Cripes! Get back to fundamentals...

Developing a Quarterback with Jim Harbaugh

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Thu, 29 Dec 2011 06:10:34 PST

Talking ball with Harbaugh as he shares his secrets to creating a better passer...

Football’s Illusions

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Thu, 29 Dec 2011 13:04:13 PST

We want diversity, but we don't want it to be an argument. But that's what diversity is.

Sometimes the arguments are creative. When you start a dialectic between people who are different, it benefits... I believe in arguing.

I'm often accused of being opinionated and argumentative, I plead guilty to that, but I've never had anything not end up better because people in the same room were arguing back.
-David Simon

This post is an attempt to articulate a deeper response to understanding today’s game of professional football and the culture that surrounds it. Please understand that there are various nuances to consider and this is not intended to be the cynical fire-starting rant that it may appear to be at first glance.

Hemlock and I are presenting our views on this subject for posterity and reflection on the impact of mass media in shaping the game of football in the current age. In a recent discussion at Coach Huey.com, the issue of NFL scheme variety was presented. Is there really a difference between one team from another, when they all essentially are running the same thing? And if they are the same, why are we being constantly told about / sold on the facets that are unique to such-and-such scheme?
Influence Of Mass Media Shaping Perception

NFL

According to many reports, professional football got its start primarily to serve gambling interests.
It was just too difficult to influence the outcomes of so many college games at the time and the money to be made through industry-sponsored teams was too good to pass up. In any event, the professional game we have today is primarily propped up to serve the interests of franchises and advertising revenue. While many professional ball clubs have a storied history of games played and athletes who forced an adaptation along the way, the system in place was really only concerned on the amount of “units” sold. In short, the Cleveland Steamers exist to turn a profit as an entertainment franchise, it just happens to be that winning games is a great way to turn a profit. “The game” is an afterthought to the bottom-line of the organization.

If the NFL captures your attention and sparks a passion for the game of football, great. Hopefully, this interest draws you into a greater appreciation of the sport, itself. Be aware that much of the NFL is competition and strategy in Kabuki form, which is fitting after all, as a night at the theatre has now been replaced with an afternoon at the stadium in our current culture. It is a marketing device that wraps itself in the flag, never-ending 9/11 tributes, breast cancer awareness, and any other maudlin trigger it could hope to entrench itself to. Anything to get you to cauterize your personal identity to socially affirmed beliefs. This has great effect for creating an illusion that the game and it’s trademark are bigger than they are (“Peyton Manning isn’t just a man, but Peyton Manning”); nurturing hero worship.

The NFL is, far and away, the most egregious, self-absorbed and greedheaded entity when it comes to displaying any logo, player, uniform, jersey, game film, highlight. If money isn’t shoved into their pocket at every single opportunity and if the script itself doesn’t extol the NFL and American football as the saving grace of our civilization, then they reserve all rights to the depiction of football as it exists in the lives of regular folk. They include in that regular folk who suffered through Katrina and its aftermath and took real solace in the Saints. They don’t give a fuck about depicting your reality or what the Saints meant to you. They give a fuck about glorifying and gilding their image and getting paid ridiculous sums of money. That’s all they care about.

- David Simon, creator of Treme

ESPN

Jesse Palmer wasn’t hired because he possesses some great insight into the game. He is the face of the game because he provided a draw for ABC’s “The Bachelor”, has a TV-polished delivery, and can accentuate the game experience. There isn’t anything wrong with that in itself. Networks exist to serve their share-holders and anything that beefs up the bottom line. Whether it’s a pretty face in the booth, a skirt on the sideline, and computer graphics peppered through the broadcast, its all about selling their brand.

This isn’t even hating on the world-wide leader in sports. They do a good job of expanding the game to a wide-reaching market. Simply understand that the 24/7 information cycle exists not because of necessity (there is so much that doesn’t need to be reported or evaluated), only because it is profitable. The bottom-line for ESPN is advertising revenue, and this is the entire thrust of this post. There are 3-hour pregame shows not because there is 3-hours of content to deliver, but that is the maximum draw ESPN can offer prime content advertising slots. To entice the viewer’s attention, they have to offer different hooks; human-interest stories, personal stories, and secret matchup scheme advantages you should watch for in a game. Again, not because you are really gaining anything out of this, but they want to build on that emotional identity you are associating with.

ESPN began taking off in the mid-1990s and has expanded its exposure over the last few decades. Try to remember what ‘sports reporting’ was like in the 70’s and 80’s. Even in the 90’s, before broadband speeds of the 2000s, they were primarily content-driven. Currently, they essentially reign without competitor, serving as king-makers and breakers depending on the chosen narrative.

So when you get done viewing one of their next “specials” or “analysis”, ask yourself if you really learned anything of substance, could the statements they made hold any relevance or be validated? If the answer is “no”, you may want to question why the fuck you watch this shit in the first place.

Another way to problematize what ESPN, FOX, and the new new kid on the block VERSUS do is locate it within perspective of the cheap drama of the average television sitcom. I add "cheap" here not to be snarky, but just not to disrespect the medium of drama. But back to my point: with their various pregame programs ESPN creates a narrative mode of emplotment for viewers to latch onto and follow; in a sense, its akin to the old Soviet master plots of Socialist Realist novels that, by and large, went something like this: boy meets girl, girl meets tractor and bam we got Utopia. These make for very nice page turners and the like, the one problem being that the players in the text no longer really matter at all; they are all interchangeable because their actions as indivduals have been subordinated to the needs of the plot. ESPN effectively offers a moderated form of this narrative, but from a slightly more capitalist perspective. ESPN is not interested in building socialistic Utopias, but in feeding an infernal system of consumption with the aid of maximizing share prices and returns.

I suppose that so long we are aware of the existence this plot then nothing is too problematic. Problems arise, however, when people actually begin to believe the plot, to believe, in other words, that what ESPN is offering is not reality, but a simulacrum of reality, a shiny, varnished, troping of a well played plot. Succinctly put, ESPN reinforces the point that perception is now reality.

And to this we can add one sidebar of sorts that is directly related to the way the plot of the NFL is executed on the "gridiron," where the fuck are you George Carlin when I need you. The subordination of the game to the plot of profit in the form shares and returns is evident in the commodified, big-box way the game is played. Small roster, smaller than those of any college program, as well as some high-school programs, combined with the intensified commodification of the game via free agency forces teams to play a generic "pro-style" of offense and defense. This combined with the odic figure of the QB, the "face" of every franchise, makes it exceedingly risky to employ a system, especially on offense, that would risk injuring the hero of the NFL-ESPN-FOX story. The reason we do not see the option, the Run-n-Shoot, or a true spread in the MIZZOU sense is not because they would not work or that NFL players are too fast, but because these styles of play would force teams to re-trope themselves in a way that departs significantly from the NFL script. The option could work in the NFL; a team would just need to design itself around the option, carry four QB, an make this their identity. What's Pat White doing these days anyway...?

RADIO

Before there was BooYah analysis, there was sports radio and the bombastic, concision-driven, dead-air killing rants of disc jockeys who troll for lulz on fan bases. The more obnoxious they could become, the greater the market share this personality could draw, and command a greater demand for advertising dollar. This type of format only exacerbated the one-liner simplicity that host and fans used. Deep and layered discussion was not embraced (boring) and inciting rivalries and spiking blood pressures is where the payoff resided. This formula, is what much of the network/Internet fan experience is founded upon. It isn’t because it is a natural course of sport appreciation, it is because that is how the game is sold to us as consumers.

Who the hell listens to radio anymore, though, amirite? It should be noted, though, that this very same cheap audience gimmick plays out daily in any medium you’re receiving sports information. This manipulative practice is what serves as the rudder in dialogue, which in turn drives the decision-making process of those selling the goods (i.e. the sports franchises).

In fact, I have the habit when I'm driving of turning on these radio call-in programs, and it's striking when you hear the ones about sports. They have these groups of sports reporters, or some kind of experts on a panel, and people call in and have discussions with them. First of all, the audience obviously is devoting an enormous amount of time to it all. But the more striking fact is, the callers have a tremendous amount of expertise, they have detailed knowledge of all kinds of things, they carry on these extremely complex discussions...

...And when you look at the structure of them, they seem like a kind of mathematics. It's as though people want to work out mathematical problems, and it they don't have calculus and arithmetic, they work them out with other structures...And what all these things look like is that people just want to use their intelligence somehow...

Well, in our society we have things that you might use your intelligence on, like politics, but people really can't get involved in them in a very serious way -- so what they do is put their minds to other things, such as sports. You're trained to be obedient; you don't have an interesting job; there's no work around for you that's creative; in the cultural environment you're a passive observer of usually pretty tawdry stuff...So what's left?

...And I suppose that's also one of the basic functions it serves society in general: it occupies the populations, and it keeps them from trying to get involved with things that really matter. In fact, I presume that's part of the reason why spectator sports are supported to the degree they are by the dominant institutions.

-Noam Chomsky

INTERNET

"We're a little too into sports in this country, I think we gotta throttle back. Know what I mean? People come home from these games, "We won! We won!" No, they won - you watched."

-Seinfeld stand-up quote from the episode "the Chaperone"

You have websites prepackaged with content selling subscriptions, run largely by individuals who have little experience /knowledge in writing or fact-finding journalism, nor especially the game. Its one thing to deliver fan-centric content such as stats and tailgating experience and impressions from the game. It is quite another thing to provide analysis of coaching decisions with absolute certainty of the outcome when you have little understanding of what is taking place on the field and no experience what goes into teaching, applying, and managing a game (coaching staff).

You don’t have to be a Michelin-rated chef to be able to discern if a meal was palatable or if your dining experience was one to be remembered. It does help my critique as well as substantiate my perspective if I understand what goes into the process of food preparation, nutrition, presentation, and how tastes are to complement each other. If I do not have an understanding of these elements, I won’t be grounded in key factors to provide objective feedback. Unfortunately, much of the ‘analysis’ by these content providers is tantamount to a steak house review where the critic clamors on about how the steak was too rare and needed more ketchup. Don’t mistake snark for being insightful.

