Foreign Policy Watch

Domestic Inertia and Foreign Policy

noreply@blogger.com (Matt Eckel) — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 16:41:00 +0000

Watching Obama's speech last night I was disheartened in a way that's become all-too-familiar over the course of the past year. The thing that's been so maddening about watching the foreign policy of the current administration, which, while a vast improvement over that of its predecessor, has been disappointing in crucial ways, is that the President really seems to get it, but can't or won't deliver. He's defined our mission in Afghanistan more or less appropriately (though whether the strategy he's pursuing is also appropriate is more doubtful). He seems alive to the tradeoffs between investments abroad and investments at home. He seems to understand the dangers inherent in the strategy he's proposing, the weaknesses of our regional partners, and the very real limits of what the United States will be able to accomplish in Central Asia. And yet, he's ratcheting up our commitment.

As many, many writers have noted, to ramp up our involvement in Afghanistan in the way Obama's proposing, or even just to maintain the status quo, is not a policy that's really consistent with the way the issue has been framed. If the fight in Afghanistan is really one of national necessity, then refusing to give the Karzai government a "blank check" and putting something like a timetable on withdrawal makes no sense. If the fight is truly necessary, then we must commit as many resources as it takes for as long as it takes to win. If it really isn't, on the other hand, then why spend more blood and treasure? Saying that Afghanistan is a war of urgency and necessity, then qualifying our commitment to it, isn't a coherent strategy. Stephen Walt guesses, and I think he's right, that Obama's decision has as much to do with domestic politics as it does with the broader strategic situation. To test that, do a thought experiment. If we had no military presence in Afghanistan right now, and the situation were similar (a small contingent of al-Qaeda fighters holed up in the Af-Pak border region, a weak and corrupt Afghan government, a large scale Islamist insurgency that threatens that government's continued viability), would committing 100,000 troops to stabilize the government, defeat the Taliban and eliminate al-Qaeda be something we were seriously considering? I doubt it.

The problem, it seems to me, is that once wars get started, it's politically almost impossible to end them without either a) winning or b) committing political suicide. Some have proposed that President Obama should have the "courage" to tell the American people that the war isn't winnable in any real sense, and that it's time for us to begin winding it down. That may be true. Americans' lives are at stake, after all. Still, it should at least be acknowledged that were Obama to follow that course, he would probably be sealing the fate of his administration. I don't care how many Americans are skeptical about the war in Afghanistan. Most of those same people would punish Obama severely if the U.S. were to withdraw and they watched the government there fall to the Taliban.

I suspect a similar kind of inertia has overtaken Obama's initial positive steps on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He's backed off the initial pressure on Netanyahu, and more or less kept up the historical U.S. policy of backing Israel, faintly criticizing it on occasion, but never actually imposing consequences when Israel pursues policies manifestly contrary to U.S. interests. Once again, unlike his predecessor, Obama seems to understand the problems inherent in our policy with regard to Israel, but he's made the calculation that he can't afford the domestic fight that really changing that policy would entail. I can understand the calculation in a sense - he's got to get a health care bill, climate change bill and (God willing, though I'm not optimistic) a job creation bill through Congress. A knock-down-drag-out brawl with Capitol Hill over an issue that most Americans don't really understand or care about doesn't make much sense in that regard. Still, what we're left with is the perpetuation of a stupid and self-defeating policy.

I'm not sure what the solution is here. I don't want Obama to fall on a political sword. I think rebuilding American strength at home requires a progressive orientation that he, at least sometimes, evinces. That said, it's absolutely maddening how simple inertia and status quo constituencies can constrict the viable options made available to American leadership.

Identity Matters: Swiss Minarets

noreply@blogger.com (Matt Eckel) — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 15:17:00 +0000

In yet another blow to my call for more inclusive democracy, the big news out of Europe over the weekend was the unexpected success of a Swiss referendum to ban the construction of minarets. This is being widely (and, in my view, correctly) derided as a xenophobic, reactionary policy that's incompatible with religious freedom and the values of a tolerant society. Unfortunately, like the various state-level gay marriage referenda in the United States, it has been given a seal of approval by direct democracy, making it harder to blame the idiosyncrasies of a particular group of right wingers who just happen to be in power (though, as Matt Yglesias points out, that did have something to do with it). For an Israeli perspective, check out the always-excellent Noam Sheizaf. Tyler Cowen's also got a decent post on the topic, and if you want to get your blood pressure up, there's always Daniel Pipes.

My own views are a bit complex, particularly since there are really two or three different questions here. The first is normative, and comes up every time some similar proposal emerges that seeks to regulate religious expression in the name of giving the polity some control over the character of its public spaces; namely, to what extent is it okay for a country with a particular ethno-cultural heritage to protect that heritage by restricting expression? In the United States, we are raised with an extremely liberal view toward free speech. People should be able to say what they want, when they want, where they want, with only basic restrictions for reasons of public safety or national security viewed as legitimate. If people don't want their skylines to look too "Muslim," well, that's their problem. Doesn't trump freedom of expression. That said, the time I spent in Quebec, with its sometimes-absurd language laws (all signs must be either in French or bilingual, but if they're bilingual the French has to be on top, and with a typeface twice as large as whatever's under it etc.) led me to appreciate the extent to which people's identities are bound up in cultural symbolism, and that a democratic polity might have some interest in maintaining, or at least guiding the evolution of, those symbols.

This leads to a problem for anyone committed to both liberalism and national self-determination, two philosophies which aren't opposed, but which don't blend perfectly either. I'm willing to allow for some government action to guide national culture, but recognize that there's no perfect, objective standard for when a line gets crossed. Subjectively, I think the minaret ban (along with its always-controversial French cousin, the loi contre la voile) goes too far. It singles out a particular "other" and severely constricts the expression of a core tenet of that group's identity. Just doesn't pass the smell test of common decency. That said, policies designed to inculcate a sense of being "Swiss" via educational curricula and cultural funding, socio-economic interventions designed to prevent the ghettoization of Muslim communities, and other "positive" means of encouraging both tolerance and assimilation strike me as okay, perhaps even necessary.

Moving past what the Swiss ought to do, though, we come to the fact that the Swiss did do this, sending a decidedly closed-minded signal to Muslims at home and abroad and furthering the perception that Europe doesn't know how to deal with people who aren't white lapsed Christians. There's plenty of literature, both celebratory and lamenting, to add to this perception (for a recent example, check out Christopher Caldwell's Reflections on the Revolution in Europe for an unapologetic argument for why Muslims don't belong). In addition to the problems posed for European Muslims, the current discourses around immigration pose a problem for European democracy more generally. Many mainstream European political parties have done an extraordinarily poor job reflecting the cultural anxieties of their constituencies, which leaves hardcore right wingers and xenophobes occupying a surprisingly powerful pole in national debates on the topic. Even if such people never gain functional control of European governments (something that, insha'Allah, remains unlikely), it's not good to have mainstream politicians alienated from the populace over important, contentious issues of national identity. It delegitimizes government more generally, at a time when Europe's political status quo remains in flux.

