Blog Invest

when we choose Everything Displays when choosing your next trade show display, booth, or exhibit?

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Sun, 19 Sep 2010 23:25:00 -0700

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Forex BulletProof- Join the Revolution!

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Insurance and save auto

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Wed, 15 Sep 2010 00:24:00 -0700

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Networking to Make a Sale

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Sun, 22 Aug 2010 03:48:00 -0700

Networking to Make a Sale: "The buzzword, these days, is networking. Social networking via sites such as Facebook, Twitter and MySpace are no longer simply ways for college friends to keep in touch or post photos. They are how businesses attract fans and patrons, how celebrities maintain a coveted position of fame (think Ashton Kutcher and Twitter), and how bands get their music heard often for the first time. As a real estate agent, you can use social networking sites to keep in contact with other realtors and keep a pulse on the market/competition. But will Facebook help you sell a home? Probably not; to do that, you may need to rely on a different form of networking - face-to-face.

Face-to-face networking is a tool you should rely on regularly to help get the word out about a home you have recently put on the market or a business about to go up for sale. It will work much faster and more efficiently than depending solely on the sign in the front yard and a fervent hope that someone driving past notices the balloons you've bought for an open house. However, networking can also be tricky. There is more to it than smiling at an average Joe on the street, so here are three tips for how to network and make the sale.

1. Know your target audience - if you are selling a small commercial building ideal for a boutique or café, you do not want to network with CEOs and big business executives with little to no interest in starting their own small, unique company. If you are selling a home perfect for a young couple just starting out, don't network with well-established families working on their third or fourth child. They won't fit in the house. They'll know it, and your sale will be lost. Find the people who will make and can make the purchase.

2. Go to a networking event - Networking events are common and frequent. You can actually take advantage of almost any event within Austin to advertise your name, face and product. But again, know who you are targeting. Do the research to see what is happening when and where, and be selective. You don't want to waste your time trying to interest prospective buyers at an all day beer fest. It's likely they won't pay a moment of attention, and if they do, they may not remember it in the morning.

3. Follow up - it is not enough to go to an event, shake hands, pass out cards and mention briefly the home two blocks from Austin's Sixth Street you just put on the market. You have to continue the conversation. Get the person's information and make a call the next day or, at the latest, the next business day. Show that you are committed to the product - the house - you are selling and that person will likely call you back, meet with you and settle down to discuss the intricacies of purchasing and taking out a mortgage on the home.

There are many other ways to maximize the outcome of your networking efforts. Above are three basic. But don't be afraid to discover and adopt more rules of networking. The more you know, the better you'll be and the more houses you'll sell.

--
About the Author:

Joe Cline writes articles for Treemont real estate. Other articles written by the author related to Austin Texas real estate and Rollingwood real estate can be found on the net.

Source: http://www.articletrader.com"

Timing is Everything in Forex, Especially in this Environment

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Mon, 16 Aug 2010 03:39:00 -0700

Timing is Everything in Forex, Especially in this Environment: "

I just finished reading a Wall Street Journal piece (Central Banks Rattle Markets), which laid out, in fairly broad terms, how the activities of Central Banks have become the main fodder for forex traders, and how this trend will continue as the global economy looks to move beyond the credit crisis. The piece got me thinking about the importance of timing, when it comes to forex.

Let’s face it, timing is important when trading any security. Buying a stock one month earlier and/or selling one month later (as compared to the actual trade dates) could yield drastically different results. This is especially the case in forex, for a couple reasons. The first is that the majority of forex traders have a shorter-time horizon than investors in bread-and-butter securities. We’re talking weeks or months here, compared to years and decades. The second reason is that while long-term trends certainly exist in forex, the average return for all currencies (over a long enough time period) should converge to 0%, since forex is a zero-sum game. In other words, buy $1,000 worth of stock today, and you might be a millionaire by 2050. Buy a $1,000 worth of Euros today, however, and you will probably have about the same, give or take, 40 years later.

This notion has taken on an added significance in the current environment because of its transitional character. As I said, there are certainly long-term trends in forex, but these tend to be anything but smooth. In the short-term, then, it’s conceivable that a currency will move with little correlation to its long-term “destiny.”

We have entered a period of extreme uncertainty, specifically surrounding the actions of Central Banks. Without exception, all of these Central Banks eased monetary policy to aid their respective economies through the credit crisis. This easing varied widely from bank to bank, and ranged from interest rate cuts to “liquidity injections” to wholesale money printing. Just as the performance of many currencies has been guided by the degree of easing exacted by their respective monetary authorities, so will such currencies be guided by the degree and speed of tightening, going forward.

For example, currencies such as the Australian Dollar and Norwegian Krone (as the WSJ article pointed out) have exploded since their respective Central Banks became the world’s first two to raise interest rates. Currencies such as the Dollar and Pound, meanwhile, remain in the doldrums, as it is forecast that the Fed and the Bank of England will be among the last to reverse the spigots of easy money that they unleashed last year.

And this brings me back to the issue of timing. There will be great rewards that inure to those who correctly anticipate interest rate hikes, “liquidity withdrawals,” etc. In this age of instantaneous fund transfers, predicting a move a day before it happens could mean thousands of PIPS in profits, maybe more, if you take leverage into account. Those that think the Fed will raise rates before the ECB but after the BOE can bet on currency crosses accordingly. Moreover, it is not enough to predict who/when will hike rates, but to what extent and how fast. Maybe the Fed will beat the EU out of the starting gate, but the EU will hike faster once it gets going, mirroring what happened (in reverse) when the credit crisis began. This possibility makes you wonder if slow and steady really wins the race…

In short, the next year or two could prove to be extremely choppy (gainful for some, bitter for others) as currencies spike and dive in accordance with the Fisher Effect (the empirical idea that money moves from low-yielding currencies into higher-yielding currencies, as investors chase higher interest rates). For those that think the Dollar is doomed in the long-run, then, be careful about betting all of your marbles in the short-run. That’s not to say that the carry trade will disappear; on the contrary, it could accelerate if interest rate discrepancies widen before they shrink. Instead, consider yourself warned that if the Fed beats other Central Banks to the punch of raising rates, there could be a dramatic pause in the Dollar’s downward slide.

Pound’s Demise Will not be Hard to Time

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Tue, 3 Aug 2010 03:40:00 -0700

Pound’s Demise Will not be Hard to Time: "

I’d like to follow up on my last post (Timing is Everything in Forex, Especially in this Environment) by looking at how to time one specific currency: the Pound. As I noted tongue-in-cheek with the title of this post, timing the Pound will not be difficult, since it is likely headed downward in both the short term and long term.

In the short-term, the Pound will be crippled by the UK’s economic woes: “Britain is the last of the big G20 countries still to be mired in recession. Its GDP has shrunk by 4.75% this year, far more than the 3.5% reckoned likely in April.” There’s no reason to pore through the economic indicators, since all signs suggest that it won’t be until 2010 that Britain returns to positive growth.

Of primary concern to forex markets, however, is not economic growth (or lack thereof, in this case), but rather how this will effect the decision-making of the Bank of England (BOE). To no surprise, the BOE announced yesterday that it would maintain its benchmark interest rate at .5%, and its liquidity program at current levels. It didn’t give any indication, meanwhile, that monetary policy on either of these fronts would change anytime soon.

Thus, Britain could conceivably replace the Dollar as one of the preferred funding currencies for the carry trade. While the Fed is also in no hurry to hike rates, the US economy has already emerged from the recession, which means that regardless of when it tightens, it will almost certainly be before the Bank of England. Unless the BOE pulls an audible then, timing the Pound will be fairly straightforward; the currency should begin to slip as soon as its peers begin to raise rates. Some analysts expect that the Pound will decline to $1.50 per Dollar within the next six months.

Over the long-term, the narrative governing the Pound is naturally more uncertain, but still straightforward. To try to dig itself out of recession, the government has spent itself well into the red, to the extent that this year’s budget deficit is forecast to be a whopping 12.6%, Next year could be even worse. The government has implemented a couple of half-baked measures designed to curb the deficit, but most of these are aimed at increasing tax revenue (which is futile during a recession), rather than trimming spending. While ratings on its sovereign debt were recently affirmed at AAA, Moody’s has warned that a downgrade in the next few years is not inconceivable.

So there you have it. As far as I’m concerned, the only question of timing, vis-a-vis the British Pound, is when the decline will begin. My guess is sometime in the beginning of 2010, when investors start getting serious about projecting near-term interest rate differentials, and pricing them into exchange rates. While most forex traders aren’t thinking this far down the road, it’s also comforting (for bears, not bulls, obviously) that the long-term fundamentals point to a sustained decline in the Pound. Whereas the Dollar could jump up before heading back down – making timing a crucial skill – the Pound will probably just head down.

Euro: It’s Still Mostly About the Dollar

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Thu, 29 Jul 2010 18:14:00 -0700

Euro: It’s Still Mostly About the Dollar: "

It’s been a while since I last wrote about the Euro (October 26: Euro Optimism (And not just Dollar Pessimism)). That’s because my perspective recently has been mainly Dollar-centric; I continue to believe that much of the recent movement in forex markets (with the exception of certain cross rates) can best be explained by the Dollar. Nowhere is this more evident than the Euro, whose rise should really be thought of in terms of the depreciation of the Dollar. It’s no surprise then that yesterday’s Euro decline – the steepest in months – was the result not of internal European developments, but rather of the US jobs report.

One analyst summarized the Euro’s ascent by noting, “The bias for risk-seeking is still in vogue.” This has nothing to do with the Euro, but rather is a roundabout way of speaking about the Dollar carry trade, which is responsible for an exodus of capital from the US, some of have which has no doubt found its way into Europe. In some ways, then, it’s almost pointless to scrutinize EU economic indicators too closely.

That being said, there are a few meaningful observations that can be made. The first is that the EU economy is tentatively in recovery mode. Some of the most closely-watched indicators such as the German IFO index, capacity utilization, and Economic Sentiment Indicator, have all ticked up in the last month, while the unemployment rate is holding steady. For better or worse, this improvement can attributed entirely to export growth, due to the recovery in world trade. GDP rose by .4% in the most recent quarter, which means that the Euro Zone has officially exited the recession.

The second observation is that many expect this exit to be short-lived. Due to the relative rigidity of the EU economy, specifically regarding the labor market, it may take additional time to get back on really solid footing. Thus, the European Commission “thinks that euro-area unemployment will continue to rise next year, reaching 10.9% in 2011. That will dampen consumer spending. Another worry is investment, which the commission thinks will fall by 17.9% this year. Businesses are unlikely to waste scarce cash on new equipment and offices when they have spare capacity. Firms confident enough to splash out may find it hard to secure the necessary financing from fragile and risk-averse banks.” The Commission also expects public finances to continue to deteriorate, perhaps bottoming at some point next year. There is even an outside concern that one of the fringe members of the EU could default on its debt, requiring a bailout in the same vein as the lifeline grudgingly being thrown to Dubai by the UAE.

