Two Weeks Notice: A Latin American Politics Blog

Marco Rubio's Venezuela Messaging

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:42:47 +0000

The State Department has a quick summary of Marco Rubio's meeting with Dinorah Figuera and it's as weird as everything else in this saga. Here's part of it:

He highlighted this year’s steps toward establishing an independent Supreme Court of Justice, the release of over 1,200 political prisoners, the recently restored access to blocked media websites, and efforts to reform the Law Against Hatred as important milestones toward restoring fundamental freedoms for the Venezuelan people.

Looking ahead to the next round of talks beginning October 14, the Secretary urged continued progress on political freedoms and electoral reform, which would lay the groundwork for free, fair, and credible elections in Venezuela.

This is the language you use when you don't have all the leverage. "Recently restored" media could have been restored in early January. The hate law could've been pushed months ago. Rubio "urged" continued progress?

The U.S. invaded the country and could have restored many freedoms a very long time ago, but chose not to. I understand that stability was favored over democracy. But abrograting the hate law wouldn't undermine stability--it would just stop innocent Venezuelans from being targeted for their political beliefs. Low-hanging fruit.

Instead, we have this scenario where the U.S. portrays the two sides are equal. In democratic transition terms, it's a bizarre combination of imposition and pacted. The former (which is rare unless you include foreign use of force) involves force while the latter involves compromise. Venezuela thus becomes a combination of the U.S. overthrowing Manuel Noriega and the Chilean dictatorships negotiated with the opposition, which I think would be unfathomable to all the scholar studying this 30ish years ago. It also confounds predictions of outcome. We hope it ends up like Chile, where the repressive apparatus was dismantled and elections persisted (even if the military's role remained strong for a long time). For now, it's like Chile where military internal intelligence remained going strong.

Maria Corina Machado Makes Her Pitch

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:59:50 +0000

María Corina Machado published an op-ed in the New York Post three days ago about why she needs to return and Venezuela needs to hold free and fair elections.

First off, why the New York Post? I mean, I guess it doesn't really matter since people will read it regardless, but it's a tabloid. That said, it's conservative and has ties to Trump.

Her points are pretty straightforward and while careful to praise Trump, she makes it clear that you can't continue to have positive relations with an illegitimate government. You can't have certainty with a rickety and thoroughly corrupt dictatorship. She makes a point directly aimed at the administration's oil deals, which is that you can't guarantee contracts with the current regime.

Donald Trump's response: "Well, I'll say one thing: she is an excellent woman. She gave me her Nobel Prize because she knew I had earned it, and she is an excellent woman, and everything is going to turn out fine."

It's a beautiful blend of narcissism and vagueness.

Meanwhile, Marco Rubio denies that anyone blocked her return and a coordinator of Vente Venezuela said she might return "within hours."

Stay tuned.

FRUS South America publication

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:51:26 +0000

I was very happy to see that the Foreign Relations of the United States series published part of the South America, 1981-1988 documents. It's been languishing. Unfortunately, the Chile and Argentina chapters are not yet out, as I would love to see those. This time around it's Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Here is a bit from a meeting Alexander Haig had with the foreign minister of Paraguay in 1981. Recall that dictator Alfredo Stroessner was still around (he didn't get overthrown until 1989) so human rights violations were rampant in the country.

And, of course, Haig had no interest in human rights:

The Secretary described human rights as a “residual problem” which we will address as one friend speaking to another and through diplomatic channels. He said his own preference would be to use the term “personal liberties” rather than human rights because the very term human rights has unfortunately become loaded with emotional and political connotations. In addressing human rights matters, it is important that we not lose sight of the security concerns that the countries of this hemisphere share.

What Haig is saying, just as Henry Kissinger said to dictatorships in the 1970s, was that attacking perceived Marxists was perfectly fine. The Paraguayans got the message loud and clear:

The meeting concluded with reiteration of expressions of good will and certainty that relations will improve steadily. As they were departing, the Paraguayans commented that this meeting marked a very sharp contrast with the recent past. They were delighted with their reception and the length of the meeting.

They are referring to Jimmy Carter and his four years of at least trying to focus on human rights. Incidentally, the meeting lasted fifty minutes. It consisted primarily of talking about Cuba and Marxists. The Carter era was officially over.

