Alex Engwete

DRC: Mobile Phone Service Providers Restore SMS & Mobile Internet But Continue To Block Facebook & Twitter

2015-02-08T04:31:00.001-05:00

Major telephone service providers in the Democratic Republic of Congo--including TIGO, VODACOM, and ORANGE--announced with much fanfare at the week's end they'd be restoring SMS and Mobile Internet services, blocked at the request of government since the riots of January 19, respectively on February 7 and 8.

There was a caveat that these phone service providers failed to mention to their customers: social media--Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube--would continue to be blocked.

These companies ought to come clean and confess to their outraged customers that they're continuing to be coerced by the government to infringe on users and citizens' rights to free access to information and the Internet.

The sooner they'd do this the better, or else they'd be seen as willing participants in the outrageous censorship of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube on Mobile Internet.

At least one of those phone service providers, ORANGE, in which the French government owns controlling shares, is known to have aided and abetted Internet censorship in Ethiopia in 2012 by deploying Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) of all Internet traffic in that country. (See my post of June 11, 2012: http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/2012/06/ethiopia-cyber-dragnet-tor-project.html?m=1)

Kinshasa: Goofing Museveni opens 17th COMESA With Gay Antijokes Amid Guffaws

2014-02-26T11:57:00.001-05:00

PHOTO: Outgoing COMESA chairman Yoweri Museveni hands over the organization's flag to incoming chair Joseph Kabila

***

That Africa is segueing backwards into the 21th century was evident this mid-morning in Kinshasa when Uganda's homophobic president Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, right at midpoint in his opening keynote address as outgoing chair of the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), chose to tell an insipidly unfunny gay joke.

After, among other things, bemoaning the fact that despite COMESA, trade between members was still negligible; priding his chairmanship for insisting on regional programs to boost infrastructure; and boasting about the anti-imperial stance of Uganda in forcing oil companies to build refineries in his country; Museveni, in a goofing mood, then expressed the wish that in the upcoming encounters between COMESA and American, western and other Africa's global partners--though the continent wouldn't necessarily see eye-to-eye on many issues with those stakeholders--there will still be areas of common interest, as in the development of infrastructure and energy.

For, Museveni went on to add with mirth, even Africa's western partners would agree that homosexuals need electricity too!

By the way, I was watching the event unfolds live on TV; I still need to read the actual transcript of the speech. Though it seemed that Museveni had ad-libbed this gay joke, he had to repeat the sentence after he was interrupted by cheerful guffaws from many among audience members for whom gay-bashing sallies are part of benign inside jokes.

For some of us watching on TV, however, this wasn't a joke; it was a cruel antijoke!

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photo by John Bompengo via radiookapi.net

Kinshasa: MP Martin Fayulu's Crusade against Electoral Commission Chair Apollinaire Malumalu

2014-02-25T09:35:00.001-05:00

PHOTO 1: MP Martin Fayulu, chairman of the political party ECiDé (Engagement pour la Citoyenneté et le Développement)

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PHOTO 2: Fr. Apollinaire Malumalu, Chair of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI)

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Yesterday in the early afternoon, at the populous Kinshasa square of "Rond-Point Ngaba," MP Martin Fayulu, the head of ECiDé, and some of his party activists donning white bibs with "Sauvons la RDC" (Let's Save the DRC) painted in blue letters on them were nabbed by cops as they were calling on citizens to sign their petition to oust the chairman of CENI, Fr. Apollinaire Malumalu.

(The political platform "Sauvons la RDC" was launched in Kinshasa by Fayulu and Vital Kamerhe on November 18, 2013 with the outlandish goal of being the "policeman of the democratization process in the DRC.")

The group was detained before being released in the evening, with the ever-defiant Kinshasa lawmaker vowing "to continue to have the petition signed."

This wasn't the first time that activists of the platform "Sauvons la RDC" have been arrested lately in Kinshasa squares for garnering citizens' signatures for their anti-Malumalu petition.

On February 18, the platform activists were arrested at Kintambo/Magasin square and the documents bearing the 600 signatures on their petition secured that day confiscated.

No one knows what MP Fayulu is planning on achieving with his petition to force Malumalu out.

As a matter-of-fact, on the subject of petitions, the Constitution is vague, stating in its Article 27:

"All Congolese have the right, individually or collectively, to submit a petition to the public authority which responds to it within three months.

"No one may be subject to discrimination in any form whatsoever for having taken such an initiative."

Besides, the Constitution doesn't spell out to which "public authority" one is supposed to take their petition. Nor is there a threshold at which a response is mandated from the unnamed "public authority."

That's why some people are calling Fayulu's anti-Malumalu petition drive a frivolous stunt or an outright fool's errand. Others are advising that Fayulu takes his quest directly to the National Assembly, the body to which he's a member and which can impeach Malumalu.

In any event, Fayulu launched his fierce campaign against Malumalu shortly after January 31, the date on which the CENI chair went to the National Assembly to deliver his "election roadmap" of the electoral cycle 2013-2016--a roadmap which is not to be confused with an "election calendar," as he now keeps insisting.

(MP Fayulu and other opposition leaders walked out of the National Assembly hemicycle when Malumalu was presenting his election roadmap.)

Malumalu's roadmap included the following two controversial "hypotheses" whose adoption would require amending some provisions of the Constitution:

1) Given financial constraints and the electoral backlog at the level of municipal and local elected offices dating as far back as 2006, Malumalu proposed that direct suffrage be held for municipal and local elections (2014-2015). Then afterward indirect suffrage could be organized for the election of provincial deputies, senators, communal burgomasters, governors, mayors and city councillors. After which, direct suffrage will then be held for legislative and presidential elections in 2016.

2) Hold direct suffrage elections of provincial deputies, national MPs, and president of the republic in 2016. Then, in 2017, organize indirect suffrage to elect senators, governors, and lieutenant-governors.

It's somewhat strange that Fayulu is opposing local elections on the grounds that they would exacerbate communal and ethnic tensions!

It's also certain that in the quite unlikely event of Malumalu's impeachment, any other person who'd be designated by the pro-Kabila majority in parliament to chair CENI will be preemptively accused of rigging.

Fayulu has just done that with his petition. On Twitter, he also accused Malumalu of nefarious intentions when the latter appointed his cabinet members.

@MartinFayulu tweeted in French on February 8:

"Mr. Malumalu has appointed his cronies at the helm of the national executive secretariat of the electoral commission (...) to gear up for fraud."

Nothing new here, after all, DRC politics is often fraught with insults, slanders, libelous imputations... and stubborn refusals to accept election results!

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photos 1 & 2 by John Bompengo via radiookapi.net

DRC: Season of Treason And Uncertainties Within Kabila's Camp

2014-02-20T19:42:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: Albert Yuma Mulimbi, Chair of DRC Chamber of Commerce, CEO of state mining giant GECAMINES, and chief auditor of the Central Bank)

***

This year seems to have opened yet another long season of the seemingly never-ending political uncertainties in the DRC--though this season is peculiar in that much of the bigger uncertainties are coming from within the very own camp of President Joseph Kabila.

To be sure, a cloud of uncertainty hangs over the still pending so-called "national cohesion government" that was slated to come out of the much-vaunted "National Consultations"--which were boycotted by a number of opposition parties, including Etienne Tshisekedi's "Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social" (UDPS), Vital Kamerhe's "Union pour la Nation Congolaise" (UNC), and MP Martin Fayulu's "Engagement pour la Citoyenneté et le Développement" (ECiDé).

But some other opposition elements saw those national consultations as a springboard for political rebirth and were consequently accused by radical oppositionists as opportunists scrambling for personal financial gains.

Especially, these critics were quick to point out, as the siren call was sounded by none other than Senate President and National Consultations Presidium co-chair, Sen. Léon Kengo wa Dondo himself--a political master contortionist who'd bent himself in every conceivable position from the dawn of his political career in the heyday of the Mobutu dictatorship down to his very enviable current position in the Kabila regime.

Last year, even before the opening of the National Consultations, Kengo had assured hungry sharks waiting in the wings in the opposition and in front of cameras of the national television that a new government of "national cohesion" would necessarily issue from those proceedings.

In the meantime, a very embarrassed MP Fayulu, a hardline contradictor of the regime and an ally of Vital Kamerhe, took the extraordinary step of suspending from ECiDé one of its rising stars, Serge Welo, who'd turned up without his party's credentials at the National Consultations as the self-appointed "representative of the diaspora."

And lately while Fayulu has been undertaking the lame crusade to garner citizens' signatures for a petition to oust Apollinaire Malumalu from the chairmanship of the national electoral commission, Kamerhe on his part has embarked on a likewise fruitless solo off-season electioneering in the Kivu.

Much lot of good both ventures have done them! Both men are instead seen as self-serving pols and the faction of the opposition they represent as listless.

Running true to form, however, Sen. Kengo has just came out this Wednesday, February 19 with a mega political platform called "Opposition Républicaine" (OR) corralling more than 30 opposition political parties--a feat that makes some pundits wager he may be either the next Prime Minister or at the very least the "informateur" or headhunter of the upcoming cabinet.

So forget the antics of drama-queen Kamerhe! The most interesting thing to watch these days is the deadly no-holds-barred power struggle being played out within Kabila's Majorité Présidentielle (MP).

On Thursday, January 30, 2014 this bloody fratricidal power struggle that was being waged behind closed doors broke out in the open at the Grand Hotel in Kinshasa. But prior to that date, there was the ever widening rift between Prime Minister Matata Ponyo--hated within the MP for allegedly effectively plugging money leaks--and Deputy PM and Budget Minister Daniel Mukoko Samba.

Anyway, the frontal attack against PM Matata was unleashed in the evening of January 30 at Kinshasa Grand Hotel by Albert Yuma, the influential president of Fédération des Entreprises du Congo (FEC), the national Chamber of Commerce; CEO of the mining giant GECAMINES; and a pro-Kabila stalwart.

Taking advantage of his speech at the traditional Christmas and New Year greetings to business operators and to the Congolese people, with Mukoko Samba in attendance, Yuma blasted the economic program of Matata--accusing the prime minister of managing the country "like a neighborhood drugstore."

