Notes on Philippine Laws

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]

2015-03-29T09:39:00.001-07:00

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

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RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case DIgest [G.R. No. 192474]

2015-03-29T09:37:00.000-07:00

FACTS:

While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del Norte, Petitioner, Romeo Jalosjos sought the transfer of his voter's registration record to Precint 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Dan Erasmo filed a petition with the MCTC which rendered judgement excluding Jalosjos from the list of voters in question on the ground that he did not abandon his domicile in Tampilasan and is still the incumbent mayor.

Jalosjos appealed the decision to the RTC but the MCTC ruling was affirmed.

Through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, Jalosjos elevated the case to the CA. His application was granted and his name was reinstated in the voter's list pending resolution of the petition.

Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 2010 national elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition with the COMELEC to deny or cancel said COC. His petition was denied by the COMELEC for insufficiency in form and substance.

Pending Erasmo's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Jalosjos won the elections and was proclaimed representative.

Meanwhile, CA rendered in his favor judgement on the pending petition. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA's decision before the Supreme Court.

Thereafter, COMELEC en banc granted Erasmo's motion anf declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as representative for not satisfying the residency requirement because of his incumbency as mayor of Tampilisan.

Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Jalosjos’ residency qualification considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

RULING:

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.

After Jalosjos' proclamation, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

On election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the Second Division’s dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC’s Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC’s failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.

Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent COMELEC En Banc’s order, and REINSTATES the Commission’s Second Division resolution

COMELEC v. Noynay Case Digest [G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998]

2015-03-29T08:03:00.001-07:00

FACTS:

Pursuant to a minute resolution by the COMELEC on October 29, 1996, nine informations for violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar.

In an Order issued on August 25, 1997, public respondent, presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.

All the accused are uniformly charged for Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Motions for reconsiderations filed by the COMELEC have been denied. Petitioners then filed the instant petition.

In its Manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General, it is “adopting” the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent “are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.”

Public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.

ISSUE:

Whether R.A. No. 7691 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

RULING:

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.

In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the court held that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.

Instant petition is GRANTED

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Enrique B. Inting Case Digest [G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990]

2015-03-29T07:03:00.000-07:00

FACTS:

On February 6, 1988, A Permanent Nursing Attendant filed a complaint against OIC-Mayor with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her to a very remote barangay and without prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC.

After a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Election Supervisor, a prima facie case was found.

On September 26, 1988, a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor was filed with the respondent court for violation of Sec. 261 Par. (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed a bail at five thousand pesos (P 5, 000) as recomended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

However, before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its decision on the ground that the Provincial Election Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec. 2 Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Provincial Election Supervisor fifteen (15) days from receipt to file another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Upon failure to comply with the order, the information was quashed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

RULING:

The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.

The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. The former, which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. The latter is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding election offenses.

Article IX C Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).

Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation.

It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:

Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

It is apparant that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.

The instant petition is GRANTED.

People v. Delgado Case Digest [G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990]

2015-03-29T06:26:00.001-07:00

FACTS:

COMELEC received reports agains private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting a preliminary investigation on said report, The Provincial Election Supervisor found a prima facie case and recommended filing of an information against each respondents for violation of Sec. 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc, in a minute resolution, resolved to file information against the private respondents.

Informations were filed against the respondents in the RTC. The Regional Election Director was designated by COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. RTC ordered the reinvestigation of the case and the suspension of the service of the warrants pending submission of the reinvestigation report of the COMELEC.

COMELEC prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that only the Supreme Court can review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but was denied.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not only the Supreme Court can review orders of the COMELEC.

2. Whether or not the respondent court has the authority to order the reinvestigation of the case and to order the COMELEC Law Department to furnish said respondent the records of the preliminary investigation of the case for the purpose of determining probable cause.

RULING:

First Issue

The Court held that "what is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions brought before it are subject to judicial review only by this Court.

However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices." Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."

Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."

From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.

Second Issue

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.

The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. Thus, Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Philippines in this proceeding. The consent of the Office of the Solicitor General should have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

2015-03-29T04:34:00.001-07:00

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Ruling in the case of SAMSUNG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PHILIPPINES, INC. v. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND COURT OF APPEALS

2015-03-11T22:52:00.000-07:00

1.) The general rule is to the effect that a forged signature is “wholly inoperative,” and payment made “through or under such signature” is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. If payment is made, the drawee cannot charge it to the drawer’s account. The traditional justification for the result is that the drawee is in a superior position to detect a forgery because he has the maker’s signature and is expected to know and compare it. The rule has a healthy cautionary effect on banks by encouraging care in the comparison of the signatures against those on the signature cards they have on file. Moreover, the very opportunity of the drawee to insure and to distribute the cost among its customers who use checks makes the drawee an ideal party to spread the risk to insurance.

