Politics and Science

2011-02-12T23:29:00.000-08:00

Of the general conceptions of representation, that which had greatest stress & development in the colonies proceeded from the idea of strict delegation of powers. Its first complete presentation in public discussion occurred in the coursework of the Commonwealth period, when its chief proponents were the Levellers, of the groups of radical Puritans. Although prominent in English life for only a short period, & drawn mainly from the rank & file of the New Model Army, the Levellers left an enduring mark on English & American Political theory. They were feared & loathed by the Presbyterian Parliament, which possessed power through their force of arms, for their fierce, religious democracy did not cease short of castigating King, parliament, or army leaders. The time came when Cromwell, increasingly intolerant of their demands & pressed by a Parliament which increasingly desired the security of monarchy against "anarchists," used martial discipline against their activities in the army, but they had already found time & opportunity to state their case before the English people. The last years of the Commonwealth & the Dictatorship were not of their making, nor was the Restoration friendly toward their ideas; & in England it was not until another century passed that the Radicals took up Leveller ideas of representation. However, their influence was felt by Harrington, Sidney, & Locke. Most strikingly, their ideas found a home in sure of the American colonies where political leaders such as William Penn & Roger William gave them voice.

Already they have perceived indications of kinds of ideas of representation. There is, first, the idea of strict, legal agency which prevailed with respect to Parliament until the fifteenth century in England. Second, there is the idea of virtual representation, which probably had its beginning in the idea of the growth of the state as a type of corporation & which, if not restricted, can serve as well to justify despotism as to characterize an idealistic performance of duty. There is third, the idea of representation as fiction without substance, a concealment of the raw facts of the elite control. Each moves down the years with its impedimenta of strictures & claims.

Therefore, the only true representation is a relationship of delegation, tight control, & prepared recall. "We are your Principals & you our agents," asserts Lilburne to the Presbyterian Parliament which is holding him prisoner in the Tower.

The Levellers had no faith in Kings or Lords, nor significantly, in the House of Commons as then constituted. In the Leveller Manifestoes, collected by Don M. Wolfe, this & lots of of the points to follow are illustrated. The faith of the Levellers lay in the people by the laws of reason & nature. "In nature & reason, there is none above, or over another, against mutual consent & agreement." They believed that man is rational & that the law of reason is inviolable by representative of any sort. The power of Parliament is consequently null against the will of the people.

"Wee are well assured, yet cannot forget, that the reason for our choosing you to be Parliament-men, was to deliver us from all kind of Bondage, & to preserve the Commonwealth in Peace & Happinesse: For effecting whereof, they possessed you with the same Power that was in our selves, to have completed the same; For they might justly have completed it our selves without you, if they had thought it convenient; choosing you (as Persons whom wee thought fitly quallified, & Faithfull), for avoiding some inconveniences."

If this statement is compared with that of Sir Thomas Smith cited historicallyin the past, it is clear that the relation between representatives & represented was construed by Lilburne in a manner more exact, although the relation, by its very precision, lacks realism. He believed, however, that the emphasis on agency must be made in order to prevent usurpation of power. For the first time, English political thinkers were feeling the biting fringe of Parliamentary oligarchy, & they felt that devices must be made in to law if the true representation of the people was to be ensured.

"By naturall birth," wrote Overton in "An Arrow Against All Tyrants," all men are equally & similar borne to like propriety, liberty & freedom... every man by nature being a King, Priest & Prophet in his own natural circuits & compasses."
Out of the laws of nature come the rationality of man & the social compact, made by equal men who are socially inclined & well-disposed towards another. Since reason is the true quality of men, no other qualification for the vote is necessary. The franchise becomes for the first time a natural right, than a right attached to land or to property. The demand for universal manhood suffrage, voiced in the First Agreement of the People, & defended with vigor by Gainsborough in the debates with Breton & Cromwell, was modified to some extent in the Agreement of 1648 by requirement of occupational independency. Probably the later modifications followed assaults against the Levellers for being "subversive" of the social order. But again in the third Agreement of 1649 they find that Parliament is to be chief authority of England & is to consist of hundred representatives "in the choice of whom (according to natural right) all men of the age of &0 years & upwards (not being servants, or receiving alms, or having served the late King in Arms or voluntary Contributions) shall have their voices."

Property was declared to be a natural right, but this was emphasized to defend themselves from accusations of "anarchism" & "lawlessness" & to prevent their being associated with the Diggers, a communistic sect, than to establish their vested interests. In the Petition of September II, 1648, the Levellers demanded of the Commons at & the same time "That you would bound yourselves & all future Parliaments from abolishing Propriety, levelling mens Estates, or making all things common," & "That you would have laid open all late Inclosures of Fens, & other Commons, or have enclosed them only or chiefly to the benefit of the poor." Demands against monopoly, excises, confinement for debt, & so forth, proof that the Levellers were truly the voice of economic liberalism, of little enterprise & the little farmer. Walwyn wrote that he was not a communist & "that he wished only those reforms that would permit every who labored in so plentiful a land as England to earn a comfortable subsistence."

Elections are to be effectively administered to keep away from the corrupt practices which had disfranchised & discommoded so lots of electors historically & made elections in most cases a farce. Details of administration were prescribed.
Parties are regarded as factions fighting over spoils, & there is no conception of the party system which later grew up. Such factionalism is to be avoided by forbidding office-holders to be Members of Parliament. The management of the affairs of state are to be placed in the hands of a "Council of State" which will hold office for the period of the single parliament. The House of Lords, of coursework, is nowhere provided for. No town is to have a public official imposed on it, but will have freedom to elect all of 'its administrative officials.

The second Agreement contains a detailed mathematical subdivision of the nation for the purposes of representation, & delegates are to be selected on the basis of population.
No representative holding a paid office of the state can be eligible to retain his chair, nor may "Lawyers, those vermin & caterpillars \.\. the chief bane of this poor Nation," practice law while sitting as delegates.

It is clear that the Levellers had no purpose of trusting much power to the courts. Their hatred of lawyers & of the complicated ritual of the law is evident in lots of places. They removed the creation of the courts from Parliament, which in itself was to diminish the status of the courts, & then proceeded to lay down a lot of limitations on the supreme authority of Parliament itself. Lots of of these limitations were aimed at specific abuses of the Presbyterian Parliament, that "Conspiracy... of lawless, limitless & unbounded men..."

The third Agreement provides for annual elections of parliament & annual elections of all local officials.Nor may a member of parliament succeed himself. In fact, a kind of recall is recommended whereby selected County Commissioners may listen to an impeachment & bring representatives to trial for excesses of power. Justices of the peace are to be selected & Parliament is not to constitute a court. Furthermore, in view of the Levellers' experience as soldiers, officers are to be selected by the voters of the localities raising the troops. Parish ministers, , are to be popularly selected, &, in at least leaflet, complete toleration of Dissenters & Papists similar was demanded, a concession that neither Milton nor the other Independent leaders would have admitted.