This will regrettably come across as a stern rebuke of fan-sites on the Internet. It is not meant to be such. They serve a purpose to heighten the fan experience and provide an inclusive support network (at a price?). This piece was intended to provide some perspective of how much of the information is being filtered to the consumer, who in turn shapes the discourse of college/pro football. This isn’t meant to disparage bloggers, either. I would argue that their perspective remains the most relevant and should be the least tainted of sports reporting. The danger lays in their attempts to mimic the ESPNs of the world with pseudo-analysis via clichés, gibberish, and rhetorical logic. These bloggers (network employees included) are often times fresh out of college with the crux of their understanding of the game founded on video games, junior high playing experience, and other cardboard analysis from cable television. It is what it is, let the consumer beware. Pump the brakes on serious analysis of coaching decisions, especially when they concern what programs should be doing behind closed doors or on the field of play. Nowhere is this more apparent than in evaluating the passing game. The fan-analyst will only see ‘bad calls’ and ‘good calls’ if they don’t factor in coverage vs passing concept, protection, concept progressions, and player execution. This is why a majority of sites will stress the run game so much because it can avoid much of the vagaries of passing the football. This insecurity / lack of confidence in subject matter contribute to the retardation of a critical response.

Also, understand the psyche of the single-minded sports fan (the people delivering the content). Emotions run high and each contest is seen through the lens of immediate gratification and pride. Living paycheck to paycheck isn’t a sound plan for financial security and neither is the rabid game-to-game evaluation of a team. As we say in coaching, “it is never as bad as you remember or as good as it seems. Watch the film”. What worked, what didn’t, film puts it all into appropriate perspective.

So what is the purpose behind this tangent? Simply to evaluate statements proffered by these mouthpieces. Don’t accept them just because they feel good, but challenge them (“why is this statement true? What is the counter-argument and what other factors are involved?”). THAT, truly is what the game of football is about. It isn’t about absolute answers, it is about presenting challenges, evaluating solutions, and determining through an economy of resources (time, athletes, odds, knowledge, etc ) what the appropriate response should be. The further you get from the field, the easier the game appears. In a game that elicits so much emotion, this is a petition for dispassionate understanding of what you’re consuming.

** UPDATE - so it's no surprise that both ESPN and the NFL are strong supporters of the obnoxious SOPA legislation
http://gizmodo.com/5870241/presented-without-comment-every-single-company-supporting-sopa-the-awful-internet-censorship-law

Sean Payton: Quarterbacking

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Mon, 19 Dec 2011 18:39:12 PST

Here is a decent resource for getting a young quarterback grounded in some solid fundamentals on throwing mechanics (circa 1992). Now, granted there are a few things in the video that don’t lead to efficiency, but, hey…..this was over 20 years ago. You’ll see a young assistant coach named Sean Payton running quarterback footwork and throwing drills.

If you want a great indoctrination of flawless throwing, you’d better invest in Darin Slack C4 and R4 materials.
Darin Slack Quarterback Training

ROD DOBBS: Teaching & Installing Zone Runs

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Sat, 10 Dec 2011 10:49:37 PST

Right behind the Alex Gibbs staff clinic with the UF staff, this has got to be one of the most comprehensive instructions on zone running. Rod Dobbs, a Gibbs disciple, who is now coaching at Chaparral High School in Denver, CO, clinics a high school staff while he was running the offense for Northern Colorado. Dobbs goes over the entire scheme, technique, and how to make it work during a season in this 6 hour presentation.

This off-season, why not establish some relationships with other coaches and invite them in to get your staff on the same page for next year.

NC: Rematch Bama vs LSU

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Tue, 06 Dec 2011 20:07:53 PST

Well, its set.....the SEC rematch between #1 LSU and #2 Alabama. While it may not be technically "fair" from an LSU perspective to have to face off against a team it already defeated on the road in regular season, I feel from a football perspective, these truly are the two best teams in the country.

As a fan of matchups, I really didn't want to see LSU play Oklahoma State (though it would be entertaining), as I don't feel the Cowboys really had enough dimension to take on this LSU team. We've included a concise recap of the first meeting this season below (more analysis likely to come). For what its worth, it should be noted that the majority of LSU's starters (with the exception of QB & 2 LBs) are all underclassmen, so barring a lot of early declarations for the NFL draft, you have a team poised for a run in 2012, too. Alabama, too, starts a good majority of underclassmen (meaning, this is really about recruiting supremacy more than schemes and strategy).

Poetically enough (for this blog), TCU squares off against Louisiana Tech in the Poinsettia Bowl, in what should be an exciting matchup. On a personal note, I'll likely be treated to the surprise switch of teams for the Jewella Slumdog, otherwise known as the Independence Bowl, featuring Mizzou and John Shoop's North Carolina Tarheels.

food for thought (and possibly more later)

THE EDGES OF CONCISION

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Sun, 25 Dec 2011 08:03:31 PST

A couple of weeks back, just before the holiday, I was in Washington DC for another profoundly boring, tedious, and ultimately, pretentious academic conference. After giving my talk and fielding an hour or so of numbing questions I went to the hotel lounge to unwind with the help of my two best friends, Mr. Jameson and Mr. Glenfiddich. I was lucky that night because I managed to grab the TV before the fireplace and monopolize it – a good move indeed because the boors who eventually descended like locusts would undoubtedly not have wanted to watch something as stimulating as the game between Iowa State and Oklahoma State that fine evening. Now, no doubt because of the good company of my two aforementioned friends, I was just a bit distracted and unable to fully digest and appreciate what was unfolding in Ames that night, but I knew I had found something quite appealing to my oh so prosaic senses, especially when the Cyclones had the ball.

I got back the next day to Madison in time to watch another interesting match – that between Baylor and Oklahoma. And this is when, with the help this time of two other friends, Earl and Lady Grey, along with a healthy dose of lemon combined with a quick shot Ms. Brandy (muddled, of course), it all started to dawn on me, almost like the initial testament Joseph Smith experienced somewhere in New York state. It all began when one of the prophets, Matt Millen, declared in no uncertain terms that if Baylor wanted to be successful against OU that they needed to move RGIII around so as to change his launch points and prevent the Sooner D from teeing off on him. For a moment, I agreed with the prophet and considered myself, with bit of self-loathing, fortunate to be in a position to take in his divinatory powers. But then something happened: the game continued, Baylor continued, by and large, to keep RGIII in the same place, and eventually the Bears won.

That night I went back and watched the ISU-OSU tilt again and noticed the same thing; hardly any pocket movement. This jogged my memory a bit and sent me back to my Arizona State cutups, which brought my attention to something I had completely taken for granted at some level or another: none of these teams protect their QBs by changing their QBs’ launch points. Does that mean that they do not move the pocket? Of course not. Only that when they do so it’s primarily to isolate a single receiver on an easy throw, usually in a short yardage situation; in other words, when they move the QB it is not because they necessarily believe that it will help them protect him more effectively.

For anybody well-versed in the fundamentals of protection, this all seems counter-intuitive, right? I mean, after all, a stationary QB is a sitting duck just waiting to get blown apart by a defense that simply needs to stay in its lanes in order to bring their pressure home? How then do these teams do such a great job of protecting their QBs, especially when they are most of the time releasing not three, but four and five guys and are thus never protecting with any more than six people? If we pause to think about it for a second or two, the answer becomes self evident: all these teams secure their QBs by ensuring that the A and B gaps are always solid and by protecting their edges by way of their KEY screen games that come off of their inside zone schemes. Since Baylor, OSU, ISU, and ASU aggressively use their KEY games they are able to displace rushers and thus widen the edge thus increasing the distance a potential rusher must cover in order to get home. But this is only applicable if the defense continues to roll the dice, as it were, because the KEY game itself forces a defense to consider the potential costs and benefits of bringing such pressure.

This is yet another example of concision. By formulating and integrating packages so that they protect one another, not just the QB as a physical being, but concepts in and of themselves, they are able to reduce the number of things they need to carry in any given game. For all these teams, the KEY game along with whatever versions of ROSE and LINDA they run work to protect not only their respective 2 and 3 man SNAG games, but also their Shallow and Drive packages as well.

In a perverse sense then, protection is as much about the periphery as it is the center.

Offseason to dos

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Wed, 30 Nov 2011 12:15:13 PST

As offseason has fallen upon us, it’s that time of year to evaluate yourself and your philosophies. In my current situation, we have had 2 very poor seasons (2 wins in 2010, 3 wins this season) after being 25-3 the two previous seasons. Obviously, after those two ends of the spectrum it is hard to look at things thru the same eyes. We are a spread-to-run team. In 2008 we had a Jr. tailback and a Jr. QB. The QB missed half the season with a broken collar bone. The tailback carried the load and was not the same player in week 13 as he was in week 1. When the season was over, we had a very definite plan. It was to revamp our passing game to give us the opportunity to be balanced. We will always be run first but we knew that for an opportunity to advance further in the playoffs we were going to need to be more efficient throwing the ball. That was an easy offseason. We visited with the staff at the University of Texas for 3 days and incorporated 4 routes (3 quick game & 1 pap). We also did some addition by subtraction. We eliminated several routes and really narrowed our focus. Bottom line…we double our yardage, had more completions than attempts from the previous season, and doubled our TD’s, while keeping the same number of interceptions. That was a successful offseason.

Now, after two dismal seasons, where do you start? Do you being looking closely at personnel, practice plans, philosophy, staff changes, etc.? There was so much wrong where do you start making it right? I coach the wide receivers and here is what I decided to do as a start for me. Our previous head coach left a bunch of COACH OF THE YEAR MANUALS in the field house. I have seen them there for years and grabbed one or two for trips to the throne before but never really thought of using them as a learning tool. Just recently, I grabbed one from 1983 and I wanted to share with you some of the things that were in it that have got the mind firing and the x’s & o’s flowing again for me.

The first page had a tribute to Bear Bryant and his famous words –“Am I willing to endure the pain of this struggle for the comforts and the rewards and the glory that go with the accomplishments? OR : Shall I accept the uneasy and inadequate contentment that comes with mediocrity? Am I willing to pay the price of success?”

That was enough to get me going. The rest of these tidbits are just a few things I jotted down that I thought were relevant NOW just as they were in 1983. My top 10…

1. You have to know what you are doing and what you want to accomplish. Don’t do it just to be doing it.

2. Get excited about the 4 yard play.

3. DO YOUR BEST. I don’t want the KAMIKAZE pilot that flew 33 different missions.

4. Factor of 11 – There are 39,916,800 ways to line up 11 objects for all of you multiple guys.

5. Roger Bannister was the first to break the 4 minute mile. It was broken 43 times the next 4 years. Don’t put limitations on yourself.

6. Be intense enough to get the job done, but relaxed enough to enjoy it. (AMEN)

7. Again from 1983…Today a player will want to know why you want him to run thru a wall. You have to tell him why and then he will run thru it.