Finally, there is the European Central Bank. Much like the Fed – and every other Central Bank in the industrialized world, except for Australia – the ECB is nowhere near ready to hike rates. “The overall economic context doesn’t suggest that they would want to tighten anytime soon. There is a feeling that, yes, things have improved, but that nonetheless, the outlook is still quite fragile,” summarized one economist. Sure, the ECB is winding down its liquidity programs, but so is the Fed. Based on long-term bond yields, investors believe that US rates could even eclipse EU rates at some point in the future.

In short, there isn’t really much to be optimistic about, when it comes to the Euro. The nascent recovery is hardly remarkable, and probably not even sustainable. While the Euro might continue to perform the Euro in the short-term for technical reasons, I would expect this edge to evaporate in the medium-term.

Debunking the Myth: The Dollar and the Deficit

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Wed, 7 Jul 2010 18:16:00 -0700

Debunking the Myth: The Dollar and the Deficit: "

Last week, I opined on the official US forex policy (“Strong Dollar” Policy is a Joke). Most of my analysis was directed towards the lackluster efforts of US policymakers in failing to execute this policy, and I paid short shrift to the policy itself. With this post, then, I would like to address whether a Strong Dollar is, on balance, actually good for the US economy, specifically as it bears on the balance of trade.

Dean Baker, of the American Prospect, in a post germane to this discussion, wrote that “Folks who took econ 101 know that currency fluctuations are the mechanism through which trade imbalances adjust.” Unfortunately, as anyone who follows the forex markets no doubt understands, reality is much more complicated. As the WSJ reported, US exports skyrocketed during the last decade when the Dollar was falling. Case closed, right? However, exports also rose during the 1990’s, when the Dollar was in fact rising. This contradiction should make make anyone think twice before assuming a cut-and-dried relationship between the Dollar and exports think twice.

While exchange rates certainly correlate with export volume, there are a few confounding variables. Fist is the lag time between fluctuations in exchange rates and corresponding changes in exports. That’s because the majority of international trade is conducted by large companies and because global supply chains are not completely fluid. In other words, if the Dollar collapses tomorrow, it will take years before companies can fully modify their sourcing arrangements accordingly.

In addition, it is mainly on non-durable goods that companies have relative flexibility on choosing sourcing locations. In this age of ODM and OEM, it’s not difficult for Nike to shift production to Vietnam if the Chinese Yuan is suddenly revalued. On the other hand, it is significantly more complicated to move an automobile manufacturing plant or oil refinery. Investments in production facilities for durable goods are made on a long-term basis, then, and aren’t responsive to short-term changes in exchange rates. If you look at the breakdown of US exports, it is heavily concentrated in services and high-tech products, many of which it’s not (yet) practical to outsource.

For goods and services that are low-skilled labor-intensive, it’s obviously cost-effective to produce them overseas, because wages are lower. This is not a product of exchange rates, but rather to disparities in standards of living and levels of development. In China (where I am based), factory wages rarely exceed 8RMB per Dollar (about $1.25 at current exchange rates). Conservatively, that’s probably less than 1/20th of US counterpart wages, when you look at salary and benefits. That’s why the weak Dollar hasn’t done much to dent US demand for imports. Personally, I don’t expect to see the RMB rise 1500% in the next few years to erase this discrepancy, which means that’s unrealistic to ever expect the US Dollar to depreciate enough to ever make the US competitive enough in certain export categories.

Obviously, the inverse is true for imports. From the perspective of the US, the shifting of non-durable goods production outside the US represents a permanent structural changes in the US economy. Regardless of how low the Dollar sinks, it’s not reasonable to assume that the US will once again become the hotbed of low-tech manufacturing activity that it once was.

Overall, exports have actually risen steadily over the last decade (and the last 50 years, on average); the problem is that imports have risen even faster. In fact, ebbs and flows in the trade deficit can be better explained by global economic cycle than by short-term fluctuations in exchange rates. Despite the weak Dollar, the US trade deficit has exploded over the last decade because of a comparable explosion in US consumption, which was made possible by cheap credit. When that cycle came to an abrupt end in 2008, the trade deficit narrowed dramatically, despite the rise in the Dollar that took place simultaneously.

Given that the US has basically committed itself to importing certain goods, a Strong Dollar is actually beneficial, because it reduces the cost of those imports. In the short-run, then, a 20% decline in the Dollar might be expected to correlate with a 20% rise in the trade deficit. The hope is that this can be offset over the long-term, with the relocation of production facilities (yes, foreign companies also outsource to the US; it’s a not a one-way exodus) to the US and the creation of new products/services that can fill the void of those that have already been outsourced.

In short, it’s not clear that a weak Dollar will dramatically improve the US trade imbalance. This can best be accomplished not through a weak exchange rate, but through incentives that stimulate innovation and discourage consumption of low-quality, non-durable goods, the majority of which are produced overseas. When you consider the inflation (Strong Dollar keeps prices in check) and financing (Strong Dollar increases the willingness of foreigners to invest in and lend to US entities) perks, the Strong Dollar probably provides a net benefit to the US economy. If Bernanke and Geithner actually believe this, it would be nice if they conducted policy accordingly.

Japan’s Fujii Still Confused about Intervention

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Fri, 25 Jun 2010 18:16:00 -0700

Japan’s Fujii Still Confused about Intervention: "

My last update on the Japanese Yen was published on October 16 (”Japan Flip-Flops on Forex Intervention). As the title suggests, I sought to overview the many instances of equivocation committed by newly-appointed Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii in the name of Japan’s forex policy. I concluded that at that time, it was probably still premature to talk about forex intervention, but that if “the Yen continues to appreciate, then Fujii may have consider how fixed his [non-intervention] principles really are.”

Since then, two things have happened. [Well really only one thing, since the second is more of a 'non-happening.'] Anyway, the first is that the Yen broke through the important technical/psychological level of 85 Yen/Dollar for the first time in 14 years. The second is that Mr. Fujii is still no closer to articulating a coherent approach to managing the Yen. Last week, alone, he referred to movements in the Japanese Yen as “extreme” and suggested that now was the time to remain vigilant and that “appropriate measures” are “possible.” A few days later, however, he called intervention “unthinkable.”

Given this nearly uninterrupted record of waffling, one might think to accuse Mr. Fujii of deliberately trying to confuse the markets. After all, how else can one explain the hourly changes in his forex policy. It’s ironic that Fujii himself has told reporters that, “It’s wrong to fuss over the currency market’s daily movement,” considering that his feelings on intervention seem to fluctuate in accordance with the Yen.

Thankfully, we may not have to deal with this carnival of uncertainty for much longer, as the Bank recently told reporters that “The government, not the BOJ, decides whether to intervene in currency markets.” At the same time, intervention would ultimately be carried out only under the auspices of the BOJ, which would presumably have the authority to determine a targeted valuation.

As for the million-Dollar question of whether intervention is more likely now that the Japanese Yen is closing in on a post-war record, it’s a bit more nebulous than it was in October. It seems that the political will now exists to intervene. The main obstacles are Fujii, himself, who had earlier pledged to administer a free-market approach to managing the Yen, and the international community.

Given that Japan still runs a trade surplus, it would be difficult to justify forex intervention. In addition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) made election promises to wean the Japanese economy off of its dependency on exports to drive growth and instead to cultivate a domestic consumer base. This promise was apparently reiterated to US President Obama during his visit to Japan earlier this month, and would be greatly embarassing if Japanese economic officials reneged so soon thereafter.

At the same time, politicians (of any nationality) are not exactly known for their integrity and their consistency, so it wouldn’t be surprising if they decided that in the context of the Yen’s continued strength that they decided to take action. “The sense of caution over the possibility of intervention is definitely higher now after the breach of Y85.00. We are all watching for any more comments from the authorities.” Given the political implications, however, it seems the more likely course of action would involve a tweaking of monetary policy – quantitative easing, under the guise of deflation fighting – rather than outright intervention. Such would be less awkward than intervention, and probably more successful.

Central Banks of the World: Unite!

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 18:17:00 -0700

Central Banks of the World: Unite!: "

Karl Marx would be pleased…well, maybe not. In any event, the world’s Central Banks are tired of the weak Dollar, and are separately taking matters into their own hands. [Before I continue, I should probably acknowledge the inherent dangers of lumping every Central Bank together under one umbrella. Still, given the current market environment, and the fact that all Central Banks are acting uni-directionally, it seems like a fair categorization].

As I was saying, Central Banks – especially in the developing world – are extremely unhappy with the Dollar’s continued decline, and with the opposing strength in their respective currencies. Over the last year, these Central Banks have waded into the forex markets, one after another, in a non-concerted effort to stem the gains in their currencies. As the Dollar’s decline has gained new momentum, so have they redoubled and intensified their efforts.

In the last couple weeks alone, at least a dozen (and these are only the ones on my radar screen) have issued threats and/or taken action aimed directly at the “speculators,” which are blamed for the across-the-board rise in emerging market currencies and asset prices. Their concerns are twofold: that currency appreciation could choke off economic recovery, and that speculative investment is driving the creation of new asset price bubbles.

While their goals are largely the same, their tactics differ. Some are testing the old approach of simply buying Dollars on the spot market. Thailand, Israel, South Korea, Philipines, and Russia, for example, are now intervening heavily on a regular basis. “Experts estimate that some of the largest emerging economies may have spent as much as $150 billion on currency intervention over the past two months, judging from the growth of their international reserves, according to data from Brown Brothers Harriman.”

Other Central Banks have resorted to policy-making measures; Taiwan and Brazil are perhaps the best examples here. The former has essentially banned foreigners from opening new time deposits in the country, while the latter has just imposed a 1.5% tax on investment in Brazilian ADR shares to match the 2% tax on new FDI. In addition, sources claim that other measures are being considered, including “an overseas sovereign bonds issue denominated in Brazilian reals and a change in rules that would allow foreign equities investors to deposit guarantees overseas.”

South Korea and Sri Lanka have been even more creative in restraining their currencies. Sri Lanka is now making it easier for its citizens to take money out of the country, while South Korea is now placing limits on the hedging activities of exporters, who “have sold large amounts of dollars in the forward market to hedge foreign orders, putting upward pressure on the won.”

Still other Banks are still in the “rhetorical” stage of intervention, whereby they simply convey to investors that they are monitoring forex markets for “instability” and “irregularities.” Such code-words are designed to signal that rapid currency appreciation will not be accepted idly. “People see the central bank looking closely at the dollar and think maybe it’s a good time to unwind some of their positions,” explained one analyst in response to “rhetorical intervention” by the Bank of Chile.

