Two Weeks Notice: A Latin American Politics Blog

Marco Rubio's Message to María Corina Machado

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 27 Oct 2026 12:51:37 +0000

Marco Rubio's message to María Corina Machado:

And you’re not going to street-protest your way into a democracy. It’s just not – the way you do it peacefully is through a process, and it’s the one we’ve set up. And if this process doesn’t work, then the alternative is going to be worse. The alternative is going to be either violence and armed conflict within the country, or back to the way things have been for the last 20 years, which have not been good for the people of Venezuela.

This is baldly untrue. I get what he means: electoral and judicial institutions should be reformed to ensure a free and fair vote. But still, it's untrue. Protests tend to be the most effective way of forcing democratic change, particularly in this context where the U.S. government clearly wants a transition that preserves its economic influence.

It just feels like Rubio doesn't trust MCM in no small part because the U.S. doesn't control her. She's a wild card with a massive following so they want her sidelined as much as possible. So she's been back for only like 48 hours and he's made several public statements aimed in her direction. I hope very much that elections are held before long and that the U.S. doesn't meddle with the process, though we can't count on that.

In the meantime, I will be fascinated to see how MCM operates. Her very presence--irrespective of protests--will hopefully speed up the process.

María Corina Machado Returns

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 26 Oct 2026 18:06:28 +0000

María Corina Machado returned to Venezuela, which is huge. No one can say how this will affect the political situation, which of course will be dictated by her actions. Clearly Marco Rubio expects her to toe the line.

In the weeks since, the process of political dialogue in Venezuela has gained momentum, the U.S. officials said. That has given the administration some confidence that the authoritarian government would not arrest Ms. Machado if she returned, they said.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Rubio expect Ms. Machado to respect and support the ongoing process of political dialogue as well as economic plans for Venezuela, one of the administration officials said.

She needs to support both the political negotiations she was intentionally excluded from and the business deals that she in fact has already questioned because the regime does not represent the interests of the Venezuelan people. So can she keep quiet about them? How does this directly challenge the authority of Dinorah Figuera in her capacity as opposition negotiator?

As an aside, I am struck by the Trump administration's claim that it needed to wait for confidence that she wouldn't be arrested. One could reasonably argue that if Rubio told them not to arrest her, then they wouldn't. But was there perhaps a whiff of doubt, a concern that they might arrest her anyway and call the administration's bluff?

Her return will change internal dynamics but no one can predict how. She's going to press for elections, fair business deals, and the like. She cultivates Trump but is not beholden to him. So let's see. But it's good she's back--Venezuela needs to become a democracy that's safe for everyone to return to.

Venezuela: Going Full Circle

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 23 Oct 2026 19:11:23 +0000

Billionares seem to be talking about Venezuela. Richard Branson says investment will flow in once there are elections. On the one hand, it's good in the sense that it can create more pressure to have free elections. That was certainly a factor in the U.S. starting to pressure Augusto Pinochet in the mid-late 1980s.

On the other, it's a return to an era that Hugo Chávez specifically fought against, where foreigners dominate the economy, which also means they have significant influence over the government's economic decisions. In the late 1980s that led to austerity policies that hurt a lot of people, followed by protests that were met with deadly force. Chávez stepped into politics in that context and people looked to him because theyir own elected leaders were not serving their interests.

It's now 40 years later. What replaced that splintered system is far worse and hurts most Venezuelans, so clearly change is needed. But the current U.S.-pushed plan to have foreign companies and billionaires swooping in will have long-term consequences. There are think tank conferences that say they're aimed at the Venezuelan private sector and I hope that becomes more common.

Regardless, are any of these folks discussing historical context as they go on about licensing, enforceable contracts, and regulatory obstacles? I hope so, though I am not terribly hopeful. Richard Branson doesn't know the history and almost certainly would have no interest in it. But Venezuelans do.

We constantly hear about the need for investment, protection of property rights, etc. but we don't hear anything about social programs. Early on, Chavismo gave many people hope who otherwise felt entirely outside the system. They were ultimately betrayed and they begin whatever new era we're in as outside the system once more.

