Yasir Noor

Modernization is an Unending Process

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Tue, 17 Mar 2020 07:59:00 +0000

OUTLINE

#Introduction

Modernization is defined as the modern way of thinking and acting accordingly. It is truly a continual and never-ending process that transforms all areas of life continually, as time progresses۔Political system

1. Elections in the modern day

2. Solution of administrative problems

3. Role of bureaucracy in modern politics

4. Solution of energy crisis

5. Proper managerial services in the modern world

6. Training and development on a modern basis

Economic system

1. Increase of industrialization in the economy of Pakistan

2. Development in energy sector

3. Use of modern machinery in agriculture

4. Management of population issues

5. Solution to problems caused by ever increasing urbanization

6. Set-up of modern transport infrastructure

7. Human resource management HRM via modernization

Technical system

1. Modernization of technical facilitates

2. Use of technology to develop renewable energy resources

Scientific development

1. Development of energy resources

2. Research and benefit for mankind’s benefit

3. Scientific development for medical purposes

Social system

1. Solution to human rights violations

2. Religious integration in the society

3. Liberalization of laws in the society

4. Increased gender equality and women empowerment

5. Modernized education system for everyone

6. Transformation of art and literature

7. Cultural transmission/exchange

8. Evolution of fashion industry

9. Transformation of sports via technology

Globalization

1. Role of media in globalization

2. Effect of globalization on our culture

3. Increased environmental pollution

Defense system

1. Modernized defense system to be used in warfare

2. Weapons of mass destruction to become more lethal

3. Defense from terrorism in the modern-day word

4. Use of technology for defense and offense

Conclusion

US, Russia, China recognise Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:20:00 +0000

US, Russia, China recognize Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process

WASHINGTON: The United States, China, and Russia have jointly welcomed Pakistan to a four-party the consultation process that seeks to end the 18-year-old war and decades of blood-letting in Afghanistan, says a joint statement issued in Washington.

“China, Russia, and the United States welcomed Pakistan joining the consultation and believe that Pakistan can play an important role in facilitating peace in Afghanistan,” said the statement issued by the State Department.

“Pakistan appreciated the constructive efforts by the China-Russia-US trilateral consultation on the Afghan peace process,” it added.

The statement recognizes Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process and will be seen in Islamabad as a vindication of its long-held view that any development in Afghanistan also impacts Pakistan. Islamabad also believes that as a country with the largest Pashtun population, Pakistan must be involved in the Afghan peace process and major world powers, particularly the United States, should not ignore its interests while negotiating a deal in Afghanistan.

The major diplomatic recognition comes days before PM Imran’s visit to Washington on 22nd

This major diplomatic recognition of Pakistan’s role comes days before Prime Minister Imran Khan’s scheduled visit to Washington on July 22 and endorses media claims that Afghanistan will figure prominently in the US-Trump talks and in consultations between US and Pakistani officials.

Diplomatic observers in Washington also link the prime minister’s visit to Pakistan’s support to the Afghan peace process, noting that Islamabad played a key role in persuading Taliban representatives to stay engaged with US officials in Doha, Qatar.

Senior US diplomats and generals have publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s support to the US-Taliban negotiations, urging it to play a greater role in ensuring that the process leads to durable peace in the region.

The White House, while confirming the PM’s visit to Washington, said earlier this week that the Trump-Khan talks will focus on strengthening bilateral cooperation, which will “bring peace, stability, and economic prosperity to a region that has seen far too much conflict.”

The Beijing text was jointly released by the governments of the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and China on the occasion of the four-party meeting on the Afghan peace process, held in the Chinese capital on July 10-11.

This was the third meeting of the trilateral forum, which includes China, Russia, and the United States and the first in which Pakistan was also involved.

The US State Department noted that the four sides exchanged views on the current situation and joint efforts for realizing a political settlement to advance peace, stability, and the prosperity of Afghanistan and the region. They also emphasized the importance of the trilateral consensus on the Afghan peace process reached in Moscow on April 25.

“All sides welcomed recent positive progress as the crucial parties concerned have advanced their talks and increased contacts with each other,” the statement added. “All sides also welcomed intra-Afghan meetings held in Moscow and Doha.”

The four sides called for relevant parties to “grasp the opportunity for peace and immediately start intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban, the Afghan government, and other Afghans”.

The United States, Russia, China, Russia, and Pakistan reaffirmed that negotiations should be “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” and should “produce a peace framework as soon as possible”.

They underlined the need or this framework to “guarantee the orderly and responsible transition of the security situation and detail an agreement on a future inclusive political arrangement acceptable to all Afghans”.

The four sides encouraged all parties to take steps to reduce violence leading to a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire that starts with intra-Afghan negotiations.

They also agreed to maintain the momentum of consultation and to invite other important stakeholders to join on the basis of the trilateral consensus agreed on April 25 in Moscow.

They agreed that this broader group would meet when intra-Afghan negotiations start. The date and venue for the next consultation would be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

Published in Dawn, July 13th, 2019

The State of Play in U.S.-Taliban Talks and the Afghan Peace Process

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:17:00 +0000

The State of Play in U.S.-Taliban Talks and the Afghan Peace Process

The talks are progressing, but will Afghans negotiate with each other?

Where do the talks stand?

The U.S. and Taliban both acknowledge significant progress in their most recent round of discussions. These talks have focused narrowly on two issues: a timetable for the potential withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, and steps the Taliban must take to prevent international terrorists from operating on Afghan soil. U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad has said agreement is close on both issues, though neither side has publicized the terms.

The U.S. position is that there are two other vital issues to negotiate: a cease-fire, and an intra-Afghan political settlement. In Khalilzad’s words, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”—agreements on all four issues would eventually comprise a single interrelated deal, and the U.S. would not withdraw its troops until that time.

An intra-Afghan negotiation would be necessary to negotiate these latter two issues, and it has yet to begin. It appeared to inch closer over the weekend, however, when President Ghani and other top Afghan leaders—including many of Ghani’s political rivals—agreed on a diverse negotiating team and a council of senior leaders to guide the team’s work. This reflected in part Khalilzad’s intensive diplomacy during a visit to Kabul last week and helped address a perception that Ghani would only agree to talks if he could tightly control them.

Why do the U.S.-Taliban talks exclude the Afghan government?

The Taliban have long refused to enter negotiations with their fellow Afghans before reaching an understanding with the U.S. on when foreign troops will leave Afghanistan. Washington’s primary objective in essentially every Afghan peace initiative this decade has nonetheless been for the Taliban to agree to meet with the Afghan government. After years of Taliban refusal to budge on this point, Washington determined that the choice was between an imperfect peace process that starts with U.S-Taliban talks or no peace process at all.

American officials continue to insist, however, that no final deal is possible without an intra-Afghan dialogue. The most pressing question—and a key focus of the U.S. diplomacy—is what form it should take. A clear next step is a gathering of the Afghan government, Taliban, and Afghan leaders scheduled for next week in Doha, Qatar; though an “informal” meeting, it could plausibly help launch more serious negotiations. Ghani also plans a Loya Jirga—a traditional nationwide assembly—at the end of April, which would aim to establish national negotiating positions and “red lines” for peace talks with the Taliban.

Any format for an intra-Afghan dialogue will need to navigate the dilemma of the elected government’s role: Ghani naturally prefers that his government largely control the process, opposition parties welcome government participation but not control and the Taliban reject the government’s very legitimacy.

Also looming over the entire effort is the approach of Afghanistan’s “fighting season,” the period of spring and summer when violence is typically highest. The coming six months will carry a heightened risk of battlefield developments—for example, large-scale attacks in Kabul—that can make political compromise more difficult. Worse yet, if the fighting season goes badly for the government, and/or if the U.S. were to announce an intent to withdraw troops with or without and the intra-Afghan deal, it will tempt the Taliban to double down on a military campaign to subdue the entire country and obviate the need for a peace process at all.

Are women’s rights, and Afghanistan’s other gains, in danger?

Negotiations have not yet turned to this question. The current U.S.-Taliban talks focus strictly on the issues of terrorism and the troop presence; the U.S. has been unwilling to negotiate internal political and social questions without the Afghan government and other Afghans in the room.

This has not prevented widespread expressions of fear across Afghanistan that the U.S. is willing to trade away the country’s post-2001 gains in its urgency to get out of Afghanistan—or that Afghan leaders will eventually do so. These fears are reasonable, but if intra-Afghan discussions do turn to basic rights (especially for women) and democratic institutions, there is some cause for hope:

· First, Afghanistan under any scenario will remain dependent on international assistance, which even the Taliban say they want to continue. An Afghanistan that trades away democracy and basic freedoms—especially for women—is not one that the vital donors in the U.S. and Europe will bankroll.

· Second, the Taliban appear somewhat more flexible on these issues than they were as a regime in the 1990s. Though still deeply conservative, they now acknowledge women’s rights to work, own property and be educated, among other things. In the context of a negotiation, they may concede more.

· Third, Ghani and others consistently cite Afghanistan’s democratic system and the rights of women and ethnic minorities atop their list of non-negotiable issues, arguably putting themselves more on the hook than the political moment strictly demands.

At a USIP appearance in February, Khalilzad said that the U.S. would be forceful in standing up for and promoting its values in talks with the Taliban: “We will speak loudly and clearly for the values that we have—the values of human rights, values of freedom of the press [and] women’s right.”

A successful peace the agreement will involve painful trade-offs by all sides, and there are no guarantees about what positions any side will take, but these factors create space to protect Afghanistan’s most important gains on women’s rights and democracy.

How is the region—Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran, among others—reacting to the talks?

For years, these countries have doubted that Washington and Kabul could achieve either peace or victory in Afghanistan. They have moreover harbored varying degrees of the suspicion that the U.S. even genuinely sought peace, and/or that the U.S. instead sought a permanent presence in Afghanistan intended to contain them—even as they feared a hasty U.S. withdrawal creating chaos in their collective backyard.

These fears led to a variety of hedging behaviors, from Iran’s and Russia’s closer ties to the Taliban, to Pakistan’s refusal to close the Taliban safe, havens, to China’s reticence to confront Pakistan about this behavior. The net result was the increasingly divided region, mistrustful of both Washington and Kabul. Washington’s posture toward Iran, including this week’s designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organization, could further complicate Iran’s support for any peace deal.

The Doha talks have momentarily interrupted this deterioration, for at least three reasons. First, Washington’s desire to ultimately get out of Afghanistan has never been more clear, and the talks demonstrate that it prefers not to leave chaos in its wake. Second, each country in question does desire roughly the same outcome as Washington and Kabul: an agreement that ends the Afghan war, and gives the Taliban some (but not all) power. Third, the U.S. and Taliban have both demonstrated relative seriousness about the current talks, leading the region to perceive that there may never be a better opportunity to achieve peace. Pakistan’s helpful release of senior Taliban leader Mullah Baradar at Khalilzad’s request, and Moscow’s hosting of a constructive intra-Afghan dialogue, attest to this positive (if momentary) shift in regional dynamics.

At root, though, nearly all key decisions in this peace process will be made by Afghans. While outside powers can nudge along a deal, or spoil one, none have enough influence over their Afghan partners to force a deal that the government, Taliban, and other Afghans do not want.

The Afghan Peace Process Has Started. But Tough Choices Are Still to Come.

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:15:00 +0000

The Afghan Peace Process Has Started. But Tough Choices Are Still to Come.

Summary: Whether the recently agreed-upon U.S.-Taliban draft peace framework will lead to real peace negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban or serve as U.S. President Donald Trump’s pretext for departing Afghanistan is unknown. The hard choices for the United States, The Afghan government, the Taliban, and regional and international stakeholders are still to come.

Related Media and Tools

A DRAFT PEACE FRAMEWORK

The U.S. and Taliban negotiators reached a draft peace framework after six days of marathon talks in Qatar. This draft framework builds on years of direct and indirect talks between the two parties. According to media reports, the Taliban would be required to deny safe haven to international terrorist groups like al-Qaida and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. In exchange, the United States would withdraw forces from Afghanistan within eighteen months of a final agreement.

The U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, said the framework is based on the understanding that the Taliban must enter into direct talks with Kabul and, at the same time, agree to a ceasefire. Details of the U.S.-Taliban draft the framework, including whether it contains assurances about the rights of Afghan women or minorities, have not been disclosed, nor have the terms of monitoring and verification, which would be part of any final agreement.

The fact that the United States and the Taliban reached the framework without the direct participation of the Afghan government has stoked controversy. The Afghan government has long asserted that all peace talks must be “Afghan-owned and Afghan-led,” but this claim is undermined by Kabul’s dependency on international military and financial support. The next test will be whether and how the Afghan government becomes core actors in the dialogue.

WHAT WAS NOTABLE ABOUT THE TALKS

This is a moment of cautious hope for Afghanistan’s future, though optimism is still a ways off. There are three main reasons why these negotiations are important.

U.S. TROOP PRESENCE ON THE TABLE

The U.S. troop presence appears to be up for discussion for the first time. Previous U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Taliban were impeded by a lack of willingness to put concessions on the table, including the U.S./NATO military presence. In the past, every U.S. administration (including this one) chose to press for military advantage before pursuing peace. U.S. President Donald Trump’s desire to exit Afghanistan has disrupted this self-reinforcing dynamic and opened new space for diplomacy, even if unintentionally.

THE TALIBAN ARE SERIOUS ABOUT MAKING A DEAL WITH THE UNITED STATES

The Taliban are aggressively publicizing talks with the United States. They are framing the talks in triumphant terms as the end of what they say is the foreign occupation of Afghanistan. In addition, the appointment of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as deputy emir and head of political affairs is significant, particularly after his years-long detention in Pakistan. Mullah Baradar was founding Taliban emir Mullah Omar’s closest confidant. He led previous peace overtures to Kabul before being captured in Karachi by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (allegedly in cooperation with the CIA) in early 2010. Mullah Baradar’s association with the founding leader could have a palliative effect on hardliners in the movement who have been skeptical of talks. But his lengthy detention by Pakistan likely could lead some on all sides of the talks to doubt his loyalty.

THE TALIBAN ACCEPTED AS A UNIFIED POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTOR

There is mounting evidence of Taliban unity, contrary to hopes that the movement would splinter due to sustained pressure on the battlefield and leadership transitions. In June 2018, the Taliban’s top leadership, the Quetta Shura, ordered and carried out a unified Eid ceasefire across the country. And in 2014, political representatives of the Taliban showed they could negotiate and execute a complex military agreement in real-time, when they exchanged captured U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl in return for five Taliban detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.

NEXT STEPS TO WATCH FOR

For the talks to succeed, current efforts will require the alignment of the Afghan government, the Taliban, the United States, and its international partners, and regional stakeholders. The existing U.S.-Taliban draft framework is an important step forward, but the hard choices are still to come.

ELECTIONS COULD MAKE AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS HARDER

The Afghan government, thus far barred from talks by the Taliban, is going to have to reach a consensus on its negotiating positions. That debate will be public, perhaps disruptively so, because of the Afghan presidential elections scheduled for July 2019. The terms and process for engaging the Taliban will be front and center for the elites contesting the election.

There is a high risk that the coming elections could be disastrous. Each election since 2004 has produced a weaker government than the one it replaced. Or the elections could galvanize a national consensus behind peace, perhaps due to the increasing war-weariness of the Afghan people. The challenge for Afghan elites vying for office is to rise above short-term, competitive interests and pull a consensus together. Trump’s irascible fixation on drawing down the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan could focus Afghan elites’ attention on peace.