Yuma then went on to deliver a blistering anaphora worthy of some of the great oratorial moments of François Hollande, who relishes this rhetorical device:

"As for the profiles of the candidates for the upcoming government, the FEC expects that they be women and men who share the vision of the President of the Republic of never betraying the Congo and whose loyalty toward the country and its leader won't be circumstantial; women and men who will be vectors of national unity and concord and not of exclusion and sectarianism; women and men who will ensure that the state is managed in an impartial and impersonal fashion; women and men competent in the fields they will be performing in, on the basis of verifiably successful past experience, and who will be accountable of their achievement; women and men who will be aware that entering into government is a sacrifice, and why not a priesthood in the service of other people, underpinned by flawless morality; women and men who will come out indiscriminately from all the provinces of the country, with the common goal of teamwork in order to address the challenge of self-reliant development of the DRC with a bold prospective vision; finally, women and men who, everyday, as they carry out their duties, will have in mind the motto of the country: Justice-Peace-Work."

Wow! Impressive piece of rhetoric Yuma delivered there--but it is just that: empty rhetoric!

In fact, the brilliant piece of oratory proffered by Yuma sounds eerie and creepy if you read it against the background of instances of his malevolent governance at the helm of GECAMINES, as documented by Global Witness.

For instance, on October 18, 2013, Global Witness published a press release titled "Secretive plans to sell a lucrative Congolese mining asset raise further Congo corruption concerns."

From the press release:

"New reports indicate that the Democratic Republic of Congo’s state-owned mining company, Gécamines, is in an advanced stage of negotiations to sell its stake in a lucrative copper mine without informing the Congolese Ministry of Mines. If true, this would follow a pattern of opaque deals in Congo mining sector giving rise to concerns about poor value for money and possible corruption, said Global Witness today.

Bloomberg has reported on the potential deal today involving the transfer of ownership of 20% of Kamoto Copper Co (KCC), which is set to become the country’s top producing copper mine next year. Bloomberg cited evidence that the Ministry of Mines had not been informed of the sale."

(http://www.globalwitness.org/library/secretive-plans-sell-lucrative-congolese-mining-asset-raise-further-congo-corruption)

In other words, Yuma needs to first clean his own house (and act) before accusing others!

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photo by Baudouin Muanda, jeuneafrique.com

DRC: 1) Tshisekedi scraps trip to the US & 2) MP Wivine MoleKa v Vital Kamerhe Case

2014-02-07T07:29:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: MP Wivine Moleka, Vital Kamerhe's erstwhile buddy turned foe)

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1) Tshisekedi scraps trip to the US

Radio-Trottoir has downgraded "President" Etienne Tshisekedi from mercurial maverick to shameless liar.

And people are wondering why the one his supporters have nicknamed the Sphinx doesn't live up by his moniker and not bother anyone any longer with his serialized empty party communiqués.

The case in point is his trip to the US, billed by his press release as a "prayer and work visit" in the US, but which has now turned out to be an abortive attendance at the 62nd National Prayer Breakfast held in Washington on Thursday, February 5.

No one knows who might have invited Tshisekedi at the event and why he'd chosen to cancel the trip and to send instead Albert Moleka, his chief of staff.

Why Tshisekedi chose to publicize his trip in the media in the first place is anyone's guess.

***

2) MP Wivine Moleka v Vital Kamerhe Case

The prosecutor in the MP Wivine Moleka v Vital Kamerhe case requested a prison term of three years for defendant Kamerhe in his closing statement on Tuesday, February 4. The court has taken the prosecutor's request under advisement and will issue its final ruling shortly.

Kamerhe ripped the prosecutor's closing statement and said he was quite "surprised" by the needless "politization" of the case while an out-of-court amicable settlement, proposed by MP Moleka was agreed upon by the parties and a sum of $7,000 paid to the accuser.

The politization, according to Kamerhe, is designed to sideline him in the presidential election of 2016.

But Moleka's lawyer, Gérard Ledi Mukoko, at a presser held two days earlier, claimed the monetary compensation isn't enough. He insisted that anything short of a public apology "through the same venues" Kamerhe used to libel MP Moleka won't do.

I had occasion to comment on the long-drawn judicial battle pitting Vital Kamerhe against pro-Kabila MP Wivine Moleka (the sister of Tshisekedi's chief of staff, Albert Moleka) on this blog in 2012 here:

(http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/2012/04/obfuscation-of-sexist-pig-called-vital.html?m=1)

But to sum up:

In the throes of the contentious general elections of November 28, 2011, presidential contender Vital Kamerhe, in order to illustrate what he claimed to be the massive vote rigging orchestrated by the Kabila camp, gave the example of his own erstwhile buddy and political ally, MP Wivine Moleka, who was running on the list of Kabila's PPRD party in in the Lukunga constituency of Kinshasa.

Not content with publicly accusing Moleka on national television of vote rigging and voters intimidation in the Mbudi precinct of Kinshasa, Kamerhe then reiterated his unsubstantiated charges in a damning letter sent to a slew of diplomats accredited to Kinshasa as well as to local and international media.

Kamerhe's letter stated in part:

"At Mbudi, a Kinshasa suburb in the Mont-Ngafula Commune, with an escort of cops carrying ballot boxes crammed with ballot sheets, Honorable Moleka showed up with a large sum of money she then proceeded to distribute to election officials. Outraged, the population chased her down and her bodyguards reacted by firing in the air to disperse witnesses. Consequently, the population decided not to vote and voting stations were shuttered."

Now, as it turned out, MP Moleka, who was tailed by the media all day long on election day, was nowhere near the Mbudi precinct.

Still, Kamerhe's refusing to apologize and is even daring the court to throw him in jail.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: via Facebook page of Wivine Moleka

DRC opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi to embark on a fortnight "prayer visit" in Washington

2014-01-31T06:33:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: Etienne Tshisekedi and wife Maman Marthe Kasalu stumping at the Stade des Martyrs in Kinshasa, Tuesday August 9, 2011)

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Kinshasa daily tabloid La Prospérité published today a press release issued on January 30 by Joseph Kapika, UDPS spokesman, announcing that opposition leader and self-proclaimed DRC president Etienne Tshisekedi is about to embark on a fortnight private "prayer and work visit" to Washington, DC.

The press release doesn't mention the names of those who've extended the invitation to the eighty-one-year-old mercurial pol, the tabloid notes.

The press release states that:

"The President and the retinue that accompanies him will leave Kinshasa on Sunday, February 2, 2014 aboard a regularly scheduled commercial flight of Air France. The delegation will depart from the French capital on Monday, February 3, to Washington where it will arrive on Tuesday, February 4."

Tshisekedi's "retinue" includes his wife and longtime aide Marthe Kasalu and Albert Moleka, his chief of staff.

The tabloid also notes that the return of Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on February 16 coincides with the anniversary of the 1992 Christians' demo violently broken up by

Mobutu's security forces.

In Kinshasa, the anniversary has since turned into a flashpoint of violent demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by opposition and pro-regime supporters with heavy-handed interventions by riot cops.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photo by John Bompengo via radiookapi.net

FARDC Launches Operation Sukola Against ADF/NALU Amid Dismal Morale

2014-01-20T12:16:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: President Joseph Kabila, middle, with Gen. Didier Etumba, left, and Col. Mamadou Ndala, far right, in Goma on November 30, 2013)

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After Operation "Pomme Orange" (Pink Apple) to root out M23 insurgents (October 25-November 10, 2013), the FARDC have just launched this past January 16 Operation "Sukola"--Lingala for "mop up"--against the Ugandan Muslim rebels of ADF/NALU (Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda).

There's however a huge chasm between the two operations.

By the end of Operation Pomme Orange, morale was high among FARDC troops and among the rest of Congolese citizens who were all surfing the towering waves of Col. Mamadou Ndala's season of strange military victories.

But that was then...

In the intervening period, Col. Ndala, who'd gone to the Beni area in preparation of Operation Sukola now underway, was murdered in an ambush that has since turned out to be an FARDC inside job, triggering wild rumors and sending the country's morale tumbling down in free fall.

Another morale-deflating cause in Congolese citizens is that the investigation into the murder of Col. Ndala is shrouded in secrecy and, as Radio-Trottoir has it, might end up being botched (un)intentionally.

This opacity in turn fans swirling rumors about sightings of one of the alleged main suspects in the murder of Col. Ndala, Gen. Moundos, freely walking in Beni streets or hopping Kinshasa "ngandas" (sidewalk bars).

As Operation Sukola was starting, an outrageous rumor stormed the country alleging that it was an operation jointly mounted by the FARDC and the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF).

Given the unpopularity of Yoweri Museveni among Congolese who blame him and his Rwandan counterpart for hatching M23 and Congo's other real and imagined woes, the DRC government scrambled to forcefully dispel the notion of a Ugandan participation in Operation Sukola.

Thus, at the very beginning of the press briefing held Saturday January 18 at Beni to unveil Operation Sukola, Brig. Gen. Léon Richard Kasonga Tshibangu, FARDC spokesman, had to dismiss the damning rumor:

"There has never ever been any joint operations of the Congolese army and that of Uganda against ADF/NALU."

Another worrying rumor was the alleged conspicuous absence of MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) from the Beni theater of operations.

MONUSCO military Spokesman Col. Félix Basse attempted last week with limited success to dispel that rumor by insisting that the UN Mission is indeed providing critical logistical and intelligence-gathering supports to the FARDC.

"We've deployed Force Intervention Brigade troops," Col. Basse told the press last Saturday, "with the aim of protecting civilians, and above all, of providing support to the offensive of government troops for achieving objectives determined by the FARDC."

Adding:

"MONUSCO is on the ground with Force Intervention Brigade, but also with [MONUSCO] North-Kivu brigade and the Nepalese battalion that is deployed north of North-Kivu."

But still people don't see MONUSCO gunships pounding ADF/NALU positions.

The FARDC have already seized from the ADF/NALU a dozen hamlets and villages the Ugandan rebels had occupied--including their stronghold of Mamundioma, about 45 Km northeast of Beni.

Close to the theater, there's another rumor spreading of ADF/NAFU simply drawing back from the area and moving northwestward to Orientale Province.

A rumor Brig. Gen. Kasonga also tackled squarely:

"In the event they'd attempt to move to another province, the security mechanism we've put in place would automatically function, for our mission this time is to completely neutralize armed groups."

Despite the stated ambition ("to neutralize all armed groups"), breath (North- and South-Kivu provinces), and the early successes of Operation Sukola, the morale of the Congolese continues to be in dismal shape as if the death of one citizen--Col. Ndala--had broken the spirit of an entire nation.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: via Twitter @magloirepaluku

Kinshasa: The Actionable Theology of Prophet Gédéon Paul Joseph Mukungubila

2013-12-30T15:27:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO 1: Members of the Presidential Guard in Kinshasa)

(PHOTO: 2006 Campaign poster of Presidential Candidate Paul Joseph Mukungubila aka Lord's Prophet Gédéon)

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To understand the suicidal insanity that was unleashed on Kinshasa today, one has to read an obscure essay penned by James Yuma titled "The Devil's Comma" published in the launch issue of the African Cities Reader--a joint publication of the African Centre for Cities and Chimurenga Magazine, both South African-based.