8. You have to be willing AND ready to throw on first down and from any place on the field.

9. Have people around you that like to work.

10. Be known for something. Be known for something you hang your hat on.

So what is your plan? What are you going to do? For those wanting to share ideas and throw things around….lets do it blog style, or shot me an email cmeans@denisonisd.net. As you may have seen in my other post, I am a HUDL guy that takes full advantage to the exchange features. If interested in swapping game films, cut ups, drills, etc… shot me an email.

Mazzone Revisited

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Tue, 13 Dec 2011 17:49:26 PST

I wasn’t quite sure if we captured the premise of the Iowa State lesson of schematic concision well enough in the last post. Admittedly, it was an off-the-cuff editorial to a climactic match. I also wasn’t sure if we have done a complete enough job to date on stressing the simplicity of concepts within an offense (hemlock has tackled this exceptionally well in previous posts), particularly as it relates to Noel Mazzone this fall. Yes, we get that Arizona State has underperformed this season and Erickson will likely be gone at the end of this year (though it is a shame, considering how explosive their offense has been), but I don’t believe that discounts the value of learning what is working with Mazzone.

With this in mind and to serve as a type of sidebar edification on the matter, we’re “reposting” an exchange offered by hemlock and I on COACHHUEY (explaining Mazzone’s system). So not to break the flow of dialogue (or require any actual work on my part) I’m leaving the posts as-is in the sequence they occured . Hemlock’s thoughtful prose and profound commentary is in gold, while my rambling gibberish is in diarrhea green.

** I realize some of the video (through Vimeo) hosted here is hard to come by. If you are not aware of how to rip flash already, I’ll direct you to use Firefox and download the video add-on. Start a video, then enable the download (and its yours).

Noel Mazzone is Noel Mazzone. He has always been 1-back. What he's doing in Arizona, is essentially what he's always done, having evolved it through the years.

It IS zone-read, but its all controlled/filtered through a systematic way of horizontally stretching the defense, while at the core being vertically orientated (zone-read, F swing, Stick/Snag/Scat/Drive/Shallows/Verts/and tons of screens). There is an efficiency in his application (which is what we've been writing about) that is worth exploring (certainly doesn't carry near the amount of stuff Air Raid teams currently do). It isn't necessarily the plays themselves, but how they're packaged together and used as punch and counter-punch diagnosis.

How he teaches "the offense" is evident in what you've seen with Threet and Osweiller. They are lightening quick in throwing 3-step and 5-step that appears brutal on defenses (they know exactly what they are looking for based on the concept and process through it all).

I would resist calling Mazzone's offense an extension of the pro-single back. If the source of this thought is Mazzone's stint with the Jets in the NFL then I think it a little off. Too me it's evident that Mazzone went to the NFL not to make that his final destination but as a sort of intense sabbatical in that he went there to see what that game had to teach him. I think his goal was always to get back to the college game.

Brophy and I are going to be writing more about the offense in weeks to come, but here are few things to keep in mind: Mazzone wants to stress the defense's perimeter fulcrum. Watch the USC game; I don't think I have ever scene such transparent objectives in my life; they are constantly trying to widen the defense. When they widen the edge their inside zone game become effective, but you need to remember that it's not a real rugged zone game; they don't do combos and stuff; its only effective if they have one on one matchups. But stretching the defense horizontally also helps his vertical game, because it transforms zone into man.

The thing to remember is this too: they really only carry a few concepts every game, especially in their dropback package. More later...
The thing to remember about their zone game is this: it's bang or bust; if they don't win their individual matchups the play goes no where. Think about some the idiotic comments that Rod Gilmore made the other night. It asked why on second and ten did Mazzone run what he described as an "inside handoff" that went for nothing. Well, it was the right call for the front; they had the numbers to win but simply did not on that play. I like to think of it as "scat" zone. I know that sounds odd, but it's not an inside zone in the Alex Gibbs, Eliot Uzelac sense.

In a lot of ways I think that Mazzone is reviving some old things that Purdue did once upon a time. Think of how he motions his backs; it reminds me of how Purdue, WAZZU, and for that matter Miami of yesterday all motioned to empty as a way of stretching the defense's flanks in order to create windows underneath, but also to put backers and backs on virtual islands.

Also, think of how they use the bubble. People talk about the bubble as an extended hand off, but most teams really do not throw it well enough for it to be considered their stretch or wide zone play; not the case with ASU. I don't think I've seen a team that can run bubbles with the back, from 2x2, or 3x1 as effectively as they do regardless of the look. In a sense, the bubble is one of their plays that they feel that they can run versus anything to make critical yards, regardless of whether the defense knows what coming or not. Their third scoring drive the other night that came of the Vontez's pick was built almost entirely of of bubbles in one form or another.
Chris is right, there is nothing radical about what their doing. We will cover this in a post later in the season, but the one thing that they have done better than just about anybody is to accelerate the speed of their vertical game; when their on their game they throw verticals just as fast as quicks.
Yeah, in a sense it really is just that - big on big; they never really get to the second level; basically, its the back's responsibility to make the backer miss, which is what happens when they get big plays out of their zone game.

In terms of packages they carry, if you watch them closely they basically run four concepts from 2x2 and 3x1: Snag; 4 Verts, Y Cross, and Drive or Shallow. Not a huge Smash team in the conventional sense; when they hit the corner its coming off their 3-man snag a lot.

That said, they do tag the backside with a number of different combos, such as double post, post corner, Dig choice, etc.

Its really about an Economy of Concepts

If you're horizontally stretching a defense and emptying the box (to run.....and run easy) I suppose it isn't necessary to mash and bang with getting vertical movement on IZ and working combos (still not sure if I swallow this just yet) them running IZ will blow your mind ("wtf are they doing!?!") if you're accustomed to how IZ is traditionally run out of 1 back.

watch how they 'zone' against a 3man front....not what you'd think

I would say that Alex Gibbs' one-cut rule is central to the success of the play in for Mazzone's back because of the nature of their scheme, which in part why the back aligns on the QB's heel rather than simply adjacent to him as he does in other zone gun schemes, such as Northwestern's, for example.

Against Oregon, the ASU offense relied heavily on motioning the H or Z into the formation. They barely used motion against Missouri. It is only used to make a more decisive read for the throw (remove a defender from the running lane).

To build on Brophy's point, motion is used here in much the same way as it was used back in the day at Wyoming, Purdue, WAZZU, etc. Yes, it definately clarifies the read for the QB in that it tells him right away which side of the field he's going to work, especially in the Snag game, but it also is a way of putting extreme pressure on the number four to that side, the defense's fulcrum. It's another way of "controlling" this guy and making sure that he is out of the box, that he does not become a 1/5 player in the box.

Though most applications of ASU's offense are pretty basic in each game, the quirks against Oregon would be apparent for most coaches. Whereas most 7-man front defenses, Mazzone can pretty much give his quarterback a very clear picture. With Oregon's nickel/dime (2/1 DL) the picture was extremely cloudy with linebackers and safeties dropping into overhang positions. The heavy use of motion in that game was a product of getting Oregon to declare what they were truly running (where the safeties had to be.....and would the out-leverage themselves from helping their corners against the larger receivers). On the swing, it would primarily require the safety to make the stop because they were playing a heavy dose of C5 and rushing 4 or fire zoning and rushing 5.

What is interesting for coaches, was how Mazzone's system could adapt to it without losing it's shit. Facing something that was as different and that could get into and out of box threats pretty easy (from depth), ASU didn't have to do anything outside of themselves to handle it. With so many defenders outside the tackles on each snap, Oregon really was daring them to run inside and how ASU was hammering the flare/swing to open up the inside. If they threw the swing, it was going to have to be a safety to stop it (leaving X/Z pretty much 1-on-1) . I didn't find many times where Oregon didn't bring 5 every down, so it made the dig/shallow read pretty easy (either the WLB/MLB was widening for the swing or were both dropping to hook) .

What should be interesting for COACHES is not what they are doing but how they are processing the information on the field. Just by segmenting the defense, picking on one particular defender they can make some pretty safe assumptions on where everyone else will fit and who becomes the best ball carrier in that situation.

I think what we have to remember is that all spread offensive systems strive in some way or another to displace defenders and in the process place an inordinate amount of structural stress on the defense's force or alley players. Whether it's RichRod's spread option or Noel Mazzone's version, both offenses are really trying to hammer on a defenses adjuster backer, which in most 2 hi looks is going to be the sam, at least most of the time. RichRod does it with the Zone Read and Zone Bubble, as we've seen in the excellent talks that Brophy has posted on the blog. For Rich, it's really about trying to make sure that the adjuster never gets into the box, he's the guy they need to control. Mazzone too wishes to attack the adjuster, but his objectives are little different; yes, he wants to run inside zone, but, as Brophy noted, it's really more about identifying the defense's anchor player in order to diagnose not the scheme in general, but more importantly, the defense's individual matches, which, if you think about it, in the era of match-zone is more important than ever.

In a sense, it shows how motion is being used again not so much as a way of gaining mismatches and what not, the offense's general scheme already takes care of that, but of diagnosing what it is that the defense is doing. So, in a way, it just shows how we are coming full circle with the spread. Motion that was once jettisoned is now coming back as a tool for identifying a defenses seams and stress points.

Also, as was noted above, motion is not used blindly by Mazzone. In the Missouri game they hardly used motion because MU is fairly straightforward structurally; with Oregon, however, it was necessary.

Protecting Against Risk: Iowa State

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Wed, 30 Nov 2011 20:18:32 PST

This is usually a weird time of year for most programs. The season has ended and now your Saturdays exist in unmetered time with no pressing needs to breakdown the next opponent. No more cramming as much as you can into your day to make sure no stone is left unturned to find a competitive edge. Now, all you can do is build for the future and remain hopeful in your underclassmen while you cycle through the flashbacks of your season. This dead silence at the end of the year always comes suddenly, leaving us asking, “Now what”?

It is this time of the “season” that we can take a step back and slow down without consequence. When under the deadline of the season, there is little time for introspection or second-guessing. So now that we aren’t faced with the task of treading water, what would be the best use of your staff’s time? It isn’t researching a new scheme, installing new plays, or trying to innovate a new clinic talk. This off-season, try re-evaluating the efficiency of your offense. Rather than making things more difficult by adding plays, find ways to simply reduce the risk within your scheme. How can you protect your core plays to that defenses can’t simply take them away?

