Brain Hammer

Philosophy of Space and Time

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 14:21:00 +0000

Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 23 Feb 2013 20:00:00 +0000

Brown, R. (ed.) Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience

Brains: Study of Color Discrimination and Memory

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 23 Feb 2013 19:37:00 +0000

Brains: Study of Color Discrimination and Memory: Study of Color Discrimination and Memory

We are conducting a study of color discrimination and short-term color memory. I would be grateful if you would participate in the study. You'll need to use the left and right arrow keys to adjust the color of a square to fit the color of a second image. It will only take about 5-10 minutes. Click on the link below to begin.
www.synesthesiaresearch.com/study

The Philosophers International Trailer

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 23 Feb 2013 14:13:00 +0000

io9's The Essential Posthuman Science Fiction Reading List

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 28 Jan 2013 22:50:00 +0000

The Essential Posthuman Science Fiction Reading List from i09.com

Foundations of Metacognition // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Wed, 23 Jan 2013 13:44:00 +0000

Foundations of Metacognition // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

Dear Hammerheads: Big Data?

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 12 Jan 2013 21:57:00 +0000

Calling all Hammerheads!

Dear Hammerheads,

Is anyone aware of any philosophical work, especially in phil mind or phil sci, (but whatever) on Big Data?

(http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data)

What's good? Whatchoogot?

Cheers,

Pete

Dennett Tweets

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 12 Jan 2013 00:33:00 +0000

The actual real (pattern) Daniel Dennett is tweeting. Check out his tweets @danieldennett

Mole reviews Prinz's book on consciousness

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Wed, 09 Jan 2013 15:05:00 +0000

The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

Recent philosophy dissertation on conspiracy theories discusses my own work on CTs

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 07 Jan 2013 14:59:00 +0000

Dentith's "In Defense of Conspiracy Theories": https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/2292/17107/whole.pdf Mandik, P. 2007. Shit Happens. Episteme: The Journal of Social Epistemology.4 (2). http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/shit.pdf

Exorcising Action Oriented Representations: Ridding Cognitive Science of its Nazg�l | Daniel D. Hutto - Academia.edu

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 18 Dec 2012 12:09:00 +0000

Exorcising Action Oriented Representations: Ridding Cognitive Science of its Nazg�l | Daniel D. Hutto - Academia.edu

Canadian scientists create a functioning, virtual brain | canada.com

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 10 Dec 2012 14:56:00 +0000

Canadian scientists create a functioning, virtual brain | canada.com:

Chris Eliasmith has spent years contemplating how to build a brain.
He is about to publish a book with instructions, which describes the grey matter’s architecture and how the different components interact.
“Then I thought the only way people are going to believe me is if I demonstrate it,” says the University of Waterloo neuroscientist.
So Eliasmith’s team built Spaun, which was billed Thursday as “the world’s largest simulation of a functioning brain.”

Jamming About the Mind at Qualia Fest - NYTimes.com

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 10 Dec 2012 03:11:00 +0000

Check me out in the New York Times: Jamming About the Mind at Qualia Fest - NYTimes.com

Extraterrestrial Cognition and Sensoria Fiction

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 22 Nov 2012 01:20:00 +0000

Calling all Hammerheads!

Dear Hammerheads,

For a Philosophy & SciFi class I'm piloting spring semester, I'm seeking recommendations of sci fi, preferably short, that depicts either extraterrestrial cognition or extraterrestrial phenomenology.

What's good? Whatchoogot?

Cheers,

Pete

Strawson and Evans Videos on Truth

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 10 Nov 2012 14:10:00 +0000

Oxford philosophers P F Strawson and Gareth Evans talk about Truth, in 1973.

Part 1 of 2:

Part 2 of 2:

Special issue on Embodied Social Cognition

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Fri, 02 Nov 2012 17:31:00 +0000

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Volume 11 Number 4

In this issue:

Introduction to debates on embodied social cognition
Shannon Spaulding

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition
J. Robert Thompson

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanistic alternative to enactivism
Mitchell Herschbach

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance
Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition
Joshua Shepherd

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Embodying the False-Belief Tasks
Michael Wilby

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Dynamic Embodied Cognition
Leon C. de Bruin & Lena Kästner

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Mirror systems and simulation: a neo-empiricist interpretation
John Michael

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Reenactment: an embodied cognition approach to meaning and linguistic content
Sergeiy Sandler

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

Gestural sense-making: hand gestures as intersubjective linguistic enactments
Elena Cuffari

Abstract Full text HTML Full text PDF

cfp: Fifth Online Consciousness Conference

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 15:42:00 +0000

I am pleased to announce the call for papers for the Fifth Online Consciousness Conference, which is scheduled for February 15-March 1, 2013.

