Bullet Wisdom

Sitting Around a Map

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Sun, 19 Apr 2009 13:28:00 +0000

Another crowded, smoke-filled room with forty or so people gathered around another long table with a projector at the end throw up a picture of a map on a too-small screen. From my position, the whiny fan on the aged Canon digital projector obscures the voices coming from the other end of the long, rectangular room.

Today at the command center, many of the provincial players from nearby Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) gathered at our weekly meeting. Normally used to discuss the previous weeks SIGACTS, or Significant Actions, the agenda from this week was to highlight the impact of the ISF ongoing turf wars. Now, these are not turf wars where one group encroaches on the territory of another. The problem here is ISF units in our areas are hesitant to engage outside of their given Area of Responsibility.

The cloud hanging over the table is the assassination of another influential sheik the previous night. The enemy, conveniently dubbed as al Quada, uses a policy to alienate the highly successful Sons of Iraq contracted-militias from ISF and Coalition Forces. The strategy is clear; alienate the people from the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces by attacking a linchpin of Coalition support.

Areas of Operations, or Areas of Responsibility, are pieces of land handed to us by our higher headquarters with the intent of preventing conflicting operations between friendly forces. In a perfect world, all the Areas would bump up against each other to provide maximum coverage to throughout the province. However, this is not a perfect world, and the Areas do not bump up against each other.

As each representative from the Iraqi Army, various Iraqi Police departments, and the National Police go to the map and draw their Areas, it become apparent that there are 1) a lot of overlapping areas and 2) a lot of gaps with no one claiming responsibility. Not surprisingly, the murder of the influential sheik happened in one of these gaps.

Also not surprising, is the use of these areas as enemy safe havens. Overlapping areas of responsibility appear to be in cities and on major highways. The gaps and enemy safe havens appear among rural areas and agricultural communities, well off the beaten path and difficult to access with the Coalition new, larger IED-resistant MRAP vehicles. By looking at reports of enemy activity and traffic through the province, we see that our enemy knows where the gaps are and is exploiting them to his advantage.

This is changing. All the professionals around the table now look at the map and see themselves hamstrung by poorly coordinated lines arbitrarily drawn on a map without much consideration for history or the enemy. The Coalition Force commander quoted Sun Tzu when he called this first step, "seeing ourselves."

Our next step is to take our maps and gaps and identify the enemy, his patterns, and his networks. This is called, "seeing the enemy." This includes sharing intelligence in a country where mishandling your 'source' could get someone killed. That portion will probably prove difficult given the turbulent history of distrust between the different Iraqi Security Force entities. Sharing will be a challenge.

We'll cross that bridge when we get there.

Being There is Easy, Not Being There is Hard

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Fri, 03 Apr 2009 11:56:00 +0000

We sat in a long conference room staring at a projection of our counterparts' planned mission. It was a brigade level sweep of a nearby area, plagues of late by an increase in violence and insurgency. A few weeks back, insurgents targeted and successfully assassinated a local Sheik and his family with a roadside bomb. Two weeks later, gunfire killed his chosen successor. The pattern was clear: assassinate influential Sheiks with ties to the Coalition and the Sons of Iraq. Reestablish a stronghold for the insurgency in a rural area where Coalition Forces rarely travel.

Different interpretations of events followed and different courses of action developed. The Coalition was in the middle of facilitating reconciliation between the area’s three tribes. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Army planned a large-scale operation intending to break the back of an insurgency operating in the area with impunity. The Coalition plan relied on partnership and finesse. The Iraqi Army’s was the proverbial hammer to the nail.

Both plans were good. Tribal reconciliation would address many related problems: governance, security, and infrastructure. A military operation would show insurgents that although the Coalition would not chase them deep into rural areas, the Iraqi Army would. The coalition aimed to gain support to key leaders in the area. The Iraqi Army plan would take support directly to the populace.

It would be best if interested parties synchronized both plans, but they did not. One was to occur with 72 hours of the other. The Iraqi Army’s plan jeopardized the Coalitions hard-won partnerships of the previous five months. Our team made many attempts to bring the sides to a common table to delay the Iraqi mission and synchronize the two efforts, but for a variety of reason, it failed to happen. The Coalition made in clear to our Iraqi counterparts:

This mission jeopardizes the bigger picture. We will not stand in your way, but if you go, this time you go it alone.

Our Iraqi counterparts conducted their final back briefs, rehearsals, lined up their vehicles, and prepared to move out.

So where does that leave our Military Transition Team? We are the advisors to our Iraqi Army counterparts. This week we put hundreds of man-hours into assisting their planning efforts. It was a good plan based on solid intelligence and backed up with many, many arrest warrants. As Combat Advisors we build credibility and rapport by ‘being there.’ Whatever our counterparts plan and execute, we are alongside them throughout.

When they go to fight, we fight alongside them. As Coalition members, we bring and coordinate the ‘force multipliers’ ranging from additional surveillance to attack helicopters to additional U.S. ground forces. Most important, we are also the conduit to Coalition Medical Evacuation, or MEDEVAC, the air evacuation assets and Coalition Force hospitals that provide the countries best chance for the critically wounded. Many Iraqi Soldiers, or “Jundi,” survive horrific battlefield injuries because of Coalition MEDEVAC brought by their Combat Advisors.