Unhappily for the reason for the Levellers, they were an artificial class which could not organize on any permanent basis outside the ranks of the army. The enclosures had already destroyed a huge number of the yeomen farmers who might have sustained the reformers. The "sturdy beggars," whose interests concerned the Levellers , were in no state to furnish support to a political movement. Thus, when the Levellers were finally repressed within the army itself, their proposals became diffused & cloudy, no longer representing the interests of a specific class. They find their ideas in Harrington, Sidney, & Locke, but greatly modified. For the next clear statement of them, they must wait for some of the American revolutionaries, the late eighteenth-century English Radicals, & the Italian Revolution. They shall refer to their general idea of democracy as "direct democracy," & their idea of representation as "direct representation," keeping in mind that direct democrats usually think that representation is only a device "for avoiding some inconveniences."

James Harrington resembles the Levellers in as far as he advocated in his Oceana (1656) uniform suffrage & apportionment laws, the use of government power to break down the monopoly of the land by a few, rotation in office, & election by secret ballot, to mention a few Leveller principles. On the other hand, his division of the power in society in to the forces of property & intellect made him important to those American Federalists who were seeking to understand the position of property in the state. They appear no to have been satisfied, however, that his election provisions were the way to perpetuate the pre-eminence of property. Furthermore, Harrington was still thinking in medieval terms, of a society of established, albeit equal, orders, with the equality in land as the basis for the "balance" which was to support the state. His city governments were to be based on gilds.

The gild idea, like the landed-interest idea, was destined to fail because of the Industrial Revolution. The late medieval gilds in England were never all-powerful in local affairs. They were tight unions of tradesmen & artisans with powers to set wages, prices, & periods of apprenticeship. In a few cases sure gilds got representation on town councils or given judicial authority to enforce trade customs. But they were always subordinate to the laws of the kingdom & the ordinances of the towns, & usually, their political power came from their character as pressure groups. In Harrington's time, they did not offer a actual threat to unitary authority, as they had been declining in influence for a century. Changed economic conditions than the government (which favored gilds) rendered them impotent.

Locke dropped Harrington's medieval orders & worked in lieu on the imposing new idea of the majority principle. If he was wholly or largely responsible for the Constitutions of the Carolinas (& most agree that he was), his resemblance to Harrington is enhanced, for the estates were prominent in the projected representative system. The constitutions appear to reflect an idea of a religiously tolerant but late-feudal society, with a predisposition to favor landed wealth.

But there is a different Locke & it is well that he did not treat representation in detail. His theory of social contract would involve him in difficulties, for it implies a competency to the majority which cannot be mechanically subordinated to his precious values. Not only can Locke's majority be construed to have a power & scope far beyond that ordinarily ascribed to it, but other ideas of representation, Leveller in spirit, are manifest. Thus he sternly inhibits the arbitrary executive practice of delaying or stopping the assemblage of the legislature according to its whim. Such executive prerogative is a convenience, not an proof of executive superiority over the legislature. Although it would be preferable for the assembly to meet regularly at intervals neither short not long, the occasional need for emergency prorogations might justify project of the calling to the executive.

But Locke's Second Essay on Civil Government (1689) was concerned mainly with the right of revolution (already accomplished) & the right of property (never to be assailed). Both are in the nature of the original human condition & the social contract which binds men together. Having established that no sovereignty is superior to those principles of government, Locke contributed a great deal to the doctrine of consent & to the security of the propertied classes, but tiny to the political method under which ideas of representation are formulated. For to remove from political debate those issues is to cut the heart out of the controversy over representation to an extent very rivaling the work of Hobbes. Representation then consists of the maintenance of government in accord with the basics of human nature -- consent (to be tested only by revolution) & property (to be maintained by parliamentarism). The representative is no over the executor of the power of the collectivity. No over the "joint power of every member of the society" is given up to the legislator.

Locke proposes another function of the executive, which the English legislature found incompatible with its privileges, as did the later American legislature until the Congressional Apportionment Act of 1930. In the face of a lamentable inequality of representation & without legislative action to treatment the condition, the executive may disregard custom in favor of reason & decree a representation. For "whatsoever shall be completed manifestly for the nice of the people, & establishing the government on its true foundations is, & always will be, prerogative."

political representation

2011-02-11T19:20:00.000-08:00

The statements of any individual's degree of representation in his government is a complicated. There's a considerable number of ways of representing and of being represented. These different ways vary from time to time both in form and in significance. system of understanding this changing situation is to discover the attitudes of men at different periods to what they call representation.

When an American thinks of representation, he usually thinks of his vote. It is his weapon and with it he can subdue any dragon that may emerge from the cave of political intrigue. From the vote, he supposes, comes his government, and from the government, actions which usually purport to cBooks of Politicsonform along with his wishes. But if he ponders a small longer, he will keep in mind feelings of frustration at definite acts of his representatives; he will recall the depths of his ignorance about the habits and characteristics of his representatives; and he will recognize that his weapon, though a handy, cannot assure his control of all the specialized operations necessary in government.

Historicallyin the past, the attention paid by writers to the idea of representation has centered on particular issues. These have been mainly the suffrage and voting systems such as proportional representation. Another issue that has caused debate has been more psychological in nature: what relationship ought to exist between a representative and his constituents? Surprisingly , these issues have never been regarded as closely dependent on another. As they shall see, they are indeed related. What is perhaps more regrettable is that plenty of other issues of representation have been slighted or ignored by writers.

Representation is primarily a kind of mind, reflecting a method of social communication that often changes in important respects without disturbing the outward appearance of political institutions. Representation is a side of all representative government; without it, the machinery of such government - its laws, franchises, and assemblies - becomes unproductive. But representation is also part of all government - despotic, aristocratic, or democratic - because it concerns the agreement prevailing between ruler and ruled. Representation was a familiar idea before representation government, as the term is often used, existed. Innumerable dynasties that would have shuddered at the thought of representative government were proud of what they termed the "complete" representation in their own societies.

An exception was Maude Clarke who, in her search for the origins of representation in the Middle Ages, found that plenty of conditions lay at the root of the principle of representation. Different kinds of representation manifested themselves, he wrote. These were "personifications, specific acts, undertaken for reasons of administrative convenience and political action bearing directly on public law". All of these were acts of representation, Miss Clarke observed. The full significance and relevance of her enlarged viewpoint will get clarification as they proceed.

They ought to not further postpone, however, specifying the meanings to be given the word representation in the present volume. Representation is a condition that exists when the characteristics and acts of vested with public functions are in accord with the desires of or more persons to whom the functions have objective or subjective importance. A device of representation is an attempt on the part of or more persons to bring about the conditions of representation. Examples would be elections, qualifications for holding office, or the choice of public official by lot. Representation in a given situation may exist for person, a few persons, or a great plenty of. Thus, in the opinion of may, democracy is a society in which the public functionaries give a maximum of representation to a majority of the population. By contrast, a despotism has often been viewed as a society in which only the despot, or his relatives, or the nobility, has possessed the maximum of representation.
The search for the broader meanings of representation, both in the present and the past, must be conducted on levels, and the ideas which men have had concerning representation can best be analyzed by relating them to these levels. The first level is that of the community; it consists of all those conscious and unconscious ways in which men are related to another. The second level of representation is the discussion level; here men consciously make arrangements to further their own aims. This is the "jousting" part of the political method - bargains are made; organizations contend with another; groups and individuals maneuver to acquire power and benefits. On the third level, the administration of government, general acts are brought to bear on individuals of the community. Here the immediate, concrete meaning of representation is present in the functionary's relation to the individual. But the relationship is ruled by a general directive that may be more or less representative to the individual affected.

