Two Weeks Notice: A Latin American Politics Blog

U.S. Soft Power is Losing to China

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 12 May 2026 15:35:00 +0000

R. Evan Ellis someone who has studied (and warned about) China's role in Latin America for a long time. It's very clear that he's deeply concerned about the U.S. ceding leadership to China. That's what headlines aren't catching--you get high profile "hey we pushed China out of this project" but underneath China is building very successful and lasting relationships while the Trump administration revels in bullying.

His most recent opinion piece laments the fall of the U.S. brand. A new largescale survey in Latin America demonstrates U.S. decline. It's stark:

36% of respondents identify the PRC as the best development model for their country. The U.S., which has fallen 13 percentage points since the last time the survey was done in 2022, does not even finish second, but rather, third, behind Japan.

Of even greater concern are the responses on which country would be the best partner for their own in specific areas. On trade, 49% see China as the best partner, versus 26% choosing the U.S. On digital technologies, 67% see China as the best partner, versus a mere 19% for the U.S. In culture and education, an astounding 40% chose China, while only 18% incline toward the cradle of hot dogs, apple pie and rock-and-roll.

That's remarkable. But think about it: why would any country see the U.S. as the best partner for trade? Trump is famously fickle and unreliable, slapping tariffs when he's annoyed. And why would any country see the U.S. as best for education? The U.S. makes it very hard for foreign students to get visas and makes them afraid for their safety while they're here.

This is a big deal. It will outlive Trump and will continue even if there is a very actively pro-Latin America president. China developed it over 25-30 years.

Trump Priorities Versus Venezuelan Realities

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 11 May 2026 14:14:00 +0000

According to sources, U.S. and Venezuelan negotiators never discussed any role for María Corina Machado in Qater-mediated talks before the invasion. Trump apparently dismissed her from the start and hasn't shown any signs of changing.

But she's an important part of Venezuelan politics. Once again, I wonder what she's thinking and when she's going back. Her return will put the Delcy Rodríguez-Donald Trump lovefest in jeopardy. Choosing to ignore her appears to mean that Trump figured he could just push his priorities through and that removing Maduro would make Venezuelans loves him indefinitely. He wanted to avoid the messiness of a democratic transition so maneuvered to make it impossible.

Bit by bit, though, it's clear that neither the opposition nor hardcore Chavistas want Delcy in power. It's also clear that Venezuelans do not see how the U.S. taking Venezuelan oil is making their lives better. Promises of improvement have never been fulfilled. What Venezuelans are discovering is that when Trump makes promises, he often has no intention of fulfilling them.

Venezuelans want change. I have no idea how long it will take before they start demanding it but it's difficult to see that not happening unless the government violently suppresses it. Trump will have to decide what side he's on that point.

More Cracks in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 07 May 2026 14:22:00 +0000

Venezuelans have been souring on the situation they're in. And now more prominent people who are close to the regime are also complaining. Whatever you think of their politics, their arguments are entirely accurate. Delcy Rodríguez has handed Venezuela's wealth to the United States and people's lives are not getting better. Her approval ratings are sliding.

The question that comes to my mind is whether there is an anti-Delcy Chavista who decides to step forward as a challenger. That's unanswerable at the moment. Tied to that is the military's loyalty, which I assume is being bought but is also unknown.

The only way an unpopular dictator supported by the United States can stay in power is to repress its own citizens. That has happened plenty of times. The difference now is that Trump pays lip service to democracy, so how much repression would he accept for his favored leader to stay in power if protests start and things get dicey?

There are so many unknowns but we know one thing for sure: Venezuela is not a stable country. As people get more unhappy and the Chavista criticisms mount, they may well go to the streets in larger numbers and with more intent on political change. And they will not be on the same page--some will want Maráa Corina Machado and some will hate her. Not a great combination.

Trump's Venezuela Honeymoon is Collapsing

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 04 May 2026 16:57:00 +0000

I hope no one is surprised at this, but Donald Trump's honeymoon in Venezuela is collapsing. In February his approval was 82.9%, which slide to 74.% in March and then 47% in April. The explanation is very simple. Venezuelans overwhelmingly wanted Nicolás Maduro out but there is broad expectation of democratization, which isn't happening, and economic benefits, which also aren't happening. Venezuela remains a dictatorship with an economy in tatters.