(http://www.africancitiesreader.org.za/reader.php)

In a nutshell, that essay demonstrates that Jesus has broken into the hallowed land of the Congo where Congolese are basking in the exceptionalism prophesied in Isaiah 18.

This is not a joke, mind you! This kind of mumbo-jumbo led people to throw their dear lives out of the window in the morning of December 30, 2013 in senseless and doomed attacks on N'Djili International Airport, the RTNC TV station, and the FARDC headquarters.

In an open letter dated December 5 that reads like the ravings of a madman, prophet and erstwhile presidential candidate Paul Joseph Mukungubila defines the Congolese exceptionalism contained in Isaiah 18, which is the linchpin of his "ministry of restoration" (of the black folks of Africa, particularly the Congolese, to their bygone biblical glory):

"You are well aware that our status [as Congolese] stems from prophecy, the prophecy of Isaiah 18:1-13, which says that we are a formidable people ever since we have been in existence and which plunges the white man in total disarray."

(https://m.facebook.com/notes/le-ministère-de-la-restauration-à-partir-de-lafrique-noire/jusques-a-quand-le-peuple-congolais-va-t-il-devoir-payer-en-versant-son-sang-pou/461190427319446)

We are here right in the midst of the realm of magical realism, what Yuma called "actionable theology," that is, "a reading of Scriptures yielding immediate practical results and action in the here-and-now."

This theology stokes at the same time as it taps into rabid irredentism and nationalism. The Nemesis or Satan and his agents in this theology are the international community, Rwanda, Paul Kagame, and his "acolytes"--including Joseph Kabila who, in this warped space-time, is construed, as I've said it somewhere on this blog, as some kind of "Rwandan Golem" kneaded by Kagame himself!

This thread runs throughout the various strands of the political discourse of the Congolese so-called "radical opposition."

In his open letter, Mukungubila, who claims to be related to the late father of the incumbent president, revisits the much-rehearsed theme of the Rwandan Golem:

"All the Congolese from the capital city of Kinshasa could give this testimonial: I went with my wife Clarisse Kot to welcome home the remains of my brother Laurent [Kabila] from Zimbabwe.

"[We were at the airport], my wife and me, the current head of state, with his brother Zoé, [their mother] Sifa, [their sister] Jaynet, and the whole group.

"[...] Look carefully at the footage of the lowering of the remains from the plane coming from Zimbabwe, you'll see me crying.

"I was crying, my wife was crying, but standing right next to me, this guy [Joseph Kabila] and his brother [Zoé] weren't displaying any emotions, except Sifa and the other women who were crying.

"You've got the footage, check it out. Journalists are witnesses, not a drop of tear from his eyes."

As "this guy" failed to shed tears in front o the casket at the airport means that he and the deceased are unrelated! It therefore follows that "this guy" is a Rwandan!

I used to think that this line of unreasoning was castrative and bad for national morale. I was wrong: it's suicidal.

He was right, the tweeter who answered my tweet earlier today:

"@chiefkalos: @alexengwete let's call this a jihads against Kabila's government lol but where this crazy pastor come for"

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photo 1: Reuters; Photo 2 via various Internet sources

DRC: The Nairobi Declaration or swinging back into the endless merry-go-round of peace deals fueling eponymous rebellions

2013-12-13T08:10:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: Malawian President Joyce Banda and her Ugandan counterpart Yoweri Museveni signing the "Joint ICGLR-SADC Final Communiqué on the Kampala Dialogue" on Thursday, December 12, 2013, at State House, Nairobi, Kenya)

***

Three separate documents were signed yesterday in Nairobi to mark the end of the Kampala talks between the DRC government and M23 insurgency.

Bertrand Bisimwa signed the death of his "terrorist group"--as M23 is labeled by the DRC government--under the weary gaze of DRC President Joseph Kabila, whereas Congolese Foreign Minister Raymond Tshibamba signed a separate declaration acknowledging M23's seppuku.

Presidents Museveni and Banda signed the ICGLR-SADC joint communiqué for the two regional organizations they're respectively chairing.

So, are lights back on in the cinema and are could we now be filing for the exit doors at the end of this nightmarish B-series movie which, despite its blood and gore, is still a film after all?

Or should we heed Ambassador Samantha Power who, among those that hailed the signing of the Nairobi declarations, clearly encapsulated in one fizzy tweet the whole bloody enterprise of M23 internationalist bandits?

Ambassador Power tweeted:

"@AmbassadorPower: With today's end to the #KampalaDialogue, it's official: after terrorizing Congolese civilians for 1.5 years, the #M23 rebellion is over."

So if M23 have the global notoriety of being terrorists preying on civilians, why on earth compel the DRC government to sign with them declarations, however separate these happen to be?

As I tweeted yesterday, there's a fundamental hypocrisy underpinning both the Kampala talks and the Nairobi Declaration: the deafening silence on the role of the vicious enabler and boogeyman played--and still being played--by Museveni.

Some analysts are astonished by the fact that the text the DRC refused to sign in Kampala is no different from the one it finally agreed to sign in Nairobi almost surreptitiously in the din and confusion of Kenya's Jamuhuri Day festivities.

Well, maybe the Congolese government, under heavy international pressure (with the exception of Belgium), was simply equivocating about signing anything on the territory of one of the two major backers of M23--the other one being obviously Rwanda's President Paul Kagame!

Just the other day, in an interview, Museveni had the galls of comparing his protection of fugitive M23 thug Sultani Makenga--a mass murderer and a looter of DRC government and civilians' property and resources--to the one he had extended to Laurent-Désiré Kabila who was then wanted by the Mobutu regime.

Some passages of the Joint ICGLR-SADC Final Communiqué on the Kampala Dialogue--the ones rehearsing the 11 points of agreement between M23 and the DRC--are so tilted in favor of the insurgents they might as well have been scribbled down and inserted by M23 and their Ugandan enablers as the Congolese negotiators were asleep on the switch.

The first one of those 11 points for instance gives M23 an agency it no longer has on the ground:

"Decision by M23 to end rebellion and transform itself into a legitimate political party."

The action words in that sentence are outrageous: M23 didn't "decide" out of the blue "end rebellion"; it was compelled to do so by military force. In fact, that (non)decision was taken in Uganda where M23 fighters had fled. Besides, there's illegality and unconstitutionality built in into the second clause of that sentence: M23 can't "transform itself into a legitimate political party" without going through the appropriate judicial channel. And how could M23 clear this legal hurdle if their political platform--or "ideology" to use Museveni's word; or "ID-logy, if I'd be allowed to use the terrific word coined by Comaroff & Comaroff--is an ethnic platform, which is unconstitutional in the DRC? What's more, if the whole leadership of M23 can't be covered by the amnesty bill the government is set to introduce in the National Assembly, how on earth could this terrorist movement "transform itself into a legitimate political party"?

At the risk of passing for a worrywart, I think the most alarming point of the 11 points agreed upon in Kampala is the 10th point relating to the "Implementation of the conclusions of the review of the implementation of the 23rd March 2009 Agreement."

This swings us back into the endless merry-go-round of failed so-called "peace deals" fueling eponymous rebellions...

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photo via nation.co.ke

DRC: Massive anti-Kampala Talks demos nationwide could thwart government signing agreement with M23

2013-12-03T06:12:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: Joseph Kabila & Yoweri Museveni at State House in Entebbe, Monday, December 2, 2013)

***

Besides the guffaws triggered by the photo above in the sidewalk bars of Kinshasa and the related mocking tweets advising Prez Yoweri Museveni to fire his tailor who seemed to have entered the Ugandan president in a contest on "How To Dress A Zombie," Congolese citizens are seething at the nightmarish prospect of the government signing of anything with M23 Rwanda's proxies.

Most people in Kinshasa who've seen that picture also cringe at Kabila beaming that unguarded smile at who they call the "nemesis of the Congolese nation."

The joint communiqué of the two presidents--unfortunately for Congolese patriots--clearly point to just that, "that the Kampala Dialogue [outrageously paid for by Congo] between the Government of the DRC and M23 should be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible, so as to facilitate the peaceful return of M23 ex-combatants and the completion of the process of demobilization" (Point 3).

By allowing this statement into the joint communiqué, Kabila appears to have caved in to Uganda and the M23. It also belies the bellicose tone and stern warning at neighbors proffered by Kabila just the other day in Goma.

What's more, people in Kinshasa are shaking their collective head at the "peaceful return" thing smacking of impunity of criminals who have raped and killed Congolese citizens, and wreaked havoc on vast swaths of the national territory for the past year and a half.

"What's the endgame, Raïs?" someone was rhetorically addressing Kabila on a bus last night. "Loser Takes All?"

According to a recent strand of Kinshasa conspiracy theory, the goons of M23, though defeated on the battlefield, are emerging as the real winners after the Kampala laundering scheme. Hence, Qui perd gagne! [Loser Takes All].

Faced with the growing resentment of denizens that risks chipping away at their Raïs' popularity, some pro-Kabila stalwarts are now biting their nails in despair and others are concocting desperate plans--like pulling out massive anti-Kampala Talks demos nationwide that could thwart the government government signing an agreement with M23!

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Twitter via @imakiT

Kinshasa: Police General Célestin Kanyama: "M23 = M-Kuluna"

2013-11-24T16:52:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: A gun-downed Kuluna gangbanger washing in his own blood)

***

About two weeks ago, Kinois saw a dramatic change in the way cops dealt with kuluna gangbangers throughout the communes of the Congolese capital.

(On the kuluna gangbangers, see my post of February 2010: http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/2010/02/kuluna-and-kuluneurs-in-kinshasa-low.html?m=1)

Whereas in the past, machete-wielding kuluneurs would go on rampages terrorizing entire neighborhoods as police officers cowered in containers reused as neighborhoods' police precincts, there were suddenly balaclava-clad gang unit cops confronting those gangbangers on their own turfs.

As these confrontations had an uncanny way of turning deadly--more than a dozen gangbangers were gun downed in the past couple of weeks--word quickly spread that the gang unit cops were extrajudicially executing kuluneurs.