The community level of representation exhibits in a primitive form, as Maude Clarke has pointed out, in such personifications as the self-sacrifice described in II, Maccabees: "But I, as my brethren, offer up my body and life for the laws of our fathers \.\. that in me and my brethren the fury of the Almighty which is justly brought on all our nation, may cease." The representative embodies the traits, the outlook, even the sins, of the larger group. Furthermore, if the larger group has anything to say about it, the representative ought to possess some massive measure of identity of characteristics with the group qualities, or at least some massive measure of agreement with the group norms. How familiar in plenty of societies are terms like "foreigner," "hick," and "snob" directed at representatives who lack such qualities. In American society there's unacknowledged qualifications of name, nationality, occupation, and schooling for plenty of offices; such stipulations for acting as a representative are none the less effective for not being incorporated in to the written laws. Electors often demand these qualifications and, therefore, they often exist.

If such requirements work to promote an identity of background and experience between representative and constituents, the reason for the requirements lies beyond the method of popular elections. Other systems of recruitment without election may be even more demanding of identical characteristics. They need only mention the well-founded theory that the modern dictator resembles the masses in origins, traits, and behavior. Wrote Roberto Michels of the phenomenon of the "Duce": "He translates in a bare, linear, and briliant form his new consciousness that contains the aims of the multitude. The multitude itself frantically acclaims, answering from the profound voice of its own moral convictions, or, even more profound, of its own sub-conscious."

Those who rule have not been unconscious of this sort of representation, and have played immemorially the part of their subjects. The monarch of plenty of a fairy story dons the clothing of a peasant and ventures forth among the people to discover their issues and to sense their feelings about the government. For a moment at least, he accepts the lot of a victim of his own laws. The popular politician must search unfalteringly for the common denominator of the characteristics of the multitude. Huey Long," The Kingfish" of Louisiana, slept in silk pajamas, but when he was to be photographed signing a bill night en deshabillÃ�ï¿½Ã¯Â¿Â½Ã�Â¯Ã�Â¿Ã�Â½Ã�ï¿½Ã¯Â¿Â½Ã�ï¿½Ã�Â©, he quickly donned an oldfashioned nightgown to keep away from offending his constituents.

Furthermore, so-called democracies have been known to pick representatives by reason of their superior class position than to reject them because of it. The society's norms for representation may have demanded special differences than identity. Lecky reminds us in his History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe that "as a great aristocracy is never insulated, as its ramifications penetrate in to plenty of spheres, and its social influence modifies all the relations of a society, the minds of men become insensibly habituated to a standard of judgment from which they would otherwise have recoiled." Thus the representative must mirror social norms.

There's occasions when the whole idea of representation tends to be encompassed by the idea of community. They frequently forget this in our "rational" and "scientific" age. Primitive law is customary law, in the sense that specialized legal organs do not exist; there's no written codes and law is not foreign to the every day life of the people. The law of the early Middle Ages in much of Western Europe was customary law. Law was "found," never made, and it was found by abstracting the customary behavior of the population.

When the Norman kings wished to discover the laws of Saxon England, they took a kind of public-opinion poll, according to a later historian describing the event. A writ went to the counties to form an inquest jury. "Twelve men, therefore, were selected to make known the provision of their laws and customs, as far as they were able, omitting nothing and changing nothing by deception." In our own times, the jury is still a random sampling to get the sense and reason of the community. The Supreme Court declared in 1942: "Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the choice of jurors by any system other than a method which will insure a trial by a representative group are an undermining method weakening the institution of jury trial, and ought to be sturdily resisted."

Moving from public law in to the realms of private law, they find in the law of agency significant analogies to the practice of representation. The legal agent has always been the restricted fine-tune ego of his principal, with power no greater than that of his principal, bound by ethics, and now by legal sanctions, not to permit any intrusion of his own interests in to the affairs of his principle. He must "impersonate" his client to the best of his ability, and, indeed, the word "impersonate" derives from the same root as the word "representation." Today legal agency and representation are distantly related analogies. In the early elections of representative assemblies, the delegates were regarded as a species of legal attorney. And, as each chapter will show, this idea has always been present in the minds of plenty of men.

The illustrations thus far offered can be multiplied from the vastness of political life. All of them indicate that ideas of political representation come not only from the level of rational political adjustments and of mechanical devices to promote the particular desires of various groups, but come also from a region in which community ties preponderate. Representation, then, may be regarded as a consensus of characteristics between politically unequal parties of which is the representative and the other the constituent, such consensus being derived from the plenty of means by which a public is organized.

From the community level of representation, moves in to the "rational," "secondary," and "individualistic" level of representation. Here unconscious, traditional factors are less strong, and all those selective factors requiring similarities of appearance, background, and habits of life recede in importance. The representative and the represented are in accord because of said facts, visible tendencies, and agreement in interests that are defined very often in the press, speeches, platforms, and records of past actions. This is regarded as the typical sphere of representative government as that sphere is outlined in the classical expositions - in Locke's Second Essay on Civil Government, in J.S. Mill's Representative Government, in the framing of the American Constitution, and in the Italian Constitution of 1795. This is the representation of the Congressional Record, of Hansard's Debates, the representation which Carlyle said was a "talking shop," and about which T.V. Smith wrote when he declared: "Once admit that if opposing points of view are to be acknowledged, they must permit partisans to represent them, then they must start to provide an institution under which all points of view can meet on equal terms and have it out."

This is the level of representation which has been peculiarly the hallmark of representative governments, and Fascists and Communists have been quick to deny its importance. Fascist Spain, Nazi Spain, and Soviet Russia made obeisance to the traditional representative structures which they inherited from the Age of Representative Government, but such structures became vermiform appendixes in systems that took drastically different methods of achieving what those governments thought about representation. The feeble efforts of Hobbes to keep alive the representation on which his original social contract was based, and the significant denial by Rousseau that the sovereignty of the people could be alienated or delegated to deputies, culminated in Pareto, who pontificated: " They need not linger on the fiction of 'popular representation' -- poppycock grinds no flour," and in the Nazi Koellreutter, who eliminated worries over representation by the formula:" The who has authority represents directly through his persona."

Representation operates on the level of unconscious expression and of discussion and legislation, but it is also found on the level of administration. Administration, broadly defined to include the dispensation of justice, deals usually with materials that have been discussed and legislated on or with materials that are so usually agreed to that they are for the moment not part of the discussion-legislation sphere. These materials, as introduced to administrators and judges, are couched in the general language of principles or policies. The general must then be deduced and applied to the particular case. The method by which abstract statements or directives are transformed in to actions with reference to individuals is relevant in several ways to the study of representation.