Unfortunately for these Central Banks, their efforts are ultimately unlikely to be successful. They can probably succeed in slowing, or even temporarily halting the rise in their respective currencies, but won’t be able to achieve a permanent cessation. That’s because the forces they are fighting against are simply too large ($3 Trillion per day of forex turnover) and too determined (Russian and Brazilian interest rates are both above 8%, compared to 0% in the US) to be stopped. “It’s [intervention] not working, and it’s a good thing that it’s not working. Emerging-market currencies are appreciating and they’re going to keep on appreciating against currencies from the old world. [Central Banks] has to adapt to that,” declared one trader. Still, you can’t blame them for trying.

“Strong Dollar” Policy is a Joke

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Sat, 29 May 2010 18:17:00 -0700

“Strong Dollar” Policy is a Joke: "

US economic officials have been busy of late, propagating the “Strong Dollar” farce to anyone who will listen. “I believe deeply that it’s very important for the U.S. and the economic health of the U.S. that we maintain a strong dollar,” said Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner at last week’s APEC summit in Singapore. Added Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, “We are attentive to the implications of changes in the value of the dollar and…will help ensure that the dollar is strong and a source of global financial.”

The markets hardly reacted to Geithner’s assertions, probably because he has parroted this same promise on several occasions since assuming office last January. Investors can be excused for their jadedness, since similar promises were repeatedly made during the Bush administration, during which time the Dollar registered some of its steepest declines in memory.

Still, you’ve got to give Geithner an A for effort, since he has seemingly taken advantage of nearly every opportunity to pontificate about the Strong Dollar policy. ” ‘The dollar isn’t strengthening in the real world, but I told him [Geithner] I value his stance. The fact that I value his stance means that I believe things will develop that way, and that I believe the U.S. is making efforts to make that happen,’ ” said new Japanese Finance Minister Hirohisa Fuji. By his own admission, Fuji’s remarks were somewhat perfunctory, and it’s obvious to him the Dollar will continue depreciating

Bernanke, meanwhile, has more credibility on this issue, especially since the Fed so rarely discusses forex in public domain, which is why the Dollar initially spiked after he spoke. However, investors quickly registered the contradiction inherent in his remarks, which contained repeated promises about keeping rates low. Not to mention that the wording he used was almost identical to a speech from 2008. It’s no wonder, then, that the Dollar actually finished down on the day.

So if the markets aren’t taking this talk about a Strong Dollar seriously and Bernanke/Geithner know they aren’t being taken seriously, what’s the point of these vain pronouncements? [After all, it's not even clear that a strong Dollar is in the best interest of the US, which has benefited economically from a narrowing of the trade deficit]. A few explanations have been suggested.

The first is that the rhetoric is intended to re-assure foreign investors and creditors that their assets/loans in the US will be safe from massive devaluation. While foreign Central Banks continue to purchase US Treasury Securities, their have been increasing grumblings that loaning to the US government is a losing proposition. Second, a weak Dollar is inherently inflationary, since it makes imports more expensive. The reverse correlation between oil (and other commodities) and the Dollar means that a weak Dollar could feed back into higher prices double time. Towards that end, Bernanke was actually speaking earnestly about the Fed’s intentions to monitor forex markets, as they bear on inflation.

Finally, while US policymakers seem resigned to the Dollar’s continued decline, they need to make sure that it remains “orderly” (this characterization has cropped up repeatedly in political circles, of late). “We believe Chairman Bernanke’s comments reflect a desire to prevent a disorderly decline in the currency, rather than halt its depreciation altogether.” There is an obvious recognition that a complete collapse in the value of the Dollar would be terrible for everyone, of which Bernanke no doubt also undersds.

Still, the markets are keenly aware that the US (i.e. the Fed) is not prepared to put its money where its mouth is. The reason for the current bout of Dollar weakness is almost entirely connected to the Fed’s easy monetary policy (and its quantitative easing program) and the never-ending US budget deficit. If the US was seriously committed to a strong Dollar, then the Fed could simply tighten monetary policy. (The federal government could make more of an effort to balance its budget going forward, but this is currently less of a concern to forex markets).

Alas, the Fed is nowhere near ready to hike rates, nor is it willing to contemplate unwinding its quantitative easing program. Most analysts expect interest rates to remain at the current record lows well into next year. Futures contracts expiring in June 2010 are pricing in a Federal Funds Rate of only .42% at that time. Most telling is that Bernanke, himself, has declared rates will remain low for an “extended period.” In hindsight, using the same speech to talk up the Dollar probably wasn’tthe best idea.

Everyone Thinks the Yuan is Undervalued….Except for China

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Wed, 19 May 2010 18:18:00 -0700

Everyone Thinks the Yuan is Undervalued….Except for China: "

Subtle title, right? I couldn’t resist, considering that literally all economists and government officials (outside of China, of course) have sounded off on the Chinese Yuan in the last month. Recent additions to this list include President Obama, Chiefs of the IMF and World Bank, President of the Asian Development Bank, US Commerce Secretary Locke and Treasury Secretary Geithner, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman, ECB Chief Jeane-Claude Trichet, Harvard University Professor Martin Feldstein, Japan’s finance minister…not to mention the thousands of others that didn’t make international news for their denunciation of China’s currency policy.

This rhetoric has also been accompanied by several important developments, including a Presidential visit to China, several meeting of the G20, a summit in Singapore, a slight change in the wording of China’s forex strategy, the release of economic data that suggest China’s economy is strengthening, etc. At the same time, their remains an obstinate insistence from every corner of the CCP that despite this pressure, there are no imminent plans to further revalue. Investors are erring on the side of appreciation, however, and futures prices reflect a 3.5% rise in the value of the RMB over the next 12 months.

This disconnect is indicative of the fact that there is both a political and an economic side to this issue. When examined exclusively from either side, it looks like pretty cut-and-dried, since economics suggests that a revaluation is both necessary and desirable, but the misalignment of political interests suggests that it won’t be carried out any time soon.

More specifically, a chorus of economists (backed by hard data) is arguing that the RMB is one of the foremost causes of the widening imbalances. After a brief hiccup, China’s trade surplus is once again expanding, and is on pace to reach $300 Bill ion in 2009, more than half of which can be attributed to the US. Meanwhile, while GDP is projected at 10.5%, the rest of the world is still sputtering along. “China is ’stealing’ jobs from developing countries and hindering a global recovery by keeping the yuan low, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman says. ‘China’s bad behavior is posing a growing threat to the rest of the world economy.’ ”

Economists also argue that a revaluation would also be in China’s own best interest. Foreign capital is now pouring into China at a record pace – largely in anticipation of an imminent appreciation in the Yuan – such that asset prices have almost doubled over the last year. “Risks of asset-price bubbles and misallocation of resources amidst abundant liquidity need to be addressed,” said the Chief Economist from the World Bank. Echoed the head of the IMF: “An undervalued currency encourages companies to invest in ways that may not be viable once the currency rises. ‘If you have wrong prices, you make wrong decisions, especially concerning investment in the long run.’ ”

Foreign politicians, especially those from the US, have been hammering these points home. President Obama made the RMB a key issue during his visit to China this week. Senator Chris Dodd chimed in with his two cents, that “You can’t give your competitor, your adversary in this case, a 40 percent advantage in global economies.” As analysts pointed out, the US, unfortunately, doesn’t have any leverage on this issue, as it is basically dependent on China to fund its budget deficits through Treasury Purchases. Thus, Chinese Prime Minister Hu JinTao couldn’t even be bothered as to so much mention the RMB when summarized the meeting with Obama for reporters.

Other Chinese Ministers rebuffed reporters in separate sessions who even dared to bring up the RMB: “Any policy changes by China, including on the exchange rate, will be based on its assessment of its own interests, not on external pressure.” Meanwhile, “Chinese officials refused to sanction a statement at the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation summit in Singapore that would have pressed it to adopt ‘market-oriented’ exchange rates for the yuan.” In fact, they have begun to push back against criticism, by arguing that a weak Yuan has actually been economically beneficial. “China keeping a basically stable exchange-rate policy is, in reality, good for the global economic recovery,” argued the Minister of Commerce .

This political/economic dichotomy is also evident within China. The Central Bank recently changed some of the language which governs its forex policy; going forward, the Yuan will apparently be tied to a basket of currencies, with its value also influenced by trends in capital flows. However, “The central bank’s position is getting a determined push-back from manufacturers and exporters –especially along China’s wealthy coast –who stand to reap significant gains in the short term.” Given that the decision to lift the RMB will ultimately be made in the political arena, it’s understandable that the latter group has such a strong bearing on the process.

As I indicated above, investors are cautiously optimistic that the government will eventually relent to its critics and allow the currency to resume its steady upward path. Futures prices have risen steadily since September, when they reflected a flat RMB over the next twelve months. According to one analyst, ” Officials may, starting in the second half of 2010, allow it to recoup the drop of about 10 percent on a trade-weighted basis it’s had since March.” Goldman Sachs, long respected for its economic forecasts, remains one of the lone naysayers, arguing that the Yuan isn’t going anywhere until at least 2011.

Personally, my money is an appreciation in the near-term, as soon as the first quarter of 2010. Chinese leaders are stubborn, but they aren’t stupid. It won’t be pressure from the US that will shake them from their moorings – but a further inflation of property and stock market bubbles and concerns over the economy’s unhealthy dependence on exports for growth.

Kiwi and Aussie Diverge, then Re-Unite

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Sat, 1 May 2010 18:18:00 -0700

Kiwi and Aussie Diverge, then Re-Unite: "

Over the last few months, the New Zealand Dollar and Australian Dollar have largely moved in tandem (see chart below). When the Reserve Bank of Australia raised its benchmark interest rate earlier this month, it shocked the markets and the Aussie shot up, while the Kiwi remained fixed in place. Many observers predicted that such was the beginning of a divergence in the two currencies. Less than one week later, however, the New Zealand Dollar hitched itself back to the Australian Dollar, and the two currencies have since traded in lockstep.

Investors have long tended to view the currencies (and economies) of New Zealand and Australia as one. Both economies boast large export sectors, and for much of the last decade, high interest rates. Given that the carry trade has been (and continues to be) one of the largest forces in forex markets, it makes sense that the Kiwi and Aussie would be grouped together.

Both these superfical similarities mask substantive differences, which have only become more accentuated as a result of the global economic crisis. Alan Bollard, Governor of the Bank of New Zealand summarized this disparity as follows: “Australia has avoided negative growth, and its prospects are driven by strong terms of trade, vast mineral deposits, the Chinese market, and rapid population growth. New Zealand has had a recession, and the pick-up is slower and more vulnerable – a difference financial markets do not appear to appreciate.”

