I Hate Politics

Profanarea simbolicii UE sau nu?

2018-04-13T07:51:00.002-07:00

Profanarea simbolicii UE sau nu?

Recent trecând prin preajma sediul Partidului Democrat am auzit o fîlfîitură care mi-a atras atenția. Mi-am îndreptat vederea - erau drapelele Moldovei arborate deolaltă cu cele ale Uniunii Europene. Trebuie să recunoaștem ele se privesc perfect pe fundalul signel PDM. Trandafiri roșii pe fon albastru combinate cu drapelul albastru UE este o asortare cu adevărat perfectă de culori care inspiră încredere și pace. Aici însă ne oprim, precum fiecare istorie conține și un DAR. Precum a zis bine cineva, totul ce este mentionat pînă la dar este doar umplutură de aceia vom trece la partea de după DAR.

Fără mari tertipuri legale știm că folosirea simbolicii unor anumitor entități politice presupune împărtășirea valorilor acestor instituții. Mai mult ca atît răspîndirea acestor valori prin arborarea simbolicii vine la pachet cu anumite responsabilități morale față de instituția a căror simbolică o arborăm. Pe de altă parte, autodeclararea de a fi "rosu" sau "albastru" presupune suport din partea aliatului, în cazul dat ne vor referi exclusiv la transferul de imagine.

Daca cumva decid să-mi afișez un chepiu cu siglă roșie și mă comport obraznic toți vor asocia comportamentul meu cu cel al partidului a cui chepiu port. Dacă însă îmi agăț o siglă albastră cu simbolică europeană voi avea aces într-o gașcă respectabilă. Acest lucru se va intimpla pentru că sigla joacă rolul de card de acces prin imaginea sa pozitivă puternică la care sa lucrat mult pe care eu o preiau (adesea fără drept) și de care beneficiez. Eu însă trebuie să mă comport în așa fel încît să nu fiu deprivat de "franciza" sau "tichetul de acces" în grupul elitist.

Unele partide își însușesc imaginea pozitivă transmisă de simbolica drapelului UE pentru a beneficia de valoarea acesteia. Ele argorează simbolica UE chiar și atunci cînd acțiunile lor merg în contradicție cu valorile simolicii pe care o folosesc. Acest fenomen era des întîlnit în cazul vaselor pirate prin arborarea drapelelor false. Această formă de expunere a unor valor prin arborarea simbolicii acestora este o formă de profanare asimbolicii. Apelînd la DEX aflăm că profanarea inseamnă:

PROFANÁRE s. 1. batjocorire, necinstire, pângărire, sacrilegiu, spurcare, violare, (înv. și pop.) prihănire. (~ unui loc considerat sfânt.) 2. v. pângărire.

sursa: Sinonime (2002)

adăugată de siveco

PROFANÁRE s. v. batjocorire, compromitere, dezonorare, necinstire, terfelire.

Sursa: http://lex.justice.md/md/336791/

Nu ințeleg cum reprezentanții structurilor Europene tolerează modul in care simbolicile pentru care au luptat și muncit atît de mult sunt folosite în așa hal de anumite forțe politice din Moldova.

Foto preluat de pe adresa: https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-politice/galerie-foto-lucrari-pe-ultima-suta-de-metri-la-noul-sediu-al-partidului-democrat-au-fost-arborate-drapele-si-instalate-panouri-cu-sigla-pdm

2018-04-10T02:16:00.001-07:00

Oamenii nu mai sînt interesați de reintegrarea Transnistriei, ci de cum să scape de ea mai puțin dureros

Revolution? orange, spring, tweeter - Are those revolutions?

2018-03-18T12:26:00.001-07:00

In this post I will present a cross theoretical analysis of the concept of political revolution. For this purpose I will try to shed light on how different theories explain the causality and dialectics of revolutionary movement.

When discussed about the revolution, we refer to the sudden and rapid changes occurring to the previous conditions. In this sense, the concept of political revolution speaks foremost about a sudden alteration in the social order and not necessarily about the qualitative dimension of this change.

Looking first at the Marxist school argument revolution is seen as a change of modes of production (Skocpol, 1981). It stems from class-divided modes of production, by transforming one mode of production into another through class conflict. According to Marx, the revolution is a sharp transition from one form of economic organization to a new one, in which new types of social relations are established. In this context, the transformation of the production relationships and the hegemony of the successful revolutionary class set up new forms of political and ideological organization. Consequently, according to Marx, the revolution is a class-based transformation driven from a “self-conscious … rising revolutionary class” (Skocpol, 1981, p. 8). In this sense, the revolution does not represent an elite-led act. It is rather a result of collective consciousness and will. Deepening into the Marxist theory, it becomes evident that this understanding ignores the role of leaders and elites in the process of shaping the mass consciousness.

The scholarship on aggregate-psychological theory highlights the psychological feature of revolutions. According to them, political violence takes place when the members of society start to be dominated by a shared feeling of anger and dissatisfaction of the discrepancies between their opportunities and needs, a condition known as ‘relative deprivation’. The main element of revolutions, according to this approach, is the ultimate presence of a certain form of aggression. According to Gurr, the revolution is nothing else than just one of the many manifestations of political violence. Thus, by differentiating between forms of violence in turmoil, conspiracy and civil war, the revolution is placed in the internal war category together with large-scale terrorism, guerilla wars, and civil wars. The problem of this approach is that scholars do not distinguish between purposes and means of revolutions. In this sense, history provided us with a large number of nonviolent revolutions, such as the nonviolent revolution in India or the ‘colored revolutions’ in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

The central argument of the political-conflict theory is based on analyzing the capacity of the challengers to mobilize the necessary material resources to be able to overturn the existing elites. According to Tilly, revolution is a special case of collective action, where the contenders fight for political sovereignty and for displacing the existing government. In Tilly’s opinion the revolution does not necessarily presume violence, which would be treated as its physical byproduct. It seems that by focusing mainly on the mobilization capacity of the contending elites, the supporters of this theory limit their attention on elite changes thus they omit from their analysis the fundamental change of the political order as a whole and with it, the existing social norms.

Skocpol (1981) identifies social revolutions as distinct forms of political protest from other types of conflicts and transformative processes. Social revolutions are different by cumulating two types of conditions: societal structural changes with class turmoil, and simultaneous political and social transformations (Skocpol, p. 4). In this sense, she highlights the importance of the radical change of social norms and political institutions as a key characteristic which makes revolutions different form other types of social unrest. Moreover, Skocpol pays a special attention to the international context as a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the emergence of a revolution. In this sense, the scholar specifies that all modern revolutions took place in states with highly disadvantaged international position. In this order, she discusses two main relevant transnational contexts. The first is the pushing factor of the global capitalist economy, which makes societies feel that they lag behind and consequently demand for social transformations. And the second is the spread of revolutionary ideas and leadership across national borders.

An innovative dimension in the scholarship on revolutions is introduced by Goldstone (2003). According to him, revolutions pass through different evolutionary stages, similarly to other political processes. Thus, in various historical periods they display different modes of manifestation. Goldstone draws the difference between old revolutions, which could be characterized by the presence of three elements such as sharp and progressive change in a society’s values and institutions, mass-action, and violence, and the new revolutions, which emphasize the efforts to change values and institutions, and mass actions. Hence, the post-1990s revolutions especially, do not always display success or violence. Unlike his predecessors Goldstone does not insist on the success of revolutions as a core characteristic. A revolution for Goldstone is not necessarily a finished act, the breakdown or substitution of a certain regime, but rather the attempt to do it. According to Goldstone, any act of protest or social disobedience, which is not necessarily violent or successful, can be qualified as revolution.

Kuran (1991), on the other hand, uses the term “revolution” in a narrow understanding that assumes “a mass supported seizure of political power that aims to transform the social order” (p. 13). Accordingly, the emergence of revolutions is a rational decision/behavior of masses to take advantage of the temporarily vulnerable autocracies in an attempt to overturn them. In this sense, as an advocate of the rationalist school, he looks at revolutions through the prism of cost-benefit relations. His core idea is based on the assumption that the outburst of revolutions cannot be predicted despite their high magnitudes. The unpredictability of revolutions is, as he assumes, due to the unpredictability of the individual rational decision that cannot be evaluated in advance because of public alienation and general state of ignorance (p. 30). Consequently, the chances of an individual to take part in a mass protest lie at the intersection between his private moral interests and material public benefits. Furthermore, Kuran shows that there are two factors that play the decisive role in a personal decision. First, the number of public protesters that already has joined the protest, and second, the level of internal dissatisfaction emerged as an effect of forced public conformity.From the brief analysis of the Kuran understanding of revolutions it seems that the scholar misses from consideration the role of governmental capacity to persecute protesters and to see how this pressure influences the motivations of individuals to participate in mass actions. Kuran does not consider the role of political leaders in the mobilization of mass protests. Despite mentioning that revolutions are possible only as an effect of governmental inefficiency and repressions, he nevertheless does not include this variable in his proposed testing mechanism. Finally, Kuran confuses causes with processes taking place during the revolution. Thus, focusing his attention on the rationality of individual mobilization, the scholar fails to explain what happens after the moment that protesters are mass protesting. Scott (1976) and Popkin (1979) focus their attention mainly on pre-capitalist agrarian societies looking predominantly on the social causes, which lead to a revolutionary situation. The scholars do not provide a definition of revolution as such, however they explain it implicitly. By speaking about revolutions both authors assume that they are led by subjugated social class, (in their discussed cases - the peasantry), who revolts against a higher social class, (the landowners), in order to change the system of social relations. In this sense, revolutions are analyzed as a class conflict. Nevertheless, the difference between Popkin and Scott concepts of revolution is hidden in their distinct understandings of peasants’ causes to revolt. At the first glance one could make an association between Scott – Popkin class lead approach with the Marxist revolutionary theory however they have a dissimilar argumentation and causal mechanisms.

As a promoter of moral economy theory Scott sees the village social relations as a safety net against the loss of subsistence capacity in the pre-colonialist and capitalist era. Thus, the village was a self-sufficient economic unit, which used its millenary moral values to ensure a hierarchy of authority and legitimacy among its dwellers. Even if the peasant collectivities could never reach the status of rich communities, the peasant societies refrained from revolutionary actions as their relations with landowners were tied by a multivalent relation of mutually connected interdependence and help. The discontent among peasants is triggered by the rapid impoverishment as a result of the degradation of the economic circuit, which represented an outcome of the encroachment of colonialist (capitalist) forces. Consequently, the massive peasant revolts did not represent a reaction against the exploiting class but rather against the economic degradation and dissolution of local traditions.

On the other side, Popkin - the supporter of the political economy theory, blame Scott for romanticism and proclivity to mythologization. He claims, that the revolutionary mobilization of the peasantry was not conditioned by the reaction against the new economic system, which threw them into subsistence, but rather by the dissatisfaction with the old system, which revealed its shortcomings in contrast to the new economic opportunities and chances offered by the new capitalist order. He shows that the peasants had their specific way of life not as a deliberate choice of its inhabitants but as lack of other alternatives. Consequently, the village represented a ‘corporate unit’, led by internal market mechanisms that have been imposed by the internal hierarchical stratification. The intrusion of the outsiders into the monotone and closed agrarian village decomposed the local traditional values and introduced significant modifications into economic practices. This incursion hence did not spoil the idyllic local moral values but rather gave a chance to the peasantry to escape from extreme poverty.The main criticism regarding the scholars understanding of revolutions emphasizes the difficulty to trace the trigger lying in between the process described by both scholars and the revolutions themselves. Moreover, Scott and Popkin focus exclusively on social economic causes and therefore neglect the role of individual leaders as potential vehicles of social mobilization. As Tilly puts it, relative deprivation is a not enough to cause popular uprisings. Considering that the scholars analyze exclusively prerevolutionary conditions, they miss on the evolutionary dynamics of revolutionary movements as such. Finally, the authors focus their attention only to specific types of revolutions, occurring in agrarian societies. This fact narrows down the understanding of revolutions as a universal social phenomenon.After a general analysis of the theory on revolutions Goldstone (2003), mentions that it would be impossible to arrive at a universal definition of revolutions since scholars look into particular conditions and stages of this phenomenon. In addition, the understanding of revolutions differs depending on what historical period they occurred in. In this sense, precapitalist revolutions display very different conditions and elements from the twenty-first century revolutions. Thus, he suggest to analyze revolutions as an outcome of the “loss or undermining of the conditions that maintain stability” (p. 78). Such an approach could allow for the creation of a common ground in researching the dynamics of revolutions. In this sense, it is worth questioning, should theorists strive to define revolutions as a universal term or should they be bound to particular contextual frameworks?

Finally, set of unanswered questions remains for further research: Is the mass or rather the leader the driving force of revolutions or each of the two have only limited supportive roles? Which elements of a revolution differentiate it from a transition process? Should a failed mass action against governmental authority still be considered a revolution? Or as the overturn of government be considered a revolution if this overturn did not bring significant desired social changes as in the case of Egypt? Lastly, in approaching the concept of revolution the scholarship almost unanimously points to its progressive nature. How should then theorists treat revolutionary involutions (i.e. Bolshevik or Iranian revolutions), and how do their characteristics differ from a regular revolution?

Another good methodological question is what research method is better to aptly in order to studying revolutions. In this regard we face again the good old debate between qualitative and quantitative school. And despite many other cases the debate is clearly won by the supporters of small N. This is because the scholarship writing on revolutions did not come even close to the point of agreement on the main traits of revolutions. Thus the concept vary from author to author in their most elementary components, varying in kind (of modernization, innovation or regression...) form of manifestation (violent non violent), who is the engine (bughouse, peasant..) level of achievements (successful, unsuccessful) and so on. Thus if we paraphrase Moore argument on analyzing major historical phenomena it would sound like how many revolutions of the same kind could a scholar collect and put in his database to run the most simple regression. And how many chances that an event of the same sort would happen in the future?

What drives ethnic conflicts forward?

2018-03-16T06:34:00.002-07:00

Which school of though better explains the causes of ethnic violence?

Introduction

The nature of ethnic violence has been always generating debates among scholars coming from the fields of comparative politics and international relations. The question discussed in this post will contrast several types of arguments, the rationalist argument that sees the ethnic conflict as a rational result of group and individual behavior (Steinberg 1981; Glazer & Moynihan 1975) with the premordialist argument that observe the ethnic violence as an inevitable clash based on innate antagonisms of contending groups (Smith 1986; Kaplan 1993), the constructivist, and the symbolist politics. I will try to project which of the theory provides a better answer to the questions: whether conflicts among different ethnicities are natural phenomena or and what are the factors that trigger the escalation of ethnic violence?

Rational choice theory perceives ethnic conflict to be a result of the rational pursuit of private or group interests. The conflict between different contending groups is not fought along cultural lines but is rather waged for achieving of such rational interests as wealth, power, and security. The rationalist logic in understanding ethnic conflict comes from their instrumental understanding of ethnicity. In this context, Glazer & Moynihan (1975), and Steinberg (1981) claim that ethnicity is “… a tool used by individuals, groups or elites to obtain some larger, typically material end” (cited in Lake and Rothchild 1998, p. 5). In the rationalists’ understanding, ethnicity is just a powerful political identity that is not different from other political identities. In this context, rational theorists do not identify any variations between ethnic conflicts and other forms of violence, interest-based contentions, which are constructed on ideological differences. As Kaufmann (2006) puts it, for rationalists “ethnicity is primarily a label used for political advantage” (p. 49).

The main problem with the rationalist argument is that ethnicity should not be treated as a regular form of political identification. While the political identity can change over time the ethnic identity remains always immutable. So, there is no clear definition given to the concept of identity from the rationalist perspective. This conceptual ambiguity introduced by the rationalists requires scholars to be more specific in defining the difference between ideological and ethnic violence (Biddle cited in Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).

Biddle specifies that unlike politically based conflicts, the ethnic wars are fought for the resistance of regional groups rather than for national principles or for the redistribution of roles between social classes. The political based conflicts are fought for maintenance of a specific ideology while the latter for survival of ethnic groups. In the same order, Kaufmann (2006) claims that the difference between the two is that “ethnic cleavages produce ‘ethnic’ or ‘intercommunity’ civil wars, whereas ideological cleavages result in ‘revolutionary’ or ‘ideological’ civil wars” (cited in Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007, p. 186). So, the ideological cleavages lead to rivalries between the state elite and the rebels for the loyalty of their constituents, while ethnic divisions result in struggles between clearly-defined and “mutually exclusive groups” (p. 186).

Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) critique is that ethnic and ideological divisions are artificial. By looking in a comparative perspective on Iraqi and Vietnam wars, the scholars draw the conclusion that it would be misleading to make a clear-cut differentiation between ideological and ethnic wars. Both elements, according to them, are present in the same wars and source one from another. Moreover, they notice that civil war violence should not be necessarily perceived uniquely as a reflection of existing cleavages between contending groups but also as a generator of new cleavages in itself. In this sense, with the escalation of a conflict situation the opposing groups can intensify the already existing cleavages that consequently lead to the rise of violence (p. 204).

A distinctive rationalist model is the security dilemma model. According to Posen 1993; Fearon 1995; Snyder & Jervis 1999, the conflict situation between ethnic groups is a result of the existing insecurity and uncertainty among them. Consequently, the dilemma in ethnic conflicts is that the collective fear against a potential conflict leads groups to violence. Thus, by increasing the level of personal security, the groups decrease the level of general security, fact that leads to violent outcomes. According to Lake and Rothchild (1998), and Kaufman (2006), ethnic wars are caused primarily by information failures and commitment problems. These two factors impede contending groups from reaching a commonly agreed, negotiated bargain. By private information the scholars mean “anything known by one group but not the other, including how intense their preferences are about specific policy objectives, how cohesive the group would be if challenged, or how military leaders would use their forces should fighting break out” (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 12). Therefore, the result of uncertainty about each others’ intentions increases the level of insecurity, which consequently pushes ethnic groups into violent conflicts.

One more problem stemming from information failure is that groups resort to bluffing strategies to be able to augment the level of personal security, which consequently, leads to an increase in the general level of insecurity. According to Lake and Rothchild (1998), with the escalation of violence, the cost of information dramatically increases also. In this sense, the conflicting groups choose to enhance their offensive and defensive capacities instead of spending financial resources on finding information about political claims and real intentions of rivals. Kaufman (2006) adds, in the same context, that conflicting parties are oftentimes unable to calculate the potential conflict outcomes and in this way, the potential loser may not be able to avoid the conflict before it escalates.

The second problem identified both by Lake and Rothchild, and Kaufman is the problem of credible commitments. According to them, the groups would prefer to bear the high costs of war today in order to avoid a potential defeat later. Consequently, the mutually advantageous agreement is impossible because both parties expect the other to defect from the agreement commitments, and consequently to use the situation for military benefits. Lijphart (1967) explores potential solutions for achieving credible commitments, and namely: first, institutionalizing political power-sharing arrangements between ethnic groups (electoral rules or group vetoes); second, placing important economic assets in ethnic minority’s oversight; third, maintaining an ethnic balance in the army and police forces (cited in Lake & Rotchild, 1998, p. 14).

Another factor that increases the chances of a security dilemma is the first-strike advantage (Melander, 2009). Each conflicting ethnic group knows, that by striking first, it could reach a net advantage over the situation. However as literature shows, this military action is not common for all communal conflicts. After carrying out a statistical analysis of ethnic conflicts, Melander (2009) draws the conclusion that the first-strike strategy is mostly used in communities where the number of competing groups is approximately equal. And vice-versa, in communities where the opposing groups are highly disproportionate, and one clearly dominates the other, the first-strike risk is extremely small (p. 96).

Another derivation of the rationalist model, which tries to explain the ethnic violence, is the predatory elites approach. According to Figueiredo and Weingast (1999), the security dilemma does not sufficiently explain how political elites manage to convince the masses to prefer violence to peace (p. 50). In their model, predatory elites are the main engines behind ethnic wars and genocides. Bloody conflagrations, in this sense, occur as a consequence of politics of the ruling elites which recourse in this sense to manipulation of masses (cited in Kaufman, 2006, p. 46-47). In this context, the theorists mention that there are three types of conflicts that could be triggered by elites. First, the ideological conflicts, which are characterized by ideological struggles defined in economic or class terms, (the case of Communist revolutions in Russia or China). In the same category scholars place the religious crusades. Second, the criminal assaults on state sovereignty, which challenge the state authority over a certain territory by individual or cartel powers (regional warlords or drug leaders in Colombia). The last is the raw struggle for power of local leaders.

The struggles for power makes political leaders use all possible political cards. The use of ethnic politics as an instrument to access power is hence briefly portrayed in the cases of Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Kenya and India. The Kaufman (2006) critique regarding this model is that is illogic for leaders to venture in ethnic politics that would lead to violence among ethnic groups because in the vast majority of the cases, they lose political power as an effect of the application of this strategy.

Mueller’s (2000) conclusion after analyzing the Rwandan and Serbian wars, is that ethnic wars in fact do not exist. He claims that the ethnic conflict is somewhat similar to the non-ethnic conflict since it is carried out by small “bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political leaders” (p. 42). Moreover, that in former Yugoslavia the violence escalated not because of nationalist claims from the opposing parties but because well-armed groups of thugs and looters managed to take under control certain regions as an effect of the breakdown of central authority (p. 47). According to Mueller, the composition of these paramilitary groups was 80% criminals and 20% radical nationalists. According to his calculations, even in the case of the Rwandan genocide the number of perpetuators could not exceed fifty thousand people, which constituted less than two percent of the whole Hutu population.

In conclusion, Mueller (2000) says that ethnicity as such, does not play a role in the escalation of violent conflicts but it is a feature around which perpetrators and politicians construct their politics or reasoning behind inhuman behavior. The solution that Mueller (2000) proposes is to increase the international policing in conflict regions. The presence of well-armed international military forces will discourage the criminal mobs to get involved into military actions. Yet, even though Mueller (2000) reasoning sounds well-argued, the scholar fails to answer some key questions. First, assuming that the ethnic wars in Serbia and Rwanda were led by non-ethnically bound military gangs searching for war loots only, why did they degrade to genocidal practices then which are economically non-profitable? Moreover, why did they ally with nationalistic leaders if their interests in the war significantly differed?

Analyzing the connection between the predatory elite behavior and security dilemma, Kaufman (2006) identifies that it is rarely possible to find a pure form of security dilemma where the leaders are not also led by predatory motives. Consequently, Kaufman declares “chauvinist leaders always claim to be driven by security motives, but what makes them chauvinists is that they deem their group’s security as requiring dominance over rival groups - which is, naturally, threatening to the others” (p. 54). The opposite is also valid, which means that if there are two parties are competing for authority over the same territory, we deal with a security dilemma. In this sense, none of the parties feel safe except when their status demands are fulfilled. Yet, these two cannot be achieved at once (p. 55).

To conclude on the rationalist approaches, it is worth mentioning that ethnic identity is regarded as an instrument for the achievement of the rational ends. The leaders use it as a tool to justify group or personal interests. That is why acceding to this school is seen mainly as a tool of mass manipulation and motivation of the perpetuated violence against other groups.

Contrasting rationalist argumentation of the ethnic violence primordialist school treats ethnic conflict as an inevitable result of cohabitation of different ethnic groups on the same territory. According to this understanding, the ethnic identity is a characteristic received from birth, which defines the state of belonging of an individual to a specific ethnic group. In this context, the ethnicity is the main agent, which makes the individual identify himself with a specific community in opposition to others. Consequently, as Van den Berghe (1981) mentions, the conflict is rooted in ethnic division of societies and will always remain a part of their history (cited in Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 7). In addition, Moynihan (1993) reinforces the argument by stating that "nation states no longer seem inclined to go to war with one another, but ethnic groups fight all the time" (cited in Fearon & Laitin, 1996, p. 716). In a similar context, Horowitz (1985), Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) notice that heterogeneous societies are more likely to experience intense domestic conflicts. A related argument is extended by Gellner (1983) who emphasizes “the nationalist principle is violated when there are multiple ‘potential nations’ within state boundaries” (cited in Fearon et al., 2007, p. 2). The conclusion in this sense would be that a territorial political unity could be formed only in the cases when the region can become ethnically homogeneous, which could be achieved by killing, expelling, or assimilates all non encompassing ethnic groups.

Bhavnani and Miodownik (2008) try to bring empirical evidence to the Primordialist argument. Running a statistical analysis of the relationship between ethnic salience and the probability of violent conflict in a number of African states, they conclude that the stronger the feeling of ethnicity of members across rival groups, the higher the probability of conflict at the lowest level of ethnic polarization. They deduce that political domination by minority groups increases the probability of violent conflict to escalate. Thus, a larger disproportion of political representation leads to higher likelihood of political conflict between ethnic groups.

The main shortcoming of primordialist school is that it fails to explain the variation in the magnitude and localization of ethnic violence. By conducting an empirical study on the post-Soviet space, Laitin (2001) did not identify a correlation between ethnic differences and ethnic wars. He did not find any relevant evidence to explain why ethno-cultural diversity in some post-Soviet states led to violence while in others it did not. Despite this argument Laitin does not negate the salience of the ethnic component on the escalation of violent conflicts claiming that ethnic diversity influences only marginally the probability of ethnic wars while.

Checking the same hypothesis on the other data set Gurr (2000) attempts to identify the tendencies in the escalation and de-escalation of violence in the period 1999-2000. For this purpose the scholar analyzes fifty-nine conflicts, and concludes that twenty-three of them de-escalated while only seven escalated (p. 54). This fact talks about a fluctuation of the level of violence in ethnic conflicts, which proves the non-sustainability of the primordialist approach according to which the number of violent conflicts should equal the number of cohabitating ethnic groups at an approximately same level.

In exchange, Gurr (2000) puts forward the concept of “accommodating behavior”, which assumes that ethnic groups can easily institute a system of accommodating policies, which would neutralize the chances for conflict situations among them. According to Gurr, the accommodating policy could be easily enforced if three main rules are followed. First is to promote democratic institutions and practices, which would enforce equal representation of all cohabitating ethnic groups and hence institute a set of norms restraining unilateral repressions. The second is the involvement of international actors, and the implementation of international human rights norms, that will make the region more secure and will align it to the existing global standards. Finally, an international global elite should be created, which will set up a global governance system by integrating state policies into a system of global politics (p. 59). Moreover, the author mentions that “preventive diplomacy which could be popular - not only because early engagement cold be cheaper than belated crisis management, but also because it is the preferred instrument of the new regime” (p. 58). According to him, the only risk for instituting a system of accommodating behavior would be the emergence of hegemonic elites who will tend to use the state for the promotion of their own interests. Additionally, the author mentions that anticipation and resolution of ethnic conflicts could be easily achieved by granting large territorial autonomy to minorities. Consequently, the risk of dividing the state could be anticipated by instituting a power sharing mechanism in which minority groups would be involved (p. 52).

Consequently, having shown that the primordialist approach does not provide complete answers by assuming that the ethnic conflict is inevitable because it results from competition of ethnic groups, we still do not know what is the outcome of state policy if a majority or a minority ethnic group leads a country. In this sense, Fearon et al. (2007) investigates whether there is a greater risk of the escalation of an ethnic conflict if an ethnic minority holds full political authority. Their initial assumption is that the exclusion of ethnic groups from power would lead to the agitation and ethnic politics. Thus statistical analysis proves that there is a very low degree of chance that in the countries with presidents belonging to a minority ethnic group would start civil war.

Constructivist explanation brings an added value to the debate on causes of ethnic violence. For Anderson (1983), Dominguez (1989), Young (1993) and Brubaker (1995) ethnicity is neither immutable nor completely open. For them, ethnicity is constructed from an intertwined network of social interactions. Therefore, ethnicity is seen as a social construction. That is why ethnicity cannot be treated as a cause of violent conflicts by itself as it is already a product of social construction. This theoretical framework claims that the majority of ethnic groups prefer to achieve their interests and demands in a peaceful manner, by using the institutionalized political channels (p. 6). For constructivists the conflict emerges from pathological social systems, which cannot be controlled and guided neither by individuals nor groups (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 6). Kalyvas (2008) mentiones in this regard that for constructivists the conflict has a self-propelling power in itself – it tends to strengthens ethnic identity which leads as a consequence to intensification of the violence.

Making a comparison between rationalist and constructivist argumentation about the ethnic conflicts Kalivas (2008) finds that they both are in favor of differentiating between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. The difference is however that the rationalist school does not practically differ between the two while the constructivist school wants to divide them to show the differentiation pattern. For instance, when combatants in ethnic wars decide to change the side they are fighting for is very rare, however this happens oftentimes in ideological conflicts. Kalyvas mentions in this case that both political and ethnic identities have similar chances to be abandoned in wars. For instance, when their army was defied the Republicans left the country. Similarly with the thousands of Caucasian Russians, nationalist Chinese, and anticommunist Vietnamese, they left their countries because they could not align to the new political identity (p. 1047). The conclusion Kalyvas comes to in his analysis of ethnic and non-ethnic wars is that these may not necessarily differ as much one from another as it is suggested in the scholarly literature. He claims hence that the existing variation originates less from the nature of identities but rather from the strategies of opposing groups in ethnic wars (p. 1048). That is why the causes o ethnic violence should not bi singled out or differentiated from the ideological ones.

In addition, Kalyvas (2008) proves that the constructivist theory does not resist the empirical testing of individual behavior during conflicting situations. Accordingly, by constructivist assumption the individuals should back the ethnic groups they belong to. Nevertheless, the scholar proves that a significant number of ethnic defections can be observed in wars. The scholar also remarks that these conditions are not specific only to ethnic wars but also to non-ethnic violent actions, fact that reinforces his stance that there is no clear division between ethnic and non-ethnic wars (p. 1050). As he puts it, the main reasons of ethnic defection are the habit of individuals to follow the leader of the clan, material incentives and fear of reckoning and revenge (p. 1052). Hence, the scholar highlights the salience of ethnic defection mainly because it obliterates the elements that make ethnic identity essential for collective action (p. 1055). Accordingly, Kalyvas mentions that ethnic civil wars where ethnic defection takes place degenerate into competitions for the loyalty of constituents and therefore are similar to non-ethnic civil wars. To conclude, constructivism for Kalyvas is a comprehensive theory but it does not fully explain ethnic-based behavior.

From the perspective of symbolic politics theory, which is a branch of the social-psychological theory, the main causes of extreme ethnic violence are rooted in group myths. According to Kaufman (2006), myths justify hostility among ethnic groups and create the state of fear of group extinction. In the same time, for symbolic politics the myths are the main triggers of chauvinist mobilization (p. 47). Thus, ethnic identity is neither rational in its nature nor a socially construct manipulated by elites. It is a uniform pattern of belief of a community about “the other”. Consequently, according to Smith (1986), every ethnic or national group has its own “myth-symbol complex” (cited in Kaufman, 2006, p. 50). Thus, the myth is the community coagulator, which identifies what elements should be incorporated in the common culture and which not. Consequently, the myth is the defining element of the group history.

Thus, being constructed on the findings of the neurologist science, symbolic politics theory shows that emotions rather than rational calculations are the main stimulators for individuals to act. Emotions make people choose the set of possible priorities. Thus being in line with thit the rationalist school argument Kaufman (2006) affirms that “fear, for example, causes people to prioritize security over other values such as wealth” (p. 51). Consequently, he notes “the more a group’s myth-symbol complex focuses the group hostility on a particular adversary, the greater the probability of a violent clash with that adversary” (p. 51). According to him the escalation of ethnic conflicts is a direct result of negative mythological arrangements, which exists in that society. The myth justifies hostility versus the outer group and based on the fear of extinction encourages members of that group to strike first. The given prescription is to change the intergroup symbolic politics. The transformation of mythological principles that underpin social beliefs would reduce the chances for predatory leaders and chauvinist politicians to use the myth as a vehicle for the promotion of their interests (p. 47).

Even though Kaufman (2006) attempted to show that his theory is more successful than the rational choice theory in explaining cases of extreme violence in ethnic conflicts, this theory did not attract many supporters. The main critics of symbolist politics theory claim that myths and symbols cannot explain the variation in outcomes of ethnic politics (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 864). They also emphasize the impossibility to treat political symbols as independent self-satisfactory elements as they did not exist prior or independently of human communities. In this context, it is claimed that political symbols cannot be treated solely as explanatory factors for chauvinist politics. They should also be analyzed as consequences of this type of politics. If political symbols are constants and underpin the political identity foundation, why then ethnic conflicts are not permanent also? Why do they escalate only at certain points in time and vary from one region to another? The symbolist theory does not explain the dynamics of civil wars and their occurrences.

Which school better explains the causes of ethnic violence?