These perceived extrajudicial killings of kuluneurs make Kinois cheer police on for the terrific job of ridding denizens of the bane of the "kuluna phenomenon."

And these days the much respected soukous star and peace ambassador Werrason is being vilified for suggesting that kuluneurs could just show up at his residence, lay down their machetes, and be forgiven.

"Why couldn't he come up with his brilliant peace initiative when kuluneurs were killing and maiming?" I heard a man fuming today. "I say, kill them all, to the last man!"

Yesterday, to straighten things out, Gen. Célestin Kanyama aka Esprit-de-mort (spirit of death)--the country's number two cop--held a small televised rally at a square in the eastern part of the capital city to showcase two dozen arrested kuluneurs and to explain what was going on.

Kinshasa police have launched a 3-month anti-kuluna so-called Operation "Likofi" (Lingala for knuckle-duster), Gen. Kanyama said.

Vindicating the point I made in that 2010 post that kuluna was a low-intensity insurgency, Gen. Kanyama equated kuluna with M23.

"M23 equals M-Kuluna!," he blared out to a cheering crowd of Kinois. "We'll deal with them the way we dealt with M23!"

It was laughable to hear Gen. Kanyama blaming the recent deaths of kuluneurs to the gangbangers themselves (dividing up loots gone awry) or to civilian vigilantes.

Be that as it may, the sprawling slums of Kinshasa were suddenly safe to live in; and to show their contentment residents displayed ostentatiously their jewelry and wads of dollars--all the while heaping praise on Jesus Christ and Gen. Esprit-de-Mort!

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Via Twitter @ManyaRiche & @Mkasiala

DRC Minister of Higher Education Bonaventure Tchelo: One gaffe too many

2013-11-22T04:33:00.001-05:00

(PHOTO: Professor Bonaventure Tchelo Lutsima, DRC Minister of Higher Education & Scientific Research.)

***

News of the abrupt sacking of Minister Bonaventure Tchelo Lutsima hit the airwaves Wednesday, November 20, in the evening, in a terse presidential decree that didn't specify the reason of the firing, except saying that it was for a "serious breach."

People in the Congolese capital city--especially Kinshasa residents hailing from Orientale Province--were shaking their heads in disbelief at the stupidity of Tchelo, also from Orientale, from the helm of the DRC Ministry of Higher and University Education and Scientific Research ("ESURS," as it is familiarly known from its French acronym).

Everyone knew that Tchelo was a reckless man--including the guy who's rumored to have pulled the strings to get him that ministerial job, MP Médard Autsai Asenga, erstwhile unpopular governor of Orientale Province and, like the fired minister, a native of Aru in the district of Ituri.

But to pull what turns out to be not an isolated breach, but the string of gaffes that Tchelo just did when all the hungry pols in Kinshasa are sharpening their knives in attempting to position themselves in the upcoming "National-Cohesion" government reshuffle was far beyond reckless. It was plain dumb and idiotic.

After the announcement by President Joseph Kabila on Wednesday, October 23, in his state of the nation address, of an upcoming "national cohesion government," Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo followed up with an official circular to cabinet ministers instructing them that henceforth they only had to deal with current business and to no longer issue any ministerial decree.

Oddly, Tchelo thought he'd somehow weasel out of those strictures by backdating 52 ministerial decrees promoting his family and friends to key managerial positions in the university system. One of those decrees appointed the minister's own eldest son and senior advisor, Jean-Claude aka J-C, as Budget Administrator at Université Pédagogique Nationale (UPN) in Kinshasa!

After the publication of the first dozen of the batch of the backdated ministerial decrees, Tchelo was asked by the premier to explain himself and to stop issuing those illegal ministerial decrees in the meanwhile.

Apparently to no avail, as Tchelo went ahead and released some more decrees. Sources at the ESURS ministry claim that Tchelo, a high-functioning alcoholic and a womanizer, had of late become alarmingly delusional, telling subordinates he'd be the next "cohesion" prime minister!

Four days ago, face with such blatant acts of insubordination, PM Matata went to see Kabila just as the latter was about to embark on his eastern Congo tour: he wanted Tchelo fired without further ado.

Among other Tchelo's malfeasances: transferring himself as a tenured professor from Kisangani to Kinshasa University; appointing his girlfriends in higher education institutions; selling plots for a Chinese shopping mall on the ground of UPN; etc.

And, by the way, the shopping mall under construction at UPN was razed to the ground yesterday.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: 7sur7.cd

Kinshasa: Jason Stearns & RVI's Usalama Project were in town

2013-11-09T14:59:00.001-05:00

(Jason Stearns, Usalama Project manager, being mobbed by the press at Sultani Hotel in Kinshasa, Monday, November 4, 2013)

***

The Rift Valley Institute (RVI) held Monday, November 4, an invitation-only 4-hour marathon event billed as the "final conference" of its flagship Umoja Project in the Suzanne Muk conference room of the Sultani Hotel on the Avenue de la Justice in downtown Kinshasa.

The project, as presented by RVI Director John Ryle, is well-targeted: To provide not only the nuts and bolts of armed groups besetting eastern Congo but actionable understandings of those groups as well.

Actionable understandings, because Usalama Project studies are thick descriptions stuffed with ready-to-tread "solution paths" for "cutting the Gordian knot of insecurity" propelled by Congolese armed groups, to paraphrase the title of one of the reports released by the Usalama Project.

These are prescriptions for action to be explored by policymakers, stakeholders, activists, donors, philanthropists, and concerned people--the global constituency--interested in lasting peace in the North-Kivu Province. In the last 12 months, said Ryle, Usalama Project has produced 11 reports and several briefings on armed groups--not to mention workshops and seminars organized in the Congo. (RVI provided each participant with a flash drive containing these reports and at least two hardcopies of these reports in French. Those reports are also available online.)

The conference theme was titled "Usalama Project: Understanding Congolese armed groups: Research Conclusions and Political Considerations."

The timing of the conference couldn't have been better. These days, here in Kinshasa, people are for the moment basking in the euphoria of FARDC military victory over M23 and feel somehow invulnerable.

And it's a good thing that Usalama Project had come to town to tell revelers they could use some reality check--a damper no doubt on the ecstatic mood prevailing around, but a clarion call nonetheless for reminding people that we aren't out of the woods yet, given that the very same dynamics that caused the outbreak of M23 could still be simmering and for a long time.

As a matter-of-fact, there are more than four dozens of armed groups still operational out there, with varying degrees of nuisance.

The Usalama Project is unfortunately winding down--unless it is continued in some form or another by its donors, Jason Stearns, its outgoing manager, told me. In that event, Stearns added, the ideal would be to bring the project where it is the most needed: here, in the DRC. But even if the project is continued, however, Stearns would no longer be at the helm: academic obligations would tie him down closer to home in New Haven, at Yale University.

The conference was divided into two parts: the first half (from 2 to 3:30 PM) being the snapshot of the current dynamics of armed groups and the FARDC, and the second half (from 4 to 7 PM) a string of political recommendations based on those fieldwork studies, followed by a Q & A section.

The conference panel featured three experts of Usalama Project:

1) Stearns: Research objectives and conclusions of the Usalama Project as well as a Case Study on the CNDP/M23;

2) Koen Vlassenroot: Case Study: the armed "franchise" Raïa Mutomboki; and

3) Judith Verweijen: Case Study of the FARDC.

All three panelists made their presentations in French.

JASON STEARNS

The last time I attended a presentation on the conflict in eastern Congo given by Jason Stearns was on Friday, April 16, 2010 in Washington, DC.

That presentation was part of the Johns Hopkins SAIS African Studies Program Spring 2010 Lecture Series and was entitled "The Logic of Conflict in the DRC: Militias, Resources, and Politics in the Kivu."

At the time, Stearns was assessing the short- and medium- term post-conflict dynamics on the ground in the wake of the "enigmatic peace deal" between Rwanda and the DRC that happened around December 2008-January 2009.

The deal itself resulted from the pressure the international community brought to bear on both countries following the military offensive unleashed by Laurent Nkunda's CNDP troops--the ancestors of M23--in October 2008 with devastating humanitarian consequences in North-Kivu Province.

Some optimistically thought that the signing of the March 23, 2009 agreement with the CNDP and other armed groups would come to seamlessly slide into that previous accord with Rwanda--and eastern Congo would henceforth live forever in peace and security.

Rwanda and its creation--the CNDP--reaped enormous benefits from the 2008-2009 and March 23. 2009 agreements whereas it more and more became apparent that the DRC was short-changed in the process.

Rwandan troops were given unfettered access to DRC territory "to track down" and "to hunt down" FDLR terrorists. The CNDP, on its part, paid lip service to its reintegration into the national army, kept a parallel chain of command, expanded its territorial control and furthered the illegal commercial and mining interests of its commanders and officer corps.

In those days, the logic in Kinshasa was a contortionist's logic, of bending over backwards to accommodate Rwanda's slightest interests and whims. The peace and diplomatic windfalls the DRC government was expecting from these deals never materialized and in fact were far outweighed by their domestic liabilities (humanitarian disaster in North Kivu, government unpopularity, and turbulence within President Joseph Kabila's coalition that culminated in the toppling of Vital Kamerhe from the speakership).

But Stearns saw this diplomatic understanding between Rwanda and the DRC as a marker, a "dramatic geopolitical shift" in the Great Lakes region--though this optimism wasn't justified by the humanitarian catastrophe that Rwandan intervention in the DRC triggered.

Like many other observers at the time, Stearns gave an appraisal of bucolic "post-conflict" conditions and the revamped ambition of ex-CNDP politicians.

As I noted, Stearns was then speculating that,

"The goal of the CNDP for now is just 'to stay alive till 2011' when general elections will be held, though they weren't pleased that they weren't given ministerial positions in the recent reshuffle of government in Kinshasa [following the agreement signed between armed groups and the DRC government]."

(http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/2010/04/jason-stearns-unpacks-his-theory-of.html?m=1)

And the rest is history...

To be sure, for M23 as for other pillage entrepreneurs there were stronger incentives for taking up arms one more time than for a reconversion into political activities.

A. UNDERSTANDING ARMED GROUPS

In Kinshasa, Stearns stressed in his opening remarks that armed groups are a complex phenomenon and that deterministic, linear theories that purport to singlehandedly explain the rise and intricacies of armed groups more often than not fall short of accounting for everything.