While both economies are currently experiencing negative trade imbalances, New Zealand’s deficit was 5.9% at last count, while Australia’s is closer to 2%. Given that Australia’s (energy and commodity) exports have surged by nearly 30% in the last few months, while New Zealand exports are stagnating, this discrepancy could widen in the coming months. Investment is also surging in Australia, as “The value of advanced resource projects — those that are either committed or under construction — jumped 41% to a record 112.46 billion Australian dollars (US$104.03 billion) in the six months to the end of October.” And of course, the most obvious point of differentiation is between the two economies’ respective benchmark interest rates. Thanks to the aforementioned rate hike, Australian rates stand at 3.5%, exactly 1% higher than comparable New Zealand rates.

Many analysts point to Australia’s improving fundamentals (higher rates, positive GDP growth, booming investment in the energy sector, increasing exports) as the basis for the strong appreciation in the Australian Dollar. Given that the New Zealand Dollar has kept pace with the Australian Dollar (it is in fact the world’s best performing “major currency” over the last six months), this kind of analysis seems dubious, if not completely irrelevant.

It should be clear to most observers that the carry trade is dominating activity in the forex markets. Carry traders, relatively speaking, are undiscriminating, with the main factor of importance being interest rate differentials. Despite the fact that New Zealand interest rates are only 2.5% higher than US rates (and actually less than Australian rates) – hardly enough to compensate investors for volatility risk – the markets are awash in liquidity, and investors are once again chasing yield wherever they can find it.

One analyst offered a frank summary of this phenomenon: “It’s all about the carry trade. The Fed can’t do anything; certainly they can’t raise rates and the market knows that, and is exploiting it for the carry trade, borrowing in U.S. dollars, and the Kiwi is a beneficiary of that…That’s the only game in town. You can forget most economic data, it’s all about…the Fed.” Given that Australian rates are projected to rise faster and higher than New Zealand rates (beginning as soon as December 1), it’s conceivable that the Aussie will outpace the Kiwi. At the same time, the fact that US interest rates will likely remain low for a while means that both currencies will continue to benefit in the short term.

Interview with Edward Hugh: The Dollar’s Demise is Vastly Overstated

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Fri, 30 Apr 2010 18:19:00 -0700

Interview with Edward Hugh: The Dollar’s Demise is Vastly Overstated: "

Today, we bring you an interview with Edward Hugh, a macro economist, who specializes in growth and productivity theory, demographic processes and their impact on macro performance, and the underlying dynamics of migration flows. Edward is based in Barcelona, and is currently engaged in research into the impact of aging, longevity, fertility and migration on economic growth. He is a regular contributor to a number of economics blogs, including India Economy Blog, A Fistful of Euros, Global Economy Matters and Demography Matters. [The interview will be presented in two parts, with the first part printed below].

Forex Blog: I’d like to begin by asking if there is any significance to the title of your blog (”Fistful of Euros”), or rather, is it only intended to be playful?

Obviously the title is a reference to the Segio Leone film, but you could read other connotations into it if you want. I would say the idea was basically playful with a serious intent. Personally I agree with Ben Bernanke that the Euro is a “great experiment”, and you could see the blog, and the debates which surround it as one tiny part of that experiment. As they say in Spanish, the future’s not ours to see, que sera, sera. Certainly that “fistful of euros” has now been put firmly on the table, and as we are about to discuss, the consequences are far from clear.

Forex Blog: You wrote a recent post outlining the US Dollar carry trade, and how you believe that the Dollar’s decline is cyclical/temporary rather than structural/permanent. Can you elaborate on this idea? Do you think it’s possible that the fervor with which investors have sold off the Dollar suggests that it could be a little of both?

Well, first of all, there is more than one thing happening here, so I would definitely agree from the outset, there are both cyclical and structural elements in play. Structurally, the architecture of Bretton Woods II is creaking round the edges, and in the longer run we are looking at a relative decline in the dollar, but as Keynes reminded us, in the long run we are all dead, while as I noted in the Afoe post, news of the early demise of the dollar is surely vastly overstated.

Put another way, while Bretton Woods II has surely seen its best days, till we have some idea what can replace it it is hard to see a major structural adjustment in the dollar. Europe’s economies are not strong enough for the Euro to simply step into the hole left by the dollar, the Chinese, as we know, are reluctant to see the dollar slide too far due to the losses they would take on dollar denominated instruments, while the Russians seem to constantly talk the USD down, while at the same time borrowing in that very same currency – so read this as you will. Personally, I cannot envisage a long term and durable alternative to the current set-up that doesn’t involve the Rupee and the Real, but these currencies are surely not ready for this kind of role at this point.

So we will stagger on.

On the cyclical side, what I am arguing is that for the time being the US has stepped in where Japan used to be, as one side of your carry pair of choice, since base money has been pumped up massively while there is little demand from consumers for further indebtedness, so the broader monetary aggregates haven’t risen in tandem, leaving large pools of liquidity which can simply leak out of the back door. That is, it may well be one of the perverse consequences of the Fed monetary easing policy that it finances consumption elsewhere – in Norway, or Australia, or South Africa, or Brazil, or India – but not directly inside the US.

This is something we saw happening during the last Japanese experiment in quantitative easing (from 2002 - 2006) and that it has the consequence, as it did for the Yen from 2005 to 2007, that the USD will have a trading parity which it would be hard to understand if this were not the case. I am also suggesting that this situation will unwind as and when the Federal Reserve start to seriously talk about withdrawing the emergency measures (both in terms of interest rates and the various forms of quantitative easing), but that this unwinding is unlikely to be extraordinarily violent, since the Japanese Yen can simply step in to plug the gap, as I am sure the Bank of Japan will not be able to raise interest rates anytime soon given the depth of the deflation problem they have. Indeed, investors will once more be able to borrow in Yen to invest in USD instruments, to the benefit of Japanese exports and the detriment of the US current account deficit, which is why I think we are in a finely balanced situation, with clear limits to movements in one direction or another.

Forex Blog: In the same post, you suggested that the Fed will be the first to raise interest rates. Why do you believe this is the case? How will this affect the Dollar carry trade?

Well, I would want to qualify this a little, becuase things are not that simple. In fact, as Claus Vistesen argues in this post, the ECB has rather “locked itself in” communicationally, and by talking up the eurozone economies they now have markets expecting clear exit road maps and even pricing in interest rate rises from the third quarter of next year. But if we look at the underlying weaknesses in some of the Eurozone economies – evidently Spain, but Italy is hardly likely to have a strong robust recovery, and the German economy needs exports and hence customers to really return to growth – it is hard to see monetary tightening being applied with any kind of vigour at the ECB, so they may move up somewhat – say to 2% – and then stop for some time.

I was also suggesting that in the short run they may do this to assist in the process of unwinding the global imbalances, since allowing the Fed to lead the world out of the monetary easing cycle would almost certainly provoke a rebound in USD, and problems for correcting the US current account deficit.

Really none of the developed economies (not even Norway) seem to be looking at the sort of really strong “V” shaped rebound some investors were anticipating, and it is more a question of who is weaker among of the weak. But if we look a little further ahead, at potential growth and inflation dynamics, then it is clear that the deflationary headwinds are stronger in Europe, while headline GDP growth may well turn out to be stronger in the US, and both these factors suggest that the Fed will at sometime be tightening faster than the ECB, in a repetition of what we saw from 2002 to 2005.

Forex Blog: You have pointed out that fiscal problems are not unique to the US. While the UK and Japan are certainly in the same fiscal boat, there seem to be plenty of examples of economies that aren’t, or at least not to the same extent, such as the EU. Do you think, then, that the long-term prospects for the Euro (especially as a global reserve currency) are necessarily brighter than for the Dollar?

Well, actually I wouldn’t say the UK and Japan are in the same fiscal boat. Let me explain. The UK evidently has severe short term problems (as does the US) with its sovereign debt, due to the high cost of resolving the lossses produced by the current crisis. But Japan has still not resolved debt problems which were produced in the crisis of the late 1990s, and indeed both gross and net debt to GDP simply continue to rise there. So I would say – as long as they can weather the present storm – the outlook for US, UK and French sovereign debt is rather more positive than it is for Japan. Indeed in the longer term it is hard to see how Japan can resolve its problems without some kind of sovereign default. This is the problem with deflation, as nominal GDP goes down, debt to GDP simply rises and rises.

But the principal reason I am rather more positive on UK, US and French sovereign debt in the mid term is simply the underlying demographic dynamic. These countries have a lot more young people (proportionately) than the Germany’s, Japan’s and Italy’s of this world, and hence their elderly dependency ratios (which are the important thing when we come to talk about structural deficits into the future) will rise more slowly.

It is also important to realise that the EU – at this point at least – is not a single country in the way the US is, and indeed there is strong resistence among European citizens to the idea that it should be. So it is impossible to talk about the EU as if it were one country. That being said, the lastest forecast from the EU Commission suggests that average sovereign debt to GDP will breach the 100% threshold across the entire EU by 2014, so I would hardly call the situation promising. Basically some cases are much worse than others. In the East there are countries like Latvia and Hungary which are currently implementing IMF-lead structural transformation programmes, ut it is far from clear that these programmes will work, and sovereign debt to GDP has been rising sharply in both cases. In the South a similar problem exists, with Greek gross sovereign debt to GDP now expected by the Commission to hit 135% by 2011, and Italian debt set to increase significantly over the 110% mark. At the same time the future of government debt in Spain and Portugal is becoming increasingly uncertain. I would also point to the strong gamble Angela Merkel is making in Germany, and indeed ECB President Jean Claude Trichet singled the German case out during the last post rate-decision-meeting press conference for special mention in this regard. The future of German sovereign debt is far from clear, and markets certainly have not taken in this underlying reality.

So basically, and I think I have already explained my thinking on this in earlier questions, we have a structural difficulty, since I am sure the way out of Bretton Woods II will not be found by simply substituting the Euro for the USD. Europe is aging far more rapidly than the US, and the dependency ratio problems are consequently significantly greater.

1. I’d like to begin by asking if there is any significance to the

title of your blog (”Fistful of Euros”), or rather, is it only

intended to be playful?

Obviously the title is a reference to the Segio Leone film, but you

could read other connotations into it if you want. I would say the

idea was basically playful with a serious intent. Personally I agree

with Ben Bernanke that the Euro is a “great experiment”, and you could

see the blog, and the debates which surround it as one tiny part of

that experiment. As they say in Spanish, the future’s not ours to see,

que sera, sera. Certainly that “fistful of euros” has now been put

firmly on the table, and as we are about to discuss the consequences

are far from clear.

2/ You wrote a recent post outlining the US Dollar carry trade, and

how you believe that the Dollar’s decline is cyclical/temporary rather

than structural/permanent. Can you elaborate on this idea? Do you

think it’s possible that the fervor with which investors have sold off

the Dollar suggests that it could be a little of both?

Well, first of all, there is more than one thing happening here, so I

would definitely agree from the outset, there are both cyclical and

structural elements in play. Structurally, the architecture of Bretton

Woods II is creaking round the edges, and in the longer run we are

looking at a relative decline in the dollar, but as Keynes reminded

us, in the long run we are all dead, while as I noted in the Afoe

post, news of the early demise of the dollar is surely vastly

overstated.