The Latin American Right Hearts Delcy

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 22 Oct 2026 13:16:12 +0000

Imdat Oner has a good analysis at Responsible Statecraft about the Latin American right and Delcy Rodríguez. They were publicly critical of Nicolás Maduro's lack of legitimacy and now embrace Delcy because it's convenient. He goes through all the various reasons, which is worth reading and I won't bother repeating them. But I do not fully agree with this:

The decisive factor is Washington’s change of course. For many governments in Latin America, democratic principles and electoral legitimacy are becoming secondary considerations, defended mostly when they align with Washington’s preferences.

On the surface, yes, obviously, these are governments that want to remain in Trump's good graces and going along with this has no political cost. But there is something deeper here as well, a longstanding Latin American (or maybe everywhere) political pragmatism that manifests in all different ways. In a sense, this shouldn't surprise us at all.

Various examples:

--Hugo Chávez railed against the U.S. and international capitalism but happily continued selling oil to the U.S., thus helping a president he had referred to as the devil.

--Current right-wing governments publicly criticize China and quietly reinforce their economic ties.

--Evo Morales railed against capitalism and yet had a staunchly pro-capitalist Finance Minister.

--The Latin American right-wing railed against the Cuban dictatorship and was fine with Pinochet.

--Latin American leftists railed against right-wing dictatorships and remained quiet about Cuba.

Maybe these aren't exactly apples to apples, like how a fly in your chardonnay actually isn't the same as a free ride when you've already paid. But going against your stated ideological beliefs in the name of self-interest is not all that unusual.

Venezuelans Are Even More Unhappy With Delcy and Trump

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 21 Oct 2026 13:37:04 +0000

Back in August I linked to a Meganalisis poll showing growing Venezuelan dissatisfaction with Trump and the state of affairs in Venezuela. The September poll shows that's just getting worse. They think, with considerable justification, that no one has any interest in the welfare of the Venezuelan people. Not Trump, not Delcy, not investors, not the negotiation teams, nobody. They want Chavistas out of power and they want elections. Things are bad and the status quo is not making them better. If anything, they're in worse shape financially and with power outages.

Here is the trajectory of feelings toward Donald Trump:

There is no doubt that most Venezuelans supported ousting Nicolás Maduro. But that action came with the expectation that things would get better. Instead, Trump has consistently said the U.S. is profiting from the invasion and Venezuelans are finally believing him, to the point that approval and disapproval have pretty much inverted since January 2026.

There's not much new to say about this. I think Venezuelans feel frustrated and helpless. They thought Trump was swooping in to help them and that just wasn't true. The administration could compel significant change and simply chooses not to. Meanwhile, Delcy and Co. are holding onto power with all their might, ceding only when forced. So things don't get better. Like the rest of us, they can only wait and see what happens with negotiations and María Corina Machado.

Maria Corina Machado's Perspective

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 20 Oct 2026 12:14:53 +0000

María Corina Machado gave an interview to the New York Times, which highlights how she differs from the Trump administration, primarily in terms of democracy, and frankly why they don't want her in power, though she is very careful with her language.

Some takeaways:

1. If she becomes president, some high-level people will be tried and some will go to prison. She says by a truth commission, which is not how they've worked in Latin America. They haven't been courts--their purpose has been to investigate and publicize what happened. Regardless, this will rock the political boat, and in a way that's inconvenient for the administration.

2. Rocking the political boat brings us to the military. She says she believes only the leaders want to persecute her and her followers, and lower levels of the military support her. We have no way of confirming or disconfirming that, but it's a reasonable argument on its face. Reassurance of not being put on trial (which she also does say is possible for lower level officials) will help a lot in that regard as well. As a side note, in Argentina lower level officials were granted an amnesty that actually years later was overturned, opening the door for prosecutions at a time when democracy was firmly entrenched.

3. The oil deals being done now will be looked at. She frames it as those "that have signed contracts right now would like to improve the terms of their contracts once we’re done." I don't know if everyone will have the same definition of "improve."

4. She mentions how a democratic transition will bring many thousands of Venezuelans back to their country, so a free election is good for U.S. immigration policy. This is a shrewd framing you don't hear very often.

Brazil Remains (and Will Remain) Close to China

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:51:51 +0000

Roberto Simon writes about Brazil and China, and how their relationship upends the Trump administration. If Flávio Bolsonaro wins, he will move ideologically into Trump's orbit but that will not change Brazil's relationship with China, which is deep.

None of that, however, would meaningfully reverse China’s deepening economic influence in Brazil, or the belief among many Brazilian business executives and foreign policy elites that the best long-term strategy is to hedge against an increasingly unpredictable United States.