There are currently 3 such linear theories wrestling to explain armed groups in eastern DRC:

1) State weakness. If the weakness of the DRC state could explain for instance that Rwanda created, organized and supported CNDP, they fail at the same time to explain why Rwanda wasn't supporting other armed groups.

2) Local conflict. Land tenure conflicts, traditional power grab dynamics, etc, though they are important variables in the onsets of some armed conflicts and groups they are by no means the primary cause of those conflicts.

3) Natural resources. They are certainly an important variable to factor in, but the theory of natural resources as a causation of armed groups is just as partial and linear as the two other ones.

Incidentally, this observation led in the Q & A section to a brief testy exchange between Stearns and a community activist who misconstrued the remark as an attempt at giving a free pass to multinationals. Stearns was at first defensive in rejecting that characterization of his observation and his explanation seemed to have put the matter to rest. Then, after two unrelated questions, Stearns grabbed the microphone again and told the community activist something along these lines:

"Sorry, I've misspoken. Multinationals do indeed directly intervene in the Congo to rip off the country. And it's not in North-Kivu, but in the industrial mining sector in the Katanga."

After making short shrift of these three partial theories of the emergence of armed groups in eastern Congo, Stearns then presented the 5 main conclusions inferred from Usalama Project field studies:

1) Peace deals in the Congo are brokered on the back of wars--a situation pregnant with ever more conflicts. A case in point being the RCD, which in time would beget CNDP. It once held sway over a third of the Congolese territory. But after the 2002 Sun City Agreement and the 2006 general elections, this control would plummet to less than 4% of politicians elected on RCD tickets nationwide. And this created deep resentment. The assumption that the Sun City Agreement had somewhat magically ushered the country into "post-conflict" conditions was therefore a fallacy. And efforts towards peace, demobilization, reintegration, etc, were foolishly abandoned.

2) Some armed groups are more important than others. And those important groups have "multiplier effects" as their actions by synergy have momentous reverberations on the ground. Thus, CNDP-qua-M23, FDLR, FNL, etc, are examples of such important groups.

3) Armed groups have broken away from their natural communities and have plugged into broader national or regional "elite networks." The armed groups Raïa Mutomboki are illustrative of this argument. Initially created as a community vigilante group in response to the security vacuum in the Shabunda district of South-Kivu Province that allowed the FDLR to move in and to perpetrate massacres in 2005, the Raïa Mutomboki are now a loosely-connected armed franchise operating across several communities.

4) Militarization of Politics and Politicization of the Military. This is by and large caused by the logic of power grabs, of electoral positioning, of strongmen--the proverbial "firefighters-arsonists" characters.

5) Repeated negotiations with and integrations of armed groups into the FARDC that have resulted in the weakening of the national army.

B. CASE STUDY: CNDP/M23

In this section, Stearns reiterated his observation on the stunning decline of CNDP from its peak in its previous incarnation as RCD--when it controlled a third of Congo territory--to its shadow as a political movement that counted less than 4% of elected politicians.

No wonder then that "fear" among the RCD/CNDP flared up as its members felt that they were being sidelined for good.

On top of the security interests of the CNDP, there were security concerns of Rwanda, which has always felt that without a strong proxy in the DRC, its regional interests would be trampled.

But by launching the CNDP on the path of escalating violence in eastern DRC, Rwanda also coincidentally triggered in reaction the creation of other armed groups fiercely hostile to its interests.

It is worth repeating here that the December 2008-January 2009 agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa and the March 23, 2009 accord between CNDP and Kinshasa were skewed to benefit Rwanda and its Congolese proxy.

While Kigali sought to appease donors and the DRC thought it was getting rid of CNDP, those agreements actually cemented Rwanda's position as a stakeholder in Congolese domestic politics. What's more, after its nominal integration into the FARDC, CNDP kept a parallel chain of command and expanded its area of control over Congolese territory, which they administered as a lawless micro-state.

Several factors would ultimately combine to set off the M23 insurgency in April 2012: upcoming provincial elections where CNDP was anticipated to obtain paltry results; the coalescing political will in Kinshasa to dissolve the CNDP, the guilty verdicts of warlord Thomas Lubanga at the ICC, and so on.

But overall, a closer look at M23 evinces an armed group beset by two major failures in its internal dynamics that its initial blitzkrieg concealed:

1) Failure in terms of significant mobilization at the grassroots level of the community from which the armed group sprang up.

2) Failure in terms of its overdependence on Rwanda.

KOEN VLASSENROOT

CASE STUDY: RAÏA MUTOMBOKI

The franchise of armed groups called Raïa Mutomboki leaps up as a case apart.

Initially created as a community vigilante group, it has evolved into a string of armed groups bound by the same "ideology" of anti-FDLR sentiments and the belief that the "dawa" (juju) could bestow the magical gift of invulnerability to combatants.

Several factors explain the emergence of the Raïa Mutomboki.

By 1998, the FDLR were deeply entrenched in the area of Kanyoka, in the district of Shabunda in South-Kivu Province. FDLR raids and all manners of small and big exactions were more or less tolerated till they hit the tipping point of the massacres of local merchants perpetrated by the FDLR in March 2005 mentioned hitherto.

The youth of the area then ganged up into a vigilante posses to go after the FDLR.

Two factors account for the success of the Raïa Mutomboki in driving out the FDLR from their communities:

1) They benefited from the support of customary power structure (chiefs, notables, etc) and

2) They were also able to cause massive mobilization of the local population.

Among the other intervening factors in the birthing of the Raïa Mutomboki there was--ironically enough--the restructuring of the FARDC that resulted in the security vacuum which allowed the FDLR to raid unprotected communities.

Once successful armed groups with widespread popular support in their communities, Raïa Mutomboki are today accused of resorting to the brutality and the exactions they rose up against.

JUDITH VERWEIJEN

CASE STUDY: FARDC

Judith Verweijen set out by positing that the recent victory of the FARDC--with the backing MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)--reflects "important advances made in logistics, (....), intelligence coordination, discipline, and morale."

These advances are not solely military, but they are political as well: better human resources management, better management of soldiers' workload, better coordination of battle groups, etc.

These advances are still a drop on the ocean in what still remains to be done in the national army.

Following the 2002 Sun City Agreement, the FARDC embarked in 2003 in a massive campaign called "brassage" that was supposed to integrate all the previously warring factions under one national chain of command.

But the brassage couldn't completely dispel the deep distrust of ex-rebel groups for one another and for FARDC troops. This distrust often ended up leading to open armed confrontations.

Besides, the brassage process had mixed results at best. And the national army was still beset by crippling woes such as ethnic or regional factionalism and double-cross.

Despite these mixed results, there were 18 fully operational integrated brigades. These gains are however threatened by factions who have taken the army hostage.

Other negative effects of unsuccessful brassage process include the inflation of high ranks and senior positions in the army, and misconstruing the creation of armed groups as leverage to gain access to state entitlements.

All these factors led to big frustrations among professional troops.

These deleterious consequences of the integration of armed groups into the FARDC don't fully explain the dysfunction of the national army. What's more, some of these problems date back to the Mobutu regime era where in order to ensure political loyalty, the army was purposefully divided and racketeering encouraged within the officer corps.

This dysfunction from the time of Mobutu was exacerbated by the more recent integrations of rebel groups into the army.

Three distinct characteristics could be pinned to these repeated integrations of rebel groups into the national army:

1) Deterioration of meritocracy. This deterioration of meritocracy has at times made some army groups look like "inverted pyramids" with members of the officer corps more numerous than the rank and file;

2) Factionalism, parallel chains of command, network membership (for example membership to the same former armed group, or to the same ethnic group) also cripple the army; and

3) The provincialization of the army in the Kivus evinces the fact that there is no balanced policy of military personnel transfer.

Coupled with rampant wheeling and dealing or outright racketeering and influence peddling, these factors create the eerie situation where weapons and intelligence are for sale, and some members of the national army are devoid of any loyalty to the state.

***

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS: A FEW SOLUTION PATHS

JASON STEARNS

In this second part of the conference panel after a half-hour break, the three panelists offered solution paths and future considerations on the topics tackled in the first half.

In attempting to come up with future considerations, Jason Stearns acknowledged right away that that exercise wasn't simple.

He further said he was glad to find a number of solution paths already contained in the speech of President Joseph Kabila of October 23 to both chambers of Parliament at the end of national consultations.

Here are a three solution paths traced by Stearns:

1) It is imperative that "elite networks" providing support to armed groups be dismantled. But the dismantling of these networks is seemingly a politically intractable problem as some of the politicians working with armed groups do so openly and brazenly. And this begs the following question: how come these troublemakers are never ever nabbed?

2) When dealing with armed groups, give priority to major spoilsports of the ilk of M23 and FLDR (whose forces are now estimated at half of their 2008 strength): Going after them would significantly decrease violence in eastern DRC.

3) Donors have to discard their technocratic point of view and have their ears closer to the ground. For example, the support given to a DRC-government-designed project like the 2009 STAREC (Kivu Stabilization) without encouraging "ownership" by the government was shortsighted; as was defining the period after the 2006 elections as "post-conflict."

KOEN VLASSENROOT

Koen Vlassenroot made the following 4 observations followed by "political responses and considerations":

1) The number of armed groups has been increasing since the 2002 Sun City Agreement. This means that old conflicts are unresolved.

2) There's a big diversity among armed groups in terms of interaction with communities, strategy, and popular support.

3) Armed groups are a form of privatized governance. The outreach of some of those groups go even beyond their local community.

4) Peace efforts have spawned new demands and claims whereas fundamental conflictual problems are left untouched.

Consequently, instead of post-conflict transition, we could be waddling deep in a "failed state" [régime déliquescent] situation.

POLITICAL RESPONSES AND CONSIDERATIONS

1) Political responses must address these observations.

The proliferation of armed groups is the result of the interaction of several variables. Therefore, each armed group needs a "target-adapted strategy" within a global policy.

At the local level, land tenure tensions, often a decisive factor in the outbreak of armed conflict, must be appeased.

While focusing mediation efforts on the short-term, more violent conflicts have to be tackled collectively and land tenure dealt with at the national level.

2) Investing in inter-community reconciliations should be a priority, in "barzas" for example. But barzas have their own problems: some of them are involved in local conflicts. The reconciliation effort must include the "real leaders" of the community, not impostors. They have to also benefit from donors' support.

3) The success of any policy targeting armed groups has to rely on local and state capacity building.

JUDITH VERWEIJEN

Judith Verweijen prefaced her "future considerations" by insisting on the obvious: the army is a complex institution.

And this complexity must be reflected throughout.

