Two Weeks Notice: A Latin American Politics Blog

Venezuelan Violators of Human Rights

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 13:19:58 +0000

This is a great example of the rhetorical gymnastics required to support Delcy Rodríguez. ICE reports that it deported a former colonel in the Bolivarian National Guard, who was a known violator of human rights. Here's how he is described: "a known human rights violator who participated in the detention and torture of political dissidents during the Maduro regime."

We can all agree that's criminal. But we can also all agree that DR was the vice president of that very same regime. We can, in fact, very accurately refer to it as the Maduro-Rodríguez regime. This dude is the small fry (though big enough). She is the big kahuna, the person who helped order all the tortures. But somehow now she's not part of the "Maduro regime."

Which leads me to the next point. OK, you removed him from the United States, but since he's going back to the regime that hired him it's not like you're punishing him beyond the fact that Venezuela is in shambles. I guess Marco Rubio could tell DR to put him in jail but that would logically mean putting lots of other people, including herself, in jail too.

Is Delcy Rodriguez President, Acting President, or Neither?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 15:10:39 +0000

One of the many weird things about current Venezuelan politics is that according to the Venezuelan constitution, Delcy Rodríguez is not the president. There is no legal president. A presidential vacancy must be filled within 180 days, which was on July 3.

Artículo 234. Las faltas temporales del Presidente o Presidenta de la República serán suplidas por el Vicepresidente Ejecutivo o Vicepresidenta Ejecutiva hasta por noventa días, prorrogables por decisión de la Asamblea Nacional por noventa días más.

Si una falta temporal se prolonga por más de noventa días consecutivos, la Asamblea Nacional decidirá por mayoría de sus integrantes si debe considerarse que hay falta absoluta.

The National Assembly hasn't done anything and obviously there have been no elections. So she's not legally the president. But then I saw a news story that called something to my attention. Official government references (like this one) have dropped the "acting" and just refer to her as president, which is not legally true.

Many people--me certainly--have been in organizations where the bylaws fall behind practice, but we're talking about a country, where the stakes are extraordinarily high. Falling out of constitutionally rips up the social contract and is dictatorship. It leads to real and severe problems.

Another Report on Cuba

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 20 Aug 2026 17:47:48 +0000

The America First Policy Institute published a report on Cuba. I think it's actually a lot better than the State Department's report from last month. But I was mostly curious about the policy implications and what the report demonstrates is that the U.S. just has no options that it hasn't tried before.

Of the 12 policy recommendations, 6 of them say the U.S. should demand something of Cuba that we've demanded before and they've continued to ignore. "Break the Communist Party's Grip on Cuba" has been a priority since the 1960s. There's nothing new in the report telling us how it would happen now. There is quite a lot of demanding and requiring but how?

Another is to increase economic pressure. It's unclear to me how this can be increased--the U.S. has been squeezing Cuba since the 1960s and the Trump administration has ratcheted it up even more. Increases have never worked before and no one can possibly know whether immiserating the Cuban people more will suddenly be different.

One of the interesting ones is to restore Radio Martí and TV Martí, which the administration dismantled. "The Trump Administration was right to target waste and inefficiency in these programs, but their underlying mission remains important." It never made sense to me why they were targeted since the main criticism they had received was that they were too conservative.

The last recommendation is to "Keep Every Lawful Instrument of American Power on the Table." This is interesting for two reasons. The first is that it's really been true since 1959. The U.S. has used every action imaginable though obviously after the Bay of Pigs, invasion was not viewed favorably. Not even Trump seems to view it favorably. But the second is why the report uses the word "lawful." In a sense it may reflect how often illegal means have been used and how terribly ineffective they've been (there are tons of declassified documents on this).

To be fair, what other recommendations can there even be, legal or not? Cuba isn't Venezuela so I don't get the impression that the U.S. has found enough willing partners inside Cuba to do a snatch-and-grab. The U.S. has tried invasion, assassination, economic sanctions and deprivation, political isolation, denunciation, punishment of countries that do business with Cuba, covert harassment, intelligence gathering, immigration policy, individual sanctions, and everything else under the sun. At various times the U.S. has also tried to soften some of those policies as a carrot. I just don't know what's left.