To the extent he thinks about it at all, I would guess Trump figures that rejuvenating the oil industry will spread wealth around. But of course there is not reason to assume that when the government is so corrupt. But he praises Rodríguez while the Venezuelan people want--and deserve!--to choose their own leaders. Maduro lost the last election so her rule is entirely illegitimate.

Nationalism will emerge at some point, though I can't hazard a guess as to when. People are benefiting from Venezuelan oil and it's not the vast majority of Venezuelans. The leader of the opposition and the true winner of the last presidential election is not back in the country. A lot has changed but too much has stayed the same.

Marco Rubio on Cuba

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 30 Apr 2026 18:44:00 +0000

From a Fox News interview with Marco Rubio:

But in order for it to get better, they do need very substantial and serious economic reforms. Those serious economic reforms are impossible with these people in charge. It can’t happen. And these people in charge aren’t just economically incompetent. They have rolled out the welcome mat to adversaries of the United States to operate within Cuban territory against our national interest with impunity. We are not going to have a foreign military or intelligence or security apparatus operating with impunity 90 miles off the shores of the United States. That’s not going to happen under President Trump.

There are two major problems here.

First, who are "these people in charge"? One would reasonably argue that it meant all the current decision-makers. But that is very much not the model Trump followed in Venezuela, where there is actually a functional opposition that can run a government. No such thing exists in Cuba. If "these people" refer narrowly to Miguel Díaz-Canel and maybe some of his closer advisors, well then fine. The same people (e.g. the military) would still be running the country but maybe the U.S. could claim it had cleaned house.

Second, China and Russia operating in Cuba is and has been happening under Trump, so it's not true that it's not going to happen when he's president. That may be nitpicky for what's just intended as a threat, but still.

What If Maria Corina Machado Returned to Venezuela?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 13:08:00 +0000

A Venezuelan researcher concisely and accurately sums up the core dilemma in Venezuela: "The greatest risk, then, is not simply the absence of a transition. It is the simulation of one." In other words, Delcy Rodríguez mimics democratization without actually ceding any power or allowing greater opposition participation in government, not to mention maintaining some level of repression.

Unfortunately, the main proposed solution was to look to the U.S. to force benchmarks. I don't think it's particularly useful to posit solutions that Donald Trump obviously won't implement.

So what changes this slow reconsolidation of authoritarianism? What I wonder is what happens if María Corina Machado returns to Venezuela. There is much we don't know, particularly in terms of what the Trump administration has been telling her. It's reasonable to hypothesize, however, that at some point she'll decide that being friends with Trump isn't accomplishing anything for her country.

From what I gather, which was reaffirmed in the panel on Venezuela I was recently on, is that Venezuelans are hesitant and uncertain. There might've been a spark of excitement a few months ago but that's died down. MCM's return would be a huge deal and she would attract crowds.

For her personally, it would be a dangerous game of two-way chicken, and when I say dangerous I mean very potentially for her own life, so this would be no easy decision. Here are the two angles:

1. Implicitly challenging Delcy to detain her, which would be a PR disaster for the regime and I'm not sure even Trump could ignore it, which is why he doesn't want MCM going there at all.

2. Implicitly (or maybe even explicitly) trying to get Trump's support for much earlier elections, which he doesn't want. And challenging Trump is risky because he takes everything personally. Plus, all he wants out of Venezuela is oil without a headache. This is a headache.

In general, her return would shake things up.

How Popular Can the Venezuelan Right Be?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 27 Apr 2026 13:03:00 +0000

Something that hasn't exactly been ignored but really deserves more attention is how well María Corina Machado and the opposition generally connect with Venezuelans. At her rally in Madrid, a Venezuelan singer joined in chants of "get the monkey out" in reference to Delcy Rodríguez. Remember that Hugo Chávez was also routinely called a monkey by the right.

Poverty and class divisions propelled Chávez to power in the first place and it's not clear that the right has ever thought much about its own role. Compare that to Chile, where the Socialist Party transformed itself as it underwent painful reflection over its role in the country's polarization in the early 1970s. Once democracy returned, the Socialists were most likely to engage in discussions with the right.

