byallmean(ing)s

KEY EXERCISES - SPEECH ACTS

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Mon, 14 Nov 2011 14:12:00 +0000

HANDOUT DISTRIBUTED IN CLASS ON NOV 10TH

SHEET 2

PRACTICE

(1) If I say to you, "I warn you not to come any closer", do I, by saying so, actually perform the ct of warning you not to come any closer? YES

(2) Does the utterance "I warn you not to come any closer" describe an act of warning by the speaker ? YES

(3) is the utterance "I warn you not to come any closer" a performative utterance? YES

(4) If Sam says to Rachel, "I admit I took 50p from the coffee money" does he, by so saying, actually perform an act of admission? YES

(5) And soes Sam´s utterance describe an act of admission? (YES)

(6) Is "I admit I took 50p from the coffee money" performative? (YES)

(7) If someone says, "I`m trying to get this box open with a screwdriver", does that utterance constitute an act of trying to open a box with a screwdriver? (NO)

(8) Is "I´m trying to get this box open with a screwdriver" performative?
NO, IN THE FIRST MOMENT OF AUSTIN´S THEORY. IN THE SECOND MOMENT, THIS UTTERANCE WOULD BE CONSIDERED ILLOCUTIONARY= ACT OF STATING; DECLARING; AFFIRMING, ETC.

PRACTICE

Are the following utterances performative (P) or constative (C)?

(1) "I name this ship Hibernia" (P) ACT OF NAMING

(2) "I believe in the dictatorship of the Proletariat" (C) IN THE FIRST MOMENT OF AUSTIN´S THEORY. IN THE SECOND MOMENT, THIS UTTERANCE WOULD BE CONSIDERED ILLOCUTIONARY= ACT OF STATING; DECLARING; AFFIRMING, ETC.

(3) "I admit I was hasty" (P) ACT OF ADMISSION

(4) "I think I was wrong" (C) IN THE FIRST MOMENT OF AUSTIN´S THEORY. IN THE SECOND MOMENT, THIS UTTERANCE WOULD BE CONSIDERED ILLOCUTIONARY= ACT OF STATING; DECLARING; AFFIRMING, ETC.

(5) "I hereby inform you that you are sacked" (P)ACT OF INFORMING

(6) "I give you supper every night" (C) IN THE FIRST MOMENT OF AUSTIN´S THEORY. IN THE SECOND MOMENT, THIS UTTERANCE WOULD BE CONSIDERED ILLOCUTIONARY= ACT OF STATING; DECLARING; AFFIRMING, COMPLAINING, CLAIMING ETC.

PRACTICE

Are the following verbs performative verbs, or not (considering the first moment of Austin´s theory, when he tries to maintain the constative X performative distinction).

(1) apologige (YES)

(2) authorize (YES)

(3) argue (NO)

(4) condemn (YES)

(5) squeal (NO)

SHEET 3

PRACTICE: Can hereby be acceptably inserted in the space indicated in the following utterances? YES or NO?

(1) "I (.......) give notice that I will lock these dodors in sixty seconds." YES
(2)"Listeners are (.......) reminded that BBC wireless licences expire on April 4th." YES

(3) "It (....)gives me great pleasure to open this building." NO

(4) "I (....) warn you not to talk to my sister again". YES

(5) "I (....) believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth".

NO (if one considers the first moment of Austin´s theory, when "believe" was not an explicit performative verb.

YES if one considers that "believe" is at the same level as "state", with performative force.

PRACTICE - Indicate whether the following sentences are odd or not odd.

(1) I hereby warn you that you will fail. NOT ODD
(2) They hereby warn her that she will fail. NOT ODD
(3) I hereby promised him that I would be at the station at three o´clock. ODD

(4) The management hereby warn customers that tmistakes in the change cannot be rectified once the customer has left the counter. NOT ODD
(5) Spitting is hereby forbidden. NOT ODD
(6) I hereby sing. ODD

ENTRY TEST

(1) Which of the following acts can be performed through the use of language? Underline your choices (answers are in bold)

kicking, asserting, warning, promising, running, referring, insulting

(2) CORRECT STATEMENT: LETTER "C"

(3) YES

(4) Performative

PRACTICE

(1) Could the utterance "Don´t come a step nearer!" be an act of warning? YES

(2) Could the utterance "Get lost" be an act of dismissing? YES

(3) Could the utterance "Why don´t you try looking in Woolworths? " be an act of making a suggestion? YES

(4) Could the utterance "Do you think I´m an idiot?" be an act of rejecting a suggestion? YES

(5) What act is typically performed by uttering an interrogative sentence?
AN ACT OF ASKING A QUESTION

(6) What act is most typically carried out by an imperative utterance?
AN ACT OF ORDERING SOMEONE TO TO SOMETHING.

AUSTIN - SPEECH ACTS

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Mon, 14 Nov 2011 14:09:00 +0000

SPEECH ACTS – JOHN AUSTIN

 The speech act theory is developed in the field of Philosophy of Language (analytic language philosophy, in the British tradition), in the late 1940s and through the early 1960s.

 Austin (1911-1960) was a leading member in the studies on speech acts. He develops his theory of linguistic action.

 Austin´s main questions were:

“What do we do when we speak?”
“What do we do when we use language?” “What do we do when we say something?”

 Austin takes the speaker (hearer, subject) into account.

 If meaning depends on the use the speaker makes of a linguistic expression, the speaker (the agent who uses language) must be considered.

 The speaker is the subject of a language act.

Austin develops his theory in two moments:

FIRST MOMENT: elaborates the notion of performativity.
 Distinction performative/constative

Performative x constative
 Austin argues that, contrary to what philosophical and grammatical tradition believed, not all declarative sentences are used to make statements.
 Austin recognizes the existence of declarative sentences which are actually used to describe some state of affairs or to state some fact (CONSTATIVES).
 Language also has the ability to inform and produce reference.
 There is a cat on the mat.
 It rains.

 DESCRIPTIVE FALLACY: the view that language is preeminently the tool of constative assertion, that is, a tool primarily interested in providing statements about the world, which are characterizable as either true or false.
 Austin claims that language also produces other types of sentences whose first meaning is not to inform, is to do something.
 He focuses on one group of sentences which he labels PERFORMATIVES, in which the saying of the words constitutes the performing of an action.

Examples:

a. ‘I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’ – as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.

b. ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ – as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.

c. ‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ – as occurring in a will.

d. ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.’

