the expense of progress emerged as one of the Achilles heels of the GNU. Zimbabwe’s case was exacerbated by the fact the two ‘responsible’ ministries (ICT and Education) were from across the two different MDCs whose relationship is as acrimonious as it is almost non-existent. The press was thus littered with announcements and promises from these ministries such as the promise for “solar-powered iPads to rural schools” from David Coltart which never materialised, “donation of 50 Computers to Kuwadzana” and “donation of 41 PCs to a Harare school” by Nelson Chamisa, to name but a few. These political stunts which involved dumping hardware in schools and hoping that 'magic' will happen, without thinking about educational content, using unproven technology and single vendors without planning can only be a recipe for failure. Additionally, even if it is acknowledged that donations of equipment can be vital in helping to initiate an educational technology project, they can rarely be counted on to sustain one, due to dependence on outside expertise.

These donation stunts were in themselves quite ironic because these were some of the dissenting voices who were quick to criticise the Presidential initiatives; labelling them political, but were here found to be personalising the issue of ICT in education. These uncoordinated efforts, parallel structures and individualisation of government efforts all appeared to be cases of individuals trying to gain cheap political and personal mileage out of the issue of ICT in Education with nothing of substance being achieved in the end. A typical example of misplaced priorities, and glory seeking escapades was thet trip to South Korea by David Coltart to recruit 6 Maths and Science teachers; instead of using the scarce resources to create better working conditions for local teachers. Zimbabwe has very good maths and science teachers locally and in the Diaspora and efforts should be directed at attracting these teachers back to the profession.

This political grandstanding and mileage seeking behaviour could be further evidenced by the fact that the ‘Education Medium Term Policy’ was not on the Ministry of Education’s website but could be found on David Coltart’s personal page. The latter was well maintained in comparison with the former website. The Ministry of Education website lacked useful digital content and hardly inspired confidence in the nation that this Ministry was capable of spearheading the ICT revolution in Education; this should be addressed. For example, the scandal of temporary teachers’ application forms being sold (they should be free) could have been avoided by simply having downloadable forms available on the website. Similar shortcomings in the Ministry of ICT were highlighted by this author, in an article published in the Sunday Mail on 13 January 2013. However to its credit, the Ministry revamped its website and revised its poorly crafted and plagiarised ICT Policy.

Going forward and having observed the multi-faceted challenges we are facing in Education, it appeared the outgoing ministry tasked with multiple responsibilities (Education plus Sports and Culture) was incapable or lacked the required dedicated focus to achieve the ICT in Education goals. In all fairness, the minister who was responsible, David Coltart was probably much better at giving a ball by ball commentary on his personal Twitter/Facebook page of a Zimbabwe cricket match, as opposed to say tackling the much more important issues of a clear cut ICT in Education policy and developing relevant curricula, for example. Given the emerging challenges in education brought by the ICT revolution, consideration should be made for taking away some of the ministerial functions in the next government and have a ministry dedicated only to Education return.

With the state of the education system in Zimbabwe, it is acknowledged that some of the efforts from NGOs, individuals and other well-wishers are providing much needed help in this sector. However their efforts could reap better results if these were co-ordinated by a central body with enough expertise in the area. Without the guidance of a specific national policy and the resources of corollary programs, it is less likely that individual school and classroom innovations will be sustained. Nor is it likely individual effects will accrue across the country to have an overall impact on the educational system. The country might end up, again, with a loose fragmented policy which is techno-centric, promoting the purchase of equipment or the training of teachers without providing a strong educational purpose or goal for the use of technology. The mere establishment of a written national ICT in Education policy has value in itself. At a minimum, it conveys the message that the government is forward-looking and intends to pursue the utilization of ICT in Education.

The government should try to create circles of innovation through co-ordinated strategies on broadband deployment, PC purchase programmes, digital literacy programmes and on-line e-service provisioning. While each of these components has value in isolation, a network effect in education can only be achieved through co-management and evolution strategies. The government should, of course, aspire to more by putting the policy content into actual practice and becoming a role model in applying ICT in their own administration and services.

It should be noted that the full realization of the potential educational benefits of ICTs is not automatic. The effective integration of ICTs into the educational system is a complex, multifaceted process that involves not just technology. Given enough initial capital, acquiring computers for example, is the easiest part. In order to make successful use of ICT in enhancing the quality of teaching and learning, policy makers need to be aware of how ICT can be of best value in the country's education system, and need to develop a supportive policy environment and framework at the national level for its integration. It is urged that the incoming government prioritises ICT in Education in order to reap the benefits of technology. This will require appropriate investment, and it has to be systematic and well planned.

The Feasibility of Using Biometrics Technology for Zimbabwe Elections

2013-02-10T05:45:00.002-08:00

1. Introduction

In a previous article published by the author, “Biometrics in Elections” was discussed, with emphasis on how this technology works. In this follow–up article this issue is further explored taking into account the current status of the voters’ roll and current economic and social environment in Zimbabwe. The feasibility of introducing “Biometrics in Elections” is looked into, taking into account the costs involved and precedence from other countries. The issue of voter identification at polling stations and problems arising from the current process will be explored. Given the history of electoral problems and disputes which have tragically led to loss of lives in Zimbabwe, it is argued that biometrics can and should be implemented to ensure credible elections.

2. Background

The call for the employment of technology in Zimbabwe for both voter registration and facilitation of the electoral process is not entirely new. Masvingo MP, Mr Tongai Matutu called for the introduction of biometrics, lodging a motion in Parliament to this effect in 2010. The issue was raised again in March 2012 by Mr Pishai Muchauraya, who stated that though it had been addressed with Justice and Legal Affairs Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, nothing concrete had materialised. In April 2012, the Minister of ICT, Nelson Chamisa also called for the adoption of a digital biometric voters roll. The author of this article also brought this issue to the limelight in a publication in July 2012 in which the basics behind Biometrics Technology were explored. Most recently calls led by Misihairabwi-Mushonga, to implement an ‘on-line voters’ registration’ have been rejected by the Registrar General who contends that this does not provide adequate checks as required in Section 24 of the Electoral Act. In this article the case for using biometrics for elections in Zimbabwe is put forward, with particular emphasis on producing a clean and credible voters’ roll for the upcoming elections and the referendum. The feasibility of doing so in the current environment will be tabled.

3. Importance of Voters Roll

The voters’ roll is of paramount importance for the running of any democratic election, and as such needs to be kept accurate and up to date. To hold credible elections it is imperative to have credible voter registration. A bloated or inaccurate voters’ register always has a negative effect on the electoral process. The voter registration framework and processes must be designed to allow only eligible persons to register as voters. Therefore the voters’ roll has a direct influence on the results of any poll, as only those on the roll are allowed to vote. The quality of the voters’ role is a crucial factor in determining the validity and legitimacy of election results and can be a deciding factor on the outcome of elections

A deficient voters' roll will disenfranchise those entitled to vote and an inflated roll with duplicate entries, ‘ghost voters’ and names of people who have migrated, exposes itself to electoral fraud, for example through ballot stuffing and manipulation of numbers without raising an obvious alarm. It can also affect the delimitation of constituencies by giving wrong indications of the population within each constituency – directly impacting on and influencing the election of MPs. It is therefore vital that measures be put in place to ensure an accurate voters’ roll before conducting any elections in Zimbabwe. It can make or break the democratic process and therefore the embracing of any technology which can improve this process is important.