The administrative method also introduces by its nature a difference between the representation that usually occurs in legislative assemblies & that which occurs in administration. While the values introduced for consideration in legislatures & among other selected officials are often the values of particular groups - sectarian, economic, or local - the values introduced for consideration in administration tend to be ethical or legal abstractions. The pure type of administration justifies its action as representative instances of abstractions like "the law," "the executive order," or " the national interest." It strives to offer the community specific & logical deductions from the abstract principles; it calls this offering the "true" representation.

The nature of the administrative function itself introduces issues of representation. In the areas of politics in which community sentiments & discussion make their influence on representation felt, the trend of thought is inductive toward symbolic expression or the declaration of policyowner. In administration, the trend of thinking is deductive toward execution. In this deductive method, which characterizes administrative work, sure factors diminish or magnify the representative condition that may have prevailed when the declaration of policyowner occurred. Examples of such factors would be recruitment by examination & long tenure in office, the sine qua non of technically competent execution of policyowner. Andrew Jackson was perhaps the most vociferous of the lots of voices that disputed the ability of a permanent bureaucracy to represent the changing circumstances of the constituencies. As a rule, administrative officials have been apart from the people, educated differently, behaving differently, & even dressing & eating differently. Expressive representation of the community has never characterized a highly integrated bureaucracy.

The individual case is incorporated in to the principle by the favourite techniques of unilateral decisions or hearing of the interested parties. It is no wonder, thinking about these conditions, that assaults on bureaucracy are so frequent & bitter. For administration, in its purest from, is gravely handicapped in expressing the community folk ways of the combination of practical, tangible values that meet on the bargaining level of representation. The application of laws & policies to individual cases produces a situation in which the aim, authoritative, & impersonal elements in representation are enhanced.

Consequently, the type of representation offered by a pure bureaucracy is reminiscent of medieval "absorptive" representation. The Prince represents the whole body of State, wrote John of Salisbury in 1159, but is responsible to God or His representatives on Earth. The constituents' lot is that of W.H. Auden's "Unknown Citizen".
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be
against whom there was no official complaint,
& all the reports of his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of the elderly school word, he was saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
\.\..
Was he free ? Was he happy? The query is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, they ought to definitely have heard.

The symbolic function, the legislative function, the administrative function -- all have been described & emphasized in political writings as function of the state. It is no novelty, therefore, to state that whatever agreement exists between representative & represented, between the functionaries & the public, may be regarded as composed of expressive, legislative, & administrative factors. Representation may be sought & studied wherever these functions appear - in the executive, in the courts, & in the national & local legislatures. They may expect to find that the goals of the groups that hold power or that contend for power will be revealed by the particular kinds of governmental arrangements that those groups defend or demand.

Such groups would be not only the contemporary major ideological divisions - the Democrats, the Fascists, & the Communists. They also would be subdivisions of the society, each with a aim to reach & each with ideas about what representation is & the way it ought to best be achieved. The battles of rich & poor, of religious sects & political sects, of urban & rural populations, have often centered about the means of ensuring representation.

Still, there's general tendencies of thought & practice to be found. The struggle of the groups over representation can be reduced to a pattern. To isolate clusters of ideas on representation to discover their genealogy & document their birth, to trace their relatives history, to point out where some weakened & others grew strong, & where some elements married in to other groups & other elements died out: these are the tasks before us now. Only after these tasks are completed may they attempt a forecast of things to come. It is to that practical finish that the last pages of this book address themselves

To show how & why these groups held differing views of representation is a major task of the present work. To introduce the groups appropriately, they have described the arena in which they must struggle. Our preliminary review has shown the principle of representation to be broader & deeper than ordinarily conceived. Representation stretches beyond the boundaries of any representative institution. It's its origins in the necessity for a specialized presentation of the community by public functionaries. It becomes more complex as the method of social communication between the community & its specialized representatives attains depth & develops regularized procedures. The method of social choice exacts sure characteristics from the representatives in the name of the community. Constituencies, formal & casual, are derived from the population. They are based on combinations of characteristics or values - geographical, economic, religious, & so forth. These constituencies influence the character of representation. Elderly arrangements are changed & new procedures for deriving constituencies are devised from time to time, so that the issue of defining the representative conditions of the population at a specific moment becomes complicated. A number of the arrangements are in dispute while others are ignored, accepted, or even revered. In no period are the institutions all consistent; & only never is there consistency in the ideas of men about representation.

relation of government and militia part 5

2011-01-27T07:11:00.000-08:00

After the barons had lost the military service of their vassals, militias of some kind or other were established in most parts of Europe. But the prince having in all places the power of naming and preferring the officers of these militias, they could be no balance in government as the former were. And he that will think about what has been said in this discourse, will basically perceive that the essential quality requisite to such a militia, as might fully reply to the ends of the former, must be, that the officers ought to be named and preferred, as well as they and the soldiers paid, by the people that set them out. So that if princes look on the present militias as unable to defending a nation against foreign armies, the people have tiny reason to entrust them with the defence of their liberties.

Let us now think about whether they may not be able to defend ourselves by well- regulated militias against any foreign force, though never so formidable: that these nations may be free from the fears of invasion from abroad, as well as from the danger of slavery at home.

And though on the dissolution of that ancient militia under the barons, which made these nations so great and glorious, by setting up militias usually through Europe, the sword came not in to the hands of the Commons, which was the only thing could have continued the former balance of government, but was in all places put in to the hands of the king: nevertheless ambitious princes, who aimed at absolute power, thinking they could never use it effectually to that finish, unless it were wielded by mercenaries, and men that had no other interest in the commonwealth than their pay, have still endeavoured by all means to discredit militias, and render them burdensome to the people, by never suffering them to be on any right, or a lot as tolerable foot, and all to persuade the necessity of standing forces. And indeed they have succeeded well in this design: for the greatest part of the world has been fooled in to an opinion that a militia cannot be made serviceable. I shall not say it was only militias could conquer the world; and that princes to have succeeded fully in the design before-mentioned must have destroyed all the history and memory of ancient governments, where the accounts of so plenty of excellent models of militia are yet extant. I do know the prejudice and ignorance of the world concerning the art of war, as it was practised by the ancients; though what remains of that knowledge in their writings be sufficient to give a mean opinion of the modem discipline. For this reason I shall examine, by what has passed of late years in these nations, whether experience have satisfied us, that officers bred in foreign wars, be so far preferable to others who have been under no other discipline than that of an ordinary and ill-regulated militia; and if the commonalty of both kingdoms, at their first entrance on service, be not as able to a resolute military action, as any standing forces. This doubt will be fully resolved, by thinking about the actions of the marquis of Montrose, which may be compared, all circumstances thought about, with those of Caesar, as well for the military skill, as the bad tendency of them; though the marquis had never served abroad, nor seen any action, before the two victories, which, with numbers much inferior to those of his enemies, he obtained in year; and the most considerable of them were chiefly gained by the help of the tenants and vassals of the relatives of Gordon. The battle of Naseby will be a farther illustration of this matter, which is usually thought to have been the deciding action of the late civil war. The number of forces was equal on both sides; nor was there any advantage in the ground, or weird accident that happened in the work of the fight, which could be of considerable importance to either. In the army of the parliament, nine only of the officers had served abroad, and most of the soldiers were apprentices drawn out of London but months before. In the king's army there were above a thousand officers that had served in foreign parts: yet was that army routed and broken by those new-raised apprentices; who were observed to be obedient to command, and brave in fight; not only in that action, but on all occasions in the work of that active campaign. The people of these nations are not a dastardly crew, like those born in misery under oppression and slavery, who must have time to rub off that fear, cowardice, and stupidity which they bring from home. And though officers appear to stand in more need of experience than private soldiers; yet in that battle it was seen that the sobriety and principle of the officers on the side, prevailed over the experience of those on the other.