Edmundo González/MCM clearly won the 2024 presidential election but one could reasonably argue that many (most?) were against. Against Maduro, against dictatorship, against economic deprivation. The right has mostly positioned itself as the anti-Maduro and in a democratic transition that will not cut it for very long. If the right is still widely viewed as racist elites, that's not a recipe for electoral success. It probably is enough to win an initial election because the regime is so discredited, but it will face intense scrutiny and even public demonstrations if results don't come quickly enough.

As long as the U.S. keeps Delcy Rodríguez in power, even in violation of the constitution, the less pressure there is on the right to develop a detailed platform, beyond just opening up markets and rebuilding institutions. That's a shame.

Latin Americans See China as a Good Partner

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 12:56:00 +0000

A new region-wide poll and report have some very interesting insights. This is from the German Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation, the magazine Nueva Sociedad, and the Diálogo y Paz group, authored by some well-known Latin American scholars. A major takeaway is how positively Latin Americans view China.

So, for example, Latin Americans consider China a better partner than the United States for protection of the environment, culture and education, commerce and infrastructure (by a lot!), digital technology (by an even more lot), and even combating poverty. And here's a fun one: Latin Americans trust Donald Trump far less than Nicolás Maduro.

I'll keep banging this drum. The Maduro kidnapping and the bombing of boats is headline-grabbing hard power but there is no much below the surface that is not making headlines in the U.S. This is even true of presidents (Javier Milei is a major example) that publicly are very pro-Trump.

For every attack and every tariff threat, there is a reaction. Under Trump the U.S. is not a reliable partner. Even if you have a trade deal he might suddenly ignore it. The administration has long given up caring about soft power and China is right there, regardless of all the threats. And Latin Americans know it.

What Venezuela Needs

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 23 Apr 2026 13:40:00 +0000

I am constantly checking to see if there is any new political news from Venezuela and the answer is typically no. What I am seeing instead is a steady stream of commentary about what Venezuela needs.

I don't generally read these because I want to know what's actually happening, not what people (especially non-Venezuelans) want to happen. From what I gather, here is what's actually happening:

1. The U.S. is sucking oil and resources out of the country.

2. Delcy Rodríguez is engaging in purges and otherwise consolidating her rule.

3. Trump is perfectly happy with Delcy as long as he can keep sucking oil and resources.

4. Delcy's rule is becoming shaky in constitutional terms but I don't know who would enforce it.

5. María Corina Machado is talking a lot about returning but appears to be waiting for Trump's green light.

6. Repression continues but whether it has softened is unknown (at least from here).

None of this is particularly new, which is the troubling part. Nothing going on is conducive to making Venezuelans' lives better and certainly not for democracy. What I wonder and certainly do not know is when the Venezuelan people will start protesting in large numbers. Otherwise I don't know if Delcy feels any pressure to liberalize, much less democratize.

Reminder: Venezuela's Democracy Isn't Trump's Goal

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 13 Apr 2026 16:56:00 +0000

Former Ambassador to Venezuela James Story has an op-ed where he laments that the Trump administration might be losing leverage to force political liberalization. Perhaps because it is impolitic he does not address the elephant in the room, which is that Trump doesn't care about liberalization, much less democracy.

The message to Chavista elites, long conditioned to see sanctions as the price of authoritarian behavior, is that change in personalities, not in institutions, may suffice to regain international legitimacy. That is a dangerous precedent in a system where the legislature remains dominated by loyalists, the courts are deeply politicized and the security services have never been held to account.

This is not a "dangerous precedent" when you don't care. If oil flows to the U.S. then you're all good. Further:

It signals that international legitimacy no longer hinges on competitive elections or institutional pluralism.

Correct! And it all just makes more sense when you realize that this is totally fine for Trump. Come on, he's been actively supporting Victor Orbán (who just lost!). Story asks what the Venezuelan people should think of all this and the answer is simple: Trump hears that they loved his actions to remove Maduro and that's all he cares about.

In short, Trump wants (and has) leverage over oil. Whether or not he loses leverage over liberalization is something I guarantee has never entered his mind. He never thinks about it because he has exactly zero interest in it.

Throwback U.S. Policy on Terrorism

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 10 Apr 2026 15:04:00 +0000

A hallmark of U.S. Cold War policy in Latin America was to label virtually any reformer as a Communist and therefore as a terrorist or tool of Moscow. And now we're back.