4. The State of Zimbabwe’s Voters Roll

The state of the voters’ roll has historically been controversial in the past elections, which have been held in Zimbabwe. It has emerged as a bone of contention each time the country has prepared for elections, and the anticipated 2013 elections are not an exception. Participants in elections have raised the issue of ghost voters; with names of deceased persons, young people below the eligible voting age appearing in the voter’s roll. Furthermore, names and addresses of completely non-existent voters have been known to feature on the roll. Duplication of names in different constituents has also been raised as a contentious issue, with the high-profile case of MP Mr Pishai Muchauraya whose name appeared in two constituencies: Makoni South and Makoni Central, in the 2008 voters roll being a prominent example. [Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) Report, 2010].

Last Name First Name Sex DOB National ID Block Constituency Address

CHAUKE ELVIS PRESLEY M 29/01/1964 08-316040-Y-54 020608 BULAWAYO SOUTH 101 DERBY ROAD, BELLEVUE, BULAWAYO

CHAUKE ELVIS PRESLEY M 29/01/1964 08-316040-Y-54 010179 HWANGE CENTRAL 14A HOSPITAL RD HWANGE

AARON FUNGAI F 10/10/1943 67-056772-V-03 050622 MASVINGO WEST SPRINGSPRUIT FARM MASHAVA MASVINGO

AARON FUNGAI F 10/10/1943 67-056772-V-03 031103 MBERENGWA NORTH VIL MSINDO HM KWATA CH MAZIOFA MBERENGWA

AKIMU BONFACE M 03/11/1982 43-120751-F-43 010815 MAZOWE SOUTH HEYSHOTT FARM VILL GLENDALE MAZOWE

AKIMU BONFACE M 03/11/1982 43-120751-F-43 170147 MUREHWA WEST KADENGE VIL HDM MUSHANINGA CH MANGWENDE

BALENI LUKA M 16/03/1966 29-105633-G-38 050129 GWERU URBAN 7-5TH STR GWERU

BALENI LUKA M 16/03/1966 29-105633-G-38 050129 MKOBA 7-5TH STR GWERU

BITI ANDREW M 20/12/1986 47-163971-K-47 410147 MUREHWA WEST VIL MUSHAYI CH MANGWENDE MUREHWA

BITI ANDREW M 20/12/1986 47-163971-K-47 410147 HWANGE WEST VIL MUSHAYI CH MANGWENDE MUREHWA

RWAFA AGIFA F 06/04/1986 18-108786-M-07 010718 CHIKOMBA EAST MAZOKERA TRADING STORE QUARTERS SADZA G/

RWAFA AGIFA F 06/04/1986 18-108786-M-07 010718 BUHERA WEST MAZOKERA TRADING STORE QUARTERS SADZA G/

NAHORO NYARAI F 10/04/1976 27-131585-C-27 012824 MHONDORO NGEZI ZVIHWATI VIL CH NYIKA KADOMA

Note

1 to 3 Same ID and Name - different address in a different constituency = Duplicate

4 to 6 Same ID, Name and Address in a different constituency with the Same Block number indicating the whole Block is duplicated in a wrong Constituency = Copy

7 Same ID, Name and Address in the SAME Constituency with the Same Block number where the whole file on the CD supplied is mis-named = Copy

An extract from Zimbabwe's voters' roll showing multiple entries (2013 VISION – SEEING DOUBLE AND THE DEAD A PRELIMINARY AUDIT OF ZIMBABWE’S VOTERS’ ROLL : By Derek Matyszak, Research and Advocacy Unit.)

The state of the Zimbabwe voters’ roll as of October 2010 was described as a complete shambles. Reports produced by the ZESN based on the roll supplied by the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) at that time revealed that there had been an increase of 366,550 in the number of voters from the roll used in the 2008 harmonised elections. Debatable figures of 49,239 new voters over the age of 50 with 16,033 of these over the age of 70 and with 1,488 over the age of 100 were presented in the report. According to the report in Mount Darwin East there were 118 registered voters over 100 years old, with a significant number having the same date of birth (01.01.1901). With Wikipedia documenting only 3 men and 3 women aged 108 and above in Zimbabwe as of 2012, the reader is invited to make a verdict on the authenticity of the above figures.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_World%27s_Oldest_People/Oldest_%28known%29_living_people_per_countr].

A number of registered voters were either under age or very young children (228). The report also revealed that 182 564 people were duplicated in the same or more than one constituency. The ZESN report showed that 27% of voters registered in the voters’ roll were deceased, with the case of David Stevens, who was widely reported in Zimbabwean Newspapers as the first victim of the land redistribution programme being highlighted. It is not clear as to how many people who are in the Diaspora (and not allowed to vote) are still on the voters roll, but an educated guess should put this figure into millions!

According to the Registrar General there were 5 612 464 registered voters by December 2007, but the number rose to 5 934 768 by February the following year. This number is quoted to have gone down to 5,589 355 by November 2012 (Herald: 20/12/2012). These figures are also debatable according to a report produced by the South African Institute of Race Relations, which analysed the roll as it stood in 2010 and concluded that taking into account Zimbabwe’s population, age-range and levels of voters’ registration elsewhere, the voters roll should consist of a maximum of 3.2 Million people (www.sairr.org.za).

Even though these figures may not be entirely accurate and up-to-date, the above reports and statistics give indications that the current state of the voters’ roll does not provide a firm foundation for conducting credible elections. The roll provides a recipe for possible chaos post-elections with results likely to be disputed by any losing candidates, as happened in the past.

5. Biometrics Elections in Africa and other Developing Countries

The proposal for adopting technology has not just been plucked out of the air without considering any precedence. Biometric technology has been used successfully in a number of countries across the world, and in particular Africa.

In 2005, "La Commission Electorale Indépendante" in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) used biometric technology to register more than 25 million voters ahead of the country's first democratic elections in four decades. In Nigeria, some 65 million people had their pictures taken and fingerprints scanned and the system was used in presidential and legislative elections in 2011. Ghana registered more than 12 million voters using biometrics in 2012. In Kenya, after protracted disputes over procurement, 15,000 biometric registration kits have arrived ahead of the elections scheduled for March 2013. Sierra Leone’s national biometric voter registration was carried out over a 3-month period in 2012, registering over 2.5 million people to vote across the country.

Biometric voter registration in Kenya (credit: The People)

Other African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Cameroon, Somaliland and Uganda have also turned to technology to improve the accuracy of their voter registers. Zimbabwe’s neighbour, Zambia has adopted a biometric voters’ roll and is receiving aid from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide the technology.

Biometric voting machine at a Ghanaian polling station (credit: Gabriela Barnuevo)

Almost half a million electronic voting machines were in action in Brazil's municipal elections in 2012. In a pilot program, around 7.5 million of 140 million Brazilian voters were using fingerprint-based biometric machines. Brazil’s Federal Election Court (“Tribunal Superior Eleitoral – TSE”) wants every voter in the country to use biometric machines by 2018. Currently, the world's largest biometric identity exercise, is taking place in India, and is reported to be well on its way to reaching its target of half the country's population.

6. Biometrics for Voter Registration

Biometrics has been used in civil and voter registration around the world for more than a decade with the aim to limit fraud and enhance voter registration. In biometrics terms the equivalent of registering eligible voters is enrolment, and the resultant voters’ register/roll is equivalent to a database.