If Brasília becomes the next Latin American capital to shift rightward, the region would be ideologically aligned with the United States to a degree not seen since at least the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War. Yet the U.S. unipolar moment is long gone, including in Latin America. No matter who is in power in the region, Trump’s revived Monroe Doctrine is destined to collide with the reality of growing dependence on Chinese trade, investment, and technology.

As Simon points out, it's common in Latin America for conservative presidential candidates to rail against China and then quietly (or sometimes even loudly) favor it when they take office. It just makes economic sense.

It's actually quite similar to Chile. As I wrote last December:

Keep that in mind for most other Latin American countries. The U.S. press in particular likes neat categories--there is a left and a right, and we can point to specific people who embody it. Presidential elections will be framed as wholesale change when in fact plenty of core policies will remain or at least will be tweaked without overturning them. China (and Europe) now have deep ties and those are not likely to change drastically. Add U.S. tariffs to the mix and the incentive to maintain friendly relations with China is even more evident.

It's important to keep emphasizing the point that despite ideological congruence, the U.S. is an unstable and unreliable partner right now and will be perceived as such for a while even after Trump is gone. He set the precedent for attacking your allies and it won't quickly be forgotten.

There Are Still Political Prisoners in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 16 Oct 2026 13:58:51 +0000

The Economist has a great article about Venezuelan political prisoners. The context is that the U.S. accepts not pushing against authoritarianism because stability is prioritized far higher than democracy or human rights protections. The U.S. could force lots of positive change but chooses not to. This is obviously ideal for Delcy Rodríguez.

Prisoners serve three main purposes for the regime:

1. Bargaining chips with the U.S. The regime lets some people out, gets some good PR, stays in Trump's good graces, and stays in power.

2. A reminder to Venezuelans that the repressive apparatus is still functional so they need to be afraid. Protests are increasing and could get out of hand if people felt truly free.

3. A reminder to the armed forces that they support the regime or else. This is critical. The military has always been the linchpin of power, which is why Hugo Chávez was so careful about purging. Right now, there are 322 political prisoners, 140 (or 43%) of which are military.

The clear conclusion here is that freeing all political prisoners (and of course not taking more) is essential for weakening the regime, which unfortunately the Trump administration is not interested in at the moment.

U.S. Troops in Latin America

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 15 Oct 2026 13:23:19 +0000

The New York Times reported on U.S. troops in Latin America. There's plenty to unpack here.

First, there is no goal at all, which the article points out. Wander around until you shoot or get shot at? This will end up killing innocent people for no gain. That will not matter to a U.S. audience until a U.S. soldier is killed, though I can't be sure people will care much even then. But objectively, it's a disaster for human rights. Plus, as I've written ad nauseum over many years, these operations will not stem the flow of drugs. They're largely for show, a testosterone-laden theater in the jungle. Probably miserable for the soldiers to boot.

Second, what happens when new presidents are elected that don't want these troops? That may not be a problem if someone else is president in the U.S. But for right now, we know the Trump administration likes forcing out governments, and of course the U.S. has a long history of it. That will hang over the region for a while.

But here is the part that shows the highest level of illogic.

Earlier this week, Gen. Joseph A. Ryan, who heads the Army’s Western Hemisphere Command, described the stark challenges the U.S. military faces as it returns to a region that for decades has not been its main focus. It is a part of the world where China has growing economic leverage, and where drug cartels have built sophisticated global networks to sell their illicit products, he said.

“We have ceded economic dominance in the region to an adversary, and that is a fact,” General Ryan said in remarks on Monday at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference in Washington. “We are fighting now to retake terrain — maritime and land, human terrain, cognitive terrain — in many cases that we’ve given up previously.”

Sending troops has nothing to do at all with China's economic influence. It will certainly not reduce it. You're retaking "cognitive terrain"? Say what? Maybe he thinks that Latin Americans will be so happy at the sight of U.S. soldiers that they will stop buying Chinese products. How anyone could think that is beyond me.

Nicaragua Denies US Ambassador

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 14 Oct 2026 16:41:46 +0000

The Nicaraguan government rejected Natasha Franceschi as the U.S. Ambassador. I immediately wondered whether she was a Trump political connection, but no (and perhaps his connections don't want Nicaragua anyway!). She's a career diplomat with long experience. There hasn't been a U.S. ambassador in Nicaragua for three years.