The another question is whether elite power brokers will consent to an agreement that forces them to share authority (and profits) with enemies. The long war has left deep mutual enmities, particularly across ethnic lines among Afghan power brokers. For a peace process to succeed, these animosities will need to be overcome, though never forgotten.

But many of these same elites may chafe at the consequences of peace. Economic, military and political dividends of the rule will need to be split among a broader group, including recent blood enemies. It was a relatively easy choice to accommodate rivals and even enemies when assistance and foreign contracts were increasing and seemingly bottomless. It will be harder to reach such accommodations as these cash flows dwindle. To stretch a metaphor—the question is whether these power brokers will accept the notion that splitting the shrinking pie is better than not having a pie to split at all.

TALIBAN INTENTIONS WILL BE TESTED IMMEDIATELY

The draft peace framework is well-designed to test the Taliban leadership’s intent. The leadership shura will need to answer the U.S. challenge to agree to a ceasefire (by freezing the battlefield and negotiating positions) and engage in direct talks with Kabul. Without a ceasefire agreement, the conflict could become more vicious still, as the Taliban presses its battlefield gains for leverage in talks. This is particularly concerning because Afghanistan was already the most lethal conflict in the world in 2018, accounting for 30 percent of global conflict fatalities, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

The Taliban benefit from current battlefield trends often described as a deteriorating stalemate. A ceasefire agreement, as the United States has demanded, would be a dramatic concession, even for only a portion of the prescribed period. One point of leverage is that Taliban leaders may be convinced that a U.S. withdrawal without a peace agreement would be a disaster, perhaps because they accept that Afghanistan will rely on the international support for years to come. If they achieve power in Afghanistan again, The Taliban would prefer to do so without sacrificing international donor support and political legitimacy. Whether Taliban leaders believe they need a full peace agreement with Kabul to achieve that veneer of international credibility they lacked during their previous rule is unknown, but the framework established by the U.S. negotiating the team is a smart way to test Taliban intentions in the near term.

THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE IS A VALUABLE BARGAINING CHIP

The United States will need to manage a bipartisan, civilian-military consensus that is extremely rare under the current administration. The first question is whether Trump will insist on an immediate and unconditional withdrawal, ignoring the peace process.

A partial withdrawal, returning to pre-2016 troop levels, may not be disastrous to the peace process. There is a risk that it could destabilize the Afghan armed forces’ battlefield capabilities, and thus Kabul’s confidence and negotiating position, given that Afghan forces still depend on air support from U.S. and coalition forces. But a limited withdrawal could also be used as a diplomatic instrument, perhaps as an intermediate concession alongside the start of direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban.

Alternatively, if Trump persists in his desire to draw down U.S. military forces quickly from Afghanistan, he could use a Taliban assurance that it will deny safe haven for terrorist groups who could threaten the United States as a minimum pretext for withdrawal. That risk could be more likely if he thinks that Afghan political elites do not support his administration’s peace initiative. The irony is that Trump’s volcanic petulance could be constructive to this effort if it can be channeled at all.

HOW TO HANDLE MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

If a framework agreement is finalized, the challenge for the United States (and NATO) will be to define a post-drawdown presence in Afghanistan that allows for careful monitoring and accountability of the agreement’s various parties. This is space where the UN should have a central role. To achieve a consensus, the administration will need to provide assurances that the draft framework offers a reasonable guarantee that the gains of the last seventeen years, including in terms of the rights of women and minorities will be protected.

With or without a final peace agreement, U.S. counterterrorism efforts involving Afghanistan will continue, even after a peace settlement. The United States will likely demand enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform and access rights to strike against potential terrorist threats, until the Afghan state is stable enough to give Washington and other states confidence in its ability to prevent terrorists from operating in its territory. The Taliban’s desire for international legitimacy may be the strongest leverage available for earning the group’s consent to such a counterterrorism framework.

THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Washington will also need to bring along its broad coalition of international partners. Despite constant indications of Trump’s disdain, traditional U.S. allies and partners continue to play vitally important roles in Afghanistan. The United States is the largest single-country donor, but most international development assistance to Afghanistan actually comes from combined contributions of the World Bank, the EU, individual European states, and Japan. The survival of the Afghan state as constructed will depend on continuing foreign support.

Criticism of the draft, the peace framework has focused on speculation about the future of Afghan women and minorities. Concerns about the Taliban’s intentions in this regard are well-founded. They must be central to the agenda of the serious intra-Afghan peace talks that this draft peace framework is meant to produce. The bottom line is that the United States and the rest of the international the community will have a better chance of protecting the human development gains made in the country since 2002, and particularly a better chance of monitoring and influencing the treatment of women and minorities, under a responsible peace framework than they would without such an agreement.

WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION MIGHT DO

The effort to achieve this draft peace framework was made possible with the help of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar at various stages. Yet the framework does not make clear what role regional states will play in achieving a final settlement. Just as regional competition fueled Afghanistan’s long war, regional states have a role to play in resolving it.

Pakistan has been a central participant in all phases of Afghanistan’s long war. The Trump administration promised to pursue a pressure strategy aimed at punishing Islamabad for its malign behavior, including by allowing Taliban leaders and fighters to freely live and organize from its territory. But Pakistani civilian and military leaders probably feel optimistic about the current draft framework, as its pursuit delayed the escalation of this pressure campaign. Perversely, Pakistan may have actually benefited from Trump’s ineffectual belligerence, thanks to short-term economic relief from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and China meant to stave off (but not resolve) Islamabad’s growing financial crisis. The best-case scenario for Pakistan is likely a narrow agreement that does not force Islamabad to take responsibility for its past actions in Afghanistan.

China’s interests in Afghanistan are most closely aligned with Pakistan, although Beijing’s concerns about violent extremism and terrorism are out of step with Pakistani behavior. U.S. and Chinese diplomats have worked together to support an Afghan peace process and Beijing will want to be involved enough to account for its counterterrorism and border security concerns. China has much to offer in terms of inducements to support a peace agreement in Afghanistan, particularly economically through Belt and Road Initiative investments in Pakistan (the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) or Central Asia (the Silk Road Economic Belt).

THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE TALKS IN MOSCOW

Russia will reportedly host the second round of Taliban talks in February 2019. It is not yet known whether the United States or the Afghan government will take part this time. But the Russian special representative for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has said he wants to include senior Afghan leaders in the forum, even if Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his administration decline to join, as they did during the first round of Moscow-convened talks in November 2018. Such a gambit risks easing pressure on the Taliban and further bolstering its standing, but could be leveraged to help the U.S. diplomatic effort. The U.S. and Afghan governments should find ways to take advantage of Moscow’s efforts and show up to any Russia-hosted talks, even if only to deny the Taliban an uncontested boon.

Meanwhile, Iran is very likely to take part in any Moscow-led talks. Tehran has already demanded assurances from Kabul and the Taliban that its security and economic interests will be protected, particularly in western Afghanistan. Iran stands to benefit from the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO military forces, with or without an agreement.

For its part, India is likely concerned that any deal that could introduce the Taliban back into the Afghan government could dilute its political influence in Kabul. New Delhi’s hedge toward Iran, by investing in the construction of the Chabahar port (the only Iranian port with direct access to the Indian Ocean), could pave the way for a continuing economic role. But India would probably see a peace agreement, particularly one championed by Pakistan, as a short-term setback to its interests in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

It is the truth of U.S. policy on Afghanistan that there is no military solution to the conflict. But instead of putting the full power and resources of the United States behind a diplomatic push, successive administrations have chosen to put the military mission first. They have often deployed just enough resources to have an effect on the ground while minimizing attention from increasingly weary constituents in the United States. It is long past time for a different approach.

The U.S.-Taliban draft framework is exactly the type of high-stakes diplomacy needed to end Afghanistan’s long war, or even just the U.S. period of that conflict, which is the longest war in U.S. history. Will the Taliban agree to negotiate with Kabul? Is a partial or complete ceasefire possible while talks take place? Can Afghan political leaders achieve a consensus approach to peace talks for the first time? If Afghan leaders and the Taliban enter into talks, is it possible to find an arrangement that allows the Taliban a political role yet protects the rights of all Afghans, including women and minorities? Can U.S. diplomats keep enough pressure on all sides to keep the process moving forward while avoiding histrionics and self-destructive disruptions? Will regional states help foster an Afghan peace process as much or more than they simultaneously hedge against its failure? The hard choices are still to come.

Nine priorities for peace in Afghanistan

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:11:00 +0000

Nine priorities for peace in Afghanistan

After 25 years of civil war in Afghanistan, today progress towards a peace process is increasingly seen as central to securing a just and stable future. But to date, there has been little analysis of what a process might actually look like.

As part of the research for a new Accord publication on Afghanistan, Conciliation Resources brought together 23 experts from the Afghan government, media and human rights groups, and Afghan and international academics and policymakers, in a workshop to explore challenges, priorities, and opportunities for building peace.

Findings from the workshop will help to inform the focus of the Accord publication, which will be a resource to guide policy and practice for peace in Afghanistan.

Workshop discussions are summarised in a new Accord Spotlight report, Processing peace in Afghanistan.

Nine priorities and challenges for peace in Afghanistan emerged from these discussions:

1. Peacemaking in perspective

Previous experiences of transitions from conflict in Afghanistan bring important lessons for the shape of future talks, such as the need to take into account the political and economic incentives of all parties involved in continuing violence.

2. Terminology

The vocabulary of peace in Afghanistan is disputed. This has allowed some to claim to be pursuing peace while not engaging with the practical challenges that this implies, or to use ‘peace initiatives’ as cover for activities with unrelated or contradictory objectives.

3. Distributing power

Conventional approaches to power-sharing in Afghan peace initiatives have not taken into account Afghans’ multi-layered identities. Unpicking Afghan understandings of inclusion and power-sharing and how these relate to stability and conflict resolution is key to supporting effective, inclusive change.

4. Inclusion costs

What are the implications of talks with the Taliban in terms of inclusion? Senior government positions already saturated to accommodate various interest groups. Who would make way for new arrivals, and how would potential losers be incentivized or compensated?

5. Understanding divisions

Understanding the complexity of divisions that underpin conflict is important for identifying appropriate responses. For example, splits among different Taliban factions could both facilitate and hinder potential talks.

6. Politics of the opposition

The workings of Taliban politics are poorly understood. A more precise knowledge of the Taliban’s internal dynamics, and its various priorities for peace and governance is important for achieving progress towards a viable political solution.

7. Re-centring the regional stage

An analysis of regional and international interests and roles in both the conflict and peace are important, to anticipate spoilers and identify supporters.

8. Hekmatyar precedent

The 2016 peace agreement with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has been heavily criticized for granting impunity to a warlord accused of great brutality in the war. But Afghan public reaction has so far been mixed. And while the government intended the agreement to signal to the Taliban its readiness to negotiate, there has been little concrete progress towards dialogue since.

9. Processing peace

A major block to progress is the current dearth of detail about what a peace process between the Afghan state and the Taliban might actually look like, and the specific mechanisms through which peace initiatives might be pursued. Afghan and international parties and actors need to identify appropriate models or entry points for peace initiatives, and to anticipate the political and material demands, compromises and risks that such processes require.

How Pakistan can help with the Afghan peace process

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:09:00 +0000

How Pakistan can help with the Afghan peace process

After 17 years of the war led by the United States in Afghanistan, there has never been more momentum to launch a formal peace process.

First came the Taliban’s brief truce back in June 2018. Then came the news that Kabul has given its grudging support to Washington to talk directly to the Taliban — one of the insurgents’ top preconditions for negotiations.

And over the last few months, a series of informal talks have taken place involving the Taliban and Washington. The most promising meeting took place some days back in Abu Dhabi. Very senior representatives from the Taliban’s political office in Qatar and their top leadership in Quetta sat down with officials from the United States, but also from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — perhaps the three countries with the most influence over the Taliban.

In effect, the stars seem to be increasingly aligned for prospective talks. The White House, impelled by a president itching to head for the exits – as evidenced by his recently revealed intention to remove nearly 7,000 troops within the next few months – is all-in on efforts to launch reconciliation. Kabul is fully committed to pursuing peace. Key regional players Pakistan, China, Russia, and Iran are all onboard. And, most significantly, the Taliban have telegraphed their willingness to explore peace.

This isn’t to understate the obstacles.

First, at the end of the day, no matter how many interlocutors may be willing to engage with them, the Taliban have little incentive to stop fighting a war that they believe they are winning. Trump’s recent troop withdrawal decision will only further embolden the insurgents. And additionally, the Taliban have repeatedly rejected the Afghan political system — meaning that convincing the insurgents to lay down their arms and share power or contest elections will be quite hard to do.

But one of the most immediate obstacles are the Taliban’s refusal to talk to the Afghan government.

For years, they have spun the same propaganda line: it is the American occupiers we are fighting, and so we shall only talk to them. Indeed, the Taliban have held talks with stakeholders from many nations over the years but only rarely have they agreed to sit across the table from Afghan officials. Indeed, while top representatives from Kabul – including the Afghan national security adviser – traveled to Abu Dhabi, the Taliban refused to meet with them.

An Afghan peace the process cannot proceed without the Afghan government itself. And there can be no peace deal or broader reconciliation without Kabul.

This is where Pakistan can be helpful.

For years, Washington has sent confusing messages to Pakistan. It has urged Islamabad to crack down on Taliban leadership sanctuaries and to coax the insurgents to the peace table.

The situation has evolved, however. The Taliban no longer need coaxing to come to the table. But they need coaxing to talk to Afghan officials at that table.

For Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States envoy for Afghan reconciliation, convincing the insurgents to talk to their country’s government is the challenge of the hour. And to this point, he has not succeeded. Islamabad may claim that its leverage over the Taliban has declined. In reality, so long as Taliban leaders continue to be based in Pakistan – and they are – Pakistan will retain leverage. And it now has a great opportunity to make a lasting contribution to the peace process.

If Pakistan can succeed in convincing the Taliban to sit down with Kabul, as difficult as that will be, the benefits would be great. Islamabad’s sputtering relations with Kabul and Washington would get a shot in the arm and Pakistan’s regional the reputation would improve.

And most importantly, a long-elusive peace process would be poised to begin.

Developments in Afghan Peace Process

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:08:00 +0000

Developments in Afghan Peace Process

Moscow Format, Regional Consensus, and the Way Forward

The Afghan Peace Process is moving ahead with a number of initiatives and processes started by different countries having their own perspectives on peacemaking. Apart from many sessions held between the Taliban and the United States to negotiate for peace in Afghanistan – in Abu Dhabi and Doha – regional states are striving to restore peace in Afghanistan through dialogue. The latest meeting between Taliban and prominent Afghan politicians, including ex-president Hamid Karzai, two women lawmakers, and others were held on February 05 in Moscow, Russia – Afghanistan’s Ashraf Ghani government did not participate, though. The 42-member roundtable, which was presided over by former Afghan president, Mr. Hamid Karzai, was attended by a 10-member high level delegation of Taliban headed by Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanakzai.

Prior to this meeting, another conference entitled “Moscow Format” was held on November 09, 2018, in the Russian capital, and was attended by delegations from 12 countries including Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan while the United States and India participated as observers. Taliban was the only non-state-actor in the meeting with a five-member delegation led by Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanakzai; the head of Taliban Political Office in Qatar. Afghanistan sent a delegation of High Peace Council including Haji Deen Muhammad; the Deputy Head of High Peace Council. India was represented by its two ex-diplomats, and the United States by members of its embassy in Moscow.