As a Soldier and Combat Advisor, I wanted and needed to be there with my Iraqi brothers. As a member of the U.S. Army and Coalition Forces, I understood the bigger picture and advised them against conducting the operation. We were stuck in a hard place between supporting our counterpart’s tactical mission and supporting the Coalition Forces strategic campaign.

In the end, we voted the only remaining way we could, with our presence. Our boss informed his counterpart, an Iraqi General Officer, that when the unit deployed a few short hours later, his combat advisors and all we bring to the table, would not be in his order of march. In this business, we call it the “Silver Bullet,” something you can only fire once.

It was the last option, and not a pretty one. By sending them off alone, we placed at risk all the credibility we built as Combat Advisor by “being there.” It was the best choice among a collection of good options. Sacrificing the credibility and effectiveness of a ten-man team for the overall security and stability of a region is a small price to pay. With that, we went to bed and waited for Iraqi Army to drive off into the night, hoping they all return in one piece.

This job is hard.

Sons of Iraq

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Sun, 22 Feb 2009 13:41:00 +0000

Last week, my team travelled to Tikrit to sit in on a transition meeting between the Iraqi Army, Coalition Forces and contractors representing almost 10,000 Sons of Iraq contractors from our province. On March 1, the process for transition supervision and responsibility for Sons of Iraq (SOI) formally begins in the Salah ah Din province. There are over 2,000 alone in my area, and over the next several months, the Prime Minister ordered all to transition to the employ of either the Ministry of Defense or Interior (Army or Police) or to a position somewhere with the Government of Iraq.

So who are these Sons of Iraq guys? Listening to some, you would believe that a good deal of these individuals where the guys we fought pre-Surge, back in 2005-2006. There is a good deal of truth to that. For young men trying to put food on the table for their family, they based their roles as insurgents almost as much on economic opportunity as they did idealism. Now they are beneficiaries of Iraq’s National Reconciliation Program. Formerly, the insurgents and terrorists were among the few available employers to young Iraqi males.

Enter the Surge and the Sons of Iraq. Part of any decent counterinsurgency, is figuring out how to convince insurgents to lay down their arms and take up jobs. The brilliance of the Sons of Iraq is that now you let them to do both. Hundreds of thousands of Sons of Iraq took their weapons and under the guidance and supervision of Coalition Forces, boldly stepped into their new roles of providing security to the people of Iraq.

Many of them, who were part of the problem, became part of the solution. Together, they provided security coverage far into areas of Iraq where Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Army did not. The fought insurgents bravely, sometimes in spite of themselves, and ultimately many sacrificed their lives in the name of the Iraqi People.

Not all SoI were part of the insurgency that swept across Iraq. Many are hard working Iraqis taking advantage of classic economic theory. We had a demand for security, many of those young men stepped in to fill it. Some came from the other side as part of reconciliation, but most were just looking for jobs.

Back to this week, many were represented in that room in Tikrit. Their sheiks were there to receive a briefing from the Iraqi Division Commander and provincial Governor on the details of the transfer. When they opened the floor to questions, there were many: Complaints of inconsistent pay; unfulfilled promises from Coalition Forces; logistical support; compensation for fallen SoI. The sheiks asked hard questions and unfortunately, there were few answers.

Cameras lined both sides of the meeting room. Interviews conducted after the meeting indicated high degrees of both hope and pessimism. There is no question that the SoI were part of the formula that greatly reduced the violence. Some were argue that they were THE critical part.

The mission now is transitioning them over the Iraqi military control. It will not be easy. Our Iraqi counterparts have difficulty dealing with their own pay and administration. Now we will gradually load thousands of additional SoI and their related issues on the shoulders of the Iraqi Army.

Our counterparts appear to be up to the challenge. In the last week, they worked late into the night to come up with a plan to focuses on integrating control of the Sons of Iraq into our brigade, while emphasizing the treatment of SoI with dignity and respect. The latter is a difficult task, not so long ago many of the IA and SoI were on opposite lines of the counterinsurgency campaign.

Now, the leadership see the SoI as an extension of their operational reach, capable of providing additional security and intelligence to the Iraqi Army. This will be our most important mission over the next several months. So far, all is well. Personally, I want to see all the SoI integrated into their new positions within the Iraqi Security Forces or government employ. Count me in the crowd that does not want to see them cross back over to the other side.

Mending Fences

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Tue, 10 Feb 2009 15:51:00 +0000

The Army is not all Kevlar and testosterone. Over the years I have come to the realization that people, not tanks and helicopters, make the Army go. Of course, it's the same as in the civilian world. You have to work with people in order to accomplish your objectives.

Over the last week, we had two objectives. First, we had to get out into our battle space and find where we fit in the grand scheme of things. Just tackling the weekly rhythm alone was a daunting task. There were meetings scattered all over the calendar and the map.

We quickly realized was that with a small, geographically isolated team you could not get everywhere for every meeting. If we did, we would spend all our time on the road going to meetings rather than performing our primary duty: advising an Iraqi Infantry Brigade.

That process is still ongoing. We're whittling the large list of meetings down to a few. We're figuring out where we need to plug in to maximize our effects. It'll be another couple of weeks, but it should pay off for us in the long run. The important part is trying to find the right forum for connection our Iraqi and Coalition counterparts. That's the key to success and will require additional work.

Our other objective was to get out and work on relationships. Before coming here, we were told that our primary problem would be lack of support from coalition partners In other words, don't bother asking for help because none will come.