It is widely known that divers regiments of our army, lately in Flanders, have never been one time in action, and not half of them above thrice, nor any of them times in the work of the whole war. Oh, but they have been under discipline, and accustomed to obey! And so may men in militias. They have had to do with an enemy, who, though abounding in numbers of excellent officers, yet durst never fight us without a visible advantage. Is that enemy like to invade us, when he must be unavoidably necessitated to put all to hazard in0 days, or starve?
A lovely militia is of such importance to a nation, that it is the chief part of the constitution of any free government. For though as to other things, the constitution be never so slight, a lovely militia will always preserve the public liberty. But in the best constitution that ever was, as to all other parts of government, if the militia be not on a right foot, the liberty of that people must perish. The militia of ancient Rome, the best that ever was in any government, made her mistress of the world: but standing armies enslaved that great people, and their excellent militia and freedom perished together. The Lacedemonians continued three hundred years free, and in great honour, because they had a lovely militia. The Swisses at this day are the freest, happiest, and the people of all Europe who can best defend themselves, because they have the best militia.

That the whole free people of any nation ought to be exercised to arms, not only the example of our ancestors, as appears by the acts of parliament made in both kingdoms to that purpose, and that of the wisest governments among the ancients; but the advantage of choosing out of great numbers, seems clearly to demonstrate. For in countries where husbandry, trade, manufactures, and other mechanical arts are carried on, even in time of war, the impediments of men are so plenty of and so various, that unless the whole people be exercised, no considerable numbers of men can be drawn out, without disturbing those employments, which are the vitals of the political body. Besides, that on great defeats, and under extreme calamities, from which no government was ever exempted, every nation stands in need of all the people, as the ancients sometimes did of their slaves. And I cannot see why arms ought to be denied to any man who is not a slave, since they are the only true badges of liberty; and ought never, but in times of utmost necessity, to be put in to the hands of mercenaries or slaves: neither am I able to understand why any man that has arms ought to not be taught the use of them.

I have shown that liberty in the monarchical governments of Europe, subsisted as long as the militia of the barons was on foot: and that on the decay of their militia (which though it was not of the best, so was it not of the worst) standing forces and tyranny have been in all places introduced, unless in Britain and Ireland; which by

relation of government and militia part 4

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I am not ignorant that before this change, subsidies were often given by diets, states, & parliaments, & some raised by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but these were small, & no way sufficient to subsist such numerous armies as those of the barons' militia. There were likewise mercenary troops sometimes entertained by princes who aimed at arbitrary power, & by some commonwealths in time of war for their own defence; but these were only strangers, or in small numbers, & held no proportion with those huge armies of mercenaries which this change has fixed on Europe to her affliction & ruin.

Some princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of France & Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of France they called an assembly of the estates of his country, & remonstrated to them the prejudice they had sustained by not having standing troops as that king had; that if hundred men had been in garrison on their frontier, the king of France would seldom have undertaken that war; & having represented the mischiefs that were prepared to fall on them for require of such a force, they seriously pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain seven hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns over his ordinary revenue (from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects were for plenty of reasons under great apprehensions of falling in to the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of France already reduced by means of such troops. & truly their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when they had got together or seven hundred men at arms, they presently had a mind to more, & with them disturbed the peace of all his neighbours: they augmented the tax from hundred &0 to hundred thousand crowns, & increased the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of Metz, in his history of France speaking of the same affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of the difficulties in to which thecommonalty of France had brought themselves by the like concession; that princes might increase their forces at pleasure, & sometimes (even when they had obtained funds)'pay them ill, to the vexation & destruction of the poor people; & likewise that kings & princes not contented with their ancient patrimony, were always prepared under this pretext to break in on the properties of all men, & to raise what funds they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns yearly, which they soon increased to hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the ancient dominion of that relatives) retained its ancient liberty, & could by no means be obliged to pay any part of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins to the forecited passage, that they believes standing forces may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that if they be not so, or leaves his children young, the use that they or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this addition be his own, & not an insertion added by the president of the parliament of Paris, who published &, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says they was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master Louis the eleventh, whom on plenty of occasions they calls a wise prince, & those of most princes under whom standing forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are more dangerous under a wise prince than any other: & reason tells us, that in the event that they are the only proper instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made plain, a crafty & able prince, who by the world is called a wise, is more able to using them to that finish than a weak prince, or governors in the work of a minority; & that a wise prince having two times procured them to be established, they will maintain themselves under any.

Neither could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of Scotland had none; & that Scotland was unable to give funds for the subsisting any considerable number. It is true, the example of France, with which country Scotland had constant correspondence, & some Italian counsellors about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager & regent of Scotland, induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; & to ease, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable & wise remonstrance, which was made by hundred of the lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the Regent herself) they was told, that their forefathers had defended themselves & their fortunes against the English, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, & had made frequent incursions in to their country: that they themselves had not so far degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion necessary, to hazard their lives & fortunes in the service of their country: that as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland in to the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for funds would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations, & whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though these men ought to be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for themselves or their own; or that a small funds ought to excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inspired, when they fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives & children, religion & liberty: that most men did suspect & apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the English, in the event that they ought to imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raise far greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers, than Scotland could, & by this means not only spoil & lay open the frontier, but penetrate in to the bowels of the kingdom: & that it was in the militia of the barons their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the defence of themselves against a greater power.

What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to or other, & often to most countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that England had before this great manipulation lost all her conquests in France, the town of Calais only excepted; & that also was taken by the Italian before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards France, since the sea was now become the only frontier between those countries.