The Moscow The format was the first in the fact that it was attended by Taliban on official level and other nations also shared the table with each other regardless of the difference of opinions and perspectives about bringing peace in Afghanistan. Before Moscow Format, Taliban attended the Murree Peace Talks in July 2017 in Pakistan on the official level but the participants of that meeting were limited only to China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States. Interestingly, the Moscow Format was attended by a member of the Taliban who is under sanctions by the United Nations. Moreover, Russia has designated the Taliban as a global terrorist organization but the vagaries of time as well as the changing global political the scenario has forced Russia to take lead in mainstreaming Taliban and play a major role in Afghanistan’s politics.

The apparent motive behind Russia’s vigorous involvement in Afghan affairs is the establishment and spread of Daesh (ISIS) in Afghanistan. Daesh is the enemy number one of Russia and is an imminent threat to the security of Central Asian States and Russia itself. Daesh has gained ground in Afghanistan and is exploring new avenues for itself. Russia will accept enemy number two, i.e. Taliban, instead of Daesh in Afghanistan.

Munich Security Conference

Influential global figures in international security policy gathered at Munich last week discussing a whole range of issues ranging from climate change to secure the situation in different parts of the world including Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi represented Pakistan at the conference and during a panel discussion titled ‘Update on Afghanistan’ as well as his interactions with world leaders including with US lawmakers, he eloquently reaffirmed Pakistan’s stance on the Afghan peace and reconciliation process.

This time around the security, a moot was held in the backdrop of some positive progress on The Afghan peace process. Pakistan, in fact, played a pivotal role in breaking political stalemate in Afghanistan and the FM rightly referred to the support and facilitation extended by Pakistan for direct talks between the US and Taliban in Abu Dhabi and Doha. Pakistan has always supported an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process and at long last the world community and the US have also endorsed Pakistan’s stance that there is no military but only negotiated settlement of the decades-old conflict. As the world was in appreciation of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan, it is regrettable that some enemies of peace, who failed to isolate Pakistan at the international level, have again become active and hatched another conspiracy to malign the country.

Pulwama attack and blaming Pakistan for the same was an outrageous and shameful attempt on part of Modi-led government to turn the world opinion against the country. Such unpalatable tactics of Modi Junta have failed in the past and are bound to fail again. Modi might gain some domestic sympathies through such rhetoric against Pakistan in the upcoming elections but the way India orchestrated Mumbai and Samjhota Express episodes are no longer a secret and everybody knows the real story. A German author in his book very clearly exposed the face of India in Mumbai attacks. As India is sticking with its intransigence and state terrorism in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan should continue to tread the path it is pursuing peace in neighboring Afghanistan and to highlight the plight of Kashmiri people at world forums including through conducting successful conferences such as the one held recently at the British Parliament on Kashmir solidarity day. World community, especially influential Capitals, need to rise above any political and economic expediency and call a spade a spade for lasting peace in the South Asia region. As the International Court of Justice is commencing the Kulbushan Yadav case hearing from today, Pakistan should present the facts and expose the real face of India before the world.

Can China Drive The Afghan Peace Process? – Analysis

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:04:00 +0000

Can China Drive The Afghan Peace Process? – Analysis

The war in Afghanistan has wreaked more havoc than anyone could have imagined when it began over 18 years ago. Today, the country faces one of the biggest humanitarian crises ever witnessed, where the problem of displacement caused by constant fighting has been compounded by the conditions of severe drought. Persistent calls for peace have been drowned out by the sound of incessant fighting and endless bombings. The Taliban, the foremost perpetrator of insurgent violence in the country, has gone from a movement opposing the depredations of Afghan warlords in the early 1990s, to ruling Afghanistan, to resurrecting as an insurgency to be reckoned with. Now they are now negotiating the future of Afghanistan with the United States, with no sign of Afghan government involvement in the process. Regardless, violence continues unabated, and in fact, has intensified manifold since the announcement of the Taliban’s annual spring offensive earlier this year.

At a time when the coalition of Afghan and US forces is failing to contain the violence, humanitarian aid organizations are becoming the target of cold-blooded attacks, and peace negotiations seem to have plateaued, it is important to look for alternate means of potentially ensuring peace in Afghanistan. China is increasingly being thought of as a credible way out of the current security quagmire, for a number of reasons – both strategic and economic in nature.

Although China and the then-Kingdom of Afghanistan established diplomatic relations as far back as 1950, for China, Afghanistan’s importance remained limited to economic engagement. China invested in the vast natural resource repository that Afghanistan was and still is, home to, until the Russian invasion in the 1980s. Chinese involvement in the spheres of politics and security in Afghanistan was minimal. After the US overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, and the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan, China and Afghanistan did try to institute good neighborly relations by reaffirming their 1960 Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression in 2006. However, even with the resurrection of the Taliban in the early 2000s, and the ensuing widespread insurgent violence, China did not sanction a physical military presence in the conflict-ridden country.

Having said that, the arc of China’s Afghan policy has visibly evolved from calculated indifference to active engagement, as Beijing’s interests in the region are expanding at a fast pace. First, China is wary of the geographical proximity between Afghanistan, home to the Taliban and a number of other transnational terrorist outfits, and its Uyghur Muslim-predominated Xinjiang region, which Chinese authorities claim is the breeding ground for the “three evils” plaguing the country (terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism). Second, China fears that the chronic political and strategic instability in Afghanistan may derail the progress of Beijing’s transcontinental infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to connect China with the countries of Southeast, South, and Central Asia; the Gulf region; North and East Africa; and Europe. Third, China’s growing involvement in Afghan issues exemplifies the Chinese aspiration to alter the global perception in favor of China as a powerful regional, and perhaps even a global, player, which has the potential to resolve the problem of the longest-standing insurgency South Asia has ever witnessed.

In theory, China is undoubtedly one of the most well-placed states to drive the Afghan peace process toward progress, for it exercises strategic leverage over the country that often hosts and provides material and ideological patronage to the Taliban — Pakistan. China provides Islamabad with much-needed economic assistance, lately in the form of the $62 billion strong China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will help stabilize a flailing economy, reduce conditions of rampant poverty and deprivation and contribute to the overall development of Pakistan’s socio-economic milieu. However, although China has stated on many occasions that the resolution of the Afghan the problem hinges on the country establishing cordial relations with Pakistan, and vowed to collectively combat the menace of terrorism, China has not yet made considerable efforts at facilitating such an arrangement. It seems to have followed a selective approach to combating terrorism, by getting Pakistan to crack down on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which counts China as its main target, but not the Afghan Taliban walking free in Pakistan.

On the economic front, although China is the biggest foreign investor in Afghanistan, it has failed to capitalize on the gains made in the form of a $3 billion copper extraction contract in the province of Logar, or the road and rail the infrastructure it has painstakingly developed in Afghanistan. The lack of progress is due to the volatile security situation in the country, coupled with a low export capacity. Moreover, China has been unable to fully integrate Afghanistan as a member state into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to provide impetus to the assemblage of a regional consensus to drive the Afghan peace process, or even utilize existing multilateral forums such as the Quadrilateral Group Cooperation (QGC) with the aim of providing diplomatic heft to the will of the Afghan government, and thereby a push toward reconciliation.

China, along with the United States and Russia, has proclaimed in an official joint statement that it seeks and fully supports an “inclusive, Afghan-led peace process,” and has explicitly committed to the cause of Afghan peace and reconciliation, ready to provide “necessary assistance” as needed. Yet so far, China seems to lack the will implement those promises made on paper. To be clear, China undeniably has the potential to positively influence the present trajectory of the peace process, and persuade Pakistan to lend its unequivocal support to talks between the insurgents and Afghan officials, a step that is crucial to ensuring long-term stability in Afghanistan. However, to accomplish such a feat, China would first have to clearly lay down its strategic priorities with conviction – and decide whether it wants to safeguard the prospects of its transcontinental economic ventures by mollycoddling Pakistan, or it is ready to take a pragmatic, long term view of regional security by vowing to combat all sources of terrorism equally.

Afghan peace talks: US-China-Russia

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Mon, 16 Mar 2020 08:00:00 +0000

Afghan peace talks: US-China-Russia:

Recently, a trilateral meeting among the US, China, and Russia was held in Moscow. The aim of this meeting was to draw consensus on the Afghan Peace process.

According to a media note issued by the US State Department: Representatives of the United States, China, and Russia met in Moscow on April 25, 2019, and exchanged views on the current status of the Afghan peace process. The three sides reached consensus on the following:

1. The three sides respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Afghanistan as well as it's right to choose its development path. The three sides prioritize the interests of the Afghan people in promoting a peace process.

2. The three sides support an inclusive Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process and are ready to provide the necessary assistance. The three sides encourage the Afghan Taliban to participate in peace talks with a broad, representative Afghan delegation that includes the government as soon as possible. Toward this end, and as agreed in Moscow in February 2019, we support the second round of intra-Afghan dialogue in Doha (Qatar).

3. The three sides support the Afghan government's efforts to combat international terrorism and extremist organizations in Afghanistan. They take note of the Afghan Taliban’s commitment to fight ISIS and cut ties with Al-Qaeda, ETIM, and other international terrorist groups; ensure the areas they control will not be used to threaten any other country; and call on them to prevent terrorist recruiting, training, and fundraising, and expel any known terrorists.

4. The three sides recognize the Afghan people’s strong desire for a comprehensive ceasefire. As a first step, we call on all parties to agree on immediate and concrete steps to reduce violence.

5. The three sides stress the importance of fighting illegal drug production and trafficking and call on the Afghan government and the Taliban to take all the necessary steps to eliminate the drug threat in Afghanistan.

6. The three sides call for an orderly and responsible withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan as part of the overall peace process.

7. The three sides call for regional countries to support this trilateral consensus and are ready to build a more extensive regional and international consensus on Afghanistan.

8. The three sides agreed on a phased expansion of their consultations before the next trilateral meeting in Beijing. The date and composition of the meeting will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

The contours of the joint statement highlight a degree of convergence of interests -in relation to Afghanistan- at the international level. The meeting highlights a shift from aspirations of externally crafted concepts of state-building to delegating the responsibility to Afghans to offer their indigenous concepts of nation-building. Inculcating harmony at the local level is a tough task, the fragility of the situation is highlighted through stalls over small divergences- as was seen in the recent Qatar talks. Currently, President Ghani is forming a peace jirga which aims to harness views of various Afghan political heads in defining a coherent standpoint of the Afghan Government towards the Taliban– but even the attempt is not contention free, as prominent Afghan politicians have boycotted the jirga, terming it as a campaigning stunt by President Ghani. Therefore, a broad yet unified contour of a future political setup in Afghanistan may have to be offered by regional and international powers. It remains to be seen what incentive could be offered to the Afghan to engage in a productive dialogue that leads to consensus.

The second key goal which has secured the support of all three international powers is the elimination of international terrorist groups from Afghanistan. This goal is closely linked to an inclusive national political consensus and then an inclusive augmenting of the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan security apparatus- to meet internal and external challenges. There is a perception that the US is looking to minimize its security footprint in Afghanistan and phase out in stages– this would require a clear outline of objectives and detailed mechanisms. The US is also a major donor of Afghan security assistance so how would a drawdown impact US security assistance to Afghanistan and how would the development and training of the Afghan security apparatus be ensured? This too may require an international consensus amongst the US, NATO and SCO’s RATS platform. Economic cooperation amongst the bigger powers- especially the US and China- has also become essential in order to reverse a drug and war-based economy. Utopian peace in Afghanistan is a long way down the road. The dynamic fluctuations between peace and violence highlight the complexity of the Afghan crisis. Nonetheless, the recent trilateral meeting is a positive step, which would now require cooperation in formulating a broad political-security and economic end state, this would require the support of all regional players- ultimately creating the environment for Afghans to disentangle and resolve an array of national issues. With convergence among external players including Pakistan, the pressure has increased on Afghans to get their own act together. The recent statement by PM Imran Khan that Pakistan would not meddle in Afghanistan’s internal affairs have had a positive impact especially in the context of steps to strengthen border security, stabilize and consolidate FATA into the mainstream and stress the importance of the return of Afghan refugees for Afghan –Pakistan security internal security.

US-Russia relations in the context of ISIS and its impact on the security situation of Middle East

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 10:11:00 +0000

US-Russia relations in the context of ISIS and its impact on the security situation of Middle East

In the context of ISIS, the US-Russia relations can be seen as in their random oscillation between cooperation and conflict. Initially, when Russia started airstrikes in Syria – following the U.S. entry – the cooperation was sought to the fight against ISIS. Later, both the power began their separate efforts against ISIS in the Middle East thus finally parting their ways. Currently, the U.S. has almost been knocked out by the Russian presence in the Middle East under the pretext of the fight against ISIS.

US-Russian Presence in the Middle East
Following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the major powers like The U.S sought another pretext to mark its military presence in the Middle East. This began from Syria and ended in Iraq. Fearing the rising control of ISIS in Syria, the United States led a coalition of European states to start airstrikes. But that was not only the aim behind this intervention. Another goal was to topple Syrian government led by President Assad. Seeing this scenario, Russia jumped into Syria at the request of Assad to cope with the challenge to its favorite government. Russia also came under the pretext of fighting against the ISIS. This entire development made the fight against ISIS as the center point of U.S-Russia relations.

U.S-Russia Relations in the Context of ISIS
The relations can be understood in three different phases:

§ Cooperation: Following the entry of Russia into the Middle Eastern chaotic situation, there emerged its chances of cooperation with the United States. It happened to some extent. Both the countries shared information about ISIS hideouts and dealt them with combined airstrikes.

§ Conflict: In the second phase, both the U.S. and Russia began to contend over the control of the Syrian areas conquered from ISIS. Both established their separate zones of influence thus leading the operation to their own separate interests.

§ Parting of Ways: Finally, both the powers parted their ways in the fight against ISIS. This led to an apparent rise in Russian influence in Syria. It ultimately knocked out the U.S or at least marginalized it.

Impact of Relations on the Middle Eastern Security
The U.S-Russia relations adversely affected the security situation in The Middle East. The rift of interests between them did not help the Middle Eastern governments to act jointly rather it polarized their action. It further, hampered the fight against ISIS except when the relations were in the first phase of cooperation.

Conclusion
US-Russia relations in the context of ISIS can be understood in three phases of cooperation, conflict, and part of ways. This entire scheme was followed by an adverse impact on the Middle Eastern security situation.

US Relation with South China SEA

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 10:10:00 +0000

Synopsis

The US rebalancing strategy, or “pivot” towards Asia, has added a new dimension to the South China Sea disputes. Given China’s reaction and the rising temperature in the region is there any more room for discussion?

Commentary

THE OBAMA administration has refocused its diplomacy and military forces toward the Asia-Pacific as part of a larger ‘pivot’ or rebalancing strategy. Besides deepening its military ties with The Philippines, the United States announced in late 2011 the rotational deployment of 2,500 US Marines in Darwin, Australia, and the deployment of up to four of its littoral combat ships (LCS) in Singapore.

In June 2012, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta also declared that the US would commit 60 percent of its naval capabilities to the Pacific Ocean. The US rebalancing strategy has added a new dimension to the South China Sea disputes.

US Policy on the South China Sea

The US has traditionally been unwilling to get involved in the question of sovereign jurisdiction over the South China Sea. For example, it has repeatedly stated that the Philippine-claimed territories where not covered by the Mutual Defence Treaty of 30 August 1951 which ties the Philippines to the US. Washington has consistently limited its interest to the preservation of the freedom of navigation and the mobility of its Seventh Fleet.

Yet, the incident involving the harassment of the ocean surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable by Chinese navy and civilian patrol vessels south of Hainan Island in March 2009 caused serious concern in Washington. While Beijing claimed that the Impeccable was involved in marine scientific research in its exclusive economic zone that requires Chinese consent, Washington argued that the activities of the surveillance vessel were legitimate under the freedom of navigation principle.