My argument is that rational school has a powerful tool to explain the causes and escalation of ethnic conflicts. However its explanation power is confined to those cases, which could be, characterize as being non-ethnic conflicts. That is why I would insist for a multi-scholarly approach for explanation of ethnic conflicts

Assuming that there is no scholarly consensus among the schools on the causes of ethnic conflicts I will try to identify which of the aforementioned better explain and cover a larger range of causes of ethnic conflicts. For this purpose I will mainly rely on the empirical analysis of Sahadevan (2003) five major causes of ethnic conflicts identified in Central Asia.

The first cause identified by Sahadevan (2003) is best explained by the constructivist theory. This is the concern of ethnic groups to lose their identity. This situation usually emerges in the case of small bordering minority groups, which were massively involved in decolonization movements, and consequently nurtured their aspiration for political independence. This type of concern engages ethnic groups usually sharing a distinct remote territory in ethnic politics fact usually non-tolerated by the numerically dominant majority. The second and the third causes are the fear of assimilation and marginalization. This cause could be answered through both perspective of both structuralist and rationalist schools. In the case of Jat Sikh, for instance, Sahadevan (2003) mentions the fact that the community was facing an internal decline accompanied by external threat sourcing from assimilative attitudes of the Hindu who treated Sikhism as a “sword arm of Hinduism” (p. 407). The author qualifies, in this sense, colonization as a state-sponsored ethnic oriented political program, which aims to neutralize the power and political positions of existing ethnic groups and to convert them in minorities within their own territory (p. 407). Hence the rationalist argument would stand for the fear of elites to lose their advantageous social status thus will recourse to the ethnic politics to oppose the assimilative and colonization practices. The structuralist argument in this case would stand for the rigidity of the ethnic values against the heterogeneous assimilating ones. The cause of relative deprivation could be also explained by the rationalist logic however it finds a better explanation power in the theories of social movements. Consequently, Sahadevan mentions that ethnic relations in Asia have always been a state-controlled affair, thus the denial of equality status for some minorities would directly affect their survival. The last cause identified by Sahadevan (2003) is directly related to the fight for power among existing ethnic groups. This is again a both rationally and culturally drieven argument. The scholar agues in this sense is that the majoritarian hegemonic principle of governance instituted in all analyzed states may lead to the total exclusion of ethnic minorities from political life.

Religious Revivalism and the Secular State

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One of the most controversial phenomena observed in the mid and especially the second half of the twentieth century is the extraordinary increase in the role of religion in public and private life. This unprecedented escalation of religious activism forced in some cases the national governments to adjust their political vector to the religious demands of society, while in others led to the overthrow of civil governments, thus transforming secular states in religious ones. Moreover, it seems that the revitalization of religious values is not a phenomenon bound to a specific type of society with a particular set of political, economic or social values but affects all types of states independent of their religion, geographic location or form of political organization. In this sense, we could follow the rise and fall of a wide variety of revivals taking place around the world throughout the twentieth century, in particular. For instance, Garfein (n.a.) notes the occurrence of sixteen different revivals taking place in the United States alone. Not all of them have had a fundamental impact upon American society even though some have left behind significant changes. Other sizeable revival movements have also been witnessed in South and East Asia, such as the revivalism of Sikhs and Muslims in pre-independent India (Fox 1985) and the tremendous increase in the number of adherents to religious cults in modern China. Concurrently, the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought up massive religious revivals of the Catholic and Orthodox Christian churches. Nevertheless, despite their cardinal dissimilarities in the form of revivalist manifestations, none of the above-mentioned revivals challenged seriously the authority of the state as an institutional structure. Moreover, none of them undercut the established political legal procedures.

A notably different trajectory could be observed in the case of some Islamic revivalist movements in the Middle East. Unlike in the above-mentioned revivals, the increase in the religious activity in the states with a majoritarian Muslim population directly challenged the authority of governments and represented at times a serious threat to the peaceful secular political process. Thus, we might notice an increase in political Islamic activity in Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s in particular that has led to the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. Moreover, the radicalization of Islamist movements in Iran led to the outbreak of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s secular regime. Also, the increase in religious fervor in the Muslim Pakistan region, in the end of the 1960s, led the army leaders to encroach and to topple down the civil government and to transform the country into an Islamic state. Hence, in some instances religious revivalism threatens the existence of the secular state and the civil political institutions and practices while in other cases it does not.

Consequently, the research question that I raise in this paper out of this puzzle is why does revivalism pose a threat to the civil governments in states with a predominantly Muslim religion while in states with a largely Christian society it does not threaten the central political power? I argue that revivalism in states with a majoritarian Muslim society displays a much tougher impact on the political system than in the states with majoritarian Christian society. This amplified effect of the religious revival in the political sphere is caused by the relatively low level of legitimacy of current secular regimes in predominant Muslim societies and by its legal capacity to substitute the secular political system. Moreover, the increased role of Islam in this region is a consequence of its dual image. From the onset, Islam emerged as both a political and a spiritual doctrine, which was used as the language, or semiotic code of the political discourse. Closer to modernity, especially with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the beginning of colonization and persecution for anti-colonial struggle, Islam became a mass vehicle for social resistance. Hence, it also represented the engine for the promotion of collective mobilization for civil, social, and political rights.

Conversely, religious revivalism in predominantly Christian societies historically has not threatened the state civil authorities and has not undermined the established political process. The reason behind this different scenario I argue is the different nature and target of revivalism. Christian revivals emerged as a reaction to the intrusion of the government in the moral and spiritual realm of society. Moreover, they promoted reforms that were targeted at the institution of the Church as such or, addressed the “moral vacuum” rather than the political one that existed in societies at different points in history. Finally, Christian revivalism used successfully or unsuccessfully the political institutional framework to achieve its desired social reforms and did not attempt to change the extant political institutions or the secular state as a whole. It activated within the political organization of the state which oftentimes was based on values drawn from the Christian religion.

In order to develop my thesis in this paper I begin with a comprehensive analysis of the concept of revivalism in the academic literature and how such concepts as Jeremiah, collective memory, Golden Age and nostalgia shape a better understanding the term. Next, I give my own definition of the term which I will base my further hypothesis on. Consequently, I analyze several cases of revivalism in Muslim countries to see the impact of these revivalisms upon civil governments. I try to contrast them with revivalisms in western countries, in particular to the United States.

Conceptualizing Revivalism

It seems that the meaning of the word revivalism varies across time and field of study. In its common application it means a return to previous values or increase in interest in something that has already passed. Thus, this term is commonly applied in literature, art, architecture and astronomy. Yet, the sense of revitalization is not as flat even in its most common application because the return to former or traditional values does not imply that the application of the same values to a new context will lead automatically to similar results. Wallace (1956), for instance, defines a revitalization movement, more specific, as “a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture” (265).

Moreover, the largest application of the concept of revivalism is related to the field of religious studies and mainly to Christian religion. In this sense, Oxford Dictionary describes religious revivalism as “a general reawakening of or in religion in a particular community or church” and “arose of religious fervor …. by means of lively evangelistic services”. Though, assuming that history provides us with fragmented narratives about diverse religious revivals which took place in the last several centuries, the following question is whether we should analyze the fragmented revival as a part of the same phenomena manifested in ebbs and flows of intensity, or each revival should be seen as an independent act with its separate genesis and end?

In this sense, the literature on the conceptualization of the term has not reached a consensus. The supporters of the cyclical understanding (McLoughlin 1978) affirm that the religious revival passes through a number of cycles. Consequently, analyzing the American revivalist movements, McLoughlin mentions that United States passed through four Great Awakenings (term used by him for revivalism) within the periods 1730-1760, 1800-1830, 1890-1920 and 1960-1990. According to him, the Awakening is the reaction of a particular society to political instabilities and the newly accepted values throughout history. Thus, he insists that the Awakening is not an isolated religious phenomenon but a reaction of the church to the changes in moral principles, such as honesty, frugality, and piety. A similar view is taken by Marvin (cited in Long 1994) who describes revivalism as a “supernatural act of God to restore the church from a decline in ‘primitive purity of doctrine’” (84).

The critics of the cyclical understanding of revivalism underline the approach’s incapability to analyze revivalism in a larger historical context. Thus, analyzing revivalism in Islamic societies, Davis (1987) observes that this particular approach fails “to address in the systematic manner the nature of socio-economic changes” (36). Thus, the solution that he proposes is not to analyze revivalism as a discontinuity but to look at it as a form of relation between Islam and politics or, in other words, the politicization of Islam.

On the other hand, the supporters of the linear model (Smith and Conan cited in Long 1994) understand revivalism as a continuous process of spread of religious beliefs. In this context, analyzing the similarities in the aspects of revivals of Old School Presbyterian and Reformed Dutch coalition and New School Presbyterians, Baptists and Congregationalists, Conan (cited in Long 1994) emphasizes that revivals develop in stages. Therefore, he mentions:

“We are now … in the fourth great revival under the gospel dispensation. The first commenced in Pentecostal times… The second commenced in the time of Martin Luther … The third was in the days of Edwards, and Whitefield, and the Tennants. The fourth is that which now pervades our country” (82).

Having presented the mainstream debate on the central components of revivalism the following question is what are the internal and external conditions, which lead masses to join revivalist movements? Why individuals magnify the role of the past and why do they venture to transpose it into the future? How do the feelings of personal discontent with the present become a part of the collective grievance to change the future? In this context, we can observe that the public manifestation of revivalism has at its basis a personal predisposition of the individual to look at his own past with an increased degree of mystical admiration, and consecutively, to try to exteriorize it by creating nets of social alliances of solidarity. At the basis of public discontent stays a hidden image about an idealized past. The larger is the discomfort with the present, the greater is the illusion that the past time was better. This type of admiration is mostly defined by scholarship as nostalgia or homesickness. In this context, for Murphy (2009a) “nostalgia serves important psychological functions, including building a sense of personal identity, defending against existential crises that arise in times of rapid social change, and bolstering social bonds among groups and generations” (131). Considering the fact that homesickness most often affects people who leave their homeland, theorists recognize that nostalgia is a psychological mechanism that connects the individual with a certain place. In this regard, Boym (2001) adds that nostalgia is not only the longing for a place but also longing for a specific time, which is not necessarily retrospective but can also be prospective.

On the other hand, Boym (2001) emphasizes that nostalgia can bear a great deal of danger because “it tends to confuse the actual home and the imaginary one” (xvi). Consequently, the author mentions that “in extreme cases [nostalgia] can create a phantom homeland, for the sake of which one is ready to die and kill” (xvi). Consequently, Boym distinguishes between two types of nostalgia, restorative and reflective. As she posits, the political application of the first type of nostalgia is extremely dangerous because its proselytes do not perceive nostalgia as a fragmented image of a segmented truth but as an absolute “project of truth”. On the contrary, the reflective type of nostalgia recognizes the shortcomings of the past but try to construct the future taking the past as a spiritual fundament.

Thus, having determined that nostalgia is a psychological comforting mechanism that reacts against the uncertainty of the present, the question is how the personal understanding of reality shapes the pattern of collective behavior. In this regard, one can observe that many political entrepreneurs tended to use the image about history (real or imagined) to lure the public into idealized political projects. In this sense, I will review several scholarly analyzed mechanisms of how individualized nostalgia becomes a platform for collective grievances.

The first, in this sense, is the use of nostalgic politics, which means the appeal to psychological mechanisms of nostalgia to manage political and/or social change rather than to deal with personal issues. In other words, the nostalgic politics tends to externalize the personal feelings of history by bringing them into the public space and to shape from them a coagulated system of political grievances.

The second is the concept of collective memory, which is close in meaning to the notion of nostalgic politics. The difference is that, it switches the level of analysis from individual to community. Thus, for Baker (cited in Zerubaverl 1994) collective memory is a “kind of history that has most influence upon the life of the community and the course of events in the history that common people carry around in their heads” (3). In addition, Halbwachs (cited in Zerubaverl 1994) shows that the perception in history of one group is different from the history itself. The history entering into the collective memory is a recyclable subject, which is used for the political reconstruction and for adjustments in future political projects. In this sense, Davis (2005) and Hourani (1991) agree with Schwartz (cited in Zerubaverl 1994) who argues that “the past cannot be construed; it can only be selectively exploited” (5).

The next concept, which tries to understand the preconditions for religious revivalism is the Golden Age. Similarly to nostalgia, the Golden Age makes an appeal to revive or to reconstruct an image of the collective memory about an idealized past. Yet, differently from the last, it does not try to build its “ideal” version of political model on any of the lived experiences but digs much deeper into history, stretching its arguments from historical beginnings or from the time of glory. In this context, Lowenthal (cited in Murphy 2009a) labels Golden Age as “an imaged landscape invested with all [critics] missing in the modern world” (130).

As a result, taking a general view over the three analyzed concepts we can observe that all notions bear some similarities. All of them generate their images of the future based on individual emotions about the past, and all of them contrast their idolized historical models against the corrupted image of the present. Consequently, considering that the precondition for the outbreak of a mass revival is due to a sophisticated arrangement of all the puzzle pieces about reality, the question that pop up is who is the promoter and who shapes the contrast how past and present should be understood?

The answer to this question could be found in Murphy’s Prodigal Nation (2009b), who describes Jeremiads as the main agents who emphasize the discontinuity between the past and present. Consequently, as the scholar mentions, jeremiads “[lament] a current crisis, identifying a historical point in time where the source of decline was introduced” (83). In this context, the jeremiads deconstruct the image of history. They select and put together only those segments that prove their diagnosis of the present ills. Thus, on the one hand, they appeal to the personal feeling of nostalgia, and on the other hand, they are the active agencies of reconstruction of the images of collective memory and Golden Age. Accordingly, as Murphy (2009b) states, by appealing to this method they distort the reality twice: firstly, by denigrating the present and secondly, by exalting the past. Hence the success of jeremiads’ projects is the reflection of their capacity to create an alternative attractive version of history, which is desired to be transposed into present, and the most important, their capacity to coagulate all nostalgically oriented individuals to share a unique identity and to start a collective action.

In order to introduce some clarity in my further analysis about the difference between patterns of Christian and Muslim revivalisms, the concept will be used as a combination of elements and factors mentioned in the analyzed scholarly literature. Revivalism, in this sense, will be understood as a sudden intensification in religious activity in the public sphere as a reaction to the radical social changes taking place in society, aiming to restore traditional values and norms either by using the political mechanisms available, if these permit, or otherwise by overthrowing the existing political system.

Legitimacy of Secular States

Muslim Societies

At the beginning of 1970s the secular Bhutto regime in Pakistan was forced to adjust its policy to the increasing demands of the rising revival of the fundamentalist Islamic movements. The start was given by constraining the power to accept the Islamic signs as state symbols and continued by prohibiting the sale of alcohol, banning gambling and shutting down all night-clubs, restaurants and other kinds of night entertaining venues. Apparently, all these adjustments did not appease the raising claims of the Islamists who intended to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state. Consequently, the pan-Islamists formed an electoral alliance (Pakistan National Alliance) made of the major religious parties such as Jama’at al-Islami, to reach the public offices and to change the state from within. The platform of the alliance was based on the demands listed in the manifesto, which according to them was based on Qur’an. Moreover, after losing the elections, the Islamists openly supported the Pakistan’s military leader in his pursuit to power. Thus, in 1977, the chief of army Shaff Zia al Haq, together with a number of other officers, arranged a coup thus removing Bhutto and its government from power. Next, Al-Haq suspended the working constitution and declared the martial law. In the same year the insurgents formed a joint government with Islamists.

The undertaken reforms of the upcoming period focused on the fundamental change of both the state structure and of the basics of the Pakistani society. In this context, one of the reforms was the creation of a Council for Islamic Ideology whose purpose was to work into the direction of islamisation of the Pakistani society. The “islamisation touched on all areas relating to Islam and public life, including prayer, Ramadan, social issues such as segregation, economic reform, shari’a and the rights of women” (Milton-Edwards 2005: 61). Thus, the final purpose of the newly created government was the transformation of Pakistan from a Muslim state into an Islamic one. This example gives a general picture of the lawlessness of the civil rule in Muslim societies, such as Pakistan. Why did it happen?

In this section I try to argue that the low capacity of secular states in predominantly Muslim societies to face the increasing advance of religious revivals in the 1970s and the 1980s is due to the lower level of political legitimacy of civil governments in front of their populations. This decreased acceptability was especially emphasized by the increased legitimacy of Islam. In this sense, both the political borders and the political system skeletons of the modern postcolonial states, such as Pakistan, were mostly duplicated from their former metropolis or were arbitrarily imposed by the former rulers. Thus the new political entities were formed without many consultations of the ordinary inhabitants of those territories. Consequently, many of those artificially included into the newly formed political organization were members of different clans and kinships which indwelled diverse territories. They also had different traditions and practiced different versions of Islam. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that just in several decades of independence the populace of such states acquired a sense of loyalty to a remote government sometimes composed of members of another clan. Accordingly, there was a huge gap of trust, transformed into very low legitimacy, between the political leaders of the laic state and the local population. Thereby Islam appeared for many states as the only shared value among these various kinships which was in different historical periods embraced by both the political regime leaders as well as their challengers.