CRS Report on Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 18 Aug 2026 14:42:27 +0000

The Congressional Research Service published a new report on Venezuela, "Venezuela's Post-Maduro Transition and U.S. Policy." As always it's a great resource for a non-partisan summary of what's going on and even what bills are currently under deliberation (there are at least six right now) and what else could be done.

Because it's rooted in Congress, it gives suggestions that would assert congressional influence, which at the moment seems quite unlikely. The most unlikely of all is to "urge or require the Administration to consult with the EU and Canada when making decisions on targeted sanctions." Since the President of the United States insults the EU and Canada on a regular basis and constantly talks about America First, it's hard to imagine Republicans allowing anything like that forward.

The Senate did recently pass a resolution that I thought was quite good, but I am not seeing signs that Congress wants to play a major role in Venezuela policy aside from getting administration officials to testify and face questions. Since Trump is set on a particular course, congressional activism would have to require Republicans questioning his choices. I'm not sure there is stomach for that. I would hope so, like I would for any major policy, because the more questioning involved, the better. Foreign policy is rarely going as well as presidents like to claim.

State Department Video on the Monroe Doctrine

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 12 Aug 2026 15:06:35 +0000

A book that's been always interesting for me over many years is Samuel Flagg Bemis' The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation, published in 1943. As I contemplated writing my own textbook, I found a used copy and was fascinated by its perspective.

It's a great window into an era where professors had no doubts about how U.S. policy served to civilize others and spread our aura. The U.S. wielded power when it needed to in order to guide Latin American nations toward their own destinies. Introspection or a critical approach is nowhere to be found. Indeed, Bemis uses the word "imperialism" in an entirely positive way. The administration of Theodore Roosevely, he writes, "ushered in a new era in the Latin American policy of the United States, an era of protective imperialism" (p. 140). Even if you might allow a little bit of criticism for U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in the early 20th century, "that intervention was an honest intent, at least, to stabilize and strength the international relations of Central America" (p. 165).

Bemis had no way of knowing at the time that U.S. control of Cuba and Nicaragua would end up disastrous, fostering violent civil wars that eventually led to dictatorships that still exist and bedevil the U.S. in 2026. U.S. policy toward the two countries has been a failure in virtually every respect. What the U.S. sees as protective imperialism is viewed as noxious control within the country itself.

Which brings us to the video the State Department recently posted, narrated by Kevin Marino Cabrera, U.S. Ambassador to Panama. It is a celebration of the Monroe Doctrine that could've been written by Bemis but, unlike in 1943, we know that much of the outcomes were terrible for the U.S. Somehow occupation of Cuba was great but so was getting missiles out of Cuba, not understanding that the first led to the second. Daniel Ortega is powerful now because he led a group of Nicaraguans fighting a dictatorship the U.S. had installed decades ago.

We know this, it's not obscure history, and pretending it didn't happen will inevitably lead to other foreign policy disasters.

Continued Repression in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 10 Aug 2026 15:42:13 +0000

Foro Penal reports that the number of political prisoners in Venezuela increased from 379 to 382 from July 27 to August 3. That's bad enough, but there are also over 11,000 people whose liberty is restricted in some way even if they're not in prison. That's the liminal space that so many Venezuelans find themselves in, harassed and threatened by security forces.

It's very telling that the Trump administration never talks about political prisoners. It boasts about controlling the country but not about allowing the abuses that the regime still commits daily. The administration talks a lot about reconciliation and you cannot have that with people being attacked for their political views. Reconciliation has to include acceptance of alternate views.

Remember the short-lived amnesty? There has been precious little discussion about why it dissolved. I'm not even sure we have an accurate count of how many people it affected. Not nearly enough, clearly.

Venezuelans Are Unhappy With Delcy and Trump

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 06 Aug 2026 13:31:18 +0000

Venezuelan firm Meganalisis has a poll from after the earthquakes. It shows truly overwhelming disgust with Delcy Rodríguez regime, from her to government agencies. Some examples:

--93% say the information they get from the regime is either little or very little

--94% say they can't believe official information they get from it

--95% say they feel indignation after the earthquakes

--92% say the regime's response was bad or very bad

--96% say the regime could've done more

--78% feel deceived by the support Trump gives the regime

And the last one asks whether they believe Trump wants what's best for Venezuelans.