The use of biometrics in voter registration can ensure that no persons are excluded. The voter registration process should include all adult eligible citizens, including the poor or homeless people, or residents of remote areas. With the versatility and mobility of modern biometric equipment, inclusion of all eligible citizens can be assured. It can go a long way in ensuring that appropriate registration facilities are available to those for whom access to traditional registration methods may be more difficult. Certain groups of people can easily be excluded from the voting process by restrictions such long distances to registrations centres. For example, this can have adverse effects on women and the disabled, who could easily be enfranchised by adopting mobile biometrics systems for registration.

Biometric systems allow for the creation of a permanent electronic register which can be updated as new voters become eligible or existing ones die. They capture data unique to an individual, in addition to biographical information, and can identify whether someone has registered more than once by centrally matching fingerprints. The system allows for people to move to a different electoral constituency without the need to re-register. In countries where it is in use, Biometric technology has been adopted to help address electoral fraud and increase the transparency, and credibility, of the electoral process.

Biometrics can be used to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained. The technology can be used to check if the identity for which a person attempts to register to vote validly belongs to that person. There are many ways to keep the voters’ register up to date. An example is the automatic inclusion in the voters’ roll of newly eligible voters when they register for the National ID. In Zimbabwe, biometrics information in the form of a facial image and fingerprints has always been captured when applying for an ID. In South Africa citizens are automatically included in the voters’ roll after they have reached the official voting age of 18 via the National ID process. The use of biometrics enables the cross-linking of the civil and electoral register, which can cut the cost of voter registration.

Biometric voter registration in Sierra Leone (credit: The Africa Paper)

The use of biometrics can help in both maintaining and purging the electoral roll. It can be used effectively in de-duplication of registries, i.e. finding multiple occurrences of the same person in a register. People register multiple times for several reasons. It can be for the purpose of voting several times, it can be to obtain other services several times. It can be for cheating purposes, or it can simply be due to misunderstandings. A common occurrence is that the registration process has not been designed to easily allow for a change of address, wherefore people when moving re-register without having their old record deleted. People may also change their names, when they get married for example. A biometrics based search can locate and eliminate such duplicate entries as it is based on physical characteristics as compared to a name search.

7. Biometrics for Voter Identification

Another problem faced in the voting process is the positive identification of voters at the polls. Protecting the integrity of the electoral process should include making sure that only eligible voters vote. A foolproof method is required in assisting poll workers to be certain that people appearing at the polls are who they claim to be. Of all the methods that have been used for strengthening the process of identifying voters at the polls, biometric identification would be the method hardest to defraud.

A positive identification system requires you to identify yourself when submitting a biometric measure. Your submitted measure is then checked against the measures given when you enrolled in the system to affirm that they match. If the submitted and stored biometric measures match then it is ascertained that you enrolled under the identity you are claiming. If the presented and enrolled characteristics do not match to a certain pre-determined level, the user can be given another chance.

8. Feasibility

Fingerprinting systems have been in use for almost three decades. In

Zimbabwe

fingerprints and facial images have been captured for National ID purposes and passports at least since independence. Therefore this is not an entirely new phenomenon. With existing technology, digitalization and maintenance of historic information is not a difficult task at all. Combined civil and voter registration can utilise synergy effects of data exchange and can serve state administration effectively. In South Africa, this system has been used successfully and can certainly function as a best practice model for

Zimbabwe

. For the past two years

India

has been building the world's most sophisticated database of personal identities. By the end of this year 600m Indians will have a Unique Identity Number (UID), aimed at improving access to welfare programmes, financial services and more. It is a project that could serve as a model elsewhere in the world. The same system used for ID and passport registration can be adapted for voter registration or data can be shared across departments. Paper based biometrics can also be easily digitised to contribute to a more comprehensive and harmonised database.

The most beneficial aspect of using biometrics in Zimbabwe, given the current state of transport links, is that it is viable to introduce and fruitfully utilise mobile biometric stations. These are portable biometric devices which can be used for biometric registration and identification. There are portable devices available on the market designed to create electoral rolls; equipment that is reusable, extensible and resistant to adverse conditions. These devices are sell-contained, autonomous units which are supported by long-life batteries which can be used in remote areas for registration, even within homesteads. They can also be used for biometric identification and verification at polling stations. Fixed biometric stations can be deployed at fixed centres, within urban cores.

Data storage is no longer an issue as several hundred to a thousand bytes will be required per user; a figure which is very small given current technology. Fingerprint scanners which link to a computer are now available for as low as USD10 and computer keyboards with built-in scanners are also available. It is therefore not an expensive technology to implement.

In Ghana, a ‘Cluster System’ whereby polling stations were placed in a cluster of 4 polling stations and given one of the 7,000 registration kits was adopted. The kit remained at each polling station for 10 days and the registration team rested a day and moved on to the next polling station within the cluster for another 10 days. This allowed the system to check double registration on a daily basis and identify cheats early. The adoption of this strategy was informed by the Nigerian experience where it took a long time to undertake the matching of fingerprints to eliminate double registration, thus enhancing confidence in the voter roll.

The Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) said it would need about US$20 million to spruce up the widely-condemned roll after which constituency boundaries would be drawn up for general elections(Herald 21/12/12). It is on record that a proposal for biometrics registration was made, detailing that the exercise could be carried out within 3 months, costing USD20 Million; the same figure the ZEC has said it needs to clean up the voters’ roll! It is therefore feasible to implement this technology, which once established and maintained, will in the long-term result in the reaping of diminishing costs of running future elections.

9. Conclusion and Discussion

Whenever the process of elections is tabled for discussion, several governments have a tendency to stay old fashioned and continue using the traditional systems as opposed to the newly introduced and burgeoning digital ones. As one of the few African nations which were at the forefront of embracing modern IT technology in the banking and telecommunications sector before economic problems surfaced, Zimbabwe should not be in this category. Other countries have turned into the biometric era and started using these systems in order to create a better and more reliable electoral process as discussed above, for example in the case of Nigeria and Brazil. Biometrics is a portable identity for citizens that can be reused in many other programs in both the public and private sectors. Delivering services such as entitlements, banking and voting brings points-of- service access to rural populations in a cost-effective, reliable and secure way. Many countries are now fingerprinting their entire population in anticipation of using biometric databases for a wide range of civil and commercial programs. The challenge for Zimbabwe will be to protect the integrity of the process without burdening the right to vote in ways that may decrease registration by eligible voters.

A registration process that uses sensitive high-tech equipment not only adds significant ‘integrity’ costs to the core costs but also increases organisational and logistical challenges. These include the increased need for technical training as well as continuous supervision and support for registration staff in the field to ensure that the data is captured, collected and processed to the highest possible standard. If the Electoral Commission lacks organisational and logistical resources while attempting to organise such a complex task, the resulting voters’ roll can be replete with errors. However Zimbabwe is blessed with a large intellectual base and technically gifted people, and this challenge is therefore surmountable. The alternative is a continuation of the current status which, as has been observed over the years, is costly to the nation, and has claimed lives. This makes this technology worth pursuing.

A complex voter registration system does not guarantee successful, fair or credible elections. The author does not propose the use of biometrics as a "silver bullet" capable overcoming all obstacles Zimbabwe faces in ensuring a level playing field in which all eligible voices have their say in the political future of the country. Its use can only work in tandem with the political-will and sincerity of authorities in charge, who are tasked with guaranteeing fairness and with ensuring inclusion of all citizens. Biometric technology cannot solve problems rooted in issues such as mistrust among stakeholders or lack of political freedoms. Elections, at the end of the day, are a political process. In spite of all the challenges, the introduction of biometrics in the compilation of voter registers should improve the accuracy of the voter registers and provide the foundation for clean and violence free elections. It is therefore urged that Zimbabwe seriously consider and embrace biometrics technology to ensure integrity, inclusiveness, accuracy, transparency and accessibility in the coming elections. This will also ensure that Zimbabwe also learns from and keeps pace with other African countries which have already adopted Biometric technology as the author foresees lots of advantages embracing it sooner rather than later. The Ministry of ICT should take a lead on this.