Put another way, while Bretton Woods II has surely seen its best days,

till we have some idea what can replace it it is hard to see a major

structural adjustment in the dollar. Europe’s economies are not strong

enough for the Euro to simply step into the hole left by the dollar,

the Chinese, as we know, are reluctant to see the dollar slide too far

due to the losses they would take on dollar denominated instruments,

while the Russians seem to constantly talk the USD down, while at the

same time borrowing in that very same currency – so read this as you

will. Personally, I cannot envisage a long term and durable

alternative to the current set-up that doesn’t involve the Rupee and

the Real, but these currencies are surely not ready for this kind of

role at this point.

So we will stagger on.

On the cyclical side, what I am arguing is that for the time being the

US has stepped in where Japan used to be, as one side of your carry

pair of choice, since base money has been pumped up massively while

there is little demand from consumers for further indebtedness, so the

broader monetary aggregates haven’t risen in tandem, leaving large

pools of liquidity which can simply leak out of the back door. That

is, it may well be one of the perverse consequences of the Fed

monetary easing policy that it finances consumption elsewhere – in

Norway, or Australia, or South Africa, or Brazil, or India – but not

directly inside the US.

This is something we saw happening during the last Japanese experiment

in quantitative easing (from 2002 - 2006) and that it has the

consequence, as it did for the Yen from 2005 to 2007, that the USD

will have a trading parity which it would be hard to understand if

this were not the case. I am also suggesting that this situation will

unwind as and when the Federal Reserve start to seriously talk about

withdrawing the emergency measures (both in terms of interest rates

and the various forms of quantitative easing), but that this unwinding

is unlikely to be extraordinarily violent, since the Japanese Yen can

simply step in to plug the gap, as I am sure the Bank of Japan will

not be able to raise interest rates anytime soon given the depth of

the deflation problem they have. Indeed, investors will once more be

able to borrow in Yen to invest in USD instruments, to the benefit of

Japanese exports and the detriment of the US current account deficit,

which is why I think we are in a finely balanced situation, with clear

limits to movements in one direction or another.

3. In the same post, you suggested that the Fed will be the first to

raise interest rates. Why do you believe this is the case? How will

this affect the Dollar carry trade?

Well, I would want to qualify this a little, becuase things are not

that simple. In fact, as Claus Vistesen argues in this post

http://clausvistesen.squarespace.com/alphasources-blog/2009/11/13/random-shots.html

the ECB has rather “locked itself in” communicationally, and by

talking up the eurozone economies they now have markets expecting

clear exit road maps and even pricing in interest rate rises from the

third quarter of next year. But if we look at the underlying

weaknesses in some of the Eurozone economies – evidently Spain, but

Italy is hardly likely to have a strong robust recovery, and the

German economy needs exports and hence customers to really return to

growth – it is hard to see monetary tightening being applied with any

kind of vigour at the ECB, so they may move up somewhat – say to 2% -

and then stop for some time.

I was also suggesting that in the short run they may do this to assist

in the process of unwinding the global imbalances, since allowing the

Fed to lead the world out of the monetary easing cycle would almost

certainly provoke a rebound in USD, and problems for correcting the US

current account deficit.

Really none of the developed economies (not even Norway) seem to be

looking at the sort of really strong “V” shaped rebound some investors

were anticipating, and it is more a question of who is weaker among of

the weak. But if we look a little further ahead, at potential growth

and inflation dynamics, then it is clear that the deflationary

headwinds are stronger in Europe, while headline GDP growth may well

turn out to be stronger in the US, and both these factors suggest that

the Fed will at sometime be tightening faster than the ECB, in a

repetition of what we saw from 2002 to 2005.

4. You have pointed out that fiscal problems are not unique to the

US. While the UK and Japan are certainly in the same fiscal boat,

there seem to be plenty of examples of economies that aren’t, or at

least not to the same extent, such as the EU. Do you think, then, that

the long-term prospects for the Euro (especially as a global reserve

currency) are necessarily brighter than for the Dollar?

Well, actually I wouldn’t say the UK and Japan are in the same fiscal

boat. Let me explain. The UK evidently has severe short term problems

(as does the US) with its sovereign debt, due to the high cost of

resolving the lossses produced by the current crisis. But Japan has

still not resolved debt problems which were produced in the crisis of

the late 1990s, and indeed both gross and net debt to GDP simply

continue to rise there. So I would say – as long as they can weather

the present storm – the outlook for US, UK and French sovereign debt

is rather more positive than it is for Japan. Indeed in the longer

term it is hard to see how Japan can resolve its problems without some

kind of sovereign default. This is the problem with deflation, as

nominal GDP goes down, debt to GDP simply rises and rises.

But the principal reason I am rather more positive on UK, US and

French sovereign debt in the mid term is simply the underlying

demographic dynamic. These countries have a lot more young people

(proportionately) than the Germany’s, Japan’s and Italy’s of this

world, and hence their elderly dependency ratios (which are the

important thing when we come to talk about structural deficits into

the future) will rise more slowly.

It is also important to realise that the EU – at this point at least -

is not a single country in the way the US is, and indeed there is

strong resistence among European citizens to the idea that it should

be. So it is impossible to talk about the EU as if it were one

country. That being said, the lastest forecast from the EU Commission

suggests that average sovereign debt to GDP will breach the 100%

threshold across the entire EU by 2014, so I would hardly call the

situation promising. Basically some cases are much worse than others.

In the East there are countries like Latvia and Hungary which are

currently implementing IMF-lead structural transformation programmes,

but it is far from clear that these programmes will work, and

sovereign debt to GDP has been rising sharply in both cases. In the

South a similar problem exists, with Greek gross sovereign debt to GDP

now expected by the Commission to hit 135% by 2011, and Italian debt

set to increase significantly over the 110% mark. At the same time

the future of government debt in Spain and Portugal is becoming

increasingly uncertain. I would also point to the strong gamble Angela

Merkel is making in Germany, and indeed ECB President Jean Claude

Trichet singled the German case out during the last post

rate-decision-meeting press conference for special mention in this

regard. The future of German sovereign debt is far from clear, and

markets certainly have not taken in this underlying reality.

So basically, and I think I have already explained my thinking on this

in earlier questions, we have a structural difficulty, since I am sure

the way out of Bretton Woods II will not be found by simply

substituting the Euro for the USD. Europe is aging far more rapidly

than the US, and the dependency ratio problems are consequently

significantly greater.

Emerging Markets Bubble Continues to Inflate, but for How Long?

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Mon, 19 Apr 2010 18:19:00 -0700

Emerging Markets Bubble Continues to Inflate, but for How Long?: "

Yesterday, emerging markets (proxied by the MSCI Emerging Markets Index) recorded their biggest fall since July, ending a week of solid gains. Still, this one-day slide of 1.4% pales in comparison to the nearly 100% gain that the index has achieved since bottoming last March. In other words, while investors might be starting to pull back, the direction of asset prices is still upward.

As for what’s causing this across-the-board appreciation, that was the subject of my previous post (Inverse Correlation between Dollar and Everything Else…Still), in which I merely stated the obvious; that the Fed’s year-long program of negative real interest rates and quantitative easing (i.e. wholesale money printing) has unleashed a flood of cash into global capital markets. Since we’re not just talking about the Dollar, here, it makes sense to point out that the Fed’s easy money policies have been copied by Central Banks in most other industrialized countries, including the UK, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, and to a lesser extent, the EU.

As for why emerging market assets and currencies seem to be outpacing appreciation in other asset classes, that’s also not difficult to explain. First of all, by some measures, emerging market stocks have hardly outperformed other assets. Oil, for example, has risen by 131% in less than a year, to say nothing of other commodities. Still, by other measures, growth has been remarkable. Most emerging market stock indexes and currencies have fully erased (or come close to erasing) the losses recorded during the peak of the credit crisis. Bonds, meanwhile, have gone one step further. Yields are collapsing, and prices have exploded – by 25% in the last year, sending the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index to a new record.

Is it safe to call this a bubble? Intuition would suggest so; given that all assets are rising across the board, without regard to particular fundamentals, it would seem that only a herd/bubble mentality could offer an explanation. Some analysts, in fact, have given up completely on fundamental analysis, instead using fund inflows (i.e. investor demand) to predict whether some emerging market assets will continue rising. As Nouriel Roubini (the NYU economist that famously predicted the credit crisis) summarizes: “Traders are borrowing at negative 20 per cent rates to invest on a highly leveraged basis on a mass of risky global assets that are rising in price due to excess liquidity and a massive carry trade.” P/E ratios are nearly twice as high in some emerging markets, compared to stocks in the S&P 500.

On the other side of the equation are the bulls and the efficient market theorists.”By historical price-to-earnings ratios — the ratio of stock prices to per-share profits — these levels can be justified, if the economic recovery continues. With massive layoffs, business costs have been cut sharply. “The hope is that when consumers and companies start spending, the added sales will drop quickly to the bottom line [profits].” Other proponents argue that the rise in asset prices is exactly what the Fed wants, since it implies that the markets are once again characterized by stability and liquidity.

Regardless of whether growth materializes, however, that doesn’t change the fact that the free ride can’t and won’t last forever. At some point, Central Banks will be forced to raise interest rates and start withdrawing Trillions of Dollars from global capital market. This will cause the Dollar to rise, and investors to rapidly unwind their carry trade positions. Warns Roubini, “A stampede will occur as closing long leveraged risky asset positions across all asset classes funded by dollar shorts triggers a co-ordinated collapse of all those risky assets – equities, commodities, emerging market asset classes and credit instruments.”

If the tech-bubble and real-estate bubble taught us anything, it is that there is no free lunch in the markets. It is not possible for all investors in all assets classes to simultaneously win. At least, in the long-term. In the short-term, meanwhile – it pains me to say this – let the party continue. My only warning is this: when the music stops, don’t be the one caught with your pants down…

Inverse Correlation between Dollar and Everything Else…Still

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Thu, 15 Apr 2010 18:19:00 -0700

Inverse Correlation between Dollar and Everything Else…Still: "

Almost two months ago, I wrote a series of posts (Dollar Down, Everything Else Up and Dollar Down, Gold Up) with self-explanatory titles. Last week, the Wall Street Journal finally got around to covering this story, and were able to quantify the extent of the trend with the use of statistical analysis. Accordingly, they observed an incredible 71% correlation between the Dollar and the S&P 500, compared to an average correlation of 2%. This implies that every 1% rise in the S&P is matched by a .71% fall in the value of the Dollar, and vice versa.