Look at the bottom part. Trump's positive image has dropped 70.7% since the invasion. He talks about how happy Venezuelans are with him but that's extremely outdated and is no longer true. Most people are still puzzled and trying to understand how the U.S. continues to support the dictatorship, perhaps waiting to see how negotiations go. The honeymoon is ending.

Senate Resolution on Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 05 Aug 2026 14:10:46 +0000

The Senate introduced a bipartisan resolution on Venezuela calling for elections. Ted Cruz and Tim Kaine are both on it. It is spot on. It calls for:

1. The "interim authorities" (definitely not using "government" though also not "regime") to immediately call for elections

2. Release of all political prisoners

3. Condemns any effort to go after people seeking public office, naming María Corina Machado

Currently, neither the Trump administration nor the Venezuelan regime want elections. Marco Rubio gets cagy about it when asked, saying it will take many months and citing Paraguay of all places. Therefore the U.S. Congress has an opportunity to push them publicly. The Venezuelan people clearly want democratic elections.

Rubio also had this nugget:

"They're not inheriting a disaster. They're not inheriting a reconstruction process. They're inheriting a functional state," he said, adding that the direction of the transition was positive even if the pace was not.

It's not a disaster? Yeah, it's a disaster that involves significant reconstruction. Sure, it's not Haiti, but that's a low bar.

What I also like about the resolution is that it doesn't mention the earthquake, which is becoming an excuse. Building a credible electoral authority is going to be a challenge, and even more so given the infrastructure that's been destroyed, but it's doable.

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 04 Aug 2026 14:05:53 +0000

Via Caracas Chronicles, Jorge Rodríguez and Dinorah Figuera say they had a phone call to start their dialogue. This was all through X.

There are three key points:

1. Dealing with the double earthquake

2. Strengthening democracy

3. Rights and political guarantees

It's not clear whether these get dealt with at one time or in order. In-person talks begin next week in Caracas.

Since Venezuela is not a democracy, it's actually a matter of starting it rather than strengthening it, but whatever. Note that there is no mention of an election. Figuera says the point of the dialogue is political transition, whereas Rodríguez emphasizes the earthquake. The last thing the regime wants is elections so it'll draw out the earthquake as long as possible.

Fortunately, the State Department's statement does mention elections, though not as part of this dialogue:

The U.S. welcomes the August 1 statements from Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly, led by Dinorah Figuera, and the interim government.

We support the launching of Venezuelan‑led efforts to address the urgent needs of those affected by the June 24 earthquakes, strengthen democratic institutions, expand political freedoms, and advance a more stable and prosperous future for the Venezuelan people. This process contributes significantly to the three phase plan the United States supports to bring about stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation and a transition to democratic elections.

We are confident this work can deliver tangible results for Venezuelans.

Will this dialogue generate a timetable for elections? No way to know at this point but that's what really matters. Without elections you can't get most of the things the State Department says it wants--democratic institutions, political freedoms, stability, reconciliation, etc.

Venezuela: Free Elections Before Reconciliation

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 03 Aug 2026 18:23:23 +0000

Marco Rubio recently gave an interview on Fox News. There's variety of stuff in there (the Cuba report, for example) but one thing in particilar caught my attention about Venezuela:

Ultimately, you have to have transition. At some point in time there has to be legitimate elections at every level so that people know that the government that’s there is a legitimate government chosen by their people. Step one towards that is a national reconciliation. This is a people that have been divided politically for a very long time against each other, and you’re going to have to look at models like what you saw happen in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. I think the role the U.S. Government can continue to play is as a facilitator of all of this.

Comparing Venezuela to Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union is the wrong approach. Those were actual nations that were becoming states again.

We should compare Venezuela to other past Latin American countries that underwent political transition. There is no perfect examples because Venezuela's path (invasion and retention of dictatorship) has no twin. It could become a weird category of negotiation with the U.S. more on the side of the dictatorship. But Rubio is talking about reconciliation so we don't need a perfect transition path--we just need to look at politically divided countries.

And the problem we then find is that reconciliation cannot happen under authoritarian rule. It happens after free elections. There might be parameters (e.g. an amnesty) that constrain what elected leaders can do, but only freely acting people can move toward bridging gaps. Right now, many Venezuelans are afraid to speak openly.