The peculiarity of the performative utterance, in contrast to the constative, is that it does not describe a state of affairs independent of itself, but that it is itself the reality it describes. It is therefore a self-reflexive utterance.

 I do not describe a state of affairs in the real world. Rather I bring a state of affairs into existence by virtue of my utterance.

CONDITIONS FOR HAPPY PERFORMATIVES
(FELICITY CONDITIONS)

In order for the act to take place fully, there are certain conditions which must be taken into account.

The speech act does not depend only on someone´s wish.

 Infelicities (unhappy utterance)

 (A.I) accepted, conventional procedure (certain words; certain people; certain circumstances)
 (A.2) appropriate persons and circumstances
 (B.1) procedures executed by all participants correctly and
 (B.2) completely
 ( 1.) speakers: sincerity/good faith/real feelings
 ( 2.) speakers must act accordingly

(A.1)-(B.2) MISFIRE = the act does not take place
(. 1) - (. 2) ABUSES= the act is achieved (abuse of procedures)

 Promise

 A promise may be void (given in bad faith)

 allow

Austin tries to establish a fixed criterion to make a distinction between constatives and performatives, through a set of constative verbs or expressions.

Performative verbs:
(i) present indicative
(ii) 1st person singular;
(iii) active voice.
I promise.
I allow.

Difficulties for Austin´s theory
1. Austin realizes that there are verbs which are not 1st person singular, but behave as performative verbs.
Go! (act of commanding)

2. There are verbs with performative characteristics, but which are constative.

There is a wasp on your head.
Austin realizes that no criterion is able to accurately include in the performative category only performative verbs and in the constative category only constative verbs.

SECOND MOMENT

AUSTIN CANNOT SUSTAIN THE DISTINCTION PERFORMATIVE x CONSTATIVE

AUSTIN CONCLUDES THAT EVERYTHING IN LANGUAGE IS ACTION.

“What do we do when we speak?”
“What do we do when we use language?” “What do we do when we say something?”
Identify the speaker´s actions when speaking.

LOCUTIONARY ACTS
The door is open.

ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS (central to language)

Promise, allow, congratulate, greet, order, etc.

PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS

If you turn right, I´ll give you a ticket!

(possible effects/ consequences?)

And the constative verbs?
They are illocutionary.
To state
To promise.
I apologize = I am sorry.

GRICE - MEANING, LOGIC AND CONVERSATION

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Sun, 23 Oct 2011 16:56:00 +0000

GRICE

• Grice includes the subject (speaker) in his theory
• Meaning is defined in relation to the speaker´s intention
• Meaning is the locutor´s intention in relation to the interlocutor
• The speaker is aware of his/her own intentions and believes they can be transmitted.
• Language becomes a tool at the speaker´s service to communicate his/her intentions.
•Grice (1957) is concerned with the types of meaning which can be identified in language.

The first distinction made is between natural meaning and nonnatural meaning:

NATURAL MEANING

(1a) "Those spots mean (meant) measles."

"Those spots didn’t mean anything to me, but to the doctor they meant measles."

(1a) Those spots meant measles.
(1b) Those spots meant measles, and he had measles.
(1c) *Those spots meant measles, but he hadn’t got measles.
(1d) Those spots didn’t mean measles, and he didn’t have measles.

In example (1a), the relationship between spots and measles is a natural one; one cannot state this relationship and then deny that it is true (1c).

Both propositions p mean (spots, measles) and q have(x, measles) must have the same truth value for the sentence to make sense (1b & 1d).

In semantic terms, p meant that q entails q.

• These are cases of natural meaning (meaning (n)

• In general terms, natural meaning refers to symptoms, signals or a state of affairs.

“The recent budget means that we shall have a hard year.”

• See that not all the examples of natural meaning refer to events or natural facts – the last one refers to a budget.

• In the case of natural meaning, the link between the signal and the state it indicates DOES NOT depend on agency.

• The relation established between spots e measles is natural: it is not possible to state the existence of a situation and at the same time deny it.

• Grices provides examples of sentences which he classifies as representing cases of nonnatural meaning:

2) (a) Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full.
(b) Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full, and in fact, the bus is full.
(c) Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full, but in fact, the conductor has got it wrong and the bus isn’t full.
In the examples above, the relationship between the ringing of the bell and the bus being full is a nonnatural one.

Essentially, the meaning is conveyed because of a conventional link between that signal and the intended meaning.

There is no natural reason why three rings rather than one or two should convey this meaning, it is simply an accepted fact.

Grice terms this as ‘meaningNN’, and his contention is that much of language is concerned with this type of non-natural meaning.

He uses the following formula to represent this:
“Sentence x meantNN something (on a particular occasion).”

This concept of meaningNN is then taken beyond the level of a particular instance of meaning, and is applied to first sentence-meaning and then speaker-meaning.

This idea is explained in a simplified fashion in this quotation from Grice (1968):

““U meant (nonnaturally) something by uttering x”, [which can be formulated as]

“For some audience A, U intended his utterance of x to produce in A some effect (response) E, by means of A’s recognition of that intention.””

Grice places emphasis on the role of speaker-intention in the process of meaning-recognition.

This is the first step towards his reductive theory of speaker and sentence meaning.
Two stages are proposed:
(1) Speaker-meaningNN is explained in terms of utterer’s intentions.
(2) Sentence-meaningNN is explained in terms of speaker-meaning.

Therefore, Grice has developed a reductive analysis of sentence-meaning in terms of utterer’s intentions.

Let us take each of these stages in turn:

The first stage:
(1) “Speaker A meantNN something by sentence x (on a particular occasion).”

If we take the utterance:

“Terry is a good electrician.”

Grice argues that there are three necessary and sufficient conditions for speaker-meaning:
1. Speaker’s intention that his utterance should induce the belief that ‘Terry is a good electrician’ in his Audience.
2. Speaker intends that the Audience should recognise the intention behind his utterance.
3. Audience’s recognition of Speaker’s intention plays a part in explaining why the Audience should form this belief.

(Fundamental notions: the importance of speaker intention and the concept of language as an active protagonist in the communication of information.)

As a Hearer, I should recognise why you said
something, and any change in my beliefs should come (at least in part) from what is said.

Communication an active process where a Speaker (or Communicator) attempts to convey their belief to the Hearer.

A contrast is drawn between a person showing Mr. A a photograph of Mrs. A and Mr. B being ‘over familiar’ versus a person drawing a picture for Mr. A of the same event.