1) Good management of integrations of armed groups.

Integration is not a uniformly bad thing. There have been good results yielded by army integrations in Burundi and South Africa for example. Unfortunately, integrations have obtained mixed results in the DRC.

If integrations are to be pursued, however, special attention has to be meritocracy and

training.

Negotiation prior to integrations are often conducted in total opacity, without any parliamentarian oversight. Transparency has to be inserted into this process.

Impunity. Care should be taken to avoid sending the wrong message of repeated amnesties and promotions of offenders.

The conundrum is that there wouldn't be any certainty of convincing rebels to get out of the jungle without some form of impunity.

Strike the right balance in transferring integrated soldiers in order to get at a geographical equilibrium. This could be done gradually as armed confrontations often break out when an armed group is moved from its turf.

Mitigate identity or ethnic tensions within the army.

In sum, integration isn't impossible though in the long term it should be discarded.

2) HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY OF THE ARMY

The Congolese soldier is poorly paid, has no paid leave, and lacks social benefits.

Military spouses often follow their husbands to the frontline where they live in squalid conditions. They do so because they can't get parts of the salaries of their husbands deployed on the frontline if they stay home. This issue of pay is crucial as famished soldiers can't be trained.

Elderly soldiers are still active because the government can't pay their retirement pensions.

TRAINING. Training only reaches an insignificant percentage of soldiers. For example, training programs seldom target leaders of "basic units" that are the hard core of the army.

JASON STEARNS adds that there are two kinds of donors' initiatives for the army: "top-down and bottom-up initiatives" which have obtained mixed results. Mobile tribunals for example are a good initiative. The major problem with those initiatives is that they aren't sustainable and collapse once funds are terminated. Besides, there's no coordination of efforts among donors. Donors' initiatives toward the Congolese police force have proved to be more successful.

***

Photo by Alex Engwete

Uganda likely fueling new M18 insurgency in Ituri

2013-10-30T06:33:00.001-04:00

PHOTO 1: Col. Fenekansi Mugyeni, then Commander of Uganda Battle Group (UGABAG) 11, flanked by relatives outside military court on March 27 after pleading not guilty to kidnapping renegade Congolese Lt. Col. Zackaria "Eric" Ndamira Ndozi, warlord & leader of M18.

***

PHOTO 2: Before his going rogue, Congolese Lt. Col. Zackaria "Eric" Ndamira Ndozi at Goli border crossing city in Uganda in 2010.

***

PHOTO 3: Gone rogue, M18 leader and FARDC Renegade Lt. Col. Ndamira Ngozi in the custody of Ugandan authorities after being freed from his abductors in March 2013.

*****

There's no other way to look at the new insurgency erupting in the Ituri district in the Orientale Province that has sent thousands of Congolese refugees streaming into Uganda in the last two days:

Uganda may be fueling the so-called M18 insurgency.

This notion isn't as tenuous as it would appear at first blush.

For one, just as along the border with Rwanda with the Congo, there are ethnic groups straddling Uganda and the DRC. And Uganda has played a damning role in the history of armed groups in the Ituri district of the DRC. Besides, Uganda, whose recent relations with the Congo have been swinging from contentious to outright open hostilities and back, has repeatedly been mentioned as another backer of M23.

Secondly, the timing.

Just when the M23 are in disarray and Prez Yoweri Museveni was in Kigali attending--alongside his Kenyan, South Sudanese and Rwandan counterparts (respectively Presidents Uhuru Kenyatta, Salva Kir Mayardit, and Paul Kagame)--the Integration Projects Summit, another Congolese ragtag rebel band, whose leader was not that long ago in the custody of Ugandan authorities, comes out of the woodwork to ignite a new insurgency on the borderlands, sending yet again thousands of Congolese refugees into Uganda.

Were these two traditional nemeses of the DRC concocting an Ituri contraption called M18 as a stopgap for the M23 debacle in North-Kivu Province?

Looking at the eerie saga of M18 warlord and former FARDC Lt. Col. Zackaria "Eric" Ndamira Ndozi--erstwhile military commander of the Mahagi border region--one is tempted to respond in the affirmative to the above question.

The saga starts in Kampala on March 16 of this year at around 9:00 (GMT + 3)) when, with some of his men, Ugandan Col. Fenekansi Mugyenyi--apparently and oddly extending a favor to Congolese military intelligence operators--"kidnapped" M18 warlord Zackaria "Eric" Ndamira Ndozi "from his home" in the neighborhood of Bunga (Makindye Division) in Kampala.

Col. Fenekansi Mugyenyi and his men then threw Lt. Col. Zackaria "Eric" Ndamira Ndozi into the trunk of their car and drove to the Ugandan border town of Arua with the intent of crossing into the Congo to hand the warlord to Congolese spooks.

By the way, Col. Fenekansi Mugyeni isn't just any other UPDF senior officer. At the time of this incident, Col. Fenekansi Mugyeni, 58, was the commander of the Uganda Battle Group (UGABAG) 11 about to be deployed to Somalia.

At any rate, that a well-known Congolese warlord would be allowed to own a house in Kampala and to roam freely on Ugandan territory is in itself a major pointer of direct collaboration between Ugandan authorities with seedy and seditious Congolese elements for the sole purpose of destabilizing the DRC.

According to the Kampala daily New Vision which was reporting on the court-martial of Col. Fenekansi Mugyeni held on March 27, "The media reported that Ndamira banged on the doors of the car in which he was being driven towards the border post between Uganda and Congo in Arua town, leading to the arrest of his alleged kidnappers."

(http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/641102-updf-officer-charged-with-kidnapping-congo-rebel.html)

Since then, Col. Fenekansi Mugyeni, though still free on bail awaiting the resumption of his trial before the General Court of Martial of the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF), has been stripped of his command.

As for his abductee, M18 warlord and renegade FARDCVLt. Col. Zackaria Ndamira Ndozi, Prez Yoweri Museveni has decided to loose that mad dog upon the Congo to kill and maim more expendable Congolese denizens.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photos by newvision.co.ug

Where M is for Murderers: As M23 are in disarray in North-Kivu, M18 erupt in Ituri

2013-10-28T07:48:00.001-04:00

(PHOTO: Congolese refugees fleeing M18 crowd the Bubukwanga refugee transit center in Uganda yesterday)

The tweep @ChangeIA (Change in Africa) exclaimed several hours ago in reaction to the Ugandan Daily Monitor story about a rebel outfit calling itself M18 that had "launched offensive attacks on [...] local communities" in Ituri that had resulted in hundreds of Congolese refugees crossing into Uganda: "apparently M=Murderer in #DRC."

(http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/500-refugees-enter-Uganda-as-fresh-fighting-erupts-in-Congo/-/688334/2049516/-/fotgh7/-/index.html)

Reading this comment, Sue Grafton's alphabet murder mysteries leaped to mind--except that here the ticking alphabet is forever stuck at the letter M, which is not for malice, but for mass murderers.

This particular copycat outfit, which also calls itself the United Congolese People's Army, apparently preys on the minority Kakwa speaking people saddling South Sudan, Uganda, and DRC.

According to the Ugandan daily New Vision, the leader of M18 used to live quietly in Kampala while carrying out his warmongering activities in the Congo:

"The M18 shot to the limelight on March 16, 2013 when their alleged leader, Lt. Col. Zachariah Ndamire Ndozi alias Eric, was abducted from him home in Bunga Makindye division in Kampala reportedly by officers commanded by UPDF soldier Col. Fenekansi Mugyeni to be secretly handed over to the Congolese intelligence officers."

Adding:

"The operation was scuttled when the abductors and Eric were intercepted in West Nile before his handover."

(http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/648848-thousands-of-congolese-flee-m18-attacks-to-uganda.html)

Well, Ituri residents would like to have the Ugandan government update them on the whereabouts of this murderous warlord...

Anyway, this fresh development casts a long shadow over the jubilation triggered by the recent debacle of M23. And some Kinshasa conspiracy theorists are already wondering whether this new "M" outfit wasn't expressly manufactured by the "international community" to ensure that the balkanization of the DRC keeps on track.

As one man quipped in a crowded taxi-bus this morning, "Pretty soon we'd be heading back to Kampala for peace talks with M18!"

.***

PHOTO CREDITS; Photo by Felix Basiime via monitor.co.ug

Collapse of Kampala empty talks: Of M23, Johnnie Carson & Kagame's Kivu heterotopia

2013-10-21T12:55:00.001-04:00

Kinshasa "Residents of the Republic" breathed a long sigh of relief when the auspicious news of the collapse of what the capital city's daily Le Potentiel called the never-ending "merry-go-round of Kampala talks."

I borrow the expression "Residents of the Republic"--from the French "Résidents de la République"--aptly coined by the late French songster Alain Bashung to describe Congolese "patriots" in contradistinction to M23 "terrorists" (Le Potentiel) who I personally like to call "Rwandan proxies of M23" or "doppelganger anticitizens," a phrase lifted from the essay "Naturing the Nation" by Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff.

But, behind and beyond M23 terrorists, obviously lurks Paul Kagame--with his crazy scheme of land grab in parts of the North Kivu Province of the DRC.

That this long-held scheme of the Rwandan President brooked no compromise could be seen through the reckless, cavalier attitude of his M23 minions at the negotiating table in Kampala. And their attitude was all the more maddening to Residents of the Republic as the Congolese government is footing all the hotel bills of M23 delegates as well as paying their outrageous stipends at Kampala! It therefore goes without saying that the collapse of these talks is most welcome news to folks here in Kinshasa.

The role of western countries (in the guise of the ubiquitous entity known as the "international community)--chief among them the United States--is also (mis)construed by the Congolese as supportive of Kagame's land grab objective, which is universally referred to in the DRC with the dreadful B-word of "Balkanization."

And, as it turns out, the State Department has to blame former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson for what will undoubtedly prove to be the longest lasting misunderstanding of the American diplomacy in the DRC.

During a presentation at the Brookings Institution titled "Finding a Lasting Solution to Instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" made on February 21 of this year, Ambassador Carson said:

"Clearly, a sophisticated and internationally-backed solution is the only way forward. We were able to achieve such a solution to end the conflict in the former Yugoslavia through the Dayton Accords. We were able to end Africa's longest running civil war, the conflict in Sudan, through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was negotiated by the IGAD states and supported by the United States, Norway, and Great Britain. A similarly energetic and international effort is now required for the DRC."