Delcy Ditches Maduro

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:31:50 +0000

This is par for the course in the weird Venezuela political saga. Delcy Rodríguez did not request Nicolás Maduro's release or invoke his immunity as head of state. As a matter of fact, Delcy has already requested that immunity for herself for a lawsuit against her in the United States. It's good old stab in the back.

It is true that even prior to Trump, the U.S. government said over and over that it did not recognize Maduro as president, constantly calling him illegitimate. Then the Trump administration did recognize her after the invasion because she was willing to kowtow.

The problem, of course, and one that keeps coming up, is that Delcy was in the same illegitimate government. She was the illegitimate vice president. She has illegitimate stamped all over her. She has zero constitutional bearing in the country but is recognized de facto by the United States (not to mention the armed forces) so that's that. As always, aside from Maduro himself the losers in this situation are the Venezuelan people.

Reforming Venezuela's Hate Law

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 30 Sep 2026 14:24:41 +0000

Delcy Rodríguez requested the legislature "partially" reform the Law Against Hate, which has commonly been used to attack Venezuelans exercising their constitutional right to free speech. Here is a quote from her:

Rodríguez dijo que se hizo “uso abusivo de esa ley.... pero yo creo en los principios de esa ley, el principio de la tolerancia, el principio del amor en relacionamiento, que no se imponga el odio”.

This is yet another example of how bizarre this situation is. Yes, the law was abusive, though in fact it was intended to be. By her own administration.

In her social media post, she said she asked for a "reforma parcial." It is to "corregir desviaciones en su aplicación." All this flowery, passive voice intended to deflect from the fact that she is complicit in all the abuses. The law should be stricken in its entirety and hopefully that actually happens.

We need to wait and see what happens, of course, but still this is an important step forward. The Hate Law is only one of many overlapping laws (it's actually easy to lose track of them because there are so many) justifying attacks on Venezuelans but it's a prominent one.

What Do Venezuelans Think of the Current Situation?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 17:46:20 +0000

We have another Venezuela poll from Meganálisis. Tellingly, the first page has a photo of Delcy Rodríguez and Donald Trump, with a warm two-handed handshake and very friendly smiles.

Do Venezuelans approve of the oil deal? 79.8% do not.

Do Venezuelan approve of Rodríguez and Trump meeting at the UN? 91.4% do not.

Do Venezuelans think Rodríguez truly represents them at the UN? 93.7% do not.

I'm not sure how chavistas exactly fall here. It may well be that they chafe under what's clearly U.S. control over Delcy Rodríguez, which manifests in not believing she's really in charge and representing them. Constitutionally, she actually doesn't represent them because the 180 day requirement of an interim president has long passed. Everyone is just pretending it doesn't matter.

The honeymoon is over but what comes afterward is unknown. Again and again, I just come back to María Corina Machado. Her return is the X factor.

Update 9/23/26: as a matter of fact, the Venezuelan government has been blocking her entry even in the just the last 24 hours and clearly the United States is not standing behind her entry.

Repression Continues in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:22:19 +0000

The United Nations Fact Finding Mission in Venezuela just released a new report on human rights. The short answer is that the repressive apparatus is still intact, more than eight months after the U.S. invasion. The legal system with all its justifications of attacking citizens is intact. People are still scared and arbitrary arrests are still occurring. Media outlets get closed. People are still in prison for political crimes.

They noticed a new pattern:

A notable new pattern that the mission has identified is the use of short-term arbitrary detention and measures of intimidation against those perceived as opposing the Government, including those who have been subjected previously to long-term arbitrary detention. These carry particular resonance given the context of widespread abuses over the past decade, a potent reminder to political activists that their activities are monitored and that the repressive apparatus remains available to limit freedoms if the authorities decide to do so.

Intimidate people and keep them just a short time, and then they won't get counted as political prisoners. Then there is still torture in prison:

The prevalent methods of torture remain the same as those previously identified by the mission, including punching and beatings with metallic objects; electric shocks, including to the genitals; suffocation with plastic bags; suspension by the hands or the feet for prolonged periods of time; and prolonged confinement in isolation or under other harsh conditions. In addition, the mission identified previously unreported methods of torture, including forced intubation and catheterization.