Invited talk by Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University

Special Session on Self-Consciousness organized by John Schwenkler, Mount St. Mary’s University. Invited participants include Katja Crone and Joel Smith. This session will also include two submitted talks by graduate students or recent PhDs. If you want your paper to be considered specifically for this special session please indicate so in your submission email.

Papers in any area of consciousness studies are welcome (construed widely so as to include philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, as well as the cognitive sciences) and should be roughly 3,000-4,000 words. Submissions made suitable for blind review should be sent to consciousnessonline@gmail.com by January 5th 2013.

For papers that are accepted, an audio/visual presentation (e.g. narrated powerpoint or video of talk) is strongly encouraged but not required.

Program Committee:
Richard Brown
David Chalmers
Adam Pautz
Susanna Siegel

For more information visit the conference website at http://consciousnessonline.com

Find Consciousness Online on Facebook!

Jerry Fodor interviewed

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 12:22:00 +0000

Jerry Fodor gets the Richard Marshall treatment at 3am Magazine:

http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/words-without-sense-and-other-revolutions/

"JF: I’m increasingly unconvinced that the fuss about consciousness being the `hard problem’ has the stick by the right end. Consciousness is itself an intensional state; you can’t be just conscious tout court; if you are conscious at all, there must be something you are conscious of; and this `of’ is intensional and exhibits the usual substitution ambiguities. This is to say that the familiar claim (see eg. Searle) that materialist theories of intentionality beg the problem of consciousness gets things back to front. Still, even if, as I rather suppose, consciousness turns out to be more or less the same thing as attention, the questions about sensory content (`qualia’ ) have to be faced; but it’s at best unclear that they bear much on theories of cognition."

3d Illustration Of A Large Wood Auction Hammer Hovering Over.. Royalty Free Stock Photo, Pictures, Images And Stock Photography. Image 7696125.

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 14:17:00 +0000

3d illustration of a large wood auction hammer hovering over top of a human brain on a glowing blue background

3d Illustration Of A Large Wood Auction Hammer Hovering Over.. Royalty Free Stock Photo, Pictures, Images And Stock Photography. Image 7696125.

Mindfulness Meditation and Autonomy: A Buddhist Theory of Free Will by Rick Repetti

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Fri, 12 Oct 2012 14:39:00 +0000

Mindfulness Meditation and Autonomy: A Buddhist Theory of Free Will by Rick Repetti:

[T]he 'hard' metaphysical problem of free will may be explained in simple, metaphysically 'easy' causal/functional terms as a product of the mechanics of metacognitive mental causation: There seems to be a causal connection between the extent to which the mind can "go meta-", or loop back in reflectively on its own processes (e.g., think about its thoughts, prefer its desires, etc.), and self-regulation (autonomy, free will), evident in sensory-motor agility, biofeedback, and a host of related phenomena of an equally mundane nature.

The present research explores two new directions to this line of thought: (1) the extent to which mindfulness and other meditation practices increase self-regulation or autonomy, and (2) the extent to which one may develop a cogent version of a Buddhist theory of free will based on these ideas.

Jacob Berger, Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate? | PhilPapers

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 09:30:00 +0000

Jacob Berger, Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate? | PhilPapers:

Mandik (2012) understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik’s arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.

What's Tye's beef with Dennett?

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Sat, 06 Oct 2012 12:30:00 +0000

There's a lot that I like about both Michael Tye's and Daniel Dennett's views on consciousness, so it's a bit of a bummer to read Tye's statements against Dennett in Richard Marshall's recent interview of Tye for 3am magazine. Of Dennett's "Quining Qualia" (one of my all-time favorite papers), Tye says:

...the most charitable way to read him is as holding that experiences themselves are dispositions to believe various things. So, there are no experiences or qualia, conceived of as non-epistemic, non-belief-laden entities. This view seems obviously mistaken...

I don't know, but if it is mistaken it doesn't strike me as obviously so. It also strikes me as significantly similar to Tye's own view. A notion of "poise" plays a key role in Tye's theory of phenomenal character, and I have a hard time reading poise as being anything other than a dispositional property, specifically, a disposition related to belief. Here's Tye describing his own view in the interview:

A mental state has phenomenal character just in case it is appropriately poised (a functional role condition) and it nonconceptually represents a complex of properties.