I'll probably have more thoughts on this as more reactions emerge, but this issue is part of a story that's immensely important to the future of Europe, and is sure to have effects far outside the peaks and valleys of the Alps.

Riedel Tomorrow

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 00:09:00 +0000

I have a chance to ask some questions of Bruce Riedel tomorrow, an accomplished man whose current bio includes: Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, policy advisor to President Obama, and an expert on counter-terrorism and South Asia.

If anyone has a question that they want me to ask, email me or make a note in the comments section. If it's good one, I'll put your query to him and write up his response here on the blog. Certainly, there is a lot that could be asked about our current approach towards Afghanistan, the limits of our counter-insurgency strategy in Pakistan, and the extent of our involvement on India-Pakistan issues, to name just a few topics.

Quote of the Day

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 00:05:00 +0000

Michael Cohen, on the news that Somalia just barely edged out Afghanistan as the world's most corrupt country:

This sort of reminds me of the old joke about Alabama's state motto - "Thank God for Mississippi."

Into the Fold

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Sat, 28 Nov 2009 19:59:00 +0000

It is always encouraging to read about new, creative efforts of counter-insurgency that involve the use of the mind rather than the mere power of the gun. So it was with some interest that I noticed this article in the Wall Street Journal outlining the ways in which American officials are hoping to "persuade Taliban insurgents to lay down their weapons" by "offering jobs and protection to the militants who choose to abandon their fight."

This idea isn't new, of course. Karzai has been involved in trying to bring Taliban fighters into the fold for awhile. Publicly, he has often spoken about the importance of national unity and many of his statements about the Taliban depict them as brothers and fellow countrymen who have, in effect, merely lost their way. His recent inauguration speech is an interesting example of this. Karzai referred to the Taliban not as enemies of the state or thugs or violent criminals (rhetoric we have often heard from the Shiite government in Iraq to describe Sunni militants); rather, he called the Taliban "disenchanted compatriots." Unfortunately, Karzai's success on this front appears to have been fairly minimal and this latest news is therefore encouraging since it represents the first time that NATO has signed on publicly as a partner in this effort.

One thing worries me, however: that the Taliban are unlikely to defect in great numbers given their current position of strength. History, I think, attests to this. I have heard people argue, for example, that the Chieu Hoi program in Vietnam - a propaganda campaign to encourage defections from the Viet Cong - was most succesful when the enemy saw itself to be losing. What's to encourage members of the Taliban to defect, take a government-financed job, and even risk their own lives (from potential reprisals) when their side appears to be winning? Who's to say they won't decide that defecting would be like backing the losing team?

Intractable

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Sat, 28 Nov 2009 19:25:00 +0000

The New York Times comes down hard on Obama today (although not hard enough, in my opinion) for his genuinely strange Middle East policy. Meanwhile, speaking of that damn intractable conflict, the always-insightful Daniel Levy further deconstructs the already-debunked notion that Netanyahu might have indicated a willingness to compromise when he announced a partial settlement freeze earlier this week. Here's the money quote:

The only apparent restraint in the Israeli cabinet decision was to suspend issuing of new permits or beginning new construction in the West Bank for ten months. The less restrained side of the equation is this: 3000 units already under construction will continue; all public buildings and security infrastructure will continue to be built; no restrictions would apply to occupied East Jerusalem; and construction would resume after ten months.

Netanyahu also repeated the totally (meaningless) commitment of no new settlements or land confiscations (meaningless because since 1993, the official policy is no new settlements yet via expansion, new neighborhoods and outposts, the West Bank settler population has grown from 111,000 then to over 300,000 today, and because although the built-up area of settlements constitutes only 2% of West Bank land, double that amount is slated for growth, and a total of 40% comes under the Settlement Regional Councils, therefore land confiscation issue is a red herring).

While it is technically true that this "restraint" is a new Israeli commitment, its practical relevance is of very limited significance - building 3000 units in ten months neatly dovetails the regular annual settlement construction rates. Moreover, Netanyahu made sure to assertively mention all these caveats in today's announcement - in effect, poking the Obama administration, the international community, and the Palestinians in the eye.

Quick Hit: Reality Has a Sense of Poetic Justice

noreply@blogger.com (Matt Eckel) — Sat, 28 Nov 2009 03:26:00 +0000

While I don't actually think this contradicts the larger point I made in my previous post, where I argued that OECD nations are unlikely to engage in a large scale transfer of wealth to the developing world in order to combat climate change, there is apparently some contradictory evidence.

American Tradition

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Thu, 26 Nov 2009 05:01:00 +0000

In the spirit of Thanksgiving, here is Obama's amusing effort to take seriously the time-honored "pardoning of the turkey." One can only imagine what kind of hilarious reaction this unusual American ritual must receive in other countries.

Oh, and P.S., as a vegetarian, this is one American tradition that I'm very proud of.

The Onion chimes in with some wisecrack-ery of its own.

WASHINGTON—In keeping with a longstanding Thanksgiving tradition, Vice President Joe Biden ceremonially pardoned a 4-pound yam today at a ceremony in the White House Rose Garden. "Under my authority as vice president of the United States of America, I hereby grant this yam full and unconditional clemency," a smiling Biden declared as he gently patted "Spud," a Beauregard sweet potato grown in Louisiana and selected from millions of candidates yielded by this year’s harvest. "May he never find himself in a casserole. Right, little guy?" Like yams reprieved before him, Spud will ride as an honored guest aboard the second float of the Disneyland Thanksgiving Day Parade before spending the rest of his life in the comfort and safety of a tuber petting zoo.

A Transparent Move

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Wed, 25 Nov 2009 20:21:00 +0000

Don't be deceived by the New York Times headline: "Israel Offers a Pause in Building New Settlements." Israel has offered merely a pause in the construction of settlements in the West Bank, not in East Jerusalem. They have not, for example, offered to rescind the recent authorization to build 900 new housing units in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo. Palestinians, I see, are quite adamantly rejecting the move - as they should. A partial freeze is nothing more than a transparent measure to appease the international community and to lessen some of the pressure from Washington.

Israeli journalist Noam Sheizaf has more details.

