Workers are now rightly wondering what comes next as the full weight of new American tariffs are imposed on $27.6 billion of CUSMA-compliant goods on top of existing duties of 10 per cent to 50 per cent on autos, steel, aluminum, copper, lumber and their derivative products.

Nearly 90,000 additional jobs across Canada are on the line in sectors from agriculture and dairy to electronics, construction and industrial inputs—along with all of the services that support Canadian manufacturing and food production.

The retaliatory tariffs announced on August 25, 2026 will also create their own measure of economic uncertainty and challenge. The counter-tariffs are designed to offer some measure of protection to the same industries hit hard by Section 232 and 338 tariffs by attempting to price American competitors out of the market—but this won’t shield every business.

At the same time, the higher cost of key inputs that can’t easily be sourced in Canada may negatively impact other businesses that are struggling to keep afloat, raising the prospect of additional layoffs.

The solid economic growth Canada posted this spring will almost certainly slow this fall.

What’s on offer

A key question at this point is whether the $7.5 billion support package for workers and businesses, announced by the federal government alongside counter-tariffs, offers sufficient protection to weather the coming storm.  

For workers, the package builds on the temporary EI measures introduced last year. This includes extending the suspension of the one-week waiting period for benefits, extending the 20 extra weeks of support for certain “long-tenured workers” by another eight months, and encouraging uptake of a new Workforce Retention and Retraining Program that combines the existing EI Work-Sharing Program and Worker Retention Grant to help employers hang onto skilled staff.

The program’s goal is to support “work-sharing flexibilities” while providing employers with funding of up to $1,000 per participant to help offset training and administrative costs—to better position firms for the future. The maximum duration of the work-sharing program will be expanded to 150 weeks and the requirements for recovery plans relaxed. Workers’ schedules—as few as two working days a week—may be approved.

For businesses, beginning in September, the government will increase funding for the Regional Tariff Response Initiative by $1.5 billion. Delivered through Canada’s Regional Development Agencies, the program is intended to help small- and medium-sized employers (SMEs) respond to tariff pressures, adapt their operations and address liquidity challenges.

There is also a new $500-million liquidity stream, under the Business Development Bank of Canada’s Pivot to Grow program, aimed at helping SMEs manage immediate cash-flow pressures, along with targeted programs for the forestry, steel and aluminum sectors. The minimum revenue threshold to access BDC tariff-related programs will be lowered to from $2 million to $1 million.

There are improved terms for the $10 billion Large Enterprise Tariff Loan facility as well, and a new $2 billion Canada Strong Diversification Fund available to medium-sized companies in tariff-impacted companies with shovel-ready projects.

A counter-tariff exemption framework is expected to be announced shortly to assist businesses that can’t source U.S. inputs domestically or from another country, or where the counter-tariffs might generate severe impacts on selected Canadian industries (as we saw with the walk back of seafood retaliatory tariffs on August 27).  

Does the federal package measure up?

As my colleagues, Stuart Trew and Marc Lee, wrote last week, the consequences of the rejected deal would have fundamentally undermined our economic capacity and our political sovereignty, entrenching our status as a vasal state. In rightly rejecting this ruinous course, workers and communities deserve a fulsome response.

While the federal government has moved quickly, the measures on offer only tinker at the margins. The extension of EI programs is important, but very narrow in scope, certainly not equal to the task of protecting Canadians in this moment of crisis.

The COVID-19 pandemic graphically revealed the EI’s sizable gaps—forcing the government to bring in entirely new programs through the Canada Revenue Agency to offset massive earnings loss.

Instead of finally fixing the well-documented problems in the years following, the government settled on doing nothing. It did not address the high eligibility threshold that effectively screens out thousands upon thousands of workers (less than four in 10 unemployed workers access EI benefits today). It did not improve the very low earnings replacement rate (only 55 per cent) or introduce a minimum benefit.

Nor did it improve the provisions for selected “long-term workers” introduced last year and now extended, which exclude the vast majority of unemployed. The new work-sharing programs and funds to assist and retrain displaced workers are useful—but these efforts need to be massively scaled up (there are only 266 work-sharing agreements currently in place!!).

Likewise, the narrow focus on manufacturing is hugely problematic. As the economic impacts reverberate through the economy, many more workers will need sustained support. This is critical if Canada wants to strengthen its domestic market to replace dependence on U.S. trade. We urgently need an EI system for the 21st century, not a series of temporary fixes.

An additional word to the federal government: Stop laying off workers. Pursuing austerity at this moment is a massive own-goal—not only in terms of the state’s capacity to deliver critical public services, but as an economic stabilizer during difficult times.

And what of business?