2.) When a person deposits money in a general account in a bank, against which he has the privilege of drawing checks in the ordinary course of business, the relationship between the bank and the depositor is that of debtor and creditor. So far as the legal relationship between the two is concerned, the situation is the same as though the bank had borrowed money from the depositor, agreeing to repay it on demand, or had bought goods from the depositor, agreeing to pay for them on demand. The bank owes the depositor money in the same sense that any debtor owes money to his creditor. Added to this, in the case of bank and depositor, there is, of course, the bank’s obligation to pay checks drawn by the depositor in proper form and presented in due course. When the bank receives the deposit, it impliedly agrees to pay only upon the depositor’s order. When the bank pays a check, on which the depositor’s signature is a forgery, it has failed to comply with its contract in this respect. Therefore, the bank is held liable.

3.) The fact that the forgery is a clever one is immaterial. The forged signature may so closely resemble the genuine as to defy detection by the depositor himself. And yet, if a bank pays the check, it is paying out its own money and not the depositor’s.

4.) “A bank is bound to know its depositors’ signature.”

5.) The deposit contract between a payor bank and its customer determines who can draw against the customer’s account by specifying whose signature is necessary on checks that are chargeable against the customer’s account. Therefore, a check drawn against the account of an individual customer that is signed by someone other than the customer, and without authority from her, is not properly payable and is not chargeable to the customer’s account, inasmuch as any “unauthorized signature on an instrument is ineffective” as the signature of the person whose name is signed.

6.) Under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, forgery is a real or absolute defense by the party whose signature is forged. On the premise that Jong’s signature was indeed forged, FEBTC is liable for the loss since it authorized the discharge of the forged check. Such liability attaches even if the bank exerts due diligence and care in preventing such faulty discharge. Forgeries often deceive the eye of the most cautious experts; and when a bank has been so deceived, it is a harsh rule which compels it to suffer although no one has suffered by its being deceived. The forgery may be so near like the genuine as to defy detection by the depositor himself, and yet the bank is liable to the depositor if it pays the check.

7.) A document formally presented is presumed to be genuine until it is proved to be fraudulent. In a forgery trial, this presumption must be overcome but this can only be done by convincing testimony and effective illustrations.

8.) On the CA's ruling that forgery was not proved during the trial due to the conflicting conclusions made by handwriting experts from the NBI and the PNP:

This reasoning is pure sophistry. Any litigator worth his or her salt would never allow an opponent’s expert witness to stand uncontradicted, thus the spectacle of competing expert witnesses is not unusual. The trier of fact will have to decide which version to believe, and explain why or why not such version is more credible than the other. Reliance therefore cannot be placed merely on the fact that there are colliding opinions of two experts, both clothed with the presumption of official duty, in order to draw a conclusion, especially one which is extremely crucial. Doing so is tantamount to a jurisprudential cop-out.

9.) The crucial fact in question is whether or not the check was forged, not whether the bank could have detected the forgery. The latter issue becomes relevant only if there is need to weigh the comparative negligence between the bank and the party whose signature was forged.

10.) The bare fact that the forgery was committed by an employee of the party whose signature was forged cannot necessarily imply that such party’s negligence was the cause for the forgery. Employers do not possess the preternatural gift of cognition as to the evil that may lurk within the hearts and minds of their employees.

11.) Jong did testify that his accountant, Kyu, kept the checks inside a “safety box,” and no contrary version was presented by FEBTC. However, such testimony cannot prove that the checks were indeed kept in a safety box, as Jong’s testimony on that point is hearsay, since Kyu, and not Jong, would have the personal knowledge as to how the checks were kept.

12.) Still, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can conclude that there was no negligence on Samsung Construction’s part. The presumption remains that every person takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that the ordinary course of business has been followed. Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. While the complaint was lodged at the instance of Samsung Construction, the matter it had to prove was the claim it had alleged - whether the check was forged. It cannot be required as well to prove that it was not negligent, because the legal presumption remains that ordinary care was employed.