In this sense, Karpat (2001) mentions that when the Ottoman Empire started to crumble, Sultan Abdulhamid intensely used Islam as a unifying ideology between all Muslim territories without challenging local rules and customs. A similar example is attested in the case of the Sadat secular regime that deliberately resorted to Islamic symbols in the 1973 war against Israel. Numerous radical Islamic movements interpreted the military defeat of the Egyptian army as a price paid for its deviation from Islam. Consequently, the rising criticism against Nasser drastically decreased the legitimacy of the laic political regime, hence forcing Sadat to recover it by embracing Islam closer to his governance.

On the other hand, the legitimacy of Islamic revivalist movements in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was growing. Their effects were aggrandized by placing a substantial focus on social, economic and cultural goals. Islam, in this context, was used as an engine for promoting new values. Thereby, the late nineteen-century Islamic revival in India triggered the development of Urdu language. Similarly, the nineteen-century Sufi revival in the remainings of the Ottoman state is considered by Karpat (2001) to be “a form of grassroots Islamic democracy” (23).

Another important factor, which enhanced the superior legitimacy of Islam, was its intensive propaganda against colonial domination. The anti-colonial component of the Islamic revival was even more accentuated in the regions where the foreign domination did not accept any form of antagonist political manifestations. The religious discourse, in this case, became a script, or a hidden transcript, understood only by those who shared the local code of meanings. While some revivals tended to upkeep a hidden anti-colonial message, others openly displayed their political intentions. In this context, we can mention the Sayyid Ahmad’s brotherhood revival in the nineteenth century, which shortly became a mass political movement, which in parallel with its religious agenda, openly tried to mobilize the Muslim part of the Indian society against the British domination (Karpat: 31). Another increase in the Islamic revitalization was observed in the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This attack coagulated together many dormant religious forces from the whole region. Thus throughout the war against the Soviets, the Islamic fundamentalists oriented their resistance against the communist occupation (Milton-Edwards 2005: 77).

Moreover, the low economic performance and inability to provide the majority of population with minimum standards of living were two of the main features that stopped the secular governments from achieving a sufficient level of legitimacy in front of their population. The encouragement of a liberalist “open door” policy (infitah) by the Sadat regime in Egypt in times of a deep economic crisis during which thousands of employees lost their jobs and the food prices magnified dramatically, and the massive discontent with the state economic policy were inflated by the intensification of the religious activity of the Islamic Brotherhood which kept stressing the illegitimate character of the promoted policy and the institutionalized secular political process. Thus, Sadat was considered to be a barrier for the state advancement that deviated from the ‘true’ form of Islamic society. In this context, one of the radical leaders, Ahmad Shukri Mustafa stated:

“I reject the Egyptian regime and the Egyptian reality in all its aspects since everything in it is in contradiction to the shari’a and belongs to heresy… we demand a return to natural simplicity and reject the so-called modern progress” (Hopwood 1986: 118).

Another dimension of the discontent on behalf of the majority of population, who contributed to the de-legitimization of the political institutions, was the inability of the state apparatus to ensure a proportional level of wealth accumulation. Thus, the implementation of both the Nasserite “socialism” and its successor, the liberal “open door” policy, emphasized the differential accumulation character of the Egyptian economy. Consequently, the increased pauperization of a large part of the population was perceived to be the result of the abuse of power by the oligarchic elites who used their political offices for the advancement of private self-interests. As a result, according to Davis (1984), the “[differential accumulation] contributed to de-legitimization of both capitalist and socialist development models” leading to a “crisis of authenticity by creating an ideological vacuum which a militant political interpretation of Islam could fill” (139). Consequently, as the scholar argues, the social impact of Muslim Brotherhood over the Egyptian society was so strong because it framed its ideology to reach the support of the town middle class who were the main losers in the process of differential accumulation.

The Christian American Society

Christian as well as Muslim revivals have at their basis large social transformations such as urbanization, immigration, and the birth of a consumer society (Murphy 2009b: 81). McLoughlin (2007), in his discussion of the origins of the First Great Awakening (1730-1760), also mentions the “rapid social change” and “changing structures of authority and power” (52-53). He talks about the transformation of society during the English settlers from Gemeinschaft, or a community-based society, to Gesellschaft (the society where the individual self-interest prevails the community interest) where religious values and the word of God could be interpreted by ordinary individuals. Values such as wealth, luxury, and more general personal economic ambition were replacing traditional values of honesty, diligence, and frugality. It is possible to notice structural similarities with the Muslim societies that have been discussed earlier.

Yet, Christianity has never posed a threat to the secular rule in Christian societies. All its claims have been extended within the institutional framework of the state thus religion has never attempted to overthrow the state institutions. The legitimacy of the state as an institutional construct, in this sense, has never been under attack by any religious groups or movements. The religious revivalist discourse became oftentimes a part of the political discourse but without any attempts to overthrow the existing legal institutional structure. Why is it the case?

Christian revivals, like the Muslim, put in contrast the pathologies of the present with the virtues of the past. In this sense, I will quote Dan Quayle (cited in Murphy 2009b: 78) who I think best describes the nature of religious claims in American society in the 1990s: “the lawless social anarchy that we [see] is directly related to the breakdown of the family structure, personal responsibility, and social order in too many areas of our society” (78). Hence, he sees a rupture of the present from the previously “dominant religious teachings”.

Moreover, Quayle talks about the development of “a culture of poverty” that has resulted from social transformations taking place in the moral realm. In a broader context, the Christian Right narrative, as Murphy mentions, presents the American nation as being “awash in sin and the fruits of sin” such as increased criminality, high rates of divorce, drug use, media violence, and dishonesty (88). In addition, the two central issues that stay at the heart of American moral decay, as George Weigel puts it (cited in Murphy 2009b), is abortion and gay rights (89). Hence, the social transformations in the 1980s and 1990s brought along a turn away from religious principles and values that created a “moral vacuum” in public life, as Neuhaus puts it, space that was exploited by Christian Right religious revivalist movements (98).

So it is noticeable that the dissatisfactions that are at the basis of American religious revivals in this period are socio-cultural in nature and aim to address the problems that exist only in this realm of society. This has been noted by Wallace (1956: 264-5) who discusses religious revitalization (used for revivalism) as a “conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture”. It has been also discussed by Murphy who describes the Christian Right’s involvement in bringing change in the moral-cultural realm (87). Finally, McLoughlin (2007) amongst other authors addressing the issue of revivalism in Christian context, also notes that the moral-cultural aspect of societies is at the core of the changes that religious revivalism is targeting.

Moreover, the reforms that are proposed by the religious revival movement are developed within the political institutional structure. As Murphy (2009b) describes in the Prodigal Nation, Quayle designed a political roadmap for his envisioned reforms that was transformed into a political program with the support of President Bush, which promoted home ownership, personal responsibility, community-based policing, the encouragement of marriage, and the implementation of child support payments (79). This example is just one of the many that are embedded in the history of the rise of the Christian Right in the period between the Civil War and World War II that Murphy addresses in his piece.

In this context, Christian Right activists entered politics in the 1980s as a reaction to the growing role of the federal government into areas of moral and religious concern, as Carl Henry notes (cited in Murphy 2009b: 84). Yet, as Murphy notes, the lack of tangible policy achievements, such as the reelection of Bill Clinton and the inability to pass a constitutional amendment that would ban abortion practices, doomed the movement to failure in terms of its involvement in American politics (85).

If we go back into American history, more illustrations of this kind can be identified. The Evangelical United Front (EUF), for example, even though involved in politics, sought social reforms rather than political, by trying to substitute external constraints with the “inner discipline of morality” (193). An example portrayed by Hadden and Shupe (1989) in this sense is the EUF’s prison reform. Hence, the Evangelists managed to lobby for the introduction of the “corrective” element in prisons, thus reshaping the function and meaning of such institutions. Hence, by reconceiving the prison as a place for correction, the authors consider that it is appropriate to interpret this reform as encouraging “responsible personal autonomy” (193). This example illustrates again the different nature of reforms sought by religious movements that had access to politics.

Another example is the early revivals in American society. During the First Great Awakening, political strings have been used to restructure the Church as an institution. In this context, it is worth noticing that no social reforms were targeted and politics were left untouched also. McLoughlin (2007), in this context, describes the efforts to fundamentally reform the Congregational churches as well as to achieve legal exemption from religious taxes by the Separate Baptist dissenters by petitioning the towns, legislatures, even the King in Council as well as the Continental Council to change the tax laws (67). Moreover, McLoughlin talks about the role of Edwards, who is considered, according to him, to be the theological leader of the First Great Awakening. Even so, “there is scarcely a word in all his [Edwards] writings to justify social reform, and nothing on politics” (71). This leads me to think that the First Great Awakening was targeting the reform of the church as an institution, rather than the state, in any of its dimensions.

Yet, it should be mentioned that the First Great Awakening did have a political impact, at least in the perception and writings of Bushman (cited in McLoughlin 2007). He says that out of this religious revival “came a new concept of government and public good based on the reciprocal interest of the governed and the governing” (79). The author however does not consider this change in governing values to be an intentional outcome of the First Great Awakening but rather a side effect of the revitalization of society as a whole.

Here it should be mentioned that there is a significant difference behind the reasoning of Muslim revival activists to get involved into politics. It is namely the divide between state and religion that secular governments in Muslim societies try to achieve that represent the main issue that Muslim fundamentalists do not want to see realized. This is because in Islam, religion penetrates both the public and the private, and it is considered that it should stay like this. In the American society, on the other hand, religious activists protest against the intrusion of the state into religious and moral matters, hence they want to see a clear separation of state and religion.

Furthermore, a significant difference between the Christian and Muslim activism in terms of bringing back the traditional values is that many American religious fundamentalists engaged in the civic sphere rather than in the political realm to promote their “mission”. Civic activism rather than political involvement was perceived to be a more efficient tool to promote a return to traditional Christian values. Hence, many fundamentalists started their own educational programs, established Bible study institutes, appeared on radio and television shows, and taught religious fundamentalist seminaries across the country. Billy Graham is probably one of the best illustrative examples in this context who promoted a political agenda of enhancing religious revivalism not only in the United States but around the world, and still never got into politics per se.

Yet, there are prominent earlier examples in Christian history of the American society, such as the Beecher family. Lyman Beecher, in this sense, is of the many illustrations of the power of religious voluntarism, as Hadden and Shupe (1989) put it. He is the founder of numerous reform movements in the early nineteenth century that contributed to the positive social changes taking place in the American society during its crucial process of transition to industrialization and urbanization. He started by addressing the stringent problem of alcoholism that affected both rural and urban areas. By encouraging temperance, he brought innovation for the traditional Christian values. Yet, as Hadden and Shupe note, Beecher never considered that the legal prohibition of alcohol in this sense would represent a viable solution of the problem. He relied on changing the public attitudes towards this social vice. Hence he founded the American Temperance Society in 1826, a voluntary association that was taken later as a model for other reform movements, and became a “conspicuous feature of American society” (168). His children and wife followed Lyman’s example by trying to reform their society along moral and religious issues.

Another example is the revivalism of the early Methodists. They organized three to four hundred gatherings annually in the form of camp meetings by offering people opportunities to socialize and communicate (Hadden and Shupe 1989: 177). Further on they also established colleges and theological seminaries for training a more professional ministry. As the authors note, there were only fifty Methodist congregations before the American Revolution and this number skyrocketed to twenty thousand just before the Civil War (180). Again, this is another example where change in society was not sought through political means and did not pose any threat to the secular government as such. Christian revivalism, at least in the American society, took place in the social realm and was embracing change in society rather than in politics.

To conclude on this section, the legitimacy of the secular state suffers greatly because of firstly how it was brought to Muslim societies in the first place, but also because of the way it handles the current socio-economic issues. Moreover, the social and cultural transformations brought by modernity have also been attributed to the secular state. Yet, we see that the Christian societies suffer from the same decay in traditional values but religious revivalism here did not attempt to blame the secular state for these changes.

Religious Rule - A Surrogate for the Secular Governance

Religious revivalism in the predominantly Muslim societies poses a serious threat to the secular governance and to the established political process. This threat is conditioned by the viable alternative to secular governing which is being offered by the Muslim religion. Thus, differently from the Christian religion, Islam establishes a set of norms doomed to administrate not only the moral and social relations but also offers a model of political community organization. Consequently, Islamic ideology is not a simple virtual model, which could be potentially implemented but is a pattern of a successful ideology associated in the collective memory with the potent state of Mohammed and the Golden Age of the Arab world. Thus, the politicization of Islam is not a consequence of the Islamic revivals of the twentieth century but constitutes a part of the Islamic tradition. Consequently, as Bergesen (2007) rightly mentions “Muhammad was active among warring tribes and had to take political action if he was to accomplish his mission. The religion could not survive without communal embodiment, and the community could not survive without defense. Hence it had to have political organization” (11-12). Thus, by embedding political practices into the Islamic religion provided the political leaders with a high level of popular credibility. This deistic legitimacy was massively applied both to justify their military actions and to establish a coagulated system of administration of communal social relations. Moreover, as Bergesen (2007) maintains, “thanks to the environment in which it originated, Islam was thus embodied in a political organization almost from the start: umma was a congregation and state together” (12).

The conditions were essentially different in the Christian case. Christianity developed as a religion of opposition, which had to challenge the central authority of the Roman Empire. Therefore, when accepted as an official imperial faith it had to accommodate itself to the state ideology thus acquiring only the administration over the souls, while Caesar continued to maintain the political authority. Islam in the same time did not have this dilemma as it originated without this division.

The high capacity of the Islamic rule to create a viable alternative to the secular form of governance is also due to the divine nature of the legitimacy the system is sanctioned with. In this sense, any political system that legitimizes its existence on legal or rational reasoning is perceived by a Muslim to be of an inferior quality comparing to the holy character of the rule in the name of God. For that reason, Qutb mentions in one of his religious writings the special role, which should be attributed to God in the hierarchy of social relations (Bergesen 2007). Hence, by emphasizing the distinction between the creator and his creation, Qutb implies that any kind of lawful legitimacy could be sourced only from the highest levels of the ladder of authority, which in the case of the Muslim states is Allah. In other words, the construction of the state apparatus based on secular principles and mainly the exercise of the legal system, which do not rely on, or breach the holly writings, usurps God’s sovereignty. Thereby, for Qutb any form of democratic regimes is doomed to destruction, as it does not hold the mandate of sovereignty. Even if Qutb is highly criticized for presenting an idealized and unsustainable model of governance, which does not provide the reader with an intelligible explanation of how the legitimacy could be practically transferred from the holy authority to the mundane administration he, nevertheless, shows that the civil administration should strictly follow the word of Qur’an, hadith and sunnas. These writings, according to him, contain all necessary norms and rules necessary to regulate the social conduit. In this regard, the emerging question is how applicable are the sharia rules established in the following centuries after Mohamed’s death to the present complex social relations?

The Sharia legislative system is a continuously modernizing system, which could successfully replace the existing modern legal system based on rationalization of the legal procedures. In this context, we should look at two major components, first Sharia’s authority in comparison to the authority of the present secular system and secondly, its capacity to face the multitude of existing social relations which were not mentioned in the religious texts as they did not exist to the time of Mohammed’s life and the codification of holy texts.

Consequently, I will proceed to the second part as the first argument was already thoroughly explained in the previous section. In Islam, Qur’an constitutes the apex of hierarchy of religious texts. Nevertheless, speaking in strictly legal terms, it could barely be called a book of law since it is comprised of a very limited number of bounding commands. According to Zubaida (2005), only about five hundred verses contain a sense of legal content. This small number of regulations could be treated equivocally. On the one hand, the small number of regulations is insufficient to create a sense of justice or could establish this justice only in undeveloped societies, which have a very limited variety of social relations. On the other hand, they determine the meaning of law, which establishes the moral context based on which the action should be judged. In the same time, the flexibility of interpretation is a good platform to be filled in with the necessary set of laws that would respond to the current necessities and which would not enter in contradiction with those clearly stipulated in the Qur’an.

