Brain Hammer

submit to me

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 13:46:00 +0000

Dear Hammerheads and potential SSPPers,
Today is the deadline for your submissions. Hurry up!
Details here.
Cheers,
Pete (aka the Philosophy Program Chair for the 2012 SSPP meeting in Savannah, GA)

cfp: Fourth Online Consciousness Conference

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 18 Oct 2011 12:34:00 +0000

Please post and distribute widely; apologies for cross-posting.

I am pleased to announce the call for papers for the fourth online consciousness conference, scheduled for February 17-March 2, 2012. The Invited Program includes,

Bernard Baars, The Neurosciences Institute

Special Session on Attention, Awareness, and Expectation organized by the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behavior featuring
Floris P. de Lange, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior
Jackie Gottlieb, Columbia
David Heeger, NYU
Marisa Carrasco, NYU

Special Session on Action Consciousness organized by Myrto Mylopoulos, The Graduate Center CUNY; participants TBA

Special Session on the Social Conditions of Self Consciousness organized by James Dow, Hendrix University; participants TBA

Papers in any area of consciousness studies are welcome. Papers should be roughly 3,000-4,000 words and subsequent presentations, should the presenter choose to make one, should be about 20 minutes (though longer papers/presentations are acceptable). Submissions, suitable for blind review,should be sent to consciousnessonline@gmail.com by December 5th 2011. Those interested in being referees or commentators should also contact me. Authors of accepted papers are urged to make, or have made, some kind of audio/visual presentation (e.g. narrated powerpoint or video of talk) though this is not required to present.

For more information visit the conference website at http://consciousnessonline.com

Find Consciousness Online on Facebook! http://www.facebook.com/pages/Consciousness-Online/361010842469

Conference and CFP: Minds, Bodies, and Problems

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 08 Oct 2011 12:28:00 +0000

Conference Announcement and 1st CALL FOR PAPERS

Minds, Bodies, and Problems --

A philosophy of mind conference

hosted by Bilkent University, Ankara, 7-8 June, 2012.

High-quality submissions are invited on the many aspects of the mind-body problem.

Some suggested topics include: naturalistic/physicalistic reduction of intentionality and/or phenomenal consciousness, the potential constitutive role of the body in mental states, the extended mind hypothesis, the potential conceptual role of the Peripheral Nervous System in the characterization of mental states/processes, body and mental causation, body/brain and free will, consciousness related topics in neuro- and bio-ethics, potential novel philosophical implications of focusing on less studied sense modalities: olfaction, proprioception, interoception, kinesthesia, etc.

Self-standing papers are preferred rather than papers responding to/commenting on another paper or book. Each talk will be 45 minutes long, including Q&A.

Keynote speakers:

Prof. Murat Aydede (University of British Columbia)

Prof. David Chalmers (Australian National University/New York University)

Prof. Tim Crane (Cambridge University)

Prof. Katalin Farkas (Central European University)

Prof. Shaun Gallagher (U. of Memphis/U. of Hertfordshire)

Interested speakers should submit an extended abstract (500-1000 words) by uploading it to the system to be found on the website of the conference:

http://minds.bilkent.edu.tr/

Submissions will be blindly refereed by a group of people comprising some of the keynote speakers, some of the faculty members of the Department of Philosophy at Bilkent University, and some members of the Turkish philosophical community.

We will select 8-10 speakers based on the submitted abstracts, and every effort is made to publish the final versions of the papers in an edited volume. The criteria of selection are both the perceived quality of the papers and the maximization of the conference’s overall diversity as far as the topics are concerned.

Abstract submission deadline: 15 January, 2012.

Expected date of a decision: 1 March, 2012.

Registration details:

Selected speakers will be asked to pay a conference fee of 160 EUR, which will cover the following:

- Three nights’ accommodation (6, 7, 8 June, 2012) in on-campus guest apartments.

- Lunches and dinners on 7 and 8 June, 2012.