The reality we discovered was very different. Coalition units have bent over backwards to provide the support needed for us to execute our mission. The primary difference between what I'll categorize as 'then-and-now' is simply personalities. We've made it a point of emphasis to get out there and shake hands with units throughout our area of operations. Already, the payoff is huge.

It is yet another reminder that an e-mail is never as good as a phone call or a handshake. Oh, and that you get more with sugar than salt.

Election Day

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Sun, 01 Feb 2009 17:47:00 +0000

Yesterday was a great day.

For the past week, out RIP/TOA focused on integrating our new team with our Iraqi counterparts and preparing for the 31 January Provincial Elections. The Iraqi and Coalition Forces managed to exceed all expectations in providing safe voting locations for the Iraqi people to come and practice their freedoms. For weeks in the region, enemy insurgent activity has been on the decline. There were two schools of thought on why.

First, pressure on the insurgents is intense. In the weeks up to the elections Iraqi and Coalition Forces continually applied pressure throughout our region. Coalition patrols and a huge amount of checkpoints run by the Iraqi Army and Sons of Iraq denied insurgents freedom of movement throughout the sector.

Second, most of our experts predicted that the downturn in violence was a tactic by insurgents to save up for large, attention getting strikes against the coalition and populace on election day. It made sense. Given the pressure placed on insurgent by Coalition and Iraqi forces, the natural assumption was that insurgent would be desperate for attention and go for the big election day hit.

What was my team's role in all this? After all, we were only on the ground for one week. This time, we were the observers. We integrated ourselves with our Iraqi counterparts. We checked and double checked their preparations. We coordinated with our Coalition counterparts throughout the region to ensure that everyone was on the same sheet of music.

When election day came, we watched, and we prayed.

Nothing happened. There were reports of a few small incidents regarding celebratory gunfire, but on whole, it was a rather quiet day. As the clock ticked, we bit our lip and held on. Everyone waited by the radio, waiting for a report from a polling station of a monstrous attack. Coalition and Iraqi Quick Reaction Forces stood by, ready to handle the worst.

The worst never came. The Iraqi people again pointed their signature ink-dipped fingers in the air, again showing a sign of victory and defiance. We still hold our breath, waiting for that big, attention-grabbing attack. Waiting for someone to break the quiet. When it comes, our Iraqi counterparts are ready, and we will be there alongside them.

Again, yesterday, was a great day.

RIP/TOA

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Sun, 25 Jan 2009 04:47:00 +0000

Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) is the process where one coalition unit takes the place of another. Over the next several days, each member of the team will spend his time following around his counterpart trying to absorb everything that was accomplished over the last year, as well as the mundane stuff such as admin, reports, etc...

We had an initial dinner with the IA (Iraqi Army) brigade executive officer. It was an informal sit down dinner where both teams had the opportunity to dine at the Iraqi officer's mess. Not all our IA counterparts were present. Mine was currently unavailable so I will have to wait until another time. Their manning is run different than ours. The either live with the unit, or with their family. Because of the danger to them and their family, the two do not mix. They will spend a few weeks living on the base, then quietly slip out to return to their family.

Once we have the systems in place, it will still take quite a bit of time to gain a complete understanding of our new surroundings. The Iraqis place a high degree of value in personal relationships. Relationships take time. Right now the old team enters a room and receives the full embrace from the IA chain of command. Currently, we merit only a handshake. We will earn that trust over time with sweat.

RIP/TOA is not the only thing going on. Lower in priority, we're working through the amenities portion of our new surroundings. Currently I'm in the MWR facility provided by the coalition unit in charge of the FOB. The mess hall they provide, from what I hear, is a huge upgrade. We are currently coordinating to get Internet access into our personal rooms, and there are many options. Unfortunately they are all barely acceptable and expensive. Oh well, you do what you have to do.

So what's coming up? Well, national elections are fast approaching. We plan on being very, very busy.

Training at Taji

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Sun, 18 Jan 2009 03:26:00 +0000

Last week I think we were waiting on a plane ride to Baghdad. Well, the plan arrived and we began our arduous journey north. Actually it was not all that difficult. We flew by C17 from Kuwait to Baghdad International Airport. They packed us into the huge aircraft like sardines. It was truly elbow to elbow with bags stacked everywhere. It was so crowded we were not allowed to get up to use the bathroom in flight. On a positive note, the C17 is a hell of an aircraft. It was a comfortable ride and one could barely feel the landing.

Here's a hint for you future TT deployers: They'll let you have two carry-on's when you leave Kansas, a backpack such as an assault pack plus a laptop bag. They both fit in a wooden box they use a screening. However, The Air Force only lets you have one when you fly from to Baghdad. So make sure your laptop bag, if that's what you plan to use, can hold a bit more than a laptop i.e. about 24 hours of provisions (shave kit, poncho liner, etc). I would suggest a tactical looking laptop backpack and stow the assault pack. Leave Fort Riley with only one bag in hand. The fewer the bags the less the hassle down the road.

From Baghdad, they moved us by helicopter under darkness to Taji. We stacked ourselves and our gear into Chinooks, large dual rotor aircraft, and took off into the darkness. Of course, with helicopters you move with no light and a ton of air flowing through the back so it's always an experience. We waddled off the back of the helicopter and incorporated ourselves into the Phoenix Academy at Taji. Phoenix Academy is where MNC-I trains all the different types of Training Teams coming into Iraq. We are a large class with many different types of teams.