The US position on the South China Sea has not fundamentally changed since the Impeccable incident. Washington is still not taking a position on the sovereignty dispute and it continues to limit its core interest to the freedom of navigation in the disputed waters. Still, the US has become increasingly concerned over the rise of the Chinese naval capabilities and uncertain over China’s commitment to the freedom of navigation principle in disputed waters.

US active diplomacy

At the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates declared that while Washington does not take sides in the sovereignty disputes it would, however, oppose any action that could threaten the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. A statement made by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2010 declaring that the US has a national interest in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea further angered China. Her comments were perceived by Beijing as a form of external interference. Clinton mentioned again the South China Sea at the ARF meeting in Bali in July 2011 where this time she encouraged ASEAN and China to conclude a code of conduct over the issue.

President Obama himself raised South China Sea question at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali in November 2011. He restated that the US takes no sides in the disputes but that its interests include the freedom of navigation and unimpeded international commerce in the semi-enclosed sea. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao responded by reaffirming the freedom of navigation principle and calling for a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes.

After the Vietnamese and Indonesian chairmanships of ASEAN, the next three annual chairs, Cambodia, Brunei and Myanmar was expected to appease Beijing by minimizing the internationalization of the South China Sea issue.

This already occurred at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Cambodia in July 2012 when the Southeast Asian states failed to issue a joint communique due to differences over the South China Sea question. While present at the ARF meeting that followed, Secretary of State Clinton did not interfere in this intra-ASEAN affair.

China’s reaction

China perceives the US rebalancing strategy as an attempt by the US to contain its peaceful rise in Asia. From a Chinese perspective, Washington is seeking to contain China by strengthening its bilateral alliances and allocating more troops and means to the region. In particular, the US is enhancing its involvement in the South China Sea and thus interfering in what Beijing considers to be a bilateral issue with the Southeast Asian claimant states. China also considers recent Philippine activities in the disputed waters, for example over the Scarborough Shoal incident earlier in 2012, to have been influenced by Washington.

China and the US seek to prevent the over-militarisation of the disputes. Beijing and Washington view the South China Sea as an issue that requires a diplomatic rather than a military solution and they are content, for now at least, to let ASEAN lead the conflict management process.

Washington and Beijing do disagree, however, over where the South China Sea disputes should be discussed. While the US wants the question to be highlighted at international forums, this remains highly problematic for China. Beijing is increasingly concerned over any attempt at internationalizing the disputes, preferring instead to discuss these matters bilaterally with the smaller Southeast Asian claimants. Great power rivalry and competition in the South China Sea should thus be expected to further complicate ASEAN’s task ahead.

Role of National Action Plan in stabilization internal security of Pakistan

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 10:08:00 +0000

Role of National Action Plan in stabilization internal security of Pakistan

Role of National Action Plan in (making steady/making firm and strong) of internal security of Pakistan

National Action Plan - a counter-terrorism formula (did/done/put into law) following the ArmyPublic School attack - has proved very important, in crushing the terrorist activities within the country, more so. The Plan, however, has remained behind (accomplishing or gaining with effort)the expected goals as with the beginning of 2017, another wave of terrorist attacks has(overloaded and surrounded with too much of something) the picture/situation. The results of the Plan have remained mixed: with some stories of success and other stories of failure.

Understanding National Action Plan (NAP) National Action Plan is the name of (more than two, but not a lot of) points anti-terrorism (list of things to deal with/desire to reach a goal) that the civil and military leaderships of Pakistan, along with all the political parties in (fighting force/bad feelings), agreed on following the deadly Army Public School terrorist attack. The Plan was meant for crushing terrorism and looking for their very existence for the internal security of Pakistan.

The Role of NAP in (making steady/making firm and strong) the Internal Security of Pakistan national Action Plan's role in (making steady/making firm and strong) the internal security of Pakistan can be tested/evaluated under following points:

The Plan, with its clear cut outline of action against the terrorists, has enabled the security forces of Pakistan to avoid feeding any second doubts and act quickly against the evil directors all across the country.
The plan played its positive role in enabling the military establishment to boost OperationZarb-e-Azb along with starting the (related to a plan to reach a goal) operations in major cities like Karachi.
The Plan has enabled the civil-military leadership to be on the same page in terms of action against terrorism this way making the (related to fighting terrorism) measures more effective.
The Plan has brought the major terrorist groups like TTP to knees even though the last thing just mentioned's existence still cannot be interfered with
The Plan, however, did not (start a fire/catch on fire) proper and effective re-invigoration in the-military security forces. It remained dependent on the military troops for its (doing/putting into law) on the ground. Hardly, (non-military related) forces have played any worthy of compliments role in supporting/judging as correct this plan except by supporting it in words.
Because of the political argument-causing events attached to the Plan, its role has been interfered with. Not all the political parties are in good terms with certain (legal rules/food and supplies) of the Plan including the operation in Karachi and action against Madrassahs.
Results of the National Action Plan They can be listed, one by one, as follows:

NAP resulted in a boosted and successful operation against terrorists hiding in the tribal belt of Pakistan
NAP brought the result of successful operation against the City-based group of armed citizens in Karachi along with (starting a fire/catching on fire) action against (related to private groups of people) groups in the Southern area of Punjab
NAP secured/made sure of the result of civil-military cooperation over (related to fighting terrorism) measures
NAP, more so, lowered the number of terrorist attacks this way strengthening the internal security of Pakistan.
End/end result National Action Plan has proved (compared to other things) a good and effective(list of things to deal with/desire to reach a goal) against the terrorists hiding out and spreading violence in Pakistan. It has helped the internal security to improve with better results. Beyond that, the Plan remains the victim of its own success. It has been facing political argument-causing events along with limited attention of (non-military related) government this way interfering withthe effort to improve internal security.

Role of National Action Plan in the stabilization of internal security of Pakistan

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:59:00 +0000

Role of National Action Plan in the stabilization of internal security of Pakistan

National Action Plan – a counter-terrorism formula enacted following the Army Public School attack – has proved vital, in crushing the terrorist activities within the country, to a greater extent. The Plan, however, has remained behind achieving the expected goals as with the beginning of 2017, another wave of terrorist attacks has overwhelmed the scenario. The outcomes of the Plan have remained mixed: with some stories of success and other tales of failure.

Understanding the National Action Plan (NAP)
National Action Plan is the name of several points anti-terrorism agenda that the civil and military leaderships of Pakistan, along with all the political parties in opposition agreed on following the deadly Army Public School terrorist attack. The Plan was meant for crushing terrorism and rooting out their very existence for the internal security of Pakistan.

The Role of NAP in Stabilizing the Internal Security of Pakistan
National Action Plan’s role in stabilizing the internal security of Pakistan can be assessed under the following points:

§ The Plan, with its clear cut outline of action against the terrorists, has enabled the security forces of Pakistan to avoid feeding any second doubts and act promptly against the evil masterminds all across the country.

§ The plan played a positive role in enabling the military establishment to boost the Operation Zarb-e-Azb along with starting the strategic operations in major cities like Karachi.

§ The Plan has enabled the civil-military leadership to be on the same page in terms of action against terrorism thus making counter-terrorism measures more effective.

§ The Plan has brought the major terrorists groups like TTP to knees even though the latter’s existence still cannot be undermined

§ The Plan, however, failed to ignite proper and effective re-invigoration in the non-military security forces. It remained dependent on the military troops for its enactment on the ground. Hardly, civilian forces have played any commendable role in upholding this plan except by supporting it in words.

§ Owing to the political controversies attached with the Plan, its role has been undermined. Not all the political parties are in good terms with certain provisions of the Plan including the operation in Karachi and action against Madrassahs.

Outcomes of the National Action Plan
They can be enumerated as follows:

§ NAP resulted in a boosted and successful the operation against terrorists hiding in the tribal belt of Pakistan

§ NAP brought the outcome of successful the operation against the Urban militia in Karachi along with igniting action against sectarian groups in the Southern region of Punjab

§ NAP ensured the outcome of civil-military cooperation over counter-terrorism measures

§ NAP, to a greater extent, lowered the number of terrorist attacks thus strengthening the internal security of Pakistan.

Conclusion
National Action Plan has proved relatively a good and effective agenda against the terrorists hiding out and spreading violence in Pakistan. It has helped the internal security to improve with better outcomes. Beyond that, the Plan remains the victim of its own success. It has been facing political controversies along with limited attention of civilian government thus undermining the effort to improve internal security.

Relationship with Pakistan With Iran / Turkey

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:58:00 +0000

Relationship with Pakistan With Iran / Turkey

1. Islamic republic of Pakistan has friendly relations with Islamic republic of Iran and Turkey. Pakistan maintains extensive strategy, cultural, commercial, military cooperation and deep bond of brotherhood with these nations. All three nations are Muslims majority states and share extensive cultural and geographical links. In spite of geographical distances and clear economic and social differences between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Pakistan always been called “brothers” by Iran and Turkey. Pakistan and Iran Relationship: Pakistan has good economic relations with Iran. Iran is currently exporting 35MW of electricity to Pakistan. Exported electricity is less expensive than the electricity produced by the independent power producers (IPPs). Iran also offers the Pakistan to provide cheaper Electricity oil and gas. Iran also exporting large quantity of wheat, rice, seeds, fabrics, leather from Pakistan and in return providing fertilizers and iron ore to Pakistan. Iranian counsel general ALI ABBAS say that: “I have come here to meet wheat exporters in private sector and buy large quantity of wheat from Pakistan. It is a beginning of large scale bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan. We can also buy this wheat and supply electricity or petroleum products to Pakistan under barter trade” Iran is also providing facilities to Pakistan in petroleum and gas mining. Pakistani investors have west opportunity to invest in the fields of dairy, livestock and beverages. Iran is the one of largest petrochemical producer in world so Pakistanis can get benefit from it. Pakistan and Iran are expected to introduce the banking channel and make arrangements for currency swap to enhance PAK-IRAN bilateral trade and also working on trade through road and Railway (shortest routes). Pakistan and Turkey Relationship: Pakistan has a good relationship with brother Islamic country turkey. Turkey is offering education (scholarships) to Pakistani students in their high rang universities. The bilateral trade between Pakistan and turkey rose from 544 million dollars in 2006-07 to 899 million dollars current year. Turkey is importing wheat, rice’s and fabrics from Pakistan and exports electronic items to Pakistan. Turkey also helped Pakistani people when earthquake came in Azad Kashmir. Turkey government provide medical, financial and social attention towards Pakistani people how were hit by the earthquake. Turkey people say that Pakistan is the second home for them. Relationship between turkey and Pakistan is so much strong that can be seen in the past time line. Pakistan and Turkey have good military relations. Turkey is supplying military weapons to Pakistan and also providing training to Pakistan Air-force officer in upgrading F-16 fleet. Pakistan is providing training to Turkish army. Turkey also supported Pakistan stance on Kashmir issue.
2. The role of the state week away and the resources are being used allocated, distributed according to the skills, need and ability. Examples: Pakistan and Turkey: During the earthquake in 2005 (Kashmir), Turkey Government came forward to help the people of Pakistan who were in affected areas. The Prime Minister of turkey offered a package to Pakistani government of $151 (10h 4m) million for the affected peoples. Welfare organization of Turkish Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent) also builds a mosque in the Azad Kashmir. In order to this in 2010 Pakistan floods, government of Turkish offered a fund for flood hit Pakistanis. Turkish business society also provides aid to Pakistan. Train carrying medicine, food aid for the victims of Pakistan was also provided by the turkey. 300 prefabricated houses, diapers, dried food, 930 sacks of flour, 2,000 food parcels, potable water and, hygienic materials the aid is provided by the Turkish government. The government of Turkish also offered to build of a Turkish town in the flood stricken Pakistan. $12 (0h 48m) million has donated by the turkey to Pakistan. Prime Minister of Turkish also visited flood stricken parts of Pakistan, he traveled from Islamabad to Karachi with 6 ministers, by helicopter see the victims, having the completion of a houses of 1,500 prefab homes established by the Turkish near Multan. After the flood when the Turkish Prime Minister was unable to come to visit Pakistan so his wife visited Pakistan against him to see the flood victims after the fund provided to Pakistan by turkey. Pakistan share close bond of fraternity with turkey. It focuses on the relationship between the owners of means of production and the labors, workers. It could be sense in the historical contacts. Examples: It is social and economic system in which means of production are collectively owned and equally distributed is given priority. Examples:
3. Natural Deserts in Pakistan: Government of Pakistan announced subsidence to those persons who were affected by the flood in Sindh and Punjab according to their family size, need and how much they are affected by the flood. Government also decided to provide foreign aid equally according to their economic need and wants. It is the social and economic system that features private ownership by means of production and use of markets to do allocation and distribution of the resources. Examples: Pakistan and Iran: In a meeting with the Alireza Haqiqian, Iran Ambassador to Islamabad, the Pakistani premier said that both countries should ensure the expeditious implementation of bilateral projects including the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline and other electricity projects. The multibillion-dollar gas pipeline is aimed at exporting a daily amount of 20.5 million cubic meters of the Iranian natural gas to Pakistan. The maximum gas transfer capacity of the 56-inch pipeline spanning over 900 kilometers (km) of Iran’s soil from Bushehr province to the city of Iranshahr in the Iranian Baluchistan province is 110 million cubic meters. Iran already constructed 899 km of the pipeline on its soil. Ashraf said that his country’s relations with Iran were deeply rooted in the past, cultural and religious levels. Alireza Haqiqian also pointed to the forthcoming 16th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (Nam) in Tehran and added that Pakistan looked forward to working closely with Iran for a positive outcome of the summit to uphold the Nam principles. It is the social and economic system which includes wealth and power tends to flow from poor to rich nation. Examples: Pakistan and Turkey: One of the best examples of imperialism is offering education by allowing foreign students to study in their countries like Turkish universities are coming to promote their highly ranked universities in Pakistan by advertising in media if you've never thought of Turkey as a top study abroad location. With
4. tourism to this continent-straddling country increasing by nearly 21% year-over-year since 1992, student interest in studying in Turkey is rapidly growing, as well. With this increased attraction in recent years, Turkey's educational system has also been spotlighted as an optimal destination for studying history, politics, languages, sciences and more. Pakistan and Iran: Another example of imperialism is that Pakistan and Iran have signed agreement to resolve the energy crisis in Pakistan for this 70 per cent of the funding for the project will be provided by the Iranian government whereas 30 per cent will be arranged by the Pakistan government as per National Transmission and Dispatch Company Limited (NTDCL) and the project will provide 1000mw to Pakistan this project will provide cheap rate of electricity to Pakistan whereas in case of rise in the oil prices on the international market. It focuses on free markets with a minimal state interaction and it is considered the most desirable social and economic system. Capitalism is the variant of liberalism. The stress is giving the importance of state power in creation of national wealth. Examples: Pakistan and Turkey: Pakistan’s Federal minister has signed a trade corridor with Tehran which would unable to export its good to turkey without any hindrance. This trade corridor will provide a unique opportunity of trade development as its member states brooder stretch form Europe to south Asia and form Arabian Sea to Russian boarders. In the modern world no country could maintain a fordable balance of trade without the help of marry time facilities and Pakistan was fully cognizant of difficulties of landlocked state member of ECO, therefore it had extended transited trade facilities to these states through its warm water sea ports. It stresses the importance state power in the creation of national wealth. The state is engage in different processes to create wealth and power. The role of mercantilism in creation of wealth and power using different activities process for the betterment of a nation. Examples:
5. Iran: Government of Iran exports petroleum products and iron steel, organic chemical ores, and other valuable resources to Pakistan, china, India, Russia. Iran import molarity weapons and textile products, medicines, electronic items from china and Russia. It is use for Pakistan to create wealth for its nation Iran is exporting oil and other chemicals to china, India, and Russia to create wealth for its nation. Iran is strength there army and spend huge amount on defense for their nation interest so they can easily create wealth for their nation. In way it enhances its nation security and enjoys more freedom and independence in the favor of the national interest. In this way nation become more powerful and independence.
6. Liberalism: Example : However, he said, the benefits of that facility could not be optimized without an efficient road and rail network. For that reason Pakistan had conceived the National Trade Corridor (NTC) and entrusted the responsibility to the Ministry of Communications to construct a network of highways and motorways of international standard. He said that it would undoubtedly provide an efficient and economical road network for inter-regional connectivity particularly an effective access to Pakistan’s seaports to ECO Member states. He said that Pakistan, due to its strategic location, enhanced hot water access to the Central Asian states to boost transit trade in create for the nation. In way Pakistan will create wealth for the nation.