At first this puzzled me. Given what happened in Venezuela and is currently happening in Cuba, I couldn't understand why Daniel Ortega wanted the Trump administration spotlight on him, especially when it seems like the ambassadorial choice was a professional. Then I looked at her testimony from her nomination hearing.

If confirmed, I will sustain diplomatic pressure toward a solution in Nicaragua that
advances American prosperity and security.

It is well past time that Nicaragua return into the fold of prosperous American
nations, free from totalitarianism.

Then it made more sense. That was pretty blunt. Nicaragua does not get in the U.S. news much but bilateral tension is definitely rising and I could imagine Trump seeing this as a personal slight. That said, Nicaragua does not have much to offer him in economic terms and can't reduce the price of gas in the U.S. As always, stay tuned.

Marco Rubio's Venezuela Messaging

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:42:47 +0000

The State Department has a quick summary of Marco Rubio's meeting with Dinorah Figuera and it's as weird as everything else in this saga. Here's part of it:

He highlighted this year’s steps toward establishing an independent Supreme Court of Justice, the release of over 1,200 political prisoners, the recently restored access to blocked media websites, and efforts to reform the Law Against Hatred as important milestones toward restoring fundamental freedoms for the Venezuelan people.

Looking ahead to the next round of talks beginning October 14, the Secretary urged continued progress on political freedoms and electoral reform, which would lay the groundwork for free, fair, and credible elections in Venezuela.

This is the language you use when you don't have all the leverage. "Recently restored" media could have been restored in early January. The hate law could've been pushed months ago. Rubio "urged" continued progress?

The U.S. invaded the country and could have restored many freedoms a very long time ago, but chose not to. I understand that stability was favored over democracy. But abrograting the hate law wouldn't undermine stability--it would just stop innocent Venezuelans from being targeted for their political beliefs. Low-hanging fruit.

Instead, we have this scenario where the U.S. portrays the two sides are equal. In democratic transition terms, it's a bizarre combination of imposition and pacted. The former (which is rare unless you include foreign use of force) involves force while the latter involves compromise. Venezuela thus becomes a combination of the U.S. overthrowing Manuel Noriega and the Chilean dictatorships negotiated with the opposition, which I think would be unfathomable to all the scholar studying this 30ish years ago. It also confounds predictions of outcome. We hope it ends up like Chile, where the repressive apparatus was dismantled and elections persisted (even if the military's role remained strong for a long time). For now, it's like Chile where military internal intelligence remained going strong.

Maria Corina Machado Makes Her Pitch

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:59:50 +0000

María Corina Machado published an op-ed in the New York Post three days ago about why she needs to return and Venezuela needs to hold free and fair elections.

First off, why the New York Post? I mean, I guess it doesn't really matter since people will read it regardless, but it's a tabloid. That said, it's conservative and has ties to Trump.

Her points are pretty straightforward and while careful to praise Trump, she makes it clear that you can't continue to have positive relations with an illegitimate government. You can't have certainty with a rickety and thoroughly corrupt dictatorship. She makes a point directly aimed at the administration's oil deals, which is that you can't guarantee contracts with the current regime.

Donald Trump's response: "Well, I'll say one thing: she is an excellent woman. She gave me her Nobel Prize because she knew I had earned it, and she is an excellent woman, and everything is going to turn out fine."

It's a beautiful blend of narcissism and vagueness.

Meanwhile, Marco Rubio denies that anyone blocked her return and a coordinator of Vente Venezuela said she might return "within hours."

Stay tuned.

FRUS South America publication

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:51:26 +0000

I was very happy to see that the Foreign Relations of the United States series published part of the South America, 1981-1988 documents. It's been languishing. Unfortunately, the Chile and Argentina chapters are not yet out, as I would love to see those. This time around it's Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Here is a bit from a meeting Alexander Haig had with the foreign minister of Paraguay in 1981. Recall that dictator Alfredo Stroessner was still around (he didn't get overthrown until 1989) so human rights violations were rampant in the country.

And, of course, Haig had no interest in human rights:

The Secretary described human rights as a “residual problem” which we will address as one friend speaking to another and through diplomatic channels. He said his own preference would be to use the term “personal liberties” rather than human rights because the very term human rights has unfortunately become loaded with emotional and political connotations. In addressing human rights matters, it is important that we not lose sight of the security concerns that the countries of this hemisphere share.