Obama Going to Copenhagen, etc.

noreply@blogger.com (Matt Eckel) — Wed, 25 Nov 2009 15:48:00 +0000

News this morning that Obama will attend the climate change meeting in Copenhagen next month, armed with a kind-of-sort-of-commitment-like statement that the U.S. will reduce carbon emissions in the range of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. Good times. I'm a bit nervous that, like his ill-fated attempt to secure Chicago for the Olympics earlier in the Fall, Obama might be diluting his brand a bit here (the meeting isn't expected to produce a binding treaty), but this is an important international issue on which the world desperately needs U.S. leadership, so ultimately I think he's made the right call.

All that said, I've become really, really skeptical that these kinds of arrangements are going to be able to avert a real climate catastrophe. For all the talk about how "easy" it would be to make the necessary investments to quickly move away from a carbon-based energy economy, the politics are really, really daunting. So many people are invested in the status quo, and moving beyond it involves lifting so much other, related political baggage, that I'm not sure I see I realistic way to do it.

First, there's the political clout of the energy industry, which in any major producer or consumer of energy (basically any country richer than Malawi) is huge. Second, there are geostrategic concerns. It's very difficult to bring countries together in an environmental kumbaya moment when they're simultaneously jockeying for position in a world where oil's expensive and ice caps are small. This is exacerbated by the fact that a huge amount of current emissions are produced by the developing world, which is understandably eager to raise its living standards as quickly as possible. After all, the OECD got its chance to ravage the global climate for the past hundred and fifty years, why should it now prevent the rest of the world from catching up? This is, unfortunately, a decent point, but the Cubs will win the World Series before West voluntarily makes massive economic sacrifices to subsidize the development of its economic, political and military rivals. Thus, more opportunity for delay, obfuscation and stonewalling.

None of these observations are new, of course, and all this might be surmountable if populations worldwide were demanding action. The problem is, they're not. A poll taken last month indicated that the number of Americans who believe there is strong evidence that climate change is happening has actually fallen precipitously. Obviously that doesn't map with somewhat more progressive opinion elsewhere, but in this situation it's not enough simply to have most people think that, yeah, global warming's a problem and, yeah, we should probably do something about it. Surmounting the political obstacles that impede action on climate change will require massive amounts of public pressure - sustained social movements of almost unprecedented scale and intensity that make it politically impossible for elites not to act. What's more - and here's the kicker - that kind of agitation will have to appear before the negative consequences of climate change become manifest. By the time Bangladesh is drowning and Arizona's uninhabitable, there will be so much carbon locked in the atmosphere that we won't be able to go back. Looking back through history, I'm hard pressed to find examples of massive popular agitation over problems that haven't yet become acute in people's day to day lives. I hope climate change will prove the exception to the rule, but I don't expect it.

So, where does this bleak assessment leave us? I'm honestly not sure. We should, of course, continue to hope for as much political and financial investment as possible to avert climate change, if only because it will give the world more time to work out some kind of sustainable solution. Beyond that, perhaps it's time to take a serious look at geoengineering, which has the advantage of ruffling fewer elite feathers and requiring less mass participation (I know this seems a bit incongruous with the post I wrote yesterday on democracy - what can I say, I'm a complex man). Anyone else have a deus ex machina up their sleeve?

Reconceiving Democracy

noreply@blogger.com (Matt Eckel) — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 03:10:00 +0000

While I've promised myself that I wouldn't make my posts this year simply a lit review of my reading list, I did want to point out an interesting book that I read last week (it's been out for a couple of years, so some people will have run across it already). Kevin O'Leary's Saving Democracy: A Plan for Real Representation in America makes some interesting points and proposes some interesting ideas. For anyone interested in rethinking the way modern democracy might work, I'd very much recommend picking it up.

O'Leary's focus is on the United States, but the themes he explores have considerable international relevance. He notes that during the years of the Cold War, America's (and the West's more broadly) standing as the champion of democracy worldwide (however much the principles of democracy might have deviated from actual Cold War policy at times), had the effect of freezing serious public debate about the ways in which democracy could be improved. Obviously, this is only a partial truth. Among Western democracies, the twentieth century as a whole saw significant democratic advances in the area of inclusion. Women and minorities were ensured the right to vote, and were integrated, if somewhat imperfectly, into the practice of citizenship as currently imagined. Procedurally, though, our idea of democracy has generally fallen along pretty standard lines. Elections should be free and fair, adult suffrage should be universal, there should be an independent judiciary, mechanisms to protect individual and (perhaps) group rights from the vagaries of the electoral process, there should be a free press, and in the social realm, a robust civil society. Obviously that's a simplified list, but it maps pretty well with how most people think of "democracy."

The intellectual impetus behind most modern democracies, though, remains in the nineteenth century. Modern democratic governments have inherited institutions that, for all their power in aligning the interests of the state with those of the people, are fundamentally aristocratic. In almost any society, the cohort of people who consistently win elections comes from its elite elements. Money, education, and elite social connections make it immensely easier to campaign for public office, and while good campaign finance laws can blunt this effect, they will never eliminate it. Combined with problems of scale (O'Leary points out that, originally, members of the House of Representatives had roughly 30,000 people in their districts - current districts are larger by many orders of magnitude), this has the effect of distancing the people from their government, allowing them to offer broad consent or rejection, but making the idea of "rule by the people" a bit of a misnomer.

O'Leary suggests creating citizens assemblies, selected by lot, with the power to veto legislation. I won't go into the specifics of his proposals, as they get a bit too much into the weeds of American political life, but the basic idea of giving people a chance to meaningfully participate in the creation of legislation, of actually authoring policy without having to make a more permanent move into professional politics, merits real consideration. So do other more radical reforms like (in the case of the U.S.) eliminating the Senate, an institution which has not aged well. O'Leary only scratches the tip of the iceberg of such ideas, and I think modern democracies are overly squeamish about experimenting with new ways of marrying their participatory ideals with procedural reality. Don't get me wrong, stability is important. One of the key merits of democracy is that political actors don't expect the rules of the game to change every time they lose an election. Still, we should not become so enamored with the status quo that we forget the compromised circumstances under which it was born. If the West is going to hold itself up to the world as an example of the transformative power of democracy, remembering the "transform" part might not be amiss.

Khalaf on Yemen: It's Not Somalia

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Mon, 23 Nov 2009 07:16:00 +0000

For a good overview of the situation in Yemen (which, if you haven't been following too closely, has deteriorated dramatically in recent months), see Roula Khalaf's excellent article in the Financial Times. Khalaf provides a good background of the current crisis, and then makes an argument against what she sees as Saudi Arabia's foolish involvement in Yemen's internal affairs.
**

I would differ (or add a caveat to) one point in the article in particular: Khalaf's suggestion that Yemen, while unstable, is not Somalia. That's probably true - for now. But I think that the most likely scenario is that Yemen is on its way to becoming the next Somalia. Yemen has for many years had frequent incidents of domestic instability and the country now appears to be falling into another crisis that looks suspiciously like civil war. This time, unlike the somewhat more clearly defined north-south conflict of the 1990s, this crises involves three-pronged opposition to the central government - from the Houthis, located in the northwest, from separatists in the south, and from Islamic extremists.