COMMENT ON DRAFT 2012 ICT POLICY FOR ZIMBABWE

2013-01-14T01:32:00.002-08:00

The Ministry of ICT (MICT) has come up with a draft ICT Policy to replace the one launched by the government in 2005. In between these documents, a Strategic Plan for 2010 to 2014 was also put in place by the MICT. Having gone through both policy documents (ICT Policy 2005 and 2012) and the Strategic Plan for 2010 - 2014, it is clear that there are glaring inadequacies in both the policies and the process used in formulating them. In this article, a review of some of the issues addressed in the Draft 2012 ICT policy is conducted, together with an analysis of the process used in its formulation. It is the author’s belief that such a scrutiny of policies and processes carried out by government ministries is important not only in order to evaluate the performance of public bodies but to enable the nation to move forward in an enlightened way. There is no benefit in producing and glorifying policies and grand-standing their launch if the people entrusted with the responsibility of implementing them are lacking the necessary ability, capacity, or power to do the job.

The MICT produced the first National Information and Communication Technology Policy Framework in 2005. This framework set out policy statements on: e-Government/Governance, Education and Training Sector, Commerce, Agriculture, Tourism and Environment, Health, Mining and Manufacturing, Transport, Gender, Youths, Disabled and aged and Human Resources Development. This was followed by a Strategic Plan five years later (MICT – Strategic Plan 2010-2014) in which explicit goals, targets and milestones were set. Whether the MICT Strategic Plan 2010-2014 was based on the 2005 MICT Policy is unclear. There was also a list of ‘quick wins’ which included for example setting up ‘interactive databases enhanced websites’ for ministries, establishment of pilot information centres, establishment of an ICT Government School and e-government among others. Some of these had already been set out in the mission statements of the 2005 Policy (for example setting up ministry websites). This brings us to the latest draft ICT Policy which has been produced citing the need to continuously review the policy. This is despite the fact that the launch of this policy is only two years after the same ministry came up with a strategic plan which covers 2010 to 2014.

When setting out to review a policy, an examination of the existing policy should be made in order to identify gaps, the need to revise or rescind and to enable consistency. A research process for review is carried out to investigate whether the policy is still consistent with new developments, strategic directions of the country and changes in other government policies and legislation. This should include an assessment of the level of compliance by the various stakeholders with the existing policy and whether any related policies need to be revised or rescinded. New policies develop from past practices – good or bad. These past practices can have an influence on government decisions, in other words the leadership cannot ignore them. It is therefore important for the policy maker to present a clear record of past practices regarding the implementation of the previous policy.

According to the MICT, the 2012 policy is based on a review of the 2005 Policy. There is also need to consider the Strategic Plan for 2010-2014. It is therefore logical and reasonable to expect that a full detailed review of the 2005 Policy and the Strategic Plan for 2010 – 2014 should precede this document with a clear record of the achievements and failures against the objectives. The relationship between the 2005 policy statements and the 2012 policy statements must also be documented. Are some of the 2012 plans completely new or continuations of those from 2005? The 2005 Policy for example promises the establishment of a National ICTs Authority and National ICTs Regulator – has this been achieved? If not – why? What progress has been made in setting up Pilot Information Centres? Where is the documentation of achievements in the areas of ICTs in education, e-Governance, e-Health, Human Resource Development etc? Is it unreasonable to expect the MICT to produce proper statistics regarding computers in schools and what it has actually achieved in human resources development and raising awareness. How can the government be expected to endorse the current policy if it does not know what the last policy achieved and where it failed? Is this information available anyway?

Both the 2005 Policy and the 2010 Strategic Plan have one of the aims as the establishment of decent websites for ministries; but the most remarkable thing about the MICT is the poor quality of its website. For a ministry that is supposed to be spearheading the development of ICT, the website does not inspire confidence or hope, that is, when it is available. The content on the website is antiquated, and has not been updated for a long period. It is also populated by blank links. The reader is invited to visit the website (www.ictministry.gov.zw) and click on the contacts link for example! The striking image that greets the reader is the picture of the ‘Hon Minister’, and beyond that nothing much of substance. A survey of the Zimbabwe Government Ministry websites (http://www.zim.gov.zw/index.php/ministries) will show that this is among the worst; if not the worst website. It stands out as the only one among those surveyed where you have the picture of the minister on the header. In contrast, the website for the Ministry of Science and Technology Development (http://www.mstd.gov.zw) is of quite a good standard, very interactive and informative. Some of the websites, with the MICT topping the league, are disgraceful for national websites, would be better removed until they are improved to a standard befitting national institutions.

If the MICT is to be taken seriously in this technology age, it should up its game and put a little effort in maintaining a respectable website. How much does it really cost to maintain an up-to-date website? This is not even about building a website – simply updating the information and making sure simple information like contacts is available! However the point here is, it is a waste of money and effort producing policies on paper and using them for electioneering if there is no visible action on the ground, and then dusting them off when it is time to produce another policy. It also brings to question the capability of those afforded the responsibility of developing this important technological area; an important cornerstone of the development of the nation.

A scrutiny of the 2 policies’ sections on ‘Status of ICTs’ in Zimbabwe in 2005 and 2012 brings up some interesting revelations. One is left wondering whether there has been any significant progress made in the ICT sector except for the obvious increase of mobile phone users and internet subscribers (quoted in both policies) – a natural growth world-wide. Alternatively one can be left wondering if it is just blatant inefficiency or evidence of shoddy work? For example, both policies mention the progress in the ICT sector as deregulation, massive computerisation of government ministries (2005) compared to ‘computerisation of government ministries in the main centres of the country’ (2012), establishment of Cabinet Committee on Scientific Research, Technology and Applications and establishment of regulatory framework for the ICTs sector. In fact, comparing the two sections, the only difference in terms of progress is that in 2005 electricity is mentioned positively with an acknowledgement of rural electrification and in 2012 there is mention of electricity shortage curtailing progress. The only significant difference in the status of ICT between 2005 and 2012 according to the two policies is the removal of duty on ICT hardware and software. The same repetitions are observed in the policy objectives; which may of course have some similarities, if they reflected a continuation of policies; but these should be clearly indicated. On a lighter note, the policy objectives for 2012 start from (f) in the circulated draft; leaving one wondering what happened to (a) to (e)! This can be viewed as a clear indication of a recycled policy, lack of adequate effort and lack of careful attention which is a prerequisite for a document of national importance.

A further look at ‘challenges facing the ICTs sector’ will yield similar results to the above. The challenges outlined are exactly the same; such as inadequate communications infrastructure, ICT facilities, skills, limited institutional arrangements etc. Strangely, the only addition on the 2012 policy is ‘insufficient awareness campaigns’! Now whose challenge is this, and who is supposed to carry out these awareness campaigns? What has the MICT been doing in the past 7 years if they could not carry out this basic task? The main policy statements regarding the ICT sector are exactly the same (compare section 3.5.1 – 2005 Policy and Section 4.4 – 2012 Policy). The only difference is in the numbering (letters vs numbers); a textbook example of trying to mask a copy and paste job. Although it is reasonable to have similar policy statements, if nothing has changed, that is; the drafting of the 2012 policy is based on changes that have occurred, and therefore the new policy should reflect these changes.