For the most part this is refresher training. Consider it the final cram session before the exam. There are classes on Advising, Security, Arabic, Counterinsurgency, etc... The majority of it is familiar, but most importantly we are getting the information as it relates to what is going on the ground NOW. In case you didn't know, around here, if you left six months ago, you are already obsolete. Timely information is paramount.

National election are coming up rapidly. The new Security Agreement between Iraq and the US is already in effect. The bottom line is things are continuously changing and we have arrived here at a challenging time. Regardless of what you see on the news, or how peaceful you might think things are at the moment, you must always be vigilant, hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. So far, with the personnel we have on our team, I think we have the right combination of optimism tempered by realism and pessimism. That sounds kind of hokey, but we are ready to go. In the next couple of weeks we get through Phoenix Academy and transition with the current team.

Until then.

Waiting on a Plane

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Mon, 12 Jan 2009 06:17:00 +0000

We are back at Camp Buerhing after a few days in the field finishing what I would categorize as refresher. Last Thursday, we loaded up and drove out into the Kuwaiti desert with the intention of pulling into a placed called FOB Scimitar, a location set up by the Army and contractors with the purpose of preparing Soldier, Sailors and Marines for life in Iraq. Because of a few missed turns, what was supposed to be a 45-minute drive to the FOB, ended up around 3 hours with a brief visit to the Kuwait/Iraq border. We were a little more than surprised.

For three days, we conducted refresher training. We spent a day at the range doing Close Quarter Marksmanship. It is always a good day when you can shoot for fun. The next day the team executed a scenario-based mission. The range attached to the FOB was a collection of mini-villages packed with role players complete with moving cars and camels. I was taken aback when we hit the first turning circle (in the Middle East, there are few traffic lights, but many turning circles) and the intersection was packed with villagers, livestock and moving vehicles. Up to now, our training has been unable to replicate those conditions.

Of course, as goes, we ran into our worst-case scenario, or what we would call our 'Kobayashi Maru.' We were hit with a vehicle IED, an angry crowd, and multiple additional explosive devices. In the business, we call this a "complex ambush." This is where the enemy lures you in with an initial strike, takes advantage of the chaos and crowds, and follows up with delayed multiple deadly attacks once you pull together to treat your initial wounded. It is another lesson that with only a ten man team, there is only so much you can do short of returning fire, buckling down and running like hell. Overall, it was a great weekend of training put on by the contractors at MPRI.

Now we wait on a plane. We have today to kill before we find out this evening if when we manifest. It could be tonight, could be three days from now. With our team's luck, we will probably draw the 1 hour notice, 1 a.m. bus ride to the airport. If any of you did not know, whenever there is a better or worse probability for mission, travel, or whatever, it seems like our team gets the worse of the two.

To make up for our misfortune, wait, I should not call it misfortune because more often than not it's more inconvenience than actual hardship. To make up for all the inconvenience, we are blessed with an abundance of talent and experience. I will get more into that in the future, but for now, I will end at that. I hope that next time I write I will be at Taji, Iraq undergoing yet more training.

Until next time

Transitioning Through Kuwait

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Mon, 05 Jan 2009 18:08:00 +0000

Let's see, where are we these days? Currently the team and I are positioned at Camp Buerhing in Kuwait undergoing additional training prior to moving north into Iraq. So far we've completed engagement skills training, weapon sight verification, a small amout of language. Today we received familiarization training on the new MRAP vehicle. I won't try to spell it out, it's big armored troop vehicle and sits well over 10 feet high. Google for more information if you want to know more about the MRAP.

We're still adjusting to the time and region change. Even after a week in country, we find ourselves waking up at all times of the night for various reasons. Sometimes we fall back asleep, sometimes not. A few of the men in the tent are starting to get sick. The main concern is a bug spreading around. That's what you get when you cram 70 Soldiers in close proximity. At best you stay clean, wash your hands constantly, use lots of sanitizer, and hope for the best.

In around a week we'll head up just north of Baghdad to continue our indoctrination training. We look forward to linking up with the team we will replace and moving to our ultimate destination at FOB O'Ryan. There we will conduct what is called a RIP/TOA, or Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority, with the current team to signify our assuming control of the ongoing mission of advising an Iraqi infantry brigade.

With a week of training left here and another 10 or so days of training up north, I think it goes without saying that our team is ready to get the mission underway. We have been training for this assignment since the end of September. Among other things, I think more than anything, the team is lookinig forward to getting a little privacy.

After almost four months of living is rooms full of dudes, we're happy to be moving into a facilities where everyone has their own quarters. They're called CHU's or Container Housing Units; shipping containers converted into portable apartments. They are small but for us they'll be the best thing since sliced bread.

After that we can start to worry about other amenities. I have no idea what kind of communication or internet capability we will have at FOB O'Ryan, but I will make the best whatever is available in order keep everyone informed as we take over the mission.

Until next time.

Long Absence and Transition Team Update

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Wed, 03 Dec 2008 03:39:00 +0000

Another beautiful sunset at the National Training Center. Over the years I've never tired of the Fort Irwin sunsets. Well, it's been almost a month since my last post. Needless to say, lately I've been a horrible blogger. Unfortunately between Facebook and my Combat Advisor education, I keep managing to find other things to do than scroll on my experiences here at Fort Riley. I apologize up front for the recent lack of communication.

In the last month our team made a trip to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin California to participate in a mission rehearsal exercise with a brigade from the 25th Infantry Division. The Brigade Combat Team was participate in an Afghanistan scenario in preparation for a deployment later in 2009. Our team was sent in to give the Brigade an appreciation for what it means to have a team of advisors assigned to their coalition partners.