- Breakfast on 8 June, 2012.

- Coffee, tea, and refreshments during the two conference days.

There will also be a two-day post-conference trip (9-10 June, 2012) to Cappadocia, which interested participants will have to pay for separately at a concession rate (approximately 100 EUR) which will cover transportation, tour guide, 4-star hotel accommodation, breakfast, dinner, and two lunches. For information on Cappadocia, see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cappadocia

The conference fee will also cover a fourth night at Bilkent upon return from Cappadocia, for of those who opt for joining us on that trip.

Payment details will be available to selected speakers by the time the final decision on the program will have been made.

The conference is open to the public, but the University is not able to arrange for accommodation and meals for non-speaker participants.

Two more reminders of the call for papers will be sent out: on 30 November, 2011, and on 30 December, 2011.

------------

Organization

Organizing department/institution: Department of Philosophy/Bilkent University

Organizer: Dr. István Aranyosi (Bilkent University)

Program Committee:

Prof. Varol Akman (Bilkent University)

Dr. Sandy Berkovski (Bilkent University)

Dr. Hilmi Demir (Bilkent University)

Dr. Kourken Michaelian (Bilkent University)

Assoc. Prof. Erdinç Sayan (Middle East Technical University)

Dr. Simon Wigley (Bilkent University)

Dr. Bill Wringe (Bilkent University)

Brains: Call for Proposals: Content and Consciousness 2.0. Four Decades After.

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 22 Sep 2011 15:01:00 +0000

I'm involved with a new book project focusing on the philosophy of mind of Daniel Dennett. The editor is seeking additional contributors. Here's a link to the CFP: Brains: Call for Proposals: Content and Consciousness 2.0. Four Decades After.

Mental Causation

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 22 Sep 2011 12:37:00 +0000

From Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind (Continuum, 2010):

mental causation, denied by EPIPHENOMENALISM, the having of effects, by mental phenomena, on any other phenomena, especially physical phenomena. An example would be the production of a bodily motion (a physical event) as a result of an episode of willing (see WILL, THE). (See also ACTION.) Another would be the causing of one mental state by another in a chain of REASONING. More broadly, mental causation concerns the causes of mental phenomena in addition to their effects. On this broader construal, an example would be the production of a PERCEPTION of an avalanche as a causal consequence of an avalanche. That mental phenomena enter into various causal interactions with one another and with nonmental phenomena is a core idea of many varieties of FUNCTIONALISM. For example, one sort of functionalistic thesis holds that what it is to be a BELIEF, and in particular a belief that tigers have stripes, is to be a state of a subject that has various causal relations to other states of the subject, including other states of belief as well as states of sensory reac- tions to striped tigers and states of intention toward certain kinds of behaviors concerning striped tigers. See also EXPLANATORY EXCLUSION; INTERACTIONISM.

Neurophilosophy bibliography translated into Romanian

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Wed, 21 Sep 2011 15:34:00 +0000

This post goes out to all you HammerHeads who like to read stuff in Romanian. Alexander Ovsov has translated my neurophilosophy bibliography into Romanian. Check it out here: link. See the original here: link.

New philosophy of mind blog

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:19:00 +0000

I've just launched a new blog, This Is Philosophy of Mind. It's a companion blog for a forthcoming book of the same name. Give it a look-see:

http://tipom.blogspot.com/

Chinese room

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 19 Sep 2011 13:50:00 +0000

From Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind (Continuum, 2010):

Chinese room, an argument, due to John Searle, against FUNCTIONALISM as well as certain conceptions of ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. The argument has, as a main component, the following THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: A computer program alleged by functionalists to allow a computer to conduct a conversation in Chinese is rewritten as a set of instructions in English that can be followed by John Searle even though he understands no Chinese. Searle is imagined to sit in a room in which cards with Chinese symbols emerge from one of two slots in the wall. Searle examines each incoming card and, though comprehending no Chinese, consults instructions concerning which appropriate response card should be selected and sent out of the second of the two wall slots. The essence of the Chinese room argument against functionalism is that since Searle can follow the program without understanding Chinese, functionalism is mistaken in its contention that intelligent processes such as understanding Chinese are constituted by program-following.