What Haig is saying, just as Henry Kissinger said to dictatorships in the 1970s, was that attacking perceived Marxists was perfectly fine. The Paraguayans got the message loud and clear:

The meeting concluded with reiteration of expressions of good will and certainty that relations will improve steadily. As they were departing, the Paraguayans commented that this meeting marked a very sharp contrast with the recent past. They were delighted with their reception and the length of the meeting.

They are referring to Jimmy Carter and his four years of at least trying to focus on human rights. Incidentally, the meeting lasted fifty minutes. It consisted primarily of talking about Cuba and Marxists. The Carter era was officially over.

Delcy Ditches Maduro

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:31:50 +0000

This is par for the course in the weird Venezuela political saga. Delcy Rodríguez did not request Nicolás Maduro's release or invoke his immunity as head of state. As a matter of fact, Delcy has already requested that immunity for herself for a lawsuit against her in the United States. It's good old stab in the back.

It is true that even prior to Trump, the U.S. government said over and over that it did not recognize Maduro as president, constantly calling him illegitimate. Then the Trump administration did recognize her after the invasion because she was willing to kowtow.

The problem, of course, and one that keeps coming up, is that Delcy was in the same illegitimate government. She was the illegitimate vice president. She has illegitimate stamped all over her. She has zero constitutional bearing in the country but is recognized de facto by the United States (not to mention the armed forces) so that's that. As always, aside from Maduro himself the losers in this situation are the Venezuelan people.

Reforming Venezuela's Hate Law

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 30 Sep 2026 14:24:41 +0000

Delcy Rodríguez requested the legislature "partially" reform the Law Against Hate, which has commonly been used to attack Venezuelans exercising their constitutional right to free speech. Here is a quote from her:

Rodríguez dijo que se hizo “uso abusivo de esa ley.... pero yo creo en los principios de esa ley, el principio de la tolerancia, el principio del amor en relacionamiento, que no se imponga el odio”.

This is yet another example of how bizarre this situation is. Yes, the law was abusive, though in fact it was intended to be. By her own administration.

In her social media post, she said she asked for a "reforma parcial." It is to "corregir desviaciones en su aplicación." All this flowery, passive voice intended to deflect from the fact that she is complicit in all the abuses. The law should be stricken in its entirety and hopefully that actually happens.

We need to wait and see what happens, of course, but still this is an important step forward. The Hate Law is only one of many overlapping laws (it's actually easy to lose track of them because there are so many) justifying attacks on Venezuelans but it's a prominent one.

What Do Venezuelans Think of the Current Situation?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 17:46:20 +0000

We have another Venezuela poll from Meganálisis. Tellingly, the first page has a photo of Delcy Rodríguez and Donald Trump, with a warm two-handed handshake and very friendly smiles.

Do Venezuelans approve of the oil deal? 79.8% do not.

Do Venezuelan approve of Rodríguez and Trump meeting at the UN? 91.4% do not.

Do Venezuelans think Rodríguez truly represents them at the UN? 93.7% do not.

I'm not sure how chavistas exactly fall here. It may well be that they chafe under what's clearly U.S. control over Delcy Rodríguez, which manifests in not believing she's really in charge and representing them. Constitutionally, she actually doesn't represent them because the 180 day requirement of an interim president has long passed. Everyone is just pretending it doesn't matter.

The honeymoon is over but what comes afterward is unknown. Again and again, I just come back to María Corina Machado. Her return is the X factor.

Update 9/23/26: as a matter of fact, the Venezuelan government has been blocking her entry even in the just the last 24 hours and clearly the United States is not standing behind her entry.

Repression Continues in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:22:19 +0000

The United Nations Fact Finding Mission in Venezuela just released a new report on human rights. The short answer is that the repressive apparatus is still intact, more than eight months after the U.S. invasion. The legal system with all its justifications of attacking citizens is intact. People are still scared and arbitrary arrests are still occurring. Media outlets get closed. People are still in prison for political crimes.

They noticed a new pattern:

A notable new pattern that the mission has identified is the use of short-term arbitrary detention and measures of intimidation against those perceived as opposing the Government, including those who have been subjected previously to long-term arbitrary detention. These carry particular resonance given the context of widespread abuses over the past decade, a potent reminder to political activists that their activities are monitored and that the repressive apparatus remains available to limit freedoms if the authorities decide to do so.