As the "sophisticated and internationally-backed solution" to conflicts in Yugoslavia and Sudan implied the partition of those states, the Le Potentiel's editorial mentioned hitherto takes Amb. Carson's suggestion--which it quotes at length, by the way--to mean that the US objective in the region is to break up or to "balkanize" the DRC--or, to quote the article, "the hypothesis of bartering a part of the national territory for peace."

(http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/95458)

In any event, something new and scary has emerged this time around in the long-drawn cycle of Rwandan-fueled "rebellions" followed by peace negotiations and integrations of erstwhile rebels into the Congolese national army and government.

It's the chilling realization that Rwanda has finally come out in the open to lay claim to vast swaths of the Congolese borderlands where, through its M23 proxies, it hopes to set up a "heterotopia"--a space of exclusive ethnic alterity, the mirror image of the tyrannical ethnic dictatorship across the border.

Hence, the ongoing "soft" ethnic cleansing in territories held by M23.

In July, for example, Human Rights Watch reported that, "M23 rebels have summarily executed at least 44 people and raped at least 61 women and girls since March 2013 in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo."

Since then M23 have upped the ante by looting and burning entire villages and by imposing forced labors of foxhole digging upon civilians in territories under their control, thus recently triggering the mass displacement of unwanted ethnic groups.

Emerging Sunday from the stalled Kampala talks, DRC Foreign Minister Raymond Tshibanda said:

"We are still ready as the delegation of the [DRC] government to continue this effort because we think that the quest for peace shall be a permanent and sustained effort."

But Kinois in the streets and in sidewalk bars of the Congolese capital, who've been spoiling for a fight for quite some time, are now keeping their fingers crossed for an all-out no-holds-barred apocalyptic war with M23 and Rwanda!

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Via Twitter account @FARDC13

Congolese to Museveni: You ain't nothing but a Bismarckian buffoon

2013-10-06T20:36:00.001-04:00

(Ugandan Prez Yoweri Museveni, accused by Congolese to be a Bismarckian buffoon)

***

The Congolese delegates to the Kampala talks with the Rwandan proxies of M23 seem to just have woken up from their naïveté about Ugandan Prez Yoweri Museveni and to the reality that Uganda and Rwanda are allies who both are actively planning the disappearance of the DRC.

And it appears these Congolese delegates have just realized what I've been saying all along on this blog, that Museveni was orchestrating a double-cross with his pal, Rwanda's Prez Paul Kagame, and their M23 henchmen to have the Congo properly screwed and balkanized.

In an interview with Radio-Okapi on October 3, François Mwamba--the DRC Coordinator of the follow-up of the Addis Ababa Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (February 2013)--waxed wroth not only at Crispus Kyonga, Uganda's Defense Minister and talks mediator, but at Museveni himself as well.

In early September, an extraordinary summit of heads of states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was convened by Museveni in Kampala just as armed clashes had flared up again between the FARDC and the Rwandan proxies of M23 near Goma.

In its final communique, the ICGLR heads of states ordered that the "Kampala dialogue resume within three days after this extraordinary summit and conclude within a maximum period of 14 days during which maximum restraint must be exercised on the ground to allow for talks to resume."

According to Mwamba, all this hullabaloo was all but a one-man-show Museveni had m.c.'ed for a twin purpose: 1) For his own image as a peacemaker at the UN General Assembly in New York; and 2) To so to speak stampede the Congolese into signing a peace agreement with M23 without reading all the damning points in the fine print.

One of those horrendous points in the fine print was that M23 should govern for a renewable 5-year period the vast swaths of the DRC territory under its control!

Said Mwamba:

"The famous fourteen days sprang a disappointment on us when we were called in Kampala, where a theater and a cosmetic show was set up. The only thing that interested [the Ugandans] was not that people had to lay down their weapons, it was not to add any pressure [on M23]. It was instead geared toward the kind of report that had to be presented in New York on September 23" at the United Nations General Assembly."

Mwamba added--"exasperated," according to Radio Okapi:

"They shoved us into a room, snapped pictures of us, crazy stuff like that, then finally we were given a so-called meeting agenda consisting of ten points" to sign.

Mwamba further said:

"Even if we've got to negotiate ten more years, no one would ever make us sign stuff of this nature."

He was teary-eyed when he added:

"No one can get us distracted at the brink of that fall--be that person called Museveni or somebody else!"

Others are more pungent in their attack against Museveni, accusing the Ugandan president of attempting to be a reincarnation of a Roman republic dictator.

"You, sir, ain't nothing but a Bismarckian buffoon," a Kinshasa politico called me out on Museveni.. He was obviously referring to the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who presided over the scramble for Africa in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1884...

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Via monitor.co.ug

Prez Paul Kagame rants against those who "accuse us of child soldiers"

2013-10-04T22:46:00.001-04:00

(Angry Rwandan Prez Paul Kagame reacts to the news of US freeze of funds for military assistance at swearing in ceremony of new MPS at Kigali, October 4, 2013)

***

You've got to give it to the man: Prez Paul Kagame never backs down. Nor would he ever say, "Oops, sorry!," when caught red-handed plundering natural resources in the DRC, sponsoring his M23 terrorist minions, or relocating thousands of his unwanted citizens in North-Kivu Province.

Just this past Thursday, October 3, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced that the Obama administration will be freezing in 2014 an undisclosed amount of funds slated for military assistance to Rwanda for the aggressive recruitment of child soldiers by its proxy outfit of M23 operating in eastern DRC.

Four other countries are hit by this freeze of funds: Burma, Central African Republic (CAR)--and strangely--Sudan and Syria!

Instead of acknowledging meddling into DRC internal affairs and vowing to stop supporting M23, Kagame doubled down on playing the ostrich for his support for the insurgents.

Speaking at the swearing-in ceremony of the newly elected (and appointed) MPs in Kigali on Friday, October 4, Kagame ranted at length against those who "accuse us of child soldiers whom we are not responsible for."

Kagame also railed against his two usual bogeymen: the FDLR and Gen. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, who now lives in exile in South Africa.

"They don't care about our children," he snarled. They care instead about "those murderers who live in the DRC [FDLR], in South Africa [Kayumba]."

Adding:

"The Rwandan spirit has never failed us. Under very heavy rain, the Rwandan spirit never dissolved, it got wet but not cold; under the scorching temperatures, it did not melt."

Whatever that means...

Kagame went on to say:

"I am not complaining, we're not naive, we are not naive...the spirit of Rwanda should be able to deliver us to another day, another week, another month, and many more years."

Kagame displays most definitely the mindset of an unhinged person...

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Via Paul Kagame Flickr Photostream

Rwandans deported from Tanzania are illegally resettled in M23-controlled areas of North-Kivu

2013-10-03T16:34:00.001-04:00

(Rwandans deported from Tanzania crossing into Rwanda with their cattle on

Sunday, September 8, 2013).

***

Thousands of people claiming to be Congolese refugees poured from Rwanda into North-Kivu Province in massive successive waves that started September 28.

The bulk of these "illegal refugees" are squatting at derelict leprosy hospital facilities in the hamlet of Chengerero, in the M23-controlled Rutshuru territory.

Hundreds of other "returnee families" coming from Rwanda have settled in neighboring hamlet of Kibumba in the neighboring administrative territory of Nyiragongo.

At his weekly presser of Wednesday, October 2, DRC Communications Minister Lambert Mende denounced this strange repatriation of "refugees" without prior notification to the Congolese government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Said Mende:

"We ask the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to enlighten us about this event since we've not been informed. It's inconceivable that a movement of return of refugees be undertaken without the prior knowledge of one of the signatories [of the tripartite accord DRC-Rwanda-UNHCR]. Now, the Congolese government wasn't informed."

North-Kivu Governor Julien Paluku saw in the move a nefarious design by Rwanda.

"These so-called refugees that arrived in the area controlled by M23 are none other than troops sent in to reinforce the ranks of M23 in preparation of their upcoming offensives," Gov. Paluku told the press Thursday, October 3.

But according to the Kinshasa daily Le Potentiel citing local sources in Rutshuru, these self-proclaimed Congolese are actually Rwandans deported from Tanzania in August and September and who've been redirected by the Rwandan government into North-Kivu.

And this isn't the first time Rwanda has literally deported thousands of its own citizens with their cattle into the Congolese territory.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photo by Timothy Kisambia via newtimes.co.rw

Kenya's bungled response to Westgate terrorist attack

2013-09-24T12:29:00.001-04:00

(PHOTO: al-Shabaab predators inside Westgate mall in Nairobi)

***

Three sets of facts clearly show that Kenyan authorities have bungled the response to the al-Shabaab terrorist attack on Westgate.

Firstly, by calling in special operators of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to respond to al-Shebaab attack at Westgate, Kenya amply demonstrated that it lacks a credible specialized antiterrorist police unit tactically trained and drilled to professionally deal decisively with such events.

Secondly, contradictory statements issued by various authorities evinced "amateur hour" big time and the need to establish a centralized emergency communications command able to brief the press and the public on unfolding events.

Thirdly, with each passing hour, it more and more appears that some of the al-Shabaab commandos might have escaped--either with the first wave of rescued shoppers who came out; or through other routes: ac vents or sewer conduits (if any)--leaving behind elements to cover their retreat.

(For more on this bungling, see http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/09/attack-kenya-0?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/claimscredibility)

This kind of first-response incompetence is quite common throughout Africa and needs to be urgently addressed by governments and their bilateral and multilateral partners. Ad-hoc assistance like the one allegedly provided at the scene at Westgate by the Israeli security operatives won't cut it.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Photo via news.com.au

Westgate Mall Terror Attack: Concern for my Nairobi friends and Outrage at Muslims who abandoned non-Muslims

2013-09-22T13:15:00.001-04:00

(PHOTO: A wounded woman screams for help at Westgate mall in Nairobi on Saturday, September 21)

***

As soon as a tweet alerted me yesterday to the terror unfolding at Nakumatt Westgate mall in the Westlands neighborhood of Nairobi, serious concern for my Kenyan and Congolese friends living in the Kenyan capital alternated in my mind with sheer raw outrage.

My concern and worry first....

I was all the more worried that I couldn't get through to my friend Jane Wanjiru, despite repeated calls placed on her Safaricom number.

Fortunately, by midday today (Kinshasa time), I was able to reach her. She was fine, she told me, as were others of our gang of friends in Nairobi.

