Apologia

Bill Johnston's Anti-Calvinist Remarks

2006-10-26T00:10:00.000-07:00

In a post dated July 3 2006 in the Conversations In Calvinism blog, J. Matthew Cleary offered an example of what he referred to as "anti-Calvinism," which can be described as an antagonistic attitude or spirit of animosity toward Calvinism. There is certainly no denying this phenomenon; Dave Hunt, D. A. Waite, Ergun Caner, David Cloud and their ilk provide ample evidence of this egregious enmity in their published works, both online and in print, never mind the abundance of evidence provided by laymen on relevant message boards and such. I have certainly encountered it myself, any time I dare utter a word about the extent of man's sinful condition, the doctrines of grace or, especially, the nature and extent of Christ's atoning work on the cross. "The single most shameful fact in this," Cleary rightly comments, "is that the typical anti-Calvinist is a professing Christian" who, despite their profession of Christ, "will drop every standard of holiness, civility, and honesty" when addressing their fellow brothers in Christ. It is curious (although historically consistent) that the gospel of Christ and its related subjects arouse such heated tensions and create such sharp divisions. Yet Christ foretold that this should happen.

Nevertheless, the point of this brief article is an offering of what my response might have been toward some of the remarks reportedly made by one Bill Johnston. (I am responding to select remarks, not all of them. Cleary's response to Johnston was quite adequate and I would direct visitors there.)

No, you chose to believe God is unjust by providing salvation for some, but not for others. You've been lied to, pal!

It would seem Johnston feels that God is unjust if he provides salvation for some but not for others. You know, he is nearly right. But he seems to have it precisely backwards. God is not unjust because he provides salvation for some but not others. More accurately, God is unjust by providing salvation for some... period. If the whole world is fallen and enslaved to sin, and if therefore God would be just in condemning the whole world for its manifest sin, then the fact that God saves anyone at all is unjust! And this unjustice has a name: it is called mercy. Indeed we choose to believe that God is unspeakably merciful by providing salvation for some, when no one at all deserves it. To get what we deserve is just; ergo, our condemnation is a result of God being just. To get what we don't deserve is mercy; ergo, our salvation is a result of God being merciful—incredibly, awesomely, unutterably merciful.

It should be further noted that the gospel message is not—and has never been—that salvation is something that God makes possible. The mercy of God, to his glorious praise, is revealed in this: that salvation is something that God makes actual. To put the matter succinctly: God does not offer salvation; He saves. Period. Jesus said, "And this is the will of him who sent me, that I shall lose none of all that he has given me, but raise them up at the last day." And elsewhere he says, "For you granted [your Son] authority over all people, that he might give eternal life to all those you have given him." And again Jesus says, "My sheep listen to my voice; I know them, and they follow me. I give them eternal life, and they shall never perish; no one can snatch them out of my hand. My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all; no one can snatch them out of my Father's hand."

But, I don't suppose you guys witness to anyone, since you don't know who is chosen and who isn't, right?

Cleary's response was adequate, a response I can only echo: We witness to everyone precisely because we do not know who is chosen and who isn't. But more than this, we witness to everyone because it is the Father's will and we love to do the will of the Father. The fact that we can serve as instruments in God's purposes and stewards of his blessings is at once both deeply humbling and incredibly exciting. We do it because it is the will of the Father. We do it because we love to, and we love to because we love him. We do it because the gospel of Christ is good news, the best news in the whole world, news which enflames our hearts with overflowing love and joy and we just cannot keep quiet about it. We do it out of profound love for God and Jesus Christ our Savior. The message of the gospel is our deepest conviction and greatest vocation.

That's always funny to me! Are there any in your group that have been chosen to go to hell?

I do not know who Johnston is referring to here by the term "your group." If this term refers to the elect, then his comment is nonsensical and blasphemous: it maligns God's most holy name to accuse him of being contradictory, to say that he would choose for salvation those he chose for damnation. Johnston forgets himself here; the character of God is most holy ground, upon which Johnston recklessly treads with shameful irreverence. Unless this term refers to Calvinists, in which case I would echo the statement Jerry Bridges once made: "There are thousands of professing Christians who think they have been justified, who think their sins are forgiven and that they are on their way to heaven, who show no evidence of the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit in their lives." This is just as true for Presbyterians as it is for Methodists, just as true for Reformed Baptists as it is for Roman Catholics. Not all Calvinists are necessarily of the elect. Nor are all the elect necessarily Calvinists; there very well may be some atheists who are of the elect but, obviously, not yet regenerate. Is it possible that some self-professed Calvinists could find themselves condemned to the fires of hell? Certainly, just as some self-professed Baptists could, or those of any other sect.

The Arminian typically has a problem with the idea that God could 'choose' to send anyone to hell, like Johnston who feels it is repulsive nonsense to say that "God created some people to go to hell," that therefore "it is God's will for some folks to burn forever." What the Arminian doesn't realize is that his own particular view carries the very same conclusion! They usually feel that God, from his transcendent frame of reference, looks upon the human theater and elects for salvation those he knows will believe in Christ. (We shall ignore the inherent problems that plague this view.) What the Arminian often fails to realize is that this means God also knows who will not believe in Christ—and allows for their existence anyway knowing full well that they will end up suffering the fires of hell! As Cleary so poignantly asked, "Can Bill explain why God created men who [he knew] had no hope of salvation?"

Since Johnston has a tendency to characterize Calvinism as an 'elitist' mindset, I'm going to close this article with a question asked by another Arminian regarding that same sentiment. It is hoped that the response I offered to such concerns will obviate any future condescending pejoratives.

- - -

Let's pretend for a moment that I am a Calvinist. If only a few elite are saved (according to my beliefs), isn't it gosh-darn convenient that I'm one of them? If I assume that there is a special elite branch of humanity—God's chosen people—how do I know that I am one of them? Is there some way to know if I am really one of God's chosen, or does joining the denomination known as "Calvinism" presuppose it?

In one sense your questions are rather difficult to address, mostly due to the proliferation of supercilious strawmen, gratuitous invectives, and distorted caricatures regarding the theology of the Protestant Reformation. There is very little in your posts that would be at all recognizable to those who adhere to the theology of the Reformers; I myself can scarcely identify with anything you've described.

First of all, there are no "elite" that are saved. As demonstrated in Scriptures, and affirmed in Reformed theology, all mankind share in the same common misery of sin and death, equally involved in ruin and who by nature are "neither better nor more deserving than others"; wherefore "God would have done no injustice by leaving them all to perish and delivering them over to condemnation on account of sin." There can be no elite when "all men are conceived in sin, and are by nature children of wrath, incapable of saving good, prone to evil, dead in sin, and in bondage thereto." (Unlike so many theological views today, Reformed theology continues to reject the heresy of Pelagius; cf. The Canons of the Council of Orange.) Out of this collective population of sinners, God chose to redeem many "to redemption in Christ," determining by the good pleasure of his will "to give [them] to Christ to be saved by Him," who was appointed as their "Mediator and Head . . . and the foundation of salvation," for the praise of the riches of His glorious grace. God's choice "was not founded upon foreseen faith and the obedience of faith, holiness, or any other good quality or disposition in man, as the prerequisite, cause, or condition on which it depended"; rather, it was out of God's "mere grace, according to the sovereign good pleasure of His own will." (All quotations were excerpted from The Canons of Dort, the historic document of the Dutch Reformers from which the mnemonic TULIP was eventually derived, and therefore accurately represents the Reformed position on these issues.)

There is, therefore, no "elite" among men recognized in Reformed theology, despite the persistent gross caricatures of its detractors. The only elite is God Most High, who alone is to be praised; those who are redeemed among men are a product of God's choice based upon God's unchangeable purpose, out of God's mere grace, according to the sovereign good pleasure of God's own will. From start to finish, salvation is of God. No facet of salvation—election, faith, justification, sanctification, etc—is a result of any intrinsic quality in man himself; rather, every facet of salvation is founded upon and wrought by the perfect life, death, and resurrection of Christ Jesus. There is nothing naturally inherent in man himself that would move God to redeem him, "for all have sinned" and Scriptures are quite clear with respect to how God feels about sin. It is for this reason—a reason we have scarcely examined—that the Son of God had to come into the world to endure and accomplish all that he did. Ergo, there is none among men that are "elite."

Humans have a tendency to create a community where they can proclaim themselves better than everybody else.

To this I could only respond by saying: The only humans that do this are those who try to derive identity and meaning in relation to their peers. The Christian finds his identity and meaning in God, as the imago Dei—God is their source of life in all its dimensions, he is their ultimate source of identity insofar as they are created in God's image and are his children, he is their ultimate point of meaning insofar as the chief and highest end of man is to glorify God. Christians are not concerned about whether they are better than everybody else because God already informs the identity and meaning of their lives, freeing them to live charitably toward their fellow man, loving their neighbour, showing no favouritism, overall taking very seriously their stewardship duties toward the environment, their fellow man, and even their own personal lives.

If I assume that there is a special elite branch of humanity—God's chosen people—how do I know that I am one of them?

I think a responsible study of Scriptures will reveal that a Christian is never concerned about that sort of thing, because a Christian doesn't concern himself with salvation for what he'll get out of it; that is, he's not in it for the rewards. A Christian has a proper view of himself before God: utter and complete humility and a sense of undeservedness that results in deep repentance, profoundly humble thanksgiving, and never-ending praise for the glory of God and the unspeakable richness of his grace and the joy to be found therein. A Christian is fully convinced of God's justice and rendered awe-struck at God's mercy, recognizing that Christ Jesus alone is his refuge and the foundation of his salvation, that of himself he can offer God no worthy thing; that is, a Christian beats his breast and cries out, "Have mercy on me, a sinner!" I have personally said to others that even if I found out that, for some unique reason, I am not going to heaven, I would still continue ministering to others, teaching them about God and salvation, spreading the good news of the gospel, because I am fully convinced of my sin and fully convinced of God's justice. I don't think I deserve a damn thing; no one but Christ alone does. Therefore in Christ alone rests all my hope and all my faith. If I should discover that I will not be going to heaven, I will bow my head and confess to God, "You are wholly just." Am I one of the elect? I'm not concerned about it. My concern is for God's glory, not for any personal gains.

Since election is necessarily the sole jurisdiction of God, having taken place from eternity, antecedent to creation, who is and is not numbered among the elect is not our concern, for it is neither under our jurisdiction nor under our control. And this abdication of any concern about the identity of the elect is an expression of supreme faith and trust in the mercy, grace, and justice of God. Christians trust God absolutely, they praise him and give all glory to him alone. Christians do not question him, they do not audit his choices as though his purposes are subject to a higher court. And they certainly do not hold his purposes and choices accountable to man. If you want Christ in your life, pursue him with all your heart. If you truly want to follow his Word, then seek after it like a man starving for bread. If you want to be saved, cast yourself at the feet of the Lamb and cry out, "Have mercy on me, a sinner!" Pursue God through Christ Jesus our Savior like there is nothing more important in your life or all of the universe, because there really is nothing more important than that. And trust God's choices, absolutely and completely, never thinking to question his righteousness. Trust him to have made the best decision, for he is God and God is good.

"I contend we are both atheists..."

2006-10-24T00:31:00.000-07:00

"I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." (Stephen F. Roberts; link)

Not only the existence of this quote but especially its abundant popularity among atheists is simply additional evidence that the average atheist is compelled more by ill-thought slogans and rhetoric than consistent rationality and critical thinking. (We shall disregard the worst of them, who find themselves compelled by fallacious antitheistic censure and invectives, which results from a complete abdication of reason.)

Stephen Roberts was once an acquaintance of mine; I would not be so presumptuous as to think that we were friends but I can say that we were friendly, and we did enjoy conversing. At the time he was a channel operator in #Atheism on the Dalnet IRC network, a channel in which I had spent considerable time for three or four years. He was known as 'wubwub' then and I, as always, was known as 'Ryft' (my online name for the last sixteen years). I remember Stephen as a good-natured fellow with a fantastic sense of humour who seemed to enjoy debate, as long as it did not go too deep; whenever it did, he was more content to sit back and let the likes of Sastra or KonKan address the finer points. For this reason I cannot fault him too harshly for originating the quote. Even if someone were to examine its merits with Stephen, it is more likely that he would abandon the exercise than pursue it too deeply. Musings and ramblings were his foray, not philosophical precision. If it wasn't fun then he wasn't interested, it seemed. And that is his prerogative.