13.) Thus, it was incumbent upon FEBTC, in defense, to prove the negative fact that Samsung Construction was negligent. While the payee, as in this case, may not have the personal knowledge as to the standard procedures observed by the drawer, it well has the means of disputing the presumption of regularity. Proving a negative fact may be “a difficult office,” but necessarily so, as it seeks to overcome a presumption in law. FEBTC was unable to dispute the presumption of ordinary care exercised by Samsung Construction, hence we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals’ finding of negligence.

14.) The assailed Decision replicated the extensive efforts which FEBTC devoted to establish that there was no negligence on the part of the bank in its acceptance and payment of the forged check. However, the degree of diligence exercised by the bank would be irrelevant if the drawer is not precluded from setting up the defense of forgery under Section 23 by his own negligence.

15.) Quite palpably, the general rule remains that the drawee who has paid upon the forged signature bears the loss. The exception to this rule arises only when negligence can be traced on the part of the drawer whose signature was forged, and the need arises to weigh the comparative negligence between the drawer and the drawee to determine who should bear the burden of loss. The Court finds no basis to conclude that Samsung Construction was negligent in the safekeeping of its checks. For one, the settled rule is that the mere fact that the depositor leaves his check book lying around does not constitute such negligence as will free the bank from liability to him, where a clerk of the depositor or other persons, taking advantage of the opportunity, abstract some of the check blanks, forges the depositor’s signature and collect on the checks from the bank. And for another, in point of fact Samsung Construction was not negligent at all since it reported the forgery almost immediately upon discovery.

16.) It is accepted that a forged signature of the drawer differs in treatment than a forged signature of the indorser.

17.) The justification for the distinction between forgery of the signature of the drawer and forgery of an indorsement is that the drawee is in a position to verify the drawer’s signature by comparison with one in his hands, but has ordinarily no opportunity to verify an indorsement.

18.) Thus, a drawee bank is generally liable to its depositor in paying a check which bears either a forgery of the drawer’s signature or a forged indorsement. But the bank may, as a general rule, recover back the money which it has paid on a check bearing a forged indorsement, whereas it has not this right to the same extent with reference to a check bearing a forgery of the drawer’s signature.

19.) Consequently, if a bank pays a forged check, it must be considered as paying out of its funds and cannot charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor. A bank is liable, irrespective of its good faith, in paying a forged check.

Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment

2015-02-22T06:29:00.001-08:00

Allied Banking Corp. v. South Pacific Sugar Corp. (as cited in the case of Santiago and Tanchan v. Allied Banking Corporation G.R. No. 164510)

"Such general averment will not suffice to support the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. It is necessary to recite in what particular manner an applicant for writ of attachment was defrauded."

"...in this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed."

"...written contracts x x x are presumed to have been entered into for a sufficient consideration."

Ng Wee v. Tankiansee (as cited in the case of Santiago and Tanchan v. Allied Banking Corporation G.R. No. 164510)

"The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show the respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit x x x is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment."

Santiago and Tanchan v. Allied Banking Corporation G.R. No. 164510

"...rules require that for the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual circumstances manifesting that the debtor practices fraud upon the creditor at the time of the execution of their agreement in that said debtor had a pre-conceived plan or intention not to pay the creditor. Being a state of mind, fraud cannot be merely inferred from a bare allegation of non-payment of debt or non-performance of obligation."

"...the requirement [to prove fraud] becomes all the more stringent when the application for preliminary attachment is directed against a defendant officer of a defendant corporation [in this case, a surety and principal debtor], for it will not be inferred from the affiliation of one to the other that the officer participated in or facilitated in any fraudulent practice attributed to the corporation."

Claim for damages:

"A wrongful attachment may give rise to liability for moral damages but evidence must be adduced not only for the torment and humiliation brought upon the defendant by the attaching party but also the latter's bad faith or malice in causing the wrongful attachment, such as evidence that the latter deliberately made false statements in its application for attachment. Absent such evidence of malice, that attaching party cannot be held liable for moral damages."

Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals (as cited in the case of Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115678)

"To sustain an attachment on this ground [fraud], it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay x x x. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case."

Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115678

",,,fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted obligation cannot be inferred from the debtor's inability to pay or comply with the obligations."

"...fraud may be gleaned from a preconceived plan or intention not to pay."

"...the lower court should have conducted a hearing and required private petitioner to substantiate its allegation of fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation."