A scrutiny of the different policy statements on e-Government, Education, Tourism etc will also reveal that there is little or nothing new. As evidence of manipulation of the 2005 policy, attention is drawn to the conclusions of both policies; instead of trying to analyse them for the public; both conclusions have been pasted below. It is acceptable and entirely reasonable that the drafting of the 2012 document could not be done from scratch, and that this is a review/revision of the 2005 Policy. What is not acceptable is when sentences are re-arranged and deliberately tweaked to mask a duplication or copy and paste job leading to plagiarised policy documents. The reader is left to judge on the amount of work done in trying to come up with the ‘new’ 2012 policy; and the justification in all the funding consumed and meetings held in coming up with a document of such poor quality.

2005 ICT Policy

19. CONCLUSION

This policy recognises that ICTs contribute significantly to the reduction of social, political and economic inequalities, increase national productivity, enhancement of wealth creation and entrepreneurship and increase in efficiency in public administration. They also strengthen democratic values and promote gender equality and the interest of marginalized groups like youths, the disabled and the elderly.

In order for ICTS to act as effective transmission vectors for the national development process, they need to locate the interests of all citizens at the centre of development strategy. They also need to be accompanied by supportive organizational and institutional change. Access to information by citizens on issues that affect their lives and capacity to 'voice' their perspectives and concerns is a key factor in development. The huge investment required to create communication infrastructure to achieve connectivity should bring advantages to all citizens and not new forms of marginalization.

The ICT policy also seeks to ensure that private sector interests and expertise create investments in which the ICTs sector generates jobs, increases national productivity and empowers citizens through the amplifications of choices brought by connectivity. In addition, for ICTs to yield increased development benefits, creative leadership is required from government, as the guardian of the public interest, especially in managing markets and establishing institutions to achieve public policy objectives. In this regard, a strong, committed and effective digital champion, always ready to invest political capital to achieve policy objectives is required at the highest level of government.

The policy further posits ICTs as enablers of development strategies whose nature, scope and purpose are steeped in ideology, power relations and authority. ICTs cut across all sectors of the society and economy. The acid test for policy effectiveness therefore lies in the extent to which the deployment of ICTs buttress the development of human capacity, generates employment and income, creates wealth, enhances enjoyment of health and well being and promotes participation and expression of voice in favour of all citizens in the development process.

Existing and new public and private sector institutions across all sectors of the economy are expected to formulate sector based strategies/programmes to implement ICT flagship projects. Such projects would, inter alia, promote awareness of the benefits of ICTs, develop human skills in ICTs, enhance research and training capability, demonstrate the benefits of public sector leadership and encourage private-public sector partnerships. The projects would also establish appropriate legal frameworks to manage markets, stimulate and promote innovations and inventions in the ICTs sector and give voice to citizens in the development process.

2012 ICT POLICY

21. Conclusion

This policy recognises that ICTs contribute significantly to the reduction of social, political and economic inequalities, increase national productivity, enhance wealth creation and entrepreneurship, and increase efficiency in public administration. ICTs also strengthen democratic values and promote gender equality and the interest of marginalised groups.

The policy further recognises that in order for ICTs to act as an effective catalyst for national development, upgrading and substantial investment in high broadband ICT infrastructure and capacity building, as well as enabling institutional arrangements, are a prerequisite. It therefore follows that the policy is advocating for supportive organizational change as a first step in seeking to achieve national development through ICTs. Access to information by citizens on issues that affect their lives and capacity to 'voice' their views and concerns is a key factor in development. The policy therefore extols the need to put in place policies that promote the achievement by Zimbabwe of the status of a knowledge society.

The ICT policy also seeks to ensure that private sector interests and expertise create investments in which the ICT sector generates jobs, increases national productivity and empowers citizens through the amplification of choices brought by unfettered connectivity. In addition, for ICTs to yield increased development benefits, creative leadership is required from government, as the guardian of the public interest, especially in managing markets and establishing institutions to achieve public policy objectives. In this regard, a strong, committed and effective digital champion, always ready to invest political capital to achieve policy objectives is required at the highest level of government.

As a means of recognizing that ICTs cut across all sectors of the society and economy, this policy has sought to take cognizance of the needs of the various members of our society. The acid test for policy effectiveness therefore lies in the extent to which the deployment of ICTs buttress the development of human capacity, generates employment and income, creates wealth, enhances enjoyment of health and well being and promotes participation and expression of voice in favour of all citizens in the development process.

In conclusion, the draft 2012 policy does not present any significant new ideas. It is inadequate, of poor quality, and not based on a clear review or documentation of what has been achieved or has not over the 7 years of its existence. As revealed, documented and evidenced above, calling this policy ‘new/revised ’is offensive and an insult to the public’s intelligence as it can clearly be seen as a manipulation of the old one. Moreover, as pointed out, there is evidence that the implementation of the existing policies is poor – as can be seen on the MICT website. The Draft Policy should therefore be ditched and re-written with meticulous care and attention which reflects its importance as a national document. It is a public document which reflects on Zimbabwe as a nation. A call is also made for a clear documentation of achievements over the past 7 years for public scrutiny, not only for accountability purposes but to enable the ICT agenda to move forward. It is from such a point that a clear-cut plan with a clear vision on moving forward can be envisaged. A good policy will preserve the MICT’s ability to serve the public and reach its objectives through logical and consistent decision making. If the same aims and objectives are set again without addressing previous failures and successes then the success of the current policy is greatly compromised.

In the next article, the author will discuss and make recommendations on what the Policy should include in the area of e-Government; which refers to the application of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for delivering government services, exchange of information communication transactions, integration of various stand-alone systems and services between Government and Citizens. Through e-Governance, the government services can be made available to the citizens in a convenient, efficient and transparent manner. The article will include a discussion and recommendations on how the MICT can implement ICT policies that facilitate the electoral process, security and law enforcement, among other areas.

The Zimbabwe ICT Policy Framework 2005 and the MICT – Strategic Plan 2010-2014 can be downloaded from: http://www.ictministry.gov.zw/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=1&Itemid=171

The 2012 Draft National ICT Policy Framework can be downloaded from:

http://www.ictministry.gov.zw/images/draft%20national%20ict%20policy%20framework.pdf

Alternatively, if the site is not available, the reader can contact the author for electronic copies.

NOTES:

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CONTACTS LINK REFERRED TO IN THIS ARTICLE HAS SINCE BEEN UPDATED
THE MICT WEBSITE HAS BEEN FACE-LIFTED AND LOOKS MUCH BETTER NOW - EVEN THOUGH I BELIEVE THEY COULD DO MORE. BUT WELL DONE.
A NEW REVISED POLICY HAS BEEN PUBLISHED - A MASSIVE IMPROVEMENT FROM THE DRAFT - AND IT IS AVAILABLE ON THE WEBSITE
I AM SURE THIS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS ARTICLE!!!!!

BIOMETRICS ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE: A MARCH TOWARDS TRANSPARENT AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS

2012-07-25T00:48:00.001-07:00

Background

Transparency and accountability in election processes can be enhanced by harnessing and utilising biometrics technology. Biometrics, refers to computerised automatic identification of people based on how they look (physical characteristics, for example, fingerprint and face), and how they behave (behavioural characteristics, for example voice and signature).

Few elections in Zimbabwe and Africa pass without charges of vote rigging and manipulation. This article advances the argument that embracing new, simple and cost-effective technology can provide a solution to some of the problems afflicting the electoral process.