With these friends, we had three haunts in Nairobi: the Nakumatt Westgate mall where the al-Shabaab terrorists unleashed Saturday what President Uhuru Kenyatta termed an "evil and cowardly act of terrorism"; the sprawling Village Market open-air mall (which also closed at around 3PM Nairobi time on Saturday though it wasn't attacked); and the Gipsy Bar nearby the targeted mall in Westlands where we used to share a "Tusker" baridi!

There is reportedly a final assault underway against the terrorists as I write this post, and let's hope the hostages held as human shields will be freed unscathed.

Then, this outrage...

Amid all the bravery and courage by ordinary Kenyans and expats on the scene of terror, there were also some cowardly and outrageous acts evinced by other denizens at Westgate.

Quoting the BBC:

"'They came and said: 'If you are Muslim, stand up. We've come to rescue you,' said Elijah Lamau.

"He said the Muslims left with their hands up, and then the gunmen shot two people."

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24191606)

Quoting The Independent:

"According to eye-witnesses, the gunmen told Muslims to leave the centre shortly before midday and said that non-Muslims would be targeted.

"Some claimed the attackers had asked, 'who is Prophet's mother?' in an attempt to discover non-Muslims. One man escaped by showing the attackers his ID with his name, Hakim, on it. Another reportedly failed to name the Prophet's mother and was killed."

(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-attack-security-forces-locked-in-standoff-with-up-to-15-armed-terrorists-in-nairobi-shopping-centre-8831413.html)

Well, Mr. Hakim and the other Muslims who behaved like you at Westgate, by following the orders of these killers instead of confronting them, you eschewed your humanity and accepted to share in the "bestiality"--to paraphrase President Kenyatta--of al-Shabaab assassins.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Noor Khamis/REUTERS

DRC First Lady Olive Lembe meets and invites Pope Francis to Kinshasa

2013-09-17T19:29:00.001-04:00

(PHOTO: DRC First Lady Olive Lembe di Sita Kabila, center, presents her letter to His Holiness Pope Francis in the Vatican, Wednesday, September 11)

***

DRC First Lady Olive Lembe di Sita met with Pope Francis in the Vatican on Wednesday, September 11.

Olive Lembe, who goes in Kinshasa by the moniker Maman-Capable, took that opportunity to present to His Holiness a letter, which conveyed her impassioned plea in behalf of the Congolese people--especially those in the east suffering "all kinds of atrocities" caused by "many unjust wars."

Maman-Capable also took that opportunity by asking His Holiness "to grant us the joy of visiting us on the earliest occasion."

She also asked "His Holiness for the intercession of prayer for lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

Amen!

But, uncannily,when I read that part of Maman-Capable's letter, I couldn't help thinking of John Fogerty's memorable lines from "Change in the Weather":

"Down on your knees, go ahead and pray/

But every demon has to have his day."

***

PHOTO CREDITS: Via groupelavenir.cd

Majority of Kinois uninterested in National Consultations

2013-09-16T10:02:00.001-04:00

(PHOTO 1: Kinois reading newspapers in April 2012)

(PHOTO 2: Opposition MP Jean-Pierre Lisanga Bonganga)

***

At midday this Monday September 16, Speaker Aubin Minaku opened this year's second session of the National Assembly in the presence of both houses convening in congress, of members of diplomatic missions accredited to Kinshasa, and of Justin Koumba--speaker of the National Assembly of Congo-Brazzaville--who also delivered a long-drawn-out speech as the parliamentary special guest.

Though this session has to deal mainly with budgetary matters, this September session, as Speaker Minaku reminded the audience, is taking place in a "particular context": it overlaps with the National Consultations in which are taking part 85 members of Parliament; and the ongoing aggression by the Rwandan proxies of M23.

These proceedings were carried live on all state-owned television channels of the "RTNC" system, though I'd surmise that most Kinois watching TV at the time didn't actually bother to follow these droning speeches, but flipped through channels to catch some Nollywood yarn.

My surmise is somehow validated by today's publication of the opinion survey of Kinshasa denizens on the National Consultations carried out by the daily "La Prospérité" and the polling company "Les Points"--though the poll results have to be taken with a grain of salt as the methodology the survey wasn't detailed.

Be that as it may, the survey finds that a whopping "70% of Kinois polled don't follow the conduct of business [in the National Consultations]. In the 22% that are interested in them, only 9% said they were following on a continuous basis as opposed to 13% that follow in an occasional manner."

(http://www.laprosperiteonline.net/affi_article.php?id=337&rubrique=POLITIQUE)

This poll could even be part of the national trend.

Charly Kasereka, who blogs from Goma, claims--albeit without taking any survey--that "90%" of the city residents aren't pleased with the way these National Consultations are conducted, and accuses Kinshasa politicians to have hijacked the proceedings for financial gains. (Each participant is paid a daily stipend of $400!)

(http://actudukivu.blogspot.com/2013/09/concertations-nationales-kinshasa-ou.html?m=1)

Amid this universal indifference laced with acrimony, a controversy erupted last Thursday within the thematic group "Disarmament, demobilization, social reintegration and/or repatriation of armed groups" that risked snarling the proceedings of that group altogether.

In that "thematic group," opposition MP Jean-Pierre Lisanga Bonganga questioned the absence of the very culprits, that is, representatives of armed groups (including the M23); refused to be lectured by so-called "experts on armed groups"; and threatened to pull out from the talks if this question wasn't solved.

The Presidium--Speaker Aubin Minaku and Senate President Léon Kengo wa Dondo--went to Hotel Invest, the venue where this group was meeting, and convinced MP Lisanga Bonganga to continue attending while this matter of the actual participation of armed groups was still pending.

But MP Lisanga Bonganga remains unyielding and threatens to withdraw from the National Consultations barring the personal intervention of Congo-Brazzaville's President Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

In the streets, people who'd even bother to speak about the consultations, shake their head in disbelief and excoriate the profiteering political class.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: John Bompengo via radiookapi.net

Kinshasa: More outrage swirls around resumption of Kampala talks with M23

2013-09-14T00:05:00.001-04:00

(PHOTO: Lt Col Olivier Hamuli, North-Kivu FARDC spokesperson, talking to Reuters at Mutaho, near Goma, July 6, 2013)

***

There's more outrage swirling around the ill-timed resumption of the Kampala talks between the DRC government and the Rwandan proxies of M23.

Ill-timed because the talks being held in Kampala somehow coincide with the National Consultations in Kinshasa.

And these consultations have once more caused a political rift, making simmering tension to flare up.

In Kinshasa, two main political camps have dug their heels in: those attending the consultations (the ruling majority and a section of the opposition, including Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC) and the "radical" oppositionists who are boycotting this forum (Etienne Tshisekedi's UDPS, Vital Kamerhe's UNC, etc.).

The radicals scold the government for talking to M23 and bandy around its compliance with the resolutions of the ICGLR as illustrative of its listless leadership.

And MP Clément Kanku--leader of the opposition party "Mouvement pour le Renouveau" (MR)--has even blamed these talks with M23, among other rationales, for his pulling out of the National Consultations.

In a scathing communiqué released in Kinshasa on September 10, MP Kanku--who participated in the preparatory phase of the National Consultations and even sat through Kabila's opening address--states:

"While the presidential decree of the Head of State convening national consultations was steeped on national cohesion in order to face the war in the east of the country, we now learn that, at the same time, our government is implementing the dictates of the ICGLR, which forces it to return to the negotiating table with the same negative force that has since been labeled a 'terrorist movement' by the United States of America.

"Today, we can legitimately wonder about the worthiness of resolutions that could be obtained through the National Consultations compared to those coming from Kampala."

Obviously, just like many who feed on rumors from Radio-Trottoir, MP Kanku didn't bother to check the US State Department up-to-date list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

If he did, he'd have found out that there was only one single addition so far this year to the FTOs list dating back to March 22: the Malian Tuareg Islamist group Ansar al-Dine (ADD).

But MP Kanku's confusion could have also been caused by the DRC government's own talking points--oft repeated and disseminated by Communications Minister Lambert Mende--which have kept systematically (and rightly) referring to the M23 as a terrorist organization....

As usual, each time M23 delegates show up at Kampala, they run some novel wacky claims up the flagpole--as if these terrorists would continue forever playing their macabre game.

They had even the gall to pretend they got legitimate "ideological demands" other than their base motives of plunder of resources and shakedowns of civilians.

And M23 claim they only got left three small demands to the DRC government: 1) Disarm the FDLR; 2) Allow thousands of people claiming to be Congolese refugees in Rwanda to return en masse to the Congo (with thousands of their cows); and, last and not least, 3) Set up a buffer zone between the FARDC and the territory occupied by M23!

Lt Col Olivier Hamuli, FARDC North-Kivu spokesman, brushed off the first one of these three frivolous demands, saying, as quoted by the daily "L'Avenir":

"In the meantime, the M23 have just spent more than a year in Rutshuru and Nyiragongo. We still have to hear in the news that M23 have clashed with the FDLR. Not once!"

Adding:

"The FDLR are at Katemba. It's nearby Kiwanja, which [M23] control."

And yet not a single shot is fired!...

Lt Col Hamuli went further to claim that this past February, during the clashes that pitted two M23 factions, the "Makenga faction" and the FDLR were coalitionists. "We got proofs" to back up this allegation, he said.

The two other demands also got the same kind of brushoff from the Congolese delegation in Kampala as pretexts made out of whole cloth to derail the talks, maintain the status quo, and accommodate Rwanda--which got in on the ground floor anyway!

Besides the mercurial M23 delegates and their frivolous demands, the Ugandan government keeps thumbing its nose at its Congolese counterpart in Kampala.

The most recent outrage proffered by Uganda was to suggest to the DRC via the media to have M23 reintegrated into the FARDC.

Ofwono Opendo, Ugandan government's spokesman, told VOA the other day about "the need for the Congolese government to accept them [M23], and if possible perhaps re-integrate the fighting forces into the main stream army; demobilization of those who want to surrender and go home and do other things, and the third issue is not giving amnesty to those who have been indicted with serious war crimes [and] crimes against humanity."

Really!

Maybe--just maybe--UNSG Special Envoy Mary Robinson didn't anticipate that her candid plea to give political negotiations a chance would turn into this charade that's now playing out at Kampala.

***

PHOTO CREDITS: REUTERS/Chrispin Mvano

Nine Eleven: Twin Sundown (Olga Vargas)

2013-09-11T00:17:00.001-04:00

Artist: Olga Vargas

Title: Twin Sundown (New York Twin Towers)

Dimensions: 60WX36H

Material: Collage on Canvas

Credits: 911memorial.org

Via: olgavargasartist.com