The great thing about democracy is that you have to reach out beyond your supporters. You have to show why you're not just a return to what plenty of people thought was a failed political system. The Chilean Christian Democrats successfully did that. So you need elections. But somehow they somehow always come at the end of the list of U.S. priorities.

Mexico Deepening Relationship with China

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 30 Jul 2026 17:29:53 +0000

Look beyond the tariffs Mexico imposed on China (which were accompanied by a meeting to explain them and plan future engagement). Donald Trump's announcement that he doesn't want to automatically renew the USMCA means Mexico is likely to deepen its relationship with China. On this point, check out Evan Ellis' latest policy paper. It outlines the many ways that relationship has spread, even military to a small extent.

One thing I wasn't aware of is how Chinese tourism increased 15% in 2025 over the year prior, with 224,000 Chinese coming by air. That is part of an intentional strategy by the Mexican government. Ellis doesn't mention it specifically, but tourism and various other things he mentions are all about soft power. It means Mexican views of China are more likely to be positive (which we've seen evidence of). It does not mean somehow not aligning with the U.S., though of course Mexico has always adopted a consciously and cautiously independent foreign policy, and so it'll be more amenable to China generally.

Anyway once again we have the irony of the U.S. talking about wanting to reduce China's influence in Latin America and then making decisions that increase that influence.

Telesur's Head is Spinning

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 29 Jul 2026 14:19:18 +0000

For many years Telesur has been a dependably leftist, anti-U.S. government news source for Latin America. After all, Hugo Chávez himself created it. It's been fascinating to see how it frames the U.S. invasion and financial control of the country. Today there a glowing account of Delcy Rodríguez's first 200 days.

The funniest thing about it is that it talks about how much progress has been made since January, particularly in economic terms. It doesn't mention what was going on before January, it does not mention the United States except for the return of air travel, and it does not refer to Nicolás Maduro. It certainly does not mention all the Venezuelan money being sucked into U.S.-controlled accounts. Just one month prior to the invasion, Telesur wrote a glowing account of the amazing economic growth occurring under Maduro.

That's how state-controlled media works. Telesur avoids whatever truths the Venezuelan government wants to avoid. It covers up whatever the Venezuelan government is covering up. This particular situation is extreme, though, because it's now required to contradict so much of its previous reporting without admitting to doing so. Suddenly the United States isn't an enemy anymore either, which must be a first.

Is the U.S. Dividing the Venezuelan Opposition?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 27 Jul 2026 18:41:26 +0000

María Corina Machado says she will not participate in the negotiations between the regime and Dinorah Figuera, which is the U.S.-backed effort. She says she won't be an obstacle, though certainly not participating is an obstacle to eventual success if she doesn't sign on to whatever they agree to. She also mentioned returning to Venezuela but not when.

Henrique Capriles weighed in on the U.S. decision to exclude María Corina Machado from the negotiations with Delcy Rodríguez:

Whilst noting that “any political negotiation effort that delivers results for the people is positive”, Capriles wrote that the “negotiation process cannot be a calculation by someone, or against someone, or to exclude someone”. He said that “talks excluding María Corina Machado and what she represents will be doomed to fail”.

Intentionally or not, the U.S. has tapped into the longstanding lack of unity in the Venezuelan opposition, which posed a serious problem for confronting Chávez and then Maduro. In 2024 MCM became a legitimately unified candidate with mass support and that is now being undermined. Donald Trump just said that "Delcy's been doing a fantastic job," which isn't surprising but also isn't helping. Marco Rubio says MCM could participate in "reconciliation" but that's not the same as negotiation.

What we have, then, is a negotiation process led by someone who is far less known, with the highest profile opposition leaders criticizing the way it's being done. They aren't opposing talks but there's a lot less oomph with Figuera. It seems to strengthen Delcy Rodríguez's hand, as any split would, though maybe her hand is mostly whatever the U.S. wants to allow her to have.

These things are changing practically daily, but I keep wondering what an eventual ballot would look like. Can anyone run in an eventual election? If not, would the Venezuelan electorate be upset or just relieved their votes finally might actually matter? Is it thinkable that the opposite would remain split enough to give Delcy Rodríguez a chance?