But I do fault any atheist that embraces this quote while passing himself off as a rational and critical thinker, because this quote simply does not hold up under scrutiny. It is delightful rhetoric as far as it goes, but rhetoric never goes very far in the intellectual arena. When we attempt to apply this proposition to the real world, it soon falls apart.

"I contend that we are both atheists; I simply believe in one god fewer than you." Although this first clause of the proposition per se is nearly acceptable, it nevertheless possesses a minor but obvious difficulty. The one making this statement is an atheist who rejects all gods, and the one to whom he is speaking rejects all gods but one. Please note: How can the latter be referred to as an atheist when he affirms a belief in one God? To affirm a belief in God contradicts the basic definition of 'atheist'. A commitment to sound reason necessitates that this first clause be deemed erroneous and nonsensical for contending that "we are both atheists" when the one to whom it is speaking affirms a belief in at least one God—the person to whom it is speaking is a 'theist', not an 'atheist'.

"When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." This is embarrassingly false. In reality, when it is understood why I dismiss all other gods, the error of this clause becomes starkly evident. For example, one reason why I dismiss the god of pantheism as illegitimate is because, by the pantheist's own admission, his god is none other than the world in which we live. The god of pantheism is nothing more than 'nature', which is an entirely appropriate and suitable term already; to replace the term 'nature' with the term 'god' is superfluous and obfuscating outside the scope of sentimentality. Now, will Stephen claim that he rejects the God of Christianity because God is nothing more than 'nature'? I surely hope not, for by that he would commit the straw man fallacy.

But this clause is false on an even larger scale. Why do I reject all other possible gods? Because the Scriptures declare that "there is one God," that "besides [him] there is no god," that all other gods "by nature are not gods," and so forth. My commitment to the truth of Scriptures is ultimately my reason for rejecting all other possible gods. I think we can be quite certain that this is not Stephen's reason for rejecting the God of Christianity. When one understands the reason why I dismiss all other possible gods, we do not thereby find Stephen's reason for rejecting the God of Christianity after all. Both clauses of this proposition are, in reality, nonsense and false.

Linkography:

Stephen F. Roberts Home Page - http://www.wildlink.com (accessed 13-Oct-06)

The History of 'The Quote' - http://freelink.wildlink.com/quote_history.htm (accessed 13-Oct-06)

It's Both Moral and Evil

2006-08-18T23:28:00.000-07:00

A blogger who, at this point, I know only as Aaron, wrote a brief piece about his lack of surprise that it might soon be politically incorrect to refer to Satan as evil, in response to professor Henry Ansgar Kelly's new book Satan: A Biography (Cambridge University Press). "No one is ever really bad," Aaron sardonically retorts. "They are simply 'misunderstood'." Kelly's book as a subject might be interesting in itself but what has me writing here tonight is the comments that attended Aaron's post. Of particular interest was the exchange between myself and an apparent atheist named Mark (who runs a blog that reviews films, and goes by the name 'Cineaste' online).

Satan, Mark insists, is nothing more than a fiction created by Christians, to give them something upon which they can lay blame for all the evil in the world. "Without Satan to blame everything bad on," he remarks, "Christians would have only God left to blame the ills of the world on. Christians can't have that; hence, they put Lucifer in the story. Satan has an important role to play in the Christian mythology." (We will ignore the fact that he conflates Satan and Lucifer, and his poisoning-the-well assertion that Christianity is mythology.) The part that really grabbed my attention, however, was where he said that people have a tendency to "confuse good and evil with morality." He feels that anything you "think of as 'evil', you are confusing [it] with what you think of as immoral." It grabbed Aaron's attention, too, and he said he found it curious that Mark thinks good and evil are not connected with morality. Mark reaffirmed his feeling that they are not connected, and then added his rejection of all supernatural beings. (With contradictory flair, he claims that if you remove man from the picture then 'nature' is all that's left—as though man were not himself a part of nature.)

I simply had to reply, of course. The following is the exchange between myself and Mark (click here).

Is God Responsible for Creating Evil?

2006-06-03T23:20:00.000-07:00

In two independent discussions with atheists Eric and Ryan, they each present what they feel are detrimental arguments against God with the presence of evil in the world. (It should be noted that they address moral evil, which is distinct from natural evil, e.g. earthquakes). I attempt to offer a response which shows that the light of criticism is really not shining quite as brightly as they might have thought.

Eric summarizes his position like this: "If nothing, ever, was without God, then God created evil as well as good. It is only logical. And God is ultimately responsible. This God is the creator and must be accountable. The greatest authority holds the greatest responsibility." Ryan follows the same line of thinking, adding further, "People, for some reason, choose not to believe that God is the creator of evil, finding every excuse in the book to let God off the hook. God is credited with creating everything in creation—except evil."

On the surface this might seem a decent enough argument but it is plagued with a crippling difficulty, and it is found at the point where they each essentially argue that, if God is the sovereign Creator of all things, "then God created evil as well as good." There is, of course, no disagreement between us over the premise that God is the sovereign Creator of all things—as a Christian, I'm going to enthusiastically endorse this premise. However, their argument does ultimately fail, and this failure is due to the fact that, although God is the Creator of all things, good and evil are not themselves 'things' capable of being created. Let's explore why.

'Good' and 'evil' are strictly moral terms. When we say that this thing is good or that thing is evil, we are making a moral pronouncement. And if God is our ultimate ground of moral order—and he is—then these terms become relational descriptions. What this means is, a thing is determined to be 'good' by the degree of its relationship to God's righteous nature, notably expressed prescriptively through his law, and 'evil' becomes a privative term expressing any want of conformity with such (inasmuch as cold is a privative description of heat).

Evil (or sin) is not some 'thing' that can be created; it describes a relationship between things but is not itself a thing, it's not any sort of entity itself. It is strictly a term which describes a privative relationship (i.e. consisting in the absence of something), whether it's a privation from an original state of righteousness in communion with God (a condition of being which we call "original sin") or a privation from God's holy law (acts of commission or omission which we call "actual sin"). Both original sin and actual sin discuss what is ultimately a relational privation of some form; in the scope of Christian theology, sin/evil is described in only these two forms. Therefore, to insist in the face of all this that sin/evil is itself a thing capable of being created is to construct a strawman argument—which is a form of faulty reasoning that regretfully fails the test of relevancy.

That these terms are relational descriptions is never escaped, for even if one's ground of moral order is something other than God, goodness or evilness is still determined by the degree of its relationship to that foundation. That is, no matter what one's worldview is, good and evil are not in themselves things capable of being created. Again, they describe a relationship between things but are not themselves things.

As far as God being held accountable, he isn't. If accountable means "liable to account for one's actions"—and it does—then God is not held accountable, for since he alone is the embodiment of Holiness, the supreme Law-giver and the sovereign Judge, there is no one to whom he must give an account. There is, by definition, no one above God to whom he is subject. We are God's creation—indeed, the whole of the universe is—so it is we who are subject to him. I suppose an atheist might object and insist that it is actually man who created God, but that would be a pretty silly objection: you see, a fictional character is even less liable to account for his actions, so the atheist would hardly make his case this way. That is the rich irony: whether by Christian or atheist philosophy, in either worldview there is none to whom God is liable to account for his actions.

I will submit, with ease, that God is the First Cause of evil's existence, in virtue of creating beings capable of relational privation through their natural free agency. This does not make God the author of evil, however. The distinct difference is that he is the author of beings who are capable of evil, but it is they who are the authors of evil in virtue of creating a breach between themselves and God Most Holy.

This put Ryan into quite a state: "First you submit with ease that God is the First Cause of evil's existance," he said, "then you point out that God cannot create evil. Then you say God is not accountable for anything that God does. Then you try to change and confuse the definition of evil into a non-existent relational term. You are talking in circles."

There is a lot to respond to, right there, so let's tackle it one at a time.

First of all, I submit easily enough that "God is the First Cause of evil's existence" only insofar as (1) all things are ultimately traced back to him as the sovereign First Cause, and (2) he created beings capable of relational privation (sin/evil), through endowing them with free agency. Given God's nature as eternal, sovereign, omniscient and so forth, he knew exactly what he was doing when he created those beings; ergo, he had a purpose in it. Sin/evil is a relational privation brought about by creatures whose actions create a breach between them and God and his law. Put as simply as possible, (1) God created man; (2) man fell; (3) this condition of being, and all actual transgressions which proceed from it, are both identified as sin (original and actual). In this way man is the author of sin, not God. God is the author of man. But since God already knew what would happen with this creation he was about to produce, he is the ultimate First Cause.

Secondly, I never pointed out "that God cannot create evil." I pointed out something completely different, which was that evil "is not some thing that can be created." This is a rather important distinction we must carefully note. You see, if we say that God cannot create a thing then we have said something about God, but if we say that evil cannot be created then we have said something about evil.

Third, it is unfortunate for Ryan's argument but Christianity has described sin/evil as a relational privation for millennia. That is, I've neither changed nor confused anything. Although it's possible that Ryan might be experiencing some confusion, the fact is I've presented a definition that is consistent with historical Christian theology. It is possible for me to cite thousands of years' worth of historical evidence to demonstrate this, but I'm not sure people would want to slog through that. Sin/evil has been described for thousands of years as "a privation from an original state of righteousness in communion with God (a condition of being which we call 'original sin') or a privation from God's holy law (acts of commission or omission which we call 'actual sin')."

Fourth, as the readers can see, I'm actually not talking in circles at all.

2005-11-19T21:34:00.000-08:00

Haloscan commenting and trackback have been added to this blog.

The Self-Immolation of Dawson Bethrick

2005-11-16T02:27:00.000-08:00

I found a new toy.

That toy is Dawson Bethrick and, along with whatever other pursuits he enjoys, he maintains the Bahnsen Burner blog (a reference to the late Greg Bahnsen, Reformed Christian apologist), which serves as his platform from which he goes about "incinerating presuppositionalism"—at least that is how he describes his blog. Judging by the posts I had read, it seems he's still looking for a match.

His post "Can Reformed Christians Count?" (07-JUN-05) seems to be a fairly typical demonstration of the integrity of his arguments, and one I wanted to succinctly post a response to before heading to bed. Bethrick remarks that Reformed Christians

tell us that their one god is actually three in number. Then they say we're wrong when we point out that this belief of theirs amounts to a species of polytheism. So we ask: Do you worship one, or do you worship three? Typically, instead of clear answers, we get bad attitude, as if we were supposed to accept their tangled convolutions on their say so.

Yes we say that you are wrong on the charge of polytheism, and for a very good reason! If polytheism is defined as belief in and worship of a multiplicity of gods—and it is—then the charge is precisely false, for Christians believe in and worship God alone, who is one. Christianity does not teach that the one God "is actually three in number," if by that you mean three Gods. "Do you worship one, or do you worship three?" Bethrick wants to ask. There is only one response possible to this intellectually dishonest equivocation: "Do we worship one what, or three what?" Do we worship one God? Yes. Do we worship three Gods? No. Is God a person? No, God is three persons—the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

I suspect Bethrick's confusion stems from the idea that "God" implies "a person," yet such an idea fails to correspond with what Christianity affirms and proclaims. He might be tempted to accuse Christianity of affirming a logical contradiction on this point, but that would be the case if and only if Christianity affirmed God is a person and, at the same time and in the same sense, three persons. But this is not what Christianity affirms. And I should like to counter that if Bethrick persists in framing his response according to the idea that God is a person, despite an awareness that Christianity teaches that God is not a person but rather three persons, then his argument commits the Straw Man fallacy and is therefore bereft of both validity and intellectual integrity.

David Heddle and the Salvation "Offer"

2005-11-04T01:37:00.000-08:00

David Heddle (http://helives.blogspot.com) in a recent post was wrestling with the idea of hyper-Calvinism in the context of evangelism, with a personal interest in one particular "flavor" of hyper-Calvinism of which he has been accused: "the denial that the gospel is a 'sincere' offer of salvation made to all persons." He was wondering if it's possible to understand and articulate God's offer of salvation as authentically sincere. Specifically, he wants to know "whether God Himself makes a sincere offer of salvation to everyone." He received a variety of comments in response to this and it made me think, How would I respond?

I believe my answer would have been, "No, he doesn't." And I say this because I am convinced that God doesn't offer salvation to all in the first place, much less sincerely. He doesn't offer salvation to all persons; rather, he efficaciously saves his sheep. I don't particularly favour the practice of describing salvation as an "offer," mostly because it seems to suggest that Christ's atoning work only made salvation 'possible' and is therefore accessibly 'offered' to all, that the will of the sinner is the ultimate sine qua non of his salvation, that God's grace is only penultimate. It smacks of Arminianism (with its roots buried firmly in semi-Pelagianism). Since Christ died for all men without exception, the 'offer' of salvation goes out 'sincerely' to all persons and they should 'make a decision for Christ' and grab hold of that.