Drawing a picture shows an intention to convey the information, whereas a photograph could be seen by chance and cause a change of beliefs in Mr. A without input from another interlocutor.

The distinction being made is that in the case of the drawing, it is necessary for the other interactant to create the drawing in order to affect Mr. A’s beliefs. Whereas, in the case of the photograph, the interactant’s role is not strictly necessary – the photograph could be viewed by Mr. A without another person’s involvement.

According to Grice, the important aspect of speaker-meaning can be derived from speaker-intention.
The second stage:
(2) “Sentence x meansNN (timeless) something (that so-and-so).”

For example:
The sentence “Terry is a good electrician” meansNN (timeless) that Terry is a good electrician.

The speaker-meaning which has been identified via speaker-intention can only be said to be that sentence’s sentence-meaning if the elements of that sentence “Terry is a good
electrician” are conventionally associated with the speaker-meaning which has been identified.

In other words, the utterance:

Blue is a fat cat.

only meansNN (timeless) if there is an X, such that X is a cat, such that X is known as Blue, such that X is fat.
Here we are concerned with conventional meaningNN.

- Meaning is not in the signal; it is in the speaker´s intention.

CONVERSATIONAL PRINCIPLE: CO-OPERATION

The idea that conversation proceeds according to a principle, known and applied by all human beings, was first proposed by the philosopher Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation, 1967/1975), who put forward what he described as the co-operative principle.

Grice observed that conversations are governed by a cooperative principle:

“You should make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”.

This implies that you need no and should not supply information which you can assume that your audience already has.

According to this principle, we interpret language on the assumption that its sender is obeying four maxims. These maxims concert what should be said in a conversation and how it should be said.

1. the maxim of quality
2. the maxim of quantity
3. the maxim of relation
4. the maxim of manner

Using this assumption, combined with general knowlwdge of the world, the receiver (interlocutor/hearer) can reason from the literal, semantic meaning of what is said to the pragmatic meaning, and identify what the sender is intending to do with his or her words.

1. the maxim of quality

Be true. Be truthful.
Do not say what you believe to be false.
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence .

2. the maxim of quantity

Make your contribution as informative but not more informative than is required.

3. the maxim of relation

Be relevant.

4. the maxim of manner

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
Avoid ambiguity.
Avoid obscurity.
Be orderly (present the information in an order that is pragmatically adequate for the conversation).

EXAMPLE:
In the case of a neighbour´s utterance:

There is a cat stuck under the gate at number 67.

(i) From my experience of the world, I know that a cat is likely to be very unhappy at being stuck under a gate; that a human is likely to be able to free such cat; that humans generally like to alleviate the suffering of pets;

(ii) From the co-operative principle, I also assumed that my neighbour was telling the truth (there is no evidence that she was lying or playing a practical joke);

(iii) I assumed by neighbour was being relevant.

Taking all this into account, I interpret this utterance as a request for help in freeing the cat.

Pragmatic meaning of the utterance:

Come and free the cat which is stuck under the gate at number 67.

FLOUTING A MAXIM

(A speaker may violate or opt out of a maxim in such a way that the listener can be assumed to understand that this is being done, with the intention of producing different meaning effects and implicatures).
It is important to understand that, in Grice´s concept of meaning, an implicature is what is implicated (implied) as a result of what was said, without being explicitly stated in the words being used in the utterance.

maxim of quality

I have millions of beer bottles in my cellar.
My car breaks down every five minutes.

- not literally true;
- perceived as figures of speech, hyperbole, metaphor, irony, sarcasm (a way of making the speaker´s point more forcefully)
- they have to be interpreted as deliberate floutings (not always the case with children and foreign language learners)

maxim of quantity

We can say more than we need (perhaps to mark a sense of respect in a certain context).

We can often say less than we need (perhaps to be rude or blunt).

maxim of relation

We can flout this maxim to signal embarrassment or a desire to change the subject.

maxim of manner

We can flout this maxim in order to establish solidarity between speakers nd exclude an overhearer from the conversation (lawyers and judges talking to each other; doctors diagnosing patients for medical students in a language which they know the patient will not follow, etc.)

PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Wed, 28 Sep 2011 18:41:00 +0000

Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic, is the branch of logic that studies ways of joining and/or modifying entire propositions, statements or sentences to form more complicated propositions, statements or sentences, as well as the logical relationships and properties that are derived from these methods of combining or altering statements.

In propositional logic, the simplest statements are considered as indivisible units, and hence, propositional logic does not study those logical properties and relations that depend upon parts of statements that are not themselves statements on their own, such as the subject and predicate of a statement.

The most thoroughly researched branch of propositional logic is classical truth-functional propositional logic, which studies logical operators and connectives that are used to produce complex statements whose truth-value depends entirely on the truth-values of the simpler statements making them up, and in which it is assumed that every statement is either true or false and not both.

Joining two simpler propositions with the word "and" is one common way of combining statements. When two statements are joined together with "and", the complex statement formed by them is true if and only if both the component statements are true. Because of this, an argument of the following form is logically valid:

Paris is the capital of France and Paris has a population of over two million.
Therefore, Paris has a population of over two million.

Propositional logic largely involves studying logical connectives such as the words "and" and "or" and the rules determining the truth-values of the propositions they are used to join, as well as what these rules mean for the validity of arguments, and such logical relationships between statements as being consistent or inconsistent with one another.

Propositional logic also studies way of modifying statements, such as the addition of the word "not" that is used to change an affirmative statement into a negative statement. Here, the fundamental logical principle involved is that if a given affirmative statement is true, the negation of that statement is false, and if a given affirmative statement is false, the negation of that statement is true.

Pelé is the king of soccer. [True]
p

NEGATION: It´s not the case that Pelé is the king of soccer.
~p: False

It is not the case that Steve Wonder is not a singer.
~(~p)
~(F)
T
Conclusion: Steve Wonder is a singer.

Propositional logic can be thought of as primarily the study of logical operators. A logical operator is any word or phrase used either to modify one statement to make a different statement, or join multiple statements together to form a more complicated statement. In English, words such as "and", "or", "not", "if ... then...", "because", and "necessarily", are all operators.

A logical operator is said to be truth-functional if the truth-values (the truth or falsity, etc.) of the statements it is used to construct always depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the statements from which they are constructed.