US Defense Policy in Latin America

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 23 Jul 2026 14:15:14 +0000

Jorge Heine critically analyzes the speech given by Under Secretary of Defense/War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in Cusco. Heine's basic take is that the Latin American audience wasn't buying it. I read the speech and it's logically incoherent and often untrue.

Hard-left regimes that enable narco-terrorists multiplied across our Hemisphere from Maduro's Venezuela to Ortega's Nicaragua to Evo's Bolivia. These same governments and their allies in the region enabled unchecked mass migration by failing in their own countries and then exporting that failure to our country.

Neither Ortega or Evo have had anything to do with mass migration. Maduro certainly did but the effects were felt primarily in neighboring countries, not the U.S. There is much more migration from Mexico and other parts of Central America, none of which are "hard left."

We will not treat the ISIS, the al Qaeda of this Hemisphere, who menaces American lives with kid gloves rather than the forcefulness the threat requires simply because they are in the Western Hemisphere rather than the Eastern.

This is what Heine focused on in his essay. Latin American official don't view drug traffickers like Middle Eastern terrorist groups. They're different animals with different goals and tactics.

As an aside, the grammarian in me couldn't stand that sentence, which makes it sound like terrorists "menace American lives with kid gloves." Those kid gloves are scary.

This is why, historically, Latin countries frequently understood America's role to be the enabler not the suppressor of their independence.

This is nuts. The Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions happened only--only--because the U.S. made it clear that it suppressed independence.

Well, to be very candid, the fact is that America doesn't need your assets or your dependency.

This even more nuts. The Financial Times, which is no liberal mouthpiece, had a headline just yesterday that read "The US Has Collected About $13bn of Venezuela's Oil Money. Where Is It?" Trump talks endlessly about Venezuela's oil. It's not even hidden.

Our people are dying in large numbers because of the drugs that come into our country and the crime that accompanies them.

As is often the case, he looks only at supply and not demand. This is a fundamental disconnect. Latin Americans see a huge rich country with an insatiable appetite for illegal drugs. Stop buying the drugs and the problem goes away.

Third and finally, it is critical that you invest more in your own defense. There is no reason why any country, particularly those facing significant narco-terrorist threats, should spend so little on defense...This is possible here, too. Take Peru, for example, which just made one of the largest purchases of F-16's in the world.

Also nutty. After strongly emphasizing that Latin America's primary defense challenge is drug trafficking, he says the way to solve it is by buying F-16s. He does not explain how F-16s address drug trafficking. If you read all the press releases about the purchase it's clear that the main goal is to remain close to the U.S. military. Having F-16s is both symbolic (hey, we're a prosperious and strong country with new military gadgets!) and practical (we will be sending soldiers to the U.S. and buying U.S. parts).

Daniel Ortega: No Elections For You!

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 22 Jul 2026 13:20:01 +0000

I am reading Fabrice Lehoucq's book The Coup Trap in Latin America for a journal and it immediately came to mind when I saw that Daniel Ortega announced the end of elections in Nicaragua. Among other things (you'll have to wait for the review for more), Lehoucq argues that one way out of the coup trap is for a dictatorship to sever any ties between the military and potential civilian coup plotters. That is relatively rare and requires a lot of violence--you have to crush the disloyal. You have to be in power for about 20 years before the chances of a coup go from positive to negative. Ortega has been in office for 19.

That said, Nicaragua is a weird case because Ortega has not been a dictator for that whole time. Like with other cases of electoral authoritarianism, his crackdowns emerged gradually, becoming increasingly violent. But it does seem a case of successful killing, imprisoning, and exiling your way to political stability. Ortega is looking ahead to the 2027 elections, a time when according to Lehoucq we would expect an increased chance of a coup, and like so many other dictators is getting his affairs in order to avoid any real political challenge.

It's also a weird case because it's a co-presidency where octogenarian Ortega barely ever shows his face. This doesn't necessarily change the coup calculus because he has a co-president wife and an entire repressive apparatus to keep things humming along. It just makes the whole situation more sad and pathetic, the worst possible conclusion to a political career that began by trying to overthrow a dictator. He actually said he had to abolish elections to make sure Somocistas could never return to power.