There is an entire separate paper on colectivos, which is good because they have been central to the government's repressive machinery.

Tras el despliegue de principios de enero, y lejos de la retórica de resistencia armada que sostuvieron por años, los colectivos optaron por un repliegue relativo. Sin embargo, según la información recibida por la Misión, los grupos han mantenido sus acciones de patrullajes urbanos y labores de inteligencia vecinal en zonas clave, así como el control sobre las economías lícitas e ilícitas. La Misión también documentó nuevos actos de hostigamiento y amenazas perpetrados por colectivos contra familiares de personas privadas de libertad por motivos políticos, incluyendo en las afueras de la prisión de máxima seguridad Rodeo I, en el estado de Miranda en las afueras de El Helicoide y en Plaza Venezuela, ambas en Caracas.

They make it sound like the colectivos are in a holding pattern, still with a hand in the till to keep them happy and serving in a repressive capacity while trying to keep a low profile.

The standard now seems to be rumors (and hope!) of things about to happen with way too little change on the ground. The U.S. appears to reaping the economic benefits with enough to the regime that it keeps its cronies happy for the time being.

China's Role in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 10 Sep 2026 14:45:20 +0000

Really interesting op-ed by a China expert at the University of Alberta on China's long-term role in Venezuela. Headlines say that China is getting pushed out, just as headlines say (and the administration repeats) that China is getting pushed out elsewhere in Latin America. China's response has been very measured and I think this is on point:

Beijing’s response reflects a calculation that the deal’s fragility will show within months. Venezuela’s production will not surge. The US$100 billion in pledged investment will not materialise while the interim regime’s legitimacy is in question. And China’s existing contracts, protected by international law, remain a legal sword.

China remains Venezuela’s most important Asian oil customer and creditor. Though physical crude flows to China were disrupted this year, Beijing’s more than US$60 billion in oil-for-loan financing since 2007 creates debt obligations that survive the change in field operators – and China’s economic leverage ensures its interests cannot be erased by a 100-year concession granted to a US proxy.

He doesn't get into it, but this leads to three conclusions. The first is that backlash in Venezuela will grow and will worsen when a democratically elected government eventually takes over. The second is that the deal will have no effect on U.S. gas prices or anything else that the average U.S. voter is interested in. The third is that China will continue to have an extensive economic presence in Venezuela.

I don't know how much the average U.S. voter cares about any of this. Increased gas prices are more linked to the Iran war. But Venezuelans care. That's the point I keep thinking about.

Venezuela Elections in 2028?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 08 Sep 2026 17:29:00 +0000

In a press conference, Diosdado Cabello said that elections might occur in 2028 (saying "I think"). Nobody else has put a date on it. And then there's this fun bit:

"We are ready, we have always been ready. Now, those who today want elections, when called to elections, say they are not ready or that they are not going to participate because, deep down, they do not want elections. Deep down they do not respect elections," Cabello stated at a press conference, where he added that the opposition "recognizes when they win," but "when they lose they do not recognize anyone."

Criticizing your political opponents for what you do is all the rage these days. Certainly we commonly see it in the United States. The July 2024 presidential election was quite brazenly stolen.

I think the oil deal is going to increase pressure for elections, evidenced by María Corina Machado's negative response to it as well as growing congressional noise about elections. The Trump administration is doing business with an illegitimate regime and using laughably bad logic to justify it.

I feel like an essential question here is when MCM is going to return. She has talked about it in general terms and there have been rumors about the regime blocking it, not to mention Trump administration admonitions not to do it. But time is ticking away. The oil deal is now a thing, the administration shifted to Dinorah Figuera, and the longer MCM says "soon" without going, the weaker her position is. Returning would be a tremendous act of courage, both in terms of personal safety and Trump's enmity, and the response in Venezuela would be considerable.

Can Congress Influence Venezuela Policy?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 04 Sep 2026 14:36:52 +0000

Both on and off the record, Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee are expressing doubts about Trump's oil deal with Venezuela. They distrust Delcy Rodríguez (as everyone should). They are concerned that it doesn't focus on elections. They're not happy María Corina Machado is being excluded and in fact she has now publicly expressed that the regime has no right to strike a deal for the Venezuelan people's oil.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is making pretty ludicrous statements in defense:

One U.S. official told NOTUS that the Venezuelan oil deal is “a private deal with a private company. It’s not a deal with the interim government of Venezuela and there was not a political process included in the negotiations.”