Concurrently, the sharia system incorporates also the prophetic tradition of hadith as well as the saying of Prophet sunna which were included in an unified system of sharia only after two centuries. All of them, as Crone and Hinds (1986) argue, trace their sources from pre-Islamic society. Furthermore, they are continuously modernized with the support of legal schools interpretations and istihsan (the preferences of lawyers), ‘aql (reason) and ra’y (lawyer’s opinion). Thus, the modern sharia system cannot be compared in its content with the Islamic law that existed just after the death of the prophet Mohammed. Therefore, the current version of sharia could guide a much larger number of social relations and could face the needs of modern societies.

To conclude on this section, Islam does provide a viable alternative to the secular political governance unlike Christianity which only offers a pattern for moral and social conduct. Because it has the necessary components to regulate a society or the necessary framework to create additional institutional structures to sustain its existence, the Sharia law represents oftentimes the only alternative to the political opposition in Muslim societies living in secular states with weak democracies or authoritarian regimes that do not permit the development of a secular political opposition.

Conclusion

In this paper I analyze the different effects that religious revivalisms have upon the political structures in states with predominantly Christian and Muslim societies. Consequently, I have argued that the Islamic revivalism threatens the state central authority and tends to substitute the secular rule with an Islamic one due to the low legitimacy of the laic political systems and high legitimacy of the religious institute. A totally different perspective could be observed in the case of Christian revivalist movements. Unlike the Muslim cases, they do not challenge the state political structures because they accommodate themselves to the extant political settings and consequently use them in order to fill the social moral vacuum left outside the political discourse.

In order to establish the difference between the effects of both types of revivalisms I explored the existing scholarly literature and identified the main criteria, which best describe the features for the investigated Islamic and Christian revivals. Thus in my argumentation by revivalism I mean a sudden intensification in religious activity in the public sphere as a reaction to the radical social changes taking place in society, aiming to restore traditional values and norms either by using the political mechanisms available, if these permit, or otherwise by overthrowing the existing political system.

My first argument is that the Muslim secular states were extremely fragile in the face of religious revivals because, first they faced a very low level of popular legitimacy and second, the legitimacy of the Islamic jeremiads were based on the idealized understanding of the value of Mohamed’s state. The second argument shows that the secular governments experience a major threat on behalf of Islamic revivalist movements because the Muslim religious mode of governance constitutes a viable alternative to the secular political systems. Consequently, both the religious authorities endowed with political attributes and the legal system of sharia pull their legitimacy from the divine sources. And finally, I argue that in addition to its sacral source of legitimacy, the Islamic legal system of sharia is able to compete with the rational-based secular legal systems because it has also passed through a long path of modernization and is able to respond to the multivariate types of social relations of modernity.

Bibliography:

Bergesen, Albert. The Sayyid Qutb Reader, Selected Writings on Politics, Religion and Society. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Boym, Svetlana. The Future of Nostalgia. Basic Books, 2001.

Davis, Eric. “Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt.” Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam. Ed. Said Amir Arjomand. State University of New York Press, 1984. 134-157.

Davis, Eric. Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Fox, Richard. Lions of the Punjab, Culture in the Making. London: University of California Press, 1985.

Garfein, Herschel. Compiled from Weisberger, Bernard. They Gathered at the River. Chicago, 1966; Sims, Patsy. Can Somebody Shout Amen? New York, 1988.

Hadden, Jeffrey and Shupe, Anson. “Awakenings of Religion.” Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered: Religion and the Political Order. Eds. Hadden, Jeffrey and Shupe, Anson. New York: Paragon House, 1989. 164-202.

Hopwood, Derek. Egypt Politics and Society. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986.

Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab People. Warner Books, 1992.

Karpat, Kemal. The Politicization of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Long, Kathryn. “The Revival of 1857-58 and the Historiography of Revivalism in America.” Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation 4.1 (1994): 77-105.

McLoughlin, William G. Revival, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion and Social Change in America, 1607-1977. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978.

McLoughlin, William. “The Puritan Awakening and the Culture Core.” What Hath God Wrotught, The Transformation of America, 1815-1848. Ed. Howe, Daniel, Oxford: University Press, 2007. 24-97.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Murphy, Andrew R. “Longing, Nostalgia, and Golden Age Politics: The American Jeremiad and the Power of the Past.” American Political Science Association 7.1 (2009a): 125-139.

Murphy, Andrew R. Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/11. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009b.

Oxford English Dictionary. revival, n. Accessed on October 2, 2011, from http//www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/164908

Wallace, Anthony. “Revitalization Movement.” American Anthropologist 58.2 (1956): 264-281.

Zerubavel, Yael. Recovered Roots. Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Zubaida, Sami. Law and Power in the Islamic World. New York: Tauris, 2003.

Why don't we chose the right version in the election day?

2018-02-27T08:20:00.000-08:00

Every person wants to live a healthy life endowed with bountiful economic benefits and social liberties, proud of his own achievements and respect of his neighbors. This description can be attributed to any being disregarding of his socio-political orientations or his geo-political preferences. This truth has a simple explanation - the humans are actors driven by rationality. That is why when it comes to express their political preferences they will chose only the best from the offered option, that comes with maximum benefits for him personally, his family members and the community/society he lives in. This system however can work only in a democratic society where different political options compete among themselves on a stage with an open and free public tribune. Where the political field is even and gives equal chances to all political options. When, the microphone installed on the public tribune invites everyone and everyone has the right to speak freely. And finally, where the political competition for hearts is won based on the principle of social Darwinism. As a consequence, the most advanced and rational electoral offer expressed in an open, public and free contest comes to win. Thus, the elections based on democratic principles, offer voters the chance to choose the most appropriate and suitable version of future.

Poverty and depression however comes to town when people make choices that directly damage their interests. This does not happen because of their fault. This happens when the choice options are artificially limited by some of the competitors who consider that to keep the political concurrent out of the game is fare. Thus they limit their access to resources and mainly the access to the public microphone. In this type of game the voter does not have the chance to choose the best option. This is because they never heard about this version.

Are Moldovan emigrants diaspora or Not? (Author: Mark Mazureanu)

2018-01-15T07:11:00.002-08:00

Modovan government started paying a special attention to Moldovan extraterritorial communities residing abroad since when the economic statistics showed that about 30% of the national GDP is pumped in Moldova from abroad and since emigrants proved a high electoral commitment during the national elections. Since then the Government developed a special branch called BRD (Bureau of Cooperation with Diaspora) in this manner defining the extraterritorial communities residing abroad as diasporic.

In this post I will try to challenge what government defines as Moldovan diaspora abroad since this community by far does not qualify to this all catchy term of “diaspora”. I will show that Moldovan communities abroad can be rather attributed to short-term migration or trans-migrants assuming a different political functions/attributes these types of communities retain.

For proving my point I will need to conceptually define who are the actors we refer to as migrants, extraterritorial community or diaspora. This is essential as all of them can easily incorporate a large spectrum of actors including short- and long-term e/migrants, refugees, diaspora, expatriates, trans-migrants and others. Moreover, these terms are oftentimes used and analyzed interchangeably in the literature. They display however different types of influences on their homelands that need to be distinguished. The most commonly identified names for these communities are diaspora, emigrants, and trans-migrants.

Since emigration is by no means a new global phenomenon, the terminology used in the literature is constantly recycled and adjusted to incorporate the newly emerging extraterritorial groups into the new settings of each “age of migration”. Thus, the terms once used to exclusively define a particular group, acquires new meanings over time. The terms also continuously broaden their meanings to get adapted to new conditions. A vivid example is the stretching and redefinition of the concept of “diaspora”. Diaspora which is a generic appellative initially used to refer to the Jewish emigrant communities, stretched its meaning throughout history to incorporate other migrant and professional groups such as the Armenians, or specific trading and professional communities. Latter on, the meaning of diaspora was extended further to incorporate new sets of characteristics of “imagined communities” not necessarily related to emigration as for instance the case of Russian ethnics residing outside the Russian Federation after the disintegration of the Soviet Union or Moldovan ethnics residing in Russia or Ukraine. In the 1990s, about 20 million Russians became diasporas by never emigrating from one place to another. The term is extensively used nowadays to define new and more heterogeneous in nature migratory groups. Despite the fact that the concept still preserves the basic features of migration it has been enriched with many other components that did not exist in the past (Dufoix, 2008). Moreover, diaspora have also changed its social role and purpose. As Portes (1999), claims: “[diasporas] have often been the cradle from which independence movements and revolutionary organizations have sprung in the past” (p. 475). That is why Jewish communities have been oftentimes persecuted for being suspected in anti-government movements. Yet, todays’ diaspora are very distinct from historical ones. They are different in how they identify themselves and also in the repertoire of political actions they undertake to influence the political processes home. Political transnational activities are significantly supported by technological advancements and by the magnitude and financial resources of communities that settled abroad. Oftentimes, governments in countries of origin become actively interested in their diaspora and the transnational activity they get involved though they might undermine the government authority.

The clear understanding of the concept and meaning of diaspora is important for several reasons. The non-systematic use of the concept in the literature introduces an immeasurable confusion in understanding which groups are covered by theoretical frameworks, and which are not.

Predominantly, the term diaspora is used in a broader sense to describe any population, which is considered “deterritorialized” or “transnational”, that currently resides on a territory other than the one of its origin, and that manages to create an international network of cultural, economic and political exchange primarily with its motherland (Vertovec, 1999). This definition is oftentimes confusing since it is increasingly applied among academics, transnational intellectuals and opinion leaders as a loose embodiment of different categories: immigrants, trans-migrants, transnationals, guest-workers, ethnic and racial minorities, refugees, expatriates, travellers and nomads (Safran, 1991; Tatla, 1993; Cohen, 1995). The reason for this interchangeable use of terms is the difficulty to always clearly distinguish the morphology of different groups and how they differ one from another. For instance, a guest worker residing abroad can become a member of a diaspora if he chooses not to return but still maintain strong psychosocial ties with his motherland. Or, a foreign-born diaspora member can choose to intensify his connections with his country of cultural origin, to return home after some generations or, to regain the citizenship of his motherland, thus switching his status from diaspora to a member of a transnational community, an emigrant, or to preserve them all.

Any thorough investigation of the concept of diaspora starts with Safran’s (1991) list of five necessary defining characteristics that distinguish this group from others: dispersal in two or more locations; collective mythology about homeland; alienation from host-land; idealization of return to homeland; and an ongoing relationship with the homeland. Robinson et al. (2001) adds one more criteria to the list: diaspora members have developed a very strong ethno-national consciousness. Sheffer’s (1995) definition describes diaspora as a group of migrants that maintain a common ethno-national identity, create networks with their homelands and their brethren in other countries, and feel strong connections with both their homelands and their new host countries (p. 9). Migrants in this sense could also be considered part of diaspora though they not necessarily form one. They may become a diaspora by “developing a new imagination of community” (Sokefeld, 2006, p. 267).

The literature also explains the nature of diaspora as a product of a specific constructed identity along a common history, religion or language (Vertovec, 1999; Baumann & Sunier, 1995). Moreover, it is possible to differentiate between “solid” diaspora, discernible by “powerful myths” of a common origin, and “liquid” diaspora, that consists of new cultural connections that manage to substitute the old “sacred icons” with the new ones (Cohen, 2006, p. 1; Vertovec, 1997, 2004). These concepts are based on Anderson’s (1983) constructed “imaginary reality” of the diaspora that combines the perception about the past with its adaptation to modern needs.

Two necessary elements, out of this set of definitions and characteristics, are the most important to be considered in this study First, the strong feeling of identity that keeps emigrants together as a single community. The awareness of having a common history, religion, or language shapes their common interests and empowers their common voice in exercising pressure on political system. Second, the attachment to the motherland that serves as an explanation why the diaspora gets involved in the political life in their remote homeland that, for many exists just at the level of collective memory. Safran (1991) claims that what connects all diaspora members is their believe that:

“… they are not…and perhaps cannot be…fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it” (p. 83-4). Thus, recognizing their ambiguous situation both in the receiving and sending states diaspora members tend to protect and lobby their interests in both societies (Sheffer, 1986).

The above-identified definitions clearly explain the existence of a connection between a diasporic group and its homeland. They do not specify however the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization. How does it get engaged in political life by exercising pressure on the political leadership in their perceived land of origin? At least three different theoretical sources provide an answer to this question. For instance, Tsing (2000), Sökefeld (2006), Lamben (1998) and Anthias (1998) observe diaspora mobilization mechanisms through the prism of existing social movements theories, Heindl (2013) examines the capacity of a diaspora to lobby hosting governments, and finally, the theory on transnationalism studies the overall impact of trans-migrants on diverse spheres of socio-political development of their states of origins.

Another commonly used term is that of migrants. Though the concept is close to diaspora and is oftentimes used interchangeably it has a distinct connotation. When the term migrant is used in the literature, several elements such as country of birth, country of destination, nationality, religion, and length of stay usually come into discussion. The latter element is a key characteristic used by the international organizations to differentiate between different types of migrants. The United Nations in this context differentiates between long-term and short-term migrants. The long-term migrant is defined as: “a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence” (United Nations, Recommendations on statistics of international migration. Revision 1, adopted in 1998, par. 36). The same document defines short-term migrants as “…when the duration of stay in the country, or away from the country, lies between three months and one year” (United Nations, par. 37).

Belonging to an emigrant community implies a clear choice to leave the motherland for a temporary or extended period of time. To choose short or long-term emigration means the preservation of all political and economic rights for the emigrants while abroad. Thus the majority of emigrants continue to maintain strong relationships with their home country. One of these ties is the connection to their dependents back home. In terms of political rights, they guard all citizenship obligations, such as the right to take active participation in political processes and mainly to elect and be elected in any elections back home. On the other hand, being part of a diaspora does not necessarily imply the same citizenship rights in the country of perceived origin. This is because diaspora members are most often already citizens of a new country, and do not or cannot have double citizenship. In this sense, emotional affiliation sometimes is all that is left. In terms of political rights, diaspora members most often have no citizen-endowed mechanisms to influence the political processes in the state of perceived origin. Thus they have less direct leverage to influence the domestic political processes from oversees.

The most important difference between the two groups for this particular study is their intent to return, and intent to participate in home socio-economic and political life. In this sense, emigrants are usually leaving the country with the intention to return. Yet, the reason for their temporary leave is usually a crucial reason why they do not participate so actively in home politics. High unemployment, and lack of job opportunities usually imply a disappointment with home politics and belief that nothing can be changed. This means that they are less interested to invest much political force in their country of origin. Remittances are usually their most important added value to home societies. Diaspora, on the other hand, is already a well-established community that lives abroad and does not intend to return. It is bound to their perceived motherland through self inflicted sense or responsibility. This emotional relationship potentially makes them strong investors in political transformations in their motherland, such as the case of the Jewish and Armenian diasporas in the United States, or Turkish diaspora in Germany. Sokefeld (2006) rightly notes that migrants could also be attributed to a diaspora though they not necessarily form one. They may become a diaspora “by developing a new imagination of community” (p. 267).

To analyze the effects of international migration, Kapur (2013) uses the terms of migrants and diaspora under a functional perspective to describe the extraterritorial community impact on the motherland. He identifies four main channels how migrants can influence home societies: prospect, absence, diaspora, and return (Kapur & McHale, 2005). The prospect channel analyzes how the possibility of leaving the country of origin influences individual decisions to invest in the development of human and social capital, which already changes the dynamics of human capital in the country. The absence channel takes into account the effects of the leave of the highly skilled migrants, who could contribute to institution building instead. The diaspora channel assumes that “an emigrant retains certain connections to the home country… They may be more likely to transact with those in the country of origin, act as intermediaries, or send back remittances, both financial and social” (p. 13). Finally, the return channel analyzes the effects of the return of emigrants who bring along new skills, savings, as well as social and ideational capital.

For many the concepts of political transnationalism or political transnational field are better idioms to explain the extraterritorial political activity of diverse actors who derive their influence from emigration. The concept of political transnationalism constitutes just a segment from the overall transnational activity that also includes cultural, political, and humanitarian engagement. Schiller and Fouron (1999) define transnational migration as:

“a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle, and establish relations in a new state, maintain ongoing social connections with the polity from which they originated” (p. 344).

In their understanding, the actors of this phenomenon are worth being analyzed as a distinct category of international actors that they call transnational migrants or shortly, transmigrants.

The problem with this definition is the same as in the case of defining diaspora, it does not provide an explicit gauge for distinguishing those who take part in the transnational activity from those who do not. It also does not provide an indicator of how intense their transnational engagement is. Assuming that almost every migrant sends remittances to his country of origin, or undertakes visits home, which are considered acts of transnationalism, does not mean that each of them should qualify as a trans-migrant (Foner, 1997).