The English words "and", "or" and "not" are (at least arguably) truth-functional, because a compound statement joined together with the word "and" is true if both the statements so joined are true, and false if either or both are false, a compound statement joined together with the word "or" is true if at least one of the joined statements is true, and false if both joined statements are false (Thus, the logical statement ``It is raining or the sun is shining '' means it is raining, or the sun is shining or it is raining and the sun is shining.
), and the negation of a statement is true if and only if the statement negated is false.

More must be said about the meaning or semantics of the logical operators '&', 'v', '→', '↔', and '¬'.

These are used in place of the English words, 'and', 'or', 'if... then...', 'if and only if', and 'not', respectively.

However, the correspondence is really only rough, because the operators of PL are considered to be entirely truth-functional, whereas their English counterparts are not always used truth-functionally.
Consider, for example, the following statements:
(1) If Bob Dole is president of the United States in 2004, then the president of the United States in 2004 is a member of the Republican party.

(2) If Al Gore is president of the United States in 2004, then the president of the United States in 2004 is a member of the Republican party.

For those familiar with American politics, it is tempting to regard the English sentence (1) as true, but to regard (2) as false, since Dole is a Republican but Gore is not. But notice that in both cases, the simple statement in the "if" part of the "if... then..." statement is false, and the simple statement in the "then" part of the statement is true. This shows that the English operator "if... then..." is not fully truth-functional. However, all the operators of language PL are entirely truth-functional, so the sign '→', though similar in many ways to the English "if... then..." is not in all ways the same.

CHAPTER 7 - KREIDLER, C. W. Introducing English Semantics. London: Routledge, 2004.

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Fri, 26 Aug 2011 20:43:00 +0000

KEY TO PRACTICES 7.1; 7.2; 7.3; 7,4; 7.5; 7.6

CHAPTER 7 - KREIDLER, C. W. Introducing English Semantics. London: Routledge, 2004.

PRACTICE 7.1 Prototypes (P.134)

The extension of bird includes robins, eagles, hawks, parrots, ducks, geese, ostriches and penguins. What is the intension? What do all the referents of bird have in common and which is not shared by non-birds? Which of these—robins, eagles, etc.— seem to you to be closer to a prototype and which farther away?
Will all speakers of English agree about this?

A PROTOTYPE CORRESPONDS TO THE IMAGE/REPRESENTATION A SPEAKER HAS OF A CERTAIN REFERENT. THIS REPRESENTATION VARIES AMONG DIFFERENT SPEAKERS.

Distinctions that we take for granted often turn out to have fuzzy boundaries when we try to explain the difference. We might say, for example, that the difference between a tree and a bush is a matter of size, but a tall bush can be bigger than a tree, and in any case a bonsai tree and a sapling are smaller than any bushes.

PRACTICE 7.2 Intension and extension (P. 134)

How do the lexemes in these pairs differ in their intension

SHOE , MORE GENERIC (INTENSION: an outer covering for the human foot, typically having a thick or stiff sole with an attached heel and an upper part of lighter material (as leather, for example).

SLIPPER (EXTENSION OF SHOE) : a light low-cut shoe that is easily slipped on the foot. A TYPE OF SHOE

CUP, MORE GENERIC (INTENSION: A DRINKING VESSEL, USUALLY OPEN BOWL-SHAPED DRINKING VESSEL (VESSEL= A CONTAINER – A CASK, BOTTLE, KETTLE, CUP, BOWL FOR HOLDING SOMETHING, USUALLY SOME LIQUID

MUG (EXTENSION OF CUP)= A CYLINDRICAL DRINKING CUP = A TYPE OF CUP)

VEGETABLE, MORE GENERIC= INTENTION: plant: a usually herbaceous plant (as the cabbage, bean or potato) grown for an edible part that is usually eaten as part of a meal.

FRUT (EXTENSION OF VEGETABLE) = a product of plant growth (as grains, vegetables, or cotton. Edible reproductive body of a seed plant, especially one having a sweet pulp associated with the seed.

DOOR (MORE GENETIC) INTENSION: A PASSAGE/;DOORWAY: a usually swinging or sliding barrier by which an entry is closed of opened, also a similar pArt of a piece of furniture.

GATE: (EXTENSION OF DOOR) an opening in a wall of fence; a means of entrance or exit; a movable barrier; an area for departure or arrival at an airport, etc.

PRACTICE 7.3 Concrete and abstract (P. 138)

The following occur in expressions with concrete reference and in expressions that have abstract reference. For each noun give an example of each kind of reference. Is there also a difference of countability?

beauty curiosity kindness
novelty personality representation

BEAUTY

NON-COUNTABLE/ABSTRACT

[qualities and characteristics]
She was enchanted by the beauty of the scenery.
A woman of great beauty.

COUNTABLE

[sb or sth beautiful]
He was impressed by the beauties of our city.
His girlfriend is a real beauty.

CURIOSITY

NON-COUNTABLE/ABSTRACT

[strong desire to know sth]
There was curiosity [PEOPLE WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT THE RESEARCH] about my research plan.

COUNTABLE/CONCRETE

[a strange or rare object]
The dress she wears is quite a curiosity.

KINDNESS

NON-COUNTABLE/ABSTRACT

[the quality of being kind]
She shows kindness to animals.

COUNTABLE

[a kind action]
I think it would be a kindness [A FAVOR] to help her with the paper.

NOVELTY

NON-COUNTABLE/ABSTRACT

[the quality of being new/clever]

He represents novelty at the department.

COUNTABLE/CONCRETE

[sth new, unusual,interesting]
Sing/plural

Christmas novelties. [PRODUCTS]
A novelty to spend my holidays abroad.

PERSONALITY

COUNTABLE AND NON-COUNTABLE

same contexts (The character of a person; people well-known to the public)

He has A strong personality.
I would love to meet TV personalities.

REPRESENTATION

NON-COUNTABLE

[the act of representing or state of being represented]

She appeared in court without representation.

COUNTABLE/CONCRETE

They made representations [OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS] against the faculty authorities.

PRACTICE 7.4 Countable and non-countable (P.139)

Which of the following are countable nouns and which are noncountable? Do any belong to both categories?

beer [COUNTABLE AND NON-COUNTABLE]

copper [ALMOST ALWAYS NON-COUNTABLE. COUNTABLE ONLY IN BRITISH ENGLISH TO REFER TO COINS OF LOW VALUE “COPPERS”, OLD USE.

dust: NON-COUNTABLE

equipment: NON-COUNTABLE

glue: NON-COUNTABLE (I need some glue, a tube of glue) or COUNTABLE: (I have found good quality glues at this shop.)

livestock (gado): NON-COUNTABLE

piano: VARIABLE: COUNTABLE OR NON-COUNTABLE (I´m learning to play the piano).