And:

What representations have to do to get to be experiences, on my view, is that they have to arise at the right level in the information processing. They have to be available to cognitive processes in the right sort of way. They have to be appropriately ‘poised’. Your visual experience of the computer screen before you and its properties is the evidential basis for your belief that there is a computer screen ahead and a whole host of related beliefs.

I'm guessing that Dennett's reaction to that wouldn't be "that's obviously mistaken" but instead "sounds pretty good to me". So what's the rift, here? I'm not seeing it. First-order representationalists about phenomenal character, can't we all get along?

9th International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 04 Oct 2012 10:33:00 +0000

CALL FOR PAPERS

9th International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication

PERCEPTION AND CONCEPTS 16-18 May 2013, Riga, Latvia.

INVITED ORGANIZERS: Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh) and Jesse Prinz (CUNY)

INVITED SPEAKERS include: Ruth Millikan (Connecticut), Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow), David Chalmers (ANU/NYU), Alex Byrne (MIT), Andy Clark (Edinburgh), Diane Pecher (Rotterdam), Ophelia Deroy (London), Rob Goldstone (Indiana), Pierre Jacob (Institut Jean Nicod), Casey O'Callaghan (Rice), Alva Noe (UC, Berkeley)

We will be particularly interested in the following questions. To focus first on concepts, could it be that, when we entertain a concept in thought, we are in fact entertaining and manipulating perceptual representations? Are concepts entirely different from perceptual representations? Does acquiring a concept consist in abstracting a representation from one’s percepts? If not, what is the relation between percepts and concepts? To turn now to perception, can our perceptual experiences be influenced, or penetrated, by one’s concepts and beliefs? If so, what is the exact nature of the influence of higher cognition on perception? Does the content of perceptual experiences depend on which concepts which one has? Can one even perceive without concepts?

Submitted papers should have a maximum of 3000 words and should be accompanied by a 200 words abstract. All submitted papers should be PREPARED FOR BLIND REVIEW, and should be sent electronically with 'Paper Riga 2013' as a subject to: lapointe@mcmaster.ca

DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION IS 15 JANUARY 2013. Authors will be notified in LATE JANUARY 2013.

Symposium proposal:

In addition to individual papers, the scientific committee will be considering proposals for symposia. Symposia should include a minimum of three and a maximum of four contributions. Submissions should be clearly identified with the heading “Symposium proposal” and include:1) The title of the symposium, 2) A brief description of the topic and its relevance to the conference (200 words), 3) The name, affiliation and academic status (student, lecturer, assistant professor, etc.) of each participant, 4) The title of each contribution as well as an extended 500-1000 word abstract. 5) The name, affiliation and academic status of the person who will be chairing the symposium. Symposium proposals should be sent electronically with 'Symposium Riga 2013' as a title to: lapointe@mcmaster.ca

DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION IS 15 JANUARY 2013. Authors will be notified in LATE JANUARY 2013.

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | Research Topics

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Thu, 04 Oct 2012 10:32:00 +0000

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | Research Topics

Examining Subjective Experience: Advances in Neurophenomenology

Hosted By:

Wendy Hasenkamp, Mind and Life Institute, USA

Evan Thompson, University of Toronto, Canada

Deadline for abstract submission: 12 Dec 2012

Deadline for full article submission: 17 Apr 2013

Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Buddhist Thought - Spackman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass - Wiley Online Library

noreply@blogger.com (Pete Mandik) — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 23:51:00 +0000

Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Buddhist Thought - Spackman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass - Wiley Online Library:

AbstractRecent years have seen a growing interest in Buddhist thought as a potential source of alternative conceptions of the nature of the mind and the relation between the mental and the physical. This article considers and assesses three different models of what contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from Buddhist thought. One model, advocated by Alan Wallace, holds that we can learn from Buddhist meditation that both individual consciousness and the physical world itself emerge from a deeper, “primordial” consciousness. A second model, supported by Owen Flanagan, maintains that we should accept from Buddhist thought only what is compatible with physicalism, and thus draws from Buddhism only insights into moral psychology and spirituality. Evan Thompson has developed a third, phenomenological approach, which derives from Buddhism a non-dualistic account of the relation between the mental and the physical, dissolving the “explanatory gap” between them. I suggest that all of these models face significant challenges, and propose a different model derived from the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, which shows the potential to resolve some of the challenges facing contemporary theories of consciousness.