Intimidate people and keep them just a short time, and then they won't get counted as political prisoners. Then there is still torture in prison:

The prevalent methods of torture remain the same as those previously identified by the mission, including punching and beatings with metallic objects; electric shocks, including to the genitals; suffocation with plastic bags; suspension by the hands or the feet for prolonged periods of time; and prolonged confinement in isolation or under other harsh conditions. In addition, the mission identified previously unreported methods of torture, including forced intubation and catheterization.

There is an entire separate paper on colectivos, which is good because they have been central to the government's repressive machinery.

Tras el despliegue de principios de enero, y lejos de la retórica de resistencia armada que sostuvieron por años, los colectivos optaron por un repliegue relativo. Sin embargo, según la información recibida por la Misión, los grupos han mantenido sus acciones de patrullajes urbanos y labores de inteligencia vecinal en zonas clave, así como el control sobre las economías lícitas e ilícitas. La Misión también documentó nuevos actos de hostigamiento y amenazas perpetrados por colectivos contra familiares de personas privadas de libertad por motivos políticos, incluyendo en las afueras de la prisión de máxima seguridad Rodeo I, en el estado de Miranda en las afueras de El Helicoide y en Plaza Venezuela, ambas en Caracas.

They make it sound like the colectivos are in a holding pattern, still with a hand in the till to keep them happy and serving in a repressive capacity while trying to keep a low profile.

The standard now seems to be rumors (and hope!) of things about to happen with way too little change on the ground. The U.S. appears to reaping the economic benefits with enough to the regime that it keeps its cronies happy for the time being.

China's Role in Venezuela

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 10 Sep 2026 14:45:20 +0000

Really interesting op-ed by a China expert at the University of Alberta on China's long-term role in Venezuela. Headlines say that China is getting pushed out, just as headlines say (and the administration repeats) that China is getting pushed out elsewhere in Latin America. China's response has been very measured and I think this is on point:

Beijing’s response reflects a calculation that the deal’s fragility will show within months. Venezuela’s production will not surge. The US$100 billion in pledged investment will not materialise while the interim regime’s legitimacy is in question. And China’s existing contracts, protected by international law, remain a legal sword.

China remains Venezuela’s most important Asian oil customer and creditor. Though physical crude flows to China were disrupted this year, Beijing’s more than US$60 billion in oil-for-loan financing since 2007 creates debt obligations that survive the change in field operators – and China’s economic leverage ensures its interests cannot be erased by a 100-year concession granted to a US proxy.

He doesn't get into it, but this leads to three conclusions. The first is that backlash in Venezuela will grow and will worsen when a democratically elected government eventually takes over. The second is that the deal will have no effect on U.S. gas prices or anything else that the average U.S. voter is interested in. The third is that China will continue to have an extensive economic presence in Venezuela.

I don't know how much the average U.S. voter cares about any of this. Increased gas prices are more linked to the Iran war. But Venezuelans care. That's the point I keep thinking about.

Venezuela Elections in 2028?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 08 Sep 2026 17:29:00 +0000

In a press conference, Diosdado Cabello said that elections might occur in 2028 (saying "I think"). Nobody else has put a date on it. And then there's this fun bit:

"We are ready, we have always been ready. Now, those who today want elections, when called to elections, say they are not ready or that they are not going to participate because, deep down, they do not want elections. Deep down they do not respect elections," Cabello stated at a press conference, where he added that the opposition "recognizes when they win," but "when they lose they do not recognize anyone."

Criticizing your political opponents for what you do is all the rage these days. Certainly we commonly see it in the United States. The July 2024 presidential election was quite brazenly stolen.

I think the oil deal is going to increase pressure for elections, evidenced by María Corina Machado's negative response to it as well as growing congressional noise about elections. The Trump administration is doing business with an illegitimate regime and using laughably bad logic to justify it.

I feel like an essential question here is when MCM is going to return. She has talked about it in general terms and there have been rumors about the regime blocking it, not to mention Trump administration admonitions not to do it. But time is ticking away. The oil deal is now a thing, the administration shifted to Dinorah Figuera, and the longer MCM says "soon" without going, the weaker her position is. Returning would be a tremendous act of courage, both in terms of personal safety and Trump's enmity, and the response in Venezuela would be considerable.