Small- and medium-sized businesses are also worried about the rescue package weighted towards loans and employers with larger payrolls. Trump’s latest 50 per cent tariff is focused largely on goods manufactured and shipped by smaller firms. Businesses with $1 million in revenues are eligible to apply, but this threshold will still exclude most small businesses, according to business groups.

Other firms will be deterred from taking on more debt—not an appealing prospect for those still digging out from COVID-related debt and facing an uncertain future thanks to tariffs.

The government has signalled that it will respond quickly on remissions and is keen to assist businesses diversify their supply chains and client base. It remains to be seen how this will play out, whether more support will be forthcoming.  

The Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS) program delivered crucial support to business, accounting for 60 per cent—or $97 billion—of all federal pandemic spending. But it was also poorly targeted: millions of dollars flowed to large or profitable companies that used the cash to boost profits, buy back shares, or pay out executive bonuses and dividends.We can’t forget the lessons of COVID in our urgency to respond to this crisis.

Private profit over public interest

The immediate challenge is to address short-term effects of this assault, but it raises fundamental questions about where we are going: what is the government’s vision not only on the future of CUSMA but the Canadian economy as a whole?

Prime Minister Mark Carney declared at the January 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos that this moment represents “a rupture, not a transition” in the international rules-based order. Yet in Canada, there’s been no shift in the government’s commitment to neoliberalism that has delivered stagnant wages, skyrocketing levels of income inequality and public sector austerity over the past 30+ years.

The federal government will host sovereign wealth funds and large private equity firms around the world next month. In its quest to finance its agenda, public assets like airports, ports, toll roads, power grids, and water systems are rumoured to be on the table. In our efforts to disentangle ourselves from the rapacious grasp of the U.S. government, we seem to be leaping from one frying pan into another.   

Confronting American aggression, Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood argued last year, “cannot be met using the same laissez-faire approaches that got us into this mess. Canada-U.S. integration is, after all, the product of a half-century of free trade, deregulation and privatization. By giving capital free rein, unhindered by borders and emboldened by the erosion of taxation and regulatory regimes, governments have facilitated the concentration of economic power into the hands of multinational corporations with no loyalty to Canada or concern for the public interest.”

As we work toward the next federal budget—with an estimated $7 billion in new tariff revenue in hand—we need a comprehensive plan that takes back control of our economic future not only from an imperialist United States but from financial elites that have no loyalty to Canada or its people.

This starts with prioritizing the needs of workers and communities from the coming storm.

The post Standing up to Trump requires standing up for workers appeared first on CCPA.

From leader to laggard: Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the federal government took an active and growing role in funding post-secondary education in Canada. At one point, the federal government was a solid funding partner, splitting the costs of post-secondary education with provincial governments. From the mid-1980s onward, but especially in the 1990s, the federal government greatly reduced its role as funder, instead leading a gradual process of government defunding that continues today.

Per student funding: In 1955, total federal funding was worth $1,580 per full-time student. By 1967, those payments had risen to $5,470 per student. When federal transfer to provinces started the next year, total federal funding immediately jumped to $8,530 per student. Federal funding continued to grow, hitting an all-time high of $11,170 per student in 1978. By 2024, it had fallen to just $5,610 per student, just half of the historic peak. Most of the decline was driven by cuts to federal cash transfers to provincial governments, while federal funding for research has long been stagnant once inflation and enrollment are accounted for.

A preventable crisis: As government funding collapsed, universities and colleges made up the difference by aggressively maximizing student fee revenue. Average student fee revenue per student grew from just $3,140 in 1990 to $12,890 by 2024. Most growth has come from international students, causing a massive increase in their tuition fees. With the loss of international student fee revenue due to federal restrictions, post-secondary education institutions are being hit hard with mass layoffs, program closures, and the shuttering of campuses. It was an inevitable result of government underfunding combined with growing overreliance on revenue from international students and could have been prevented with adequate government funding.

Funding fell far behind economic growth: Federal funding has declined relative to the government’s rising financial capacities and Canada’s growing economy. At a high point in 1984, federal funding represented 0.67 per cent of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP). By 2024 it had fallen to just 0.34 per cent of GDP. In the early 1970s, federal post-secondary education funding represented over 3.5 per cent of all federal government spending. In 2024, it had fallen to just 1.9 per cent of total federal spending.

Today, Canada’s universities and colleges face a financial crisis of a far greater magnitude than the one that prompted the federal government to step in as a funder in the first place. To avoid the long-term decline of Canada’s universities and colleges, the federal government must demonstrate leadership in post-secondary education, as it did once before.

Introduction

Canada’s universities and colleges have been shaken by a severe financial crisis, triggered by the loss of international student fee revenue. Across the country, post-secondary education institutions are being hit hard with mass layoffs, program closures, and the shuttering of entire campuses.