"...not only was petitioner's application defective for having merely given general averments, what is worse, there was no hearing to afford private respondents an opportunity to ventilate their side, in accordance with due process, in order to determine the truthfulness of the allegations of petitioner."

"Time and again, we have held that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly against the applicants. The stringency is required because the remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature. If all requisites for the granting of the writ are not present, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction."

D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc. v. Nicolas (as cited in the case of Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115678)

"There is thus the necessity of giving to private respondents an opportunity to ventilate their side in a hearing, in accordance with due process, in order to determine the truthfulness of the allegations."

Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)

2015-02-06T19:34:00.000-08:00

FACTS:

In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.

The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."

On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period set forth by R.A. 8189.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in every national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.

R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.

In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.

With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the petitioners had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.

As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DOMINGO R. DANDO G.R. No. 177456 September 4, 2009 (Case Digest)

2014-12-14T23:05:00.000-08:00

FACTS:

The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages by BPI against Dando before the RTC.Dando availed of a loan in the amount of P750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), BPI's predecessor in interest. Dando defaulted in the payment and despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation.

After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. The RTC issued a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, which directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial.

Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief on time while BPI filed its Pre-trial Breif with the RTC and furnished Dando with a copy thereof on the very day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. Dando then moved for the dismmissal of the case on the ground of late filing of the Pre-trial Brief. RTC granted Dando’s Motion to Dismiss.

BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC which reconsidered and set aside it former order. Dando filed a Motion for Reconsideration

but was denied.

Dando sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. CA held that BPI's excuse is too flimsy to justify the reversal of an earlier order dismissing the action. The BPI did not come forward with the most convincing reason for the relaxation of the rules, or has not shown any persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules. The RTC decision was ANNULLED and SET ASIDE by the CA.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION, CORRECT WHEN IT STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

RULING:

It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as “shall,” “must,” or “ought” are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word “shall” is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.

x x x However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. x x x This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.

In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

x x x The substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure, more so, since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes only the amount of his outstanding liability to BPI. To dismiss the case with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had lent to Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.

x x x BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set the case for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando’s Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing the case.

Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing of the case, as he is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

Negative Pregnant Denial

2014-12-14T21:59:00.000-08:00

A denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

ZENAIDA POLANCO, et al vs. CARMEN CRUZ, represented by her attorney-in-fact, VIRGILIO CRUZ G.R. No. 182426 February 13, 2009 (Case Digest)

2014-12-14T21:55:00.001-08:00

FACTS:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent Carmen Cruz, through her attorney-in-fact, Virgilio Cruz, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for allegedly destroying her palay crops. While admitting that petitioners own the agricultural land she tilled, respondent claimed she was a lawful tenant thereof and had been in actual possession when petitioners maliciously filled so with soil and palay.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners simultaneously filed an Answer to the complaint and a Motion for Reconsideration. The court a quo denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case due to respondent’s failure to prosecute.

With the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which granted the appeal.

CA ruled that, since filing the Complaint, respondent filed an Opposition to petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, an Answer to petitioners’ counterclaim, and a Comment to petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration; that respondent did not ignore petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss nor did she repeatedly fail to appear before the court; that no substantial prejudice would be caused to petitioners and that strict application of the rule on dismissal is unjustified considering the absence of pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case on the part of respondent; and that justice would be better served if the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and final disposition

Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration; hence, this petition.

Petitioners allege that respondent failed to comply with the mandate of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to promptly move for the setting of the case for pre-trial; that “heavy pressures of work” does not justify the failure to move for the setting of the case for pre-trial;

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS NULLIFYING AND/OR REVERSING AND/OR SETTING ASIDE THE ORDERS ISSUED BY THE RTC-BULACAN IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.

RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to promptly move ex parte to have the case set for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 17 provides that failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with said duty without any justifiable cause may result to the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules of procedure.

It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the dismissal of respondent’s complaint is too severe a sanction for her failure to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial. It must be pointed out that respondent prosecuted her action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch since filing the complaint – she filed an opposition to petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint; a comment to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order of the trial court; and an Answer to Counterclaim of petitioners. When the trial court issued an order dismissing the case, respondent filed without delay a motion for reconsideration; and upon its denial, she immediately filed a Notice of Appeal. Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ claim that respondent was silent for one year since she filed her Answer to Counterclaim until the trial court’s dismissal order, records show that between said period, both parties and the trial court were threshing out petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order.

x x x unlike the respondents in the said case, herein respondent never failed to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the trial court at any other time. Failing to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial was her first and only technical lapse during the entire proceedings. Neither has she manifested an evident pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case nor a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the parties are given the full opportunity to litigate their claims and the real issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. Besides, petitioners would not be prejudiced should the case proceed as they are not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. Indeed, on several occasions, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their cases. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.