A case in point we can use is the I-35 shocker in Ames this past Friday. While exciting, I’d hardly call a game with 8 turnovers (and countless miscues) “great”. However, the game did provide a decent exercise in risk management for Iowa State. Oklahoma State is one of the best teams in college football this year and truly outmatched the Cyclones in every area. What aided Iowa State in the overtime victory wasn’t necessarily certain plays, but how their system allowed them to play within themselves and maintain their comfort zone.

With Freshman quarterback, Jared Barnett, the Cyclone offense could keep his workload light through a minimalistic approach of moving the football. Much like the modular approach of Noel Mazzone we’ve discussed before, the Cyclones were going to run zone and zone-read to establish their inside run game. They protected this series through KEY (flash) and MICKEY (flash draw) on the perimeter. The rationale is, a defense can either put 6 in the box to even up on the perimeter (put them in a better position against the flash screen) and be vulnerable to frontside zone or a backside keep. If a defense loads the box with 7 defenders to take away your zone and zone-read game, they open themselves up to an explosive play by a free receiver on the perimeter (see the comments section of Mazzone Revisited).

If these plays are just viewed by themselves, they aren’t all that sexy, and are quite cheap. What is particularly interesting about this pairing and witnessing it in this game, was how ineffective they were early in the game (particularly the key screens). Tom Herman and staff stuck to the game plan and used these plays to diagnose the appropriate response, leaving little responsibility to burden their young quarterback with. Because they continued to stick with the formula (inside-outside-inside compliments), they were able to slow down an athletically superior defense and open them to this horizontal stretch of the field throughout the game, climaxing in the 2nd Overtime ( 3 successive inside zone runs) for the win.

More Running from the Gun: Robert McFarland

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Fri, 04 Nov 2011 17:53:41 PDT

With recent stops at Stephen F Austin and Iowa State, Robert McFarland (no longer in Ames), knows a thing or two about getting production with limited rosters (THAT's coaching).

Featured here is an exhaustive teaching tool covering the run game standards from the gun (speed option, power, zone).

Air Raid Adaptation (cont'd)

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Thu, 27 Oct 2011 16:29:48 PDT

We've covered this before quite a bit and Chris Brown knocks it out of the park when writing about the loaded backfield of Oregon and West Virginia but just documenting the trend that many teams are featuring heavy backfields out of the same "spread" 10 personnel groupings.

Since most nickel packages don't bother repping 2-back looks (simply because you'll be in base defense vs 21), a spread offense that lives in the 3x1 and 2x2 world can completely ham-fist the defensive personnel on the field when seeing power formations such as this. Although an adaptation of the TFS since about 2007 (Brown/Black gun), the use of essentially 3-backs here by Louisiana Tech against a sound Utah State is exactly the same look they showed Mississippi State, with the exception of the tight end being replaced (and Franklin inserts a linebacker as a lead blocker).

It goes to show that everything is cyclical and if you stay in the same spot (schematically) all you become is a stationary target.

On a somewhat personal note, I find you can discover so much more about actual 'coaching' from the programs that have to fight for wins. It takes creativity, some guile, and a lot of hustle to manufacture plays that add up to wins when you're playing with a short deck. While Tony Franklin will never be considered a face for the public, there is no denying his commitment to his players and his humble desire to win. An interesting note to the season for La Tech is how much their offensive staff (in their first real season after recruiting) is relying on brand new faces to the program. With transfers (WR) Quinton Patton and (OT) Oscar Johnson, to true freshmen (QB) Nick Isham, (RB) Ray Holley and (RB) Hunter Lee getting the bulk of responsibility in the past four weeks.

Rich Rodriguez Spread Offense

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Sat, 22 Oct 2011 01:56:23 PDT

Like the Calvin Magee clinic? How about hearing from the man himself, Rich Rodriguez?

Six more hours of spread offense dissection from one of the decade’s biggest names. This clinic took place just before Rodriguez took over at West Virginia while he was making a name for himself under Tommy Bowden at Clemson.

While nothing went according to plan at Michigan, the innovations Rodriguez spearheaded at Tulane, Clemson, and finally West Virginia, became his thumbprint on many offenses we’re seeing today (particularly in the run game). What if Rich Rod stayed at WVU instead of trying to resurrect Michigan? What if they actually landed Terrelle Pryor in 2008 instead of having to pin their last desperate hopes on Denard Robinson? UM’s defense certainly didn’t help matters, but it makes for an interesting look at how drastically perceptions would change if a few chance events took place.

In the late 90s, while other programs were rediscovering athleticism at quarterback (McNabb at Syracuse / Vick at Va Tech), Rodriguez was capturing lightning in a bottle by paring athletes (Shaun King, Woody Dantzler) with complimentary, multiple option threats from the gun. If you have the old (now canonized) Alex Gibbs Gilman clinic on wide-zone, you’ll hear Gibbs marvel over what kind of mileage coaches were getting out of Dantzler at the time. In the infancy of his philosophy, it was applying extremely simple concepts from the gun and capitalizing on the low-hanging fruit of “athletes in space”. It was by adapting to the talent on the roster to the innovations of defensive adjustments, borrowing from other successful programs (Northwestern), and acquiring an infusion of expertise (Rick Trickett), that Rodriguez became increasingly successful through the height of his career.

Rodriguez essentially set the table for up-tempo offenses of today (Oregon, Oklahoma State, etc) that have taken the best of both worlds (spread option with proven Air Raid concepts) and evolved into a multi-dimensional threat to defenses. Did Rodriguez plateau or hit the creative wall before leaving WVU? The offense relied heavily on zone read and speed option with the passing game usually a result of play-action or a simplified 2-man-game. Was he the victim of a program in decline, a dried up well (little recruiting help), or did his offense simply fail to evolve itself to the defense’s natural response? Will we witness his return to the coaching ranks, adapting his offense to the new decade’s defenses?

Most of the second session illustrates what Rodriguez was doing at Clemson. Since part of this discussion relates to how that offense changed through the decade, here is some supporting evidence:

Quarterbacking with Jim Miller

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Sun, 09 Oct 2011 17:03:49 PDT

A collection of quarterback fundamentals with Jim Miller, the grittiest of the gritty. Grab your pain meds and enjoy these drills from the Michigan State staff and Chicago’s John Shoop.

For the best quarterback instruction, it begins and ends with Darin Slack C4 Method.

Calvin Magee: Rodriguez Spread Offense

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Fri, 21 Oct 2011 16:57:46 PDT

It wasn’t long ago that the West Virginia football program was known for an entirely different high-octane offense. That offense was spearheaded by a coach who is now deemed a pariah after languishing at Michigan for the past few years. Rich Rodriguez used this simple brand of fast-paced-spread to pressure defenses during his stops at Glenville State, Tulane, Clemson and West Virginia.

Now at Pittsburgh, Calvin Magee was an integral part in developing this ‘spread to run’ offense that Rodriguez became renowned for. In his own words and philosophy, here are 5 hours worth……

Air Raid Wrinkle (Part II)

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Mon, 26 Sep 2011 10:13:47 PDT

A valiant effort by Louisiana Tech against formerly ranked Mississippi State, coming up short in overtime.
Something new Tony Franklin used in this game was an unbalanced trey 2-back look (like Heavy Over, but from the gun and H is off).

Franklin ran power, counter, and reverse out of this set……

and ended up setting up a huge 3rd down conversion in the 4th quarter running 51 Solid off of Rodeo action (02:34:52 of broadcast).

Though they lost, the 17 year old quarterback Isham produced in the passing game using Stick, Levels, Drive, and Y Cross (end of regulation interception in the end zone) even with the running back injured (Creer) and the multi-purpose H-back (Holley) out for the game. On the final interception, needing to inch closer to convert the downs (5 yards), likely because of the inconsistent short-yardage production from the banged up Lennon Creer, Tech opts for Y Cross isolating standout receiver, Quinton Patton, in the boundary with a double outlet underneath to the field. Mississippi State presses the line of scrimmage showing press cover 1, essentially baiting Isham to throw the 1-on-1 with Patton. At the snap, MSU bails out to cover 3, Patton's cornerback retreats deep with deep help from the free safety in the end zone. Because MSU disguised this so well (discouraging the run with 7 defenders versus the 5 blockers), it was too late for Isham to recognize the Hi-Lo on the lone MSU linebacker to the field.

The rebroadcast can be seen at the link below
http://espn.go.com/watchespn/player/_/source/espn3/id/226926/

Greg Studrawa: Zone from the Gun

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Sat, 24 Sep 2011 18:53:31 PDT

LSU’s current Offensive Coordinator, Greg Studrawa, provides a clinic of zone philosophy from the gun (circa 2006).

Catch-Man Technique

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Tue, 27 Sep 2011 05:56:19 PDT

We’ve touched on this trend before and I believe it will be the trend for the future of defenses as they continue to aggressively adapt to passing offenses. It used to be that when you played man coverage, it was required that you dogmatically adhere to tight or press-man technique and relied on disrupting routes and pressuring the quarterback. This pretty much meant your defense needed to out-athlete the offense you were facing as well as showing your intentions pre-snap if the offense ever presented a one-back formation.

As defenses adapted through the 90s and offenses began finding more and more success passing the football, zone defenses were forced to evolve to pattern-matching routes. Matching out of zone with six defenders would leave an extra hole player against five receivers. The natural progression from this was the fire-zone, adding a zone defender to an overloaded pressure while accounting for all receivers. Fire-zoning became (and continues to be) a catch-all solution with static pre-snap defensive looks. The only issue would be the ability to retain alignment leverage without giving away your intentions For this reason, fire-zones are largely packaged by field and boundary rather than strength of formation.

So what would be the next step for defenses to get a jump on playing a variety of routes while providing the capability of overloaded pressure? In the perfect world, the defense that could ensure it:

retained its pre-snap coverage shell (consistent look)
got the favorable personnel matchup
was able to generate an overload pressure on the passer

A defense that could do that would be able to hold the chalk last in this new age of offensive football. "Catch Man" or "off-man" coverage means exactly that; the defensive backs catch the route as it develops. Because this 'catch' won't happen until well into the route, the overall defense can assume any shape/structure (1-high / 2-high) it wants without giving many pre-snap clues to the offense. From basic pre-snap zone looks, the defense could be fire-zoning or playing man and very likely will be bringing pressure, but from where?