New State Department Report on Cuba

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 21 Jul 2026 14:30:00 +0000

The State Department released a report on how Cuba has infiltrated the United States. I assume the authors see this as a transformational document. I also assume it will be cited in the case of a U.S. invasion. To give you sense, it uses the word "reportedly" 20 times. It purports to situate Cuba within every protest movement in the U.S. Jumping back and forth chronologically, it basically says there are few original protest ideas in the U.S.--they all come from Cuba. Fringe Cuba-linked groups control anti-ICE protests, that sort of thing. Overall, it's regurgitated McCarthyism.

Who's implicated?

--Professors (naturally!)

--Barack Obama (they had to get him in there somehow)

--Zohran Mamdani (ditto)

--anyone who doesn't approve of ICE tactics

--Black Lives Matter

--George Floy protests (which are labeled "uprisings")

--any kind of university protest (labeled "pro-terrorist activism on American college campuses")

With all the chronology jumping, it fails to show how support for the Cuban model is greatly reduced. In the past, yes, it was real and widespread, but that's not the case now. It also fails to acknowledge how you can simultaneously oppose the U.S. embargo and the dictatorship.

There are very, very few Communists anymore, but this report seeks to make it seem like there are. How much traction that gets remains to be seen. That may not matter anyway if the purpose is to justify foreign policy.

Latin American Views of the US and China

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:57:04 +0000

The Pew Research Center has a new poll on Latin American views of the United States and China. Views of the U.S. have worsened while China's have remained more or less the same. Results vary depending on the country, but it's obvious the Trump administration is needlessly squandering goodwill. The thing is, Latin Americans don't love Xi Jinping at all. China's advantage is mostly just not being overtly intrusive.

This just repeats what we know: Latin Americans play the field. They work strategically with different countries, without necessarily aligning with any of them. You don't have to love a leader to do business with their country, but the less confidence Latin Americans have in the U.S., the more they will seek alternatives.

Probably the saddest indicator is that fewer Latin Americans believe the U.S. respects personal freedoms. Mexicans believe China respects them far more than the U.S.

Freedom of Expression in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 16 Jul 2026 13:12:10 +0000

Luz Mely Reyes, Co-founder and editor of Efecto Cocuyo, submitted testimony on freedom of expression in Venezuela to the House Foreign Affairs Committee Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing on "Human Rights in Venezuela: Status and Opportunity." As you might guess, freedom of expression is most definitely not respected.

In particular, the Hate Law is still on the books and it can encompass pretty much anything the government wants it to, even on WhatsApp. Further, at least 43 media outlets, both national and international, are blocked in the country. Some journalists have been freed from prison but others remain. Journalists have been harassed trying to report on the earthquake. "Official rhetoric not only revictimizes them but also encourages further attacks against those who remain in the field of journalism."

It's clearly not something the Trump administration cares about.

Is Latin America Caught Between Rebalancing and Hegemonic Erosion?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 14 Jul 2026 13:40:20 +0000

Andres Malamud and Luis Schenoni recently published an article about Latin America being caught between strategic rebalancing and hegemonic transition:

The current international landscape lends itself to two competing interpretations. One understands it as a process of strategic rebalancing: a temporary hardening of U.S. leadership aimed at managing the decoupling from China in a bipolar world. The other conceives it as a hegemonic transition, in which U.S. primacy is being structurally eroded by China’s rise.

I find this binary approach a bit frustrating. As I've argued, Latin America has increasingly played the field and does not have to choose between alignment or non-alignment. Javier Milei loves Trump and also works closely with China. I guess it depends on what we mean by "alignment." No matter how much Trump (or Marco Rubio) talk about China, we are not in another Cold War. It's not all or nothing.

I don't think it's useful to view hemispheric relations in terms of a U.S.-China rivalry. Autonomy doesn't mean choosing sides--it means diversifying. As they write:

As one Latin American foreign minister confided to us, “active non-alignment or strategic autonomy sound very appealing and entertain academics, but the truth is that these concepts are beyond our grasp. We are vulnerable, and all we can do is try to play the game of political maneuvering”.

This nails it perfectly. There is no alignment or non-alignment. There is strategizing for your country's interests. Now more than ever, even with Trump, there is more room to do that.