The United States was as concerned as always about Islamist terrorism, said the official, Monica A. Jacobsen, according to a copy of her prepared remarks reviewed by The New York Times and three officials briefed on the meeting. But, she told her counterparts from Europe, Canada and Australia, the Trump administration also wanted more attention on what it believed was an insidious, underestimated threat: the far left.

Western governments must combat “antifa and far-left terrorism,” Ms. Jacobsen’s prepared remarks asserted, casting the effort as an evolution in counterterrorism following the “global war on terror.” Her prepared speech defined far-left terrorism to include threats from communists, Marxists, anarchists, anticapitalists and those with “eco-extremist” and “other self-identified antifascist ideologies.”

Now, as then, all this means is that you can target your political opponents by labeling them in a particular way. "Antifa," of course, isn't even an organization, and far left terrorism is far rarer today in Latin America and elsewhere than it was during the Cold War. It reflects mindlessly casting around for scapegoats.

In Cold War Latin America, it led to widespread murder, torture, and misery. Those are the only possible outcomes. The good news is that this appears not be getting much traction except from the far right.

Who the Venezuelan Amnesty Doesn't Cover

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 08 Apr 2026 17:49:00 +0000

Delcy Rodríguez says she is putting together a group of religious leaders to help oversee the amnesty process. The problem is that the government claims differ from NGOs:

La brecha entre las cifras oficiales y las verificadas independientemente es sustancial. Mientras el diputado Jorge Arreaza, presidente de la comisión parlamentaria de seguimiento, informó que al 26 de marzo 8.416 personas obtuvieron “libertad plena”, Foro Penal contabilizaba al 30 de ese mes 490 presos políticos aún recluidos: 303 civiles y 187 militares. La diferencia metodológica es determinante: el gobierno incluye en sus totales a personas con medidas cautelares no privativas de libertad, mientras la organización solo registra excarcelaciones efectivas de quienes estaban físicamente en prisión. Foro Penal advirtió además que la ley aplica en la práctica solo a 13 de los 27 años que dice abarcar.

But there remains the bigger question of who the amnesty doesn't cover, namely the thousands of Venezuelans who have been harassed, attacked, detained, and the like without any criminal charges. Their names are in databases and there is no sign that they are being erased.

That's beyond the purview of the religious leaders, who are tasked with the amnesty, not the amnesty's forthcomings. But all those people are living in fear or in many cases have fled the country. If a colectivo comes after you on a motorcycle, grabbing your phone, threatening, or maybe even shooting, then you leave the country even when there are no formal charges. And those folks can't find relief in the amnesty.

New Paradigm Shift in US Policy Toward Latin America?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 03 Apr 2026 18:29:00 +0000

Carlos Pared Vidal has a piece out in Global Americans about the new paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy:

First, public signaling: a disciplined communications posture that frames the stakes, clarifies red lines, and compresses negotiating timelines. Second, economic leverage: sanctions, tariff tools, and related measures that expand the perimeter of bargaining. Third, targeted military action: limited in scope, often technology-intensive, and designed for outsized strategic effect.

I agree with the basic pattern but there is one problem*. Communications are very definitely not disciplined. At all. One key problem with both Iran and Venezuela is that neither country took Donald Trump's threats seriously because he so often threatens without doing anything. His communication consists of social media posts with lots of caps and exclamation points.

So the trick here is to figure out when he's actually serious, which is impossible. Trump viciously criticized Colombian President Gustavo Petro, then later said he was great even though nothing had really changed. He's done with same with Lula. Often his communications are vague and therefore not clear about what he actually wants.

Perhaps as the number of wars he launches increase, leaders will assume he means what he says, but I am not sure we're quite there yet.

* Given the Iran morass, I am not so sure the military action is limited in scope. Perhaps just because the U.S. has not (yet) committed ground troops. But that's not my focus in this post.

Democratic Transition Timing in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 02 Apr 2026 18:14:00 +0000

This is Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Fox News:

Q. You met earlier today with the Venezuelan opposition leader, María Corina Machado. Right now, Delcy Rodríguez seems to have been working well with the U.S.