This ‘answer’ kind of becomes a full-circle evolution, where many successful defenses are returning to a formula that was relied upon 30 years ago. It isn’t surprising that the leaders of catch-man defenses are protégés of the Buddy Ryan school of defense (Gregg Williams, Rex Ryan, Rob Ryan, Dom Capers) of the 80s. Many of the more advanced elements of Buddy Ryan's late 80's-era 46 defenses (catch man, loaded coverage, fire-zones, swipe/thumb coverage, and a reliance on man-free) are what is now en vogue in today's game. This wide array of skill sets also begets a need to include multi-functional personnel on the field, where a 3-man fronts (or less) are preferred (see psycho posts).

In this post, we’ll try to provide some coaching insight into developing the skills for effective catch-man coverage. This concept was admittedly difficult for me to get comfortable with many years ago, as I really believed in the old bump-and-run technique of man coverage. I felt that you had to immediately disrupt routes and out-leverage a receiver before he even began his release. While there are benefits to holding up receiver stems and immediate reroutes, there is limited flexibility in adapting to formations using this technique. The effectiveness of press can be diminished with pre-snap movement from the offense. With catch-man, you can get the best of both worlds because the coverage structure remains consistent, you can effectively play quick and deep passing game, while still disrupting receiver stems.

Added for illustration purposes, this Revis 1-on-1 footage highlights how to leverage a receiver from many different alignments (some off, some press but they all essentially turn into the same type of coverage by the time the receiver makes his break).

With the help of video, I hope to illustrate some of the techniques and methods of leveraging routes from an “off” alignment. The skill sets used for catch-man are also helpful in other coverage (press man / pattern-match) techniques, so using these drills will have carry-over (high ROI) for your secondary. The depth of alignment for the defensive back usually starts at 8 yards. From this depth, a defender could essentially stay put and the receiver would likely make his break in front of the defender. As the player gains more confidence (athletic ability allowing), this pre-snap cushion can be shortened and stemmed in and out of. The beauty of this is that just aligning in the path of a receiver’s stem, the defender has already re-routed the receiver; either the receiver runs over the defender (not conducive to actually running the route) or he is forced to make his break early, declaring how the defender will play the route.

Just like pattern-matching in zone, secondary defenders will play routes based on the drop of the passer, then anticipating route breaks based on a process of elimination. Once the route is identified/confirmed, the defender can jump the interception point or secure the tackle.

Catch-man is best delivered to players by staging teaching into depths of the quarterback drop. Just like pattern-matching, you will get specific routes based on the depth of the drop.

With quick-step or 3-step (quicks 0-5 yards), a receiver could really only run one of the following routes: Screen, slant, hitch, speed out
With 5-step routes (intermediate 10-15 yards), the receiver would likely run: out, curl, hook, dig, comeback
With deeper routes (15+ yards off of 5-7 step drops / sprint out and play-action) you could expect: post, corner, fade wheel

As you’ll see in these videos, defensive backs start at a depth of 8 yards and are keying the quarterback in their initial pedal.

While eyeing the quarterback, the corner will slowly come out of his stance in a crossover step (or backpedal). The key here is for him to remain in control of his body with an arched back with the intent to be able to mirror the receiver perpendicular to the line of scrimmage (inside/outside break under 6 yards). If the receiver stems inside, the corner should laterally step inside to mirror him. Again, it should be stressed that the corner should walk out of his stance, reading the quarterback in slow motion, keeping horizontal leverage on the receiver (mirror him). By using this horizontal leverage, he can easily recognize where the quarterback is going with the ball (based on the angle) and attack the interception point.

If the corners are consistently aligning with 8 yards depth, they will likely see a lot of quick game to attack the cushion. When the receiver breaks under 8 yards, the corner shouldn’t attempt to come underneath the receiver for the interception unless he is certain he can get two hands on the ball. Otherwise, he should look to secure the tackle by coming in low, with arms clubbing up and expanding the receiver’s noose. It should be acknowledged that playing 3-step is difficult. The important thing is that the defender doesn’t give up a double-move or lose the 1-on-1 tackle if the ball is caught. In the event the DB gets beat here, he should cut his loses by collisioning the receiver or actually pulling him down (preventing a sure touchdown).

Once the defender sees the drop is greater than 3-step, he accelerates his pace and immediately snaps to the receiver, keying the inside hip. The defender will then fight for control of the receiver with leverage (either hip-to-hip or at least be at arm’s length). If he loses this control (out-of-phase), the priority is just to catch up to the receiver and never look back. To help against false stepping or getting beat on double-moves, its important to rep receiver jukes, that a cut can only be made when the receiver’s shoulders rise up. Once the DB recognizes the drop is greater than 3-step his thinking is to “slowly absorb the route” and close any air that exists between the receiver and defender. With the accelerated pace of this deeper route, the defender’s concentration should be solely on the receiver’s inside hip. From this point, there is little that differentiates itself from traditional (press) man coverage. The defender should work for total control of the receiver with the progression of “receiver – recognition point (break) – ball”. Only until the receiver is controlled with leverage and the route break is identified, should the defender actually play the ball for the interception. Always finish – play the man, THEN the ball.

Like I said, this will likely be a defensive flavor we’ll see more of in the future and your thoughts and experiences on the matter are certainly welcome. For an added bonus, some more video on leveraging receivers (from a press position, but its all relative). Key points to take note of are the solid base and stuttering of the corner's feet until the receiver truly commits to a release and then the flipping of the hips (and footwork) to maintain the in-phase relationship….

WHY NOEL MAZZONE: DENNIS ERICKSON AND THE ONE-BACK SPREAD OFFENSE

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Wed, 14 Sep 2011 19:37:57 PDT

Over the course of this summer, Brophy and I have talked a lot of offense. As many of you know, we’ve focused much of our discussion on what Noel Mazzone is doing at Arizona State. And given the richness of this topic, I suspect that we will continue to do so throughout much of this college football season.

For me, perhaps the greatest upshot of these discussions has been the way it took me back in time to when I first got into coaching football. Specifically, it got me thinking about Dennis Erickson and how much I enjoyed watching his offenses at Wyoming, WAZZU, and Miami, which in turn got me to think more critically about his hiring of Noel Mazzone. Sure, Mazzone was one of his guys for a short while at Oregon State, but when Erickson was forced to replace Rich Olsen, he clearly had the pick of the litter. I mean, besides knowing Mazzone, which obviously counts for something, there had to other reasons why he chose him, rather than, let’s say, Dana Holgorsen, or some other hip, en vogue spread offense guru.

I think to get at this problem the right way we have to settle a few things about why Erickson found himself in such a situation in the first place. If we were to blindly swill the pap that ESPN spews, the reason was quite simple: Erickson’s job was on the line and Rich Olsen’s offense was too antiquated for today’s game. Now, I think most readers know where I stand on this matter, but for the sake of posterity, let’s understand that Rich Olson is an outstanding football coach and that the offense he coordinated was not outdated by any stretch of the imagination. The simple fact is that the administration forced Erickson’s hand, so a change had to be made. But this should not be interpreted as the administration taking the keys away from Erickson, because his choice of Mazzone reflects the degree to which, at a deep structural level, Noel’s offensive thinking is predicated upon the same set of fundamental beliefs and values as Erickson’s.

The reason I harp on this is because, and I mean no disrespect here, Mazzone’s incarnation of the spread is so medieval that it’s progressive. By this, I mean that the fundamental principles and structures upon which Mazzone’s offense is predicated are virtually identical to those upon which Erickson based his offenses throughout the 80s and 90s, which is to say – verticals, quicks, and zone running made easy by defensive displacement.

I don’t want to spend too much time on Erickson’s original offense. For those interested, please see Chris Brown’s treatment at Smart Football. The other source to consider is UTEP football, because for all intents and purposes the offense Mike Price runs today is not too terribly different from the one he ran back in the 90s at WAZZU.

With that disclaimer of sorts, I will say a word or two about the spread offense Erickson ran with great success from Idaho and Wyoming to Miami, Oregon State, and, at least initially, Arizona State. For those expecting gaudy route structures, Erickson’s may appear, at least upon first blush, somewhat basic; Erickson really did not rely much on layered concepts, such as Shallow, Drive, Mesh, etc, preferring instead to rely on vertical stem packages in both his quick and drop back games. The reason for this is very simple: Erickson never wanted to stop running the ball; he simply wanted to create defensive structures that would enable him to run the ball effectively inside. This is why Erickson from the very beginning emphasized stretching the defense from sideline to sideline, not only with formations, but concepts as well. Formations and splits that would effectively center the defense by inviting it to align players closely to the LOS were jettisoned in favor of five very basic environments that by alignment would engender some type of a Nickel response.

Diagram I. Tight End / Slot

Diagram II. Trips Closed (TE to the boundary)

Diagram III. Trey

Diagram IV. 3X2 (with Y or T Flexed or in the Slot)

Diagram V. 3X2 (with Y in the Formation)

And because Erickson never wanted to bring the defense towards the ball, his passing game, by design, was designed to create an environment that would stretch the field horizontally, which he would then attack vertically. Consequently, Erickson eschewed routes that could possibly negate the horizontal stretch of his formations, for those that would always “push” the defense off the ball, creating even more vertical space between it and the offense.

Does this mean that Erickson’s one-back was not a ball-control offense, that it was always trying to go for the deep shot? No, only that he sought a way of throwing the ball that would not draw the defense towards the formation, and thus, towards the ball. As a result, what you see is a pass offense based around vertical stems, be they seams and benders, or option routes paired with posts and digs over top.

Now, before continuing, I want to head a potential problem off at the pass: rightfully, many coaches would look at this and say that without an aggressive shallow or drive game, how did he manage to control the linebackers? After all, this is essentially the problem Northwestern had a decade ago after their first big year in the spread offense; they had a half-field passing game to either side of the formation, but with nothing over the middle because of wide splits their receivers took. For this, much more so than Northwestern, Erickson used option routes that effectively prevented the linebackers from providing hard and aggressive run support.

So what does any of this have to do with Noel Mazzone? I think what we need to remember is that for a while, and even recently, when coaches hear Mazzone’s name they equate it not just with Snag, but with shallows and other layered concepts. And there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth to this, because for a while shallows and crossers were the bread and butter staples of any Mazzone offense; and while he recognized the need to get vertical even then to prevent people from squatting on his underneath stuff, it was, as will be covered in a future post, usually paired on the back side of his shallows. But shallows are not what characterize Arizona State’s current offense; in fact, one can say that while shallows and drives remain an important part of Mazzone’s current offense, they now play a decidedly more secondary role to his Arizona State’s Vertical game. And this is why, I think, Mazzone was so attractive to Erickson, because Mazzone’s current offensive thinking, from the role formations and verticals, to a simple, yet effective inside zone running game, effectively is entirely in synch with Erickson’s base offensive values.