Furthermore, this trend appears to be both strengthening and spreading. The average correlation between the Dollar and stocks since July is 60%; given that it’s now 71%, this suggests that it was closer to 50% over the summer. In addition, the correlation between stocks and oil has touched 75%, the highest level since 1995. By extension, this implies a proportionately high correlation between the Dollar and gold. In short, the notion that as the Dollar is tanking, virtually every other commodity/asset under the sun is rising, now has some weight behind it.

Understanding the basis for this relationship is not complicated. You can think of it in terms of the Fed’s liquidity program or in terms of the carry trade, but regardless of what you call it, the concept is the same. Basically, the Federal Reserve Bank has printed nearly $2 Trillion as part of its quantitative easing program. For better or worse, most of this money found its way into the markets, rather than into the economy. Investors have been faced with the dilemma of either holding the currency in cash or investing it. (Here, I would argue that “speculate” is a more appropriate descriptor than “invest,” but anyway…) The simultaneous rise in stocks, bonds, emerging market currencies, commodities, and even real estate is proof enough about where that money went.

Stepping outside of forex markets a moment, the fact that all asset prices are rising in unison suggests that a new bubble is forming. Normally, one would expect that in a bull market, some assets would outpace others, but in this case, it seems that fundamentals are being pushed to the backburner, and investors are piling into anything and everything that’s liquid. Even traditional relationships, like that which leads bond prices to fall as stock prices rise seems to have broken down.

Getting back to the Dollar, the fact that bubbles are forming in stocks/bonds/commodities probably means that an inverse bubble is forming under the Dollar. One can draw understanding from last year’s partial collapse of the Yen carry trade, which began to deflate after several reliably strong years. The same could very well happen to the Dollar carry trade.

If and when the Fed raises interest rates, and/or begins to draw the excess liquidity out of the markets by offloading its inventory of securities, well, the markets should witness a simultaneous correction. How violent the correction is depends largely on the degree to which the markets anticipated it as well as the finesse of the Fed. If everybody rushes for the exits at the same time, it could create the same kind of panic that ensued after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, whereby asset prices collapsed and the markets flooded into the Dollar.

History is never far from repeating itself.

Forex Implications of China-US Economic Codependency

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Fri, 9 Apr 2010 18:20:00 -0700

Forex Implications of China-US Economic Codependency: "

The Economist recently published a special report on China and America (”Round and round it goes“). As the title suggests, the article described the increasing interdependency between the economies of the US and China. In a nutshell, China maintains an undervalued currency, in order to stimulate exports. The resulting overseas (American) demand puts upward pressure on the RMB, which China defuses by buying US Treasury securities. This results in artificially low US interest rates, causing American consumers to import more, putting even more pressure on the RMB, which is further defused by buying more US Treasuries. And the cycle continues ad nauseum.

The article focused primarily on the political side of this precarious relationship, at the expense of the financial implications. It got me thinking about the forex forces at work, and how a disruption in the cycle could have tremendous ramifications for currency markets. It’s clear that in its current form, this system keeps the Yuan artificially low, but does that means that the Dollar is also being kept artificially high.

Given the depreciation of the Dollar over the last six months, this seems almost hard to believe. Over the same time period, though, China (as well as many other Central Banks) have vastly increased their Treasury holdings. This would seem to imply that indeed, the Dollar’s fall has been slowed to some extent by the actions of China. It’s kind of a paradox; as US consumers recover their appetite for Chinese goods, the Dollar should decline. But as China responds by plowing all of those Dollars back into the US, then the net effect is zero.

As the Economist article intimated, there are a couple of developments that would seem to upset this equilibrium. The first would be if the Central Bank of China began diversifying its forex reserves into other currencies. By definition, however, it would be impossible for China to continue pegging the RMB to the Dollar without simultaneously buying Dollars. Thus, the day that China stops recycling its export proceeds into the US, the RMB would start to appreciate, almost instantaneously. In addition, the sudden surcease in US Treasury bond purchases would cause interest rates to rise. Both higher rates and a more expensive currency would presumably result in lower demand for Chinese exports, and hence eliminate some of the need to recycle its trade surplus back into the US. In this way, we can see that China’s Treasury purchases are actually self-fulfilling. The sooner it stops purchasing them, the sooner it will no longer need to purchase them.

I’m tempted to elaborate further on this point, but it seems that I’ve already taken it to its logical conclusion. China must recognize the dilemma that it faces, which is why it refuses to break from the status quo. If it allows the Yuan to appreciate, it will naturally face a decline in exports AND the relative value of its US Treasury holdings will decline in RMB terms. Both would be painful in the short-run. However, by refusing to concede the un-sustainability of its forex/economic policy, China is merely forestalling the inevitable. With every passing day, the adjustment will only become more painful.

How will Foreign Investment Tax Affect the Real?

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Sat, 3 Apr 2010 18:20:00 -0700

How will Foreign Investment Tax Affect the Real?: "

On October 20, the executive office of the government of Brazil enacted an emergency measure, calling for a 2% tax on on all foreign capital inflows. And with one foul swoop, this year’s 35% rise in the Real had come to an end, right?

The tax certainly took investors by surprise, with the Brazilian stock market falling by 3% and the Real falling by 2%, the largest margins for both in several months. The tax is comprehensive and applies to essentially to all foreign capital deployed in Brazilian capital markets, whether fixed income, equities, or currencies. While the tax doesn’t apply to those currently invested in Brazil, the possibility that it would cause potential investors to stay away was enough to cause a sell-off.

The ostensible reason for the tax levy is to prevent a further rise in the Real. By most measures, the currency’s rise has been excessive, more than erasing the losses incurred during the credit crisis. The concern is that a more expensive currency will derail the Brazilian economic recovery before it has a chance to firmly get off the ground. “Brazil’s currency needs to weaken as much as 19 percent for sustainable economic growth, said Nelson Barbosa, the Brazilian Finance Ministry’s top policy adviser.”

According to cynics, however, the tax is a backhanded effort to raise revenue to fund a growing budget deficit. The government continues to spend money (perhaps to offset the negative impact on exports brought on by the Real’s rise) as part of its stimulus plan, but is increasingly tapping the bond markets to do so. The tax is expected to bring in an impressive $2.3 Billion over the next year, which could go part of the way towards fixing the government’s fiscal problems.

The real question, of course, is how the Real will fare going forward. The initial reaction, as I said, was ‘The Party’s over…‘ But investors with a longer-term horizon aren’t fretting. “In the medium term, the measure will have a limited impact. The fundamentals point to a stronger real, with commodities rising and the dollar weakening globally,” asserted one economist. While investors aren’t happy about paying an arbitrary 2% fee to the government, such pales in comparison to the 10%+ returns that investors still aim to reap from investing in Brazil over the long-term.

Ignoring the possible bubbles forming in Brazilian capital markets (admittedly, a dubious suggestion), Brazil still looks like a good bet, especially on a comparative basis. Interest rate futures point to a benchmark interest rate of 10.3% at this time next year, compared to ~1% in the US. Even after accounting for inflation and the 2% tax levy, the yield spread between Brazil and the US remains impressive. For that reason, the Real has already stalled in its expected fall against the US Dollar, standing only 1.7% below where it was on the day the tax was declared.

It’s unclear how determined the Brazilian government is towards pushing down the Real. The comments by its finance minister suggest that the consensus is that it is not slightly – but extremely overvalued. Thus, it’s likely that the government will enact other aggressive measures to prevent it at least from rising further. It continues to buy Dollars on the spot market, and is trying to make it easier for Brazilians to take money out of Brazil. It is not yet ready to tamper with its floating currency, but by its own admission, the “government was studying additional measures to regulate the heavy inflow of foreign investments and its impact on the country’s currency.”

There are also implications for other (emerging market) currencies. As I wrote earlier this week (”Central Banks Prop Up Dollar“) a number of Central Banks have already intervened or are currently mulling intervention in forex markets, to push down their currencies. You can be sure that other governments will be studying the situation in Brazil closely, with the possibility of implementing such policies themselves.

Central Banks Prop Up Dollar

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Sun, 28 Mar 2010 18:20:00 -0700

Central Banks Prop Up Dollar: "

By all accounts, the decline of the US Dollar has been measured, and without incident. This, despite the fact that most investors reckon the Dollar is doomed, both from a long-term and a short-term perspective. What, then, is preventing an all-out collapse?

Personally, I think the best answer is that Central Banks (and their sponsoring governments) don’t want the Dollar to collapse. In other words, a schism is forming between private investors and public government, whereby investors (on a net basis) are rooting against the Dollar, while Central Banks are rooting for it. That’s not to say that there is a global conspiracy involving Central Banks, designed to prop up the Dollar. Rather, it is that Central Banks are simply trying to protect their short-term financial interests, and long-term economic interests. By this, I mean simply that foreign Central Banks have everything to gain from a strong Dollar, and seemingly everything to lose from its collapse.

From an economic standpoint, foreign Central Banks also benefit from a strong Dollar, especially those whose economies are powered by exports. “A stronger local currency relative to the dollar attracts foreign investment and tempers domestic price pressures by keeping import prices in check, but also cuts into the competitiveness of the country’s export sector.” Given that inflation is currently a moot issue whereas economic growth remains tenuous, Central Banks have made it clear that they currently favor weak currencies. “If (their currencies have) too much strength and the U.S. recovery falters, it’s bad for emerging market growth,” and could even lead to a so-called “double-dip recession.”

In order to alleviate this possibility, many Central Banks have intervened directly in forex markets and depressed their currencies through the purchase of Dollars. During only one trading session earlier this month, “Asian central banks said to be intervening in currency markets overnight by buying dollars included South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines and possibly, Indonesia, according to analysts.”

Meanwhile, Central Banks in industrialized countries are using increasingly strong rhetoric to try to talk down their currencies. The Banks of Canada and England have achieved modest success in the last few weeks in convincing investors that overvalued currencies would be met with decisive action. The Royal Bank of Switzerland has intervened several times, while the European Central Bank has expressed concerns about “volatility” (code for the rapid appreciation in the Euro) in forex markets. It’s still not clear where the Bank of Japan stands. The newly appointed Finance Minister has already flip-flopped several times, settling finally on a course of action that would prevent the Yen from rising too high and threatening the nascent recovery.

Consider also foreign Central Banks’ collective holdings of US Treasury securities, which increased by nearly $800 Billion over the last year, a large portion of which was accounted for by the Banks of China and Japan. According to the most recent Federal Reserve data, they are collectively adding to their stockpile at a pace of $10 Billion per week. As the WSJ explains, “The inflows highlight the challenges facing nations with large dollar holdings, particularly developing countries. A weaker dollar is, in theory, bad for their investments as it eats into returns when translated back into local currencies.”

In other words, continued foreign Central Bank investment in US Treasury securities is perhaps rooted less in investment strategy, then in the simple desire to prevent their current holdings from depreciating. At the same time, those banks that intervene directly in forex markets often have little choice other than to hold their forex reserves in US Treasuries.