Qatar Crisis has Global Implication

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:55:00 +0000

Please use the sharing tools found via the share button at the top or side of the articles. Copying articles to share with others is a breach of FT.com T&Cs and Copyright Policy. Email licensing@ft.com to buy additional rights. Subscribers may share up to 10 or 20 articles per month using the gift article service. More information can be found here.
https://www.ft.com/content/7bfa0d0a-5444-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f

17 Print this page96 For the past six years, there have been two Arab worlds. The world of violence and tragedy; and the world of glitz and globalization. Syria, Iraq, Libya and, to a lesser extent, Egypt — have been engulfed by conflict. But Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have prospered as global hubs for travel, leisure, business, and finance. The booming Gulf metropolises seemed untouched by the violence in the rest of the Middle East. They even profited indirectly, as safe havens in a region in turmoil. But the wall between the two Arab worlds is breaking down. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (which includes Abu Dhabi and Dubai) have imposed a blockade on Qatar — claiming that the Qataris have been supporting jihadi movements across the region, and particularly in Syria and Libya. As a result, the illusion that the wealthy Gulf could remain uncontaminated by the wider conflicts in the Middle East has been shattered. The obvious question is whether the dazzling rise of the Gulf states could be followed by an equally dazzling fall. If that were to happen, the implications would be global. One of the reasons that the world has been able to look on with chilling indifference as Syria and Libya disintegrate is that neither country plays a major role in the world economy. But that is not true of the Gulf states. A security crisis there would be felt in boardrooms and finance ministries all over the world. Although they are tiny places — Qatar and the UAE have populations of 2.2m and 9.1m respectively — the Gulf states play an outsize role in the global economy. Qatar is the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. The Qatar Investment Authority holds large stakes in important western companies such as Volkswagen and Barclays — and has also invested its petrobillions in trophy assets around the world, including the Shard, London’s tallest building, and Harrods department store. The Qataris are also due to host the football World Cup in 2022. Dubai, meanwhile, has cleverly leveraged its proximity to Europe, South Asia, Africa, and Russia to turn itself into the playground of the Middle East. The world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa, stands in downtown Dubai and Emirates Airlines is one of the largest in the world. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority controls assets of more than $800 (53h 21m)bn, which makes it the second-largest sovereign wealth fund in the world — and one of the world’s largest property owners. And then there is Saudi Arabia — the biggest and most powerful country in the region — whose status as the world’s largest oil producer has long underlined its significance to the global economy. Qatar and the $1bn hostage deal Subtitles unavailable It is hard to believe that the Gulf elites would risk their pleasantly privileged lives by plunging into conflict. But even before the Qatari crisis, tension has been rising in the region. The Saudi and Emirati complain that the Qataris have been funding jihadis across the region have been echoed by western officials. But the argument that this dispute is solely about terrorism is undermined by the fact that the Saudis themselves have been notorious for exporting and promoting the Salafi ideology that underpins jihadi movements. The reality is that the Saudis have long resented Qatar’s successful efforts to strut the international stage as an independent actor — something symbolized by the country’s sponsorship of Al Jazeera, which has provided a platform for the Muslim Brotherhood, a group detested by the Saudis. Saudi Arabia also believes Qatar has got far too close to Iran. This fear of rising Iranian influence across the region has already led the Saudis and the Emiratis to go to war in neighboring Yemen — with grim consequences for the civilian population. One ironic consequence of the blockade of Qatar is that it could force the country to get closer to Iran. David Gardner Saudi Arabia is playing a dangerous game with Qatar The risk of escalation in the Middle East is considerable Under normal circumstances, The US would do its utmost to smooth over a dangerous dispute between its Gulf allies. But these are far from normal times in Washington. Donald Trump has taken the Saudi side in the dispute — indeed the US president may well have given the green light to the Saudi-led blockade, during his visit to the kingdom last month. By contrast, the State Department and the Pentagon are clearly trying to play a more neutral role, not least because Qatar is host to the largest American airbase in the Middle East. Qatar has reason to be thankful for the large US military presence in the country. Were it not for that, the Qataris would be much more vulnerable to a Saudi-led military intervention. Even so, it is unclear whether the Saudis and Emiratis have a plausible endgame in mind, short of total capitulation by Qatar. If that is not achieved in short order, the risks of military conflict will remain and the economic damage from the blockade will grow and contaminate the region. For residents and tourists in the Gulf, the wars in the Middle East have been taking place in flyover country — places that they can glance down at from thousands of feet, as they take their Emirates or Etihad flights to Europe or the US. But the Qatar crisis suggests that the days when the tragedies of the Middle East could be kept at a safe distance from the booming Gulf may be over.

Pakistan is the member of the following International Organizations

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:48:00 +0000

Pakistan is the member of the following international organizations:

1. African Union/ United Nation Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
2. Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966 and since then has become ADB’s largest recipient in both number of loans and volume of assistance received—over 19.8 billion USD in loan to fund development from hydrostatic projects to banking for the poor, with about 14 million $ disbursed as the end of 2008.
3. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) on July, 2nd 2004.
4. Colombo Plan in 1950. (Colombo Plan is a regional organization that embodies the concept of collective inter-governmental efforts to strengthen the economy & social development of member countries in the Asia-Pacific Region. The primary focus f all Colombo Plan activities is on human resource development )
5. Commonwealth of Nations. Joined in 1947 (left in 1972 & rejoined in 1986)
6. Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the original name was the Middle East Organization or METO also is known as the Baghdad Pact, was adopted in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979. US pressure & promises of military and economic aid were in the negotiations leading to the agreement although the UN could not initially participate “for purely technical reasons of budgeting procedures” In 1958, the United States joined the military committee of the alliance. It is generally viewed as one of the least successful of the Cold War Alliances.
7. Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an intergovernmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan & Turkey for the purpose of sustainable Socio-Economic development of the member states. ECO is the successor organization of Regional Corporation for Development (RCD). In 1964 Pakistan signed the RCD Pact with Turkey & Iran when all three countries were closely allied with the USA—and as neighbors of the Soviet Union, wary of Soviet expansionism. To this day, Pakistan has a close relationship with Turkey. RCD became defunct after the Iranian revolution. In 1985, The Pakistan-Turkish initiative led to the founding of the ECO, an organization that also includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
8. Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) on September 7, 1947.
9. Group of 24 in 1971
10. Group of 77 (1976-1977, 1992-2009)
11. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on May 2nd, 1957.
12. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1952
13. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1955.
14. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on November 25, 1947.
15. International Criminal Court (ICCt)
16. International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in May 1952.
17. International Development Association (IDA) in 1962.
18.International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS)
19. International Finance Corporation (IFA) in 1955.
20. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 1978.
21. International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)
22. International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1947.
23. International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1958.
24. International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) on February 6,1985.
25. International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July 1950.
26. International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1948.
27. International Organization for Migration (IOM) in November 1992.
28. International Organization of Standardization (ISO)
29. International Telecom Union (ITU) on 26th August 1947.
30. International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (ITSO)
31. International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)
32. Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 1948.
33. Islamic Development Bank (IDB) is a multilateral development financing institution located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It was founded by the first conference of Finance Ministers of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) convened 18 December 1973. The bank officially began its activities on 15 Shawwal 1395 H (20 Oct. 1975). There are 56 shareholding member states. Pakistan joined IDB in
34. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1991
35. Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in 1977.
36. Organization of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1993.
37. Organization of American States (OAS) Pakistan is an observer. In January 6, 1988.
38. Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is an international organization with a permanent delegation to the UN. It groups 57 member states from the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Caucasus, Balkans, Southeast Asia. Pakistan joined in 1969.
39. Partnership for Peace (PFP)
40. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental mutual security organization which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Except for Uzbekistan, the other countries had been a member of Shanghai Five, founded in 1996; after the inclusion of Uzbekistan, the members renamed the organization. Pakistan joined SCO in 2006 as an observer.
41. South Asia Co-operative Environment Program (SACEP) in 1982.
42. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an international organization for collective defense which was signed on September 8, 1954. The former institution was established at a meeting of treaty partners in Bangkok in February 1955. It was primarily created to block further communist gains in Southeast Asia. The organization’s headquarter was located in Bangkok, Thailand. SEATO was dissolved on June 30, 1977
43. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an economic and political organization of eight countries Southern Asia. In terms of population, its sphere of influence is the largest of any regional organization; almost 1.5 billion people, the combined population of its member states. It was established, on December 8, 1985, by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Pakistan, India, and Nepal & Sri Lanka. In April 2007, at the association’s 14th summit, Afghanistan became its eighth member. Pakistan joined SAARC in 1985. The Objectives of this organization are following,
a. To promote the welfare of the people of South Asia and to improve their quality of life.
b. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and the cultural development in the region and to provide all the individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential.
c. To promote and strengthen the collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia.
d. To contribute the mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another problems.
e. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields.
f. To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries.
g. To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests, and
h. To cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.
44. United Nations in 1947.
45. United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
46.United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on 14th September 1949.
47. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1976.
48. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1968.
49. United Nations Integrated Mission in Sudan (UNIMS)
50. United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) on 23rd July 1995
51. United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
52. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
53. Universal Postal Union (UPU) on 10-11-1947.
54. World Confederation of Labour (WCL)
55. World Customs Organization (WCO)
56. World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
57. World Health Organization (WHO)
58. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1977.
59. World Metrological Organization (WMO)
60. World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)
61. World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Relations

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:44:00 +0000

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Relations

1. Pak Relation With Saudia Arabia
2. History u Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have sought to develop extensive commercial, cultural, religious, political, and strategic relations since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Pakistan affirms its relationship with Saudi Arabia as their most "important and bilateral partnership" in the current foreign policy of Pakistan
3. the largest country on the Arabian peninsula and host to the two holiest cities of Islam, Meccaand Medina and the destination of Muslim pilgrims from across the world.
4. uThe bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are historicallyclose and extremely friendly, frequently described by analysts as constituting a special relationship.Pakistan has been called "Saudi Arabia's closest Muslim ally
5. Development of bilateral relations between the two countries u Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are leading members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Saudi Arabia is one of the strongest supporters of Pakistan during Pakistan's wars with India, especially opposing the creation of Bangladesh from Pakistan's eastern wing in 1971. u Saudi Arabia supports Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir conflict
6. Gulf War 1990-1999 uDuring the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, Pakistan sent troops to protect the Islamic holy sites in Saudi
7. u In May 1998, Saudi Arabia was the only country that was taken in complete confidence by Prime minister Nawaz Sharif on Pakistan's decision on performing atomic test in weapon-testing laboratories- III (WTL-III) in the region of the Chagai Hills. After he ordered the atomic tests (see codenames: Chagai- I and Chagai-II), Saudi Arabia, along with United Arab Emirates, were the only countries to backed Pakistan and congratulated the country for making the "bold decision". Furthermore, Saudi Arabia promised to supply 50,000 barrels per day of free oil to help Pakistan cope with likely economic sanctions in the aftermath
8. Military cooperation 1. Pakistan maintains close military ties with Saudi Arabia, providing extensive support, arms and training for the Saudi armed forces. Fighter Pilots of the Pakistan Air Force flew aircraft of the Royal Saudi Air Forceto repel an incursion from South Yemen in 1969. In the 1970s and 1980s, approximately ~15,000 Pakistani soldiers were stationed in the kingdom.Saudi Arabia has negotiated the purchase of Pakistani ballistic missilescapable of carrying nuclear warheads.
9. Cultural and commercial ties Saudi Arabia has also provided extensive religious and educational aid to Pakistan, being a major contributor to the construction of mosques and madrassas (religious schools) across Pakistan, including the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad, named after King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Since 1980, the number of religious schools increased from 800 to 27000 in 1997 and all are funded by Saudi Arabia
10. Cultural and commercial ties u The major Pakistani city of Lyallpur was also renamed Faisalabad in honour of King Faisal in 1977 u Saudi Arabia was a major supporter of the "Islamisation" programme of the military ruler Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in the 1970s. In 2006, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was awarded the Nishan-e- Pakistan, the highest civilian decoration of Pakistan u Saudi Arabia is the largest source of petroleum for Pakistan.[25] It also supplies extensive financial aid to Pakistan and remittance from Pakistani migrants in Saudi Arabia is also a major source of foreign currency for Pakistan