It's not that salvation is offered to all. This, I feel, is incorrect. Rather, it's that the gospel is proclaimed to all—and that quite sincerely! With passion, conviction, and boldness, we proclaim sincerely the good news of reconciliation for all who believe. We scatter the seed indiscriminately, but whether it takes solid root and grows is up to God and his most wise and righteous purposes (1 Cor 3:6-7; Act 13:48; 16:14). "I lay down my life," Jesus said, not for all persons but "for the sheep." There are some, like those Jews to whom he was speaking, who do not believe because they are not his sheep (Joh 10:26), nor do they hear the message of Christ because they do not belong to God (Joh 8:47). "All that the Father gives me will come to me," Jesus proclaimed. He came to do the will of the Father, which is "that I shall lose none of all that he has given me, but raise them up at the last day" because the Father "granted him authority over all people that he might give eternal life to all those you have given him" (Joh 6:37-39; 17:2).

Salvation is not offered to all, sincerely or otherwise. However, the gospel of peace is indeed proclaimed to all, and very sincerely. The gospel is about salvation but is not itself salvation. 'Salvation' is a multi-faceted rubric of which the gospel is a part; other facets are sanctification, justification, regeneration, election, etc. Salvation is God's jurisdiction alone. Proclaiming the gospel, with sincerity to all persons, is our jurisdiction. It is in fact our great commission. And great joy.

Sorry

2005-10-18T11:42:00.000-07:00

My sincere apologies for my prolonged absence. I had left my computer connected to the Internet unattended for about three weeks and, upon returning, I discovered that it had been irrecoverably infested with BHO's and adware, etc. I couldn't even open a web browser or email program. But I now have a new computer and I am back once again (the other computer was a 333 mHz and not worth fixing). Those of you that had emailed me or left comments in my journal or certain communities, rest assured that I have received them all and intend to respond to all of them in due time.

Is It Just or Right That I Go to Hell?

2005-07-18T20:58:00.000-07:00

Although I was at work when this conversation took place and therefore could not participate, it nevertheless captured my interest and I wanted to offer what would have been my answers to these questions and ideas. The names of the individuals are fictions that I created in order to protect the identity of the actual participants, because I do not have their permission to publish the conversation. If either one of them happens upon my blog and recognizes their comments, simply keep quiet and say nothing because no one else in the world knows that it was you who said these things.

I have named the first person Ethan, and he is an atheist. The second person I named as Cathy, and she is a Roman Catholic.

ETHAN: Here's a question. I'm an atheist. And as such I can't bring myself to believe in God or that Jesus is my savior. I'm told by Christians that I can only be saved from oblivion or hell by accepting—which first requires that I believe—that Jesus is my savior. Now, in your view, does this mean that I deserve hell and damnation? I emphasize the word 'deserve' here. Is it right or just that I go to hell?

It is interesting to note how he expressed himself here, when he said that he cannot bring himself to believe in either God or Jesus as the Savior. And the way in which it is interesting is two-fold, one of which actually goes toward answering his question.

The first way in which it's interesting is that it echoes a statement made by the apostle Paul, who explained that the sinful mind "is hostile toward God; for it does not subject itself to the law of God, for it is not even able to do so, and those who are in the flesh cannot please God" (Rom 8:7-8). How is this relevant? Notice something that John revealed in one of his epistles: "This is His commandment, that we believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ" (1 Joh 3:23; cf. Joh 6:28-29). Paul affirms that the sinful mind neither does nor can submit to God's law, and one of God's commandments is to believe in the name of his Son. We see that Ethan unwittingly confirms this by his remarkably honest choice of words.

The second way in which it's interesting is that this actually provides the reason for his condemnation, or how it is deserved. He wonders how it is just that someone would be condemned to hell for simply not believing in God or his Son. The simple answer is, "It is just because it is a violation of God's commandment" (cf. 1 Joh 3:4), and most people recognize that if you are guilty of breaking a law then it is just for the judge to sentence you upon conviction. However, there are multiple violations of God's law recorded on Ethan's account for which he is guilty, not just this one alone. However, a sentence is warranted whether I am convicted of one charge or twenty. This is how his condemnation is just.

However, notice how Cathy responds:

CATHY: As a Catholic Christian, I do not believe that all atheists automatically go to hell, but that God will judge you when you die. And, if you have done good in your life, we know the source of that good is God (whether you acknowledge it or not).

Two things need to be mentioned here, I feel—one of which this astute atheist picks up on, as we shall see.

First of all, it is true that all atheists do not automatically go to hell, because it is true that God will judge the atheists. It is not 'automatic'. God is just: there is a review of the charges against them, a conviction of guilt, then the sentencing. This is when, and why, all atheists go to hell. If they are not in Christ Jesus, whose atonement provided propitiation, then God's wrath remains on them. As scripture says, "Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life, but whoever rejects the Son will not see life, for God's wrath remains on him" (Joh 3:36). This is because the Son alone is the propitiation; the person who has not the Son bears God's wrath on himself. And earlier we see Jesus affirming that "whoever believes in him is not condemned, but whoever does not believe stands condemned already because he has not believed in the name of God's one and only Son" (v. 18). There are many other passages from scripture which underscore this, but the point has been made.

Secondly, Cathy says that "if you [the atheist] have done good in your life," etc. And that's the sticking part, isn't it? If he has done good. The question immediately presents itself: what is 'good'? This is a moral question, is it not? What is the ground of our moral order? What is the final determinant and arbiter of moral order? Is it not God's authority, will, and law? I have said it before, and I will here say it again: "If anything is not informed and influenced by God's authority, will, and law, or grounded therein, it is sin. This is why even the apparent good that unbelievers do is nevertheless sin, because both their authority and motivation is something other than God." That "if" is a vastly empty hope, which is ultimately shipwrecked on God's righteous justice.

It's interesting to notice that Ethan picked up on this. Hear what he says:

ETHAN: Ah, that's refreshing to hear. But I'm puzzled, then, because more hardline Christians insist that I am doomed to hell because Jesus is 'the way, the truth and the light', and that no one enters the kingdom of heaven except through him. Now, that sounds pretty unequivocal.

Although Jesus is indeed the Light, the passage he's referring to actually says, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father but through Me" (Joh 14:6). I think it was very astute of him to pick up on this point, even if it was only something he recalled other "hardline Christians" referencing. As Peter noted, "there is salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men by which we must be saved" (Act 4:12), one of the most attested to and consistent themes running throughout scripture. Ethan is quite right on this.

Cathy responds, however:

CATHY: Those same [hardline] Christians are called to go forth and teach, not go forth and judge. It is my duty as a Christian to teach you about Christ, by my words, my life, etc. To say that one must accept Jesus in order to get into heaven damns a great many good people who never have heard of him. For me, to say that you are damned because you do not believe is wrong.

This, I confess, absolutely astonishes me.

First of all, the Christian would not be judging him. The Christian would simply be answering his question. He asked how God can be just in condemning him, and the Christian would simply be answering this by explaining the truths contained in God's Word, those which defend exactly how God is just in this. The Christian does not judge him by quoting and explaining scripture; it's the testimony of God's Word that is judging him.

Secondly, to say that one must accept Jesus in order to be saved is to quote scripture! I am the Way, scripture proclaims of Jesus! No one comes to the Father but through Me, scripture proclaims of Jesus! It is scripture which says that whoever rejects the Son will not see life, for God's wrath remains on him! It is the Word of God which says that whoever does not believe stands condemned already because he has not believed in the name of God's one and only Son! Scripture proclaims that there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men by which we must be saved! It is God's Word which tells us that to believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ is God's commandment!

To say that one must accept Jesus in order to be saved does indeed damn a great many people, but who are you to say that they are good? How are they good? Integral to answering that question is the answer to this one: What is 'good'? "God alone is good," Jesus said, because morality is grounded in God's nature, his authority, will, and law. Whatever fails to conform to God's holy nature, whatever is not informed and influenced by God's authority, will, and law, or grounded therein, it is sin. If someone's moral authority and motivation is something other than God, if their life is want of conformity to God's righteous and holy nature, then they are absolutely not good! To suggest anything to the contrary is to suggest a moral order that is grounded, even if partially, in something other than God. And what could that possibly be?

Nothing, for it is emphatically false, by virtue of contravening the clear word of scripture.

Ethan goes on to say:

ETHAN: Good point. But my question isn't about whether they have a right to judge me or point fingers. My question is about whether or not I, in fact, deserve hell simply because I can't muster a belief that Jesus was God, died for my sins, rose from the dead, and that I can be saved by believing in him.

Hopefully I have at least began to answer this question here, and have done something to defend God's justice and righteousness.

Ethan had one other interesting question which I wanted to address, apart from the above issue.

He said, "My question is a principled one about the conditions for salvation. The specific question of who gets to decide this, or whether I or someone else gets into heaven, doesn't concern me. It's a question about the very notion of what merits salvation, not who."

Except it is precisely a question of who, not what. And that 'who' is Christ Jesus. He alone merits salvation. We do not. Salvation is not a matter of merit but of grace, which by definition is unmerited favour. Christ alone lived a sinless life of righteousness in God's sight, and when he was delivered over to death for our sins and raised to life for our justification, he reconciled those in him to God by virtue of these seven things: (1) he was their propitiation, turning aside God's wrath by suffering in his body the penalty due unto their sins; (2) he was also their expiator, having thereby removed the guilt of their sin with God having canceled the record that contained the charges against them, taking it and destroying it by nailing it to Christ's cross; (3) he imputes his righteousness to them in order that the righteous requirements of the law might be fully met in them, who do not live according to the sinful nature but according to the Spirit; (4) he is always in the presence of the Father, at his right hand, interceding for them; (5) he sanctifies them by the indwelling Holy Spirit, a sanctification which continually works to conform them to the image of the Son, a process he does not stop throughout their entire lives; (6) he empowers and edifies them with gifts of the Holy Spirit, to not only encourage and uplift one another but to also proclaim the gospel of salvation throughout the world with boldness and with the powerful conviction of the Spirit; (7) and in the end, those in Christ ultimately find themselves fully transformed into glorified bodies at his coming.

This is what merits salvation, and there is only one 'who': Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ and one and only Son of the living God. There is salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men by which we must be saved.

Bridget and the Serpent

2005-05-23T21:00:00.000-07:00

A 23-year old young lady from Indiana, Bridget, has decided she's going to pretend to be a Christian for a while, because she wants to know what Christ can do for her. And if this is not the sort of attitude Arminian theology leads to—the prevailing theology of most Evangelical churches—then I don't know what is.

It is a fact, given in evidence, that prevailing Evangelical theology leads inevitably to the same attitude and behavior of Adam and Eve at the point of the Fall, that moment when sin first reared its ugly head on Earth and mankind was thrown into corruption by his own will. The difference between the message of scriptures and Arminian theology is striking: the former places its emphasis entirely on God's grace because of mankind's desperate condition of spiritual death, while the latter places its emphasis on mankind's free will, insisting that man is only spiritually sick—that his carnal nature has within itself a small germ of spiritual life by which, on his own accord, he can understand spiritual things and reach out to God. "But the serpent said to the woman, 'You will not surely die'."

Bridget, our young lady from Indiana, is going to serve as an example of this sort of attitude that the Arminian 'gospel' fosters in unbelievers.

She and a friend of hers were enjoying some coffee at a little place called The South Bend Chocolate Company and they were soon immersed in lengthy philosophical discussion, something they typically engaged in. Somehow the conversation had rolled around to an interplay of Christianity and scientific testability, and a thought occurred to Bridget: "Why not try and test Christianity?" she asked herself. Most religions and philosophies, she felt, cannot be tested scientifically, but "the interesting and unique thing about Christianity is that it does indeed claim to produce 'results'." She further reasoned,

If I understand it correctly, a Christian has two main objectives: (1) to open his or her heart to Jesus, and allow Him into his or her life, and (2) to do his or her best to lead a 'Christian' life—that is, to be faithful and obedient to the Lord. If one does these two things, then, as I understand it, God begins to go to work in that person's life and in their heart, literally changing this person.