You can see from this that the idea of an alternative reserve currency would actually run counter to the interests of many of these Central Banks. With the exception of a few (i.e. Iran, and to a lesser extent, China) that would like to see the Dollar fail for political reasons, the vast majority of banks have a vested interest in the Dollar remaining where it is. Otherwise, they would witness the value of their Dollar-denominated assets collapse, as well as a collapse in exports to the US.

It looks like, then, there will be a showdown at some point between the Central Banks and investors. If you accept the notion of efficient markets, then it should be obvious who will win in the long-term. On the other hand, you can’t underestimate the determination of some of these banks.

Bank of Canada Still Mulling FX Intervention

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Thu, 25 Mar 2010 18:21:00 -0700

Bank of Canada Still Mulling FX Intervention: "

The Canadian Dollar fell from parity with the US Dollar in July 2008. For a minute, it looked as though it would return to that mark in October 2009. Alas, it was not to be, as the currency that had risen 20% since March wasn’t able to rise another 3% to close the elusive gap that would once again bring it face-to-face with the Greenback.

The Loonie’s rise was not difficult to understand. Soaring commodity prices and the fact that the economic recession was milder in Canada than in other economies drove the perception that Canada was a good place to invest. Despite a surging budget deficit and weak domestic consumption, investors bought into this notion. The weak Dollar and rising risk aversion reinforced this perception, and as investors accepted that parity was inevitable, hot money poured in and the Loonie’s rise became self-fulfilling.

That was until Mark Carney, head of the Bank of Canada, used the strongest rhetoric to-date in discussing the possibility of intervention. For the first time in this cycle, the markets took the hint, and sent the Canadian Dollar down by the largest single-day margin in months. “Markets should take seriously our determination to set policy to achieve the inflation target. Markets sometimes lose their focus, we don’t lose our focus,” he said firmly, adding that forex intervention is “always an option.”

Intervention is supported both by economic data, and other Canadian institutions. According to one estimate, every 1 cent increase in the Loonie against the Greenback costs the county $2 Billion in export revenue and 25,000 jobs. The chief economist for CIBC, meanwhile, has warned that many companies are in the process of making long-term direct investment decisions, and could be discouraged from locating in Canada because of perceptions that its currency will remain strong for the immediate future: “If the loonie is overvalued for a few years, we may be sacrificing business plant and equipment on the altar of a strong currency.” He also compared the predicament facing the Bank of Canada to that facing the Royal Bank of Switzerland, which ultimately and successfully intervened on behalf of the Franc. Intervention on behalf of the Loonie, he argued, could be undertaken under the umbrella of fighting speculation and irrational movements in currency markets.

Prior to this outburst, investors had basically concluded that the BOC wasn’t prepared to put its money where its mouth was, so to speak. “The central bank’s shot across the bow has definitely subsided. There’s not much they can do,” summarized one analyst a few weeks ago. The term “jawboning” had become the preference of columnists and investors when discussing the resolve of the BOC. The belief was that the BOC had concluded that intervention was essentially a futile proposition (based on its failed efforts in the late 1990’s), and that it would instead resort to making idle threats.

In fact, it seems investors still are no convinced that the BOC (via Carney) means what it says. “Mark Carney has raised the prospect of intervening in currency markets, but seems reluctant to actually do so,” argued one analyst. “I don’t think they would really like to intervene at all, and they would prefer avoiding it. If they can intervene by jaw boning, they would much rather do that,” added another.

Why did the Loonie fall suddenly then, if the markets still aren’t concerned about intervention? The answer is that they have seen the concrete impact of the expensive Loonie on the Canadian economy. In the words of one analyst, it has moved from being a threat to a bona fide impediment. Especially given the stall in the commodity price rally, investors apparently are willing to acknowledge that they may have gotten ahead of themselves and that parity with the Dollar is not yet justified by fundamentals. Meanwhile, Canadian interest rates are at a comparable level with US rates, which means foreign investors can’t earn a yield spread from investing in Canada. This is likely to be the case for a while, as the valuable Loonie has kept inflation in check and given the BOC some flexibility in tightening its monetary policy.

Personally, I don’t think the BOC will ultimately intervene. Investors have shown that they aren’t afraid of the BOC, which would make any intervention both expensive and unfruitful. In addition, I think investors have accepted their own accesses, and will hesitate to push the Loonie much higher (or past parity, for that matter) until there is more evidence that such is justified. In the meantime, expect the Loonie to hover in the 90’s and perhaps even test parity, before smashing through when the time is right. And this, I do believe, is inevitable.

Euro Optimism (And not just Dollar Pessimism)

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Fri, 19 Mar 2010 18:21:00 -0700

Euro Optimism (And not just Dollar Pessimism): "

According to a recent Merril Lynch (Bank of America) survey, Europe has officially returned to favor among investors. “A net 30% of global portfolio managers see euro-zone equities as undervalued relative to other regions, the highest reading since April 2001. A net 11% are overweight Europe, the first overweight allocation in nearly two years, said Baker.”

The numbers, meanwhile, reflect this perception. Over the last month, investors have poured a net (inflows minus outflows) $2.1 Billion into EU capital markets, an impressive sum when you consider that the figures for Japan and the US were both negative. Meanwhile, stock markets in the region are up by 50%+ since bottoming last March. When you account for currency fluctuations (i.e. Euro appreciation), stock market comparisons between the US and EU start to look pretty lopsided.

According to a WSJ report, there’s no mystery behind the European stock market rally: “Even though prices have risen sharply since March, valuations aren’t stretched. Average price-to-earnings ratios in Europe, on a trailing 12-month basis, are about 16, up from seven back in March, according to Citigroup…On a price-to-book ratio, stocks are trading about 15% below their long-term average, and dividend yields compared to government bond yields are historically still very attractive.”

At this point, you’re probably wondering, “Why the long preamble on European stocks?” Because, it’s easy to forget that there are inherently two sides to every currency pair. In the case of the USD/EUR (the most frequently traded pair in the world), most of the recent commentary has focused exclusively on Dollar-negatives, portraying the dynamic as a depreciation in the Dollar. In this context, it’s easy to forget that the Dollar’s depreciation implies an appreciation in the Euro. Duh?! But seriously, for every Dollar bear, it seems there is at least one Euro bull.

To be fair, those who don’t see much to be excited about in the Euro can be forgiven. After all, the European economy is technically still mired in recession, and isn’t projected to return to growth until 2011. While some of the intangible indicators are improving, others continue to stagnate. “Industrial output in the euro zone is 20% lower than its February 2008 peak, despite some recent improvements.” In addition, the appreciation in the Euro threatens to choke off exports and stifle the recovery before it has a chance to get off the ground.

Speaking of which, the European Central Bank (ECB) will probably hold of on raising rates because of the strong currency. A more valuable Euro keeps inflation in check (via cheap imports). Besides, higher interest rates would attract carry traders hungry for yield, and would make it even more difficult to keep the Euro in check. Many EU monetary officials (including ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet) have already made their concerns about the Euro’s appreciation clear. If they are able to succed in halting its rise, that could make investing in Europe a lot less exciting…

Prospects for Chinese Yuan Revaluation Improve

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Tue, 9 Mar 2010 18:21:00 -0800

Prospects for Chinese Yuan Revaluation Improve: "

In its semi-annual report to Congress, the Treasury Department once again failed to officially label China (or any country for that matter) a currency manipulator. No surprise there. While it’s self-evident that China manipulates the RMB (via the peg with the US Dollar), the political implications of such a label prevent it from being used except in the most extreme cases. Nonetheless, there is mounting pressure on China, both domestic and international, to “adjust” the peg and allow the Yuan to move closer to its fundamental value.

Most of the international pressure has been soft, coming in the form of roundabout pleas for China to allow the Yuan to float “for the sake of global stability.” Said one US Senator weakly, “I hope that with strong leadership from the United States, the G-20 nations and our international institutions will undertake what has been missing — a focused, sustained and meaningful multilateral engagement to address currency manipulation and current imbalances.” At the same time, some of this rhetoric has recently been translated into action. Last month, the Obama Administration enacted a 35% tariff on Chinese tire products. Other countries have also begun to raise concerns about Chinese dumping, and bringing their cases to the WTO for good measure.

Many of these countries are in fact suffering more than the US. Since the Yuan is effectively pegged to the Dollar, the decline of the latter has been mirrored by the former. Since many other currencies of developing countries are also fixed, this leaves only a handful to absorb the shock. For example, the Euro and Yen have both risen about 15% against the RMB over the last year, in line with their appreciation against the Dollar. The handful of floating currencies in the region, such as the Korean Won, Indian Rupee, Malaysian Ringhit, etc. have also faced strong upward pressure. For them, it is not so much the weak Dollar that they fear so much as the weak RMB, since China is a direct competitor to all of them.

More importantly, there are now voices within China’s ruling Communist party that have also begun to press for a stronger Yuan. The Nationalist camp, for example, is pressing for China to make the Yuan a more prominent currency on the international trade scene. While such doesn’t inherently require a floating currency (in fact, all of the trade/swap agreements involving Yuan are based on fixed exchange rates), a loosening of capital controls and liberalizing of financial markets would probably bring about a stronger Yuan.

The other group pushing for a stronger Yuan is doing so on more fundamental, economic grounds. Just-released 2009 Q2 GDP data showed prelimenary growth estimates of a whopping 8.9%! Not bad, especially when you consider that the rest of the world remains mired in recession. Chinese economists largely ignore the political implications of the notion that this growth probably came at the expense of the rest of the world, and focus instead on the economc implications.

First is that the economy remains hopeless dependent on exports to drive growth, which can only be remedid through a stronger Yuan. Second, it heralds the coming of inflation. Many foreigners continue to pour “hot money” into Chinese asset markets hoping to reap the upside from both asset and currency appreciation. In response, “Analysts say China could let the yuan appreciate to help restrain inflation, since a stronger yuan would reduce the cost of imports. But some caution that Beijing tried a similar strategy in early 2008, but didn’t achieve great success in containing inflation or stemming the inflows.”

While analysts don’t expect the Bank of China to allow the RMB to rise until after the Chinese New Year in January, investors are pricing in incremental appreciation every month beginning with the next. In fact, futures prices already reflect the expectation that the RMB will rise 3% over the next twelve-months. My bet is that this will be kicked off by another one-off appreciation, in the same vein as July 2005. Now as was the case then, China needs to make up for lost time.

Dollar at a (Technical) Crossroads

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Wed, 3 Mar 2010 18:22:00 -0800

Dollar at a (Technical) Crossroads: "

I deliberately concluded my last post (US Dollar: Same Old Story) on a somewhat ambiguous note; even though though the deck is stacked against the Dollar, its 14% decline in 2009 has left it perilously close to record lows, and traders are nervous about pushing the limits further.