In the same manner we can puzzle the trans-migrants’ political participation. It is worth asking how frequent and dedicated migrants’ political participation should be to be categorized as a separate group, and to be analyzed as a distinct type of political activity. This question was researched by Guarnizo et al. (2003) on the cases of the Salvadorian, Colombian, and Dominican recent emigrant communities in the United States. They concluded that the political transnational field exists as a separate category, and trans-migrants should be analyzed as a separate type of actors. This is because they identify permanent and persistent political actions that connect emigrants to their home countries. They, however, recognize that the trans-migrant political activism is much weaker and less intense than many scholars claim. This activism also varies across different political events. The trans-migrant political involvement is significantly felt only in crucial moments such as competitive elections or reaction to humanitarian crises.

It is important to note that the types of political influence exercised by different deterritorialized groups also vary across groups. All of them can exert a certain level of influence on the homeland political landscape however this influence is disproportional across them and vary in function of a number of factors such as availability of financial and human resources, expertise, time and others. Some groups exercise more direct forms of political influence while others recur to hidden lobbying practices. The repertoire of their political mobilization practices depends on their ability to bring about the needed political change. It is however salient to differentiate between the various communities to understand the differential impact they might have.

Instead of conclusion: The prospect of gathering economic contribution without officering electoral rights to Moldovan emigrants, by putting them in the box of diaspora, is an interesting option for Moldovan government since it was clearly noticed the emigrants are not willing to vote for the power elites preferring preponderantly the non-incumbent parties/candidates.

The bibliography can be offered upon request:

The Impact of Remittances on the Endurance of Nondemocratic Regimes (Mark Mazureanu)

2018-01-08T04:55:00.002-08:00

In this post I will investigate the impact of remittances on the endurance of non-democratic regimes and the survival of autocratic elites. I will look in particular on whether remittances can influence the prospects of democratization in states with transitory political systems. For this purpose I will brush through the literature that assesses the prospects of the incumbent elites’ to preserve power in remittance-receiving societies using the political patronage resource.

Before analyzing the impact of economic remittances let us explain in few words what is political patronage. The main assumption of the patronage theory is that nondemocratic elites cannot solely rely on undisguised force to stay in power since this type of governance is extremely costly to be maintained. That is why the majority of nondemocratic regimes prefer to preserve elements of procedural democracy that help them legitimize their rule. Organized elections are less competitive since a large part of the population is dependent on the elites. They maintain with the elites an established patronage and clientelist relation. To maintain these “preferential” relationships, elites buy allegiance from their direct supporters by offering them access to different spoils of power. In the same time, elites provide access to public goods for those who passively accept their mastership.

Three essential elements are considered in this analysis of the effects of remittances on the endurance of nondemocratic regimes. First, the power of nondemocratic regimes is contingent upon the size of their supporting coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Second element is the size of the assembly from which privileged supporters are selected (Geddes, 1999). Last one is the size of power elites’ opponents. This latter element is important since the consent of power opponents represents the cost elites should pay in forms of policy concessions and access to public goods in order to stay in power (Gandhi, 2008). Remittances, in this state of affairs, change actors’ preferences by revising their individual bargaining power. Finally, the influx of remittances changes economic and political preferences of the different domestic groups. This change transforms the popular levied support previously conveyed to power elites. A good illustration is the Escriba-Folch (2013) analysis of 137 autocracies in 91 countries in the period of 1975-2009 who finds that remittances destabilize autocratic regimes by reducing citizens’ dependence on government spoils. Consequently, he concludes that remittances undermine the survival of autocratic elites. By increasing the levels of private revenues spent mainly on consumption, remittances lower the perceived value of state-provided public goods and services. By offering individuals and households an exit option from the regime’s patronage network, remittances hence break the existing clientelist link between voters and incumbent elites.

This conclusion is however conditional upon a set of conditions. First, power elites should hold multiparty elections regularly. Elections as a method of legitimation are very frequent in autocracies (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Second, the political system should be organized in such a manner to governed by a dominant political party. According to Geddes, (2003) party-based autocratic regimes were the most commonly met forms of autocracies in the last six decades. That is because dominant party regimes are inclined to have larger support coalitions than other regime types. In this case, power elites rely on broad-based distribution of goods to obtain allegiance from large winning coalitions by deterring the general public from investing in the opposition. That is why the survival of these types of regimes depends not only on the elites’ capacity to provide their direct supporters with goods and services – patronage (Gandhi, 2008), but also on the delivery of public goods to larger segments of the population – clientelism (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Malesky et al., 2011; Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007; Pepinsky, 2007).

To explain the working mechanism under these first two conditions, Greene (2010) clarifies that clientelist systems with a dominant party can be established only through politicization of public resources/public services. The party control over state assets opens the possibility for the elites to control and distribute the access to housing, social services, property, agricultural allowances, subsidies and pensions, education, transportation cost, fuel supply, access to jobs or prices of food. Incumbents in this manner secure their positions as public services become accessible only in exchange for regime support. This politicization of public services makes large portions of society be economically dependent on the services provided by the incumbent elites (Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). For instance, public housing programs promoted by the ruling People's Action Party in Singapore represented a key source of support and votes for the party since 1960. The most common forms of hooking allegiance were to distribute different types of goods or money in the pre-electoral period. For instance, during elections in Malaysia, the ruling party staff visited rural households to distribute cash payments to supporters (Pepinsky, 2007, p. 144). During presidential elections in Romania in 2014 the ruling party distributed wristwatches and clothes. The Communist Party in Moldova distributed in 2004 and 2008 elections potatoes, rice, pasta and sugar. In Ukraine and Moldova the parties also offered theatre, circus and concert tickets for free, not to mention that an outstanding practice is to invite pop-stars to perform during electoral shows in support of the incumbent party. A more recent development of political clientilistic relationship in Moldova is to buy people elegance by offering the poor part of the electorate Christmas gifts coming from incumbent elites personal foundations. For instance the president’ wife runs “From Soul” foundation and the leader of Democrat Party – the “Edelweiss” foundation.

The incumbent can also use coercive methods. Blaydes (2010) shows that during Mubarak's rule in Egypt, areas that opposed the ruling party saw almost no development in sewerage and water providing infrastructure between 1980s and 1990s. A rule of thumb was established since independence in Ukraine: the elected president and his party would represent only the Eastern or Western part of Ukraine thus neglecting almost entirely the development of the other region from which he would have little support. Moreover, under PRI rule in Mexico, PRONASOL funds, consisting of public works where deployed in those municipalities, which managed to ensure the voters’ loyalty (Magaloni, 2006). In Moldova the same can be observed regarding borrowed funds distribution. For instance the FISM (The Fund for Social Investment from Moldova) whose budget is predominantly made out of foreign grants is in charge to implement major infrastructural projects in Moldova. Upon analysis it is seen that the benefiting communities are exactly those whose mayors are members of the party that dominates the political landscape.

The third condition described by Green refers to remittances. He claims that them must increase the household consumption to replace the amount and quality of public services provided by the regime (Fajnzylber & Lopez 2007; Chami et al., 2008). Adida and Girod (2010), for instance, show that remittances in Mexico were extensively used to replace the previously provided public services, such as sanitation and clean water. Chaudhry (1989) presents a similar situation in Yemen where during the 1970s, local cooperatives used the remittances they received from abroad to finance road reconstruction, schools and clinics constructions, as well as develop farming projects. In Moldova remittances are massively used to access private medical service by bypassing the public health sector that is offered only to preferential groups. Remittances hence provide households with an exit from the regime's patronage network (Ahmed, 2011; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2003; Pfutze, 2014).

Fourth, to be able to exit the patronage trap, the voters should not care exclusively about material benefits. They need also to have ideological preferences. It is true that ideology is pushed aside when deprivation level is unbearable. That is why the poorer the voters the easier they can be trapped into clientelist regimes. Assuming that the provision of public services is the price the regime pays for buying support in clientelist regimes, the higher the state of general social deprivation, the lower the price elites must pay for this support. Consequently, with increased household revenue received from remittances, voters pursue first their ideological preferences (Merino, 2005). The theory is supported by empirical studies carried out in a number of municipalities in Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2003; Pfutze, 2014) where remittances from migration have proved to empower non-incumbent parties. Ahmed (2011) confirms that these results are valid for the majority of Latin American countries. The last condition identified by Escriba-Folch (2013) is for power elites to have limited resources to pay for voters’ allegiance. In this sense, the available resources to be used for subsidized public services should not overbid the transfers coming from emigrants.

The main argument refuting the patronage explanation of the beneficial role of remittances is that domestic elites can also control or influence the flux of remittances entering the country. Oftentimes they can use the remittances flows to those directions that would empower their own positions. Some studies show how policymakers managed to compile specific politico-economic projects to channel the flow of remittances and to manage how these are being used (Spector & de Graauw, 2006; Meseguer & Aparicio, 2012). Meseguer and Aparicio (2012) investigated government projects in Mexico that were meant to match 3-to-1 the amount or ‘remidollars’ sent by Mexican emigrants through the existing hometown associations. A similar project in Moldova called “Pare” is run by BRD (Government Bureau in charge for the Relationship with Diaspora) that channels the emigrant’s money into the local investment projects. The study shows that, in case of Mexico, the matching of government support for public infrastructure projects was granted predominantly to municipalities that supported the incumbents. The municipalities that experienced higher political competition received less support. This is just one of the ways how governments can repay incumbent supporting communities and penalize those that support opposition candidates.

This post analyzes to what extent can economic remittances received from abroad can autonomies the local population political chose, and spoil the allegiance type of relationship built by the incumbent autocratic elites.

No conclusion…

Bibliography will be uploaded it by request.

Extraterritorial Voting as a Form of Emigrants’ Political Participation (Author: Mark Mazureanu)

2018-01-06T10:33:00.002-08:00

In this post I will try to answer the question whether the emigrants constitute a powerful mechanism to exercise political pressure on the domestic elites to bring institutional reforms and political representation home considering the emigrants right to take part in domestic elections. The emigrants's non-electoral power is discussed in the previous post. I will answer the raised question by resuming the predominant scholarly arguments based on individual observations or large and small N analyzes. This material can be used to understand to which extent Moldova emigration has the possibility to influence the political process home, considering their rights to take part in elections.

Research on extraterritorial voting is still scarce considering that historically only few states granted their emigrants the right to vote while abroad (Barry, 2006; Rubio-Marin, 2006; Tager, 2006; Waldrauch, 2003). Yet, in the last decade, states have increasingly created frameworks for dual nationality to allow their expats to take part, to some extent, in elections (Ellis et al., 2007). According to Portes (1999), “[t]his policy represents a remarkable departure from earlier times, when emigrants were almost regarded as defectors and where naturalization in another country entailed the automatic loss of the original citizenship” (p. 467). Nowadays there are 115 out of 214 states that already enfranchised their co-nationals abroad (Fierro et al., 2007). Moreover, there are cases when for political reasons states grant citizenship, and with them electoral rights to their co-nationals in other states, as in the case of Romania granting citizenship to Moldovans, or Russia granting citizenship to large numbers of citizens from the post-Soviet republics. If until recently governments treated their emigrants only as sources of remittances (Itzigsohn et al., 1999), currently they have increasingly “started to perceive their expatriate communities as a source of investments, entrepreneurial initiatives, markets for home country companies and even political representation abroad or right to advance its geo-political interests in the region” (Portes, 1999, p. 467). This is an important change because in highly competitive elections, migrants can have the final say on electoral outcomes. This was the case in the Romanian presidential elections in 2014, and in Moldovan parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2014.

There is a strong debate in the literature whether emigrants should generally preserve their right to vote from abroad. Many states with large emigrant communities abroad undertook the necessary reforms to offer their emigrants the right for dual citizenship with formal political representation of their expatriates in Parliament and some governmental agencies (Lessinger, 1992; Mahler, 1998; Guarnizo & Smith 1998). The arguments range from procedural, to nationalistic, utilitarian, and ethical justifications. Supporters claim that since migrants contribute to the economic and socio-cultural development of their homeland they have the right to preserve their political privileges to influence home politics through voting (Itzigsohn, 2000; Wuker, 2004). This argument is also supported by the advancement of modern technologies that facilitate the process of voting from abroad (Barry, 2006; Baubock, 2006; Mercurio & Williams, 2004; Spiro, 2003, 2006). The ethno-nationalist argument claims that allowing emigrants to vote keeps them closer to the motherland, and empowers their status abroad (Baubock, 2006). Granting the right to vote also improves the democratic image of a state on the international arena (Levitt & la Dehesa, 2003).

Opponents claim that extra-territorial voting offers the mandate on decision-making to those subjects who do not support the consequences of their decisions. Thus they take uninformed or less informed decisions about the electorate candidates since they are not the ones to bare the consequences. This principle violates one of the main ground rules of democracy, “the governors must also be the governed” because emigrants are participating through their vote in the process of governance without feeling its impact since they are abroad (Fitzgerald, 2006; Lopez-Guerra, 2005; Rubio-Marin, 2006; Baubock 2005; Blais et al., 2001). The normative arguments state that the extraterritorial vote might bring disproportional representation, especially valid for states with large diaspora abroad (Vertovec, 2005). Baubock (2006) argues in this regard that, “A reasonable expectation that expatriate voters may outnumber domestic ones provides a strong argument against enfranchising the former and for restricting the franchise to temporary absentees” (p. 2444).

The debate on emigrants’ voting autonomy raises the question whether emigrants can freely formulate and express their electoral priorities, or these are influenced and controlled by the power elites from their countries of origin. Some claim that despite receiving the right to vote in national elections, governments can control emigrants’ electoral choices. Smith (2008) argues that in many cases before enfranchising emigrants the power secures mechanisms to retain control over the flow of their votes. By analyzing the evolution of the enfranchisement process in three consecutive elections in Mexico, Smith concludes that the ruling elite established a number of bureaucratic institutions specifically dedicated to administer the state relationship with diaspora. These establishments in Mexico are the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, Institute for Mexican Abroad, and the National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad. These institutions were delegated to create the official channels of communication between the state and emigrant communities. Thus the state obtains a strong hand in guiding emigrants’ priorities.

Another argument contends that by allowing governments to formalize the organizational activity for diaspora, makes it easier for governments to control how the diaspora creates and delivers its political message. As a result, the granted right to vote does not challenge the governing elites since the state shapes emigrants’ views on home politics through modeled institutional mechanisms (Schedler, 2007). The challengers of this view show that reasoning is not universal and there are cases that disprove the argument. Despite the large role played by the Mexican administrative chapters organized for the diaspora at home and abroad, emigrants managed to overturn the dominant party by massively voting for the non-incumbent candidate during the presidential elections in 2006 (Cornelius et al., 2007). In other cases, such as the Italian and Cape Verdean elections in 2006 (Baubock, 2006), and the presidential elections in Romania in 2014, emigrants played a decisive role in overturning the incumbents.

Assuming the high uncertainty of impact, power elites are very cautious in enfranchising their emigrants. In some cases the legislation has been approved, but not yet implemented, as in the case of Dominican Republic (Levitt, 2001). A similar situation was in Mexico. First, the legislation was voted, and later amended several times thus restricting the right to vote for some segments of emigrants (Saldana, 1999). This was the case because the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was influencing the legislative process at the time. The majority of Mexicans in California however were anti-PRI (Quinones, 1999). By extending the right to vote, the incumbents were immanently empowering the opposition.

Governments can also use their political leverage to attract the loyalty of emigrants abroad. Granting political representation to emigrants at the national level is a tool to sway emigrants’ allegiance. The granted political representation is the cost paid by the elites in exchange for emigrants’ political and economic support in elections (Roberts et al., 1999; Glick Schiller & Fouron, 1999). Some political elites implemented reforms that institutionalized the migrants’ long-distance political participation. One of the first diaspora payoffs took place in 1990 when Croatian diaspora contributed four million dollars to the electoral campaign of Fanjo Tudjman. Upon winning elections, the diaspora was rewarded with 12 out of 120 seats representation (Vertovec, 1999). Collyer 2014 show also that in 13 states emigrants have obtained the right to have extra-territorial legislative representations. Another instance is the Dominican PLD that offered three legislative seats to representatives of the Dominican transnational community. The elected representatives had to act on behalf of both their home-region and the interests of the emigrants living abroad at governmental level (Itzigsohn et al., 1999). The Colombian case displays a similar pattern where an individual living abroad with dual citizenship was voted to represent a Colombian region in the national congress (Guarnizo et al., 1999).