This synergist idea is one of the hallmarks of Arminian theology—that faith (from man) both precedes and is the necessary condition for regeneration (from God)—and is heavily championed by most Evangelical churches, making it quite evident what theology influenced Bridget's thinking. She admitted that the idea of trying on Christianity like some kind of jacket and seeing how it fits had occurred to her before, but she was always skeptical about the outcome because she didn't feel she could properly distinguish whether something was a 'spiritual experience' or a product of her own imagination or some delusion (although she somehow feels that she can now because she is more skeptical and analytical than before; not sure how that works).

She then described the conditions and environment in which she would conduct this test—in other words, she laid out her presuppositions, those basic attitudes which for her are the non-negotiable starting points of enquiry. First, that she does not expect to ever actually learn "the" ultimate truth because, fundamentally, "it cannot be proven or disproven", and as "a good little scientist", she cannot be satisfied with anything less than absolute proof (while such an attitude has the appearance of modesty, it actually bears no relationship with the philosophy of science, which knows nothing of absolute proof). Second, she insists on presupposing that "we all live in some sort of delusion because we are human, and the true way of things is only as we each perceive it through [fallible human] eyes and ears," beings who (she maintains) are ultimately illogical. "So as a human, and because I am human," she says, "what matters the most is not so much the truth that is, but the truth that works for me, literally."

So that is what I think I am going to do. I shall declare myself an interim Christian and live my life accordingly for as long as I see fit, all the while monitoring its progress (if any) by measuring the sense of joy and fulfillment I have in my life.

What we see here is that Bridget has established her self as the ultimate arbiter of truth, purpose, and meaning, setting her desires and will as the ultimate foundation and her view of the world as the non-negotiable starting point to which God must conform himself if he wants to work with her. She holds her self as the arbiter of truth by virtue of having defined truth (into two categories, inaccessible ultimate truth and pragmatic what-works-for-me truth), and the arbiter of purpose and meaning by virtue of insisting that "what matters most" to her is what works for her, being an interim Christian for as long as she sees fit, determining the sense of joy and fulfillment she has in her life. After laying this foundation, she then contemplates 'opening her heart to Jesus'—which is a "thing" that she is not even sure exists! "How do you invite something into your life," she asks, "if you are not even sure, at your core, that this thing even exists? . . . All I can do is say, essentially, 'Okay Jesus, if you're there, I'm here.' Is that enough? Unless any of you have any other suggestions, it's gonna have to be."

What bearing does this have with Eve and the Fall? It ought to be clear.

When it came to eating from the forbidden tree, there existed a conflict of authority and will—God's versus Eve's. Her ultimate downfall was the sinful delusion of autonomy, her authority and will taking precedence over God's. "So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate." Eve looked upon the fruit of the tree, discerning for her own self—without regard to God's authority—that the fruit of the tree was good for food, deciding by her self and for herself that nothing in the fruit of the tree showed it to be bad and unfit to be eaten, wondering by her own authority why it should be forbidden for food. She set her self as the final court of arbitration, her will taking precedence over God's. As William Law so aptly put it, "Nothing hath separated us from God but our own will, or rather our own will is our separation from God." This was mankind's fall into sin, this setting of our will above God's, a sin no less prevalent today—and no less prevalent than in Arminian theology, which establishes man's alleged free will as the sine qua non of salvation (that is, Christ's death saves no one, until they decide). With just such a focus on the importance of man's will, Bridget finds nothing amiss about setting her will as the foundation with which God must conform if he wants to work with her.

Do you suppose an 'experiment' of this nature is going to work? Do you suppose God will be so overcome with gratitude by Bridget's willingness to bend her will to consider God that he'll conform to her parameters and conditions? Did he conform to Eve's?

Agnosticism/Atheism -- IRC Discussion

2005-04-14T00:27:00.000-07:00

[The following is a brief but enjoyable discussion I had on IRC (Internet Relay Chat) this evening. I am sharing here in my blog because (1) I wanted to share with a larger audience my thoughts and ideas on the subject under discussion, and (2) because I have been so overwhelmed at work and putting in so many hours, six days per week, I've been too exhausted to write anything yet. My apologies for the lull in posting. All mistakes in spelling, grammar, punctuation, etc., belong to the speaker that prefixes each comment]

[FrSam] Atheists like to say they lack beleif -- but this is simply a rhetorical trick to gain the high ground in a debate -- they actually do have a positive metaphysical beleif in the non-existence of gods, which they camouflage with persiflage.

[Ryft] Atheism is just a proposition with regard to deity/deities. What atheists actually believe, their actual belief system, varies greatly -- for most it is naturalism.

[Jewelz] Best to ask atheists what they believe

[Ryft] Jewelz: The answer wouldn't be "atheism."

[Jewelz] who, what and how atheist define themselves is the definition of atheism, not what Christians define it as

[Ryft] Jewelz: Atheism, as defined by atheists, still regards only the question of God(s). It is not a belief system; it is a statement about the lack of a particular one. When it comes to an atheist's belief system, the talk is usually about naturalism, evolution, etc. "Atheism" is simply a statement about one particular subject: God(s). An atheist is what someone is not -- a "theist." What he or she is, is a separate question.

[Jewelz] Ryft, atheism is the lack of belief in any gods. Babies and children are atheists.

[Ryft] Jewelz: I reject the latter part of your statement; however, the former is what I said, yes.

[Jewelz] Reject, I don't know how you can reject it. Babies lack a belief in any gods.

[Ryft] "Atheism" is an informed position. One is an 'atheist' on consideration of the question of God's existence, the evidence (or lack) thereof, etc. After such consideration, they come to the informed position of atheism. Infants and babies are not informed of anything. They are non-theists, and also non-atheists.

[Prophet2PostModerns] Ryft don't atheists usually have reasons for why they are atheists that have to do with rational (heheh) thought processes and so on? Isn't that part of why they are atheists? and wouldn't that be part of their philosophy? and isn't a philosophy a system of beliefs (but not necessarily having to do with gods/God)?

[Jewelz] Prophet2PostModerns, makes perfect sense. My children are atheists. My children lack a belief in any gods, that like I lacked a belief in any gods up untill a few years ago.

[Prophet2PostModerns] Ryft well stated!

[Ryft] Prophet2PostModerns: Yes, atheists hold an informed position on the question of God(s). Correct. However, it regards only the question of God(s), nothing more. Jewelz, rather unflatteringly, would have it that atheism is a position of ignorance. I'm not sure many atheists would be quick to agree with her; I also know, in fact, several atheist philosophers who reject her position.

[Jewelz] Ryft, it can be a position of ignorance. Infact, from my point of view now, it is.

[Ryft] Jewelz: I see that. And that is quite unfortunate. Thankfully, the more scholarly atheists I have read of, and from, hold quite a different position on the matter, one far less unflattering. It's one reason -- rather, the primary reason -- atheist and skeptic Michael Shermer coined the term 'non-theist'. I know that if I were an atheist I would want people to understand it as an informed position I hold, one quite unlike the utter non-thought that goes on in the minds of incontinent infants.

[Jewelz] If there is a God, anyone who lacks belief in God would be ignorant about it.

[Ryft] That regards agnosticism, not atheism (see the Greek root 'gnosis'). Interesting note -- not all atheists are agnostic. One does run into the occasional atheist that knows there is no God(s).

[Jewelz] agnosticism doesnt specifically invovle religion or gods. It it includes a lack of knowledge in anything supernatural. Atheism is more specific in dealing with gods,

[Ryft] Jewelz: Correct, which was my point above. Agnosticism is not an alternative to theism or atheism. It is not as though agnosticism is a third option. Agnosticism is a subset of either theism or atheism -- you can have agnostic theists and agnostic atheists.

[PreacherLuke-KJV] how can you have an agnostic athiest?

[Ryft] PreacherLuke-KJV: An agnostic atheist is someone who (1) does not believe God exists, but (2) does not know whether God exists or not. Such a person admits God may or may not exist, but personally does not believe God does.

[PreacherLuke-KJV] so they are just agnostic then

[Ryft] PreacherLuke-KJV: No, they are at once both atheist and agnostic. For instance, agnostic atheism is also known as "implicit atheism" or "weak atheism." In contrast to this is "strong atheism" or "explicit atheism," adherents who know God does not exist, in addition to believing he does not. Again, see the Greek root 'gnosis' (to know, or knowledge).

[Jewelz] And it refers to much more than just gods

[Ryft] Jewelz: Agnosticism? Correct, yes. And to expand a little on my thoughts here, agnosticism and atheism regard two different but related spheres of human thought -- belief and knowledge. While belief is a necessary condition for knowledge (it is nonsensical to 'know' something that you do not 'believe'), knowledge is not a necessary condition for belief (it's possible to 'believe' something you do not 'know').

[OnEarthAsHeaven] Jewelz, why do atheists believe in life on other planets but not god.

[Ryft] OnEarthAsHeaven: They don't necessarily believe life on other planets exists. Their position on that issue is simply a probablistic statement.

[doppelganger] as an atheist, i do not believe that aliens have visited our planet, however it is entirely possible that life may exist on other planets...

[Ryft] OnEarthAsHeaven: Notice what doppelganger, as an atheist, just said. For him, the question of life on other planets is a probablistic issue (". . . it is entirely possible that life may exist on other planets.")

[doppelganger] ryft: for all we know, life elsewhere probably thrives in, say, five hundred degree temperatures...

[doppelganger] there may be some crystalline lifeforms on some other planets that completely defies our definition of life as we know it...

[Ryft] doppelganger: There is credulous speculation, and then there is knowledge. You can have the former, if you want it.

[doppelganger] ryft: im not saying there is, and im not saying there isnt. im saying there could be.

[doppelganger] for all we know.

[Ryft] doppelganger: Indeed. There may also be, on some other planet, purple winged pigs wearing Nike sneakers and selling flopsap.

[doppelganger] ryft: bah. they would be selling mepsipax :P

[Ryft] doppelganger: For all we know.

[StBruno] this might sound silly, but what on earth is flopsap?

[Ryft] StBruno: For all we know, it could be a breakfast cereal. I'm just underscoring the epistemic poverty of doppelganger speculations.

[doppelganger] poverty?

[Ryft] doppelganger: Probability is not knowledge; possibility is even less so.

[StBruno] lol

[doppelganger] ryft: good, now since we both agree that we dont know whether life exists on other planets or not, let's shake hands and move on.

* Ryft shakes

* doppelganger shakes

A Question of Prayer

2005-03-26T16:18:00.000-08:00

"When I pray, am I expecting to have a two way conversation or just me talking with pauses? I was involved in Christianity before and never really felt the power of prayer working. I felt then that I was just not good enough, a bit of an empty vessel."

I'm not sure what expectations you are holding, but I can relate to you how I understand prayer, religion, and God.

Harold Kushner, in his book Who Needs God, talked about how we tend to think that for religion to work, for our prayers to be answered, we should get what we ask for. "That is to say, we have confused God with Santa Claus," he writes. And isn't this quite right? For too long in my spiritual infancy I certainly treated God as a sort of cosmic supermarket and my prayers as a grocery list. Too many times I promised God that, if he would only do such-and-such, I would commit to this change in behavior or that course of action. Too often we think that prayer means giving God the list of things we want and assuring Him that we have been or will be good girls and boys and should we not then get them? And how many times do we run into disappointment? "When we pray sincerely and intensely for something," Kushner writes, "when we shower God with pleas and promises and still don't get what we prayed for, we are left wondering what went wrong. Is there something wrong with us? Were our prayers not fervent enough, our promised changes not enough of a sacrifice? Are we not good enough people for God to heed our prayers?"

He writes further:

There is nothing wrong with religion if we would only understand it properly, and neither is there anything so terrible about most of us that God should withhold from us the rewards of religion and prayer. What happens most of the time is that we are disappointed in religion because we are doing it wrong . . . God will not suffer Himself to be manipulated by our words or deeds. That is not religion. A century ago, Sir James Frazer, in The Golden Bough, suggested that this was the difference between religion and magic. Religion, he said, is the attempt to serve God. Magic is the effort to manipulate God. When we turn to religion as a way of getting God to give us what we want—be it health, love, riches, or whatever—we run the risk of being disappointed, not because we are unworthy of being loved or being rich, and not because God is stubborn or spiteful or incapable of helping us, but because that is not what religion does . . . Once we get over the Santa Claus mentality, prayer can be that kind of discipline; not an inventory of what we lack but a series of reminders of what we have, and what we might so easily take for granted and forget to be grateful for.