Can Congress Influence Venezuela Policy?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 04 Sep 2026 14:36:52 +0000

Both on and off the record, Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee are expressing doubts about Trump's oil deal with Venezuela. They distrust Delcy Rodríguez (as everyone should). They are concerned that it doesn't focus on elections. They're not happy María Corina Machado is being excluded and in fact she has now publicly expressed that the regime has no right to strike a deal for the Venezuelan people's oil.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is making pretty ludicrous statements in defense:

One U.S. official told NOTUS that the Venezuelan oil deal is “a private deal with a private company. It’s not a deal with the interim government of Venezuela and there was not a political process included in the negotiations.”

“I understand the initial reaction is that we’ve done a deal with the interim government. The deal is not with the interim government; the deal is with a private entity based abroad,” the official said in a statement. “So this in no way impedes a democratic transition, nor does it mean that it cements the interim government as the government.”

As if taking oil from a country has absolutely nothing to do with that country, which somehow has no role to play. I would love to know who the official was.

There is bipartisan agreement on this and it makes me wonder whether that can become leverage to force Trump's hand. There's no way to know Marco Rubio's beliefs but ultimately they aren't decisive anyway. Trump may shift if he feels there is enough opposition that it might start making him look bad. Even Ted Cruz has said there should be elections by mid-2027 (while, like the others, being very careful not to criticize the president).

Cato Institute Says the Venezuela Deal is Socialist

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 14:09:45 +0000

There is a piece in the Cato Institute's blog criticizing the Venezuela deal, in part for reasons I've laid but also because it's socialist.

It expands state corporatism by giving the US government a large, and possibly majority, stake in a major joint oil venture in Venezuela, an entity the Wall Street Journal reports “would be the world’s second-largest corporate holder of proven reserves after Saudi Aramco.” State-owned enterprises are a bad idea anywhere, but as Scott Lincicome observes, this comes after the US government under Trump has already taken equity in 31 private companies. As Scott says, “This isn’t even ‘creeping’ socialism anymore.”

In the meantime, the House of Representatives voted to condemn socialists and Scott Bessent calls socialists "underachievers." The President of the United States, however, wholeheartedly embraces core socialist ideals.

Of course, this version of socialism only entails state ownership, not state redistribution, so it's the worst possible version. At least the Soviets pretended to give back. Given the lack of details and the connection to a clearly corrupt go-between, it adds to the overall vibe of kleptocracy.

There is a lot to be revealed still, but it feels like an alternate version of the "Boliburguesía," the well-connected Venezuelans who got rich off the fruits of state ownership while claiming it was a revolution for the people. I feel confident that a bunch of people are either going to get very wealthy (or get much wealthier because they're already rich) by being tied into this deal.

And remember, imperialism and socialism can go together perfectly well. The Soviets are a perfect example. Imperialism doesn't have to mean capitalism. It just means controlling and plundering for your own benefit. What you do with the spoils afterward isn't part of the definition.

The big question is how much this deal helps Venezuelans. It doesn't seem promising.

Venezuela Apparently Loves Dependency

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Tue, 01 Sep 2026 13:27:24 +0000

After having periodically looked at Telesur over the years, it is absolutely fascinating to see it become pro-U.S. and basically anti-socialist. Without realizing it, this article about the U.S. oil deal outlines exactly what dependency theory argued was destructive:

Venezuela aportaría acceso a sus recursos energéticos y a su mano de obra cualificada, mientras que Estados Unidos contribuiría con tecnología y capital. El presidente venezolano describió el acuerdo como una combinación de las fortalezas de ambos países.

Venezuela cuenta con una larga trayectoria en la producción petrolera y una fuerza laboral con experiencia en exploración, extracción, refinación y actividades industriales afines. Sin embargo, gran parte del sector requiere modernización de equipos, inversión técnica y mayor financiamiento.

Mientras tanto, Estados Unidos cuenta con importantes compañías energéticas con acceso a tecnologías avanzadas, capital a gran escala y redes de distribución internacionales. Estos recursos podrían utilizarse para mejorar la recuperación de petróleo, reparar la infraestructura y aumentar la fiabilidad de la producción venezolana.

People don't talk much about dependency theory anymore but it is certainly relevant. The United States brings in private industry, capital, technology, and distribution networks. Venezuela provides its oil and some workers.