Wire: VARIABLE: COUNTABLE OR NON-COUNTABLE (the telephone wire(s)

PRACTICE 7.5 Specific reference (P. 142)
Which of the underlined expressions have specific reference and which do not?

1 Somebody telephoned and left a message for you. SPECIFIC, IF I HAVE THE PERSON IN MIND, AND CONSIDERING THIS SOMEBODY LEFT A MESSAGE IDENFIFYING HIMSELF/HERSELF.

2 I hope somebody will tidy up this file cabinet. NOT SPECIFIC

3 The last person to leave the office should lock the door. NOT SPECIFIC.

4 A stitch in time saves nine. NOT SPECIFIC

5 Evans sometimes forgets to keep his eye on the ball. SPECIFIC

PRACTICE 7.6 Anaphora (P. 151)

What do the underlined words refer to?

1 Pete promised me a souvenir from Paris but I never got it. SOUVENIR

2 Pete promised me a souvenir from Paris but I never got one. SOUVENIR

3 Frances asked Shirley to lend her some money. FRANCES

4 Frances promised Shirley to lend her some money. SHIRLEY

5 The police arrested several demonstrators because they were destroying property. DEMONSTRATORS

6 The police arrested several demonstrators because they felt the demonstration was getting violent. THE POLICE = PLURAL

FOURTH CLASS - AUG 25

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Fri, 26 Aug 2011 20:29:00 +0000

SUGGESTED ANSWERS

PRACTICE – GROUP ACTIVITY IN CLASS

QUESTION 1

Consider the following utterance, and answer the questions:

If anyone makes too much noise, you have my permission to strangle him.

a) Could the hearer be expected to identify the referent of him?
b) Is him semantically definite?

ANSWER:

a) No, as it has a generic value (anyone).
b) No. This pronoun agrees with “anyone”, but one could use “him/her” or “them”

QUESTION 2

Consider the following situation, and answer the questions:

I am working in the garden, and accidentally stick a fork through my foot. I tell my wife, who knows I have been gardening and knows the fork I have been working with.

a) Which would be the more appropriate utterance (to my wife) in this situation? Justify your answer.

(i) “I´ve just stuck the fork through my foot”
(ii) “I´ve just stuck a fork through my foot”

b) Find a context for the answer you did not choose in (a).

ANSWER:

a) I´ve just stuck the fork through my foot.
The definite article “the” is appropriate, as the wife most certainly knew which fork her husband referred to.

b) If we consider the utterance “b” (“a fork”) produced when consulting a doctor, after the accident.

QUESTION 3

The cat I had as a child is long since dead and cremated, so that that particular cat now no longer exists.

a) Is it possible to refer in conversation to the cat I had as a child? YES

b) Does it follow that the extension of the predicate cat includes the cat I had as a child, which now no longer exists? YES. Although the cat is dead, when it was alive, it belonged to the class of cats.

QUESTION 4

Consider the following excerpt, from John Fowle´s novel The Collector and answer the questions:

When she was home from her boarding-school I used to see her almost every day sometimes, because their house was right opposite the Town Hall Annexe. She and her younger sister used to go in and out a lot, often with young men, which of course I didn´t like.

a) Could the hearer be expected to identify the referent of she?

ANSWER: YES, ALTHOUGH HER NAME IS NOT MENTIONED.

b) What effect is probably produced on the reader by the mentioning of their house?

ANSWER

A TECHINIQUE USED IN NARRATIVES TO CREATE AN EFFECT OF INFORMATION ALREADY GIVEN, TO ATTRACT THE READER QUICKLY INTO THE PLOT.

QUESTION 5

Consider the following utterances. Find context for each one of them:

a) Do you remember when we met at the university, five years ago?
b) Do you remember when we met at a university, five years ago?
c) Shall we go into the house now?
d) Shall we go into a house now?

ANSWER

A) The interlocutors entered the same university five years ago, where they were students.
B) The interlocutors met at a university building, not necessarily as students at the mentioned institution.
C) The interlocutors intend to enter a particular house, belonging to either or both of them.
D) The interlocutors are about to enter a place which does not belong to them, so as to do something (depending on the context you choose!).

QUESTION 6

Consider an anecdote by Mark Twain and explain how the speaker (narrator) reaches his conclusion:

I married a widow who had an adult daughter. My father then married this daughter. Later on, we all had children. By looking at the babies, I got crazy, because I realized I was my own grandfather.

QUESTION ANSWERED IN CLASS. THE SPEAKER IS HIS OWN GRANDFATHER ONLY IF WE CONSIDER LEGAL CONNECTIONS (“IN LAW” RELATIONSHIPS).

QUESTION 7

Consider the following utterance and explain what it means:

Paul turned over the field.

ANSWER:

a) The speaker changed direction or the field (off the road, for example).
b) The speaker is a pilot turning an airplane.
c) The speaker is a ploughman.
d) Other possibilities taking into account the meaning of the verb “turn over”.

QUESTION 8

Consider the following pairs of sentences. In each case, say whether there are any circumstances of which one member of the pair could be true and other false (assuming in each case that the same name refers to the same person).

a) John gave Mary a book.
b) Mary was given a book by John.
c) Bob took out the garbage.
d) Bo b took the garbage out.
e) Tessa loves Tony.
f) Tony loves Tessa.

ANSWER: Sentences “a” and “b” are paraphrases of each other.
Sentences “c” and “d” are paraphrases of each other.
Sentences “e” and “f”: both could be true or false; “e” could be true and “f” false; “e” could be false and “f” could be true.

QUESTION 9

Do the words pavement (British English) and sidewalk (American English) have the same sense?

ANSWER: YES, THEY ARE USED TO REFER TO THE SAME ENTITY IN THE WORLD, IN TWO DIFFERENT VARIETIES OF ENGLISH.

QUESTION 10

Is the following statement correct or incorrect?

Whether a sentence contains any referring expressions or not depends on the time and place at which the sentence occurs.

ANSWER:

THE STATEMENT IS INCORRECT. IN ORDER TO MAKE IT CORRECT, WE SHOULD REPLACE THE WORD “SENTENCE” BY THE WORD “UTTERANCE”.

QUESTION 11

Have you ever been involved in a conversation with someone over an apparently factual matter, only to discover that some particularly crucial word in the conversation had a different meaning for the other person? Give an example.