When we come to God in prayer, it's not for his benefit or instruction. God does not need our prayers; indeed, I'm not sure God "needs" anything. Nor does God rely on us to inform him of something he was not previously aware of. Does it not seem, if we think our prayers are to inform God of our wishes or needs, that we are stripping him of his divine nature? For instance, what information can we bring to an omniscient God who knows our needs before we even ask him (Matt. 6:8), and isn't such a notion a tacit denial of omniscience at any rate? And does it not seem that praying to God about our wants is self-centered rather than God-centered? Whose will are we seeking when we do such a thing—ours, or his?

Let me say this about prayer. It is one of the most fundamental and intimate moments in the life of the spiritual person, and one that, perhaps unwittingly, reveals the most about how we perceive God, our relationship to him, and how we approach religion. Prayer is about experiencing the presence of God—often, it need not even involve words. Prayer is that intersection where the human meets the divine, the finite meets the infinite, where we drop the shackles of the mundane and material and reach beyond ourselves to become immersed in the singular sense of God. It is meditation expressed in forms; the cares, worries, and distractions of the everyday world are set aside for a time while the one praying comes to encounter God. I should also think that, in a more tangible sense, prayer is a sort of reminder about our priorities. It keeps God and his will at the forefront of our mind, lest we should forsake him and pursue our own desire and will—which is its own form of idolatry—and reminds us to rely on him, to submit to him and his will, because we all know how easy it is to think that we're fine on our own. And as Kushner noted, it's also about keeping mindful of our blessings; rather than coming to God about what we lack and feel we want or should have, we come to God overwhelmed with gratitude for all that we already do have, thankful for God's gracious blessings, for his providence and mercy, and even grateful for his chastisements and disciplines (cf. Heb. 12:5-11).

Allowed to die? Part 2

2005-03-23T00:59:00.000-08:00

There are a number of things that bother me about the heartwrenching and complicated Terri Schindler-Schiavo case—and I am using "complicated" here in the verb form (not that it 'is complicated' so much as that things 'have complicated' it)—and although I could spend the next two hours writing about what these things that bother me are, I am going to restrict myself to the four things that bother me the most.

Now before anyone accuses me of becoming sympathetic with this case only because it has within the last year received pronounced media attention and that I have, consequently, fallen prey to the emotional rhetoric, not having examined the extensive facts of the case (there has been a lot of such accusations being thrown around various forums and blogs), please be advised that I have spent several, often consecutive hours poring over considerable amounts of history (as far back as February of 1990), court rulings, documents, and statements (going back to March of 2000), media editorials, et cetera, opinions and arguments that are sympathetic towards Terri Schindler-Schiavo and her parents, as well arguments and opinions that are sympathetic towards Michael Schiavo and Circuit Court Judge George Greer. Although I may not have informed myself enough to serve as an expert on any matter involving the case, I have informed myself enough to hold a legitimate opinion about it. You're free to disagree with me; you are not free to accuse me of ignorance.

One of the first things that bothers me is a prevailing opinion, originating with Michael Schiavo and affirmed by sympathizers of his view, that Terri should be "allowed to die," and I will tell you why this bothers me—Terri is not dying. By that I mean to say that she is not suffering from a terminal illness. She is not even on any sort of life support system—at least, not any "life support system" that differs from what any other human being is on, that is, food and water. Like some victims of Huntington's Disease, Terri cannot properly swallow. During my early twenties, I had the privelege of working in care homes for physically and mentally disabled adults and experienced, first-hand, people with this sort of problem. Yet not once did it ever occur to me nor did I ever hear anyone suggest that such people should be "allowed to die," and for good reason—they weren't dying. They suffered from neurologic conditions that impaired swallowing, but they had otherwise an intact, functional gastrointestinal tract. Like Terri. And like Terri, they too were not on any form of life support—their heart, like Terri's, beat on its own, their lungs functioned on their own, like Terri's. No one ever suggested that these people should be "allowed to die" because, like Terri, they were not dying. They were physically and mentally disabled, like Terri, one of them quite severly (the other workers always volunteered me to change his diapers; what fun), and certainly a great many of us able-bodied individuals are sure that we could not bear to live like that, but the point will be stressed once more here: neither they, nor others like them, nor Terri, are considered to be "dying." If Terri is not dying, it makes no sense to say that she should be "allowed to die."

Another thing that bothers me is the persistent expression of percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) as "life support." It simply is not. This evening I had a nice pasta dish dressed in a cheese sauce with seasoned beef—all right, it was Kraft Dinner with ground beef stirred in—and a glass of milk. In a forensic sense, perhaps one could call this life support, for surely food and water go to support life. But who in their right mind would sincerely call meals a "life support system"? It is simply absurd, if you ask me. And yet the only difference between myself and Terri is that I swallowed my nutrients and hydration. Is that what makes the difference for these people? If you can swallow, it's food; if you cannot swallow, it's life support? What kind of logic is this? I encourage them, or anyone else, to inquire after the American College of Gastroenterology, the American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, the Society of American Gastrointestinal and Endoscopic Surgeons, or any other physicians and surgeons with expertise in gastroenterology, and ask them, "Is a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy considered to be a life support system?"

I am also bothered by Michael's allegation, propagated by his sympathizers, that Terri expressed a desire to die, and that the removal of the PEG is nothing more than Michael deferring to Terri's wishes. This is not a tangential issue; it is, in fact, one of the very hubs of the entire controversy, as seen throughout most of the judicial proceedings. Had Terri never uttered a word about it, in any context or form, it seems quite likely that court rulings would have turned out very differently. Given that this question is so central to the entire issue, why has it been given the weight it has when it is established by nothing more compelling than hearsay? Did Terri say that, if she was ever in a situation were she would require a PEG, she would rather be allowed to just die? Pay very careful attention to this answer: "No." In fact, I'm fairly confident (and both her parents and Michael could affirm or deny this) that during the first 26 years of Terri's life, she never even heard of a PEG. Let me tell you what happened, according to the materials I've gone over. Michael alleges that Terri made a comment, after watching a movie (about Karen Quinlan), about how she wouldn't want to be on a life support system like that. Four things I want to say about this. First, it was a comment made after watching a movie! The idea that comments you make after watching a movie could one day decide whether you live or die would sure make you think more carefully about what you say when the credits roll, hmm? Second, Karen Quinlan was on a respirator; Terri is not. Third, Terri is not on any life support system at all, other than that which every one of us is on—food. Fourth, Karen was in a coma; Terri is not.

Related to this, I am bothered by Judge Greer's incompetent handling of this issue. When Diane Meyer, a friend of Terri's, testified in court about the 1982 comment Terri made after the movie, Greer said he thought Meyer's testimony was not credible because she described the conversation in the present tense. Pardon me? You are basing the decision whether to end someone's life on your confusion over verb tense? "The court is mystified as to how these present tense verbs would have been used some six years after the death of Karen Ann Quinlin [sic]," he wrote. First of all, it is not agreed that Michael's hearsay constitutes "clear and convincing evidence." Second of all, Greer's confusion over verb tense is not a justifiable basis to end Terri's life. Third, Greer's mystification over present tense verbs notwithstanding, it was highly appropriate for that conversation to have occurred in the present tense since Quinlan didn't die when they pulled the plug on her in 1976—she didn't die until 1985, three years after their conversation in 1982! And Greer has been informed of this. It is one of the many reasons Terri's parents want him to void his 2000 ruling. Even though that conversation did not occur "six years after" Quinlan's death but, rather, three years prior to it, Greer denied the motion. Furthermore, Michael's lead attorney, George Felos, told the Springfield Times that this point was insignificant and not worthy of revisiting. Excuse me? We are talking about starving Terri to death here, based on a 'comment she made after watching a movie; this makes Diane Meyer's testimony eminently significant!

Wesley J. Smith, an Attorney and Consultant for the International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide and a board member of The Center for Bioethics and Culture, recounted a very relevant and thought-provoking story that I am going to share here at this point. I want you to read this carefull, and consider the implications it has to Terri's fight [republished without edit]:

Many dehydration cases have involved such casual statements. The most disturbing of these was that of Marjorie Nighbert, which, ironically, also occurred in Florida. Marjorie was a successful Ohio businesswoman who was visiting her family in Alabama when she was felled by a stroke that left her disabled but not terminally ill. After being stabilized, she was moved to a nursing home in Florida where, it was hoped, she could be rehabilitated to relearn how to chew and swallow without danger of aspiration. To ensure she was nourished, she was provided a feeding tube.

This presented an excruciating quandary for her brother Maynard, who had a general power of attorney from Marjorie (not power of attorney for health care), as a consequence of which he became her surrogate medical decision-maker. Marjorie had once told her brother that she didn't want a feeding tube if she were terminally ill. Despite the fact that she was not dying, however, Maynard believed that if she were unable to be weaned off the tube, she would have wanted to die rather than live using the tube for nourishment. When she did not improve, he ordered the tube removed.

As she was slowly dehydrating to death, Marjorie began to ask the staff for food and water. In response to her pleas, members of the nursing staff surreptitiously gave her small amounts. One distraught staffer eventually blew the whistle, leading to a state investigation and a temporary restraining order requiring that Marjorie be nourished

Circuit Court Judge Jere Tolton received the case and appointed attorney William F. Stone to represent Nighbert and to conduct a 24-hour inquiry, the sole issue being whether Marjorie was competent to rescind her power of attorney and make her own decisions. After the rushed investigation, Stone was forced to report to the judge that she was not competent at that time. She had, after all been intentionally malnourished for several weeks. Stone particularly noted that he had been unable to determine whether she was competent when the dehydration commenced.

With Stone's report in hand, the judge ruled that the dehydration should be completed, apparently on the theory that Marjorie did not have the competence to request the medical treatment of food and water. Before an appalled Stone could appeal, Nighbert died on April 6, 1995.

Society's approach to the so-called "right to die" has become far too casual. None of us should be made to die because of statements made in casual conversations or due to misconstrued oral directives. The time has come for the best legal minds in the country to draft model legislation that will tighten existing laws so as to give every reasonable legal benefit of the doubt to life rather than, as too often happens now, to slow death by dehydration. [read]

As Family Research Council President Tony Perkins said, "We can debate which level of governments, and which branch of governments offer Terri the most protection. But this we must not debate: the deliberate, public, and publicly sanctioned dehydration and starvation of a disabled woman is a profound affront to Americans' deepest values—and it must halt." [read]

Allowed to die? Part 1

2005-03-21T23:45:00.000-08:00

"The sick person in a vegetative state, awaiting recovery or a natural end, still has the right to basic health care (nutrition, hydration, cleanliness, warmth, etc.) . . . I should like particularly to underline how the administration of water and food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act. Its use, furthermore, should be considered, in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such morally obligatory..." [read]
- Pope John Paul II

Dory at Wittenburg Gate wrote a very thought-provoke piece:

"No one has suggested that Terri should be 'allowed to die' because she is dying anyway. What is being suggested is that she should be caused to die because her life is not worth living. 'I wouldn't want to live that way,' people are fond of saying. Well, thanks for sharing, but that's not really the point, is it? What if I decided that I wouldn't want to live as a diabetic with all the challenges that disease presents. Does that then justify me killing a diabetic child or spouse? Dare I argue that to suggest otherwise is to interfere with 'a personal family decision'?" [read more]

My apologies for not having posted over the last couple days. I was really sick this weekend, laid out on the couch with a temperature and no energy to even get up and eat. It was pretty brutal. But thankfully today I was feeling considerably better (since I did have to go to work, after all) and I suspect I'll be feeling even better yet tomorrow. I have some things I want to post about, so I may get to that tomorrow. We'll see how I'm feeling.

Added some new blogs to the Blogroll. Check them out.

New Books

2005-03-18T23:32:00.000-08:00

So I bought two new books today:

White, James R. Scripture Alone: Exploring the Bible's Accuracy, Authority, and Authenticity. Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2004.

Grudem, Wayne. Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994.

Needless to say, I will be devoting a great deal of time to reading, especially Grudem's monumental volume. But I am very pleased.

And tired, and heading to bed... *tips hat*

A Catholic on Election, Free Will, and Salvation

2005-03-14T23:12:00.000-08:00

The following was a forum post at ChristianForums.com and includes my response to this person. I am including it here because these questions are both common and important, and I desire to do all I can to publish these answers publically, spreading the Word of truth as far as I can, anticipating others who might harbour similar questions. This will become a fairly regular feature in this blog, wherein I will publish here the questions and concerns I encounter in my experiences on the Internet and in real life. As always, when my interlocutor is not a public figure, the questioner is left nameless.