A. Ultimately, there will have to be a transition phase. There will have to be free and fair elections in Venezuela, and that point has to come. And that has to – it’s not forever, but we have to be patient, but we also can’t be complacent. And so I feel very good about the progress we’ve made in Venezuela in three months.

He chose both not to discuss the specific people and to remain vague on timing. Vagueness has been a hallmark of the transition plan. But avoiding mention of MCM is interesting because at the same time the administration just lifted sanctions on Delcy Rodríguez, who Trump is clearly very satisfied with. The 2018 sanctions noted the following:

“President Maduro relies on his inner circle to maintain his grip on power, as his regime systematically plunders what remains of Venezuela’s wealth. We are continuing to designate loyalists who enable Maduro to solidify his hold on the military and the government while the Venezuelan people suffer,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin. “Treasury will continue to impose a financial toll on those responsible for Venezuela’s tragic decline, and the networks and front-men they use to mask their illicit wealth.”

Delcy Rodríguez still has a hold on the military and the government and the Venezuelan people still suffer. Clearly that isn't the point for the Trump administration. The point is the oil. Elsewhere in the interview:

The second is a phase of recovery. And that’s what we’re in – the recovery phase – right now, where you’re seeing not just economical recovery going on in Venezuela, but you’re also seeing an economic recovery in a way that’s good for the United States. I mean, they are shipping all of that oil to our refineries, and that money is being – the profits from that is being deposited into bank accounts controlled by the United States Treasury, and the money is going to the benefit of the Venezuelan people, not being stolen.

What I love is that in the same sentence Rubio says the profits from Venezuelan oil are going into U.S. bank accounts and that now they're not being stolen.

What is Regime Change Anyway?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 12:49:00 +0000

Donald Trump says regime change in Iran is complete.

Though Iran’s clerical and military establishment remain in control of the country, and its most hard-line factions may even have emerged strengthened, Mr. Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One: “We’ve had regime change.”

“The one regime was decimated, destroyed, they’re all dead. The next regime is mostly dead,” he said. He suggested that Iran had moved onto its “third regime,” and that American negotiators were speaking to “a whole different group of people,” who have “been very reasonable.”

We don't actually know what negotiations are going on, but that's not the point. Trump sees regime change in terms of individuals. That's not the way it's typically been used, though it's a slippery context. Here's a more common way of thinking about it:

A regime, then, may be characterized as that part of the political system which determines how and under what conditions and limitations the power of the state is exercised. In other words, the concept of regime is concerned with the form of rule.

This can be related to the individual(s) in power but it's more of an overall way of conceiving how state power should used. You can have changes of government but not regime change, even though each ruler may not wield power in exactly the same way (maybe think of Fidel and Raúl Castro). In Venezuela I don't think we can say regime change happened because as of now the state wields power in very similar ways and there is no move toward elections, which would drastically change how power is used. Venezuela is in a really weird liminal space, though.

Coming back to Trump, he views regime change in terms of finding a leader who will work with him to do what he wants on a limited number of very specific issues, especially oil, in a way that clearly erodes sovereignty. The entire structure of the government doesn't need to change. He doesn't care.

Perhaps the bottom line is whether we should say regime change is happening if the average person sees little change in how they relate to the state. The U.S. may reap tremendous benefits in looted oil, but Venezuelans aren't sure what's coming next or whether they're free to speak out.

Venal Leadership in Cuba and Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Sat, 28 Mar 2026 17:19:00 +0000

I am at the Southeastern Council of Latin American Studies conference. Yesterday Renata Keller presented a paper based on her book on the regional response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and I've been finishing up the excellent podcast series on the crisis (which she also co-leads). The stark difference between that era and now has really struck me.

At that time, and in Venezuela, say, 20-25 years ago, the leadership was popular and committed to a particular political and economic project. Ultimately that's why the Bay of Pigs failed as did the 2002 coup in Venezuela.

What we have now are Cuban and Venezuelan leaders totally open to negotiation about ceding sovereignty because in fact they believe in nothing beyond self-preservation and access to power. Now we hear about the Castro family negotiating like a royal family, which they clearly view themselves as, while the Rodriguez's do the same in Venezuela.

Meanwhile, they negotiate with a U.S. president with no interest in democracy, which is precisely what gives them incentive to talk in the first place. I think the Venezuelan example gives them hope that they can sacrifice Miguel Diaz-Canel, who doesn't mean anything to anyone, hold onto power, and avoid consequences.