Yemen has also become a huge base for al-Qaeda, which has used it as a launching pad for a series of attacks against Saudi targets, one of which almost succeeded in killing a prominent Saudi prince in September. Central government authority is weak (although I would concede that it is not as weak as Somalia's has historically been); there are extremely high rates of poverty, low rates of development, and scarce water and dwindling oil resources. [Perhaps a more minor but still important issue contributing to the country's instability is that a large percentage of the male population is addicted to Qat, a kind of buzz-inducing plant; statistics have indicated that Yemenis spend an average of one-fourth to one-third of their income on Qat! The reliance on this drug, for a variety of reasons, suffocates the possibility for the country to achieve real development.] Additionally, Yemen has an absurdly high gun-per-person ratio (60 million guns, about 3 for every citizen), which is undoubtedly playing a role in fueling the three-pronged civil war that is currently underway.

The Yemeni government, despite many public statements to the contrary, doesn't seem to be able to prevent the country's slow disintegration. The Saudis, seeing Sana'a as powerless, have intervened to fight the Houthis on the border area with Yemen. There are allegations that Iran is also involved (although no clear evidence.) Whatever the case, the situation in the country is incredibly unstable and there appear to be few positive prospects for the country to turn itself around in the near future. Indeed, I would argue that there is a definite possibility that, a la Somalia, Yemen may become a kind of failed state in which the central government only has control over a portion of its own territory.

UPDATE: Blogging colleague T. Greer writes in with a great observation:

Khalaf's comparison of Yemen and Somalia brought to mind a piece written by Robert Haddick two or so years ago. Titled, "Once there was a state called Somalia". In this post, Haddick sketches the collapse of the Somali state from a fully functioning entity in 1977, to a realm of anarchy in 1995. The point he made - that I considered quite extraordinary at the time - was that a state can collapse into nothingness within a generation's time. Somalia was, in many ways, a more stable state than Yemen is now. Here is Khalaf's weakness- [she] states what Yemen is now, not what it will be. Absent any evidence that Yemen cannot become a failed state in the near future, we must prepare as if it will.The last question then, is this: what kind of preparations should we make? What can we do to help pull Yemen out of its self-inflicted death spiral?

Foreign Policy As an Adage

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Sun, 22 Nov 2009 17:00:00 +0000

No one would disagree that arming tribes in Afghanistan, which the NYT reports on today, is a huge gamble. Yet it is not clear to me that the strategy has been fully thought through. At the heart of the issue is the question of loyalty. Have we determined that these tribal leaders are loyal to the central government in Kabul, that they feel they have a stake in the future of a democratic Afghanistan? Or are we just following the age-old adage, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," as a substitute for more nuanced or realistic policy?

These questions need to be asked first, not later. There must be a clear litmus test for giving military assistance to any of the Afghani tribes -- a common opposition to the Taliban is not enough. Rather, the central question is whether or not X or Y tribe shares our vision for a democratic Afghanistan. If they don't, then off the table immediately should be any discussion about providing them with weapons, training, or equipment of any kind.

Again, it's easy to see short-term success with this kind of strategy. Iraq is case in point. But the verdict is still out on whether arming Sunni militants and Baathists will lead to long-term stability. The groups associated with the Sunni Awakening have exhibited zero loyalty towards the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad; and, in reverse, Maliki's government has expressed little serious interest in making nice with them. Thus, we've seen the integration of a very small percentage of these fighters into the Iraqi army. Whether or not the Sunnis will agree to play second fiddle to the Shiites in the emerging Iraq, now that they've been heavily armed, is still dangerously unclear. Relative short-term stability, in other words, doesn't necessarily lead to the same thing over the long term.

In Iraq, there is a clear lesson to be applied to Afghanistan: loyalty to the idea of a democratic country, pluralism, of the worth of state institutions --- all of these things matter greatly. Without this loyalty, we risk arming those who will only fuel a civil war or turn against the very government we are trying to support.

Photo credit: Moises Saman for The New York Times

What Hezbollah Is Thinking

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 17:03:00 +0000

By all accounts and measures, Hezbollah, since the 2006 war with Israel, has dramatically strengthened their position in Lebanon. On the military front, they've developed a long-range weapons capability and restocked their missile arsenal; politically, they've been able to stymie the formation of a government in Lebanon for months, despite the win of the March 14th coalition early this summer.

Hezbollah has long worried about the potential for internal division or the emergence of various break-off factions. As Hassan Nasrallah himself has repeatedly argued, such division is the greatest threat that the movement faces - more so, even, than that of Israel's army. This lesson was driven home to Hezbollah's leadership late during the Lebanese civil war when the Shiite Amal party and Hezbollah militants engaged in a vicious inter-Shia conflict. The dispute caused the focus to shift away from the party's overarching goal, that of fighting the Israeli occupation, and led to a significant reduction in attacks on Israeli forces.

These days, however, as Nicholas Noe argues in the Palestine Chronicle, the "specter of internal division" has receded from Hezbollah's vision and they are now focusing their attention more squarely on Israel. While their domestic position is obviously not entirely secure, Hezbollah is looking increasingly confident. Noe suggests that Hezbollah is convinced that another conflict with their Jewish neighbor is right on the horizon -- thus, all the reports about re-arming and expanding their missile capabilities that we've seen in recent weeks. But Hezbollah is not only confident that another war is in the offing, they also believe that they can win it - even more decisively than they won the July 2006 war. Noe writes:

The overwhelming sentiment within the party seems to be that a confrontation is not only inevitable, but that when it comes it will finally lead to the total collapse of Israel. This means, above all else, that the relative quiet of the past few years has not brought restored Israeli deterrence, but instead the deferment of a conflict that Hizballah feels vastly more secure in waging.

Hezbollah, writes Noe, believes that what they're seeing in Israel is a kind of internal collapse of the state as evidenced by military failures, corruption scandals, heavy international pressure, and the "corrosive" effects of the occupation. Now armed to the teeth and eager to experiment with their new toys, Hezbollah looks ready - if not eager - for a fight. It's a fight that, according to Noe, Hezbollah believes will deal a decisive blow to Israel.

Joshua Landis, the Syria expert over at the University of Oklahoma, contests Noe's theory about Hezbollah's burgeoning confidence.