I am what I consider a 'new Christian'. I was born Catholic, fell away from God in my late teens and twenties, and am now working to build my relationship back with God. A part of that is struggling with the various doctrines who all say their's is the correct path.

With Calvinism, if I understand correctly, one does not choose to be saved. God chooses you -- or elects you, basically. It is predetermined.

If this is true, then I have no control over my saving? It is already decided before I existed whether I would be saved nor not?

If that is true, how does this work with the idea of God giving us free will to choose Him or not?

If I want Christ in my life, and truly want to follow His Word, and want to be saved, and I take the actions of one that is saved, is this indication of me being predetermined? How does one know they are elected?

It seems to me that Calvinism does not coincide with the gift of free will to follow God or not. But yet, if God knows all, then I can understand how he knows who will and will not choose him-hence him predetermining you. So I can see both sides-which confuses me even more.

"With Calvinism, if I understand correctly, one does not choose to be saved. God chooses you-or elects you, basically. It is predetermined."

I would emphasize caution here over the important theological distinction between 'salvation' and 'election', to the effect that we must never conflate the two.

Concerning 'salvation' and your above statement I would say that, on the Reformed view, there is no conflict between the two ideas. In other words, both ideas are true: God chooses us, and we choose God. Salvation is a multifaceted rubric which, in at least some respects, involves interaction between God and man. The different facets of salvation are outlined under the Reformed ordo salutis (Lt. 'order of salvation'). However, although it is true that 'election' is one facet of salvation, it did not involve any interaction between God and man; 'election' is a different matter because this act took place in the divine singularity of God's eternal frame of reference, which is antecedent to and transcendent of the created order. Scriptures speak of 'election' occurring before any of the elect were born both explicitly (e.g Rom. 9:10-16) as well as implicitly, insofar as scriptures reveal election taking place before the world was even created (Eph. 1:4; 2 Tim. 1:9; Matt. 25:34 [cf. Psalm 32:1,2]; Rev. 13:8; etc.).

"If this is true, then I have no control over my saving? It is already decided before I existed whether I would be saved nor not?"

This will be one of the most notable differences you will discover between Protestant and Roman Catholic doctrine. Reformed theology affirms and emphasizes the scriptural truth that no one has any control over their salvation—no one can save themselves apart from God, nor can anyone coerce God into saving them against his will. Reformed theology affirms and emphasizes the sovereignty of God as ultimate and supreme over all things; his nature, his character, his will, his purposes, his decrees, every facet of God's being is sovereign, subject to nothing external to him.

And this must be so if we are to contemplate God as God, not lacking anything prior to creation; to the degree that God is subject to anything external to himself, to that degree God was incomplete prior to creation. But scriptures do not proclaim God as a contingent existent; quite to the contrary, scriptures proclaim an absolute, sovereign, necessary, complete, self-existent God, and repudiates the notion of any reality that transcends God.

All of this is to say that, if anyone is saved, it can never be said to be independent of nor contrary to God's will. Scriptures proclaim that salvation is under the jurisdiction of the sovereign and righteous God, not the jurisdiction of mortal and sinful man. If we are saved, it is because God saved us. Never should a man think that he did, or even can, save himself.

Do I have any control over my salvation? No. Did God already decide from eternity whether or not I would be saved? Yes, and could such a decision be in any better hands? Would not such a decision be better left up to sinful man? God forbid.

Do I have any part to play in my salvation? Absolutely.

"If that is true, how does this work with the idea of God giving us free will to choose Him or not?"

Man does not have a 'free' will, and hasn't since the Garden of Eden. Man's will is subject to his nature. Surely it would be agreed that every decision of his will is a product of man's nature, every decision a concert of his desires, his passions, his intellect. But this nature is fallen. Man's will is not free, man does not have 'free' will. He does, however, have free agency, insofar as he is capable of making decisions, of making choices according to his greatest desires, but the will that directs this free agency is not itself free—it is corrupted by sin.

"If I want Christ in my life, and truly want to follow His Word, and want to be saved, and I take the actions of one that is saved, is this indication of me being predetermined? How does one know they are elected?"

Because election is necessarily the sole jurisdiction of God, since it took place from eternity, antecedent to creation, who is and who is not of the elect is not man's concern. It is not our jurisdiction, not under our control, not our concern. And this abdication of any concern about the identity of the elect is an expression of supreme faith and trust in the mercy, grace, and justice of God. We trust God absolutely, we praise him and give glory to him. We do not question him, we do not audit his choices, as though his purposes are subject to a higher court. And we certainly do not hold his purposes and choices accountable to man.

If you want Christ in your life, pursue him with all your heart. If you truly want to follow his Word, then seek after it like a man starving for bread. If you want to be saved, cast yourself at the feet of the Lamb and cry out, "Have mercy on me, a sinner!" Pursue God through Christ Jesus our Savior like there is nothing more important in your life or all of the universe, because there really is nothing more important than that.

And trust God's choices, absolutely and completely, never thinking to question his righteousness. Trust him to have made the best decision, for he is God and God is good.

"As Adelphia Goes, so Goes America?"

2005-03-14T17:55:00.000-08:00

This article was simply too good to not share. Originally published at The American Cause website, it has been subsequently cross-posted to several forums and communities, one of them being the Apologetics community at Livejournal, which is where I discovered it. The article as follows is unedited and properly credited and referenced. (NOTE: My posting of this article here neither does nor should be thought to constitute a broad personal endorsement of the views of The American Cause and/or Patrick Buchanan, nor Creators Syndicate Inc. and its columnists. My interest and applaus extend no further than this particular article).

As Adelphia goes, so goes America?

by Patrick J. Buchanan
February 14, 2005

In his second inaugural, George W. Bush used the words liberty and freedom 42 times. And, indeed, if America is about anything, she is about freedom. But freedom from what, and for what?

What brings the old question to mind is the decision by Adelphia Communications, the cable operator that has long refused to carry pornography, to offer triple-X rated programming for the first time in a major media market: Southern California. What is triple-X-rated programming?

Sallie Hofmeister of the Los Angeles Times explains: "Single-X-rated movies feature nudity, long-range or medium-range camera shots, simulated sex and sex between women." Her depiction of double-X- and triple-X-rated programming is best left to the imagination.

In short, this is the sort of squalid, grungy stuff that, not long ago, would have had the men who produced and distributed it sent to prison for years, after being denounced from the bench as perverts.

Why did Adelphia change its policy? Well, it seems that John Rigas, the 80-year-old founder who, on moral grounds, refused to carry "soft-porn," is on his way, along with his son, to a minimum-security facility for looting his company. Family values at work. And as Adelphia has filed for Chapter 11 and is on the block, its present managers wanted to make it as attractive a property as possible.

Spokeswoman Erica Stull, in what might well stand as the motto of modern capitalism, gave Adelphia's reason for reversing its policy: "People want it, so we are going to provide it." Erica gets it.

Adelphia's fall from grace would be a matter of little interest were it not for the trend it exposed, which Hofmeister details.

"Adelphia joins a marketplace already teeming with ways to procure hard-core sexual content," she writes. "The Internet has become a carnal cornucopia, with graphic images, videos and cartoons ... EchoStar Communications Corp., the nation's second-ranked satellite TV provider, has offered triple-X programming for several years on its Dish Network. Satellite leader DirecTV Group Inc., owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Corp., peddles fare that falls just shy of triple-X."

Fifty percent of all hotel movies purchased are "adult."

"It's scary how much money is made on porn," proclaims Tim Connelly, editor and publisher of Adult Video News, the journal of the porn trade - although Connelly does not seem all that scared.

"I think they made a really smart business decision," Connelly told another reporter. "So, today Adelphia, tomorrow Wal-Mart."

Connelly estimates that when strip clubs, magazines, the Internet, television and DVDs are factored in, porn has become a $10 billion industry. "That's more than Hollywood makes at the box office," says Connelly. "And it just grows and grows and grows. It's mainstream now."

Yes, it is. And if Connelly is right, pornography grossed 30 times as much as "The Passion of the Christ," and 200 million citizens spend on average $50 a year each to keep the industry booming.

One need not have lived through Legion of Decency days, when its condemnation could kill a movie, to realize that America is still "defining deviancy down," in the late Sen. Pat Moynihan's phrase. We are in a worldwide race to the bottom, and America is winning.

Our popular culture - free and diverse, or polluted and poisonous, depending on your views and values - is a consequence of convergent forces. First, a Supreme Court, led by such worthies as William Douglas, brought pornography under the protection of the First Amendment.

At the same time, Christianity, as definer of standards of morality, was being displaced by the new religion that came out of the cultural revolution of the '60s, secular humanism. This belief system holds that all voluntary sexual acts between consenting adults are moral.

Then, the mighty engine of American capitalism, which, per Stull, is about "People want it, so we are going to provide it," went to work to meet the new market's demand. That demand comes from an affluent Weimar America whose children have been taught in their schools, and by their song-singers and films, that casual sex is good, hang-ups are bad and chastity is stupid.

November's landslide repudiation of gay marriage is regarded as a triumph by moral-values voters in Red State America. But history will likely record it as a defensive victory of one of the last citadels of traditional Christian morality, which eventually fell.

In "Witness," Whittaker Chambers writes of how, in a hospital, as he spoke with a priest friend about whether the West might be saved, he was brought up short by the priest's question: "What makes you think the West is worth saving?"

As the West advances from aborting its unborn to assisting the suicide of its sick, from euthanasia of its elderly to mercy-killing its disabled young in Europe, from its Christian roots to its post-Christian decadence, decline and death from a lack of births, the priest's question is being asked - and not only in the madrassas of the East.

© 2005 Creators Syndicate, Inc.

Buchanan, Patrick J. "As Adelphia Goes, so Goes America?" The American Cause. 14 Feb. 2005. The American Cause.
14 Mar. 2005 [http://www.theamericancause.org/a-pjb-050214-adelphia.htm].

Creators Syndicate, Inc. (Richard S. Newcombe., President and CEO) [http://www.creators.com/index2.html].

A Response to 'Kevin' and 'puritan'

2005-03-13T21:59:00.000-08:00

At the risk of offending either 'Kevin' or 'puritan', I am going to respond to their posts out here on the main blog, primarily because I think these are essential matters with very important consequences and should be made readily available to readers. My purpose in doing this is not to engage in any sort of debate here on these points but, rather, to simply express my thoughts on them and allow the readers to consider the various points on their own. I think they both made some good points, and I have a couple of thoughts of my own I want to add to them. Since their comments were already a matter of public record, published on the Internet for anyone to see, I don't imagine there will be too much concern.

Kevin is right to point out the inherent contradiction possessed by the Arminian perspective, because even a "nominally moral act" is nevertheless a moral act, which the Arminian would have to concur with if he or she wants to retain a biblical understanding of 'moral'. Ergo, if God chooses his elect according to his prescience of who will accept Christ and believe (and to believe in his Son is a commandment of God), then man's self-determined choice becomes the sine qua non of salvation, not God's mercy (i.e. they are not saved, their salvation is not actualized, until they have 'decided' for it on their own), and grace is no longer grace because the 'favour' was consequently 'merited'. This does, and should, leave a bad taste in the Arminian's mouth, and violates a startling number of passages from scriptures. I spent a great many years as an Arminian myself and I can personally testify to the bad taste it left in my own mouth. Because of its manifest theological and scriptural problems, I dropped my Arminian perspective and began a search for a more biblically sound view. Although I didn't know yet what view is more biblically sound, I did know which view was not; I felt it was both my theological and philosophical responsibility to let go of a view I knew was demonstrably wrong, even if that meant I had to start over.

Kevin said that, back when he held an Arminian view, his interpretation might have been "God chose me because of what happened after He started giving me grace." He is right to call this "muddle-headed" thinking because it does not escape the problem: Why did God choose you for his gift of grace? There are additional questions, such as what is the nature of "grace" in this interpretation, what means does God use to give it, and can sinful man prevent God from accomplishing what he sets out to do—all the while keeping in mind that the Bible offers answers to these questions and, therefore, our answers must reflect the testimony of scriptures. Furthermore, such an interpretation would be tantamount to an Arminian offering a Reformed response—namely, that regeneration precedes faith—which is specifically problematic and generally ironic.