I just think any discussion of U.S. actions towards these countries needs to grapple with the venality of their leaders.

Will Russia Do Anything For Cuba?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 13:17:00 +0000

I had not thought all that much about what Russia would do if the U.S. attacked Venezuela and/or Cuba. I have countless posts about how Russian and Iranian influence was far lower than alarmists wished to portray. That said, the Russia-Cuba relationship is very old and deep, so I might have expected more than zero. But with Venezuela, it was zero.

And for Cuba it has been pretty much zero up to this point. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement about Cuba and it is pretty vague:

"There has been a deliberate effort to ratchet up the atmosphere of confrontation," the ministry said in a statement on its website.

"Against this backdrop, Russia reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the Cuban Government and its brotherly people. We firmly condemn attempts to grossly interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, intimidate it and engage illegal unilateral restrictive measures," it said.

It noted that Cuba today faces unprecedented challenges created by the long-standing trade, economic and financial embargoes imposed by the United States. "For our part, we are providing and will continue to provide Cuba with the necessary support, including material assistance," it said.

The main material assistance is needs now is oil and a commitment to defending Cuba militarily. The latter has not happened and I can't imagine it happening for a variety of reasons. Oil is more doable but hasn't happened yet. There appears to be a Russian oil tanker on its way but we'll have to see what happens. The rubber hits the road when the U.S. and Russia face off directly.

Cuba just doesn't have allies willing to deal with the U.S. A big part of it is that the revolution is long dead. It's very similar to Venezuela in that ideals were once real and now are just pantomime. It's all just clinging to power at this point. Cuba was once widely admired in Latin America but that's a long time ago. Miguel Díaz-Canel is an uninteresting bureaucrat who does not generate even a modicum of admiration anywhere. Who would want to risk U.S. retaliation for that?

CHina Supplants Midwest Farmers

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 18:47:00 +0000

Keep looking beyond the big headlines to see what happens with China in Latin America. One such example is that farmers in the midwest are concerned by how China has shifted away from buying U.S. soybeans and instead is buying even more from Latin America, where it now has long-standing relationships and infrastructure.

And the farmers know why. It's not complicated Here is a quote from one:

For her, the changing politics and policies have made the United States an “unreliable trading partner.”

“The only way that we become their top choice would be if our soybeans were far cheaper than South America’s.”

China has been strategically investing in infrastructure, especially after 2018 when the Trump administration's trade war policy heated up. The U.S. slaps tariffs on China, which reciprocates. The reciprocation means that U.S. farmers get shut out because Brazil doesn't impose such tariffs. It's how global capitalism works. You can't count on unreliable trading paretners so you do your best to work around them.

What this does, of course, is to cement exactly what the Trump administration claims it doesn't want, which is increased Chinese investment and involvement in Latin America.

Watch for more of this all the time. It's been ongoing.

Human Rights Still Abused in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 13:28:00 +0000

A UN fact finding mission went to Venezuela and one of its members discussed ongoing human rights abuses for the period going back to September 2025.

First of all, she noted the very obvious holes in the amnesty law:

It applies only to criminal offences (and not to civil, disciplinary, administrative or other types of proceedings) and only to a closed list of events. It excludes a large number of individuals detained in relation to other incidents, including alleged “armed or forceful actions” against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country—an accusation frequently used by authorities to detain military personnel, ex-military members and civilians.

Further, people are still being detained. I had been wondering about the colectivos, which are specifically mentioned:

Information available to the Mission confirms that “colectivos”—armed civilian groups— continue to operate. Civic and democratic space remains severely restricted. Civil society organizations, the few remaining independent media outlets, and political actors continue to face attacks, harassment or intimidation. The prospects for full guarantees necessary for free and democratic elections remain remote.

It notes that all of the laws used to repress people remain on the books. The fact is that while there appears to be a lot of cautious optimism, the entire repressive apparatus and the people who run them remain exactly as they were before the invasion. There are a million ways this could go, but elections are the clearest way to repeal all of that.

Cartel Proclamation

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 15:26:00 +0000

Donald Trump issued a proclamation in conjunction with his Shield of the Americas initiative.