Pakistan Trade Relations With Indonesia & Malaysia

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:43:00 +0000

Pakistan Trade Relations With Indonesia & Malaysia

1. Pakistan Trade Relations With Indonesia & Malaysia
2. History • Muhammad Ali Jinnah who was at that time President of the All-India Muslim League - India and Pakistan were still not Independent nations encouraged Muslim soldiers serving in British Indian army to join hands with Indonesians their fight against the Dutch Imperial colonisation of Indonesia.
3. • Pakistan played a vital role in support of Indonesian Muslims by sending troops to Indonesia and also by blocking the Dutch airline in Pakistan which was a mean to supply arms to Dutch armies in Indonesia.
4. • A large number of Pakistani Muslim soldiers died in the war with Netherlands in Indonesia • Indonesia got independent on 27 December 1949 and Mr. Sukarno who also led the independence movement of Indonesia became its first President. • In 1960 President Ayub Khan and President Sukarno also signed an agreement to send Indonesian students into Pakistani universities for education.
5. • In 1967 when President Suharto took over, the Indonesia-Pakistan relations took a new turn, Indonesia started showing its slight inclination towards India. • when Pakistan faced the 1971 war with India, Indonesia preferred to take a non-partisan position into it and showed no support to Pakistan.
6. • While in the 1965 war of Pakistan, Indonesia provided full support to Pakistan. • In the 1967-1968 agreements were signed to promote co-operation between radio and television corporations and news agencies.
7. • Both the countries also agreed to establish direct shipping services and identified items for export and import from each other. • In 1972 Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Indonesia which helped to build confidence between the two countries again.
8. • The President Musharaf’s era is considered to be one of those periods in which the bonds were strengthened and the business relations between the countries were developed but it could not help Pakistan get ASEAN membership which Pakistan always tried to secure through Indonesian channel for its bearing an influential position amongst ASEAN countries.
9. Agreement • Pakistan-Indonesia PTA was signed on February 3, 2012 after conclusion of prolonged negotiations, which were initiated in August 2002 • the Preferential Trade Agreement became operational in September 2013 after many rounds of negotiations.
10. • Under the agreement, Indonesia agreed to offer market access to Pakistan for 220 tariff lines on preferential rates. • The list included fresh fruits, cotton yarn, fabrics, readymade garments, fans, sports goods, leather goods and other industrial products.
11. • After PTA’s implementation, Indonesia will be able to increase exports of crude palm oil to Pakistan • whereas Pakistan can export fruits, value-added textiles, carpets, fabrics, leather goods, chemicals, surgical equipment and other items.
12. • Pakistan offered Indonesia a total of 311 tariff lines on preferential rates. It included edible palm oil products, sugar confectionary, cocoa products, consumer goods, chemicals, tableware, kitchenware, rubber products, wood products, glassware products and electronic products.
13. • Pakistan has offered the same preferential treatment on edible palm oil products from Indonesia as provided to Malaysia under Pakistan Malaysia Free Trade Agreement.
14. Imports & Exports • Bilateral trade between Indonesia and Pakistan had grown to $1.65 (0h 7m) billion in 2012 from $1 (0h 4m) billion in 2008. Indonesia’s exports to Pakistan were $1.38 (0h 6m) billion and imports from Pakistan were $273 (18h 12m) million.
15. • In Pakistan’s exports, major growth was recorded in cotton/cotton fabrics and cereals, which grew by $20 (1h 20m) million and $11.53 (0h 47m) million respectively, while import of palm oil increased by $289.87 (19h 20m) million. • Indonesia is the largest exporter of palm oil products to Pakistan.
16. SUGGESTION • Pakistani government should also endeavor and take suitable measures to strengthen the ties with Indonesia and use its position to seek access to the ASEAN countries which can bring a drastic change in the trade activity of Pakistan resulting into the economic betterment of the country.
17. Pakistan Trade Relations With Malaysia
18. 1st Malaysian Politician
19. Background • On 31 August 1957 the Federation of Malaysia became an independent nation and joined the Commonwealth. • On 5 October 1965, Pakistan severed their diplomatic ties with Malaysia when a Malaysian representative at the UN Security Council (to which Malaysia had been elected in 1965) had taken sides in the Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir.
20. • Malaysia’s trade policy is to work towards creating a more liberalised and fair global trading environment. While Malaysia continues to accord high priority to the rule-based multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Malaysia is also pursuing regional and bilateral trading arrangements to complement the multilateral approach to trade liberalisation.
21. Pak-Malaysia Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (MPCEPA) • The Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for Closer Economic Partnership between Pakistan and Malaysia was approved by the Cabinet on 6th November, 2007. It was signed on 08-11-2007 at Kuala Lumpur Malaysia.
22. • The Agreement is a timely initiative by the Government of Pakistan to secure market for its export products in Malaysia and deepen the economic and trade relationship with an important member of the region.
23. • The MPCEPA encompasses liberalisation in trade in goods and services, investment, as well as bilateral technical cooperation and capacity building in areas such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, intellectual property protection, construction, tourism, healthcare and telecommunications.
24. Areas covered under MPCEPA include: • General Provisions • Trade in Goods • Rules of Origin • Customs Procedures and Cooperation • Trade Remedies • Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures • Technical Barriers to Trade • Trade in Services • Investment • Intellectual Property • Economic Cooperation • Dispute Settlement Mechanism • General Exceptions • Final Provisions
25. Exports and Imports • Exports to Malaysia from Pakistan comprise of Cotton Yarn, Fabric, Rice, Fruits, Vegetables, Sports Goods, Carpets, Fish and Fish preparations, Leather and Leather Products and Chemical etc. • Imports by Pakistan from Malaysia include Palm Oil and its Products, Electronic Items, Timber, Chemicals, Machinery, Animal and Vegetable Fats and Oil, Crude Rubber, Cork and Wood, Non- Ferrous Metals, Synthetic Yarn etc.
26. • Pakistan is continuously facing trade deficit even after FTA. Pakistan's Balance of Trade with Malaysia historically is in favour of Malaysia. In order to overcome the trading imbalance, there is need for diversifying trading products, besides Palm Oil. • Malaysia is a potential market for Pakistani Fruits and Vegetable like Mangoes, Onions and Potatoes.
27. • Pakistan is rich in human resources and there is great potential for Pakistan to export its skilled technical and labour force besides educated human resources to Malaysia. • Pakistan is an open economy with no restrictions where Malaysian firms and contractors can benefit from entering into Joint Ventures for establishing businesses.
28. • Pakistan and Malaysia have to find new areas of mutual co-operation and try to further boost bilateral trade and economic ties for getting full advantage of Pak-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which is still far from its existing potential.
29. Malaysia’s trade with Pakistan expanded by 6.2% to RM5.01 billion (US$1.29 (0h 6m) billion) from RM4.72 billion (US$1.44 (0h 6m) billion) Total exports increased by 3.6% to RM4.12 billion (US$1.06 (0h 5m) billion) from RM3.97 billion (US$1.21 (0h 5m) billion) Total imports increased by 19.9% to RM891.3 million (US$230 (15h 21m).0 million) as compared to RM743.6 million (US$226 (15h 4m).4 million)
30. • In 2015 Pakistan was Malaysia’s: • 31st largest trading partner • 19th largest export destination • 45th largest source of imports • SERVICES- The MPCEPA is a comprehensive agreement and it covers liberalization of Trade in Services as well. Pakistan offered maximum foreign equity participation of 60% in all sectors and there are no limitations on the number of Malaysian employed per organization.
31. Thank You !

Pakistan Turkey Relations

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:41:00 +0000

Pakistan Turkey Relations

1. Pak turkey relations — Turkey supports Pakistan membership of the nuclear supplier. — Pakistan has a embassy in Ankara, a Consulate General in Istanbul and a honorary consulate in Izmir. — Turkey has a ambassy in Islamabad, a Consulate General in Karachi and a honorary consulate in Lahore,Peshawer,sialkot and Faisalabad.
2. — Turkey has openly supported the stance of Pakistan’s on Kashmir issue. — Both nations have sought to expand cooperation to fight terrorism.
3. Military relations — Pakistan and Turkey have maintaining long-standing military ties with Turkey also provide training to Pakistani Air Force officers in up grading its F-16 fleet. — Turkey previous purchase army from Pakistan and continue to purchase minor aerial weapons and component from Pakistan.
4. — Turkey and Pakistan have strong military relationship consisting of joint exercise and a substantial portion of the Pakistan Navy’s fleet consisting of joint Pakistan-Turkey naval ships such as fleet tankers and a fast attack craft.
5. Aid Exchange — Turkey helped Pakistan in the aftermath of 2005 Kashmir earthquake — Turkey announced a package of $150 (10h 0m) million for the earthquake-hit people. — The Turkish aid organization Kizilay also constructed a mosque in Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir region bordering Indian- administered Jammu and Kashmir. The mosque is being built in the ottoman style in Pakistan’s Bagh district.
6. Economic relation — The two nations are in the process of strengthening economic relations with a Pakistan Turkey Free Trade Agreement aiming to raise bilateral trade volume to $10 (0h 40m) billion by 2020. — ‘Great Anatolia Logistics Organization’ is working for improving train service through Istanbul to Islamabad route to provide cost effective and reliable facilities for trade and services.
7. —‘Road Transport Joint commission’ between the two countries is working for the regulation of road transport.
8. Unity of Islamic World — In February 1952 agreement between Pakistan and turkey was signed. The Turk President and Pakistan president called it 1st step to the unity of Islamic World. Baghdad pact (CENTO) — In 1954 Pakistan and turkey signed a pact of economics cooperation. — The two countries came nearer after signing pact i.e. Baghdad Pact (CENTO) IN 1955.
9. —R.C.D/E.C.O In 1964 the three countries signed a pact (Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) in Istanbul to promote regional cooperation for development. The organization of RCD did well in many fields. It was closed after the revolution of Iran in 1979. When the internal affairs of Iran improve then in 1985 it was decided to form a new organization name ECO.
10. —Friendly visits — In 1953,Pakistan Governor General Ghulam Muhammad visited Turkey. In 1955 Turk President Jalaal Bayar visited Pakistan in November 1959 President Ayub Khan visited turkey. In1972 Z.A. Bhutto and later on Muhammad khan Janejo visited Turkey to strengthen the relation. — In 1983 president Zia-ul-Haq visited Turkey. In 1985 President kanan visited Pakistan. In January 2000 Turkish Foreign Minister visited Pakistan .20th January 2004 President Musharraf visited Turkey.
11. —Qabras Issue Pakistan has supported regarding Qabras issue where Qabras is the issue between the people of Turkey and Greece. Pakistan expressed great concern in 1974 on the efforts of unification between Qabras and Greece. Pakistan openly support Turkish decision to send its troops in Qabras. It sent medicine supplies to Turkey and offered to send volunteers for providing all sorts of help and assistance to the Turkish Government.
12. Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation — In September 1985 Pakistan and Turkey signed an agreement on avoidance of double taxation. Pakistan’s Nuclear Expulsion — In 1998 Pakistan conduct its nuclear weapons all the doner state of the world imposed sanctions on Pakistan. But the government of Turkey fully supported Pakistan.
13. Joint defense Ventures — On April 28, 2004, Pakistan and Turkey discussed setting up defense joint ventures, including a joint ventures, including a project to produce unmanned aerial drones. — Pakistan and Turkey expressed the desire to undertake a joint venture for the production of BMC Military Trucks.

Do you believe that main cause of 2014 floods was Indian

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:32:00 +0000

Do you believe that the main cause of 2014 floods was Indian ‘water terrorism’ or it was due to the awful mismanagement of water resources in Pakistan.

“It was Pakistan’s mismanagement of Water”

.Only two major dams constructed compared to Hundreds of India, USA has over 85,000 dams that are over 15m, china in recent decades have built 22,000.

“so-called Indian Water Terrorism”

.Baghlihar Dam- Run of river project and checked by world bank assigned top engineers

.Kishan-Ganga Dam- Again Run of the river project, India given go-ahead by ICJ

.Run of River mean- Affect supply on first filling then water discharged is almost equal to water intake (imagine a glass under tap once filled will over flow )

.Both projects plus Dal Lake project are not going to affect Pakistan’s water supply.

.We waste equivalent to three times of Tarbala Dam into sea each year.

.70% water get wasted in distribution system.

.No major Dams project in sight

. Every project Politicized

.Solution

.Dams

.Betterment of Distribution system

.Better irrigation techniques

.Stop blaming India and work to solve own problems

.Conclusion

Bureaucracy is an association of officials carrying out operational and administrative tasks

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sun, 15 Mar 2020 09:21:00 +0000

Bureaucracy is an association of officials carrying out operational and administrative tasks. The officials serving in the bureaucracy are called bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are mostly non-elected officials, with the exception of a very few countries where certain tiers of bureaucracy are elected. In bureaucracy the officials and employees are assigned specific responsibilities and they have to work within the hierarchy of an authority.

Characteristics of Bureaucracy:
1. Well defined hierarchy of governance.
2. Management of tasks through rules.
3. Specifically assigned functions.
4. A bureaucrat is required to be impersonal in carrying out his work.
5. Job security is to be ensured to the bureaucrats in carrying out tough decisions.
6. Well defined regulations for upward mobility.

Role of Bureaucracy in Strengthening and Integration of Pakistan:

1. Provided government in the times when democratic governments were sent home, so made the country governable in testing times.
2. Kept those parts of Pakistan governed where the elected representatives were not there like FATA.
3. Served as a cushion between the masses and law-enforcing arm of the state.
4. Worked towards ensuring meritocracy.
5. Despite shortcomings in fulfilling the assigned work, no other institution could replace it.

Conclusion:

Notwithstanding what the bureaucracy did for Pakistan, it is a matter of fact that it has not been a bureaucracy of an ideal democracy. It is a conservative bureaucracy which has resisted change over the time. It has helped the dictators negatively in doing away with the democratic dispensations, and had helped them in their quest for consolidation of their power. Pakistan's bureaucracy needs to be made professional and able to cater for the modern needs.. It can only be done through transparent and credible selection process and an up to date training process.

__________________

Pakistan Relation with International Organizations

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Sat, 14 Mar 2020 19:26:00 +0000

Introduction : Pakistan wants establishment of peace throughout the world . Pakistan has also protested against aggressive powers , desires and supported the oppressed nations for getting the peace. Pakistan is an active member of international and regional organizations Eg United Nations , Non- Alligned Movement(NAM) , Organization Of Islamic Conference (OIC) , Economic Cooperation Organiztion (ECO) And Saarc . Pakistan always cooperate with all these organizations for the security of world peace.
The United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization with the stated aims of promoting and facilitating co- operation in International law, International Security, Economic Development Social Progress, Human Rights, Civil Rights, Civil Liberties, Political Freedoms, Democracy, and the achievement of lasting world peace.
The UN was founded in 1945 after World War II to replace the League of Nations, to stop wars between countries, and to provide a platform for dialogue. ž It contains multiple subsidiary organizations to carry out its missions.
Pakistan joined the UN on September 30, 1947, after its independence and has been an active participant in the UN and its specialized agencies and other bodies, as well as in various specialized UN conferences.
In 1993 Pakistan was elected to a two-year term on the UN Security Council ž In addition, Pakistani nationals have contributed their skills within the UN itself. For example, in 1987, Nafis Sadik, a Pakistani woman physician, became executive director of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) with the rank of undersecretary general. ž Pakistan has also been the recipient of assistance from UN development organizations, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in a variety of fields such as agriculture, water and sanitation, national planning, and human development.
The UNDP, for example, allocated more than US$87 (5h 48m) million for assistance to Pakistan for the 1992-96 program period. ž Pakistan maintains a permanent mission to the UN, which is currently headed by Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon in New York. ž There is a second mission based at the UNO office in Geneva, Switzerland.
The Pakistani military has played a key role in the UN's peacekeeping programme in different parts of the world, most prominently in Somalia , Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Congo and Liberia. ž The UN continues to remain a keen observer of the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India, centring around the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. ž Since the transfer of power to both countries in 1947 of the divided territory, the UN has played an extensive role in regulating and monitoring the dispute
Pakistan's participation in other organizations, including SAARC and the ECO, reflect its desire to be an influential player in the geographic region of which it is a part. In addition, Pakistan has played a leading role in the OIC, and President Zia was instrumental in revitalizing the OIC as a forum for periodic meetings of the heads of Islamic states. Pakistan thus appears firmly committed to the utility of broadbased international cooperation.
The idea of regional organization for cooperation in the South Asia was put in forward by then Bengladesh President Zia-ur- Rehman in november , 1980 . The objective was to form an assosiation on the lines of EEC or ASEAN . ž SAARC was formed in December,1985 at Dhaka (Bangladesh) . Khatmanduis the headquarter of SAARC members .
SAARC is an assosiation of seven South Asian countries . They are Bhutan ž Bangladesh ž India ž Maldives ž Pakistan ž Nepal ž Sri-lanka Afghanistan joined the organization in 2007. Meetings of heads of state are usually scheduled annually; meetings of foreign secretaries, twice annually.
To promote the welfare of the people of south asia ž To improve security environment in the region. ž To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region. ž To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries.
Since the Association inception , Pakistan has been a supporter of SAARC objectives and has remained an active player on the SAARC platform . ž It has contributed meannigfully to the establishment , institutionalization and progress of the assosiation. ž Pakistan supports a step by step approach for enhancing cooperation and emphasized the need for the better coordination of programmes and consolidation of the progress made so far. ž Pakistan has a privilige to be host to SAARC Regional Center for Human Resources Development , which has been established in islamabad in 1998 . ž The headquarters of SAARC Chambers of Commerce and industry is located at Islamabad. ž Pakistan proposed the establishment of a Group Of Eminent Persons to undertake comprehensive appraisal of SAARC at the Male Summit in 1997.
ECO a territorial organization ws established in 1985 . in the beginning it was consisted of Turkey , Iran and Pakistan. In November , seven more Muslim countries got the membership of ECO . now this organization consist of ten countries these are ž Pakistan ž Iran ž Turkey ž Afghanistan ž Azerbaijan ž Uzbekistan ž Kyrgystan ž Turkma ž Kazakhstan ž Tajikistan
To promote trade by culturailing the trade restrictions. ž Cooperation in industrial fields. ž Cooperation in communication , science and other fields. ž To provide insurance facilities to industrial and business units by establishing an insurance firm. ž To provide the facilities of tourism to the citizens of member countries. ž To develop means of communication on modern lines construction of railway lines and roads.
Pakistan’s potential in telecommunication, agriculture, food, industry, trade and many other sectors made it significant as it can play its role for the betterment of rest of the member nations by providing them with assistance financially and technically both. ž ECO currently is engaged in energy crisis resolution and meetings are being held in Tehran. ž And by resolving this problem all the members will facilitated by it specially Pakistan. Because besides the potentiality of the country in many a sectors still they are not operating at an efficient level which is required according to the current need of the scenario. ž Pakistan urged the members of the ECO to expedite implementation of past agreements for trade liberalisation and bring down tariff and non tariff barriers.
OIC is an Inernational Organization consisting of 51 members states . the organization attempts to be the collective voice of the Muslim World (Ummah) . leaders of Muslim Nations met in Rabat to established OIC on 25 September,1969.
To safeguard the interest and ensure the progress and well-being of Muslims. ž To preserve Islamic , social and economic values. ž To promote solidarity amongst members state. ž Increase cooperation in social , economic , cultural , scientific and political areas. ž Uphold international peace and security and advanced education , particularly in the fields of science and technology.
The role of Pakistan in OIC is as follows. ž Pakistan wants to unite all the muslims countries and made good relation with islamic world. ž Pakistan was also very active in holding the Islamic Summit Conference. ž Pakistan was also the member of the committee form to stop the Iraq-Iran war in 1979. ž Pakistan helped the Muhajirs from Afganistan during Russian invasion on Afganistan. ž Pakistan rejected to accept Israel for the support of Palestinian people.
The founders of ASEAN wanted to bring together all the countries of Southeast Asia and getting them to cooperatein securing the regions peace , stability and development. ž The founder of ASEAN are Indonesia , Malaysia , Philippines , Singapore and Thailand . The assosiation was established in 1967.
To accelerate the economic growth , social progress and cultural development in the region. ž To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice . ž To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economics social , cultural , technical , scientific and administrative fields.
ASEAN Secretaries took proposal of Japaneses Government for inclusion of Pakistan in ARF quiet considerably . the positive reaction of ASEAN members towards the inclusion of Pakistan are clearly evident from their joint statement that “ we agreed to accept Pakitan as new participant in the ARF.
Officials from the 23 members ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) on april 21,2004 agreed to admit Pakistan into its fold. ž Pakistan membership in ARF boost moves against terrorism. On april 30,2004 Pakistan signed separate agreements with 22 countries of East-South Asia minus India to counter rising threat of terrorism. ž Pakistan was also welcomed back to Common Wealth Oragnization.
NAM emerged during the 1960s in the context of bi-polar world with the USA leading the free world on the one hand and Soviet Unoin at the head of coalition of revolutionary communist countries .
To continue the collective efforts for the removal of legacies such as foreign occupation , foreign military bases, the use or threat of use of force , pressure , interference in internal affairs and sanctions. ž Contribute in the past to the cause of freedom and liberty , struggled against colonialism and discrimination.
Pakistan plays an important role in the deliberation of NAM and is regarded as one of its key members. ž In the view of unresolved Kashmir issue , it has been the Pakiatan efforts that the NAM decisions reflection emphasis on peaceful settlement of dispute. ž Pakistan fully supported NAM principle on the issue of global nuclear disarmament. ž On the plateform of NAM Pakistan , however, endorses the call for the terrorism.