On the one hand, everyone believes that the Dollar is fundamentally still in a weak position. The US balance of trade remains deep in deficit. Government spending has exploded, with record-setting deficits and an expansion in the national debt. Interest rates are at rock bottom, and are by some measures, the lowest in the world. Despite signs of life, the economy remains mired in recession. The money supply has also expanding, to the extent that some long-term investors are wondering out loud about the possibility of future inflation.

As a result, the decline in the Dollar since last spring has suffered very few blips, with volatility declining at the same pace as the currency, itself. “There seems to be a paradigm shift underway where more and more foreign investors are becoming concerned that the long-term path of the dollar is downward,” summarized one analyst. The consensus among investors is almost eerie. “Speculators betting that the dollar index will fall outnumber those betting that it will rise by nearly 2 to 1, according to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.”

Some (mainstream) analysts have even begun to open consider the possibility of a crash in the Dollar, a view that had previously been relegated to conspiracy theorists and doomsday scenarists. “In a run on the dollar, that thinking would create a cascade — fearful global investors would shy away from dollars, expecting further steep declines, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy.” Adds a former Chief Economist of the IMF, “Every time the dollar starts depreciating there is angst and everybody starts raising the question what happens if there is a collapse.” While the majority of Dollar-watchers still believe that a Dollar crash is unlikely, the point is that they are now discussing it actively.

Despite the fact that all of these factors are already in place, the Dollar remains relatively buoyant. Personally, I think this is because investors don’t really want to acknowledge that this is a real possibility. For one thing, the alternatives aren’t any better. While forex investors in recent years have enjoyed ganging up on the Dollar, the fact remains the fundamentals for the other major currencies remain just as weak. For example, a model of purchasing power parity developed by “the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development finds the dollar is worth roughly 0.85 euro, compared with its market valuation of 0.67 euro, suggesting that the euro is 21% overvalued.” Likewise, the Yen is held to be 22% undervalued.

As a result, the market as a whole is having trouble pushing the boundaries. The Dollar has approached the psychologically important level of $1.50/Euro on several occasions, but has retreated each time. “People are wondering whether we’re going back to $1.46 in euro/dollar or heading toward $1.54. But one thing is for sure, as we head toward $1.50, we’re going to experience a lot of volatility,” summarized one analyst.

“Risk reversals, a measure of currency sentiment in the options market derived by looking at the difference in implied volatility between out of the money calls and out of the money puts, show a bias for euro puts, trading at a mid-market level of 0.2. That means investors are hedging their short dollar positions with bets for a euro downside even though no one expects the euro to fall.” Meanwhile, volatility has edged up slightly, reflecting an increased level of uncertainty surround the near-term direction of the Dollar. It could be the case that if the Euro breaks through $1.50, heartened investors will send the currency up even higher, while a failure to break through means investors just aren’t read to commit. A classic technical crossroads!

US Dollar: Same Old Story

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Sat, 27 Feb 2010 18:22:00 -0800

US Dollar: Same Old Story: "

These days, it’s hard to offer a fresh perspective on the Dollar. The factors driving its short-term momentum – namely low interest rates and its perception as a financial safe haven – have been in place for nearly a year. It’s long-term prognosis, meanwhile, also hasn’t changed much. Since the beginning of the decade, the Greenback has been in a state of perennial decline as a result of its twin deficits and the related notion that it will be soon be replaced as the world’s pre-eminent currency.

Since the last time I posted about the Dollar (October 6: Dollar’s Role as Reserve Currency in Jeopardy), then, there haven’t been many developments. Fears that oil will one day be priced and settled in an alternative currency – such as the Euro – continue to reverberate through the markets. Several ministers from OPEC countries have already officially dismissed such claims as baseless. A parallel debate is now taking place on the sidelines as to whether or not such a shift even matters.

Dean Baker argued in a recent article for Foreign Policy magazine, that pricing oil in Dollars represents a mere “accounting convention,” adopted by most simply by default, since the US is the cornerstone of the world economy. Argues Baker, “World oil production is a bit under 90 million barrels a day. If two-thirds of this oil is sold across national borders, then it implies a daily oil trade of 60 million barrels. If all of this oil is sold in dollars, then it means that oil consumers would have to collectively hold $4.2 billion to cover their daily oil tab.”

Unfortunately, Baker’s “simple arithmetic” is both erroneous and slightly irrelevant. Assuming a price of only $100 per barrel (pretty conservative if you believe the notion of peak oil), current consumption of 85 million barrels per day implies a daily turnover of $8.5 Billion per day, or $3+ Trillion per year. If the price doubles to $200 per barrel….well, you get the point.

Taking this line of reasoning further becomes somewhat problematic, however. First of all, while OPEC members currently hold the majority (70%+) of there reserves in Dollar-denominated assets, it’s unclear how this would change in the event that oil was no longer priced in Dollars. It’s conceivable that just as many of these Central Banks currently diversify their Dollar-denominated proceeds into other currencies, that they would “diversify” Euro-denominated proceeds back into the Dollar. Of course, it’s also conceivable that a combination of inertia and investment strategy would cause them to hold a larger portion of there reserves in Euros.

If OPEC Central banks continue to prefer Dollars, than Baker is right in arguing that the currency in which oil is priced has no implications outside of accounting. If, on the other hand, he is wrong, and a change in pricing causes/coincides with changing preferences, then the implications for the Dollar would be disastrous. [Consider that $3 Trillion/per year which is at stake currently represents more than 15% of total foreign ownership of US assets.] The problem is that we just don’t know.

Regardless, the status quo favors the Dollar, since creating a new reserve currency would take at least a decade, if not more. For that reason, the World’s Central Banks (we’re not just talking about OPEC anymore) continue to prefer Dollars. “In the five weeks through Oct. 7, foreign central banks bought more than $48.55 billion in Treasury securities, an average of $9.71 billion per week, according to the latest data from the Federal Reserve.” In addition, “Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii said he expects the dollar will remain the key reserve currency for some time to come.” Private foreign investors, meanwhile, are dragging their heals a bit, perhaps waiting for the Dollar to fall further before jumping in. Asks one columnist rhetorically, “Why buy now if the dollar might be even weaker in six months’ time?”

What else is new? The US budget deficit came in at $1.4 Trillion for the fiscal year, the highest level since World War II. On the bright side, the deficit was $200-400 Billion less than earlier estimates. Meanwhile, members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors restated the unlikelihood of higher rates in the immediate future. “Richard Fisher, president of the Dallas Fed and thought to be a rare hawk on the Fed’s Open Market Committee, chimed in that no one at the Fed thinks this is the time to raise interest rates.” Finally, the US trade deficit is once again narrowing, due in no small part to the declining Dollar.

At this point, it seems reasonable to assume that much of the bad news has already been priced into the Dollar. Sure, the Australian rate hikes came as a surprise and forced many to rethink their calculations. Investors have already begun to separate the healthy currencies from the sick (to borrow an analogy from a previous post), but that the Dollar would be grouped with the “sick” currencies has long been anticipated. Given that the currency has already fallen by double digits in 2009 and is nearing the record lows of 2008, some are wondering how long it can continue.

Japan Flip-Flops on Forex Intervention

noreply@blogger.com (Blog Invest) — Fri, 19 Feb 2010 18:23:00 -0800

Japan Flip-Flops on Forex Intervention: "

In my report on last month’s Japanese election, I noted that the newly-appointed Japanese finance minister, Hirohisa Fujii, had spoken out against forex intervention. With that, it seemed the matter was closed.

But not so fast! Over the following few weeks, Fujii (as well other members of the new administration) moved to clarify his position, backtracking, sidestepping, contradicting, but never going forward. The following is a summary of selected remarks, beginning with the original statement against intervention and ending in what seems like a promise to intervene:

September 15: “I basically believe that, in principle, it’s not right for the government to intervene in the free-market economy using its money, either in stock or foreign-exchange markets.”

September 27: [The Yen's rise is] “not abnormal…in terms of trends.”

September 28: “That’s not to say I approve of the yen’s rise.”

September 28: “I don’t think it is proper for the government to intervene in the markets arbitrarily.”

September 29: “If the currency market moves abnormally, we may take necessary steps in the national interest.”

October 3: “As I have said in Tokyo, we will take appropriate steps if one-sided movements become excessive.”

October 5: “If currencies show some excessive moves in a biased direction, we will take action.”

Confused? I know I am. Is it possible to glean any semblance of meaning from these remarks? Summarized one columnist, “Hirohisa Fujii has gone through several cycles of remarks that first appeared to favor a strong yen and then seemed to backpedal after markets took him at his word and sent the Japanese currency soaring.”

I think this encapsulates the regret that Minister Fujii must have felt, after his original comments were taken a little too seriously. In hindsight, it appears that Fujii attempted to convey the new administration’s stance on forex, in a nutshell, and certainly didn’t expect that investors would run wild and send the Yen up another 4%, bringing the year-to-date appreciation against the Dollar to 15%. In the words of the same columnist cited above, “Japan’s finance minister has been rudely reminded of the cardinal rule when speaking to markets — less is more.”

So where does Fujii actually stand? I would personally hazard to guess that his original explication is still the most accurate portrayal of how he will tend to the Yen while in office. The former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration intervened several times while in office (once under the direction of Fujii himself!) and most recently in 1994. Despite spending trillions of Yen, the campaign only marginally stemmed the rise of the Yen.

Meanwhile, the Japanese economy has been mired in what could be termed the “world’s longest recession, dating back to the 1980’s. It’s clear that the cheap-Yen policy, designed to promote exports, hasn’t benefited the Japanese economy. The new administration, hence, has indicated a shift in strategy, away from export dependence and towards domestic consumption.

Ironically, the nascent Japanese economic turnaround is once again being driven by exports. Fujii is no doubt cognizant of this, and doesn’t want to jeopardize the recovery for the sake of ideology. For example, Toyota Corporation has indicated that a 1% appreciation in the Yen against the Dollar costs the company $400 million in operating income. In addition, while a strong Yen increases the purchasing power of Japanese consumers, an overly strong Yen can lead to deflation, as consumers forestall spending in anticipation of lower prices down the road.

In other words, Fujii is certainly not a proponent of Japan’s recent runup, but his stance is more nuanced than initially understood. “Fujii is basically saying currencies should reflect economic fundamentals and that it is wrong to manipulate their moves to lower the yen for the sake of exporters,” offered one strategist. This, the markets finally seem to understand, and the Yen has actually reversed course over the last week. After all, “A yen in the 80s is excessive,” given the context of record low interest rates and a economy that is still contracting.

In the near-term, then, it doesn’t even make sense to talk about intervention. It seems the markets were getting ahead of themselves in this regard. It doesn’t make sense to price out the possibility of intervention when interevention shouldn’t be a factor in the first place. If on the other hand, the Yen continues to appreciate, then Fujii may have consider how fixed his principles really are.