(1) Criminal cartels and foreign terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere should be demolished to the fullest extent possible consistent with applicable law.

There is nothing new here, except maybe the use of the word "demolish" to be dramatic.

(2) The United States and its allies should coordinate to deprive these organizations of any control of territory and access to financing or resources necessary to conduct their campaigns of violence.

This is already a goal, even with countries not part of the initiative. If there is enhanced regional coordination that would be great.

(3) The United States will train and mobilize partner nation militaries to achieve the most effective fighting force necessary to dismantle cartels and their ability to export violence and pursue influence through organized intimidation.

In general this is not new. How it gets carried out may well be. More coordination isn't necessarily a bad thing, though I don't know if that's what they have in mind (to be fair, they may well not know what they have in mind). But you can't help but think about Operation Condor kind of stuff.

The biggest problem here is that this is pure military, in a way that echoes the worst parts of the Cold War. No mention of civilian authorities, democracy, governance, etc. So what will the training consist of? If it means blowing up boats, it can get dicey. In any event, blowing up boats doesn't do anything to dismantle cartels or reduce violence.

There are longstanding debates about the role of the military in Latin America, which I've been part of and don't need to rehash here. Suffice it to say that military autonomy when it comes to using force is problematic. But I also know the administration doesn't see it as a problem.

(4) The United States and its allies should keep external threats at bay, including malign foreign influences from outside the Western Hemisphere.

This is straight-up Cold War, so what's old is new again. Obviously this is aimed at China, though secondarily to Iran and its allies, which are an age-old boogeyman for the U.S. right. The difference with the Cold War is that China has been deeply involved in Latin America for almost 30 years, which was certainly not the case with the Soviet Union.

And I'll say, over and over, that if the U.S. wants to keep China at bay it needs to offer itself as an alternative, which is in conflict with an "America-first" attitude.

The Venezuelan Opposition and Presidential Election

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 19:00:00 +0000

When the U.S. announced its re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Venezuela, it included mention of a "phased process" toward "a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government." Meanwhile, there is an opinion piece at Caracas Chronicles that calls for a primary to determine a single opposition candidate.

The twist is that María Corina Machado is clearly the opposition leader with the most political momentum (though she is now out of the limelight) but Trump consciously sidelined her and brought Enrique Márquez, another opposition leader who also ran in the 2024 election and was an opposition member of the CNE for several years, to the State of the Union. That gives us two high visibility candidates, which is exactly what Delcy Rodríguez would want and the regime wanted for many years before that--opposition division. So a single candidate makes sense if they can agree to it.

But there is also the question of what their platform will be. People will want to know what the opposition will do better and be reassured that the social services they have won't be removed. The country is already selling oil to the U.S. and Delcy talks very nicely about Donald Trump so you can't promise better relations. You can't really promise trials or accountability. You can talk about free market capitalism but you'll want to be very careful with that.

Delcy Rodríguez did a verbal 180, or close to it, so it's hard to be her opposite, whereas just in December it would've been easy. So it gets easier for people to choose her and avoid the unknown.

Shield of the Americas Summit

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 19:32:00 +0000

Donald Trump is pulling an Hugo Chávez. Chávez thought the OAS was too pro-U.S. so he created CELAC, which was more leftist. He also created UNASUR, which did a few things and then disintegrated. Right-wing governments created PROSUR, which as far as I know hasn't done much of anything and likely barely exists. CELAC still exists but mostly disagrees, which frankly is a lot of what the OAS does as well.

So now Trump is creating the Shield of the Americas, a disparate group of countries whose sole thing in common is that their current government is on the right*. The formal announcement comes Saturday so we don't yet know details but it is hard to imagine it being significantly different from all the others. He just learned that Kristi Noem will be the U.S. "special envoy," which means ideology will be front and center, and reality several steps behind. It also signals this institution is not super important to him because he's putting someone in that he just fired.

Part of the new institution's goal will be to push back on China. As I and plenty of others have argued, however, the U.S. needs to be a reliable partner to make this happen, and impromptu tariffs combined with reneging on past agreements make that challenging. Maybe you can push out Chinese investment to some degree if U.S. investors are ready but what about trade?