Kevin expressed how, in his view, most Christians "are just happy holding logically impossible premises in their heads" and, if I understood him correctly, he felt that this is "where a lot of frustration originates in theology." I disagree with that latter statement, personally. I think a lot of frustration in theology originates from the cognitive dissonance that results from taking what we uncritically learned by rote, applying it eisegetically to scriptures, and confronting a conflict between scriptures and what we were taught. Most Christians, in my experience, are not terribly Berean about the things they are taught, if at all. I know I wasn't, for many years, and this was to my shame. We must receive the message with great eagerness, examining the scriptures daily to see whether these things are so (Acts 17:11-12).

Puritan felt that most Evangelicals would be in agreement with me, when it comes to "one-on-one witnessing" or "telling others about Christ and his atonement." But I don't think I am able to agree here, simply because, when it comes to spreading the gospel, we rarely, if ever, get into the finer points of theology like election. The message is about Christ and him crucified, whereas growing in the knowledge of Christ comes later in one's Christian walk, which is after conversion, which is after our hearing the gospel. When we spread the good news about Christ Jesus, "telling others about Christ and his atonement," we don't ever seem to get into things like the nature of God, predestination, election, the ordo salutis, etc., and I feel it is good not to—to employ a biblical analogy, the meat comes after the milk. So why do we bother with such finer points of theology at all? Because there comes a point in our learning and growing in the knowledge of Christ where we ought to leave the elementary teaching about Christ, pressing on to maturity, not laying again a foundation of repentance from dead works and of faith toward God, etc.; and this we will do, if God permits (Heb. 6:1-3).

Puritan also reminds me, and perhaps our readers too, about the grace and gentleness extolled in 2 Tim. 2:24-26 and that perhaps most Arminians "do believe [that] salvation is by grace through faith," but that they are just "weak when it comes to understanding why that is true in relationship to all eternality and providence." For this I would thank Puritan; those are words to live by, and I certainly strive to.

Neither 'Kevin' nor 'puritan' should feel they need to respond to this (although they are welcomed to); the point of this was not to incite a debate. Again, I simply felt these are important issues and points, which I wanted to make more readily available to our readership and encourage them to consider these issues themselves.

Think about it. Question everything.

Christianity is the Right Religion for Me

2005-03-11T20:49:00.000-08:00

It's true. It's even official. See, I answered all the questions to one of those QuizFarm thingers, this one created by 'callalily19' and called "Which Religion is Right For You?" and it told me so. "You scored as Christianity," the results informed me. "Your views are most similar to those of Christianity. Do more research on Christianity and possibly consider being baptized and accepting Jesus, if you aren't already Christian."

My views are "most similar to" those of Christianity, she said. Heh, right. Of course, I'm wondering why my views are not "exactly" those of Christianity, and simultaneously wondering how anyone can trust the theological judgments of someone named 'callalily' who is probably not much more than a high school kid with accounts at six different online journal services. "Do more research on Christianity," she says. Heheh. For those of you that know me personally, you can certainly appreciate the humour of that one. Now, I know these tests are generic at best, just some good tongue-in-cheek fun for those who take life a little less seriously, so understand that I am being entirely facetious here, having my own bit of fun.

But I do have a little concern about this test. I mean, have you seen some of the questions she asks in that quizlette? Amazing. Probably the most blatant example, and certainly my favourite, is Question 34: "Because I haven't made up my mind, I never rule out the possibility of God's existence." Now I am supposed to consider this question and answer either (1) Strongly Disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Undecided, (4) Agree, or (5) Strongly Agree.

Uh...

How do I answer that? Every single optional answer is wrong. "Strongly disagree," meaning I emphatically rule out the possibility of God's existence. Wrong. Okay, and obviously "Disagree" is likewise wrong. "Undecided"? No, I'm quite decided. All right, so then do I "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" that, because I haven't made up my mind, I never rule out the possibility of God's existence? Neither, because I have, in fact, made up my mind. So you tell me, dear reader, how do I answer this question? And maybe it's because of questions like this that the results show my views as being only "most similar to" those of Christianity. I chose "Undecided" because to move in any direction towards agreeing or disagreeing is even more inaccurate; therefore, because "I haven't made up my mind" about God's existence, my views don't quite align with Christianity.

Question 22 was interesting: "'Evil' as many religions see it does not exist; 'evil' is just imbalance and human mistakes." Well we have a problem here, don't we, if "evil" as a religion sees it is precisely imbalance and human mistakes. Like Christianity, for example. How do I answer this one? Man is said to be "fallen," there is an intrinsic imbalance not only in the human experience but also in man's relationship with God—we are alienated from God, which is why reconciliation is needed, a relational breach which lends to our concuspience that inescapably results in manifest human mistakes. There is "imbalance and human mistakes," certainly, but Christianity answers the question of why there is. And why it's evil. Question 29 states, "I have a strong belief and trust in myself over anything or one else." Yes, autonomy, or self-law. It was the first sin man committed, the whole reason we're in this mess, and it remains man's favourite sin that he still commits routinely to this very day.

"People are not inherently evil; they are just weak and have free will." What is meant here by "evil"? And it was a curious statement to make, ripe for exploration: "I'm not evil, I just have free will."

What about Question 11? "I am certain that no being higher than humans exists." What does "higher" mean here? What about, say, dolphins? What if someone felt that dolphins were a higher order of being than humans? I know what she meant, I think: this was an anti-supernatural statement, the rejection of the idea of beings that transcend the physical, spatio-temporal sphere of existence, from the idea that "if it has no extension or form in space then it does not really exist."

"God has chosen a race to follow him." Chosen. Interesting choice of words. I could have some theological fun with this one, by presenting an argument which attempted to show that the regenerated elect were a distinct race from the unregenerated non-elect—the latter being born of the flesh while the former being born of the Spirit. However, I had to Strongly Disagree because I think this question had in mind such groups as the Ku Klux Klan.

"Jesus died for our sins." Who is meant by "our" here? And what does "died for" mean, what did that accomplish?

Ah my. It was fun, at any rate.

They Found Me!

2005-03-10T03:15:00.000-08:00

Now how cool is this? Jared Wilson, from The Thinklings blog, stumbled across my personal blog; not only did he mention me by name (at least, my Internet name), he also said some very nice things about me (read Jared's post here). I am simultaneously humbled and delighted. Greetings to my brothers in Christ, and may the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with them.

Muggeridge: Let's Be Honest

2005-03-10T01:52:00.000-08:00

"There is in each of us a hard core of pride or self-centeredness which corrupts our best achievements and blights our best experiences. It comes out in all sorts of ways—in the jealousy which spoils our friendships, in the vanity we feel when we have done something pretty good, in the easy conversion of love into lust, in the meanness which makes us depreciate the efforts of other people, in the distortion of our own judgment by our own self-interest, in our fondness for flattery and our resentment of blame, in our self-assertive profession of fine ideals which we never begin to practice."

—Malcolm Muggeridge

More on Election and Moral Worthiness

2005-03-09T21:42:00.000-08:00

You know, I find it very difficult to write while music is playing. At least, music with lyrics. I always have. I'm not sure why—maybe I struggle with splitting my attention—but nevertheless I need to turn this music off if I intend to write something coherent. I'm enjoying it, it's good music, but it's time to write now.

With a comforting mug of hot, steaming coffee set beside me, I shall begin.

In another post of mine, I was addressing someone's allegation that God's criteria for choosing his elect might be "morally arbitrary." I believe I've dealt with that allegation sufficiently enough, but in that post I had also said that, if our 'moral worthiness' of heaven is not part of his criteria for choosing his elect, then whatever happens to be God's criteria are indeed irrelevant—to our moral worthiness (but then I also noted that just because his criteria might be irrelevant in one context it does not follow that his criteria are therefore irrelevant per se; that is, in all contexts).

I wanted to stop on that note and perhaps expand a little bit on what I was saying there, because there is some potential for misunderstanding. I may be eloquent but that does not mean I am perspicuous. I want to explain what I meant when I said that God's criteria for choosing his elect are irrelevant to their moral worthiness because, on the surface, that might sound scandalous enough to raise some eyebrows (certainly the eyebrows of nearly every Evangelical reader).

Let me begin by stating what I do not mean. The criteria that God uses for choosing his elect might be irrelevant with regard to their moral worthiness, but this does not mean that their moral worthiness is irrelevant with regard to their entrance into heaven. It is actually quite relevant; there is no shortage of statements in the sacred scriptures which outline what sort of person will not enter heaven. So it would seem that their moral worthiness becomes an issue at some point. The careful distinction I am stressing right here is that God's sovereign election of his children neither equates with nor somehow results in their license to sin—the latter is quite a different matter from the former. Just because the criteria that God uses for choosing his elect might be irrelevant to their moral worthiness, it does not mean that they may behave and act any way they like and they'll still find entrance into heaven.

However, their entrance into heaven is eschatological, isn't it—something that they, here now alive, at least have yet experience. There is a process involved prior to that event, a process which begins first, obviously, with their birth. But did God wait until they were each individually born before electing them? No. God's choosing his elect occurred in the divine singularity of his eternal frame of reference, which is antecedent to and transcendent of the created order. His elect were chosen before they were even born, before they had done anything either good or bad, in order that God's purpose in election might stand, demonstrating that it depends neither on man's desire nor effort but on God's mercy (Rom. 9:10-16). In fact, his elect were chosen not only before they were born but before the world was even created. We read that "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1:4); we read that our salvation and holy calling was "granted us in Christ Jesus from all eternity" (2 Tim. 1:9); we read that the kingdom has been prepared "from the foundation of the world" for those blessed of the Father (Matt. 25:34; cf. Psalm 32:1,2); we read that the names of the elect have "been written from the foundation of the world in the book of life" (Rev. 13:8). If we said that their moral worthiness were a criterion of God's choosing his elect, then we would be saying that it is no longer a matter of grace but, rather, of obligation (that it is something God owes them). If it was "on the basis of works," then grace (being "unmerited favour") is no longer grace (Rom 11:6); but we know that God "saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace" (2 Tim. 1:9).

Might this not also begin to suggest, then, that if the criteria God uses for choosing his elect are irrelevant to their moral worthiness—if no one, in themselves, deserves to be permitted into heaven, whereby God is under obligation—then perhaps our moral worthiness is contingent upon God's act of electing (cf. Heb. 13:20-21; Phil. 1:6, 2:13; Rom. 8:29; etc)? That is, if no one in themselves deserves heaven, then all mankind would be lost if God had not intervened; both the salvation and the moral worthiness of those redeemed, then, are the result of God's intervention by grace—in our justification, sanctification, and glorification—and therefore to none other is praise and glory due. I would echo Matthew Henry's expression that all fulness dwells in Christ, "a fulness of merit and righteousness, of strength and grace for us," as well as John Gill who affirms that Christ is our sanctification, and we have "all [our] sins expiated by his sacrifice, and [our] persons washed and cleansed in his blood, and [our] hearts sanctified by his Spirit," which will be completed by the author of it.

Hebrews 13:20-21
"Now the God of peace, who brought up from the dead the great Shepherd of the sheep through the blood of the eternal covenant, even Jesus our Lord, equip you in every good thing to do His will, working in us that which is pleasing in His sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom be the glory forever and ever. Amen."

Philippians 1:6; 2:13
"For I am confident of this very thing, that He who began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Christ Jesus. ... for it is God who is at work in you, both to will and to work for His good pleasure."

Romans 8:29
"For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, so that He would be the firstborn among many brethren."

"This encourages us to do our utmost," Matthew Henry writes, "because our labour shall not be in vain: we must still depend on the grace of God. The working of God's grace in us is to quicken and engage our endeavours. God's goodwill to us is the cause of his good work in us."

Change of Address

2005-03-06T19:43:00.000-08:00

NOTICE: I have changed the addresses of my blogs.

my Personal blog is now http://ryft.blogspot.com
the Apologia blog is now http://prosapologian.blogspot.com

Please update any links to these blogs or their respective articles to reflect these new addresses. Thank you, and my apologies for the inconvenience. A change of this order will not occur again in the future.

The Arrogance of Atheism -- Austin Cline 1

2005-03-06T16:46:00.000-08:00

On a quiet Monday evening (February 28th) I was working on the content of the meta data for my blog—altering the description, keywords, configuring the access and permissions of indexing robots, et cetera—and I wanted to check how, or if, things would appear in a Google search. So I typed in "ryft" and "blog" as my keywords in the first run and was quite surprised to discover an unexpected hit at About.com. Wait, what is this? I've never written anything for that website. Yet it was something about The Arrogance of Atheism, which is suspiciously identical to the title of an article I wrote.