Postponing Venezuelan Elections

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:46:53 +0000

To the surprise of no one, the Venezuelan regime says it can't even discuss elections anymore. It would distract from saving Venezuelans from the earthquake and would even be downright disrespectful.

In the short term, the earthquake works well politically for Delcy and Jorge Rodriguez precisely because they can wrap themselves in a cynical show of concern for the Venezuelans they've long neglected and postpone giving up power. But there are already complaints about corruption in the form of stealing goods meant for the victims (a la Anastasio Somoza). Unless the situation changes drastically, Venezuelan support for the regime--which is already deeply unpopular--will worsen.

The Trump administration seems totally uninterested in elections so this works just fine for them too. This all boils down to the Venezuelan people themselves. At what point do they get fed up and test the repressive institutions of the regime? It's also not at all clear how Maria Corina Machado will fit into this. At a certain point, which is impossible to determine ahead of time, Marco Rubio will have to either allow elections or actively go against the Venezuelan people. He's getting closer and closer to the latter.

Historical U.S. Policy and Current Realities

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:42:58 +0000

On his blog Henry Ziemer makes what he calls his most controversial opinions. One is "It's all the United States' Fault, That Matters Less Than You'd Think." In sum:

Everywhere you look in the region, the scars of past U.S. interventions and policy failures are painfully obvious. Still, I don’t think it follows that U.S. engagement today is by necessity pernicious or counterproductive. Nevertheless, I often find myself encountering a certain type of commentary that substitutes historical grievances for an actual understanding of current events.

My controversial take is that I don't find this very controversial. I think it would have been much more controversial to say in the past. When I started my dissertation research, Augusto Pinochet was still Commander in Chief so the 1973 coup remained very present. And don't get me started on how U.S. influence in that coup was actually much lower than is often assumed anyway. But it's not so present 30 years later.

Additionally, it's clear that especially in the post-Cold War era, sometimes U.S. policy is a positive force. The U.S. engineered the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 but also was a driving force (starting under George W. Bush) behind CICIG, an anti-corruption effort that was bearing fruit until another U.S. president, Donald Trump, looked the other way when corrupt Guatemalan officials got rid of it. In other words, the fact of the 1954 coup isn't related to policy decisions today, even though we may say it contributed to (but did not create) a long-term culture of authoritarianism and impunity.

My sense is that we see fewer op-eds these days that start by using the examples of 1954 Guatemala and 1973 Chile, which were often staples. U.S. policy toward Venezuela has no particular historical referent at all. Cuba policy may be an exception because the embargo actually started in the early Cold War and never stopped. There is more acknowledgment of Latin American agency, which is a welcome change.

The U.S. and Maria Corina Machado

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 29 Jun 2026 16:17:35 +0000

María Corina Machado wants to come back to Venezuela even more badly now because of the earthquake, which also largely coincides with the Trump administration trying to shove her to the side. The administration is not happy.

U.S. officials say they are frustrated with María Corina Machado, the exiled Venezuelan opposition leader, for requesting help facilitating her return to Venezuela in the aftermath of two devastating earthquakes, according to two White House officials.

They said Ms. Machado’s multiple requests were ill-timed, and one official called them a “political stunt.” The United States, as well as dozens of other countries, has been focused on giving aid to Venezuela on Saturday.

There are several things to untangle here.

First, I hate, and I mean hate, when politicians accuse other politicians of politicizing something. This earthquake is extremely political and deserves to be politicized. Usually this is meant to stop debate or change. In any event, she's been wanting to go back for months--it's not as if this is the first time she's pushed to do so.

Second, MCM is the most popular politician in Venezuela and so it is entirely reasonable for her to return as soon as possible. The U.S. wants long-term authoritarianism to give space to reap benefits from the oil industry while not having to worry about the messiness of democracy.

Third, giving her strong signals not to return is entirely imperialist. I am curious about what precisely U.S. officials have told her beyond vague discussions of waiting for more stability. That's been working up to this point but it's starting to show signs of strain. At a minimum, her return entails figuring out a passport because hers is expired and also having private security.

Fourth, if the Venezuelan regime response continues to be a problem, such as blocking private aid and preventing journalists and others from traveling freely, MCM's arrival could be hastened. Indeed, a transition could be hastened.