Finally, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the new Guidelines To Be Observed By Trial Court Judges And Clerks Of Court In The Conduct Of Pre-Trial And Use Of Deposition-Discovery Measures, which took effect on August 16, 2004, aims to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets, and to further implement the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC states that: “Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.” As such, the clerk of court of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos should issue a notice of pre-trial to the parties and set the case for pre-trial.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED

FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005 (CASE DIGEST)

2014-11-16T19:06:00.000-08:00

FACTS:

Petitioner FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC alleging that the respondent by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon depriving the petitioner of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the boundary line.

The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno (respondent's brother), who received the same.

The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.

The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Respondent claimed she was a resident of Oslo, Norway and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.

In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent considering that she left the Philippines for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the respondent. Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in rem.

RULING:

The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and complaint by the Sheriff:

In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.

In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :

… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.

In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and OrlandoMacasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house.

In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

LAURENCE M. SISON vs. EUSEBIA CARIAGA (G.R. No. 177847 - July 31, 2009) CASE DIGEST

2014-11-16T15:48:00.000-08:00

FACTS:

Teofilo Sison and his son Nelson purchased from the Land Bank of the Philippines a parcel of land situated in Barangay Cabuaan, Bautista, Pangasinan.

On December 14, 1999, Teofilo and Nelson donated, via a Deed of Donation, the 11 lots into which Lot 23-B was subdivided in favor of Laurence Sison (petitioner) and his therein named siblings.

After a relocation/verification survey of the subject lot, it was found out that the house of Eusebia Cariaga (respondent) was erected thereon, hence, petitioner, as co-owner, repeatedly demanded the vacation thereof by respondent, the last of which was by a September 15, 2003 letter informing her that her occupation of the subject lot was illegal and merely tolerated. The demands were, however, unheeded.

Petitioner as co-owner of the subject lot thus filed on January 19, 2004 a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Alcala, Pangasinan.By Decision of September 7, 2004, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner ruling that given respondent’s virtual admission of occupancy of the subject lot and of her failure to substantiate her claim of ownership, the nature of her possession is possession without title, while petitioner has the title but without possession.

On appeal by respondent, the RTC reversed the MCTC decision.The RTC held that petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that respondent’s occupation of the subject lot was merely tolerated, hence, the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement to constitute a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer.Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court affirmed the RTC decision, holding that the tolerance which petitioner claimed was not present from the inception of respondent’s possession of the subject lot, for prior to petitioner and his co-owner’s acquisition thereof via donation in 1999, respondent, who constructed her house in “1972,” was already in peaceful and prior possession thereof.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of May 8, 2007, he filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether or not unlawful detainer was the proper remedy in the case at bar.

RULING:

The nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction over it are determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. They cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the Answer or pleadings filed by the defendant, and neither can they be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties.

X X X

Clearly, petitioner’s complaint established the basic elements of a complaint for unlawful detainer to vest jurisdiction over it in the MCTC.

That respondent has, in her Answer, claimed that her father owned the lot on which her house stands did not render the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissible, for the issue of ownership may, in an ejectment case, be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

On the merits, by respondent and her siblings’ filing before the DARAB of a petition for annulment of the sale of Lot 23-B by the Land Bank to petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest Teofilo and Nelson Sison and for them (respondent and her siblings) to purchase said lot, respondent effectively admitted the ownership of petitioner and his co-owners of the subject lot which forms part of Lot 23-B, and that her house indeed stands on the subject lot. On that score, the Court finds for petitioner.

Decision of Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO and ALEJO DOPEÑO vs. HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, et al G.R. No. 164560

2014-11-15T21:58:00.000-08:00

FACTS:

Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a Complaint against herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

Private respondents alleged that subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property. It was further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged property was spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to surrender possession of subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss said complaint on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The MeTC then issued an Order dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property of small value. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 was denied.

Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87. However, in its Decision dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and possession of real property located in Quezon City, with an assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by petitioners, but was denied in an Order dated July 3, 2003.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same. In the assailed CA Resolution dated September 15, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they should have availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal was denied per Resolution dated June 1, 2004.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, be reversed and set aside.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND FOR FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE CERTIORARI REGARDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF A CASE OF ACCION REINVINDICATORIA.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF (SIC) JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN RESOLVING THAT A CASE OF ACCION REINVINDICATORIA IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT MANUEL TARO AS PRESIDING JUDGE MeTC, BRANCH 42, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SO TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE COMPLAINT FOR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA IN CIVIL CASE NO. 27434 ENTITLED, “HEIRS OF SPS. APOLONIO V. DIONISIO AND VALERIANA DIONISIO, ETC. VS. ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO, ET. AL.”

RULING:

The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have been entertained from the very beginning.

The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, in Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded as follows:

The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct remedy.

x x x x

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained – remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by Petition for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and the instant petition must, therefore, fail.

For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.

Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for review on certiorari had lapsed by the time the instant petition was filed, the assailed CA Resolutions have attained finality.

Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,[12] to wit:

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve “title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.”

x x x x

x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."

Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, dated September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968

2014-11-15T21:17:00.000-08:00

FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents. [G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999] Case Digest

2014-07-29T09:42:00.000-07:00

FACTS:

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber.

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents:

Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
Sales Invoice;
Delivery Receipt; and
Tally Sheets.

Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.

On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.

On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.

On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representatives x x x".

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989.

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was also denied for the same reason.

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.

On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.

As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.

RULING:

Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.

It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.

Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.

First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by the private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of their properties.

Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of court could be committed.

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents against petitioners.

PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V. AGUILAR [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001] Case Digest

2014-07-29T04:18:00.001-07:00

FACT:

On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While the cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying documents where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended, against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.

On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks, through the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them.

Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L Hadja and to prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard. According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties. Moreover, complainant pointed out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within the five day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ, thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying the integrity of said evidence.

Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was premature since there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment and neither did the DENR issue a seizure report.

Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard to prevent the departure of subject vessel since he does not have the means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from a legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order. Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999, recommended that the judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and that the charges against respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence for issuing the writ of replevin.

RULING:

The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These allegations would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances involved in the offense.

It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body of special competence.

The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.

On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.

Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is dismissed for lack of merit.

Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom, petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla, respondents Case Digest (349 SCRA 483)

2014-07-15T08:38:00.000-07:00

This petition for review seeks for reversal of the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling, Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original Title Certificate in his name.

On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola, who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.

On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their predecessor-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the name of the petitioners.

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the DENR dismissed Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for the revocation and cancellation of its title.

On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject land and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES:

What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action on the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?

RULING:

Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority to dispose public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree. Thus, reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in error.

DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.

Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.

Garingan vs. Garingan Case Digest (455 SCRA 480)

2014-07-15T07:05:00.001-07:00

FACTS:

Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, et al., herein respondents, alleged that their grandfather Sauri Moro owned an agricultural lot, fully panted with coconut and other fruit bearing trees, containing an area of 11.3365 hectares. Saupi Moro acquired the land through purchase from Gani Moro. Saupi Moro then donated the land to his daughter Insih Saupi, mother of Hadji Munib, et al. and petitioner Haymaton S. Garingan.

After the death of Saupi Moro in 1954, Haymaton and and husband Pawaki, who was also known as Djayari Moro, herein petitioners, took over the administration of the land. Later, petitioners declared the land, then still untitled, in their names for taxation purposes. Petitioners refused to share with the respondents the income from the sale of fruits from the land. Petitioners claimed that on 22 September 1969, Pawaki alleged that he bought the land from Jikirum M. Adjaluddin (Jikirum) and a TCT was issued in the name of Djayari Moro. Pawaki took possession of the land in the concept of an owner in the same year. He declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675.

Respondents filed an action for Partition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against petitioners with the Shari'a District Court, Third Shari'a Judicial District, Zamboanga City. The Shari'a District Court then ordered to partition the land in equal shares among the respondents and their sister petitioner. Each of them was entitled to one-fourth share of the aforesaid property. The TCT in the name of Djayari Moro was ordered annulled and cancelled, and, in lieu thereof the Office of the Register of Deeds of Basilan City was ordered to issue a new TCT in the names of the respondents and their sister petitioner. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated 19 July 2000.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Shari'a District Court erred in ordering the partition of the subject property and annulment of the Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis alone of respondents' claim that Saupi Moro, their predecessor-in-interest, was the one who owned the said parcel of land during his lifetime, thereby disregarding the protection accorded to the persons dealing with property registered under the Torrens system.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership, and the action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the property in dispute. In the case at bar, Hadji Munib, et al., herein respondents, failed to prove their right to the land in dispute.