One noteworthy functionalist response to the Chinese room argument has come to be known as the systems response. According to the systems response, it is not John Searle who is running the program, but a larger system, of which he is a mere proper part, that runs the program. This larger system includes, in addition to John Searle, the cards coming in and out of the slots, and the book that Searle consults when each new card comes in. According to the systems response, no threat is posed to functionalism by the possibility that John Searle can play his part without understanding Chinese. It is the whole system that runs the program and thus, according to the functionalist, the whole system is what understands Chinese.

Searle has countered against the systems response that the cards and the book are irrelevant and that it is possible, at least in theory, for John Searle to memorize the contents of the book (or its functional equivalent) and replace the cards with heard and spoken Chinese utterances. In this imagined sce- nario, John Searle hears a Chinese question and then, though he doesn’t understand Chinese, consults his memory of the rule book, which describes different sounds in terms of their purely auditory, nonsemantic characteristics, and Searle then produces an appropriate sound with his mouth. Now the whole system running the program does not have John Searle as a mere proper part.

Another functionalist response to the Chinese room argument is the robot response. According to the robot response, the system comprising the Chinese room does not adequately satisfy the conditions for SYMBOL GROUNDING and thus no state of the system exhibits the appropriate INTENTIONALITY for understanding Chinese. If, instead, the system comprised by the whole Chinese room and its contents were embedded in a large robot so that it could act as the robot’s brain, the states of the room-system could acquire intentionality in virtue of their relations to the rest of the robot and the robot’s relations to its environment. Such a response emphasizes the importance of embodiment for cognition. See EMBODIED COGNITION.

CFP: Origins of Mind

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Wed, 07 Sep 2011 14:01:00 +0000

Origins of Mind is a forthcoming volume in the Springer Book Series in Biosemiotics. Abstracts (of ~150 words) are solicited by September 15*; formal invitations to contribute to the book will be sent by October 1. The final book manuscript will be sent to Springer in June 2012.

Book précis:
Origins of Mind will address a question that is fundamental to both science and philosophy: how and why did organic mindedness come to exist in the natural world? Researchers in the life and mind sciences will be invited to contribute papers that present or critique either comprehensive theories on the origins of organic mindedness, or accounts of the origins of specific cognitive capacities, e.g., mental representation, meaning-making, language and other forms of symbolic communication, moral behavior, creativity, etc.

*If you already submitted an abstract for the book proposal, you do not need to submit anything at this time. The book’s table of contents will be decided, and formal notification of inclusion in the book will be emailed, by October 1.

--
Liz Stillwaggon Swan, PhD
Hist & Phil of Science Fellow
Center for the Humanities
Oregon State University

http://lizswan.com

Brains: Forthcoming Synthese issue on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 01 Sep 2011 10:47:00 +0000

Brains: Forthcoming Synthese issue on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy

Call for Philosophy Papers SSPP

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 11:07:00 +0000

I'm the philosophy program chair for the 104th annual meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, to be held March 22-24, 2012 in Savannah, GA. SSPP meetings feature concurrent programs in philosophy and psychology, as well as plenary sessions jointly sponsored by the philosophy and psychology program committees. The deadline for all submissions is November 1, 2011.

Invited Speakers:

David Rosenthal (CUNY Graduate Center)

William Bechtel (UC San Diego)

Jesse Prinz (CUNY Graduate Center)

Invited Symposia:

Cognition and the Social: Carrie Figdor, Bryce Huebner, Anthony Chemero

Perplexities of Perception: Brian Keeley, Robert Briscoe, Berit Brogaard

Fictionalism, Falsehood and the Epistemic Value of Truth: Anthony Dardis, Chase Wrenn, Tad Zawidzki

Explaining Consciousness: Richard Brown, Josh Weisberg, Kenneth Williford

The Philosophy Program Committee encourages the submission of papers and symposium proposals. Their selection will be based on quality and relevance to philosophy, psychology, and other sciences of the mind. The aim of the committee is to present as balanced a program as the quality of submissions in each area permits.