I recommend Adam Ratzlaff's take on it. An additional point to make based on the experience of the other existing multilateral institutions is that governments change and a new leftist government will have considerably less interest. If it becomes ideologically obnoxious they may just leave it. That's the core problem of ideologically based institutions. Ideologies change. A Chilean president helped created PROSUR and a Chilean president suspended the country's participation in it. That's how it goes.

* Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Paraguay, El Salvador, Ecuador, Argentina, Honduras, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Chile. And I believe Panama.

Rebellion in Cuba and Venezuela?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 16:29:00 +0000

Rut Diamint and Laura Tedesco have an essay in Foreign Affairs about Cuba, arguing that the long-standing revolutionary model is ending and that we don't know what will replace it. There is one part that I wonder about:

To be sure, many Cubans would likely perceive their government’s acquiescence to U.S. demands as an erosion of Cuban sovereignty, even a reversion to the island’s pre-revolutionary status as a U.S. client state. A rebellion by the military and parts of society cannot be ruled out.

Is this true? In both Venezuela and Cuba we have a strong revolutionary past that has long ceased serving its own citizens. Further, the people in power aren't the original leaders, who had strong personal followings. Instead, there are annointed leaders who mostly make their citizens' lives worse. These revolutions are long dead.

I am dubious about the "reversion" argument because it's over 60 years ago so very few people experienced it. I can see military leadership feeling threatened (as targets) but would rank-and-file Cubans want to fight for this revolution? What would the goal of such a rebellion be? Put some authoritarian technocrat back in power?

Nationalism matters. A lot. U.S. protectionism will wear thin, perhaps quickly. But people want solutions to immediate problems. The Venezuelan revolution was starting to fail before the U.S. government turned the economy screws on it. The Cuba revolution had suffered the embargo for many years but is a dependent revolution so was hurt even worse by the fall of the Soviet Union and the gradual decline of Venezuelan oil production. Obviously the Trump administration made things worse but they were already bad.

Venezuelans and Cubans will certainly fight for their countries but I am not convinced they'll fight for these governments. I especially wonder because up to this point Trump has avoided occupying forces that could become targets. An occupying force would change everything but that's not where we are up to this point.

What if María Corina Machado Returned?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 04 Mar 2026 18:12:00 +0000

María Corina Machado says she plans to return to Venezuela in a few weeks. The big question, of course, is what the regime will do about it. We have this:

“With respect to her life, we do not understand why there is so much commotion,” Rodríguez said. “As for her return to the country, she will have to answer before Venezuela. Why did she call for a military intervention? Why did she call for sanctions against Venezuela? And why did she celebrate the actions that took place at the beginning of January?”

It's a pretty funny statement when you think about it since everyone knows why MCM called for those things. Military intervention is what got this ball rolling.

What fascinates me are all the political calculations going on. I assume there are all kinds of discussions, including between MCM and Marco Rubio. The thing is, I don't see how they could arrest her without creating mayhem, which would lead to repression and some kind of U.S. response. I also figure the U.S. would prefer not to have to respond because it's clear Trump himself has zero interest in Venezuelan democracy. So there's a good chance she doesn't come back until she's received some kind of green light. On the other hand, she could chance it and just go.

But if they let her in without imprisoning her, then things will accelerate. She will have rallies and they will be large as people feel emboldened. The call for elections will get louder. That would not be allowed just a short time ago and it's unclear how the regime would respond to it now.

Anti-Terrorism Courts in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 27 Feb 2026 15:16:00 +0000

The International Commission of Jurists just released a report on the use of anti-terrorism courts in Venezuela to, frankly, terrorize the population. The anti-terrorism code got going 20ish years ago under Hugo Chavez and conveniently did not define the term. So it simply came to mean regime opponents, same as many other Venezuelan laws intended to attack the population. Subsequent laws provided some more definition, but it could mean anything the regime wanted since the courts did whatever it wanted.

The anti-terrorism laws were used extensively after the fraudulent 2024 election, with references to "treason" and "conspiracy" that had no real meaning. They also used the term "hate" since it had its own vague law.

The report notes at the end that it was largely written before the U.S. invasion and certainly well before the amnesty. It's not clear to me that supposed anti-terrorism charges would automatically be dropped due to the amnesty. All these laws need to be abrogated and anyone even remotely held under suspicion by the government should be allowed unconditional freedom (and ability to return to the country).