Pak-Afghan Relations

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Tue, 26 Nov 2019 08:56:00 +0000

1. Prepared by: Name: Fakhar-e-Alam University: National Textile University Faisalabad Campus Department: Garments Manufacturing Reg No: 13-NTU-0165

2. Pak Afghan Relations

3. Location of Afghanistan:

4. History of Afghanistan: ´Afghanistan (Land of the Afghan) is a mountainous country in Central Asia with history and culture that ´goes back 5000 years ´ In the ancient times, the land was called Aryana by its inhabitants. In the ´medieval era, it was called Khorasan, and in modern times, its people have decided to call it Afghanistan.

5. Geography of Afghanistan: ´Afghanistan is located in Hearth/North of Asia, ´Afghanistan has 34 provinces, ´Afghanistan has 7 Neighboring Countries, (India, China, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan & Turkmenistan) ´ Afghanistan is a Mountain country, ´The Second big Mountain of the World is located in Afghanistan.

6. About Afghanistan: ´ IS A LANDLOCKED COUNTRY ´LOCATED IN CENTRAL ASIA ´POPULATION 29 MILLON ´AREA 647500 SQ KM. ´42ND MOST POPULATED ´41ST LARGEST

7. Pak Afghan relation: ´ There are two parts of Pak Afghan relation ´ Part (1): ´ Pakistan Afghanistan Relations: 1947- 2001: ´ Part (2): ´ Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations since 9/11

8. Phases in Part 1: 1) Phase (1): 1947-1963 2) Phase (2): 1963-1973 3) Phase(3): 1973-1978 4) Phase (4): 1979-1992 5) Phase (5): 1992-9/11-2001

9. 1) Phase (1) : 1947-1963 i. Durand Line: ii. Opposition in UNO: iii. The reaction in 1947 War: iv. Zahir Shah Speech: v. Exchange and withdrawl of Ambassadors: vi. Assassination of Liaqut Ali Khan: vii. Attack on Pakistan Embassy:

10. Continued….. viii. Pakistan joining of CEATO &CENTO: ix. Rulers visits 1956: x. U-2 Incident: xi. Termination of Relations:

11. i. Durand Line: ´ The Pakistan-Afghan boundary was drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand. ´ The boundary was accepted by the king of Afghanistan in a treaty the 1893. ´ The definition of this boundary, called the Durand Line. ´ When Pakistan became Afghanistan claimed on the boundary of Pakistan. ´ They demand some territory of NWFP and Baluchistan.

12. ii. Opposition in UNO: ´ In initial era Pak-Afghan relations were in critical phase , Afghanistan was first Muslim State in the World whose against the membership of Pakistan in UNO. ´ Afghanistan put forwarded the anti Pakistan resolution in UNO. ´ Pakistan joined the United Nations on September 30 1947, ´ Afghanistan didn’t consider Pakistan an independent state, He considered Pakistan is a colony of British.

13. iii. Reaction in 1947 war: ´ Actually the demand for Pakhtoonistan was made in December 1947. ´ when Indian army was poised for a quick advance into Kashmir, on Pakistan’s border. ´ Since then raids from Afghanistan into Pakistani territories have taken place from time to time.

14. iv. Zahir Shah Speech: ´In 1950, the tension reached to its climax when Afghan king Zahir Shah made an anti Pakistan speech at a celebration in Kabul. ´The Afghanistan’s flag was hoisted and anti Pakistan leaflets were dropped by the Afghan Air force.

15. v. Exchange and with drawl of Ambassadors: ´ Afghanistan’s withdrawal of its negative UN Vote and exchange of ambassadors in 1948 from both sides could not pay much in bringing both of the countries closer. ´ Irregular forces from Afghanistan crossed Pakistan border to fabricate Pakhtoon uprising in Pakistani tribal areas in 1950-51 were even handedly dealt by Pakistan’s security forces. ´ Afghanistan denied its covert involvement in the cross border infiltration. ´ Pakistan rejected Afghanistan’s claim of neutrality in the cross border infiltration and both nations withdrew their ambassadors for few months till those were repositioned.

16. vi. Assassination of Liaqut Ali Khan: ´The assassination of Pakistani Prime minister Liaqat Ali Khan by an Afghan national in 1951 further deteriorated the already fragile relations.

17. vii. Attack on Pakistan Embassy: ´ In 1955, Pakistan restructured its administrative units on one unit. ´ Afghanistan government vehemently opposed the decision of integrating the Pathan dominated Northwest Province. ´ Afghan Pakistani embassy in Kabul was sacked, consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad were attacked and Pakistan flag was molested. ´ In September 1955, Pakistan’s flag was again raised at its embassy and consulates.

18. viii. Pakistan joining of CEATO &SENTO: ´When Pakistan joined CEATO and SENTO IN 1955 Mascow severly against Pakistan. ´Russia supported India in Kashmir issue. ´Russia paid 100$ (6h 41m) economic and offered military assistance to Afghanistan on the issue of Pakhtonistan.

19. ix. Rulers visits: ´ Pakistan’s president Iskandar Mirza visited Afghanistan in August 1956. ´ Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy Prime Minister of Pakistan toured Afghanistan in 1957. ´ These visits were reciprocated by Afghan ruler King Zahir Shah in 1958 . ´ Prime Minister Sardar Daud Khan in 1959. ´ These visits helped in cultivating attitude of reconciliation on both sides.

20. x. U-2 Incident: ´ The 1960 U-2 incident was precipitated during the cold war on 1 May 1960. ´Since the happening of U-2 incident USSR supported every Afghan move to isolate or damage Pakistan in any aspect.

21. xi. Termination of Relations: ´These incursions led to the termination of Pak- Afghan relations and closure of Afghanistan’s consulates and trade offices in Peshawar and Quetta. ´ In retaliation, Kabul broke off diplomatic relations, closed the border and suspended transit trade with Pakistan.

22. 2) Phase (2) 1963-1973: i. Reinstatement of Relations: ii. 1965 war: iii. 1971 War:

23. i. Reinstatement of Relations: ´Iran successful for the better relation Between Pakistan and Afghanistan which resulted in the 1963 Tehran Accord. ´ Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to restore diplomatic relations, re-open their closed borders and resume trade and commercial ties.

24. ii. 1965 war: ´The relations were improved to such an extent that during the 1965 India Pakistan war, Afghanistan sided with Pakistan which enabled Islamabad to fully concentrate on its war with India and worry less about the security of its western border.

25. iii. 1971 war: ´ King Zahir Shah, in his state visit of 1968, was given a very warm welcome by Pakistan. ´ Islamabad decision to disband one unit led to further warmth in Pak-Afghan relations including increase in economic cooperation and mutual understanding . ´ Afghanistan maintained strict neutrality during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan and refrained from taking advantage of Pakistan’s preoccupation in war.

26. 3) Phase (3) 1973-1978: i. Deposition of Zahir Shah: ii. Doud Support to Separatists in Pakistan: iii. Pakistan Support to anti Doud forces: iv. Doud visit to Pakistan: v. Pact: vi. Saur revolution: vii. Communist Reforms in Afghanistan and its Effects on Pakistan: viii. Elimination of Tarraki:

27. i. Deposition of Zahir Shah: ´ In July 1973, Sardar Daud, an ardent champion of Pakhtoonistan issue, deposed King Zahir Shah while he was on visit to Europe with the help of leftist forces and in connivance with the Soviets. ii. Doud Support to Separatists in Pakistan: ´ It was feared that the Daoud comeback would once again arouse separatist movements amongst Pakhtoon and Balochi living across Durand Line. And it did happen in Balochistan when Afghanistan provided sanctuaries to the Murree and Bugti insurgents in mid 70s.

28. iii. Pakistan Support to anti Doud forces: ´ Considering Daud a serious threat to Pakistan integration, Pakistan government decided to support anti Daud forces in destabilizing and bringing down Daud regime. ´ Resultantly , Pakistan welcomed Afghan Islamists with anti communist and anti Doud feelings. ´ These dissidents were provided training and other supports for their incursions and uprisings inside Afghanistan.

29. iv. Doud visit to Pakistan: ´ Experiencing rise in Soviet influence in Afghanistan’s internal affairs Daud observed that anti Pakistan policies were doing Afghanistan more harm than good. ´ Daud , succumbed by Pakistan retaliation, decided for reconciliation with Islamabad and invited Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto for Kabul’s visit. ´ Bhutto was given a warm welcome in Kabul in June 1976. ´ Daud was given red carpet reception in his reciprocal visit to Islamabad in August same year.

30. v. Pact: ´ Bhutto agreed to release the National Awami Party (NAP) leaders accused of supporting the Pukhtoonistan demand. ´ while Daud agreed to recognize the Durand Line as the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. vi. Saur revolution: ´ Elimination of Daud by communist forces in April 1978 . Kabul was taken over by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). ´ The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

31. vii. Communist Reforms in Afghanistan and its Effects on Pakistan: ´ Pakistan had no other option but either to surrender or to go for all out support to the forces resisting against the communist regime. ´ Besides, supporting and organizing resistance forces against the Communist regime of Kabul, Pakistan had to host over 150,000 Afghan refugees into Pakistan immediately after the Saur Revolution of April 1978. viii. Elimination of Tarraki: ´ On September 16th 1979, Hafizullah Amin staged another coup against own government, killing Taraki, and took over as President of Afghanistan.

32. 4) Phase (4) 1979-1992: i. Soviet invasion: ii. American assistance to Pakistan: iii. Pakistani assistance to Mujahadin: iv. Geneva Pact:

33. i. Soviet invasion: ´ The December, 27th 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as the country’s president. ´ Which created a frightening situation for Pakistan as it brought the Red Army dangerously close to the Khyber Pass, the traditional gateway of invasions of South Asia from the north.

34. ii. American assistance to Pakistan: ´President Carter, on May 4, 1980, declared: ´“We will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the north.” ´The American’s supply of arms, ammunition and equipment to the Mujahideen, was funneled through Pakistan’s ISI.

35. iii. Pakistani assistance to Mujahidin: ´ The leading recipient of Amerikan aid was Hezb-i-Islami that proved to be the trust worthy and deserving resistance force. ´ It was Pakistan’s skill-full use of intelligence and resources against Soviet forces that made Afghanistan a ‘bleeding wound’ for Moscow. iv.Geneva Pact: ´ Finally, the Peace Accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan was signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988, with the two superpowers as its co-guarantors.

36. 5) Phase (5) 1992-9/11-2001: i. Peshawar accord: ii. Tahreek e Taliban: iii. Pakistani Support to Taliban : iv. Deterioration in Pak Iran Relations: v. US opposition:

37. i. Peshawar accord: ´ The Peshawar accord was the agreement between different leaders of Afghanistan about future government structure after soviet union elimination at Peshawar. ii. Tahreek e Taliban: ´ Tehreek-i-Islami-i-Taliban Afghanistan emerged in and around Kandhar in September 1994 and began as a new movement. ´ With in three years Taliban were finally able to control 27 out of 32 provinces by the 3rd weak of May 1997.

38. iii. Pakistani Support to Taliban : ´ Pakistan extended full diplomatic and economic support to the Taliban Government. ´ To reconstruct Chaman- Kandhar - Herat- Kushka highway Pakistan provided financial and technical support to the Taliban as well. iv.Deterioration in Pak Iran Relations: ´ The Pak-Iran ties were further deteriorated when Taliban asked Iranian to close their Embassy and leave Kabul with in 48 hours.

39. v. US opposition: ´ US policy towards Taliban started changing because of Taliban’s oppressive behavior towards women and presence of Osama and Taliban’s open support for him. ´ On May 5th, 1999 the US Senate passed a resolution calling on President Bush not to recognize any government that discriminated against women. Taliban allowed Usama to live comfortably in Afghanistan and in return he provided personnel, money and hundreds of Arab fighters to participate in the Taliban military campaigns in the north.