Papers: Submissions exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered. Submissions should include a word count and an abstract of no more than 150 words. Self-reference should be deleted to permit blind reviewing; authors should indicate their identity only on the cover letter that accompanies their submission. All papers submitted and presented should employ gender-neutral language. Please submit file as lastname.firstname.doc or lastname.firstname.rtf or lastname.firstname.pdf.

Papers, along with the Abstract Submission Form on the website, should be submitted electronically to:

Dr. Pete Mandik petemandik@gmail.com

Certain papers may be selected for commentary depending on overall programmatic considerations. People who wish to comment on a paper or to chair a session may volunteer by sending a short version of their curriculum vitae directly to the program chairperson at the above address.

Please specify ‘SSPP Submission' in the subject line. If the paper is being submitted in consideration of a Graduate Student Travel Award, please specify ‘SSPP Submisson– GSTA.’ If the paper should be considered for the Griffith prize, please specify ‘SSPP submission - Griffith.’

Further info can be found at the SSPP website and especially in the SSPP August Newsletter.

xphi of zombies

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 22 Aug 2011 18:12:00 +0000

ScienceDirect - Cognition : More dead than dead: Perceptions of persons in the persistent vegetative state:

Patients in persistent vegetative state (PVS) may be biologically alive, but these experiments indicate that people see PVS as a state curiously more dead than dead. Experiment 1 found that PVS patients were perceived to have less mental capacity than the dead. Experiment 2 explained this effect as an outgrowth of afterlife beliefs, and the tendency to focus on the bodies of PVS patients at the expense of their minds. Experiment 3 found that PVS is also perceived as “worse” than death: people deem early death better than being in PVS. These studies suggest that people perceive the minds of PVS patients as less valuable than those of the dead – ironically, this effect is especially robust for those high in religiosity.

Ross on Macpherson on the Senses

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 22 Aug 2011 12:56:00 +0000

From NDPR: Peter Ross reviews Fiona Macpherson's new collection on the senses (a collection containing a piece by my good buddy Brian Keeley).

This collection makes it clear that philosophical issues about the sensory modalities deserve attention. It comprises eleven 'classic' works, eight previously unpublished papers, and a substantial introduction by Macpherson. All of the classic works (with the exception of a selection from Aristotle's De Anima) were published in the past 50 years. Some of these selections -- in particular, De Anima and H. P. Grice's 1962 essay "Some Remarks about the Senses" -- are classic in any context. However, the other classic selections have been underappreciated until recently, when the philosophical literature on sensory modalities started gaining more attention. Together the classic works demonstrate the challenge, complexity, and sheer (philosophical) fun of issues having to do with senses. The previously unpublished papers, most of which originated as invited papers for a 2004 conference titled "Individuating the Senses" at University of Glasgow, largely build on the classic works.

This is Quiet Karate Reflex

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 16 Aug 2011 12:27:00 +0000

Thanks for voting, but we decided to go with "Quiet Karate Reflex." Here we are, playing Aristotelian Eye Jelly:

You can follow us on Google+ (until we get thrown off).

CUNY Kripke Conference

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 13 Aug 2011 16:04:00 +0000

Conference, September 15-16, 2011: Celebrating the publication of Saul A. Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1, Oxford University Press

Click Here for Schedule and Registration Information

new Mandik book forthcoming: This is Philosophy of Mind

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 28 Jul 2011 16:49:00 +0000

I have just received the signed contract for a book project I'm working on for Wiley-Blackwell: This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. The book is part of a forthcoming series of introductory philosophy texts edited by Steven Hales. Distinctive of the series are various planned tie-ins with online resources. I plan on creating a companion blog to go along with the book, which will feature supplemental material.