As always, things can change quickly.

Political Fallout of the Venezuelan Earthquake

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 25 Jun 2026 19:21:23 +0000

The huge earthquakes that hit Venezuela would be devastating under any circumstances, but they come in a country whose leadership has dismantled infrastructure while the U.S. had also been dismantling its own systems of humanitarian aid. The political fallout will be unpredictable and ongoing, but Marco Rubio has already said something concerning:

Mr. Rubio said that the earthquakes, which have killed at least 164 and destroyed hundreds of buildings, represented a “setback” for Washington’s multiphase plan to recover Venezuela’s moribund economy and ensure democratic elections.

Don't be surprised if Delcy Rodríguez latches onto this argument, namely that the already vague last part of the "plan" (which must be put in quotations to indicate that it is not exactly a plan) can be postponed in the name of rebuilding. You can't have elections until we get things back up to speed, that sort of thing.

Both the U.S. and the Venezuelan regime have been cagey about elections because neither want them very much. Both are getting what they want--oil, money, and power. Having elections means giving up some or all of the three.

It is impossible not to think of the 1972 Nicaragua earthquake, which helped spark rebellion because of the Somozas' naked corruption. Venezuelans were already wondering when they were going to benefit from the U.S. invasion and they're now going to need rapid and effective (and even mostly corruption free!) response, which Maduro/Rodríguez are definitely not known for.

All of this is so awful for the Venezuelan people, who are getting hit from all sides.

Modest Control of Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 24 Jun 2026 14:53:55 +0000

There is a line in an opinion piece in The Economist from late May that I just happened to see and really caught my attention. The argument is that an attack on Cuba is a bad idea.

Cuba is not Venezuela. Its dictatorship is more deeply entrenched and ideological. Perhaps Mr Trump might be able to replace the top communists with more pliable leaders, but even the modest degree of control he has established over Venezuela would be difficult to replicate.

The word "modest" grabbed me and despite all appearances it feels right. On January 2 Venezuela was a dictatorship with a high level of poverty and a lot of despair. Now in June none of that has changed except the despair is exacerbated by unfulfilled hope. U.S. control has been narrowly focused on funneling Venezuelan oil profits into a Citibank account in the United States.

One could reasonably argue that it's not inability to control but rather indifference about controlling. I have to chew on that but I don't think the U.S. can control an election campaign once it gets going. Or rather, it can throw its weight around but it'll be really hard to control the pent up desires of millions of Venezuelans. And at some point the Chavista rift will blow open and that won't be controllable either, except by brute force.

In other words, at this moment U.S. control is more tenuous than it seems and is based a lot on acquiescence, a "wait and see" attitude by everyone, a sort of honeymoon. Honeymoons end and reality sets in. When that happens we'll really see how strong U.S. control is.

U.S. Manipulation in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 23 Jun 2026 13:42:54 +0000

The latest U.S. effort to maintain control of Venezuela is to shove Maria Corina Machado aside and instead favor Dinorah Figueroa, who is president of the unofficial National Assembly elected in 2015. She is a legitimate member of the opposition but very clearly not the head of that opposition. Figueroa admitted she has differences with MCM. But now she's negotiating with Jorge Rodriguez. Further:

“María Corina es la líder, pero aquí estamos hablando de institucionalidad y yo soy presidente de la Asamblea Nacional.”

Clear as mud, and she didn't refer to the Panama Manifesto, which gave MCM the role of negotiating with Delcy Rodriguez. So a big question now is whether MCM cedes that role, which is also admitting that the whole thing can be scrapped if the U.S. demands it.

This is a delicate game for the U.S. to play and obviously we can mostly expect blunt instruments from the Trump administration. Delcy Rodriguez is very unpopular and Venezuela is primed to unite behind a single candidate. The U.S. is introducing a split. They seem to see MCM as too divisive and that may well be linked to the notion that she is not manipulable. She has stayed publicly mum, which right now seems like a good idea.

Overall, we have an unstable combination of an increasingly divided Chavismo and a potentially divided opposition. The Chavista division is clear and driven by anger at the eager cooperation with the imperial power. Beyond personalities, we'll have to wait and see what drives the opposition's division or whether it can be bridged.