IN THIS CASE, EACH ONE WOULD HAVE THEIR OWN EXAMPLES, CONSIDERING THEIR LIFE EXPERIENCE…

QUESTION 12

How could the following dialogue be interpreted?

A: My neighbor´s child is an adult.
B: You mean he was a child and is now grown up?
A: No. He is still a child, even though he´s an adult.

How are the words “child” and “adult” related in terms of meaning in this particular situation ?

ANSWER:

Speaker “A” probably means that the neighbor´s child behaves like an adult. The expression “even though” is a hint in this case.

QUESTION 13

Analyse the words “mean” and “meant” in the following utterance. Do they indicate sense or reference?

“I´m sorry to have disturbed you – when I say “Will you move your chair?”, I didn´t mean you, I meant Patrick here.”

ANSWER:

THEY INDICATE “REFERENCE”, SPECIFIC PEOPLE IN THE WORLD IN THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT.

QUESTION 14

Consider the following sentence and classify it according to what it means:

John is simultaneously a man and not a human being.

ANSWER:

THIS IS A CASE OF CONTRADICTION. A MAN CANNOT BE AT THE SAME TIME A MAN AND NOT A MAN, IF WE CONSIDER THAT “A MAN” IS INCLUDED IN THE CONCEPT OF “HUMAN BEING”.
FIGURATIVELY, THE SENTENCE CAN ALSO HAVE RELEVANT MEANING.

QUESTION 15

Is the phrase old men and women ambiguous? if yes, explain why.

ANSWER : YES, IT IS AMBIGUOUS : IT COULD MEAN “OLD MEN AND OLD WOMEN’; “WOMEN AND OLD MEN”

QUESTION 16

Say whether the sentences below are cases of ANOMALY. If yes, explain why.

1. Jack´s courage chewed the bone.
2. James sliced the idea.

ANSWER :

IN TERMS OF SENSE IN THE LANGUAGE, IF THE SENTENCES ARE TAKEN TO THE LETTER (LITERALLY), THEY ARE ANOMALOUS. HOWEVER, IF CONSIDERED IN A FIGURATIVE SENSE, THEY CAN BE PART OF COMMUNICATIVE CONTEXTS. (1) MEANS THAT JACK IS A BRAVE PERSON, READY TO FACE CHALLENGES. (2) JAMES IS PROBABLY FOCUSING ON SPECIF ASPECTS OF AN IDEA.
QUESTION 17

Consider the following utterance:

I am as old as myself.

What do “I” and “myself” refer to in this case?

ANSWER: THESE WORDS REFER TO THE SAME SPEAKER (THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UTTERANCE), PROBABLY UTTERED IN A CONTEXT IN WHICH THE PERSON DOES NOT WISH TO REVEAL HIS/HER AGE.

QUESTION 18

What are the referring expressions in the sentences:

Bob opened the door with a key.
Seymour sliced the salami with a knife.

ANSWER:

“BOB”; “THE DOOR”, “A KEY”
“SEYMOUR”, “THE SALAMI”; “A KNIFE”

KEY TO REFERENCE EXERCISES- AUG 25

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Fri, 26 Aug 2011 20:02:00 +0000

EXERCISES

1. Circle the referring expressions in the following utterance:
“Neil Armstrong was the first man on the Moon and became a hero.”

2. Who does “I” refer to in the following utterance?
“I will never speak to you again.”

ANSWER: “I” REFERS TO THE SPEAKER OF THE UTTERANCE (THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UTTERANCE)

3. When Ben says “I´ve lost the contract”, the word I refers to BEN.
When Penny says “I´ll send you another one”, the I here refers to PENNY.

4. If a television news reporter, speaking in Fresno, California, says, “This town was shaken by a major earth tremor at 5 a.m. today”, what does this town refer to?

ANSWER: FRESNO

5. In general, what clue to the identity of the referent of a referring expression is given by the inclusion of the demonstrative word this?

IT PRECEDS A NOUN PHRASE. A REFERRING EXPRESSION MODIFIED BY “THIS” REFERS TO AN ENTITY (PLACE, PERSON, THING) AT OR NEAR THE ACTUAL PLACE OF THE UTTERANCE IN WHICH IT IS USED.

6. If, on November 3rd 2005, I say, “Everything seemed to go wrong yesterday”, what day am I picking out by the word yesterday?

2nd of November

7. If, on May 4th 2004, my sister says to me, “Yesterday wasn´t my birthday”, what day is being picked out by the word yesterday?

MAY 3RD

8. To summarize in a general statement, what does yesterday refer to?

ANSWER: “YESTERDAY” REFERS TO THE DAY BEFORE THE ONE THE UTTERANCE IS PRODUCED. IT IS A DEICTIC (A WORD WHICH TAKES SOME ELEMENT OF ITS MEANING FROM THE SITUATION OF THE UTTERANCE IN WHICH IT IS USED (PRONOUNS, HERE, THERE, TODAY, YESTERDAY, ETC.)

These exercises show that the words this and yesterday are deitic. Deitic terms (such as you, here and today, or modifiers which can be used with referring expressions, like the demonstrative this) help the hearer to identify the referent of a referring expression through its spatial or temporal relationship with the situation of utterance.

EXERCISES - REFERENCE

1. Imagine that you and I are in a room with a man and a woman, and, making no visual signal of any sort, I say to you, “The man stole my wallet”. In this situation, how would you know the referent of the subject referring expression?

FROM THE CONTEXTM AS THERE IS ONLY ONE MAN BEING REFERRED TO.

2. If in the situation described above I had said, “A man stole my wallet”, would you automatically know the referent of the subject expression a man?
NO, IT COULD BE REFERRING TO A SITATION OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT.

3. So does the definite article, the, prompt the hearer to (try to) identify the referent of a referring expression?

YES, AS IT WOULD INDICATE ONLY ONE ITEM.

4. Does the indefinite article, a, prompt the hearer to (try to) identify the referent of a referring expression?
NO.

5. Is the phrase the man who is in the corner a referring expression?

YES, THE HEAD OF THE NOUN PHRASE IS “MAN”.

6. Does the phrase in the corner help to identify the referent of the referring expression in (5) above?

YES, AS THEE COULD BE OTHER MEN AROUND AT THE TIME OF SPEAKING.

7. In The whale is the largest mammal (interpreted in the most usual way) does the whale pick out some particular object in the world (a whale)?