I hope to have more news on the project in coming weeks. Stay tuned!

[link to proposal]

Mental Colors Published

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 25 Jul 2011 13:42:00 +0000

My paper,"Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars" has been published online at Consciousness and Cognition here:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810011001607

See also: http://petemandik.blogspot.com/2011/06/mental-colors-conceptual-overlap-and.html

Cat and Robot

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 18 Jul 2011 18:14:00 +0000

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Help rename the 8-bit Criminals

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 14:41:00 +0000

Calling all Hammerheads

Dear Hammerheads,

The New York Consciousness Collective spinoff, 8-bit Criminals, is renaming itself. The tiny subset of you who give a shit are hereby invited to help. If you are reading this message in a feed reader or printed on a slip of paper in a bottle that just washed up on your beach, you may need it pointed out to you that there is a poll you can vote in on the right-side column of the Brain Hammer blog. The poll is open until 7/25/2011. Multiple votes are permitted.

Thanks!

Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 11 Jul 2011 19:32:00 +0000

ScienceDirect - Trends in Cognitive Sciences : Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness:

by Hakwan Lau and David Rosenthal

Abstract:

Higher-order theories of consciousness argue that conscious awareness crucially depends on higher-order mental representations that represent oneself as being in particular mental states. These theories have featured prominently in recent debates on conscious awareness. We provide new leverage on these debates by reviewing the empirical evidence in support of the higher-order view. We focus on evidence that distinguishes the higher-order view from its alternatives, such as the first-order, global workspace and recurrent visual processing theories. We defend the higher-order view against several major criticisms, such as prefrontal activity reflects attention but not awareness, and prefrontal lesion does not abolish awareness. Although the higher-order approach originated in philosophical discussions, we show that it is testable and has received substantial empirical support.

double-plus good

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 11 Jul 2011 14:36:00 +0000

Alright, brainy/thinky-type people, let's go plus it up. See you on the other side.

ht: http://fuckyeahdementia.com/

Morgan Freeman saying "The New York Consciousness Collective" and other things

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 07 Jul 2011 14:03:00 +0000

Here are a bunch of mp3s of Morgan Freeman saying stuff like:
"The New York Consciousness Collective," "an elite group of
philosophers," and "trying to understand the nature and limits of
consciousness."
Ganked from Through the Wormhole with Morgan Freeman.

All Together Now by Morgan Freeman Listen on Posterous

The New York Consciousness Collective by Morgan Freeman Listen on Posterous

An Elite Group Of Philosophers by Morgan Freeman Listen on Posterous

Trying To Understand The Nature And Limits Of Consciousness by Morgan Freeman Listen on Posterous

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Philosophy of Cognitive Science at Oxford Bibliographies Online

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 05 Jul 2011 20:28:00 +0000

Mandik, P. (2011). Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. doi: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0019

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary study of the mind loosely united by the idea that the mind is a computer. Philosophy is one of the main contributing disciplines (along with psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, and computer science), and many of its contributions concern the conceptual foundations of the separate disciplines (e.g., psychology and artificial intelligence), explorations of the relations between the disciplines (e.g., is psychology reducible to neuroscience?), and examinations of core uniting ideas (e.g., how best can we understand the idea that the mind is a computer?). Much contemporary philosophy of cognitive science overlaps with contemporary philosophy of mind. The present work tries as much as possible to focus on work peculiar to the philosophy of cognitive science, but the reader is advised to see pertinent work discussed in other Oxford Bibliographies Online articles, especially Metaphysics of Mind and Consciousness.

Gareth Evans

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 05 Jul 2011 13:15:00 +0000

Mandik, Pete. (2005). Gareth Evans. In: The Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers. Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Continuum.