It is hard to believe Hizbullah is really as confident as [Noe suggests.] Certainly, “the resistance,” and that includes Hamas and Syria, must do something. The ball is in their court. Israel has won, at least it would seem that way for the time being. What do I mean by won? The Gaza solution. Israel has defied Obama, who claims that only the two-state solution is viable. It has presented an alternative solution, the Gaza solution. By bombing Hizbullah hard and bombing Hamas hard Israel has mapped out a policy. It seems to be working. No Western power complained when Israel smashed Gaza, nor have they complained since. No Hizbullah attack in over 3 years and quite on the Gaza front as the population languishes in its tents – that is success of the starkest kind.
If the “resistance” does not respond within the year, there will be precious few remaining Israelis – or Westerner politicians for that matter – who will argue that concessions need to be made for peace. Hizbullah may talk a confident
game, but the Israelis have promised that Lebanon will be Gaza’ed if Hizbullah strikes. I believe them.

I largely agree with this. I am not sure I would take Hezbollah's bravado-filled public statements as an indication of what the movement really thinks. Nasrallah is trying to appeal and excite a domestic audience, and talking tough about Israel is a practiced method they've used many times before. That said, I would caution that Hezbollah's dramatic expansion of its missile arsenal is a big cause for worry - not just because of the practical application of these weapons, but because of the sense of adventurism and excitement that they must imbue in the movement's leadership. Time and time again, most notably in WWI, big arms build-ups have left leaders itching for a chance to test out their new toys. I fear that there might be a sense of this within Hezbollah as well.

That said, Nasrallah's circle is made up of pragmatists and I would be surprised if they were truly itching for the kind of conflict with Israel that Noe seems to suggest they are. Even though Hezbollah "won" the last round (by way of a draw), the Lebanese suffered many, many times more than did the Israelis. It's hard for me to believe they want to run that nightmere-ish scenario all over again, big guns or not.

Good News for Space Watchers

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 16:44:00 +0000

A Vanity Fair poll reveals that more Americans -- I kid you not -- think it more likely that life will be found in outer space than that peace will be achieved in the Middle East.

What Journalists Get Paid For

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 06:16:00 +0000

This exchange between the press and the State Department spokesman, Ian Kelly, is truly a gem. I'm glad that there are still some journalists floating around in Washington that are willing to ask the tough questions. That said, credit to the journalists aside, I'm not happy to see it so clearly confirmed that George Mitchell is accomplishing a big bunch of nothing with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It actually sounds like he's getting a fairly good talking-to by the Israelis.

I am posting the full transcript here, which is long, but also impossible to just excerpt in brief. Every sentence is telling.
_________

QUESTION: On the peace process, Israel has approved today the construction of 900 new housing units in East Jerusalem. How do you view this approval at this specific time?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think, Michel, you've heard us say many times that we believe that neither party should engage in any kind of actions that could unilaterally preempt or appear to preempt negotiations. And I think that we find the Jerusalem Planning Committee's decision to move forward on the approval of the - approval process for the expansion of Gilo in Jerusalem as dismaying.

This is at a time when we're working to re-launch negotiations, and we believe that these actions make it more difficult for our efforts to succeed. So we object to this, and we object to other Israeli practices in Jerusalem related to housing, including the continuing pattern of evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes.

And - just to repeat what we've said all along, our position on Jerusalem is clear. We believe that the - that Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved through negotiations between the two parties.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, did this come up in Ambassador Mitchell's meetings in London yesterday? Apparently, we were told that he met an advisor to Netanyahu, asked them to not permit these new buildings, and then that request was flatly turned down.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Andy, I just don't want to get into the substance of these negotiations. They're sensitive. I think you've seen the Israeli - some Israeli press reports that did report that this was raised in the meetings. This is - I mean, these
kinds of unilateral actions are exactly the kind of actions that we think that both sides should refrain from at a time when we're trying to start the negotiations again. But I don't want to get into the substance of the discussions yesterday in London.

QUESTION: Would you steer us away from not believing the Israeli press reports?

MR. KELLY: I just don't want to get into the substance. I'm not going to steer you one way or the other on it.

QUESTION: Where's Senator Mitchell today?

QUESTION: How long is the U.S. going to continue to tolerate Israel's violation of international law? I mean, soon it's not even going to be possible - there's not going to be any land left for the Palestinians to establish an independent state.

MR. KELLY: Well, again, this is a - we understand the Israeli point of view about Jerusalem. But we think that all sides right now, at this time when we're expending such intense efforts to try and get the two sides to sit down, that we should refrain from these actions, like this decision to move forward on an approval process for more housing units in East Jerusalem.

QUESTION: But should U.S. inaction, or in response to Israel's actions, then be interpreted as some sort of about-face in policy - the President turning his back on the promises he's made to the Palestinians?

MR. KELLY: You're - okay, you're using language that I wouldn't use. I mean, again, our focus is to get these negotiations started. We're calling on both parties to refrain from actions, from - and from rhetoric that would impede this process. It's a challenging time, and we just need to focus on what's important here, and that's --

QUESTION: Well, what actions (inaudible) the Palestinians taken recently that would impede progress?

MR. KELLY: Well, as I say, we would discourage all unilateral actions, and I think --

QUESTION: Fair enough. But the Palestinians --

MR. KELLY: We talked yesterday --

QUESTION: -- don't appear to be taking any unilateral actions. It seems to be (inaudible).

MR. KELLY: Well, we did talk yesterday about the - and I want to make sure I get my language right here - about the - discouraging any kind of unilateral appeal for United Nations Security Council recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That would fall in that category of unilateral actions.

QUESTION: Okay. So the Palestinian call for this, which was rejected by both the EU and yourself yesterday, you're putting that on the same level as them building - as the Israelis building --

MR. KELLY: No, I'm not saying that. You just said that, Matt. I'm not saying that. I'm just saying that --

QUESTION: Well, you're saying you're calling on both sides to stop doing these things.

MR. KELLY: We are.

QUESTION: Yeah. But the rhetoric from the --

MR. KELLY: I'm not saying they're equivalent.

QUESTION: -- Palestinians is not actually constructed in a --

MR. KELLY: I'm not saying they're equivalent. I'm just saying that we - they - we have to treat these things as sensitive issues.

QUESTION: You said a little bit earlier that we understand the Israeli point of view on Jerusalem. Can you explain what you mean by that?

MR. KELLY: Well, you have to ask - I'm not going to stand up here and characterize
the Israeli point of view on --

QUESTION: No. I'm just asking you, if you understand the Israeli point of view on Jerusalem, why are you saying that this is not a good thing?

MR. KELLY: I'm not saying we support the Israeli point of view. We understand it.

QUESTION: Right. And then, last one on this, you characterized this decision by the planning commission as dismaying.

MR. KELLY: Yes.