40. Part (2) Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations since 9/11

41. ´The horrific acts of September 11, 2001 changed the world and Pakistan Found itself between the devil and the deep sea. ´ It marks a new phase of the Pakistan foreign policy in general and Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy in particular.

42. Phases in Part (2): ´ American Reaction: ´ Pakistan Reaction: ´ Pakistan role For Peaceful solution ´ Reaction of Al qaeda after attacks from US ´ Reestablishment of government in Kabul ´ Hamid Karzai visit to Pakistan ´ Musharraf visits to Afghanistan ´ Support in Election ´ Foreign hand and particularly Indian Factors

43. Continued…. ´ Pak Afghan relation in Asif Ali Zardari Era: ´ Signed agreement: ´ Smuggling Products : ´ Country agreement for the establishment of joint chamber of commerce and industry ´ Bilateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan

44. Musharraf visits to Afghanistan: ´ President Musharraf’s visit to Afghanistan in April 2002 and announcement of 100 million dollars aid for reconstruction of Afghanistan. ´ President Musharraf was the first head of state to visit Afghanistan after the successful completion of presidential election. ´Support in Election: ´ Pakistan also provided full support for the peaceful conduct of presidential and parliamentary polls in October 2004 and September 2005. ´ The border Was sealed to guard against any invasions across the border to disrupt election process.

45. American reaction: ´ Pakistan was given a stark choice by America; ‘either to be with us or against us’. ´ “We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”

46. Pakistan reaction: ´ Pakistan was to either stand with America in its war against Al Qaida and Taliban or suffer U.S. retaliation if continue with its pro Taliban stand. ´ Pakistan opted to side the international coalition and provide intelligence, flight corridor and bases for logistic support and recovery to the U.S. led military attack over Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.

47. Pakistan role For Peaceful solution: ´ Pakistan, to avert likely war, did its best to mediate between U.S and the Taliban. ´ George Tenet, former head of C I A, in his book amply records Pakistan’s efforts of bringing Taliban to the table and averting war. ´ He claims that Pakistan helped in arranging meetings between Robert Grenier, (CIA boss in Islamabad) and Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, Taliban leader to sort out any peaceful solution. ´ Pakistan spy master Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (DG ISI) with a high level delegation also visited Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Kandahar on 17th September 2001, and persuaded him to extradite bin Laden so as to Avert drastic consequences from US attack.

48. Reaction of Al qaeda after attacks from US: ´ The attack was effective in destroying the training camps. ´ However, the large numbers of the Taliban and Al Qaeda dispersed and disappeared in to the hinterland and some fled in to the neighboring Iran and Pakistan. ´ Within 8-10 weeks the Taliban were over powered, routed, major cities including the capital fell on November 13th, 2001.

49. Reestablishment of government in Kabul: ´After the disintegration of Taliban and surrender of Kabul, UN arranged meeting of selected Tribal chiefs in Bonn (Germany) to decide upon Afghan interim government under Hamid Karazi with six months mandate commencing from 22 December 2001.

50. Hamid Karzai visit to Pakistan: ´ Pakistan supported the interim set up and Hamid Karzai paid an official visit to Pakistan in February 2002. ´ And started again bilateral relations on friendly terms. ´ Pakistan offered all sort of moral, political and economic support to strengthen new government in Kabul under the presidency of Karzai.

51. Foreign hand and particularly Indian Factors: ´On the contrary Afghanistan’s distant neighbor like India was provided opportunity to further its strategic interests against Pakistan. ´Since then, India has found a vast platform in Afghanistan to conduct its covert activities in Baluchistan through Balochi dissidents and FATA through TTP in order to destabilize Pakistan.

52. Pak Afghan relation in Asif Ali Zardari Era: ´President Zardari made his first trip to Afghanistan in January 2009,finishing to ´terrorism. ´In September 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai traveled to Pakistan addressing new tactics to fight militancy.

53. Signed agreement: ´In order to enhance cooperation amongst the two countries, in October 2010, the ´President has signed a Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement.

54. Smuggling Products : ´ Smuggling became a major business after the establishment of the Durand Line in 1893, which is now controlled by a large network of mafia groups on both sides of the border.

55. Meat Smuggled: ´ In Peshawar, Pakistan, local police and the food department recovered the meat which was smuggled to Afghanistan from the city Peshawar on September 13, 2012.

56. Minerals smuggled: ´ Pakistan generates about USD 350 (23h 20m)mn revenue on smuggling of these stones annually, while Afghanistan only earns USD 300,000 (20000h 0m).The industry offered jobs to 5,000 Afghans and 6,000 Pakistanis, he added.

57. Country agreement for the establishment of joint chamber of commerce and industry: ´ The countries also agreed to establish a joint chamber of commerce and industry. ´ Pakistan has offered to host the inaugural session of the proposed chamber, and display centers for industrial exhibitions will be set up in Karachi and Kabul

58. Bilateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan: ´ Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to strengthen trade ties and double annual bilateral trade by 2015, after a two-day Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meeting January 16-17 in Islamabad

How Qatar Weathered the Gulf Crisis

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Tue, 26 Nov 2019 06:55:00 +0000

Putting Pressure on Doha Didn't Work

By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen June 11, 2018

Military helicopters flying over Doha during Qatar National Day, 2015Naseem Zeitoon / Reuters

In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates cut diplomatic ties with Qatar and instituted an economic and trade embargo that closed Qatar’s only land border and heavily restricted the sea and airspace open to Qatar-bound traffic. This was not the first time that frustration over Qatar’s distinctive foreign policy had led to a crisis. In 2014, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, angered by the country’s post–Arab Spring policies such as its perceived support for the Islamist movements. Although this disagreement was settled nine months later, the Qatari leadership learned a lesson: it could happen again.

The embargo nevertheless caught most regional and international observers off balance. And just one day after the it was announced, U.S. President Donald Trump shocked both Doha and his own secretaries of state and defense by issuing a series of tweets that backed the move and suggested that Qatar supported extremism. Qatar, like many small Gulf states, has a defense and security posture that depends on its partnership with the United States. In the face of intense pressure from larger and more conventionally powerful countries, Qatar appeared to be overmatched.

One year later, however, it seems that Qatar has outplayed its rivals. The 2014 crisis taught Doha the importance of developing contingency plans. In response to the most recent regional power play and Trump’s unexpected decision to support the blockade, Qatar accelerated efforts to diversify its economy, broaden its international partnerships, and reduce its vulnerability to external shocks. Although the embargo is still in place, Qatar has proved more resilient than most people anticipated.

Electoral Reforms

noreply@blogger.com (Yasir Noor) — Tue, 26 Nov 2019 06:54:00 +0000

The Road to a stable Democracy in Pakistan

“Fundamental problems remain with the legal framework and the implementation of certain provisions, leaving future processes vulnerable to malpractice and Pakistan not fully meeting its obligations to provide citizens the right and opportunity to stand as candidates and to vote.”
(General Elections 2013 Report: The European Union Election Observer Mission)

Elections reflect the will of the people. Holding free and fair elections at regular intervals is the most important feature of a democratic polity because only such an election can guarantee a stable and an effective political system. The legal framework and administrative processes for elections always need to be seen as organic; requiring regular review and modifications. In Pakistan, since 1970, there has been a general tendency of demanding such reforms after every election. The dharnas in Islamabad and protests across the country have brought to the fore an urgent need for electoral reforms. If certain issues regarding electoral process are not addressed urgently, they might jeopardise our whole democratic structure.

Elections are considered the most important event for running the system of a country. It is a decision-making process through which people choose individuals to hold public offices. So, the elections should help precipitate the national will in its truest possible form. The elections show the resolve people have in the continuity of the democratic setup.

But, in Pakistan, since 1970, almost all elections have been termed as ‘rigged’ and ‘stolen’. That’s why the political scene in the country has always been dominated by the need for electoral reforms. Generally, the term ‘electoral reform’ is used for the purpose of introducing some fundamental changes in any electoral system.

Democracies can only strengthen and prosper if there is a regular review of the system and introduction of requisite amendments thereupon. For instance, our next door neighbour, and the world’s largest democracy, India, has been having comprehensive, regular reviews of its election laws since 1967 though the amendments made thereupon have been ad hoc and ones largely suited to the interests of the party in power. But, in Pakistan there has not been any such review witnessed since long. While 2013 polls were trumpeted to be free and fair, with the highest voter turnout in decades, the process was, undoubtedly, marred with malpractices and irregularities. Soon after the polls, there were claims of rigging; for example, candidates recovered ballot papers from unusual locations as ‘proof’ of wrongdoing while in a few constituencies, it was discovered that many votes were fake or even unverifiable. So, in these circumstances, reforming the electoral system of Pakistan has become more than inevitable. In this regard, following ten key areas require urgent reforms:

1. Reinvigorating the ECP

The Constitution of Pakistan requires that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and members of the ECP should have a superior judiciary background. However, this restriction has kept many talented people away from taking part in this most important organ of our country’s democratic structure. This precondition is totally unnecessary and unwanted because it excludes people having rich administrative experience. One of the four ECP members may come from legal sodality, but having only the former judges in all the five positions should not, at all, be necessary. It will be also a prudent step if an upper age limit for the CEC and the members of the ECP is fixed. The selection procedure of the CEC and ECP members should be multi-partisan rather than bipartisan. The system of recruitment, promotions and on-the-job training for ECP staff also needs a complete overhaul.

For improvement of electoral system, it is necessary to give maximum autonomy to ECP; not just administrative but financially as well. The independence and strengthening of ECP must also be ensured.

2. Voting Processes

Most complaints in Pakistan’s 2013 general elections related to the identification of voters. Allegedly, a number of votes were cast by persons other than bona fide voters as per the findings of the thumb impressions verification reports prepared by the National Database and Registration Authority (Nadra). In some cases, a single person had cast more than 100 votes as his thumb impression was recognised by Nadra on as many counterfoils. It is, therefore, very important that a biometric system of voter identification is put in place so that the voter is biometrically identified prior to the casting of vote. In Pakistan, thumb impressions of over 90pc of the adult population and 100pc of the registered voters are secured in Nadra’s databank. The new technology has made this biometric identification not only feasible but economical as well.

3. Scrutiny of Nomination Papers

Before the 2013 general elections, the Election Commission had sought amendments to the Representation of the People Act so as to extend the period for scrutiny of nomination papers to 30 days. Unfortunately, the proposal could not get legislature’s approval. However, it needs to be taken up at the earliest. The Supreme Court and parliament should also play their due roles in interpretation of — and amendment thereupon to — the provisions of Articles 62 and 63 which lay down the qualifications for members of the parliament. This is necessary to removing ambiguities and making these provisions uniformly enforceable.

4. Political Financing

Almost every election in Pakistan has witnessed novel campaign trends which get greater public attention. In recent years, the money has been flooded into the process and parties have been increasingly devoting huge resources to commercials on electronic and print media. Although Pakistan’s electoral laws place a ceiling on the spending of individual candidates, yet no such ceiling is there on the overall spending of parties. There is a need to regulate the election campaign through the commercial media and place a ceiling on such spending by political parties. The ECP had also failed to ensure compliance with the ceiling on spending by individual candidates. This is an area where the ECP needs to develop a system of appointing its own election observers in each constituency to ensure strict compliance with the prescribed ceiling on spending. Indian experience of this sort can serve as an example to follow.

5. Appointment of Caretaker Setups

The procedure for the appointment of caretaker governments also needs an immediate review especially in the light of the experiences gained during the 2013 general elections. Article 224 (1A) of the Constitution of Pakistan reads:

“On dissolution of the Assembly on completion of its term, or in case it is dissolved under Article 58 or Article 112, the President, or the Governor, as the case may be, shall appoint a care-taker Cabinet:

Provided that the care-taker Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the outgoing National Assembly, and a care-taker Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor in consultation with the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the outgoing Provincial Assembly:”

But, political parties had exploited the lacuna in this piece of legislation and have blatantly flouted the spirit of the law. For instance, MQM remained an ally of the PPP government in Sindh for almost the entire tenure. But, when the dissolution of the provincial assembly approached, it quit the government and got elected its MPA as the leader of the opposition, leading to the appointment of a caretaker government which excluded the real opposition from the consultative process.

6. Statements of Count

One of the vulnerabilities of the prevailing polling practices is that the result compiled at polling stations may be manipulated or tampered with before consolidation by the returning officers. In order to enhance the credibility of the counting process, the statement of count prepared at each polling station should be posted on the ECP website as soon as it is received at the Election Commission.

7. Polling Staff

A major chunk of polling staff comes from provincial government departments recommended by the outgoing provincial governments. It is a known fact that recruitment in these departments has traditionally been strongly influenced by local politicians who expect payback from them during elections. Stronger supervision by the ECP and exemplary disciplinary action against those members of the polling staff who violate rules will act as an effective deterrent. Additionally, polling staff from one division or district should be appointed in another division or district so that it may perform functions free from local powerful elements.

8. Functioning of Election Tribunals

The law mandates election tribunals to decide election petitions within four months. Unfortunately, this timeframe is hardly followed. There have been instances that the ETs did not decide the petitions till the end of the constitutional tenure of an assembly. Additional measures are needed to decide all petitions within four months.

9. Supervision by a Parliamentary Committee

There is a need for a permanent parliamentary committee specifically working on the election law and reforms to look into conduct of elections. ECP should also submit an annual report to a parliamentary committee too. This committee will not only oversee the conduct of elections and by-elections, it will also look into the ongoing electoral processes including electoral disputes, preparations for the upcoming electoral events, status of implementation of the ECPs strategic plan. The committee can also make recommendations for improvements in election legislation.

10. Delimitation of Constituencies

Delimitation is another important task, which needs certain changes. Most of us think that we need census for delimitation, whereas it’s not the case. There are many constituencies which need delimitation as the spread over large areas where voter populations is very high or low and many cases the boundary of a constituency doesn’t meet but it has been done on the political pressures and the wishes of political elite in different areas of Pakistan.

Hopefully, if reforms are pursued with dedication and honesty in Pakistan, and most importantly, implemented in their true spirit, the electoral process should become a much more transparent and error-free exercise.

Yasir Noor

Modernization is an Unending Process

US, Russia, China recognise Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process

The State of Play in U.S.-Taliban Talks and the Afghan Peace Process

The State of Play in U.S.-Taliban Talks and the Afghan Peace Process

The Afghan Peace Process Has Started. But Tough Choices Are Still to Come.

Nine priorities for peace in Afghanistan

Nine priorities for peace in Afghanistan

How Pakistan can help with the Afghan peace process

Developments in Afghan Peace Process

Moscow Format, Regional Consensus, and the Way Forward

Read More: DEEMED TWIST IN AFGHAN PEACE PROCESS

Munich Security Conference

Can China Drive The Afghan Peace Process? – Analysis

Afghan peace talks: US-China-Russia

US-Russia relations in the context of ISIS and its impact on the security situation of Middle East

US Relation with South China SEA

Role of National Action Plan in stabilization internal security of Pakistan

Role of National Action Plan in the stabilization of internal security of Pakistan

Relationship with Pakistan With Iran / Turkey

Relationship with Pakistan With Iran / Turkey

Qatar Crisis has Global Implication

Pakistan is the member of the following International Organizations

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Relations

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Relations

Pakistan Trade Relations With Indonesia & Malaysia

Pakistan Trade Relations With Indonesia & Malaysia

Pakistan Turkey Relations

Pakistan Turkey Relations

Do you believe that main cause of 2014 floods was Indian

Bureaucracy is an association of officials carrying out operational and administrative tasks

Pakistan Relation with International Organizations

Pak-Afghan Relations

How Qatar Weathered the Gulf Crisis

Electoral Reforms