And the profit? If you look at the history of U.S. domination of natural resources, including in Venezuela, you'll notice that the Latin American country came to realize it was a terrible deal. Money will be flying out of Venezuela with the rationale that it is required to keep technologies updated, buy and repair equipment, etc., etc. That will keep happening until a Venezuelan government says it has to stop. How long that will take is impossible to guess.

Along those lines, note that María Corina Machado just gave a speech calling for elections. She did not mention the deal but it seems clear that she realizes the only kind of government that can push back against the U.S. is a democratically-elected one. There's no way she likes this deal. I haven't seen Dinorah Figuera comment on it, but I don't think anyone can laud it, opposition or Chavista. For Chavistas it's a betrayal of the revolution and for the opposition it's a betrayal of national resources by a government beholden to the United States.

Taking Venezuela's Oil

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:19:50 +0000

Hugo Chavez in 2008:

Chavez criticized the terms under which Exxon extracted oil in the region and accused the Venezuelan opposition parties of "giving away" the nation's resources when they were in power.

"The oligarchy and the Venezuelan opposition had no shame because they didn't have any problem with giving away the most sacred things. In this case, our oil," he said.

Delcy Rodriguez in 2026:

She thanked Trump and the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, for striking the deal but added: “There is something that must be made absolutely clear: Venezuela retains the ownership and sovereignty over its resources.”

Donald Trump in 2026:

"This Historic Transaction MORE THAN DOUBLES American Oil Reserves, greatly increases our Oil Supply, and will substantially lower Gas Prices for all Americans, long into the future," Trump said.

Since details are so sparse about the massive Donald Trump/Marco Rubio-driven oil deal, I don't have any specific commentary on it. Yet regardless of the details, it is hilariously clear that it is exactly what Chavez railed against. Trump clearly sees it as taking Venezuelan oil, with no interest in how it benefits Venezuelans.

At this moment, especially in the aftermarth of the earthquake, Venezuelans may well be willing to swallow it if they feel it injects resources into the economy in a way that materially helps them. In the longer run, and even in the shorter run if no improvements happen, that will almost certainly sour. You can't just take a country's critical natural resource without backlash.

Venezuelan Violators of Human Rights

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 13:19:58 +0000

This is a great example of the rhetorical gymnastics required to support Delcy Rodríguez. ICE reports that it deported a former colonel in the Bolivarian National Guard, who was a known violator of human rights. Here's how he is described: "a known human rights violator who participated in the detention and torture of political dissidents during the Maduro regime."

We can all agree that's criminal. But we can also all agree that DR was the vice president of that very same regime. We can, in fact, very accurately refer to it as the Maduro-Rodríguez regime. This dude is the small fry (though big enough). She is the big kahuna, the person who helped order all the tortures. But somehow now she's not part of the "Maduro regime."

Which leads me to the next point. OK, you removed him from the United States, but since he's going back to the regime that hired him it's not like you're punishing him beyond the fact that Venezuela is in shambles. I guess Marco Rubio could tell DR to put him in jail but that would logically mean putting lots of other people, including herself, in jail too.

Is Delcy Rodriguez President, Acting President, or Neither?

noreply@blogger.com (Greg Weeks) — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 15:10:39 +0000

One of the many weird things about current Venezuelan politics is that according to the Venezuelan constitution, Delcy Rodríguez is not the president. There is no legal president. A presidential vacancy must be filled within 180 days, which was on July 3.

Artículo 234. Las faltas temporales del Presidente o Presidenta de la República serán suplidas por el Vicepresidente Ejecutivo o Vicepresidenta Ejecutiva hasta por noventa días, prorrogables por decisión de la Asamblea Nacional por noventa días más.

Si una falta temporal se prolonga por más de noventa días consecutivos, la Asamblea Nacional decidirá por mayoría de sus integrantes si debe considerarse que hay falta absoluta.

The National Assembly hasn't done anything and obviously there have been no elections. So she's not legally the president. But then I saw a news story that called something to my attention. Official government references (like this one) have dropped the "acting" and just refer to her as president, which is not legally true.

Many people--me certainly--have been in organizations where the bylaws fall behind practice, but we're talking about a country, where the stakes are extraordinarily high. Falling out of constitutionally rips up the social contract and is dictatorship. It leads to real and severe problems.