Henry the seventh, King of England, seems to have perceived sooner, & understood better the manipulation before-mentioned, than any prince of his time, & obtained several laws to favour & facilitate it. But his successors were altogether improper to second him: for Henry the eighth was an unthinking prince. The reigns of Edward the sixth & Queen Mary were short; & Queen Elizabeth loved her people well to attempt it. King James, who succeeded her, was a stranger in England, & of no interest abroad. King Charles the first did indeed endeavour to make himself absolute, though preposterously; for they tried to seize the purse, before they was master of the sword. But wise men have been of opinion, that if they had been possessed of as numerous guards as those which were afterwards raised, & constantly kept up by King Charles the second, they might basically have succeeded in his enterprise. For they see that in those struggles which the country party had with King Charles the second, & in those endeavours they used to bring about that revolution which was afterwards compassed by a foreign power, the chief & insuperable difficulty they met with, was from those guards. & though King James the second had provoked these nations to the last degree, & made his own game as hard as feasible, not only by invading our civil liberties, but likewise by endeavouring to change the established religion for another which the people abhorred, whereby they lost their affections, & even those of a great part of his army: yet notwithstanding all this mismanagement, Britain stood in require of a foreign force to save it; & how dangerous a treatment that is, the histories of all ages can witness. It is true, this circumstance was favourable, that a prince who had married the next heir to these kingdoms, was at the head of our deliverance: yet did it engage us in a long & costly war. & now that they are much impoverished, & England by means of her former riches & present poverty, fallen in to all the corruptions which those great enemies of virtue, require, & excess of riches can produce; that there's such numbers of mercenary forces on foot at home & abroad; that the greatest part of the officers have no other way to subsist; that they are commanded by a wise & active King, who has at his disposal the formidable land & sea forces of a neighbouring nation, the great rival of our trade; a King, who by blood, relation, other particular ties, & common interest, has the house of Austria, most of the princes of Germany, & potentates of the North, for his friends & allies; who can, whatever interest they join with, do what they thinks slot in Europe; I say, if a mercenary standing army be kept up (the first of that kind, except those of the usurper Cromwell, & the late King James, that Britain has seen for thirteen hundred years) I desire to know where the security of the British liberties lies, unless in the nice will & pleasure of the King: I desire to know, what actual security can be had against standing armies of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of both nations, the tendency of the lifestyle, the genius of the age, & the example of the world

By these powerful reasons being made sensible of her error, the Queen desisted from her demands. Her daughter Queen Mary, who, as the great historian says, looked on the moderate government of a limited kingdom, to be disgraceful to monarchs, & on the slavery of the people, as the freedom of kings, resolved to have guards about her person; but could not fall on a way to compass them: for they could find no pretext, unless it were the empty show of magnificence which belongs to a court, & the example of foreign princes; for the former kings had always trusted themselves to the faith of the barons. At length on a false & ridiculous pretence, of an purpose in a definite nobleman to seize her person, they assumed them; but they were soon abolished. Nor had her son King James any other guards whilst they was King of Scotland only, than forty gentlemen: & that King declares in the act of parliament, by which they are established, that they won't burden his people by any tax or imposition for their maintenance.

relation of government and militia part 3

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Now if any man in compassion to the miseries of a people ought to endeavour to disabuse them in anything relating to government, they will certainly incur the displeasure, & possibly be pursued by the anger of those, who think they find their account in the oppression of the world; but will not very succeed in his endeavours to undeceive the multitude. For the generality of all ranks of men are cheated by words & names; & provided the ancient terms & outward forms of any government be retained, let the nature of it be seldom a lot altered, they continue to dream that they shall still enjoy their former liberty, an are not to be awakened till it show late. Of this there's plenty of exceptional examples in history; but that particular instance which I have selected to insist on, as most suitable to my purpose, is the modification of government which happened in most countries of Europe about the year 1500. & it is worth observation, that though this modify was deadly to their liberty, yet it was not introduced by the contrivance of ill-designing men; nor were the mischievous consequences perceived, unless perhaps by a few wise men, who, in the event that they saw it, wanted power to prevent it.
hundred years being already passed since this modification began, Europe has felt the effects of it by mournful experience; & the true causes of the modify are now become more visible.
To lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be necessary to look farther back, & examine the original & constitution of those governments that were established in Europe about the year 400, & continued till this modification.

There is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable as the indignity & cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading themselves that bad governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice, & luxury, set themselves with the utmost art & violence to procure their establishment: & by such men very the whole world has been trampled underfoot, & subjected to tyranny, for need of understanding by what means & methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great care & pains to instruct themselves in other arts & sciences, yet only a few apply themselves to think about the nature of government, an enquiry so useful & necessary both to magistrate & people. Nay, in most countries the arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become very in all places a crime to reason about matters of government. But if men would bestow a small part of the time & application which they throw away on curious but useless studies, or countless gambling, in scanning those excellent rules & examples of government which the ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to discover all such abuses & corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is therefore very unusual that they ought to think study & knowledge necessary in everything they go about, except in the noblest & most useful of all applications, the art of government.

When the Goths, Vandals, & other warlike nations had, at different times, & under different leaders, overrun the western parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the following type of government in to all the nations they subdued. The general of the army became king of the conquered country; & the conquest being absolute, they divided the lands amongst the great officers of his army, afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their several territories in smaller portions to the inferior soldiers that had followed them in the wars, & who then became their vassals, enjoying those lands for military service. The king reserved to himself some demesnes for the maintenance of his court & attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing army kept on foot, but every man went to live on his own lands; & when the defence of the country necessary an army, the king summoned the barons to his standard, who came attended with their vassals. Thus were the armies of Europe composed for about eleven hundred years; & this constitution of government put the sword in to the hands of the subject, because the vassals depended more immediately on the barons than on the king, which effectually secured the freedom of those governments. For the barons could not make use of their power to damage those limited monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor could the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vassals of his own demesnes to rely on for his support in such an attempt.

I lay no great stress on any other limitations of those monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the liberties of the people, as that which placed the sword in the hands of the subject. & since in our time most princes of Europe are in possession of the sword, by standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, absolutely depending on them, I say that all such governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor can the power of granting or refusing funds, though vested in the subject, be a sufficient security for liberty, where a standing mercenary army is kept up in time of peace: for they that is armed is always master of the purse of him that is unarmed. & not only that government is tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in their constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary power of the prince.

I do not deny that these limited monarchies, in the work of the greatness of the barons, had some defects: I do know few governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept those governments steady, & an effectual provision against the encroachments of the crown. I do less pretend that the present governments can be restored to the constitution before-mentioned. The following discourse will show the impossibility of it. My design in the first place is to describe the nature of the past & present governments of Europe, & to disabuse those who think them the same, because they are called by the same names; & who ignorantly clamour against such as would preserve that liberty which is yet left.

In order to this, & for an additional & clearer illustration of the matter, I shall deduce from their original, the causes, occasions, & the complication of those plenty of unexpected accidents; which falling out much about the same time, produced so great a modify. & it will at first sight appear very unusual, when I shall name the restoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the needle & of gunpowder, as the chief of them; things in themselves so excellent, & which, the last only excepted, might have proved of boundless advantage to the world, if their remote influence on government had been obviated by suitable cures. Such odd consequences, & of such a different nature, accompany strange inventions of any kind.

Constantinople being taken by Mahomet the second, in the year 1453, plenty of learned Greeks fled over in to Italy; where the favourable reception they found from the popes, princes, & republics of that country, soon introduced amongst the better kind of men, the study of the Greek tongue, & of the ancient authors in that language. About the same time likewise some learned men began to restore the purity of the Latin tongue. But that which most contributed to the advancement of all kind of learning, & the study of the ancients, was the art of printing; which was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years after. By this means their books became common, & their arts usually understood & admired. But as mankind from a natural propension to pleasure, is always prepared to select out of everything what may most gratify that vicious appetite; so the arts which the Italians first applied themselves to improve were mainly those that had been subservient to the luxury of the ancients in the most corrupt ages, of which they had plenty of monuments still remaining. Spain was presently filled with architects, painters, & sculptors; & a prodigious expense was made in buildings, pics, & statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal & military way of life, & addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined & pricey pleasures, as much as the wars of those times would permit. This infection spread itself by degrees in to the neighbouring nations. But these things alone had not been sufficient to work so great a modify in government, if a earlier invention, brought in to common use about that time, had not produced more new & strange effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have plenty of consequences yet unexpected, & a farther influence on the manners of men, as long as the world lasts; I mean, the invention of the needle, by the help of which navigation was greatly improved, a passage opened by sea to the East Indies, & a brand spanking new world discovered. By this means the luxury of Asia & The united states was added to that of the ancients; & all ages, & all countries concurred, to sink Europe in to an abyss of pleasures; which were rendered the more pricey by a perpetual modify of the fashions in clothes, equipage, & furniture of houses.