Of course I clicked on the link and was taken to the Atheism/Agnosticism section of About.com, which ought to have been expected, edited by one Austin Reed Cline, Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism. There I discovered that Cline was critically reviewing precisely that article of mine. Evidently the influence of my writing has begun to expand into unexpected areas, and without my knowledge because he certainly made no effort to contact me, to either make me aware of his article or ask if I would like to respond.

Perhaps needless to say, I was nevertheless somewhat delighted. And as for a response to his article, that is exactly what I intend to do here.

It is unfortunate that Cline had so grossly misunderstood the context of my article, which could be attributed to both the briefness of my article and Cline's lack of interacting with me about it prior to publishing his. Yet the question which opens and sets the tone of his article demonstrates his misunderstanding rather succinctly, wherein he asks, "Are atheists arrogant for insisting that theists support their claims before accepting them as true? . . . It's a serious sign of weakness, I think, when someone starts whining about having to support their assertions" (para. 1). Disregarding Cline's gratuitous invective, this of course was not the arrogance I was speaking of; I was aiming at something significantly deeper than that. I was talking about how certain atheists "presuppose the truth of their system of belief and then tacitly insist their Christian opponent work within the framework of that system. In other words, the Christian is expected to provide arguments in defense of Christian theism which accord with the atheist's epistemology in particular and world view in general." Another atheist elsewhere had responded in a similar fashion to Cline, wherein he had said the challenge "Prove that God exists" is a "perfectly logical argument" for someone to pose. My response to that atheist may help shed light on the context of my article and prove helpful for Cline:

Actually, it is not a perfectly logical argument. Even if it could be properly considered an 'argument' at all—and it certainly cannot be—we would say it is a perfectly empirical argument, for it is evidence that the speaker is demanding and, typically for claims of existence, those making the demand expect the nature of the evidence to have extension or form in space (i.e. be 'empirical', or apprehensible by sense perception). Additionally, this evidence, as defined by that person's philosophical commitments, usually must posses certain epistemic virtues—such as demonstrating (1) some relationship to the object in question, (2) an absence of internal and external conceptual problems, or (3) some scope of alethic realism—virtues which are likewise defined and whose acceptability is determined by that person's philosophical commitments. The further we explore this demand for proof (or rather, evidence), the more warrant my argument above receives because we expose, exponentially, the rather significant number of presuppositions undergirding the atheist's approach, which the Christian theist is expected to, first, uncritically allow and, second, conform to when meeting his demands. If the Christian theist should refuse to uncritically allow the atheist's presuppositions, his claims are summarily dismissed as 'irrational' (which begs the epistemic question) and the discussion is terminated.

It bears repeating: "If it is permissible for the atheist to presuppose the truth of his system of thought and expect the Christian to work within the framework of that system, then it is also permissible for the inverse of that situation. Otherwise, the atheist would shoulder the epistemic responsibility for explaining why the only presuppositions permitted in the field of debate are his own."

A Christian young lady said about my article, "In all sentiments, true; although the [Christian's] challenge is to be as Paul was—all things to all men. That is to say, Christians must find a way to argue in the atheist paradigm." However, this underscores my very point. Christian theism cannot exist in "the atheist paradigm"—atheism, by design of its own presuppositions, is antithetical to theism of this nature. The only theism that "the atheist paradigm" will permit is the saccharine sentimentalism of pantheism, whose claims admittedly posses no alethic realism and, consequently, no threat to atheism qua atheism. I'm talking about a philosophical prejudice so pronounced that competing systems of thought are required to uncritically allow his presuppositions and conform their argumentation to those, and refusal or failure to do so is prejudicially demeaned as 'irrational'. I am talking about a form of bigotry, which G.K. Chesterton relevantly referred to as "an incapacity to conceive seriously the alternative to a proposition." Herbert Spencer noted wisely, "There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance—that principle is contempt prior to investigation."

Cline writes, "Ryft doesn't like being held to the standard of having to provide evidence for his claims" (para. 3). In addition to the potential fallacy of poisoning the well, this statement is patently false and fails to reflect the intention of my article. What I actualy dislike is confronting philosophical prejudice that is anathema to free and critical thinking and having to unilaterly conform my arguments to the presuppositions thereof; that is,I dislike having to grant antecedently and uncritically the epistemological structure that undergirds my opponent's system of thought when he is not willing to permit the inverse of that situation, which "would shoulder the epistemic responsibility for explaining why the only presuppositions permitted in the field of debate are his own."

Cline writes, "Actually, though, I suspect that he only objects to being held to that standard when it comes to claims about his god [sic] —I'll bet that he is quite comfortable with that standard in every other situation" (para. 3). Cline would lose that bet for I do not, in fact, share his epistemology and philosophical precommitments. In my view, empirical standards regard only empirical claims; a claim which regards some state of affairs that has extension or form in space would require evidence of the same nature. But evidence need not be empirical to serve as evidence (cf. logic and necessary truths). Cline demonstrates this distinction when in the same paragraph he asks, "Would he, for example, object to scientists having to provide evidence for their scientific claims? Would he object to prosecutors having to provide evidence in support of murder charges brought against him? Unlikely." Correct. However, these claims are empirical in nature, are they not? Of course I am going to hold empirical claims to empirical standards.

Cline writes, "It's fair to question the nature of what evidence is expected in support of a claim, but trying to exempt one's own personal god-claims [sic] from a standard used pretty much all the rest of the time in other situations is an example of the Special Pleading fallacy" (para. 4) . . . "The whole thing strikes me as an admission that one's god-claims [sic] can't stand up to the same critical scrutiny that all other claims are expected to and, so, the only recourse is to try to deny that those standards should be employed. Convenient, eh?" (para. 5) It would be this fallacy if, and only if, one's own personal God-claims are empirical in nature. If one claimed that God was a contingent existent that had extension or form in space, then it would be Special Pleading to exempt said God from empirical standards. But if the God claimed exists transcendent of spatiality, then it would not be Special Pleading; it would, in fact, be appreciably avoiding a categorical mistake.

Cline writes, "If someone really thinks that some particular claim merits being exempt, they'll have to provide a sound logical argument in defense of that claim" (para. 4). Such arguments can be, and are, just so provided; there is centuries' worth of this material, more in the twentieth century than at any time before (I would especially recommend Alvin Plantinga's series on Warrant). There is certainly no shortage of it. However, one has to keep in mind the difference between a logical argument and an empirical one; it would not make sense to complain about the lack of empirical evidence for a logical argument.

Cline writes, "Of course, sound logical arguments is another one of those standards that atheists typically apply to god-claims [sic] —just the sort of thing Ryft is complaining about" (para. 4). As has been amply demonstrated, this is not the sort of thing I am "complaining" about at all.

* * *

[6-MAR-2005, 21:38] I wrote Austin Cline an email, making him aware of my response to his article and encouraging him to provide a link to it from his. The following is his email in its entirety:

Both of your pieces presuppose that there is such a thing as "the atheist paradigm" or "the atheist worldview" which is antithetical to theism. There is, however, no "the atheist paradigm" any more than there is "the theist paradigm." There perhaps as many [sic] atheist "paradigms" or "worldviews" as there are atheists.

This renders both of your pieces incoherent - the real arrogance is in the rash generalizations you make about all atheists. I used your piece as an example of poor reasoning and see no need to inflict yet another on my readers when the errors are all basically the same thing.
(Cline, Austin. "Re: The Arrogance of Atheism." E-mail to David Nesbitt. 6 MAR 2005)

Ignoring once again Cline's gratuitous invective (is this critical thinking skills being practiced?), in point of fact neither of my pieces "presuppose" that there is such a thing as "the atheist paradigm" or any "rash generalizations" of the sort, which is verifiable immediately upon reviewing both of my articles. It can be seen readily enough that I made no reference at all to anything like "the atheist paradigm" (although that Christian young woman did, whom I was quoting), and I confess that I have no idea what that could even be. Atheists are fairly diverse in their philosophies and worldviews and, on the more scholarly level, some even enjoy healthy debate on conflicting views. My articles regarded only a segment of the atheist population, those with a particular epistemology and worldview and notably the ones that enjoy debating against Christian theism. When I talked about how the "Christian is expected to provide arguments in defense of Christian theism which accord with the atheist's epistemology in particular and world view in general," no mention was made as to what worldview that was, nor was mentioning it even relevant to the point being made; insert whatever worldview is relevant at the time and place the discussion occurs. But would it not take quixotic mental gymnastics to interpret that as a generalization about all atheists or positing something like an atheist paradigm? And the end product of such an exercise would amount to a strawman caricature at any rate, so how would that even be productive? Simply put, it wouldn't be.

I leave it to you, the reader, to review his article and email, and my responses to both, and determine for yourself which of us evinces poor reasoning. And keep in mind also that he refuses to provide his readership the opportunity to review my response, whereas I am quite willing. In the final analysis, I believe I am finished with Mr. Cline on the issue of his article.

- - -

NOTE: A question just occured to me. If your opponent truly displayed "poor reasoning" skills, why wouldn't you want your readership to see it? Would that not be exactly what you would want your readership to see? "Look, when he attempted to respond to my article he only evinced poor reasoning skills further." Would not poor reasoning be exactly what you want your readership to witness in your opponent?

Cline, Austin. "Arrogance of Atheism." Agnosticism/Atheism Blog. 9 Feb. 2005. About.com.
28 Feb. 2005 <http://atheism.about.com/b/a/144721.htm?nl=1>.

Election as Morally Arbitrary

2005-03-05T02:44:00.000-08:00

This conversation is likewise excerpted from an interesting discussion on IRC, this time with an atheist who was arguing that God may have been morally arbitrary in his choosing his elect:

"Yes, he [God] could be doing that [choosing his elect by some criterion other than one's worthiness of heaven], but the problem then is that it concedes to the criticism that God is deciding that some go to heaven on criteria that are irrelevant. That IS arbitrary."

It does not concede to that, actually. One's 'worthiness' of heaven is not relevant to whatever happens to be God's criteria, this much is true. But it does not follow that somehow, therefore, whatever happens to be God's criteria is itself irrelevant.

"I'm not sure how that doesn't concede that the criteria God uses [for choosing his elect] are irrelevant. What are the criteria he uses? What criteria besides worthiness of heaven could even be relevant to who he lets into heaven? Presumably God is being fair here, not morally arbitrary. Now, if he's being fair, what are the criteria that make it fair to put person A in heaven and person B in hell? This isn't a question about how we know what his criteria are -- that might be beyond our ability to know -- it's a question of how it could ever be fair and morally non-arbitrary if none of us are deserving of heaven yet only some of us are permitted to go to heaven."

Three things I would note, here -- the first as sort of a brief but important interjection, the other two as a more direct response.

First, before there can be any agreement about God's criteria being judged as "irrelevant," some hidden assumptions need to be exposed -- that is, it needs to be understood what is being meant here. Irrelevant (or "not relevant") to what, exactly? Depending on how this is answered, it may very well be that God's criteria are indeed irrelevant. Consider the following. If our moral worthiness of heaven is not part of his criteria for choosing his elect, then whatever happens to be God's criteria are indeed irrelevant -- to our moral worthiness. But this does not then somehow mean that the sum of his criteria is irrelevant in itself.

Second, the need to know what God's criteria are in order to determine the morality thereof -- and the fairness of God -- is to implicitly suggest that God is or ought to be responsible to some moral order which is external to him. However, since my position is such that moral order is grounded in God's eternal nature, this response is not relevant to my position and therefore fails to address it.

Third, it is fair and morally non-arbitrary that, although none of us are deserving of heaven, some are permitted to go because it is God that is making that decision, and moral order is grounded in his eternal nature (i.e. it is not something external to him).

"See, the question is about moral relevance. It's not enough that God has some reason or other or some decision procedure. The question is whether his criteria are morally relevant. God could use 'eye color' as one criterion, for example. That wouldn't be arbitrary in the sense that it's random, but it would be morally arbitrary since he could just as easily decide that blue-eyed people get in instead of brown-eyed people (or vice versa). Simply having a criterion [for choosing his elect] doesn't imply that God's criterion is a morally relevant one. The problem isn't that God can't make up his mind but that he has no moral grounds for admitting some into heaven and not others if, by hypothesis, none of us deserve to be admitted at all."

In order to make an argument that his "simply having a criterion doesn't imply that God's criterion is a morally relevant one," one has to first presuppose that moral order is in some respect external to God, but simply presupposing your position is not an effective argument against mine. The argument works only if God is responsible to a moral order that is external to him (wherein it was asserted that "he has no moral grounds for..."), which my stated position rejects. Ergo, this response here is not relevant to my argument.