QUESTION: You can't come up with anything stronger than "dismaying"? I mean, this flies in the face of everything you've been talking about for months and months and months.

MR. KELLY: It's dismaying.

QUESTION: Yeah, you can't offer a condemnation of it or anything like that? (Laughter.) I mean, who is in charge of the language here.

MR. KELLY: I have said what I have said, Mr. Lee. Yeah.

QUESTION: Would you say, though, that your own envoy has - does he have any leverage at this point, given the fact that the Israelis not only refuse, but blatantly have ignored his wishes on this?

MR. KELLY: Well, let's take a step back and let's also recognize that both sides agree on the goal, and that goal is a comprehensive peace. That goal is two states living side by side in peace and security and cooperation. So that is why we continue to be committed to this. That is why Special Envoy Mitchell meets with both sides at every opportunity, and why we are continuing to expend such efforts on this. So let's remember that, that we do share a common goal.

QUESTION: Well, where's Senator Mitchell today?

MR. KELLY: I believe Senator Mitchell is on his way back today.

QUESTION: Could you give us just a brief synopsis of the progress that Senator Mitchell has made in his months on the job?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think we have - we've gotten --

QUESTION: Yeah, maybe if the --

MR. KELLY: -- both sides to agree on this goal. We have gotten both sides --

QUESTION: Ian, they agreed on the goal years ago. I mean, that's not --

MR. KELLY: Well, I think that we - this government --

QUESTION: You mean you got the Israel Government to say, yes, we're willing to accept a Palestinian state? You got Netanyahu to say that, and that's his big accomplishment?

MR. KELLY: That is an accomplishment.

QUESTION: But previous Israeli administration - previous Israeli governments had agreed to that already.

MR. KELLY: Okay, all right.

QUESTION: So in other words, the bottom line is that, in the list of accomplishments that Mitchell has come up with or established since he started, is zero.

MR. KELLY: I wouldn't say zero.

QUESTION: Well, then what would you say it is?

MR. KELLY: Well, I would say that we've gotten both sides to commit to this goal. They have - we have - we've had a intensive round or rounds of negotiations, the President brought the two leaders together in New York. Look --

QUESTION: But wait, hold on. You haven't had any intense --

MR. KELLY: Obviously --

QUESTION: There haven't been any negotiations.

MR. KELLY: Obviously, we're not even in the red zone yet, okay.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. KELLY: I mean, we're not - but it's - we are less than a year into this Administration, and I think we've accomplished more over the last year than the previous administration did in eight years.

QUESTION: Well, I - really, because the previous administration actually had them sitting down talking to each other. You guys can't even get that far.

MR. KELLY: All right.

QUESTION: I'll drop it.

MR. KELLY: Give us a chance. Thank you, Matt. Yeah, in the back.

QUESTION: It seems Senator Mitchell is focusing in his meetings on the Israeli side. Is he - does he have any plans to talk with the Palestinians, or there is no need now for that?

MR. KELLY: Well, he, as I say, he had meetings yesterday with the Israelis. He's coming back to the U.S. now. He always stands ready to talk to both sides. There are no plans at this moment to meet with the Palestinian side.

_____________
The painful lack of a clear condemnation from the American side with regards to continued Israeli settlement destruction goes back to the argument that blogging colleague Noam Sheizaf made recently: that Washington just is not getting it. Saying that our side is "dismayed" is not going to cut it anymore. We start to look pretty bad when, as Sheizaf writes, "the president of the United States is practically being told to go to hell by some low level bureaucrats [in the Jerusalem Planning Committee]" and all we can come up with as a response is some bland statement to express our general concern.

I also want to make a note here about George Mitchell. Liberals are often criticized for putting too much faith in diplomacy, of supporting "talk for the sake of talk." Allow me clarify something: liberal internationalists support smart and calculated diplomacy. Mitchell is not engaged in anything of the kind. I know few serious foreign policy analysts who are on board with his 'talk big and carry no stick' style of diplomacy with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But let's also be clear about something else. While Mitchell is catching a lot of flack for Washington's failure to restart peace negotiations and stop Israeli settlement expansion, it's President Obama that is ultimately to blame. The buck stops with the president himself, not his envoy. If there is no authorization from the White House for Mitchell to seriously engage with the Palestinian and Israeli leaders in a way that combines carrots with legitimate sticks, which there doesn't seem to be, Mitchell's task is doomed from the outset.

(Hat tip: Steve Clemons)

Choosing the Right Broker

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 04:08:00 +0000

Consider me a critic of the talk that France might play the role of mediator in a renewed round of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. Coming on the heels of supportive comments to this effect from Netanyahu, who stated on Sunday his interest in French -- rather than Turkish -- mediation, and a successful visit to Paris by Syria's Bashar Al-Assad, the AP reports today that Sarkozy has expressed his willingness to take on such a role. But it should be clear why Israeli hard-liners would wish to see Paris get involved: Netanyahu's administration has stated categorically that it has no interest in ceding the Golan to the Syrians and bringing the French into the equation would ensure that they don't have to, at least not anytime in the near future.

At a first glance, it would not be unreasonable to think that France could be considered a relatively fair mediator (and therefore a good broker for peace) - Paris commands a certain degree of respect in Damascus and Sarkozy has worked to cultivate a more pro-Israel image since taking office. But being seen as a fair mediator is not enough. A Syrian-Israeli peace deal is going to involve pressure and incentives from a third-party actor à la the Camp David Accords. And the French hold none of the same cards that the Americans do. Engaging with the French, therefore, is a convenient way for the hard-line Israeli government to show the world that they are "working for peace" while ensuring that an actual agreement never takes shape.

Moreover, French mediation would undermine and stall the more viable American effort to restart these talks - an effort which, while still stuck in a preliminary phase, remains our best (and perhaps only) hope for progress on this track. And let's be clear: America's historic ties to Israel and its dominant role in the Middle East dwarfs that of France's. Syria certainly understands this, which is one of the reasons that they have long pushed for a central American role - and have gone along only skeptically with other mediation efforts.

For statesmen, it is difficult to give up an opportunity to play the "peacebroker." But sometimes it is better to just say no. Although it is admirable of Sarkozy to display his willingness to take on the role of mediator, the fact is that if he's truly interested in peace, he should reject the idea. It is much more likely to be Washington who ultimately secures this agreement than Paris. Under the circumstances then, it is probably better to not muddy the waters with new actors and competing peace efforts.