Intro to Zone Runs: 1988 Bengals

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Sat, 17 Sep 2011 02:27:50 PDT

Fire up the DeLorean and insert the second 5 ¼” floppy disk into your Apple IIe!
We’re going back to 1988….

Here is a team video handout from Head Coach Sam Wyche that features a young Jim McNally (doing his best Matt Foley), Jim Anderson and Bruce Coslet. Wyche may never get the credit he deserves for advancing the ‘modern’ game as he should, but in this time capsule we can see the evidence of his staff’s attempts to break out of the box and spread defenses. If you lived through the 80s, I apologize for the flashbacks you’ll experience watching this, we're just offering this as a continued treatment documenting the adaptations of schemes.

McNally and Anderson cover the run game and Coslet jumps in (38:36) to review Y Option and the rest of the passing game.

The Bengals went on to be the most productive scoring (448), rushing (2,048 – 4.8 yard/carry average), and total yardage (6,057 – 7.9 yard/average) offense in the league in 1987.

TCU Defense Explained

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Tue, 06 Sep 2011 19:32:56 PDT

It seems the one thing people want to see more of

is TCU’s split-field coverage principles.

I don’t blame them. It is an efficient system for distilling defenses down to their root element and provides a framework built-in to handle any offensive formation. I’ll reiterate that WHAT they do is actually what all other defenses do. It is the system that Gary Patterson and Dick Bumpas developed over the last two decades (through necessity) is what is important.

Since its just you and me here, I’ll let you in on a little secret…..but don’t tell anyone else, okay?

First 3 hours of Gary Patterson explaining how it all came about, how he installs it, and how it will be applied (with a film review of game and practices).

Previous entries:
TCU's 42 Nickel Coverage & Front Coordination
TCU's 42 Nickel Blitz & Coverage Concepts
TCU "2 Read": Adaptation to the Spread (2x2)
TCU "2 Read": Adaptation to the Spread (3x1)

** be sure to check out these blogs as well **

http://footballislifeblog.blogspot.com
http://www.coachhoover.blogspot.com

Attack Nodes: Running From The Gun

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Wed, 14 Sep 2011 19:15:26 PDT

This entry (and most that proceeded and will follow) is a result of a summer-long Noel Mazzone discussion between hemlock and I. Mazzone represents the offensive innovation of the 90s maturing and adapting to the constantly changing world of football. If you’re over 30, you may be able to appreciate how an imaginative spark can ripple into a wave of change as time passes, sometimes taking decades to blossom. Specifically, how the things done in the late 80’s ended up shaping the zeitgeist of football we know today.

The previous posts featuring the Alex Gibbs staff clinic was simply a prelude to the larger focus here. The stretch clinic illustrated the brainstorming involved as offenses adapt to living in the gun full-time (“we’re not in Kansas anymore”).

As those videos documented, there came a time when Gibbs just threw out tight zone because it wasn't worth investing in as he was getting a favorable return with stretch. While zone and stretch share similarities, many offenses are finding it is easier to just drop one or the other because they just don't have enough time to become proficient in the necessary skills to run them both.

While I believe there are some distinct “families” emerging here, I don’t truly believe there is a right or wrong path (both have considerable merit). With that, I will preface this with the disclaimer that most run attacks aren’t as codified as they will be depicted here. In this post, I’ll attempt to illustrate what issues offenses face by choosing a particular path. This post won’t offer any absolutes or hidden truths, its just an editorial on where many offenses are headed.

INSIDE

Nearly two decades since Dennis Erickson made the above comments regarding his philosophy, that same tenet holds true for Mazzone. You spread the formation (horizontally) to run the ball. You aren’t running the ball to areas of the field where you are drawing defenders to (outside). With one-back, you empty the box to make running inside easier (by eliminating defenders by alignment) with the added dimension of utilizing outside receivers.

I believe the most interesting thing we can witness from the Arizona State Offense is how truly simple it is (we’ll get into greater detail later, but much can be seen by examining their protection). It is this simplicity that allows it to be so effective and helps package the entire offense into easily distilled decisions for the quarterback. Mazzone’s run game is an extension of galvanized concepts he has carried with him during his career.

What is distinct about Mazzone is how he’s held true to that Erickson philosophy. He doesn’t run stretch, he’ll run zone, zone read and trap, but for perimeter attacks, it is reduced to flash, tunnel, slow screens, and swing from play-action. This isn’t unlike West Virginia under Rich Rodriguez or Tulsa under Herb Hand and Gus Malzahn, who were renowned for speed sweeps and power, but made their living off of zone and zone-read options.

For a 4-wide gun offense, zone can serve as the sprint-draw of the 2-back offense; an effective way to gain a numeric advantage against a defense with minimal defenders in the box. Zone, by itself, would allow the offense to get 5 linemen on 5 defenders and insure at least 1 double-team at the point-of-attack. With the way Mazzone packages his offense, the run game is actually able to further weaken the integrity of the defensive front by systematically isolating backside defenders with a horizontal stretch (making the play-side C-G-T the only crucial blocks needed). With zone-read, the tight zone action can be used to:

manipulate the backside defensive end into caving down inside and open up the quarterback keep (zone-read)
keep the WILB flat-footed and out of position to defend the backside snag or F quick (flare)
hold the play-side safety longer to provide an extremely clear read to run verticals against

OUTSIDE The other end of the spectrum here is where most other teams are at in terms of the spread run game, using stretch as the primary means of running the ball. This creates a bit of a quandary that opens a door of additional answers.

With a tight end

When you operate in a true one-back gun environment without a tight end, running stretch can be a challenge. Without a tight end, you need the play-side tackle to reach an athletic defensive end who is in pass-rush mode for the better part of the game.

Without a tight end

You are also aiming for an area where you’ve already drawn defenders to by alignment (perimeter). This can be a cheap way of gaining yards (relying on cutting and reaching on the line), much like flash screens, where you don’t need killer blocks to gain positive yards. You don’t have to be tremendously athletic to reach a defender, but the better the athlete, the better the backside runs will be (because your backside guard/tackle can actually get close enough to cut backside linebackers).

If you’re aiming point is to a ghost tight end, the read will most often be closed or consistently muddy for the runner. With all linemen bucket-step reaching play-side, it really amounts to just cutting off/getting in the way of defenders. Because that second down defender probably won’t get reached, he will impede the runner from actually bouncing outside (with second-level defenders gap filling inside of him), leaving the cut back the only option. To make up for this liability, you can attempt to fortify your read by adding another blocker (back or tight end) and simply try to invest more resources to improving the run (read). This now invites more defenders back into the box which works contrary to the reason most spread offenses “spread”.

Add a back to insure your chances at the point of attack

The other alternative to making stretch work is to rely on the one guy your “spread” offense is centered around, the quarterback, to assume a dual-role as a runner.

Make your quarterback a runner (BOSS)

This limited end-game is what leads most gun offenses to two answers.

Use the bucket-step skill set of stretch and add to it by skip-pulling backside linemen for power (adding blockers to the POA)
Purposely use stretch action to attack inside voids created by pursuit

by simply drop-setting the backside tackle to handle the backside end,

now the horizontal stretch on the backside linebacker becomes more pronounced.

As an illustration, we’ll use Tony Franklin as the contrast to Mazzone’s run game, though there are many who share the same philosophy of Franklin. Another “coach’s coach”, Franklin has evolved his offense tremendously over the past decade and has been forced to find answers with limited talent. The current version of his offense is largely owed to Dwight Dasher during his time at Middle Tennessee, where there was a heavy reliance on stretch and dash. While at Louisiana Tech, Franklin began tapping into these skill sets more due to the reliance on running back, Lennon Creer (considerably more two-back, “wild dog”, truck, and power). 2011 will likely feature more of the same with the addition of a more mobile passer in Colby Cameron (update: it appears 17-year old Nick Isham is now the starter).

These ‘variations on a theme’ may be required to survive if stretch is going to be the source of your gun run game. While all of these counters off of stretch action open up avenues of stress for a defense (it provides a prescription for every symptom), they also require your offense to carry more tools into a game (more plays). We’ve gone over several of these adaptations before and we don’t intend on covering old ground in this post. The point is to illustrate that current meme of stretch offenses centers around heavily exploiting backside horizontal voids, call it your “stretch counter”, if you will.

truck

Crunch

Stretch read (Flame/Fire)

Dash

You may need to invest more resources in your run game, but the potential for a greater dividend is there. That being said, throwing a flash screen off your inside zone run action is one thing, it can become an even more explosive off of stretch action (see below) because of how it creates an inside void for the receiver to run through.

This all just accentuates the recurring theme that as things evolve and adapt, it all is cyclical. Trends and flavors of strategy have to remain organic and willing to adapt to their environment to survive.

There isn't any assertion here on which method is the best. I am attempting to highlight the efficiency of one method over another. Both offensive styles will run nearly the same passing concepts, both 5-step, quick, and screens. The question would be posed on how much of a return should you expect on what is needed to be invested to make your run game from the gun work ( when operating from a true 4-wide, sans tight end, environment )? To base your run game out of stretch when you don't use a tight end can become expensive, because it will necessitate the offense to incorporate the many variations to keep it viable.

** Hemlock will likely follow with additional perspectives on Noel Mazzone and how a few concepts have evolved through the last decade and how Mazzone marries it altogether.

Alex Gibbs: Stretch/Gun Run Developments (Part 2)

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Sat, 27 Aug 2011 00:47:33 PDT

Part two of the chalk talk video.

After covering Gibbs’ system and reviewing film examples in the first 4 ½ hours, the coaches assess Florida’s attempts at running zone-read and the feasibility of adding a give-read element to stretch from the gun (final 3 ½ hours).

We will follow shortly with an editorial post on the direction and choices many spread offenses have been facing in recent years.

Alex Gibbs: Stretch/Gun Run Developments (Part 1)

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Wed, 31 Aug 2011 08:16:27 PDT

There are great coaches, legendary coaches, and then there is Alex Gibbs.

Alex Gibbs, while not the architect of zone and stretch, certainly became the patriarch of the most productive run concept in the past three decades. Since “officially” retiring with Atlanta, but doing heavy consultation work with Houston and Seattle (and we can clearly see his thumbprints there), Alex Gibbs has remained an integral part in advancing the art of the run game.