EVANS, Gareth (1946-1980)

Gareth Evans (Michael Gareth Justin Evans) was born in London 12 May 1946 and died in London on 10 August 1980. He was educated at Dulwich College (1961-1962) and later at Oxford, where he was heavily influenced by his teacher, P. F. Strawson. In 1963, Evans won the Gladstone Open Scholarship in History at University College, Oxford. In 1965 he passed his PPE (Philosophy, Politics & Economics) exam prelims with distinction and in 1967 he was first in his class in the PPE finals. He won a Senior Scholarship at Christ Church, Oxford. He won a Kennedy Scholarship in 1968, allowing him to spend academic year 1968-1969 in the United States at Harvard and the University of California, Berkeley. Evans returned to Oxford where he would be a Fellow from 1969 to 1979. In 1979 Evans was elected to the Wilde Readership in Mental Philosophy. On 2 June 1980 Evans was diagnosed with cancer and on 11 June 1980 he was privately married to Antonia Philips in the University College Hospital.

Evans best known work, the posthumously published The Varieties of Reference was an incomplete manuscript at the time of his death and edited by John McDowell. The primary significance of Varieties is for the philosophy of language but it has had significance for the philosophy of mind as well. The varieties referred to in the title are varieties of referring expressions, that is, expressions understood as distinct from predicates and quantificational phrases in virtue of their distinct contributions to the semantic values of sentences. The primary semantic value of a referring expression is its referent, the thing it refers to. Following Frege, some philosophers have argued that referring expressions have a sense in addition to a referent, where a sense is conceived of as the mode of presentation of the referent. According to Evans, the two main varieties of referring expressions are those whose semantic values include Fregean senses and those whose semantic values do not include Fregean senses. Proper names, Evans argued, are referring expressions that lack Fregean senses, since they can be understood without any description being associated with the referent in the mind of the speaker or hearer. Referring expressions that have Fregean senses, according to Evans, include demonstratives (“that book”) and indexicals (“I”, “here”). Additional examples of referring expressions with Fregean senses include expressions Evans called “descriptive names”. According to Evans, descriptive names are names that, unlike proper names, can be understood only if one knows some associated description. Evans thought that descriptive names were rare and that examples included names that were stipulated, as in his example “Let us call whoever invented the zip ‘Julius’” (Varieties p. 31). Evans thought the key feature that distinguished demonstratives and indexicals on the one hand from descriptive names on the other was that demonstratives and indexicals are, in Evans phrase, Russelian. A Russelian expression is an expression that, if it is empty (if it fails to refer) then it is meaningless. However, in holding that demonstratives and indexicals have Fregean senses, Evans incurs the obligation of saying what those senses are. Evans holds, following Perry, that no description can capture the content of a demonstrative or an indexical. However, whereas Perry saw this as an argument against the positing of Fregean senses for demonstratives and indexicals, Evans supplies an account of non-descriptive senses. Evans’s quest for non-descriptive senses for demonstratives and indexicals led him to one of his most central and influential views, namely, that there exists such a thing as non-conceptual content. Non-conceptual contents are mental representational contents that can be grasped by a subject even though that subject lacks the concepts we would employ in attributing that content. For example, the perceptual state of an infant may represent the presence of an object colored with a certain shade of red, say vermillion, even though the infant is insufficiently sophisticated to have a concept of vermillion.

Only 34 at the time of his death, Evans short life gave rise to remarkable philosophical contributions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Varieties of Reference (Oxford, 1982).

The Collected Papers of Gareth Evans. (Oxford, 1985).

Other Relevant Work

Ed., with John McDowell Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (Oxford, 1976).

Chalmers and the New York Consciousness Collective on TV

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 05 Jul 2011 11:22:00 +0000

David Chalmers (http://consc.net/chalmers/) and the New York Consciousness Collective (http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-New-York-Consciousness-Collective/110597088... are featured in this episode of Through the Wormhole with Morgan Freeman (starts around 7:35):

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