Grading the Strategy

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 17:31:00 +0000

Nathan Brown, over at Carnegie, notes that one of the central flaws of the Obama administration's strategy towards Israel-Palestine is that they have essentially recycled many of the ill-considered policies of the Bush era. These poor policy choices include:

A "West Bank First" strategy that favors backing Palestinian moderates in the West Bank while largely ignoring the situation in Gaza.
Putting our trust in just one or two Palestinian leaders (in this case, Salam Fayyad and Mahmoud Abbas) to deliver the goods on building a viable Palestinian state.
Ignoring the fact that Palestinians "have domestic politics too." (Consider what happened when the US convinced Abbas to ignore the Goldstone Report.)
Assuming that Israeli settlements are an important but nonetheless a "side issue."

To Brown's list of poor assumptions and failed policies, I would add:

The belief that the Palestinians can engage in meaningful and legitimate negotiations without a unified Palestinian authority. (In other words, that negotiations can be restarted while at the same time the Cairo-led reconciliation process falls to pieces.)
The neglect of the Israeli-Syrian track, and the failure to realize the importance of the Syrian role in influencing Hamas and the broader Palestinian peace process.
The failure to put any serious, sustained pressure on the Israeli side that involves a legitimate threat of aid cuts and/or other diplomatic or economic punishments.
The establishment of high-hopes for peace that are not backed by a comprehensive plan or sustained engagement from Washington.

All Bark and No Bite

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 00:20:00 +0000

Odd though it may sound, I am vaguely heartened by Obama's continued indecision on Afghanistan - not for what it reveals about his foreign policy strategy for the region, but for what it says about the internal decision-making process in the White House. Specifically, what it indicates is that there is a clear policy of review and debate that accompanies major decisions of this nature; moreover, Obama appears to be engaged in fundamentally examining the assumptions on which our current involvement in Afghanistan is based. This may seem only logical -- it is, after all, what presidents are supposed to do -- but there are many examples where prior presidents surrounded themselves with ideologues and yes-men and poor foreign policy blunders were the result. (Anyone in particular coming to mind?)

That said, weeks of discussion with his Cabinet and top military leaders has yet to fully drive home to Obama what he absolutely must understand about our involvement in Afghanistan: that it's Afghan politics that matter more than anything. The American military can't win this fight through guns alone. Oh, Obama's made statements to the effect that Karzai's administration needs to reform itself - but, as a NYT analysis piece notes today, there has been no "or else" threat. In other words, by failing to threaten a withdrawal of American troops -- perhaps the only serious leverage the Obama administration has over Karzai -- we have established no bargaining power for which to affect change.

White House officials acknowledged this week that they were not planning on using the ultimate cudgel: pulling all American troops. Such a step would certainly get Mr. Karzai’s attention — it might lead to his overthrow because his political survival is dependent on the presence of American troops.
...“What if Karzai doesn’t do what we ask and calls our bluff?” asked Richard Fontaine, a former foreign policy adviser to Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona.

White Phosphorus Over Gaza

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 23:39:00 +0000

A Syrian friend of mine sent me these images of Israeli use of white phosphorus in its attack early this year on Gaza.

Often used for illumination or providing smokescreens during a battle, white phosphorus is also highly flammable and can cause terrible burns on the bodies of those who come in contact with it. In Gaza, one of the most densely populated areas in the world, the use of this weapon has been well documented; Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both issued reports on the subject. HRW, for its part, has documented how Israel choose not to use less damaging smoke shells and, in one example on January 15th, "even ignored repeated warnings from UN staff before hitting the main UN compound in Gaza with white phosphorus shells." The Guardian quotes a senior researcher at HRW, Fred Abrahams, as saying:

"In Gaza, the Israeli military didn't just use white phosphorus in open areas as a screen for its troops....It fired white phosphorus repeatedly over densely populated areas, even when its troops weren't in the area and safe smoke shells were available. As a result, civilians needlessly suffered and died."

Israel initially denied the use of white phosphorus, but has since launched an "internal military investigation." It goes without saying, but I wouldn't hold your breath waiting on the results of that inquiry. The pictures below illustrating the use of this weapon are some of the most vivid I have seen. I have taken out some of the more graphic and terrible shots of burn victims. (Credit for these photos goes to Mohammed Abed of the AFP.)

Obama's War

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 01:58:00 +0000

This piece is the first in a series of posts that I'll be writing over the coming weeks that look at our developing policy towards Afghanistan in a historical context, drawing from our involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

You have to wonder about the extent to which Obama's developing strategy in Afghanistan is based not upon a comprehensive foreign policy plan, but on pure domestic political calculations. More bluntly, and at the risk of sounding sensationalist, are we considering an escalation in our involvement in Afghanistan in order to pass a health care bill or ensure Obama's re-election?

It's not entirely out of the question. Obama has, for better or worse, staked out this conflict as "his war." He has taken personal ownership of it. It's not the Afghans' war; it's Obama's. By tacitly admitting defeat, by acknowledging that the war is unwinnable, by pulling American troops out of Afghanistan, Obama would make himself the target of a barrage of criticism from Congress and from the media; he would be labeled a weak, ineffective, and even cowardly leader. Without a doubt, such accusations would severely undercut Obama's impressive domestic agenda, including his health care package, his immigration proposals, and his plan for heavy investment in infrastructure. Can a president, weakened by a debilitating foreign policy defeat, truly implement his domestic goals? In most cases, history shows us, the answer is a clear no.

So you have to wonder: Is Obama recommitting to this war because he truly believes we can win (despite the obvious signs that victory is nowhere in sight), or is he hedging his bets and agreeing to some modest troop increases in order to, in part, save his ambitious domestic agenda?

Lyndon Johnson, in the mid-1960s, faced this same dilemma. Remember, LBJ hated the Vietnam War. He hated the Cabinet meetings, the casualty reports, the protests from anti-war demonstrators, the public criticism, the body bags. In fact, Johnson was not much of a foreign policy practitioner; he had little eye for foreign affairs, as biographies about him indicate, and he had a poor understanding for history or cultural differences. It was domestic policy that he excelled at. But I would argue that while it is true that LBJ fundamentally worried about the effect that war might have in serving as a distraction from his Great Society agenda, he also realized that he had to look strong and appease certain constituencies in order to pass his desired legislation. In essence, crass though it may sound, it may be fair to say that Johnson traded American and Vietnamese lives overseas for Medicare and the Great Society at home.

Johnson believed, at least early in his presidency, that if he pulled out of Vietnam, he'd face a popular revolt from not only Republicans but also members of his own party, particularly hawkish southern Democrats. Attacked as a coward and a poor president, he would have little remaining political capital to push through civil rights legislation or any of the rest of his sweeping legislative plan. Is Obama engaged in a similar calculation? Like Johnson, is he preparing to sacrifice additional American lives in order to, in part, safeguard and bolster an ambitious domestic agenda? It is a question worth considering.