On the surface, we kind of appear as proverbial pain in the ass. We require more support than we have to offer in return. I hear friends of mine in theater complain about MiTTs unable to proficiently walk the line between their Iraqi counterparts and the local coalition force commander. What I think is missed in all the complaining is the realization the difficulty in finding balance between loyalty and 'going native' is grossly under appreciated.

What I learned at NTC with the Brigade is that you have two commanders with two separate agendas. One represents the future and the eventual ticket home. Increasing his capability and competence is what Counterinsurgency is all about. The other commander represents our personal future and holds the careers of the local Transition Teams in his hand. Obviously we are Americans first and foremost, loyal to the U.S. Army and our chain of command.

Fortunately, I see things getting better. From the Transition Team standpoint, the BCT Commander I met at NTC along with his staff 'gets' what COIN is about. They were intent on working through the local Transition Teams rather than just working them. They sought input from the Transition Team Chief on all matters relating to the host nation military. It was a pleasant surprise and raises my expectations for the upcoming year.

The impromptu relationship between the Transition Team, host nation military, and brigade combat team managed to be productive in a very short time despite new relationships and unfamiliar languages and land. I'm positive that had our teams met up downrange rather than in a training environment that the outcome would have been equally positive.

Well, our time here at Riley is quickly drawing to a close. The upcoming weeks will bring some time off and an eventual plane ride back to Iraq. I'll update as I can.

Weeks 5 & 6 - Equipment and Weapons Training

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 01:39:00 +0000

The training fire hose continues. We moved past the cultural and team indoctrination phase and transitioned into the field phase. The training consisting of communications, combat lifesaver, driver's training, and weapons. Communications entailed the latest on all the possible systems that will be available to the teams in theater. New to me was the capability of the handheld Harris and EMBITTER radios. My only previous experience with handhelds had been unsecured ICON and Motorolas. These represent an impressive jump in capability and will serve the team well.

Combat lifesaver has been upgraded since my last time through. Along with the new first aid kits came extensive tourniquet and tension pneumothorax training. Of course, the rite of passage in all CLS training events is sticking your buddy with an IV, and him sticking you. My partner and I did quite well, both hitting gold on the first stick. Others did not go so well. A few missed sticks is funny. Watching a poor soul get multiple perforations in both arms becomes quite sad.

Last week was a condensed version of range week. In order to get the team ready for NTC, we pushed through M9, M4, M203, M240B, and M2 and all the associated Pre Marksmanship Instruction (PMI) in a week. Most teams spread the training over a couple of weeks, but since we needed to get the training done, we compressed it and got it done in time to line haul our vehicles and equipment for a 10 day trip out to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.

You heard that right. We are deviating from the normal training plan in order to participate in an NTC rotation with a Brigade Combat Team from the 25th Infantry Division. The purpose is twofold. First, expose the BCT to a Military Transition Team and the security and support requirements associated with them. Second, and most important, this give our team the opportunity to roll in the desert under more realistic conditions than Fort Riley and work on out teams Battle Drills and Tactical Standard Operating Procedures. I anticipate the rotation will benefit everyone. I almost feel like I'm going home as I spent 5 rotations at the NTC in the first half of my career.

Weeks 3 & 4 - Language, Cultural Awareness and Counterinsurgency

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Tue, 21 Oct 2008 03:37:00 +0000

For the last couple of weeks, we've been knee deep in classroom instruction. The curriculum here for deploying MiTT members starts with a solid foundation of FM 3-24's take on counterinsurgency. Instructors handed out homework in the form of Galula, Kilcullen, and Petraeus. The important thing to note here is that they're not just teaching this to the senior Non-Commissioned Officers and Field Grades, they're are teaching this to everybody. This includes to all enlisted and company grade officers that come through the training.

The goal is to provide every armed forces member deploying as a Training Team (TT) member a rudimentary knowledge of wide variety of considerations in play in their respective Area of Operations (AO), be it Afghanistan or Iraq. I have seen members here from the Army, Air Force, and Navy. While I get a minor chuckle at the cultural differences between services, the bottom line is that they are departing their traditional roles in order to assist the overall mission. Although, it's still funny watching them work their weapon through a clearing barrel.

Probably the most entertaining classes up to now are the Defense Language Institute (DLI) contracted courses in Iraqi-Arabic. They have done an outstanding job in putting together a talented group of individuals that perform the daunting task of teaching an alien language in what seems like an impossibly short time. They also provide invaluable insight in cultural awareness.

As we finish up this phase of our training we looking forward to the tactical phase. Vehicle, weapons, tactics, movement, and other traditional Soldier training awaits. We get in quality physical training in the morning and the food is nothing to complain about. All in all it's been a good couple of weeks as our team appears to have the right combination of leadership, common sense, talent, and experience.

I look forward to getting this mission underway.

MiTT Week 1 - Lots of New Gear

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Mon, 06 Oct 2008 04:24:00 +0000

I'm always nervous anytime I sign in to a new unit. My degree of apprehension is largely related to my knowledge of the unit and the job. My confidence is high if I am familiar with the installation and the unit mission. To say I was a bit apprehensive about reporting to a new job of which I know very little is an understatement. Like any good Soldier, I began preparing for my Military Transition Team assignment months in advance.