“I understand the initial reaction is that we’ve done a deal with the interim government. The deal is not with the interim government; the deal is with a private entity based abroad,” the official said in a statement. “So this in no way impedes a democratic transition, nor does it mean that it cements the interim government as the government.”

As if taking oil from a country has absolutely nothing to do with that country, which somehow has no role to play. I would love to know who the official was.

There is bipartisan agreement on this and it makes me wonder whether that can become leverage to force Trump's hand. There's no way to know Marco Rubio's beliefs but ultimately they aren't decisive anyway. Trump may shift if he feels there is enough opposition that it might start making him look bad. Even Ted Cruz has said there should be elections by mid-2027 (while, like the others, being very careful not to criticize the president).

Cato Institute Says the Venezuela Deal is Socialist

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 14:09:45 +0000

There is a piece in the Cato Institute's blog criticizing the Venezuela deal, in part for reasons I've laid but also because it's socialist.

It expands state corporatism by giving the US government a large, and possibly majority, stake in a major joint oil venture in Venezuela, an entity the Wall Street Journal reports “would be the world’s second-largest corporate holder of proven reserves after Saudi Aramco.” State-owned enterprises are a bad idea anywhere, but as Scott Lincicome observes, this comes after the US government under Trump has already taken equity in 31 private companies. As Scott says, “This isn’t even ‘creeping’ socialism anymore.”

In the meantime, the House of Representatives voted to condemn socialists and Scott Bessent calls socialists "underachievers." The President of the United States, however, wholeheartedly embraces core socialist ideals.

Of course, this version of socialism only entails state ownership, not state redistribution, so it's the worst possible version. At least the Soviets pretended to give back. Given the lack of details and the connection to a clearly corrupt go-between, it adds to the overall vibe of kleptocracy.

There is a lot to be revealed still, but it feels like an alternate version of the "Boliburguesía," the well-connected Venezuelans who got rich off the fruits of state ownership while claiming it was a revolution for the people. I feel confident that a bunch of people are either going to get very wealthy (or get much wealthier because they're already rich) by being tied into this deal.

And remember, imperialism and socialism can go together perfectly well. The Soviets are a perfect example. Imperialism doesn't have to mean capitalism. It just means controlling and plundering for your own benefit. What you do with the spoils afterward isn't part of the definition.

The big question is how much this deal helps Venezuelans. It doesn't seem promising.

Venezuela Apparently Loves Dependency

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 01 Sep 2026 13:27:24 +0000

After having periodically looked at Telesur over the years, it is absolutely fascinating to see it become pro-U.S. and basically anti-socialist. Without realizing it, this article about the U.S. oil deal outlines exactly what dependency theory argued was destructive:

Venezuela aportaría acceso a sus recursos energéticos y a su mano de obra cualificada, mientras que Estados Unidos contribuiría con tecnología y capital. El presidente venezolano describió el acuerdo como una combinación de las fortalezas de ambos países.

Venezuela cuenta con una larga trayectoria en la producción petrolera y una fuerza laboral con experiencia en exploración, extracción, refinación y actividades industriales afines. Sin embargo, gran parte del sector requiere modernización de equipos, inversión técnica y mayor financiamiento.

Mientras tanto, Estados Unidos cuenta con importantes compañías energéticas con acceso a tecnologías avanzadas, capital a gran escala y redes de distribución internacionales. Estos recursos podrían utilizarse para mejorar la recuperación de petróleo, reparar la infraestructura y aumentar la fiabilidad de la producción venezolana.

People don't talk much about dependency theory anymore but it is certainly relevant. The United States brings in private industry, capital, technology, and distribution networks. Venezuela provides its oil and some workers.

And the profit? If you look at the history of U.S. domination of natural resources, including in Venezuela, you'll notice that the Latin American country came to realize it was a terrible deal. Money will be flying out of Venezuela with the rationale that it is required to keep technologies updated, buy and repair equipment, etc., etc. That will keep happening until a Venezuelan government says it has to stop. How long that will take is impossible to guess.