Here may be the beginning and end to your education on stretch runs and how the concept has evolved through reduction in the past five years (and adapting itself to the proliferation of the gun). Gibbs sits down with Steve Addazio (now head coach at Temple), Dan Mullen (now head coach at Miss State) and the rest of the Florida staff brainstorming how they can improve their gun run game after Chris Leak left. Gibbs begins by explaining his entire system in great detail, going over the terminology that is integral to how his stretch runs are packaged, how his quarterback in Atlanta evolved the game, and the new challenges of today presented by defenses out of the gun (and more)…..

We will provide this video as a preface, offer up the second-half of the video later in the week, then follow-up with how many spread teams have codified their run game (and how it ties into what Mazzone is doing at Arizona State) into two distinct families (and the advantages of each).

Sit down, grab a notebook, and enjoy…..

BACK TO THE FUTURE: SLIDING WITH NOEL MAZZONE

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Wed, 17 Aug 2011 16:41:45 PDT

Last season, Arizona State was, at least in terms of wins and losses, a very average team. After all, ASU won on six games, two of which against FCS teams. But for anybody who watched ASU play last year, it was clear that they were, perhaps, the best 6-6 team in the land. I saw them play live at Camp Randall against the Badgers and remember walking away from the game with two thoughts: 1) This team will get better as the year goes on and they will peak in November; 2) Their offense is really neat and will undoubtedly be the subject of much scrutiny in the offseason, assuming, of course, that they get it down.

Undoubtedly, ASU improved, and without question, it was due primarily to the great strides they made mastering Noel Mazzone’s new offensive scheme. In the ensuing series of posts leading up the start of the new season I will discuss in some depth the nuances of ASU’s offense. While one of my aims is clearly to shed some light on what I believe are exciting advances in the passing game, another one of my goals is to discuss the offensive thought of one of the game’s most innovative, but frequently overlooked, offensive thinkers, a coach, who, if things bounce the way they should this year, could very well end up the next HC of the University of New Mexico – Noel Mazzone. So while I will definitely talk about what Coach Mazzone is doing at ASU now, I will also provide a detailed sketch of the evolution of his offensive thought over the years, from his years at TCU of the old Southwest Conference to the Jets of the NFL.

2010 Mazzone sample series against Oregon

First, I think it would be helpful to provide a little immediate background to his current position. Dennis Erickson hired Noel Mazzone after the conclusion of the 2009 season. He replaced Erickson’s longtime friend, Rich Olson. Erickson’s decision to hire Mazzone represented a change in his offensive thinking, for while Erickson has always been a spread one-back coach, he was always more of a vertical stem, option route guy who, by and large, never invested much in the type of layered, over-under schemes for which Mazzone made his reputation.

Why Mazzone?

I guess the first question that needs to be asked is: What is so special about Mazzone’s offense that it merits such close scrutiny. I mean, sure, it was extremely effective last year, put up tons a points, even more yardage, and was, overall, very exciting, but isn’t it just another spread offense? Undoubtedly, all of this is true, but there are some differences in Mazzone’s approach that are clearly worth studying, not because they are necessarily better than those practiced by other coaches, such as Mike Leach, Tony Franklin, or June Jones, to name only three, but because it shows how spread football is progressing by returning to its origins.

Protection:

In general, most pass-heavy spread offenses employ man protection schemes. This is not something unique only to Air Raid teams, but the vast majority of single / empty spread offenses. There are many reasons for this, but one of the main reasons, I believe, is that the rise of single and empty environments coincided with that of the fire zone. To appreciate this we need to have a little history in regards the development of slide protection. Generally speaking, sliding as a means of protecting the quarterback came into vogue during the early 1980s as a way of dealing with inside and outside pressure to the quarterback’s blindside with a single move. In a sense, sliding away from the call was a way of narrowing the quarterback’s field of vision, making it so that he would not have to worry about unexpected pressure by an inside backer through the “B” gap or number 4 flying off the edge.

By and large, sliding was how most one-back teams protected during this period. But there have always been some issues related to stunts and games along the front that posed some real problems for slide teams. In particular, any type of stunt that crosses the face of the center, regardless of direction, threatens the integrity of the protection, in part, because of the kick-slide technique upon which the protection is predicated. (Matt, I’m thinking here of dogs, but of specific stunts, like the “t-chain” in which the 3 and the 4I or 5 slant the A and B gaps respectively with the shade ripping off their backsides into the opposite C) This type of movement exposes the twin problems of “depth” and “center” of the scheme; for unlike vertical set man teams, and I’m not just talking here about Air Raid programs, units that slide gain very little depth and separation from the defensive front after the snap. Consequently, any quick horizontal movement across the line’s fulcrum, the center, takes advantage of center’s compromised base, that is, the side to which he steps in order to combo on the shade with the adjacent guard or post on the one technique while keeping an eye on the stacked backer. While on paper that step may seem inconsequential, it places the center in a compromised position from which it is difficult to play catch up with any type of hard crossing action. For this reason, many one-back teams began to rely more on vertical set man schemes that enables the line to gain depth in order to “sort” and dissect the pressure as it comes.

Examples of vertical set protection

Without question, I think we can see why coaches, especially in recent years, chose to pursue man schemes, that while requiring more tweaking on a week to week basis, nevertheless, at least until recently, offered more tactical leeway for the players themselves, as well as more strategic flexibility for the coaches in terms of maximizing the number of people they could release on any given play. I bring this up because with the advent and development of fire zone packages, sliding became increasingly costly in the sense that in order to protect the QB teams were forced to limit the number of receivers they could release on a given route, which, if we pause to think for a second, simply plays into strengths of any fire zone coverage by eliminating the very receivers for which any five man pressure scheme fails to account.

And this is what makes what Noel Mazzone is doing so interesting, because unlike everybody else, ASU is very much a slide team, and one, mind you, that has hardly any issues with protection. Now, before getting into the nitty-gritty of his protections packages, let’s briefly consider why Mazzone chooses to slide. Mazzone’s reasons for sliding are simple and can be traced back to his days at Auburn. In a word, Mazzone wants the QB to focus on one thing and one thing only: THROWING TO VOIDS. That is to say, Mazzone does not want, in no uncertain terms, for the QB to be concerned with what the defense is doing; the QB’s sole job is to focus on delivering the ball. And what’s interesting about this is that because his goal to get five players out as much as possible, Mazzone, in a sense, seems to want to make it schematically impossible for the QB to bring another blocker back into the formation, and his way of doing so is to make the QB feel protected by securing the side of the field to where there is no grass.

I know that the above statement seems somewhat strange, but it really is keeping completely with the old Hal Mumme maxim of throwing the ball to the grass. But in order to appreciate this point and its import to how Mazzone slides today, let’s say a word or two about basic slide protection.

Below is basic slide protection, or what ASU today calls “ACT,” versus what I like to call “country stack,” or your garden variety 42 or 44 look.

So, working from right to left, this is what we have:

RT: Man on
RG: Man on
C: Linda call to the Mike stacked over the shade; post on the shade with the guard
LG: Set with the Center on the shade
LG: Man outside; key Will backer for possible Joker call.
RB: Key Sam to Adjuster/Strong Safety; responsible for most inside threat.
QB: Throw the Void (this is not Hot; more on this in future posts)

Now, I think the fundamentals of this protection are all fairly self evident. If the tackle senses that number four is going to come, he will make a Joker call, which will, depending on whether it’s an even or odd front, trigger either a three or four man slide to that side beginning with the first uncovered lineman.

Generally speaking, this scheme is fairly stable in that the line slides opposite the back in order to secure the QB’s backside thus making the side to which the back is checked to the call side, regardless of how many receivers are deployed there.

But what happens if the scheme, regardless of whether there is a back behind the line or not, is essentially an empty one with no check release? For all intent purposes, this nothing really changes for the line, with the exception that now the front side tackle has what amounts to a duel read in that he must eye the Sam backer and be ready to pick up the nearest inside threat, thus making the adjuster backer the sole responsibility of the QB.

As noted earlier, one of the strengths of this approach is its stability, the fact that the QB know from the very beginning that his backside is, at least in principle, secure, thus placing everything else firmly within his immediate line of vision. But this has also been one of the scheme’s greatest drawbacks, especially in the wake of the fire zone craze, because DC’s could always set their fronts, stunts, games, and fire packages to the back’s call, making moot, in effect, the very purpose of the slide itself.

Herein lies the beauty of Mazzone’s innovation, one that I believe, at some level or another, reflects the influence of the Hal Mumme, Mike Leach, and other Air Raid coaches: rather than simply slide away from the back, Mazzone freed his line to slide to where the defense was on the field, which is another way of saying, away from the grass and towards where the defense had the potential to deploy the most people.

On the surface this sounds odd, but it really makes quite a bit of sense, because across the football field there are really only three generic types of zone pressure: boundary, middle, field. Moreover, most teams, as well as conferences, for that matter, especially at the college level, usually have signature pressure packages and preferences. For example, both the Pac 12 and Big 12 are heavy field pressure conferences. Despite the fact that boundary pressure is easier to disguise, most programs in these conferences prefer to fire it up from the field, so this is where their defensive numbers are going to be. Below are two diagrams, the first offering a global perspective, the second illustrating how ASU slides to the numbers.

This is your standard field blitz from a three man front. There are different ways to package this concept, but the nuts and bolts of it are pretty simple. For the same reasons, it should be easy to see where the defense is putting its numbers. If we count the nose, we get six players to the field, leaving only five to the boundary. Yet if we were to employ a standard slide here away from the back, it immediately becomes evident that we would, in effect, be protecting away from the threat. But as the diagram below illustrates, ASU’s answer enables them to account for this with no difficulty.

So, rather than have his line slide into the boundary away from the pressure, Mazzone has his guys slide into it with a four man slide that not only seals off the interior paths of pursuit to the quarterback, but the edge as well, leaving the boundary tackle to ride the end out with the back checking inside out from Mike to Sam.

The one question that remains, however, is whether or not the frontside is now where the back ends up or his original position? Simply put, the frontside remains the side of the back’s original alignment. Now, I recognize that some may say, and rightfully so, that doesn’t this defeat the purpose of slide protection; after all, the reason coaches slide is to secure the backside, right? My answer to this is that that the secure side needs to be the side from wherever the pressure is coming from; it is senseless to protect the QB’s backside if there’s more grass there than there are jerseys with numbers on them.