I studied a wide variety of books, both military and civilians. My reading consisted of Field Manuals, Economics, Anthropology, Culture, Leadership, Interpersonal dynamics, etc. I tried not to limit the scope of my research to any one topic, choosing rather a wide variety of materials. I figured the success of my team was dependent on: interpersonal relationships, cultural awareness/anthropology, talent. It could not hurt to expand my education on all three.

Anyway, back to Fort Riley. We received our gear, lots and lots of gear. This is my first time receiving a Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI). All the coolest and latest stuff from body armor to backpacks. Four duffel bags full to be exact. I spent two days in the barracks piecing everything together and I am still not finished. Some stuff I like such as the ACH helmet and the assault pack. Other stuff I'm not a huge fan such as the MOLLE rifleman kit.

Still, it represents the massive investment they've made in equipping Soldiers with better equipment. There is better out there, but it is not like the gear I deployed with back in 2003. When compared to other combat arms units, we deployed with poorly designed gear. Of course, we accepted the fact that the 82nd's and 101st's would always get the latest and greatest. Back then there were haves and have-nots and we accepted that we would be poorly equipped when compared to our divisional counterparts

All Soldiers now deploy with the same RFI. All Soldiers wear the best the Army has to offer. It's nice to see that changed for the better. Of course, the wearing and carrying of all this heavy ass crap will be a different matter.

A New Job and a New Patch

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Wed, 01 Oct 2008 20:09:00 +0000

New assignment, new mission, new patch. Finally after years of bouncing around since my time at Fort Sill, I'm back wearing a bona fide patch. Hello Big Red One. Why isn't the One Red? Don't ask me, I am just a bit stoked that the Leavenworth Lamp is off my shoulder replaced by an insignia with history and tradition.

I am now the Effects and Operations Advisor of a Military Transition Team which will be assigned to an Iraqi Infantry Brigade sometime in January. I anticipate the assignment will be the most challenging in my career, but it also has the potential to be the most rewarding as the Iraqis continue to step up to the table and take charge.

This marks a transition in my blog as I will now focus on detailing the experience of myself and my team.

Hacking Georgia: On Further Review

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Wed, 20 Aug 2008 03:39:00 +0000

I am still in the process of taking some lessons learned from the past week's Russian incursion into Georgia. As with any operation, there was a lot of questionable information floating around the internet. One of the interesting pieces coming from the region was the reports of Denial of Service attacks against websites belonging to government agencies. On the surface, it looked like Russia had deftly managed to combine offensive maneuver operation with the burgeoning concept of Network Attack.

As they say in the NFL, "On further review." First, it appears that the attacks did not appear to originate from government operators, but a group of civilian hackers. According to Shadowserver, a volunteer group that monitors internet hacking activity, the attack linked to a group of servers previously corresponding with hackers known for hacking pornography and gambling websites.

It is important to note that, as with any attack, the ability to pin the rose on any particular group, government or individual is extremely difficult. The attack may originate in Russia, but that does not mean it came from their government. On the other hand, you cannot remove government-sponsored operators from consideration regardless of their own spokespeople.

Do not think that the Georgian hackers are sitting idle while their country takes a pounding. Apparently, they responded, by taking down sites that provided news about the Russian-backed Georgian breakaway province of South Ossetia and in one case replacing the Web site´s content with a news feed from a pro-Georgian service.

Now that the cyber dust is settling, what did we learn? Here is a great PCWorld article by Andreas Antonopoulos. His point: "There were no reports of attacks against critical infrastructure, electronic jamming of stock exchanges, SCADA-hack explosions in substations or anything like that. This was not a battalion of elite army-trained hackers from the Russian Southern Command of Cyber Warfare. In all likelihood it was groups of run-of-the-mill script kiddies with control of a botnet, stroking their egos with the higher cause of injured nationalism."

Personally, I believe the lessons learned lies somewhere in the middle. While the cyber attacks in Georgia proved anything buy decisive, they received considerable attention from an international press fascinated by cyber-warfare. Hackers were able to draw the attention of Georgian officials already decisively engaged by attacking Russian forces. Like it or not, they were a factor albeit not a decisive one.

Nice Job USA

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Mon, 11 Aug 2008 13:16:00 +0000

Jason Lezak charged home in the anchor leg of the 4x100m freestyle relay to outtouch 100m world-record holder Alain Bernard of France. Apparently the French team made it a point to assert the dominance and publicly comment about their superiority in this particular event just prior to the game. The win gives Phelps his second gold of the games and most experts believed this particular event was his only real hurdle to record setting gold.

After the race Bernard clung to the wall, his head down. He was the French swimmer who talked confidently of beating the Americans; "smashing" was his word of choice. Hey, he was the world record holder, and it is good to note that the U.S. has not won this particular event in a few Summer Games. Phelps and co. did not forget.

Way to go Bernard.

Mehdi Army To Stop Carrying Arms?

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Wed, 06 Aug 2008 13:10:00 +0000

According to the BBC a spokesperson for cleric Moqtada Sadr, Salah al-Obeidi, said "his militia will no longer carry weapons, but he stopped short of declaring an end to violence." He also stated that resistance would continue if a timetable for U.S. withdrawal was not set.

The general consensus is that the militia has been seriously weakened in the past year by Iraqi and U.S. forces bent on taking them out of the equation. The organization already announced to reorganize back in June to a more political organization.