Photo credit: (Doug Mills/The New York Times/Redux)

Op-Ed Page as Farce

noreply@blogger.com (Matt Eckel) — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 18:27:00 +0000

Had I been eating or drinking something when I ran across this Washington Times op-ed by Oliver North, I'm sure I would have very comically spit it out. As it was, I just stared agape at the computer screen for a minute until my retinas hurt and I had to blink.

In brief, North argues that, in trying to engage the Iranian regime, the Obama Administration is repeating the mistakes of Jimmy Carter, failing to recognize Tehran's implacable and slightly psychotic hatred of the West. He implies some truly bizarre things. He argues, for example, that the United States could have stopped the consolidation of the Iranian Revolution had the Carter Administration not "dithered" while Khomeini was consolidating power. How we could have done this isn't made clear (invasion? engineering a coup?), but many conservatives take Carter's "weakness" as prima facie obvious (allowing, as it does, for the Great Redeemer Reagan to come save the day), so the historical liberties probably won't matter much to his audience.

He also implies that, in the context of an immensely fluid political situation in an area of prime strategic importance, it would have been somehow unwise for the U.S. to try to develop an understanding with those coming to power in Tehran. That's just dumb. Iran was a key element of America's "twin pillars" strategy in the Persian Gulf, and losing one of those pillars (Saudi Arabia being the other) did indeed throw our whole Middle East policy out of whack. The fact that, largely for domestic reasons, the factions that won out in Iran had much more to gain by antagonizing the U.S. than they did by reaching an accomodation made such gestures futile, but that doesn't mean they weren't worth trying.

Finally, North argues that the Iranian regime today is basically identical to its original incarnation of thirty years ago. Also dumb. Iran sees itself as a rising power with genuine political conflicts with the regional status quo, but to argue that nothing has changed ignores large shifts (back and forth) in policy and rhetoric over the past few decades, as well as the structural damage done to the regime by its naked repression of those it purports to represent. Now, that's not to say that "engagement" right now is necessarily the right strategy. Reports indicate that (again likely for domestic reasons) the current political balance within Iran will make successful engagement extremely difficult, and it may indeed be time to change tacks, but the U.S. shouldn't do so based on essentialist logic and poor history.

More than anything, though, the fact that Oliver North, Oliver North is arguing about how dispicable this regime is and how useless diplomacy will be in dealing with it is so absurd as to border on art. Oliver North, you may remember, was at the center of the Iran-Contra scandal during the 1980s, where he masterminded the sale of missiles to Iran through Israeli middlemen in order to covertly fund right wing rebels in South America.

Why in the name of God would a newspaper, even one with the impeccable editorial standards of the Washington Times, give this man a voice on this particular subject?

Not A Clue

noreply@blogger.com (Jeb Koogler) — Fri, 06 Nov 2009 16:47:00 +0000

It has been a true disappointment to watch our Middle East strategy visibly collapse these last few weeks as American officials have steadily turned a blind eye to Israeli settlement building. To their credit, the Obama administration had initially, at least for several months, been relatively clear about the need for Israel to stop construction of additional housing units. That is, until recently, when the administration began to drop the ball on the issue and their tough line against settlements started to fade perceptibly.

Then came Hilary Clinton's statement this week that appeared to praise Netanyahu's "unprecedented" policy towards settlements. No surprise, the Arab world erupted in anger, assuming that her words were evidence of a new American policy towards Israel based upon a highly lenient view of additional settlement construction. By the time that Clinton got to Morocco on the next leg of her overseas tour, she was already being roundly criticized by Arab leaders as a flip-flopper.

Clinton has since "clarified" the statement, but her simple poor choice of an adjective went a long way to undermining the Arab world's trust in the new American leadership. Reader of the Arab press over the last few days get a clear sense of a broad feeling of disappointment on the part of many Arabs. Obama, people thought, what with his majestic speech in Cairo not long after his inauguration, was supposed to herald in a new era of diplomacy and sustained American engagement. He was supposed to be different.

In the context of this latest controversy, no one should be surprised that Arab leaders haven't more enthusiastically jumped on board to Obama's plan for solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute - a plan that involves, for them, undertaking a range of good-faith measures towards Israel. Arabs have little faith in America's commitment to this issue; they know the history of our biased and spotty engagement. Why should they sacrifice politically, putting themselves on the chopping block of rabidly anti-Israeli domestic audiences, for an effort that -- like its predecessors -- is likely to fail because of Washington's lack of commitment? Clinton's latest statements, combined with the general lethargy of the Obama administration towards this issue in recent weeks, has done nothing but further discourage the kind of Arab participation that Washington so desperately wants.

Adding to the administration's troubles, a now-humiliated Mahmoud Abbas has said that he won't run for re-election in light of the lack of peace progress. Now, our primary Palestinian partner, Fatah, which had already been undermined politically when they were told to disregard the Goldstone Report, is looking shakier than ever. More generally, Palestinian moderates who argue that only dialogue and engagement with the Israelis will bring a just solution to the conflict are appearing increasingly weak in the face of militant Hamas supporters who point to signs of another failed peace initiative as an indication that negotiations are a dead end.

Meanwhile, our Secretary of State, exemplifying the poor leadership that she has exhibited on the Israel-Palestine issue, now seems to think that she can just give the Arabs more money to make them like us. On Tuesday, just as the settlement controversy was breaking, she unrolled a miserly initiative to give a few dollars to "vulnerable young people" in Jordan (alongside some other projects in the region.) Shockingly, this bold, dramatic new initiative got little attention in the press.

Memo to Clinton: want to curry favor in the Middle East? Then tell the Israelis to stop settlement construction and then threaten them with aid cuts if they don't do it. That will, I can guarantee it, be a much more fruitful public diplomacy effort.

Quick Hit: The Absurdity of Authoritarian Rule

noreply@blogger.com (Matt Eckel) — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 15:29:00 +0000

This isn't the most analytical thing I've ever written, and maybe I'm just punch drunk from being up nights lately, but as deadly serious as the subject is, I couldn't help but laugh when I read the following bit in the Times about Iranian hard-liners' attempts to circumscribe demonstrations around the thirtieth anniversary of the taking of the American Embassy in Tehran:

No rallies would be permitted except the state-sanctioned ones outside the old embassy and anyone chanting anything except “death to America” would be arrested.

Again, I don't mean to make light of the very real crimes committed by a very repressive state, but stepping back, one has to appreciate the profound absurdity involved in choreographing support for authoritarian regimes. They've gone beyond the standard tactics of rounding up some supporters and putting implicit boundaries around the general gist of what they're supposed to express. They're quite literally demanding that people get together at a particular time and place and look REALLY EXCITED while reading from a meticulously prepared script. The closest parallel I can think of is certain elements of religious ritual, but when was the last time you heard someone put real passion into the Nicene Creed?