Along those lines, note that María Corina Machado just gave a speech calling for elections. She did not mention the deal but it seems clear that she realizes the only kind of government that can push back against the U.S. is a democratically-elected one. There's no way she likes this deal. I haven't seen Dinorah Figuera comment on it, but I don't think anyone can laud it, opposition or Chavista. For Chavistas it's a betrayal of the revolution and for the opposition it's a betrayal of national resources by a government beholden to the United States.

Taking Venezuela's Oil

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:19:50 +0000

Hugo Chavez in 2008:

Chavez criticized the terms under which Exxon extracted oil in the region and accused the Venezuelan opposition parties of "giving away" the nation's resources when they were in power.

"The oligarchy and the Venezuelan opposition had no shame because they didn't have any problem with giving away the most sacred things. In this case, our oil," he said.

Delcy Rodriguez in 2026:

She thanked Trump and the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, for striking the deal but added: “There is something that must be made absolutely clear: Venezuela retains the ownership and sovereignty over its resources.”

Donald Trump in 2026:

"This Historic Transaction MORE THAN DOUBLES American Oil Reserves, greatly increases our Oil Supply, and will substantially lower Gas Prices for all Americans, long into the future," Trump said.

Since details are so sparse about the massive Donald Trump/Marco Rubio-driven oil deal, I don't have any specific commentary on it. Yet regardless of the details, it is hilariously clear that it is exactly what Chavez railed against. Trump clearly sees it as taking Venezuelan oil, with no interest in how it benefits Venezuelans.

At this moment, especially in the aftermarth of the earthquake, Venezuelans may well be willing to swallow it if they feel it injects resources into the economy in a way that materially helps them. In the longer run, and even in the shorter run if no improvements happen, that will almost certainly sour. You can't just take a country's critical natural resource without backlash.

Venezuelan Violators of Human Rights

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 13:19:58 +0000

This is a great example of the rhetorical gymnastics required to support Delcy Rodríguez. ICE reports that it deported a former colonel in the Bolivarian National Guard, who was a known violator of human rights. Here's how he is described: "a known human rights violator who participated in the detention and torture of political dissidents during the Maduro regime."

We can all agree that's criminal. But we can also all agree that DR was the vice president of that very same regime. We can, in fact, very accurately refer to it as the Maduro-Rodríguez regime. This dude is the small fry (though big enough). She is the big kahuna, the person who helped order all the tortures. But somehow now she's not part of the "Maduro regime."

Which leads me to the next point. OK, you removed him from the United States, but since he's going back to the regime that hired him it's not like you're punishing him beyond the fact that Venezuela is in shambles. I guess Marco Rubio could tell DR to put him in jail but that would logically mean putting lots of other people, including herself, in jail too.

Is Delcy Rodriguez President, Acting President, or Neither?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 15:10:39 +0000

One of the many weird things about current Venezuelan politics is that according to the Venezuelan constitution, Delcy Rodríguez is not the president. There is no legal president. A presidential vacancy must be filled within 180 days, which was on July 3.

Artículo 234. Las faltas temporales del Presidente o Presidenta de la República serán suplidas por el Vicepresidente Ejecutivo o Vicepresidenta Ejecutiva hasta por noventa días, prorrogables por decisión de la Asamblea Nacional por noventa días más.

Si una falta temporal se prolonga por más de noventa días consecutivos, la Asamblea Nacional decidirá por mayoría de sus integrantes si debe considerarse que hay falta absoluta.

The National Assembly hasn't done anything and obviously there have been no elections. So she's not legally the president. But then I saw a news story that called something to my attention. Official government references (like this one) have dropped the "acting" and just refer to her as president, which is not legally true.

Many people--me certainly--have been in organizations where the bylaws fall behind practice, but we're talking about a country, where the stakes are extraordinarily high. Falling out of constitutionally rips up the social contract and is dictatorship. It leads to real and severe problems.

Another Report on Cuba

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 20 Aug 2026 17:47:48 +0000

The America First Policy Institute published a report on Cuba. I think it's actually a lot better than the State Department's report from last month. But I was mostly curious about the policy implications and what the report demonstrates is that the U.S. just has no options that it hasn't tried before.