Concerns have been raised in past elections about ‘zombie’ (deceased voters apparently ‘voting’ from the grave), individuals engaging in double or multiple voting and inflated voting figures. It is important that allegations and the incidence of fraud, double or multiple voting, etc raised in the last presidential and parliamentary elections are not repeated in the next crucial elections.

A growing number of countries such as Ghana, Zambia, South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia, and Mozambique among others have either started using biometrics in the election process or are preparing to do so in the near future. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the body charged with the constitutional role of conducting and supervising elections in Zimbabwe, should seriously consider investing in biometrics technology, particularly when it takes charge of voter registration and maintenance of the voters’ rolls.

The election process does not begin and end on the actual polling day. The polling day might be the climax of the process but for every individual voter, the voting process actually begins at the point of registration to vote. At that point, new eligible voters register for the first time or existing voters verify that they are registered. This is an understated but critical stage of the voting process because unless one is registered he or she will not be able to exercise his or her constitutional right to vote. The main rationale for registering is to confirm the eligibility of the person as a voter and to ensure the correct identity of the voter. It means that only the person who is registered and whose details correspond to the details on the voters’ roll can vote.

In the past there have been problems with the voter registration exercise and the voters’ roll. There has been criticism that the voters’ roll is a shambles – persons who are long deceased are still on the voters’ rolls; the details of voters are sometimes missing or incorrect – the accuracy of the voters’ roll has been widely questioned. The result has been allegations of ‘ghost voters’ and the disenfranchisement of otherwise eligible voters who discover on election day that they are not registered; that their details are missing or incorrectly recorded, etc. This is a clear denial of the constitutional right to vote.

It follows, however, that voter identity and accuracy of voter details are critical aspects of the voting process which can affect the entire election. As this paper argues, establishing the correct identity of the voter can be easily and cheaply solved by investing in biometrics technology. The right to vote is a very basic right for which the liberation struggle was waged – therefore it is vital that it be facilitated and protected from fraudulent conduct.

A new voter registration and voting system based on biometrics can and should be introduced in Zimbabwe. It is important to give a brief and basic overview of biometrics and how it works.

Biometrics Overview

As human beings we easily recognise each other by observing the way we look and processing this information in our brains. We do so sub-consciously by collecting a variety of information, processing it in our brains and reaching a conclusion about the identity of individuals. We gather information about for example, a person’s height (‘murefu/mupfupi’ – short/tall’), body size (‘mukobvu/mutete’ – fat/thin), even about ears/eyes size (ane mazinzeve mahombe/ ane maziso mahombe’ – he has big ears /large eyes) etc which enable us to recognise individual. Biometrics is simply an attempt by a ‘computer’ to do similar things.

However, in order for the computer to do so, it has to be presented with information regarding an individual’s physical or behavioural properties in a language which it understands such as numerical distance between the eyes, the depth/size of the nose, size of the mouth, etc. Of course, more complex data is gathered in practice, but it is not the aim of this article to go deep into the complexities of biometrics.

Biometrics - identification based on distinctive personal traits, has the potential to become an irreplaceable part of any identification system in all spheres in the long term. Biometric identifiers cannot be shared, misplaced, and they intrinsically represent the individual's identity. This is technology which many have now embraced and is geared towards making society safer, to minimise fraudulent activities and improve convenience.

In general and which is important for our present purposes, biometrics can be used for positive identification, that is, to prove that an individual is who they claim to be. It can also be used on a large scale to verify whether the person is in the database or not. Biometrics can also be used for screening people, for example, to check whether someone is on a police “wanted list” or to prevent/allow access to facilities. The simplest and most basic form of biometric screening can be seen at a nursery school where security of children is of utmost importance. The door to the nursery playing area would be high enough to allow toddlers to run through, but would be too short for an adult to pass through. The biometric trait being utilised here is ‘height’.

The key step in the biometrics process is for a user of the system to be enrolled (registered) by having their biometrics captured and stored. This essentially means giving the computer the physical measurements of the individual to enable it to recognise the individual in the future. This can be the individual’s fingerprint, iris of the eye, face or voice. Positive identification (also called authentication or verification) verifies the authenticity of the identity claimed. For example, a person claims that he is Nelson Mandela to the authentication system and offers his fingerprint; the system then either agrees or disagrees with the claim by comparing what is in store and what has been presented. Now, in the voting process, this technology can be applied to eliminate the issue of ‘ghost’ or ‘zombie’ voters where a living person tries to vote using a deceased person’s identity, therefore enabling him/her to fraudulently cast multiple votes.

For checking whether a user is in a database, an input biometric sample is presented to the system which determines if the pattern is associated with any of a large number of enrolled identities. In this voting process, this can answer the question of whether or not one is a registered voter.

Biometrics can also be used for screening users. Screening applications can covertly and unobtrusively determine whether a person belongs to a ‘wanted’ list. In the voting process, this can be used to determine whether one is prohibited from voting – for example because he or she is disqualified from voting for any reason.

Some examples of usage of biometrics in modern gadgets are computers/phones were you can login using your fingerprint, cars which you can open and start using your fingerprint and phones which can recognise your voice. A lot of advanced countries have also now adopted biometric passports which have a chip containing an individual’s face and fingerprint information. It makes it easier to check, verify and establish identify more efficiently than using the traditional procedures.

Biometrics Devices

In general, biometric devices consist of a reader or scanning device (this captures the biometric information, a simple example being a camera), some software that converts the scanned information into digital form (information or in a language that can be ‘understood’ by a computer’) and a database that stores the biometric data for comparison (to later compare and prove that the individual presenting the biometric information is indeed the person whose information is stored).

Simple/cheap and portable fingerprint scanners

To convert the biometric input, a software application (a computer program) is used to identify specific characteristics of the data (such as distance between the eyes, skin texture, distance between eyes and centre of nose etc for example in face recognition) as match points. The match points in the database are processed using a computer program that translates that information into a numeric value. The database value is compared with the biometric input the end user has entered into the scanner and authentication is either approved or denied. The level of security can be changed by adjusting certain values in the computer programs to make it more difficult for impostors to be accepted by the system depending on where the biometric system is used.

Biometrics in Action

The regular reference to computing technology might cause some to imagine that this is implausible and impracticable in the context of a developing country whose level of technological sophistication is limited. I will conclude this part with a few comments on how good and effective the technology is.

Although this might be overlooked fingerprint technology has been widely used for years in electoral process and policing. Error rates vary considerably between vendors and a small percentage of people are unable to use these systems at all because of unsuitable fingerprints. The main advantage of this method, however, is that people have multiple fingers, each with a different fingerprint. By requiring the use of multiple fingerprints, error rates can be reduced for those able to use the system. Experiments have been carried out using fingerprints and the number of genuine users falsely rejected on multiple attempts can be as low as 1 in 100 000 cases. The chances of imposters being accepted can be as low as 0. One has to be really determined to cheat the system to try several times for acceptance, especially given that measures will be in place to arrest and prosecute such individuals, therefore the chances of that happening can be as low as 0%.

Whilst working for the University of Kent, the writer took part in a 3-year multi-national EU Project on 3D Face Recognition for automatic border control. The project involved several key players in the security technology industry including Sagem Sécurité, Bundesdruckerei (German Security Company), Philips Research, Cognitec, L-1, Polygon Technology, Fraunhofer IGD, Hochschule Darmstadt, Computer Graphics Centre, University of Twente, Berlin Airport, National Research Council, Bundeskriminalamt (German Police), Salzburg Airport and Joint Research Centre. More information regarding this project can be obtained from www.3dface.org.