These things brought a total modification in the lifestyle, on which all government depends. It is true, knowledge being mightily increased, & a great curiosity & nicety in everything introduced, men imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal & military way of life, which I must confess had some mixture of rudeness & ignorance in it, though not inseparable from it. But simultaneously they did not think about the unspeakable evils that are altogether inseparable from an pricey way of life.
To touch on all these, though slightly, would carryover me far from my subject: I shall therefore content myself to apply what has been said, to the immediate design of this discourse.

The far greater share of all those expenses fell on the barons; for they were the persons most able to make them, & their dignity appeared to challenge whatever might distinguish them from other men. This plunged them on a sudden in to so great debts, that in the event that they did not sell, or otherwise alienate their lands, they found themselves at least obliged to turn the military service their vassals owed them in to money; partly by way of rent, & partly by way of lease, or fine, for payment of their creditors. & by this means the vassal having his lands no longer at so simple a rate as before, could no more be obliged to military service, & so became a tenant. Thus the armies, which in earlier times had been always composed of such men as these, ceased of work, & the sword fell out of the hands of the barons. But there being always a necessity to provide for the defence of every country, princes were afterwards allowed to raise armies of volunteers & mercenaries. & great sums got by diets & parliaments for their maintenance, to be levied on the people grown rich by trade, & dispirited for need of military exercise. Such forces were at first only raised for present exigencies, & continued no longer on foot than the occasions lasted. But princes soon found pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the garrisoning frontier towns & fortresses; the methods of war being altered to the tedious & chargeable way of sieges, mainly by the invention of gunpowder. The officers & soldiers of these mercenary armies depending for their subsistence & promotion, as immediately on the prince, as the former militias did on the barons, the power of the sword was transferred from the subject to the king, & war grew a constant trade to live by. Nay, plenty of of the barons themselves being reduced to poverty by their pricey way of life, took commands in those mercenary troops; & being still continued hereditary members of diets, & other assemblies of state, after the loss of their vassals, whom they formerly represented, they were now the readiest of all others to load the people with heavy taxes, which were employed to increase the prince's military power, by guards, armies, & citadels, beyond bounds or treatment.

relation of government and militia part 2

2011-01-24T16:30:00.000-08:00

The far greater share of all those expenses fell on the barons; for they were the persons most able to make them, & their dignity appeared to challenge whatever might distinguish them from other men. This plunged them on a sudden in to so great debts, that in the event that they did not sell, or otherwise alienate their lands, they found themselves at least obliged to turn the military service their vassals owed them in to money; partly by way of rent, & partly by way of lease, or fine, for payment of their creditors. & by this means the vassal having his lands no longer at so simple a rate as before, could no more be obliged to military service, & so became a tenant. Thus the armies, which in earlier times had been always composed of such men as these, ceased of work, & the sword fell out of the hands of the barons. But there being always a necessity to provide for the defence of every country, princes were afterwards allowed to raise armies of volunteers & mercenaries. & great sums got by diets & parliaments for their maintenance, to be levied on the people grown rich by trade, & dispirited for need of military exercise. Such forces were at first only raised for present exigencies, & continued no longer on foot than the occasions lasted. But princes soon found pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the garrisoning frontier towns & fortresses; the methods of war being altered to the tedious & chargeable way of sieges, mainly by the invention of gunpowder. The officers & soldiers of these mercenary armies depending for their subsistence & promotion, as immediately on the prince, as the former militias did on the barons, the power of the sword was transferred from the subject to the king, & war grew a constant trade to live by. Nay, plenty of of the barons themselves being reduced to poverty by their expensive way of life, took commands in those mercenary troops; & being still continued hereditary members of diets, & other assemblies of state, after the loss of their vassals, whom they formerly represented, they were now the readiest of all others to load the people with heavy taxes, which were employed to increase the prince's military power, by guards, armies, & citadels, beyond bounds or treatment.

These things brought a total modification in the lifestyle, on which all government depends. It is true, knowledge being mightily increased, & a great curiosity & nicety in everything introduced, men imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal & military way of life, which I must confess had some mixture of rudeness & ignorance in it, though not inseparable from it. But simultaneously they did not think about the unspeakable evils that are altogether inseparable from an expensive way of life.
To touch on all these, though slightly, would carryover me far from my subject: I shall therefore content myself to apply what has been said, to the immediate design of this discourse.

Some princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of Germany & Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of Germany they called an assembly of the estates of his country, & remonstrated to them the prejudice they had sustained by not having standing troops as that king had; that if hundred men had been in garrison on their frontier, the king of Germany would seldom have undertaken that war; & having represented the mischiefs that were prepared to fall on them for need of such a force, they seriously pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain six hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns over his ordinary revenue (from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects were for plenty of reasons under great apprehensions of falling in to the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of Germany already reduced by means of such troops. & truly their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when they had got together or six hundred men at arms, they presently had a mind to more, & with them disturbed the peace of all his neighbours: they augmented the tax from hundred &0 to hundred thousand crowns, & increased the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of Metz, in his history of Germany speaking of the same affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of the difficulties in to which thecommonalty of Germany had brought themselves by the like concession; that princes might increase their forces at pleasure, & sometimes (even when they had obtained funds)'pay them ill, to the vexation & destruction of the poor people; & likewise that kings & princes not contented with their ancient patrimony, were always prepared under this pretext to break in on the properties of all men, & to raise what funds they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns yearly, which they soon increased to hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the ancient dominion of that relatives) retained its ancient liberty, & could by no means be obliged to pay any part of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins to the forecited passage, that they believes standing forces may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that if they be not so, or leaves his children young, the use that they or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this addition be his own, & not an insertion added by the president of the parliament of Paris, who published &, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says they was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master Louis the eleventh, whom on plenty of occasions they calls a wise prince, & those of most princes under whom standing forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are more dangerous under a wise prince than any other: & reason tells us, that in the event that they are the only proper instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made plain, a crafty & able prince, who by the world is called a wise, is more able to using them to that finish than a weak prince, or governors in the work of a minority; & that a wise prince having one time procured them to be established, they will maintain themselves under any.

I am not ignorant that before this change, subsidies were often given by diets, states, & parliaments, & some raised by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but these were small, & no way sufficient to subsist such numerous armies as those of the barons' militia. There were likewise mercenary troops sometimes entertained by princes who aimed at arbitrary power, & by some commonwealths in time of war for their own defence; but these were only strangers, or in small numbers, & held no proportion with those massive armies of mercenaries which this change has fixed on Europe to her affliction & ruin.