Of the 12 policy recommendations, 6 of them say the U.S. should demand something of Cuba that we've demanded before and they've continued to ignore. "Break the Communist Party's Grip on Cuba" has been a priority since the 1960s. There's nothing new in the report telling us how it would happen now. There is quite a lot of demanding and requiring but how?

Another is to increase economic pressure. It's unclear to me how this can be increased--the U.S. has been squeezing Cuba since the 1960s and the Trump administration has ratcheted it up even more. Increases have never worked before and no one can possibly know whether immiserating the Cuban people more will suddenly be different.

One of the interesting ones is to restore Radio Martí and TV Martí, which the administration dismantled. "The Trump Administration was right to target waste and inefficiency in these programs, but their underlying mission remains important." It never made sense to me why they were targeted since the main criticism they had received was that they were too conservative.

The last recommendation is to "Keep Every Lawful Instrument of American Power on the Table." This is interesting for two reasons. The first is that it's really been true since 1959. The U.S. has used every action imaginable though obviously after the Bay of Pigs, invasion was not viewed favorably. Not even Trump seems to view it favorably. But the second is why the report uses the word "lawful." In a sense it may reflect how often illegal means have been used and how terribly ineffective they've been (there are tons of declassified documents on this).

To be fair, what other recommendations can there even be, legal or not? Cuba isn't Venezuela so I don't get the impression that the U.S. has found enough willing partners inside Cuba to do a snatch-and-grab. The U.S. has tried invasion, assassination, economic sanctions and deprivation, political isolation, denunciation, punishment of countries that do business with Cuba, covert harassment, intelligence gathering, immigration policy, individual sanctions, and everything else under the sun. At various times the U.S. has also tried to soften some of those policies as a carrot. I just don't know what's left.

CRS Report on Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 18 Aug 2026 14:42:27 +0000

The Congressional Research Service published a new report on Venezuela, "Venezuela's Post-Maduro Transition and U.S. Policy." As always it's a great resource for a non-partisan summary of what's going on and even what bills are currently under deliberation (there are at least six right now) and what else could be done.

Because it's rooted in Congress, it gives suggestions that would assert congressional influence, which at the moment seems quite unlikely. The most unlikely of all is to "urge or require the Administration to consult with the EU and Canada when making decisions on targeted sanctions." Since the President of the United States insults the EU and Canada on a regular basis and constantly talks about America First, it's hard to imagine Republicans allowing anything like that forward.

The Senate did recently pass a resolution that I thought was quite good, but I am not seeing signs that Congress wants to play a major role in Venezuela policy aside from getting administration officials to testify and face questions. Since Trump is set on a particular course, congressional activism would have to require Republicans questioning his choices. I'm not sure there is stomach for that. I would hope so, like I would for any major policy, because the more questioning involved, the better. Foreign policy is rarely going as well as presidents like to claim.

State Department Video on the Monroe Doctrine

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 12 Aug 2026 15:06:35 +0000

A book that's been always interesting for me over many years is Samuel Flagg Bemis' The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation, published in 1943. As I contemplated writing my own textbook, I found a used copy and was fascinated by its perspective.

It's a great window into an era where professors had no doubts about how U.S. policy served to civilize others and spread our aura. The U.S. wielded power when it needed to in order to guide Latin American nations toward their own destinies. Introspection or a critical approach is nowhere to be found. Indeed, Bemis uses the word "imperialism" in an entirely positive way. The administration of Theodore Roosevely, he writes, "ushered in a new era in the Latin American policy of the United States, an era of protective imperialism" (p. 140). Even if you might allow a little bit of criticism for U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in the early 20th century, "that intervention was an honest intent, at least, to stabilize and strength the international relations of Central America" (p. 165).

Bemis had no way of knowing at the time that U.S. control of Cuba and Nicaragua would end up disastrous, fostering violent civil wars that eventually led to dictatorships that still exist and bedevil the U.S. in 2026. U.S. policy toward the two countries has been a failure in virtually every respect. What the U.S. sees as protective imperialism is viewed as noxious control within the country itself.