The provision of improved socioeconomic public services is another form of reward paid by governments to thank emigrants for their electoral allegiance. For instance, Laguerre (1998) describes how the Haitian government created the Ministry of Diasporic Affairs to coordinate relations between the Haitian government and its diaspora. In Mexico, Programa Paisano aims to reduce bureaucratic problems for returning migrants (Guarnizo, 1998). The Dominican government worked out a range of policies to ease the migrant return and the long-distance transnationalism. A special custom policy introduced under the President Leonel Fernández allows return migrants to bring their possessions to the island without paying taxes. The returning Dominicans were entitled to purchase at a discount price housing units in Santo Domingo built by the government specifically for returnees. Also, a special agreement was set up with the American banks to secure long-term loans for returning emigrants under president Fernandez. The Salvadorian government crafted a transnational credit union that supports migrants in the United States and their relatives back in El Salvador to secure loans (Hamilton & Chinchilla, 1999). All these and many other measures constitute clear signals sent by the government to their migrants abroad (Levitt, 2001). These can be treated as an invitation to return home but also a demand for continuous loyalty. Portes (1999) however, concludes the following:

“From these policies, it is clear that sending governments do not want their immigrants to return, but rather to achieve a secure status in the wealthy nations to which they have moved and from which they can make sustained economic and political contributions in the name of patriotism and home town loyalties” (p. 467).

Some scholars who have examined the electoral power of emigrants’ vote conclude that emigrant enfranchisement rarely makes a significant difference for national politics. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) claims that the emigrant vote represents more of a symbolic act as it formally reasserts the existence of a constitutive tie between a state and its citizens, wherever they reside. This symbolic character of emigrant vote shows the insignificant impact it can have on home politics. Moreover the benefits emigrants get from voting are also very little. This makes them lose interest in taking part in the voting routine. Although emigrants are enfranchised they exert little interest to take part in elections. According to statistical results on voting patterns of newly enfranchised Mexican emigrants in the United States, Waldinger and Soehl (2013) notice that only an insignificant group of Mexican emigrants registered to take part in elections since 2005 when they were granted this right. Moreover, just half of those registered came to express their vote. Another explanation of low participation rate of Mexicans in elections is the lack of previous electoral experience or the low level of political culture (Waldinger & Soehr, 2013).

The low electoral participation among emigrants is however not characteristic only to emigrants that lack electoral traditions. The same lack of interest to vote is observed among the French expatriates who have the right to vote from abroad since 1946. Despite the presence of a strong political culture among French expatriates, the turnout is way below the level of electoral participation in France (Cariot & Clave, 2009). In the Ruget and Usmanalieva (2011) study the authors assessed the patterns of participation among Kyrgyz emigrants and returnees in the 2009 presidential elections. The respondents were asked if they used their right to vote and how much they value having this right while abroad. Only one fourth of respondents declared that they took part in elections. And only one fourth of those who took part in elections voted from abroad. All others voted while at home. This data shows an extremely low electoral participation of Tajik emigrants. Boccagni (2011) also reported that only a tiny fraction of 1.6 percent of Ecuadorian migrants residing abroad showed up to vote in 2006 elections from the estimated 20 percent population with an electoral right.

A similarly low interest can be observed among emigrants in regards to other forms of political participation beyond electoral participation. Based on data from the 2006 Latino National Survey, Fraga et al. (2006) show that 34 percent of foreign-born respondents pay no attention to home country politics, while 23 percent stated that they pay only little attention. Moreover, only 4 percent of respondents in the 2008 National Asian American Survey said they participate in activities dealing with their country of origin (Wong et al., 2011). Among Latin American emigrants, 94 percent of Colombian, Dominican and Salvadoran expatriates surveyed in the Comparative Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project declared that they never took part in campaigns to support any of their home country political candidates. Concurrently, 96 percent declared that they never made a donation to support any of the electoral campaigns.

The low interest in political affairs among emigrants is due to reduced levels of trust and knowledge about institutionalized social and political activity, and the lack of an institutionalized venue where to organize beyond the usual circle of friends and relatives, is the conclusion Ruget and Usmanalieva (2011) came to in their study on electoral behavior of Tajik emigrants. This type of political apathy is also noticed by Fox (2009) who claims, in fact, that by not engaging in political life does not mean that migrants stay apathetic to the political reality. The emigrants create an alternative form of engagement by networks of ‘translocal citizenship’. The transnational citizenship is a creation of a specific international community that acts without paying much attention to the political life of countries of origin.

Political parties also show different forms of interactions with their emigrant communities. Some parties become increasingly interested in getting emigrants involved in domestic politics. The literature illustrates numerous cases when political parties opened branch offices in migrant settlements (Levit, 2001; Kapur, 2007; Graham, 1996; McDonnell, 1997; Itzigsohn et al., 1999). In this context, political campaigns undertaken by political candidates became a routine activity especially among the Latin American countries. These campaigns usually aim to capture emigrants’ attention, gather their votes in the upcoming elections, and recruit financial donations from these communities (Levit, 2001). The political and financial support provided by emigrants is especially valuable for opposition parties. In the case of Dominican Republic, the migrants’ financial contributions constitute nearly 15 percent of major Dominican parties’ annual fundraising revenue (Graham, 1996). Levitt (2001) reports that approximately 10 to 30 percent of the Dominican PRD’s budget and 50 percent of the budget for the 1994 Dominican presidential campaign came from migrant contributions. Numerous scholars claim that despite long standing residence abroad, emigrants continue to keep themselves engaged in home politics (Kearney, 1991, 1995; Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Smith, 1994; Kyle, 2000).

There is also a large body of literature analyzing the emigrants’ impact on the quality of political and economic institutions in their countries of origin. Docquier et al. (2010) analyze the impact of skilled vs. unskilled migration on the quality of political institutions. Based on quantitative data analysis of migration to the OECD countries in the period 1975–2000, they conclude that low-skilled emigration positively affected the quality of political institutions in their home countries. Emigration of the highly skilled, on the contrary, brings positive effects only in the long-term. Li and McHale (2009) also look at the mechanisms through which skilled migrants can affect the political and economic institutions in their countries of origin. Their results show positive effects on the quality of political institutions. Skilled migration contributed to political stability, voice, and accountability in sending countries.

Emigration of the skilled, however, negatively affects the quality of economic institutions by decreasing the levels of government accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. After a detailed statistical analysis of panel data for 111 countries over the period of 1986–2010, Berdiev et al. (2013) conclude that the influx of remittances brought by emigrants increases the level of corruption in the country of origin. The correlation between corruption and remittances is conditioned by the fact that higher remittances lead to an increase in the GDP per capita. Hence, when people are poorer there is nothing to extort through corrupt behavior. And vice-versa, when the level of income increases it opens up greater avenues for corruption.

Kapur (2007) also claims that the loss of human capital through migration can adversely affect the country’ institutions. The prospect for emigration makes the younger less eager to invest in skills relevant for the local institutions. Instead, they invest in skills that are more internationally marketable. This fact increases the demand for such specializations as programmers, engineers and decreases those of lawyers and public service workers. Consequently absence of talented individuals negatively affects the supply of institution builders. As a result, the less trained remains the local population the lesser demand they exercise for qualitative institutions (Kapur & McHale, 2006).

No conclusion…

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Non-electoral Political Impact of Emigration (Author: Mark Mazureanu)

2018-01-02T02:40:00.000-08:00

In this post I will analyze where emigrants have a capacity to influence the political processes back home besides their electoral participation. The element of emigrant'selectoral participation is discussed in the following post.

Migrants have multiple development effects on the left behind states, largely debated in media and in scholarly literature. Obviously the most debated is the topic of the economic impact of emigration. I consider that having a look at the political impact of emigration is probably more important since the state political structure is the foundation of a certain economic development. In this article I will analyze the political impact of emigrants and diaspora on their home societies. For this purpose I will revise a large body o literature that shows us both the positive and negative effects of emigration. I will not come with a conclusion for Moldova leaving this question open for the reader.

I will start this review from having a look on the theory of political socialization that describes the process of emigrant-led democratic diffusion through transfers of norms in forms of social and political remittances (Fargues, 2007; Beine et al., 2008; Spilimbergo, 2009; Kerr, 2008; Agrawal et al., 2011). Lauth and Pickel (2009) define diffusion in its broader sense as “a process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time” (p. 40). This process is voluntary and unintended. The assumption is that the novelty, when perceived as attractive, “is transferred from one country to another with a noticeable effect” (Rother, 2009, p. 250). Democratic diffusion, in this sense, takes place through various channels such as the media, networks, secondary socialization (i.e. education, work), and migration. Diffusion, in this context, is seen “as an exogenous factor for democratization, carrying opinions, values and expectations that can have an endogenous effect” (p. 251).

Political and social remittances, in this context, are observed as non-pecuniary forms of transfers that contribute to the process of democratization in their home societies (Levitt, 1998; Rother, 2009; Batista & Vicente, 2011; Garza & Hazan, 2003). Levitt (1998) defines social remittances as “ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (p. 927). They constitute all social and cultural resources that are brought by emigrants with them from the Global North to the Global South. By not having a direct political character, social remittances transform migrants into actors with significant leverage able to shape political and civic demands back home (Itzigsohn & Villacres, 2008). These alternative forms of remittances received by local communities in countries of origin from their emigrant fellows oftentimes contribute to the process of democratization. Emigrants thus become, as Thomas Faist calls them, “collective agents of change” that promote new “forms of governance, rights and responsibilities, and democracy” (2008, p. 26-27). So, the higher the number of emigrants residing abroad, the more social and political remittances they are able to send back home.

In the “emancipative theory of democracy” Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) analyze how mass attitudes can influence the levels of democracy in a specific state. Though Welzel (2007) does not refer to the role of migrants per se in his further study, the scholar analyzes how an increase in pro-democratic attitudes within a country motivates mass actions that consequently prove people’s willingness to struggle for democratic transformations. This might indirectly speak about the diffusion of democratic ideas brought also by migrants from hosting societies and their positive effect on levels of democratization. Deriving from Welzel’s findings, we can infer that the higher is the number of those spreading democratic values, the stronger is the demand for democratization, and consequently the higher is a society’s chance to democratize. Portes (1999) also highlights the positive role of trans-migrants on the country of origin and civic culture. He studies how local civic associations can influence the power structure of places of origin and how returnees can help reshape local life. Portes claims, that transnational migrant activities have a democratizing effect on local communities.

Itzigsohn et al. (1999), and Guarnizo et al. (1999), conclude in the same volume that the emigrants’ driving force for democratic change and greater influence is determined by their preponderant intolerance towards local traditional elites, their lack of exposure to repressive and cooptive mechanisms used by these elites, and finally, increased economic capacity and freedom to organize abroad. While living abroad, migrants have the freedom “to denounce corruption and seek to improve their communities outside traditional political channels” (Portes, 1999, p. 474). Moreover, Portes concludes that “[t]he experience of living under a democratic system with an effective and autonomous judicial system socializes immigrants into a new political outlook and increases their expectation for change in their own countries” (p. 474). This political socialization process experienced abroad makes migrant communities and organizations challenge “old rules” and call for higher levels of democracy in their country of origin.

The literature also shows that the emigrants’ economic capacity conditions their political impact. In this sense, the power to demand political and social transformations is legitimized through the massive economic support offered by the emigrants. The established channels of financial help provided to their dependents and implementation of large societal projects through established networks of grassroots philanthropic actions empowers their voice and makes them influential actors in local politics (Fox, 2009). Consequently they manage to create a “migrant civil society”, which contributes to the construction of public spaces and representative social and civic organizations. In this regard, emigrants are perceived as having enough capacity and leverage to induce democratic transformations at home.

Though the aforementioned arguments seem plausible they also have some major lapses that need to be discussed. Since the so far conclusion might look too optimistic conclusions. First, not all emigrants are moving to mature and consolidated democracies. A large part of global emigration is conditioned not by the political but mainly by economic, financial (Rother, 2009), and security reasons. Emigrants fleeing the areas affected by natural disasters, military conflicts and economic distress are moving to other areas that provide better conditions than in their country of origin. Their choice in this case is dictated by two factors: the availability of migratory chain-networks, and the resources at their disposal necessary to emigrate. Since both of them are usually limited, emigrants use the lip-frog emigration practice meaning that they move just to the adjacent state where the political landscape is not significantly different from their home communities (MacDonald, J. & MacDonald L., 1964). Short-term migrants tend to move first of all to those areas where jobs with higher income are available. These states, however, are not necessarily democratic. For instance, the oil rich Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates countries started in the 1970s to invest in economic spheres other than oil. This change created numerous job opportunities for low-skilled construction and infrastructure workers that have been supplied from abroad. The same tendency was observed in the case of Singapore and Hong Kong by offering jobs for women coming from neighboring countries as housekeepers. And the most obvious case for us –Russia, a state that by far is not a democracy. The accessibility of relatively better-paid jobs did not socialize emigrants into democratic patterns in these cases (Rother, 2009). Moreover, Goodman and Hiskey (2008) argue that even if migrants move to a democracy they have little exposure to the host country’ democratic institutions. Consequently political remittances should be analyzed from a very equivoque perspective.

Violence and radical ideas are another version of undesirable social remittances that are transferred together with returning migrants. Kapur (2007) presents instances when Pakistani and Yemeni combatant migrants to Afghanistan brought upon return new radical and militarist ideas, which were very dangerous for their societies considering the already unstable political context in these states. Many of the illegal emigrants from Latin to North America are much more inclined to use weapons upon return. Kapur also, discusses the sizable effects of criminal networks of common in diverse diaspora groups. He shows that much of the international crimes reported by the United Nations, that ranges annually between $1–1.5 trillion earned from drug trafficking, arms trading, human trafficking are also constitutive parts of variations of social remittances. Consequently, this negative experience increases the level of violence and slows down the prospects for positive political transformations in the emigrant sending countries.

Rother (2009) also shows that the process of migration consolidates the existing political attitudes, the “degree and direction of such changes in attitudes are dependent on migrants' [previous] individual experience” with freedoms and restrictions, and a potential bias when selecting the country of destination (p. 256). In this context, the migration experience has equal chances to lead to a more critical position in regards to the homeland government, as well as to lead to lesser support for democratic standards.

Political diffusion of ideas driven by returning migrants also means the spread of any ideology not just the democratic one. It also includes the spread of autocratic or religious fundamentalist ideas. That is why political socialization could similarly bring positive as well as negative consequences. Mahmoud et al. (2010) investigation on the voting patterns of Moldovan emigrants in the Russian Federation and the European states in 2005 and 2009 elections serve as example. His results show a strong antidemocratic spillover effect from Russia. He shows that the majority of the Moldovans residing in Russia voted predominantly for the Communists’ Party (which is considered of lower democratic standards) while those residing in Europe voted predominantly for pro-European parties. He claims that the high rate of emigration to Russia increased the already high support for the communists’ party. This voting pattern was conditioned by the spillover effect of autocratic political values socialized by Moldovan emigrants in a non-democratic setting of residence.

Another salient example is Ruget and Usmanalieva’s (2011) qualitative research on political perception and behavior of Kyrgyz emigrants residing in Russian Federation. When asked to choose among a set of political priorities, the majority of respondents prioritized ‘stability’ over other issues. ‘Democracy’ was chosen only by one fourth of respondents, and another quarter declared themselves are not interested in political issues at all. Ruget & Usmanalieva (2011) conclude on the case of Kyrgyz emigrants that being exposed to well-functioning authoritarianism abroad, emigrants will support the same type of regime home.

Emigration can also negatively impact prospects of democratization at home through indirect means, such as brain drain. Brain drain reflects the potential economic and socio-political losses associated with emigration. According to the U.S. Census as cited in Rapoport (2002), 88 percent of immigrants to OECD countries had at least secondary school degrees. The flight of the most valuable citizens, in this sense, leads to the decrease of a nation’s capacity to create bright oppositions (Li and McHale, 2009; Hirschman, 1970). In this context, it is a commonly recognized fact that emigration from Mexico and Haiti to the U.S. has slowed down the political change in these countries. Hirschman (1970), claims that emigration is a form of political curse for democratizing societies because it allows those dissatisfied with their political institutions to leave their home country. Thus, by choosing to ‘exit’, emigrants abandon the domestic political struggle and subsequently weaken the domestic democratic opposition. Conversely, if emigrants choose to stay and express their “voice”, they choose to participate in the process of demanding political change. Comparable political analyses have been posted about the autocratic regimes in Cuba (Colomer, 2000; Hoffman, 2005), Belarus, Haiti (Ferguson, 2003) and Mexico (Hansen, 1988), where emigration was used as means to reduce domestic pressure.