Concluding Remarks:

In closing, I think it’s necessary to note that a vertical set man scheme is just as up to the task as sliding. Why, then, does Mazzone slide? In addition to the reasons outlined at the beginning of this piece, we should consider the place of the drop-back game within the whole of his offense. One reason Mazzone continues to slide is because of the extent to which his quick, screen, and zone games are integrated into a near seamless whole with his dropback package. In essence, Mazzone views these not as separate aspects of the offense, but as protective extensions of his core passing game. And by “protective” I mean that they tie so well into his slide protection scheme not only tactically, that is, how they appear to the defense, but also, and perhaps more importantly, pedagogically for his offense’s players. So, from a global perspective, provides Mazzone with a flexible way of protecting the QB that also enables the other central components of his relatively simple, if not reductionist, yet incredibly dynamic offensive system.

>>> MORE FROM HEMLOCK <<<<

This ain’t your Mouse’s Run and Shoot

brophyfootball@gmail.com — Thu, 11 Aug 2011 09:15:54 PDT

I’d like to take this opportunity to take a look at a lesser known variation of the run and shoot.

Hemlock, another contributor on this site, has fantastic insight into the Mouse/Jenkins/Jones version of the Run and Shoot that found it’s way into the NFL level in the early 90’s. The origins of that version of Run and Shoot, however, not only looked different in terms of plays and philosophy of attack, but also had a lesser known evolutionary branch that was basically limited to the Midwest United States, especially Indiana.

Glenn “Tiger” Ellison’s book should be required reading for all coaches, if for nothing else then the beginnings of the book where he talks about how he came to develop (truly create) an offense. More importantly, it details how his “coaching epiphany” allowed him to break out of the monotony of the generic offense and football philosophy which surrounded him.

(For the purists, forgive my shortened paraphrase)

Ellison was a coach at Middletown High School in Ohio, and it 1958 he found himself staring down a 1-4 record. Like Ohio State, under the guidance of Woody Hayes at the time, most high school teams relied on the “3 yards and a cloud of dust” approach. When things weren’t working, the players and coaches simply had to try harder. As Ellison noted, the idea was if the coaching staff and the 11 offensive players poured every ounce of themselves into the play, they could WILL themselves to at least 3 yards. This is a great thought. However, when you fail (and in competitive sport, there is always a loser), your failure is attributed to either your laziness, your inability to motivate, or both.

Ellison, like many football coaches, found himself putting more pressure on his staff, who put more pressure on the players, who in turn saw their execution and confidence falter.

It was during a trip to the park, probably to wonder about his job security, that Ellison had his epiphany. There, a group of kids were playing a pickup game of 2-hand touch football. Ellison watched as the QB, throwing on the run, would release the football to a receiver breaking toward grass. There was no diagram, no play call to follow, just “run out there and get open”.

I’d like to take a timeout to talk about Bob Gibson. Yeah, I know, way out of left field (no pun intended), but please bear with me.

In 1968, Bob Gibson had an ERA of 1.12, which is a record for the live ball era, and was just off the MLB record of .96 set during the dead ball era. Gibson was so dominant that after the 1968 season, MLB lowered the pitcher’s mound from 15 to 10 inches to give hitters a fighting chance.

During one game in the 68’ season, Bob gave up a single to the opposing pitcher, who was a notoriously bad batter. When asked by a reporter how he managed a hit off baseball’s most dominant hurler, the pitcher replied: “I closed my eyes, and I swung like hell!”

That, is exactly what Ellison started to do with his team at Middletown.

From the micro-managing, ultra-conservative, fist pounding coach came this new philosophy:

1.) Go reckless!

2.) Stay loose!

3.) Score now!

Practices became laid back. If it wasn’t fun, why were we doing it? Instead of detailing the quarterback’s mechanics and the receiver’s route stem and break, the coaching point became “you run out there, he’ll get open, and you throw it”.

Ellison spent the rest of that year operating out of the lonesome polecat, winning his remaining games. The following season, he add a little more systemization and developed a double wide, double slot set that is so recognizable as “Run and Shoot” today. It is important to realize that while he did add some structure to his offense, he now approached his problems from a pragmatic point of view, rather than a tacit, “this is the way we’ve always done it”/”everyone else does it this way” approach. The greatest minds in any field think this way. Anyway, he went on to be wildly successful, and even became an assistant for Woody Hayes at Ohio State.

Another quick aside: One of Ellison’s most prolific passing concepts was “Gangster”, which began by motioning into trips (which started the idea of using motion to identify coverage). Gangster was the grandfather of our modern day Go route, and basically looked like a flood route with the “deep out” guy simply finding grass.

The quarterback would roll right with the FB blocking and throw on the run. Ellison also gave his quarterback the unheard of freedom to roll the opposite way whenever he felt like it to throw what was essentially the choice route. Very cool.

Two coaches picked up on the basic structure and philosophy of Ellison. The first one you all know about. The second was a head coach at small private school in southern Indiana called Franklin College. His name was Stewart “Red” Faught. Facing limited scholarships, limited staff, and limited, well, just about everything else, Coach Faught knew trying to win the old way would not work. He needed an edge, and he found it in the animal Ellison created.

The main difference between Mouse’s version and Red’s version of the run and shoot lay not only in route structure, but in the philosophy of attack. Make no mistake, Red was shocking the folks in Indiana with how much he was throwing the football. Coach Faught said when the quarterback got off the bus he wanted the ball in the air until he got back on. One of my favorite Redism is: “Balance?! Hell, pass!”

However, Red’s version did include some wing-T run game elements whose primary function was to set up one of the most devastating Play Action Passing and Play Action Screen games ever devised. More than once, I’ve heard coaches who really knew him say he ran just enough for you to believe the play fakes.

Red’s run game included some base inside runs, and as expected, the draw. Later on, Red would become the offensive coordinator at Georgetown College (which, despite the fact they had several more scholarships, Red held a winning record against while at Franklin) and he added some triple option, setting the foundation for Georgetown to win the 2000 and 2001 NAIA national championship.

For the purposes of this article, I want to focus on his sweep and trap series. For those versed in the “fun” terminology that Ellison created, that would be “Texas” and “Popcorn”.

One of the improvements Red made to the run and shoot was use of Rocket Sweep. Ellison’s version utilized a orbit sweep with the FB leading off the edge. As early as the 1970’s Franklin College was running the Rocket, and few teams could keep up. Anyone who hasn’t checked out Ted Seay’s Wild Bunch manual needs to do so right now for the best explanation I’ve heard for the power of the Rocket Sweep.

While not from the same formation, this is the best diagram of Rocket Sweep I could find on Google…..and I did spend over 30 seconds looking.

The slot, sent in deep motion, should be behind the FB when the ball is snapped. The QB reverses out and pitches. The slot should catch the ball just as he is breaking the tackle box. Because they will never make a play, every down lineman inside a 5 technique can be left unblocked (many times, the 5 tech can’t make a play either and can be ignored), allowing offensive linemen to scramble to the second and third level.

The sweet part of rocket how it demands that the defense move pre-snap, because after we snap the ball you will be out of position. Obviously, like any sweep, you stop the Rocket by keeping contain and making the runner cut back into the defensive pursuit. It is the pursuit that sets up the constraint play known as “Popcorn” (trap).

Before we get into trap let’s examine a current trend in the NFL. Pre-inside zone, any team worth their salt stopped trap. Trap, power and power sweep were the basis of the NFL run game. Then, people started to pass and utilize area blocking. The demands on an Over Front 3 technique started to shift into a more penetrating, rush the passer, split the zone double type of player. The Warren Sapp’s of the world became gold. In the last few years, however, you can see a cyclical return to the use of trap as a constraint play, and NFL teams are garnering big yards. The Rocket Sweep and the roll-out pass game Red utilized lends itself to horizontal and vertical DL movement, and the trap take perfect advantage.

Again, bear with the diagram.

The left slot goes in Rocket motion to the right, and the QB opens up to his left (which is the same as if he were reversing out to pitch the sweep), and hands to the FB running trap to the right.

As we mentioned, this little series had the power to make defenses worry about the width of the field, and then make them pay when they rallied too strongly to the sweep. The real beauty, and what Red loved to do, was the Play Action Passes and Screens off this action.

To wrap up this article, we will look at Red’s best play action pass (Popcorn Pass), and then some of the screens he would throw off it.

Rocket motion, fake the trap, and boot to the smash route. Very much like an inverted Buck waggle. This was a simple play, yet with defensive secondary concerned with filling the alley on Rocket, it was a highly productive part of the playbook.

Another important difference between Mouse and Red was in protection. On Popcorn Pass, 7 blockers stayed in. Red also had an 8-man protection call “Everybody Block” (love it). With the ability to utilize more than just the 6-man protection Mouse and his heirs utilize, Red was not merely providing more protection for his quarterback, he was preparing to ATTACK the blitz.

The Superback screen in Mouse’s version of the run and shoot is deadly. One of those ‘just when you think you have everything covered’ type of plays. Everything looks like roll-out (60/61 protection), and then the OL releases up field and the FB curls around for the dump off screen. It is just so easy to discount a skill player staying in to pass protect.

That’s right, I went there……

What Red added was the ability to manufacture multiple screen looks (off roll and play action), using multiple screen men (FB and slots), while keeping it simple with one screen scheme (the OL just had ‘screen left’ and ‘screen right’). Again, it is so easy to ignore an offensive skill player tied up in protection, especially with so many moving pieces (rocket, trap, play action pass) going on around you.

In the Popcorn Pass diagram, you can see how easy it would be to slip screen the FB to the left, and also how easy it would be to slip screen the slot who stayed in to block to the right. Some of the biggest gainers in Franklin College history have come off simple dump offs to a screen man with a wall of undersized, but willing to cut block their grandmother down, offensive linemen in front.

I’m not advocating one style of run and shoot over the other. However, I cut my teeth on Red’s run and shoot attack; the offense and the man holds a special place in my heart.

Red Faught passed away during my sophomore season at Franklin College. I, along with 90 other players, attended his funeral in our game jerseys….each of us also wore a plain red baseball cap. Red always wore one on the sidelines, despite the fact Franklin’s school colors are blue and gold (I loved that about him). Obviously, that is why people called him “Red”. I had the pleasure of speaking to him a few times, and that philosophy to “go reckless and stay loose” (which Ellison coined and Red so ardently advocated) applies as much to football as it does life.

“Balance?! Hell, pass!”

Right on Coach Faught, right on.