Which brings us to the video the State Department recently posted, narrated by Kevin Marino Cabrera, U.S. Ambassador to Panama. It is a celebration of the Monroe Doctrine that could've been written by Bemis but, unlike in 1943, we know that much of the outcomes were terrible for the U.S. Somehow occupation of Cuba was great but so was getting missiles out of Cuba, not understanding that the first led to the second. Daniel Ortega is powerful now because he led a group of Nicaraguans fighting a dictatorship the U.S. had installed decades ago.

We know this, it's not obscure history, and pretending it didn't happen will inevitably lead to other foreign policy disasters.

Continued Repression in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 10 Aug 2026 15:42:13 +0000

Foro Penal reports that the number of political prisoners in Venezuela increased from 379 to 382 from July 27 to August 3. That's bad enough, but there are also over 11,000 people whose liberty is restricted in some way even if they're not in prison. That's the liminal space that so many Venezuelans find themselves in, harassed and threatened by security forces.

It's very telling that the Trump administration never talks about political prisoners. It boasts about controlling the country but not about allowing the abuses that the regime still commits daily. The administration talks a lot about reconciliation and you cannot have that with people being attacked for their political views. Reconciliation has to include acceptance of alternate views.

Remember the short-lived amnesty? There has been precious little discussion about why it dissolved. I'm not even sure we have an accurate count of how many people it affected. Not nearly enough, clearly.

Venezuelans Are Unhappy With Delcy and Trump

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 06 Aug 2026 13:31:18 +0000

Venezuelan firm Meganalisis has a poll from after the earthquakes. It shows truly overwhelming disgust with Delcy Rodríguez regime, from her to government agencies. Some examples:

--93% say the information they get from the regime is either little or very little

--94% say they can't believe official information they get from it

--95% say they feel indignation after the earthquakes

--92% say the regime's response was bad or very bad

--96% say the regime could've done more

--78% feel deceived by the support Trump gives the regime

And the last one asks whether they believe Trump wants what's best for Venezuelans.

Look at the bottom part. Trump's positive image has dropped 70.7% since the invasion. He talks about how happy Venezuelans are with him but that's extremely outdated and is no longer true. Most people are still puzzled and trying to understand how the U.S. continues to support the dictatorship, perhaps waiting to see how negotiations go. The honeymoon is ending.

Senate Resolution on Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 05 Aug 2026 14:10:46 +0000

The Senate introduced a bipartisan resolution on Venezuela calling for elections. Ted Cruz and Tim Kaine are both on it. It is spot on. It calls for:

1. The "interim authorities" (definitely not using "government" though also not "regime") to immediately call for elections

2. Release of all political prisoners

3. Condemns any effort to go after people seeking public office, naming María Corina Machado

Currently, neither the Trump administration nor the Venezuelan regime want elections. Marco Rubio gets cagy about it when asked, saying it will take many months and citing Paraguay of all places. Therefore the U.S. Congress has an opportunity to push them publicly. The Venezuelan people clearly want democratic elections.

Rubio also had this nugget:

"They're not inheriting a disaster. They're not inheriting a reconstruction process. They're inheriting a functional state," he said, adding that the direction of the transition was positive even if the pace was not.

It's not a disaster? Yeah, it's a disaster that involves significant reconstruction. Sure, it's not Haiti, but that's a low bar.

What I also like about the resolution is that it doesn't mention the earthquake, which is becoming an excuse. Building a credible electoral authority is going to be a challenge, and even more so given the infrastructure that's been destroyed, but it's doable.

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 04 Aug 2026 14:05:53 +0000

Via Caracas Chronicles, Jorge Rodríguez and Dinorah Figuera say they had a phone call to start their dialogue. This was all through X.

There are three key points:

1. Dealing with the double earthquake

2. Strengthening democracy

3. Rights and political guarantees

It's not clear whether these get dealt with at one time or in order. In-person talks begin next week in Caracas.

Since Venezuela is not a democracy, it's actually a matter of starting it rather than strengthening it, but whatever. Note that there is no mention of an election. Figuera says the point of the dialogue is political transition, whereas Rodríguez emphasizes the earthquake. The last thing the regime wants is elections so it'll draw out the earthquake as long as possible.

Fortunately, the State Department's statement does mention elections, though not as part of this dialogue:

The U.S. welcomes the August 1 statements from Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly, led by Dinorah Figuera, and the interim government.