3DFace Project: Liveness testing at Salzburg Airport

In this project 3D facial data was collected at the University of Kent, at Sagem in France and the Centre for Graphics and Computer Vision in Germany. Practical trials were carried out at Berlin Airport and Salzburg Airport which included “liveness tests”, that is testing whether someone had presented a proper picture or a dummy. The results showed that the chance of someone being falsely rejected by the system was less than 2% and for someone being falsely accepted by the system was less than 0.25%. This was by using face information only in an automated way; results which can be improved by human intervention. Improvements can be obtained by combining information from different biometrics or different algorithms to reach a decision on whether to accept or reject a voter

Prof Raymond Veldhuis (Biometrics Expert; Netherlands), Alexander Nouak (Director: Computer Graphics Centre, Germany) and Dr Samuel Chindaro at the EU Commission Biometrics Review meeting in Salzburg

Adopting this technology can lead the way for integration of Electronic Voting, which is a different topic beyond the scope of this article suffice to state that it can help to improve speed in the electoral process through facilitating instant counting of votes and therefore elimination of the risk of manipulation. For example, an electronic voting system was launched in Brazil back in the middle 1990’s, rapidly becoming an international benchmark because of its accuracy, accountability and security. The results of the elections of 2008, when more than 130 million Brazilian citizens in 5.560 municipalities voted, were officially informed just 3 hours after its closure.

In the next part, I will delve specifically into the use of biometrics technology in the voting process and also discuss the important issue of feasibility of using this technology in the context of Zimbabwe.

PUBLICATIONS : DR CHINDARO

2012-06-06T06:11:00.000-07:00

1. Z.Zhou, S. Chindaro , F. Deravi, ‘A Classification Framework for Large-Scale Face Recognition Systems’, International Conference on Biometrics, Alghero, Italys, June 2009.

2. M. Castro Neves, S. Chindaro, M. Ng, Z. Zhou, F. Deravi, ‘Performance Evaluation of Multibiometric Face Recognition Systems’, Proceedings of the Special Interest Group on Biometrics and Electronic Signatures (BIOSIG 2008), Darmstadt, Germany, Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI), Vol. P-137, 47-58, Sept 2008.

3. Z. Zhou, S. Chindaro, F. Deravi, ‘Non-Linear Fusion of Local Matching Scores for Face Verification’, Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2008.

4. S. Chindaro, M.W.R. Ng, F. Deravi, M. Castro-Neves, ‘Report on Test Protocol’, Research Report IST-026845/D3.1.2/V0.2, IST, European Union, Feb. 2008.

5. S. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst. An Ensemble-based PCA Model for Recognition of Handwritten Numerals’, Proc. 10th International Workshop on Frontiers in Handwriting Recognition (IWFRH), pp. 167-172, La Baule, France, Oct 2006.

6. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ,’An Ensemble-based PCA Model for Medical Diagnosis’, Proceedings of the 6^th International Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC2006), pp 297-302, 2006.

7. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ,’Trainable PCA Sub-space Linear Combiner’,Proceedings of the 6^th International Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC2006), K. Sirlantzis (Ed) pp 224-229, 2006.

8. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ‘Analysis and Modelling of Diversity Contribution to Ensemble-Based Texture Recognition Performance’, 6^th Intern. Workshop on Multiple Classifier Systems, California, USA, 2005.

9. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst, ‘Exploiting Diversity in Colour Representations for Ensemble-Based Texture Recognition’, The 5th Intern. Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC04) Nottingham, U.K, 16 -18 December 2004.

10. S. Chindaro, R.M. Guest, M.C. Fairhurst, J.M. Potter, ‘Assessing Visuo-Spatial Neglect through Feature Selection and Combination from Geometric Shape Drawing Performance and Sequence Analysis’ International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence, Vol.18, 7, pp. 1253-1266

11. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis, M. Fairhurst and S. Hoque, ‘Diversity-Performance Relationship in Bit-plane Decomposition Based Handwriting Recognition System’, 9th International Workshop on Frontiers in Handwriting Recognition (IWFHR-9), October 26-29, 2004, Hitachi Central Research Laboratory (HCRL), Kokubunji, Tokyo, Japan

12. S. Chindaro, R.M. Guest, M.C. Fairhurst, M.A. Razian, J.M. Potter, ‘Feature Selection Optimisation in an Automated Diagnostic Cancellation Task’, Procedings of ICCHP 2004 9th International Conference on Computers Helping People with Special Needs, July 7-9, 2004, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France. pp 1047-1053. ICCHP 2004,

13. R.M. Guest, S. Chindaro, M.C. Fairhurst, J.M. Potter, ‘Using Image Analysis Techniques to Analyse Figure Copying Performance of Patients with Visuo-Spatial Neglect from Control Groups’, Behaviour Research Methods, Instruments and Computers, Sept. 2006.

14. R. Guest, S. Chindaro, M.C. Fairhurst and J. Potter, ‘Assessing visuo-spatial neglect through feature selection and combination from geometric shape drawing performance and sequence analysis’ , Proc. 11th Conference of the International Graphonomics Society (IGS) 2003, Scottsdale, AZ, pp. 127-130 2003 November

15. R. Guest, S. Chindaro, M.C. Fairhurst and J. Potter, ‘Automatic Classification of Hand Drawn Geometric Shapes Using Constructional Sequence Analysis’ 7^th Int. Conf. on Document Analysis and Recognition, Edinburgh, 3-6 August 2003

16. S. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and F. Deravi, ‘Combining Colour Spaces: A Multiple-Classifier Approach to Colour Texture Classification’ Visual Info. Eng. Conf, Surrey, UK, Jul. 2003.

17. S. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and F. Deravi, ‘Colour Space Fusion for Texture Recognition’ EC-VIP-MC 2003, 4th Conference Video/Image Proc. and Multimedia Comms, Zagreb, Croatia, Jul. 2003.

18. S.Chindaro, R.M.Guest, M.C.Fairhurst, J.M.Potter, ‘Optimisation Procedures For Diagnostic Processing Of Hand-Drawn Geometric Figures’ Electronic Letters, Vol. 39, Iss. 2, pp. 205-206, Jan 23, 2003.

19. S. Chindaro and F. Deravi, 'Directional Properties Of Colour Co-occurrence Matrices For Lip Location and Segmentation' 3^rd International Conference on Audio- and Video- Based Biometric Person Aunthetication, Halmstaad, Sweden, June 2001; Also; Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp.84-85, August 17, 2001.

20. S. Chindaro and F. Deravi, 'Lip Localisation Using Chromaticity Information’ First International Conference on Colour in Graphics and Image Processing, Saint-Etienne, France, October, 2000.

21. Z. Zhou, S. Chindaro, F. Deravi, ‘Non-Linear Fusion of Local Matching Scores for Face Verification’,Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Sept 2008.

22. R. Ng, M. Castro-Neves, S. Chindaro, F. Deravi, ‘Report on Technology Test’, Research Report IST-026845/D3.1.3/V2.0, IST, European Union, Oct 2008.