The more recent wave of migration from the region, however, shows a different pattern. Morawska (2002) argues in this sense that “the relationship between westbound travels of a vast majority of migrants and democratization in their home countries has weakened” (p. 164). Migration, in this context, has helped to depress the resistance from below by serving as a “pressure valve” in the process of providing job opportunities abroad in the context of unpopular economic reforms at home. Remittances secured a certain level of income for the local population while making them apathetic to the decreasing quality of the provided public services. Also, the chance for the dissatisfied to leave can empower a non-conflicting slow democratic transition. Hirschman (1970) also states that the option for exiting allows the most radical demanders such as anarchists, socialists, and revolutionaries to vacate the dense political debate. By leaving the political sphere, they decrease the levels of social tensions in society, and allow gradual reforms to be carried out.

Moreover, brain drain does not necessarily decrease the political opposition capacity as presented by Hirschman (1970) argument on ‘exit voice’. On the contrary, the prospects of emigration increase the demand for education in the country of origin. This fact redefines the individual choices of utility of the knowledge by making people want to invest more in education. The perspective of emigration resupplies the local society with better-educated and more politically involved actors (Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2001). Spilimbergo (2009) also looks at the spillover effect of foreign education. He argues that foreign education acquired by the emigrants in countries with established democratic regimes have a positive effect on democratization in their home societies. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2001) also claims that emigration does not decrease by far emigrants’ political participation. The expressed ‘exit’ does not speak in favor of a weakened domestic civil society, as Hirschman (1970) claims, because the ‘exit’ already reflects the voice of the weak. Vice-versa, by finding fertile lands for political mobilization in hosting societies, emigrants intensify their transnational political activity (Fox, 2009). Portes (1999) notes that many Mexicans left exactly because they did not have a voice or because the authorities denied their expression of that voice. Consequently the enfranchisement of emigrants is always an act of supporting the opposition, as the emigrants will be very reluctant to vote for the power elites. Looking through the perspective of political diffusion theory Mahmoud et al. (2003) notes that Hirschman’s exit voice theory could be valid for the ‘50s-‘60s when the decision to emigrate was signaling the total removal from the political context where the political pressure could be exercised. Whereas, the advance of modern communication and transportation networks offers now the possibility for the removed from the system emigrants to exercise a political power on the home society sometimes maybe even stronger than if the emigrant would stay home. Since the emigrant is exposed to new modern ideas that could be easily transferred by them back home.

From this review we see that besides migroEuro or migroRuble the emigratns have a strong capacity to influence both positively and negatively the political process in Moldova. The question is which of the pro or anti democratization pol proves stronger? In one of the next posts I will discuss the emigration political impact on Moldovan politics.

No conclusion…

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Un Pahar Pentru Patrie - Noua Identitate Nationala (Autor: Mark Mazureanu)

2017-12-26T11:54:00.001-08:00

Fiecare natiune are o tema de discutie tabu de evitat pentru a nu degrada o conversatia decenta intr-un conflict. Cu un azer sau armean nu vom discuta despre Karabahul de Munte, cu un turc despre drepturile curzilor, cu un neamt despre trecutul nazist, cu un spaniol despre dreptul bascilor; sirul poate continua pina la nesfirsit. Moldovenii tot au un topic de iritatie sporita, numit “limba oficiala”. La prima vedere un subiect inocent, in realitate, insa, fundamental pentru natiune, pentru ca limba defineste in mare parte identitatea nationala a moldovenilor.

In continuare, voi discuta pe scurt citeva exemple de identitati nationale, apoi voi trece la prezentarea conflictului istorico-lingvistic al identitatii nationale din Moldova. La final voi explica necesitatea identificarii unui alt element in baza caruia trebuie construita identitatea nationala in RM.

Crearea statelor-natiune este un process relativ recent care a demarat in 1789. Transformarile politice care au urmat au dus la stabilirea relatiilor contractuale dintre cetatean si stat. Prin contractului mutual stabilit, statul putea taxa cetatenii in schimbul onorarii unor obligatii fata de ei. De aici si vine conceptul democratic de nici o taxare fara reprezentare. Aceasta relatie de tip contractual dintre stat si cetateni a constituit baza ideii statului-natiune prin care acestea se atasau de institutiile politice a statului prin relatii de interes si beneficiu comun. Doar datorita crearii natiunilor politice, administratia puteau guverna diverse comunitati etnice diverse adunate sub un singur pavilion. Prin consecinta, cei din Bavari, Prusia sau Wurrtemberg se puteau simti egali sub umbrela unei entitati politice Germane unice care le reprezenta anumite drepturi.

Pina la revolutie, populatia statelor nu era nici franceza, prusa sau suedeza in sensul modern al intelegerii, ci mai degraba semana a comunitati care locuiau pe anumite terenuri care apartineau unei nobilimi, biserici sau direct coroanei. Taranii nu luptau in razboaie pentru “patrie” sau “natiune”. Aceste concepte au aparut mai tirziu. Strigatul lui Mel Gibson in rolul lui William Wallace din filmul Braveheart in fata armatei scotiene “Vom muri pentru Natiune” este un anachronism hollywoodian. Este adevarat ca locuitorii Scotiei se identificau cu o anumita cultura, apartenenta la aceasta, insa nu le oferea nici un drept politic sau vreun beneficiu special pe care l-ar fi putut avea din partea elitelor sale scotiene.

Lipsa in perioada pre-1789 de idee nationala in sensul ei modern nu inseamna ca pina atunci nu exista o forma de conexiune psiho-sociala intre oamenii care locuiau intr-o anumita entitate politica. Conexiunea existenta era fie prin limba vorbita regional, destul de fragmentata, fie prin ocupatie, muzica, cutuma sau preferinte gastronomice. Toate acestea creeaza componenta culturala a natiunii si constituie un element suplimentar pentru crearea identitatii nationale. Prezenta similitudinii culturale insa, nu neaparat va duce la crearea natiunilor politice.

Despre identitatea nationala in Statele Unite ale Americii

Acum vom analiza citeva cazuri de identitate nationala din prezent. Sa incepem cu Statele Unite ale Americii. SUA este o natiune creata dintr-o pluralitate etnica, lingvistica, culturala si rasiala. Deci, nici unul din indiciile enumerate nu poate sta la baza natiunii pentru ca niciunul din ele nu este dominant sau ar putea sa reprezinte toti membrii societatii. Orice prioritizare a unui element ar duce la dezbinarea societatii pe principiu de antagonism. Drept exemplu poate servi clivajului rasial depasit in anii 1960. In asa fel, conexiunea s-a construit pe elemente politice, cum ar fi increderea in constitutie, curtea suprema, drapelurile politice, dolarul, drapelul, sau pashaportul american.

Despre identitatea nationala in Serbia

Un exemplu diferit este cazul Serbiei, in care factorul de identificare nationala este religia. Spre diferenta de fostele state membre ale Iugoslaviei, Serbia este unicul stat care continua traseul crestin ortodox, crucial pentru Serbi, care se disting de Bosniecii preponderent musulmani, sau Croatii catolici. Limba sirbo-cruata nici pe departe nu poate servi functia de identificator national precum este aproape similara cu limbile vorbite in restul statelor fostei Iugoslavii. In ce tine de alfabet, atunci situatia este si mai bizara, cel putin pentru noi. Serbii folosesc alfabetul chirilic de rind cu cel latin fara a face o distinctie intre cei care prefera unul contra celuilalt. In asa fel, nu se pot diferentia de natiunile din jur prin alfabetul folosit.

Despre identitatea nationala in Rusia

Acum vom arunca o privire asupra Rusiei ca stat cu identitate slaba. Pe cit nu ar fi de straniu, dar nici la o etapa istorica, cu exceptia celei sovietice, Rusia nu a reusit sa creeze o idee nationala unica. Nici ortodoxismul sau slavizmul nu au fost capabile sa creeze coeziunea sociala. Ambele identitati mai degraba au dezbinat populatia decit au unit-o, intrucit Rusia, in majoritatea sa, nu este nici ortodoxa, nici slava. Prin consecinta, puterea este in continua cautare a unei idei coagulatoare a natiunii ruse.

Care sunt cauzele esecului de crearea a identitatii nationale in Rusia? Prima cauza este extinderea teritoriala rapida a statului dintr-un teritoriu mic al principatului Musocvit (de aproximativ teritoriul RM de azi) spre un gigant imperiu transcontinental. Acest lucru a dus la incorporarea sub o singura coraoana a unor mase uriase de oameni, apartenente la diferite grupe culturale, etnice, religioase, aflate la diverse nivele de dezvoltare, avind sisteme sociale ierarhice diferite, moduri diverse de guvernare si sisteme administrative si fiscal eterogene. Pentru a tine teritoriile sub control, statul a creat o retea bine functionala de unitati militare distribuite geografic. Prin intermediul acesteia, puterea tarista a reusit sa sugrume orice val de miscare revolutionara si sa pastreze autocratia tarista aproape intacta. Acest fapt a stopat tranzitia Rusiei spre un sistem de guvernare representativa ca in cazul statelor europene. In alte cuvinte, statul nu a reusit sa creeze contractul social de care vorbeam mai sus. In asa fel, un cecen plateste taxele exclusiv pentru ca statul are mecanisme sa le extraga. La orice slabiciune a statului, insa, el va tinde sa se desprinda de imperiu, pentru ca relatia contractuala dintre dinsul si stat nu este respectata (el nu primeste aproape nici un beneficiul economic sau cultural din a fi parte componenta a acestui stat). De aceea, democratizarea Rusiei este imposibila fara destramarea posterioara a acesteia.

In ultima vreme urmarim o tentativa mai noua a Kremlinului de reanimare a ideii nationale ruse dintr-o identitate sovietica puternica mai veche. Aceasta se construieste pe ideea de lupta maniheana intre fortele binelui si raului. Terenul de lupta propus este razboiul doi mondial. Aceasta rivalitate contrapune fortele binelui intruchipate in toti cei care au luptat sub un singur drapel sovietic contra fortelor demonice naziste, prezentat ca o forta unica europeana, avind Germania in frunte. In asa fel, Kremlinul construieste un simbol de lupta continua unita contra fortelor naziste. Evident ca Rusia isi rezerva dreptul de conducere a acestei lupte. Conflictul simbolic se intensifica la maxim in lunile Mai-Iunie cind are loc razboiul panglicilor. Aderarea la grupul biruitorilor nazismului se face prin prioritizarea simbolicii sf Gheorge masiv distribuite si reclamate de puterea rusa. Aceasta are drept scop sa contrabalanseze mesajul vestic materializat in simbolica albastra a Uniunii Europene.

Despre identitatea nationala in Moldova

Moldova, la fel, este in cautarea identitatii nationale proprii. Din anii ‘90 pina in prezent au fost incercate mai multe modele. Primul s-a axat pe crearea coeziunii nationale focusate pe simbolica politica - drapelul, parlamentul, constitutia, la fel ca si modelul de identitate american. Procesul, insa, a esuat rapid pentru ca puterea nu a reusit sa asigure o functionalitate a institutiilor statului, in asa fel devalorizind simbolica. Modelele ce au urmat s-au construit pe principii etno-culturale. Elementele definitorii au devenit etnia, limba si istoria. Aceste modele au aratat atit incapacitatea de creare a coeziunii nationale, cit si au dezgolit nervul conflictului latent existent in societate.

Accentul pus pe limba a intensificat mai multe clivaje existente. Promovarea limbii romane ca limba nationala a aratat ca acea jumatate din populatie care nu vorbeste limba nu este gata sa accepte binevol limba romana ca limba dominanta, iar statul nu are modalitati de stimulare sau coercitie ca in cazul statelor baltice. In acelasi timp, autoritatile au realizat ca accentul pe limba romana poate submina suveranitatea statului pentru ca ii va permite Romaniei sa obtina o pirghie de control asupra prioritatilor culturale din Moldova. Mai mult ca atit, acest model va partaja populatia in clase lingvistice, antagonizind vorbitorii de limba rusa si ucraineana. Proiectul “limba moldoveneasca”, conceput ca un compromis lingvistic a strins foarte putini suporteri, insa a trezit un intreg val de rezistenta din partea ambelor tabere.

Identitatea, bazata pe o istorie unica, este si mai conflictuanta, pentru ca ofera un univers intreg de interpretare. Cultivarea unei istorii eroice nationale confortabile pentru toate taberele ethno-culturale este cu atit mai complicata, cu cit statul nu este in stare sa asigure nici resursele necesare pentru a o crea prin filmografie sau televiziune, nici expertiza necesara. Mai mult ca atit, identitatea istorica creata dinauntru este permanent subminata de modelele istorice promovate din afara. Pe de o parte, avem modelul ‘Roamania Mare’, iar pe de alta, modelul ‘civilizatia slavona si Imperiul Rus’. Ambele fac proiectul “Moldova - entitate istorica autonoma si de sine-statatoare” aproape imposibil.

Drept rezultat, aplicarea numeroaselor modelelor de cultivare a identitatii nationale, bazate pe elemente culturale, au sporit doar gradul de confuzie sociala. Populatia s-a grupat in tabere beligerante antagoniste, baricadate pe argumente sterpe care duc o lupta care doar adincirea canionului dintre ele.

Functiile identitatii nationale

• Cea mai importanta functie a identitatii nationale este de unire a populatiei prin agregarea intereselor, indiferent de micile dissensiuni si interese grupale existente .

• Identitatea nu poate crea outsideri, ci doar insideri. In asa statul va functiona sa asigure integrarea tuturor subgrupelor sociale ci nu va tinde sa le marginalizeze pe cele care nu intra intr-o mostra prestabilita.

• Drept rezultat, identitatea puternica va crea o forta centripeta care va spori capacitatea economica si politica a statului. Doar identitatea nationala unica conditioneaza ca fiecare cetatean sa se implice la realizarea proiectelor socio-economice de interes comun indiferent de prioritatile sale marunte. Drept rezultat al implicatiei creste atit beneficiul colectiv cit sic el individual.

Vinul ca identitate nationala pentru Moldova

Din prezentarea anterioara putem deduce ca modelul identitar moldovenesc trebuie sa evite la maxim orice element de natura etno-lingvistica, istorica si politica pe care se pun acentul in prezent. El trebuie creat in baza unui factor care constituie elementul de mindrie generala. Factor care poarta o incarcatura emotionala pozitiva si puternica pentru toti, indiferent de prioritatile acestora.

Acest element de conexiune in Moldova este vinul. Noua identitate construita pe vin ar veni cu un intreg sir de avantaje.

• Avantajul de identitate distincta: In calitate de produs national vinul Moldovenesc este absolut distinct de cel fabricat in oricare alta tara din vecinatate; in asa fel, accentul pe vin va cultiva o identitate deosebita de cea romaneasca, rusa sau ucraineasca.

• Accent pe calitate: Produsul de calitate poate deveni un brand puternic international, iar producatorii lui se pot mindri cu el.

· Domolirea conflictelor etno-politice: Vinul nu are apartenenta politica sau etnica in asa fel indiferent de subgrupa etno-lingvistica sau de prioritate politica din care fac parte cetatenii ei se pot regasi sub banerul vinului moldovenesc. Un gagauz, rus sau moldo-roman din Moldova pleacati in Rusia, sau alta parte iau cu sine o sticla de vin produs din Moldova. Toti trei intind sticla drept cadou cu cuvintele “v-am adus o sticla de vind bun din Moldova”. Vinul ii va uni pe toti sub o umbrela comuna de conexiune.

• Cresterea gradului de mindrie nationala in exterior: Identificarea cu brandul “wine from Moldova”, respectat international, va creste nivelul de mindrie nationala la fel cum Ozon sau Zdob si Zdub au sporit pe scurt timp nivelul de euforie, facindu-i pe moldoveni mindri de apartenenta nationala. Prin urmare, Moldoveanul nu se va mai sfii de faptul apartenentei sale la un stat cu o imagine politica precara, ci va intinde pasaportul national cu mindrie, pentru ca acesta este simbolul unui produs viticol de calitate inalta.

• Costul redus de construire a noii identitati nationale: Viticultorii din republica vor contribui substantial la promovarea brandului, ceea ce este un avantaj major al prioritizarii vinului ca idee nationala. In asa fel, statul va beneficia de promovare cu minim cheltuieli de dirijare a procesului. Noua idee nationala va fi rapid preluata si de operatorii turistici care vor tinde sa o fortifice penru ca ideai nationala bazata pe vin este si profitabila.

Fara concluzie.