NOT ONE IN PARTICULAR, BUT A SET OF ANIMALS CLASSIFIED AS WHALES.

8. Is the whale here a referring expression?
YES, A GENERIC REFERENCE.

9. Is That whale over there is a mammal a generic expression?
NO, AS IT IS SPECIFYING THE ANIMAL.

10. Are these generic sentences?

a) Gentlemen prefer blondes. YES

b) A wasp makes its nest in a hole in a tree. YES

c) A wasp has just stung me on the neck. NO

We reproduce below a passage from Alice in Wonderland. Pick out by underlining all the expressions which clearly refer to something the reader is supposed to be aware of at the point in the passage where they occur, i.e. all the expressions referring to things which must be assumed to be already present in the context of the passage. You should find 15 such definite expressions altogether.

There was a table set out under a tree in front of the house, and the March Hare and the Hatter were having tea at it; a Dormouse was sitting between them, fast asleep, and the other two were using it as a cushion, resting their elbows on it, and talking over its head. “Very uncomfortable for the dormouse”, thought Alice; “only, as it´s asleep, I suppose it doesn´t mind.”

1. the house
2. the March Hare
3. the Hatter
4. it (table, anaphoric)
5. them (the March Hare and the Hatter)
6. the other two
7. it (the Dormouse)
8. their elbows
9. it (the first Dormouse)
10. its head (the first Dormouse´s head)
11. the dormouse
12. Alice (the story – already known)
13. it (the Dormouse)
14. I (Alice)
15. it (dormouse)

1) The word it occurs 5 times in this passage. To which different things does it refer?
Table, the Dormouse

2) Is there ever any doubt in this passage about the referent of any occurrence of it?
No.

3) Who does them in line 3 refer to?

The March Hare and The Hatter.

THIRD CLASS - 18 Aug

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Wed, 24 Aug 2011 23:06:00 +0000

SENSE AND REFERENCE IN FREGE
- for Frege there are two levels of semantic significance: sense and reference, and sense is primary;
- Frege makes a distinction between sense and reference;
- The concept of sense is essential for the concept of reference;
- Frege excludes from Semantics individual representations a certain word can provoke.

IDENTITY RELATIONS

a=a and a=b

Only when one states a=b one is acquiring KNOWLEDGE

A table is a table a=a

This piece of furniture is a table a=b

- How can we explain the difference between a=a and a=b (not a common sense explanation)?

- In order for each expression to have a reference, it must go through a sense.

- Mode of presentation: the mode of presentation of the reference a=b is differente from a=a

(1) The morning star is the morning star a=a
(2) The morning star is the evening star a=b

There are two different senses (meanings) to realize the same reference
Sense: mode through which an expression leads to a reference.

The morning star has a sense and the referent is Venus, the planet.

The evening star has a sense and the referent is also Venus, the planet.

- Two ways to arrive at the same reference.

- We learn that we can refer to the planet Venus in at least two different ways.

- In Frege sense is not simply the object in the world.

- Sense is related to the emaning of an expression and it is not the object (referent).

- Sense is the mode of presentations that language has on an object.

- The question of meaning is a question of language.

- An expression can have a sense without having a referent:

There is a unicorn running outside.- Sense does not guarantee reference.

SECOND CLASS 11 Aug

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Wed, 17 Aug 2011 12:07:00 +0000

Ten aspects of any speaker´s semantic knowledge:

1. Speakers know whether a sentence is meaningful.

Anomalous – anomality

2. Speakers know when two sentences have essentially the same meaning or not.

Paraphrase (sentences 2a and 2c; 2b and 2d are paraphrases of each other). Sentences make equivalent statements about the same entities.

3. Speakers know when two words have the same sense in a given context.

They are synonyms. They are instances of synonymy; they are synonymous with each other.

4. Speakers know when the meaning of one sentence contradicts another sentence.

Sentences that make opposite statements about the same subject are contradictory.

5. Words may have opposite meanings in a given context.

Two words that make opposite statements about the same subject are antonyms; they are antonymous; they are instances of antonomy.

6. In each of the groups of words, 6a and 6b, all but one of the words have something in common.
The common element of meaning shared by all but one item in 6a and 6b is a semantic feature.

7. Sentences may have double meaning.

A sentence that has two meanings is ambiguous- an example of ambiguity.

8. Speakers know how language is used when people interact.
When a question and an answer, or any two utterances, can go together in a conversation and the second is obviously related to the first, they constitute an adjacency pair.

9. Speakers are aware that two statements may be related in such a way that if one is true, the other must also be true.
These pairs of sentences are examples of entailment.
Assuming that 9a and 9b are about the same garden, the truth of 9a entails the truth ob 9b (if 9a is true, 9b must also be true).

10. Speakers know that the message conveyed in one sentence may presuppose other pieces of knowledge. If 10a is accepted as true, 10b-10-e must also be accepted as true. The meaning of sentence 10a presupposes what is expressed in 10b, c, d, and e. The latter are presuppositions of 10a.

Note that a presupposition does not establish the truth of anything.

Sentence 10a is meaningful as it is, but it is true only if there is a person named Andy Murfee, who works and owns a Datsun, etc. The sentence is presented as if there is a person named Andy Murfee.

These ten terms have been introduced to show the latent knowledge that people have about their language.

Reading for Aug 11

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Sun, 07 Aug 2011 18:18:00 +0000

Reading assignment for Aug 11: Chapter 7 , "Reference"

From the book: KREIDLER, C. W. Introducing English Semantics. London: Routledge, 2004

A copy of the text can be found at Xerox - Dona Lúcia

FIRST CLASS Aug 04 2011

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Sun, 07 Aug 2011 18:07:00 +0000

FIRST CLASS Aug 04 2011

STRUCTURAL SEMANTICS

a) Saussurean structuralism
b) F. de Saussure: generally regarded as the founder of modern structural linguistics
c) Movement initiated by his Cours de Linguistique Générale

What is the central idea of structuralism?

Every language is a unique relational structure, or system, and that the units which we identify in analysing the sentence of a particular language (sounds, words, meanings, etc.) derive both their essence and their existence from their relationship with other units in the same language-system.