What would any self-respecting terrorist organization would do when faced with annihilation? Well, join the political process of course. It's a slick move by the militia. By linking disarmament to a U.S. withdrawal, they place pressure on their own government to get a deal done. Whether or not this move by Sadr's militia impact our own stance on negotiations remains to be seen. In the effects business, we call this good IO (Information Operations).

Put an iPod Touch in your deployment kitbag?

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 01:17:00 +0000

(Note to regular readers: Sorry about the recent lack of posts. We are in the middle of a difficult PCS move so opportunities to update the blog have been few and far between. As I get my family stable I'll get back to my usual writing fare. Today I figured to post something a bit more fun.)

The perfect MP3 player to take downrange would need to be slim, durable, have a lot of flash-based memory, and have some nice additional features like WiFi browsing and some basic productivity applications. You can't take your laptop everywhere and the ability to send your spouse an email from a surprise WiFi hotspot would rock. Could that player be Apple's flagship iPod?

Hell yes. I am posting this from my new WiFi enabled iPod Touch. My wife got a sweet package deal on a Touch packaged with a Macbook. It features 32 Gigabytes of flash memory storage. Flash memory means no moving parts which means no hard drive to break. It also means that with 32 GB you should have no problem holding the largest music collections as long as you do not mind lossy compression algorithms.

Personally I am a fan of lossless codecs like FLAC or Apple Lossless. With a lossless library already stretching over 60 gigs myself, I needed to find an acceptable codec that would meet my audiophile standards while at the same time providing better-than-harddrive reliability.

The Touch appears to be that device, albeit one with a high price for membership. Without rebates, the 32 gigs Touch will set you back $499. Granted, that is a lot to spend on any device just for just a collection of tunes. However, the Touch isn't just an MP3 player. The integrated WiFi and Safari browser allow for the best full page web browsing of any device on the market smaller than a laptop. Great for surprise hot spots, airports, Starbucks, etc...

My entire library compressed down to about 13 gigs using the 192 kpbs MP3 encoding function available in iTunes. (I would challenge anyone to hear a discernable difference between 192 kpbs and lossless using only earbuds.) As for durability, we'll have to find out. Flash based players are generally more durable than their hard drive counterparts. A case is going to be a must, so my first candidate will be the iTouch Defender from Otterbox. Anyway, I'm stoked to have it. Thanks honey!

New GI Bill blows through House with overwhelming majority

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 04:37:00 +0000

Now it's on to the Senate. The final version of the bill attached to the war supplemental adds full WWII-type benefits as well as benefit-transfers to spouses. Huge. The administration had been promising a veto, but with a final count of 416 to 12, the writing apparently was on the wall.

Personally, I'm going to give mine to my wife for Christmas so she can pursue her Masters.

June Practical Shooting Match

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Wed, 18 Jun 2008 16:28:00 +0000

This weekend my father and I went to the monthly USPSA practical shooting match at the Mill Creek Practical Shooting League in DeSoto. Here is the video from the match.

Looking back at early video from February and comparing my performance to the June video, the improvements are there. I'm using the grip technique better and more consistently. I still have the problem of my right thumb holding down the slide release and preventing it from locking back after expending the last roung.

More practice will solve that. I really need to work on my shotgun reloading, but that also will come with time. I did shoot the match with no misses or penalties, something that continued from the last month. Now I need to start getting faster.

Does Defense Spending Matter?

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 13:11:00 +0000

I understand the title of this thread is obtuse, but more and more I hear folks talking about all this money we're going to save by pulling out of Iraq and lowering the national debt. At the bottom there is a link to an excellent, non-partisan presentation that should shed light of how our government spends its money, how we build debt, and how the amount we spend on the War on Terror is going to be irrelevant in the grand scheme of things.

Huh? I do not believe a lot of people understand how we build public debt, where defense spending falls in the grand scheme of discretionary spending, or how defense spending impacts that national debt. The short answer is that it does, but only a little.

The long answer is in 2011 the baby boomers start to draw their retiree benefits from Social Security and Medicare. From there the amount of workers paying into the system drops precipitously and the government starts paying out more in benefits than it is collecting from its workers.

Where does defense spending fit in this? Defense spending is the historical victim anytime our elected officials in Washington want to save money. If we redeployed from the War on Terror today, tomorrow there would be politicians lining up to take the 'peace dividend' from the War and chuck it into other programs, usually anything but Social Security and Medicare. Doing that would completely ignore the upcoming costs of modernization, especially upgrading the Air Force's aging fleet.

Here watch this slide show courtesy our old buddy Ross Perot, it puts everything in painful perspective:

Entitlement Crisis

It's long, but the narrative is excellent. Make sure you stick through to the end and get the 'so what' of the presentation.

The Bullet Debate: Is Bigger Better?

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Sun, 01 Jun 2008 16:46:00 +0000

Since the AP does not have enough to bitch about these days regarding Iraq, they and other news outlets have turned their eyes to they age old debate: Is the 5.56 mm round man enough for the modern battlefield. This is an interesting debate and one that has raged among gun enthusiasts for many, many years.

This all goes back to the 1950s when a bunch of ballistics geniuses decided that "the 7.62 mm round was too powerful for modern service rifles, causing excessive recoil, and that the weight of the ammunition did not allow for enough "firepower" in modern combat." ( Wikipedia). "Firepower" was synonymous with carry-capacity and rate of fire. Simply, a Soldier could should more 5.56 at a higher rate and carry twice as much as opposed to the 7.62.