We support the launching of Venezuelan‑led efforts to address the urgent needs of those affected by the June 24 earthquakes, strengthen democratic institutions, expand political freedoms, and advance a more stable and prosperous future for the Venezuelan people. This process contributes significantly to the three phase plan the United States supports to bring about stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation and a transition to democratic elections.

We are confident this work can deliver tangible results for Venezuelans.

Will this dialogue generate a timetable for elections? No way to know at this point but that's what really matters. Without elections you can't get most of the things the State Department says it wants--democratic institutions, political freedoms, stability, reconciliation, etc.

Venezuela: Free Elections Before Reconciliation

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 03 Aug 2026 18:23:23 +0000

Marco Rubio recently gave an interview on Fox News. There's variety of stuff in there (the Cuba report, for example) but one thing in particilar caught my attention about Venezuela:

Ultimately, you have to have transition. At some point in time there has to be legitimate elections at every level so that people know that the government that’s there is a legitimate government chosen by their people. Step one towards that is a national reconciliation. This is a people that have been divided politically for a very long time against each other, and you’re going to have to look at models like what you saw happen in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. I think the role the U.S. Government can continue to play is as a facilitator of all of this.

Comparing Venezuela to Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union is the wrong approach. Those were actual nations that were becoming states again.

We should compare Venezuela to other past Latin American countries that underwent political transition. There is no perfect examples because Venezuela's path (invasion and retention of dictatorship) has no twin. It could become a weird category of negotiation with the U.S. more on the side of the dictatorship. But Rubio is talking about reconciliation so we don't need a perfect transition path--we just need to look at politically divided countries.

And the problem we then find is that reconciliation cannot happen under authoritarian rule. It happens after free elections. There might be parameters (e.g. an amnesty) that constrain what elected leaders can do, but only freely acting people can move toward bridging gaps. Right now, many Venezuelans are afraid to speak openly.

The great thing about democracy is that you have to reach out beyond your supporters. You have to show why you're not just a return to what plenty of people thought was a failed political system. The Chilean Christian Democrats successfully did that. So you need elections. But somehow they somehow always come at the end of the list of U.S. priorities.

Mexico Deepening Relationship with China

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 30 Jul 2026 17:29:53 +0000

Look beyond the tariffs Mexico imposed on China (which were accompanied by a meeting to explain them and plan future engagement). Donald Trump's announcement that he doesn't want to automatically renew the USMCA means Mexico is likely to deepen its relationship with China. On this point, check out Evan Ellis' latest policy paper. It outlines the many ways that relationship has spread, even military to a small extent.

One thing I wasn't aware of is how Chinese tourism increased 15% in 2025 over the year prior, with 224,000 Chinese coming by air. That is part of an intentional strategy by the Mexican government. Ellis doesn't mention it specifically, but tourism and various other things he mentions are all about soft power. It means Mexican views of China are more likely to be positive (which we've seen evidence of). It does not mean somehow not aligning with the U.S., though of course Mexico has always adopted a consciously and cautiously independent foreign policy, and so it'll be more amenable to China generally.

Anyway once again we have the irony of the U.S. talking about wanting to reduce China's influence in Latin America and then making decisions that increase that influence.

Telesur's Head is Spinning

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 29 Jul 2026 14:19:18 +0000

For many years Telesur has been a dependably leftist, anti-U.S. government news source for Latin America. After all, Hugo Chávez himself created it. It's been fascinating to see how it frames the U.S. invasion and financial control of the country. Today there a glowing account of Delcy Rodríguez's first 200 days.

The funniest thing about it is that it talks about how much progress has been made since January, particularly in economic terms. It doesn't mention what was going on before January, it does not mention the United States except for the return of air travel, and it does not refer to Nicolás Maduro. It certainly does not mention all the Venezuelan money being sucked into U.S.-controlled accounts. Just one month prior to the invasion, Telesur wrote a glowing account of the amazing economic growth occurring under Maduro.

That's how state-controlled media works. Telesur avoids whatever truths the Venezuelan government wants to avoid. It covers up whatever the Venezuelan government is covering up. This particular situation is extreme, though, because it's now required to contradict so much of its previous reporting without admitting to doing so. Suddenly the United States isn't an enemy anymore either, which must be a first.