We identify both the units and their interrelations.

a) Phonology, or sound-system of English.

b) The word “pit” consists of three segments in written and spoken English (letters and phonemes)

c) Continuous burst of sound, classified by the phonetician in units

d) Every pronunciation of the word-form “pit” is different from every other pronunciation of the same word-form by different speakers and by the same speaker in different occasions.

e) But there is a constancy which underlies this diversity of physical manifestation. The structuralist will say that it is an identity of patterns or structure.

f) Every acceptable pronunciation of pit is kept distinct from every acceptable pronunciation of bit, fit, kit

g) We say there is a p-phoneme, a b-phoneme, an f-phoneme in English because pit, bit, fit and cop, cob, cough, etc. operate as distinct forms in English, with different meanings.

h) A phoneme is an abstract construct, the locus of functional contrasts and equivalences holding among sets of forms. We say there is a p-phoneme and a b-phoneme because there is a relationship of functional contrast between pairs of forms.

The Saussurean dichotomies

i) Distinction of langue (language-system) and parole (language-behaviour)

LANGUE

a) a code
b) social
c) psychological, stored in the brain of every member of the language-community
d) changes slowly

PAROLE

a) coded message
b) individual
c) physical and psychological aspects
d) ephemeral

(ii) Substance and form(or structure)

Substance (“marble sculpture”). The marble, as substance, is potentially many things; it becomes one thing rather than another by the imposition of one structure. For Saussure, languages result from the imposition of structure on two kinds of substance: sound and thought.

a) Paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships

Syntagmatic:

‘the old man’ (internal structure Article+Adjective+Noun)

Paradigmatic: (units are replaced in the syntagm)
the old man
young woman
tall boy

b) Synchronic and diachronic investigation of languages

Synchronic: investigation of the language as it is, or was, at a certain time

Diachronic: the study of changes in the language between two given points in time

Meaning in Saussure: external element, excluded, not part of the langue

Three exclusions:

a) Subject (individual, parole)
b) object (representation of the object, not the object itself, no reference)
c) history (relations inside the system only)

.................................................................................

Semantics: generally defined as the study of meaningWhat is the meaning of ‘meaning’ ?

(i) What is the meaning of ‘sesquipedalian’?

(ii) I did not mean to hurt you.

(iii) He never says what he means.

(iv) She rarely means what she says.

(v) Life without faith has no meaning.

(vi) What do you mean by the word ‘concept’ ?

(vii) He means well, but he´s rather clumsy.

(viii) Fame and riches mean nothing to the true scholar.

(ix) Dark clouds mean rain.

(x) It was John I meant not Harry.

• The meaning of words and sentences depends on the use to which language is put in communicative situations.

• Natural languages: capacity for referring to, or describing, themselves (reflexivity)

...................................................................................

UTTERANCE- Énonciation/énoncé
- Enunciação/enunciado

UTTERANCE-ACT ( enunciação)
UTTERANCE-SIGNAL (enunciado)

An utterance may consist of a single word, a single phrase, a single sentence, a sequence of sentences, one or more grammatically incomplete sentence-fragments.

SENTENCE
- convention of punctuation and capitals
- system-sentence: a sequence of words, grammatically complete

TEXT

Any connected passage of discourse, whether it is spoken or written and whether it is a conversation or a monologue.

PROPOSITION

Propositions are expressed by sentences and may be either true or false.

A proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence when that sentence is uttered to make a statement. The function of a declarative sentence is to make a statement.

TÓPICOS DE SEMÂNTICA - COURSE DESCRIPTION

noreply@blogger.com (Deusa) — Tue, 02 Aug 2011 17:18:00 +0000

UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO
FACULDADE DE FILOSOFIA, LETRAS E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS
Departamento de Letras Modernas
Estudos Lingüísticos e Literários em Inglês

Disciplina: Tópicos de Semântica
Semestre: 2o. / 2011
Turma: Matutino e noturno
Professora Dra Deusa Maria de Souza Pinheiro Passos
Email: deusa@usp.br, deusasouza@gmail.com

TÓPICOS DE SEMÃNTICA

CONTENT

The following topics will be covered during the course:

(i) Meaning of meaning: sentence, utterance, text
(ii) Structural semantics
(iii) Reference, sense and denotation
(iv) Meaning and truth
(v) Meaning and intentionality
(vi) Speech acts

METHODOLOGY

Lectures, discussion of theoretical assumptions, workshops.

ASSESSMENT

Students will be assessed on the following basis:

(i) Students are expected to complete reading and writing assignments. Completion of the assignments includes the ability to discuss the reading in class and write about the reading in and out of class.
(ii) Students´ knowledge and interpretation of the readings and lectures will be assessed by written tests and written activities.
(iii) Oral assignment (optional);

Bibliography

AUSTIN, J.L. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1962.
BENVENISTE, E. Problemas de Lingüística Geral I. (Tradução de Maria da Glória e Maria Luiza Neri. Título Original: Problèmes de Linguistique Générale). Campinas, SP: Pontes: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Campinas
COOLIN, F. & GULDMANN, F. Meaning, use and truth – introducing the Philosophy of Language. GB: Ashgate, 2005.
COOK, G. Discourse. Oxford University Press, 1989.
FREGE, Gottlob. (1978) “Sobre o sentido e a referência”. In: Lógica e Filosofia da Linguagem. São Paulo: Cultrix. P.59-86(1892a) “Sobre o Conceito e o Objeto” Lógica e Filosofia da Linguagem. (Tradução de Paulo Alcoforado) São Paulo: Cultrix, Ed. Da Universidade de São Paulo, 1978.
GRICE, H. P. (1957) “Meaning”. In: Philosophical Review, 67.
______________ “Lógica e conversação”. In: Dascal (org.) (1982) vol 4.
GRICE, H. P. (1957) “Meaning”. In: Steingberg, E. & L. Jakobovits. Semantics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
GUIMARÂES, E. Os Limites do Sentido - Um Estudo Histórico e Enunciativo da Linguagem. Campinas, SP: Pontes, 1995.
HURFORD, J. & Heasley, B. Semantis, a coursebook. Cambridge: C.U.P, 1983
KREIDLER, C. W. Introducing English Semantics. London: Routledge, 2004.
LYONS, J. Semantics. Vol. 1 & 2. Cambridge University Press, 1979.
LYONS, J. Introdução à Lingüística Teórica.(Trad. De Rosa V. Mattos e Silva e Hélio Pimentel. Tít. Original: Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics). Sào Paulo: Ed. Nacional; Ed. Universidade de São Paulo, 1979.
SAUSSURRE, F. Curso de Lingüística Geral. São Paulo: Cultrix, 1969
SEARLE, J.R. Speech Acts. London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969.