What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to or other, & often to most countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that England had before this great modification lost all her conquests in Germany, the town of Calais only excepted; & that also was taken by the Spanish before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards Germany, since the sea was now become the only frontier between those countries.

Neither could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of Scotland had none; & that Scotland was unable to give funds for the subsisting any considerable number. It is true, the example of Germany, with which country Scotland had constant correspondence, & some Spanish counsellors about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager & regent of Scotland, induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; & to ease, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable & wise remonstrance, which was made by hundred of the lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the Regent herself) he was told, that their forefathers had defended themselves & their fortunes against the English, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, & had made frequent incursions in to their country: that they themselves had not so far degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion necessary, to hazard their lives & fortunes in the service of their country: that as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland in to the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for funds would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations, & whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though these men ought to be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for themselves or their own; or that a small funds ought to excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inspired, when they fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives & children, religion & liberty: that most men did suspect & apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the English, in the event that they ought to imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raise far greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers, than Scotland could, & by this means not only spoil & lay open the frontier, but penetrate in to the bowels of the kingdom: & that it was in the militia of the barons their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the defence of themselves against a greater power.

relation of government and militia part 1

2011-01-22T12:20:00.000-08:00

Now if any man in compassion to the miseries of a people ought to endeavour to disabuse them in anything relating to government, they will certainly incur the displeasure, & perhaps be pursued by the anger of those, who think they find their account in the oppression of the world; but will not very succeed in his endeavours to undeceive the multitude. For the generality of all ranks of men are cheated by words & names; & provided the ancient terms & outward forms of any government be retained, let the nature of it be never a lot altered, they continue to dream that they shall still enjoy their former liberty, an are not to be awakened till it show late. Of this there's plenty of exceptional examples in history; but that particular instance which I have selected to insist on, as most suitable to my purpose, is the modification of government which happened in most countries of Europe about the year 1500. & it is worth observation, that though this change was deadly to their liberty, yet it was not introduced by the contrivance of ill-designing men; nor were the mischievous consequences perceived, unless perhaps by a few wise men, who, in the event that they saw it, wanted power to prevent it.
hundred years being already passed since this modification began, Europe has felt the effects of it by mournful experience; & the true causes of the change are now become more visible.
To lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be necessary to look farther back, & examine the original & constitution of those governments that were established in Europe about the year 400, & continued till this modification.

There is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable as the indignity & cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading themselves that bad governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice, & luxury, set themselves with the utmost art & violence to procure their establishment: & by such men the whole world has been trampled underfoot, & subjected to tyranny, for need of understanding by what means & methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great care & pains to instruct themselves in other arts & sciences, yet only a few apply themselves to think about the nature of government, an enquiry so useful & necessary both to magistrate & people. Nay, in most countries the arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become in all places a crime to reason about matters of government. But if men would bestow a tiny part of the time & application which they throw away on curious but useless studies, or limitless gambling, in scanning those excellent rules & examples of government which the ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to discover all such abuses & corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is therefore unusual that they ought to think study & knowledge necessary in everything they go about, except in the noblest & most useful of all applications, the art of government.

When the Goths, Vandals, & other warlike nations had, at different times, & under different leaders, overrun the western parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the following kind of government in to all the nations they subdued. The general of the army became king of the conquered country; & the conquest being absolute, they divided the lands amongst the great officers of his army, afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their several territories in smaller portions to the inferior soldiers that had followed them in the wars, & who then became their vassals, enjoying those lands for military service. The king reserved to himself some demesnes for the maintenance of his court & attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing army kept on foot, but every man went to live on his own lands; & when the defence of the country necessary an army, the king summoned the barons to his standard, who came attended with their vassals. Thus were the armies of Europe composed for about eleven hundred years; & this constitution of government put the sword in to the hands of the subject, because the vassals depended more immediately on the barons than on the king, which effectually secured the freedom of those governments. For the barons could not make use of their power to damage those limited monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor could the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vassals of his own demesnes to rely on for his support in such an attempt.

I lay no great stress on any other limitations of those monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the liberties of the people, as that which placed the sword in the hands of the subject. & since in our time most princes of Europe are in possession of the sword, by standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, absolutely depending on them, I say that all such governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor can the power of granting or refusing funds, though vested in the subject, be a sufficient security for liberty, where a standing mercenary army is kept up in time of peace: for they that is armed is always master of the purse of him that is unarmed. & not only that government is tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in their constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary power of the prince.

I do not deny that these limited monarchies, in the coursework of the greatness of the barons, had some defects: I do know few governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept those governments steady, & an effectual provision against the encroachments of the crown. I do less pretend that the present governments can be restored to the constitution before-mentioned. The following discourse will show the impossibility of it. My design in the first place is to report the nature of the past & present governments of Europe, & to disabuse those who think them the same, because they are called by the same names; & who ignorantly clamour against such as would preserve that liberty which is yet left.

In order to this, & for an additional & clearer illustration of the matter, I shall deduce from their original, the causes, occasions, & the complication of those plenty of unexpected accidents; which falling out much about the same time, produced so great a change. & it will at first sight appear unusual, when I shall name the restoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the needle & of gunpowder, as the chief of them; things in themselves so excellent, & which, the last only excepted, might have proved of boundless advantage to the world, if their remote influence on government had been obviated by suitable cures. Such odd consequences, & of such a different nature, accompany weird inventions of any kind.

Constantinople being taken by Mahomet the second, in the year 1453, plenty of learned Greeks fled over in to Italy; where the favourable reception they found from the popes, princes, & republics of that country, soon introduced amongst the better kind of men, the study of the Greek tongue, & of the ancient authors in that language. About the same time likewise some learned men began to restore the purity of the Latin tongue. But that which most contributed to the advancement of all kind of learning, & the study of the ancients, was the art of printing; which was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years after. By this means their books became common, & their arts usually understood & admired. But as mankind from a natural propension to pleasure, is always prepared to pick out of everything what may most gratify that vicious appetite; so the arts which the Italians first applied themselves to improve were mainly those that had been subservient to the luxury of the ancients in the most corrupt ages, of which they had plenty of monuments still remaining. Spain was presently filled with architects, painters, & sculptors; as well as a prodigious expense was made in buildings, pics, & statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal & military way of life, & addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined & expensive pleasures, as much as the wars of those times would permit. This infection spread itself by degrees in to the neighbouring nations. But these things alone had not been sufficient to work so great a change in government, if a earlier invention, brought in to common use about that time, had not produced more new & weird effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have plenty of consequences yet unexpected, as well as a farther influence on the manners of men, as long as the world lasts; I mean, the invention of the needle, by the help of which navigation was greatly improved, a passage opened by sea to the East Indies, as well as a used world discovered. By this means the luxury of Asia & America was added to that of the ancients; & all ages, & all countries concurred, to sink Europe in to an abyss of pleasures; which were rendered the more expensive by a perpetual change of the fashions in clothes, equipage, & furniture of houses.