Giving the 5.56 the lethality edge (at the time) was the round's tendency to yaw and fragment in soft tissue at speeds more than 2,700 ft/s (820 m/s). In layman speak, than means the round is small and fast enough to turn and break apart inside the body.

I can personally testify when this round tumbles, nasty things happen. Up til now the 5.56 had be proudly killing commies and other enemies of the state for over 40 years. What changed? My thesis: shorter barrels and the Internet compromised a round that was a compromise from its inception.

Muzzle velocity (speed) directly correlates to barrel length. The M16 with its 20 inch barrel sported 3,110 ft/s, more than enough to induce the dreaded fragmentation effect. The M4 by comparison with it's 14.5 inch barrel drops the velocity to 2900 ft/s. I am not a firearms expert, but given the high number of reported pass-throughs (where the round goes through the enemy with little or no effect), I contend the decrease make a difference. Not a huge one, mind you, but under the right circumstances to make a difference.

Next point, the Internet. Folks bitched about the 5.56 as long as it's been around. Ask any WWII or Korea vet that hung around for Vietnam what they thought of the 30-06 and 7.62 compared to the 5.56. Well, the Internet gave them a voice. AR-15.com is one of the largest web forums out there. They are vocal and well-read. Their membership includes some of the sharpest ballistics experts in the country. Arguments on bullet size used to be restricted to the club houses of your local shooting range. These experts combined with every-Soldier-a-blogger in combat are making what used to be a rather exclusive private debate among friends into a political issue during an election year.

Enough on the politics, but you get the point. Experts say better aim is the answer, but practical experience dictates that a person inaccurately winged with a 7.62 is more likely to go down that one nicked with a 5.56. Conversely, you better shoot straight with your 7.62 because you can't carry half as much 5.56. Again, it goes back to accuracy.

Other newer rounds are making a case for themselves. Already, Special Operators because of their access to the flexible supply regulations required to get the best Soldiers the best equipment are going downrange with M4 variations based on the 6.8 mm Remington SPC.

From Wikipedia, the 6.8 mm Remington SPC (or 6.8x43mm) is a new rifle cartridge that was developed with collaboration from individual members of US SOCOM. It is midway between the 5.56 and 7.62 in size and velocity with more energy than both. It is particularly adaptable to current 5.56 mm NATO, the cartridge length being relatively equal to the 5.56, the only modification required to the M4 is the upper receiver and barrel. The 6.8 delivers 44% greater energy than the 5.56 mm NATO at 100-200 meters, exactly the type of engagements detracting from the current bullet. The 6.8 does fall short of the 7.62, but maintains the higher carry capacity of the 5.56. (see offset picture, 6.8 on left, 5.56 on right)

The fact that we're having this discussion in public is great. Any discussion that puts better equipment in the hands of Soldiers is fine by me. Personally (if you couldn't already tell), I'm a big fan of the 6.8. Oh, I would also like to see it from a piston-driven AR variant like the FN SCAR, but that is a discussion for another day.

Presidential Candidates Clash on New GI Bill

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Tue, 27 May 2008 23:43:00 +0000

Well, I suppose I have to admit that progress is being made in order to update the venerated GI Bill for our Soldiers. The issue has no come to the forefront of the Presidential race. For the last week, Senators Obama and McCain traded barbs over support for Soldiers via a renovated GI Bill program.

Democrats champion Senator Webbs bill that provides full college scholarships for people who spend three years in the armed forces. Republicans counter saying that the bill is all but an open invitation for massive of talented young Soldiers to leave the military, depriving our nation's military of a critical mass of young Noncommissioned Officers, seen by most as the backbone of our military.

Republicans counter with a bill that boosts benefits in line with how long a veteran had served. Additionaly, the Republican version supports transferrability of GI Bill benefits to spouses and dependants, pretty much making a guarantee that benefits will be used.

Personally, I'm rooting for a combination of the two. I want full college scholarships for Soldiers, but not at the expense of our Noncommissioned Officer corps. I also want to transfer my benefits to my spouse or children, as directed by the President in his last State of the Union. I guess I was asking for too much when I wanted my cake and to eat it, too.

In the end, the more attention given to the problem, the better. Soldiers will no doubt benefit greatly from either version of the bill.

Memorial Day, 26 May 2008

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Mon, 26 May 2008 01:08:00 +0000

"Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends."

John 15:13

Al-Queda in Iraq admitting defeat?

noreply@blogger.com (Ken) — Thu, 22 May 2008 15:39:00 +0000

Probably not in so many words, but they are admitting their difficulties. Courtesy The Two Malcontents, on of Al-Queda's most prolific online supporters posted posted data on on of the premier 'jihadist' websites detailing the steep decline in insurgent operations by 94 percent over the last twelve months. Eighteen months ago, A-Qaeda accounted for 60 percent of Jihadist activity in Iraq. Now they find themselves owning less than 10.

According to the post, the author tallies up and compares the numbers of operations claimed by each insurgent group under four categories: a year and half ago (November 2006), a year ago (May 2007), six months ago (November 2007) and now (May 2008). He demonstrated that while Al-Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq could claim 334 operations in Nov. 06 and 292 in May 07, their violent output dropped to 25 in Nov. 07 and 16 so far in May 08. Keep in mind that these assessments are based on Al-Qaeda’s own numbers.

Disclaimer, I cannot read Arabic so I rely on the expertise of others. So what is the so-what? AQI is getting pasted and knows it. That one of their own felt necessary to post it (if he is one of theirs) is huge.