23. Z.Zhou, S. Chindaro , F. Deravi, ‘A Classification Framework for Large-Scale Face Recognition Systems’, International Conference on Biometrics, Alghero, Italys, June 2009

24. An Adaptive Fusion Framework for Fault-Tolerant Multibiometrics, S Chindaro, Z Zhou, M W R Ng and F Deravi, International Conference on Information Security and Digital Forensics 2009, City University, London, September 7-8, 2009, pp 187-194

25. Face Recognition using Balanced Pairwise Classifier Training, Z Zhou, S Chindaro, F Deravi, International Conference on Information Security and Digital Forensics 2009, City University, London, September 7-8, 2009, pp 65-74

26. S Chindaro, F Deravi, Z Zhou, M W R Ng, M Castro Neves, X Zhou and E Kelkboom, ‘A Multibiometric Face Recognition Fusion Framework with Template Protection’ in Biometric Technology for Human Identification VII, edited by B. V. K. Vijay Kumar, Salil Prabhakar, Arun A. Ross, SPIE Defence and Security Conference 7667 - Proceedings of SPIE Volume 7667, Orlando, Florida, USA, April 2010. pp 76670U-1-6, doi:10.1117/12.849673

Dr Samuel Chindaro' s Blog

Using Biometrics to eliminate “Ghost Workers” in the Civil Service in Zimbabwe

Dr Samuel Chindaro

Social Media and Zimbabwe Politics

By Dr Samuel Chindaro

Of the Voters’ Roll, Transparency and Right to Privacy

Fighting Corruption Using E-Governance

Zimbabwe Operation Restore Legacy: Digital Footprint Lessons

Zimbabwe: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity

BVR in Zimbabwe Elections : Going Forward

Biometric Voter Registration (BVR): Dispelling the Myths

By Dr Samuel Chindaro

Biometric Elections in Zimbabwe – Managing the Risks

Call for Focus on ICT in Education for Zimbabwe

The Feasibility of Using Biometrics Technology for Zimbabwe Elections

1. Introduction

2. Background

3. Importance of Voters Roll

4. The State of Zimbabwe’s Voters Roll

5. Biometrics Elections in Africa and other Developing Countries

6. Biometrics for Voter Registration

7. Biometrics for Voter Identification

8. Feasibility

9. Conclusion and Discussion

COMMENT ON DRAFT 2012 ICT POLICY FOR ZIMBABWE

BIOMETRICS ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE: A MARCH TOWARDS TRANSPARENT AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS

Background

Biometrics Overview

Biometrics Devices

Biometrics in Action

PUBLICATIONS : DR CHINDARO

1. Z.Zhou, S. Chindaro , F. Deravi, ‘A Classification Framework for Large-Scale Face Recognition Systems’, International Conference on Biometrics, Alghero, Italys, June 2009.

3. Z. Zhou, S. Chindaro, F. Deravi, ‘Non-Linear Fusion of Local Matching Scores for Face Verification’, Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2008.

4. S. Chindaro, M.W.R. Ng, F. Deravi, M. Castro-Neves, ‘Report on Test Protocol’, Research Report IST-026845/D3.1.2/V0.2, IST, European Union, Feb. 2008.

5. S. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst. An Ensemble-based PCA Model for Recognition of Handwritten Numerals’, Proc. 10th International Workshop on Frontiers in Handwriting Recognition (IWFRH), pp. 167-172, La Baule, France, Oct 2006.

6. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ,’An Ensemble-based PCA Model for Medical Diagnosis’, Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC2006), pp 297-302, 2006.

7. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ,’Trainable PCA Sub-space Linear Combiner’,Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC2006), K. Sirlantzis (Ed) pp 224-229, 2006.

8. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ‘Analysis and Modelling of Diversity Contribution to Ensemble-Based Texture Recognition Performance’, 6th Intern. Workshop on Multiple Classifier Systems, California, USA, 2005.

9. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst, ‘Exploiting Diversity in Colour Representations for Ensemble-Based Texture Recognition’, The 5th Intern. Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC04) Nottingham, U.K, 16 -18 December 2004.

10. S. Chindaro, R.M. Guest, M.C. Fairhurst, J.M. Potter, ‘Assessing Visuo-Spatial Neglect through Feature Selection and Combination from Geometric Shape Drawing Performance and Sequence Analysis’ International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence, Vol.18, 7, pp. 1253-1266

13. R.M. Guest, S. Chindaro, M.C. Fairhurst, J.M. Potter, ‘Using Image Analysis Techniques to Analyse Figure Copying Performance of Patients with Visuo-Spatial Neglect from Control Groups’, Behaviour Research Methods, Instruments and Computers, Sept. 2006.

15. R. Guest, S. Chindaro, M.C. Fairhurst and J. Potter, ‘Automatic Classification of Hand Drawn Geometric Shapes Using Constructional Sequence Analysis’ 7th Int. Conf. on Document Analysis and Recognition, Edinburgh, 3-6 August 2003

16. S. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and F. Deravi, ‘Combining Colour Spaces: A Multiple-Classifier Approach to Colour Texture Classification’ Visual Info. Eng. Conf, Surrey, UK, Jul. 2003.

17. S. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and F. Deravi, ‘Colour Space Fusion for Texture Recognition’ EC-VIP-MC 2003, 4th Conference Video/Image Proc. and Multimedia Comms, Zagreb, Croatia, Jul. 2003.

18. S.Chindaro, R.M.Guest, M.C.Fairhurst, J.M.Potter, ‘Optimisation Procedures For Diagnostic Processing Of Hand-Drawn Geometric Figures’ Electronic Letters, Vol. 39, Iss. 2, pp. 205-206, Jan 23, 2003.

20. S. Chindaro and F. Deravi, 'Lip Localisation Using Chromaticity Information’ First International Conference on Colour in Graphics and Image Processing, Saint-Etienne, France, October, 2000.

21. Z. Zhou, S. Chindaro, F. Deravi, ‘Non-Linear Fusion of Local Matching Scores for Face Verification’,Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Sept 2008.

22. R. Ng, M. Castro-Neves, S. Chindaro, F. Deravi, ‘Report on Technology Test’, Research Report IST-026845/D3.1.3/V2.0, IST, European Union, Oct 2008.

23. Z.Zhou, S. Chindaro , F. Deravi, ‘A Classification Framework for Large-Scale Face Recognition Systems’, International Conference on Biometrics, Alghero, Italys, June 2009

24. An Adaptive Fusion Framework for Fault-Tolerant Multibiometrics, S Chindaro, Z Zhou, M W R Ng and F Deravi, International Conference on Information Security and Digital Forensics 2009, City University, London, September 7-8, 2009, pp 187-194

25. Face Recognition using Balanced Pairwise Classifier Training, Z Zhou, S Chindaro, F Deravi, International Conference on Information Security and Digital Forensics 2009, City University, London, September 7-8, 2009, pp 65-74

6. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ,’An Ensemble-based PCA Model for Medical Diagnosis’, Proceedings of the 6^th International Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC2006), pp 297-302, 2006.

7. S.Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ,’Trainable PCA Sub-space Linear Combiner’,Proceedings of the 6^th International Conference on Recent Advances in Soft Computing (RASC2006), K. Sirlantzis (Ed) pp 224-229, 2006.

8. Chindaro, K. Sirlantzis and M.C. Fairhurst ‘Analysis and Modelling of Diversity Contribution to Ensemble-Based Texture Recognition Performance’, 6^th Intern. Workshop on Multiple Classifier Systems, California, USA, 2005.

15. R. Guest, S. Chindaro, M.C. Fairhurst and J. Potter, ‘Automatic Classification of Hand Drawn Geometric Shapes Using Constructional Sequence Analysis’ 7^th Int. Conf. on Document Analysis and Recognition, Edinburgh, 3-6 August 2003