The subject property originally belonged to Gani Moro and was acquired through sale by Saupi Moro. After Gani Moro's death, his heirs, including Andaang, offered to repurchase the land, but Saupi Moro refused. The heirs instituted a civil case for Unlawful Detainer but was dismissed by the court. Despite the dismissal, Andaang filed for a homestead patent over the said property. It was approved on 17 February 1955 and he was issued Letters of patent. On 6 December 1955, an Original Certificate of Title was issued in Andaang's name. In July 1956, the brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro filed a civil case for the annulment of the OCT and damages against Andaang. Again, the case did not prosper. The plaintiffs did not revive the case and it was considered abandoned.

Andaang died intestate in 1959. On 13 April 1960, Andaang's widow and sole heir, Cristeta Santiago vda. de Gani, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale adjudicating to herself the land in dispute and at the same time selling it to Jikirum. Consequently, a TCT was issued in the name of Jikirum.

CA 141 requires the applicant for a homestead patent, to enter in possession of, improve and cultivate the land. Petitioners, insist that Andaang did not comply with these requirements. A person deprived of the land, estate, or interest therein by virtue of a decree of registration may avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496. Section 38, however, contemplates of an external fraud. In the case of Libudan vs. Gil, the Court explained the scope of external or collateral fraud as any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of the case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case". The fraud being attributed to Andaang is not extrinsic and collateral.

Granting that Andaang committed extrinsic and collateral fraud, respondents failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period. In Nelayan, et al. vs. Nelayan, et al., this Court ruled that in the case of public land grants (patents), the one-year period under Section 38 counted from the issuance of the patent by the government.

Upon registration, the land in dispute falls under the operation of Act 496 and becomes a registered land. A homestead patent, once registered, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title. Instead of availing the remedy of Section 38 of Act 496, respondents filed an action for partition, which must fail because a Torrens title is not susceptible to collateral attack.

In any event, the respondents are not the proper parties to file the action for reconveyance of the land in dispute. In the civil cases, respondents did not claim that the land was privately owned and thus not proper for homestead application. They only alleged continuous possession of the land. The respondents acknowledged that the Illegal Detainer case filed by the heirs of Gani Moro, only confirmed Saupi Moro's physical possession of the land. This, however, did not settle the issue of ownership of the land.

Evidently, the land was not privately owned by Gani Moro from whom Saupi Moro acquired it. The land in dispute was part of public domain before the issuance of OCT in the name of Andaang. If it were otherwise, there would be no need for Andaang to file a homestead application.

Respondents' action for partition effectively seeks to cancel the homestead patent and the corresponding certificate of title. However, even if the homestead patent and the certificate of title were cancelled, respondents will not acquire the land in the concept of an owner. The land will revert to the government and will again form part of the public domain. The proper party to bring such action of patent cancellation is the Government. This is provided for in Section 101 of CA 141.

Considering the foregoing, the respondents is not the proper party to file an action to recover possession of the land in dispute. Further, they failed to timely avail of whatever remedy available to them to protect whatever interest they had over the land.

The decision of the Shari'a District Court is set aside and another one is entered dismissing the said complaint.

Bonite vs. Zosa Case Digest (162 SCRA 173)

2014-07-13T05:16:00.000-07:00

This is a petition for a review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, dated 25 of February 1971, dismissing the complaint for damages, and the order dated 27 March 1971 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order.

FACTS:

On the 24 of September 1968, Florencio Bonite was hit by a truck driven by private respondent. As a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. A criminal complaint for homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs (now petitioners) against the respondent Abamonga. Petitioners through their counsel, as private prosecutor, actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the accused.

After trial on the merits, the court acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same accused for the death of Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III. The court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages on 25 February 1971. In its ruling, the court held that since the plaintiffs did not reserve the right to file and independent civil action, and the fact that they have been represented by a private prosecutor in the prosecution of the criminal case, the action presently filed by the plaintiffs is already res adjudicata. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order but the same was denied.

Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.

RULING:

Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused in a criminal case, where the acquittal is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted and requires only a preponderance of evidence. This is pursuant to the express provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, the criminal case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages

The court held that the petitioners may also base such separate civil action for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Acquital of the accused from the charge of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for the recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not punishable by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damage in both scores (delict and quasi-delict).

Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite to file a civil action from damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. When the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.

Contrary to private respondent's claim, Article 33 of the Civil Code cannot apply in this case for it assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal negligence under the Revised Penal Code punishes the negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be instituted under said article. It is, therefore, not applicable to the case at bar.

The court a quo's ruling that the petitioners did not reserve the right to file an independent civil action is without merit. Article 29 does not include any reservation requirement to institute an independent civil action. It allows an action for damages against the accused upon the latter's acquittal in the criminal case based on reasonable doubt. The reservation requirement of the Rules on Criminal Procedure has also been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. This provision has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declaring such requirement of reservation as ineffective.

Petitioners active participation in the prosecution of the criminal action does not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code.

The Orders dated 25 February 1971 and 27 March 1971 of the court a quo was reversed and set aside, and a new one is entered reinstating the action for recovery of damages by the petitioners and directing the said court to proceed trial with the case.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

2014-07-06T16:11:00.001-07:00

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Menguito vs. Republic Case Digest (G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000)

2014-07-03T21:35:00.000-07:00

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC of Pasig City, granting the application for registration of the lands in question to the petitioners.

FACTS:

On November 10, 1987, an application for Registration of Title was filed with the RTC of Pasig City by herein petitioners who were successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Froilan Menguito and Generoso Menguito.The petitioners sought to have parcels of land, situated in Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, be brought under the operation of Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered, conformed and be declared as owners in fee simple of said parcels of land. The petitioners also asked the Court to declare that they acquired the said parcels of land through inheritance and that said lands were occupied by applicants and their predecessors-in-interest in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. Petitioners, in their application, opted to apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case.

Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a notice of hearing addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of adjacent properties as mentioned in the application. The hearing was scheduled on April 25, 1989.The addressees were then ordered ‘to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon.'

The Solicitor General filed its opposition to the application for registration contending that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, according to the Solicitor General, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for and the said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage. The Solicitor General further contends that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990. The Solicitor General claimed that the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation and thus, prayed for the the denial of the application for registration and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

On April 25, 1989, at the initial hearing, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and registered a verbal opposition to the application.

The lower court then issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their ‘Formal Offer of Evidence,’ together with documentary exhibits.

On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants’ formal offer of evidence. In the manifestation, it objected to the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self serving and the tax declarations for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. the oppositor Republic also objected to the tax receipts submitted by the applicants, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It also objected to the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito submitted by the applicants as being self-serving and a mere photocopy. The first page of the Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants was also claimed by the oppositors as self-serving and mere photocopy. The second page of said deed was also attacked as referring to different parcels of land other than those being applied for. Oppositor respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and that there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.

On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision affirming the order of general default against the whole world and confirming the registerable title of the applicants.

On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of the lower court decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.

On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals where the decision was reversed due to the failure of the lower court to consider the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles. The Court of Appeals was not convinced that the land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, the petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: : (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. The records show that petitioners failed to establish this two requisites.

Petitioners relied on a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit “E” indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. This proof is insufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State." The petitioners must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of public domain.

If the land was indeed alienable, petitioners still needs to establish possession of the lots in question in an open, continuous, exclusive and adverse in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945. Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim. Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974. Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.

Cirilo’s children were the best witnesses because they could have substantiated petitioners’ claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito and they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support their supposed claim. However, they were not presented as witnesses. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Tax declarations, tax receipts and the Municipal Treasurer’s certifications of tax payments presented in evidence by the petitioners were incompetent and insufficient because they are of recent vintage.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Teofilo Martinez vs. People of the Philippines Case Digest

2014-05-06T08:35:00.001-07:00

FACTS:

Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed a motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.

Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper attaching thereto affidavits by himself and two disinterested persons of his eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate court subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing the petitioner to pay the proper docketing fees within five (5) days from notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was also denied by the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a manifestation through his counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required "under protest" and that the money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.

In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to pay the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the required docket fee. In the second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion on the ground that it was short of 150.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as pauper litigant?

RULING:

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court held that a motion to litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with the Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed by himself and two other disinterested persons were enough to convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as indigent.

The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he paid.

Contracts

2014-04-25T01:03:00.002-07:00

pactum commissorium - a clause providing that the mortgagee will automatically own the mortgaged property if the debt is not paid at maturity.