The federal government of Canada bears significant, but often underappreciated, responsibility for this situation. First, by leading generations of government defunding of post-secondary education systems, while encouraging and enabling the turn to student fee-based funding models. Then by abruptly cutting the number of international study permits issued in 2024 and following up with further cuts the next year, without any plan for dealing with the inevitable revenue crisis that would follow.

Canada’s federal government once played a more positive leadership and funding role, which was essential to the creation of the country’s modern higher-education systems. For a brief time, the federal government prioritized higher education as in the national interest, establishing itself as an active funding partner to the provinces. Since the late 1970s, it has vacated that role, leading the long retreat from government funding.

Despite its diminished role, the federal government remains the actor with the greatest financial capabilities to support post-secondary systems across the country. It is difficult to imagine a renaissance of public post-secondary funding in Canada without the federal government becoming a credible funding partner to provincial governments once again. It must summon the political will to begin that process immediately.

The rise and fall of federal post-secondary funding

The federal government once embraced an important role as a funder

The federal government’s role in post-secondary education was forged in the first financial crisis in Canadian higher education. Prior to the 1950s, before post-secondary systems had matured into their modern form, the federal government had little part to play in the sector.

In the aftermath of World War II, the federal government provided educational subsidies to returning veterans, covering tuition fees and the cost of living, allowing mass numbers of working-class people to enrol at universities, which had previously been the near exclusive domain of the elite.

Universities struggled to serve the massively expanding student population. A financial crisis loomed, as described in the 1949 report of the Massey Commission, which named rising operating costs, insufficient government funding, and over-reliance on student fees as threats to the viability of the system: “Our universities are facing a financial crisis so grave as to threaten their future usefulness.”

The report called for swift intervention, recommending that the federal government step in to prevent a national crisis. In the following year, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent declared the financial health of universities to be in the national interest and established a formal system of federal funding for universities.

From 1951 to 1966, the federal government made payments to universities themselves, using the National Council of Canadian Universities—the precursor to today’s Universities Canada—as an intermediary to distribute the funds as operating grants. This arrangement helped to keep universities afloat, but eventually proved untenable, viewed by some provinces, particularly Quebec, as an infringement on their constitutional authority over education.

By the mid-1960s, it was becoming clear that the significant funding increases needed to keep up with expected enrolment growth would soon outstrip the financial capabilities of provincial governments. In 1965, Prime Minister Lester Pearson stated that the government “accepts the federal responsibility” of assisting the provinces with rising post-secondary costs, “in order that the opportunities for higher education should be adequately improved for all Canadians, in all parts of the country.”   

In 1968, the federal government stopped grants to institutions and began making transfer payments to provincial governments to support their post-secondary spending. Such transfers are the most meaningful tool the federal government has to exert positive leadership on higher-education funding.

Some of this transfer was provided in the form of federal tax abatement that allowed provinces to raise more tax revenue, while the rest was a cash payment. Experts have debated the extent to which the tax transfer counts as a federal contribution. This analysis focuses only on the cash payments.

Federal direct funding continued after 1968, but in a different form. From that point until today, most direct funding exists as grants, contributions and contracts to support the research activities of institutions and individual scholars. Direct funding also contains a much smaller capital funding component to support investment in post-secondary infrastructure like buildings, laboratories and specialized equipment.

Figure 1 shows federal government post-secondary funding, adjusted for inflation and full-time enrolment, from 1955 to 1978, broken down into direct funding to institutions and transfer payments to provincial governments. All funding amounts herein are net of spending on student financial aid, so funding for systems only. All dollar amounts are inflation adjusted to 2025 dollars unless indicated otherwise.

In 1955, total funding was worth $1,580 per full-time student, which was entirely direct funding to institutions. By 1967, those payments had risen to $5,470 per student. When federal transfer to provinces started the next year, total federal funding immediately jumped to $8,530 per student.

Despite losing ground to very high inflation in the mid-1970s, federal funding rebounded to hit an all-time high of $11,170 per student in 1978. The total amount of federal funding grew massively, from $162 million in 1955 to over $6.4 billion by 1978. Most of that increase was due to transfer payments, which had grown from $1.6 billion in 1968 to $5 billion a decade later.

Federal post-secondary funding has collapsed over time

The tide began to turn with the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, which the federal government responded to with harsh austerity measures, curbing growth of spending on public services. From that point, the federal government began a long, gradual retreat as a funder, a path it still walks today.

Growth of post-secondary transfers was capped at 15 per cent a year in 1972, a rate that would seem extremely generous by current standards. In 1977, growth of transfers was pegged to the rate of economic growth. Total federal funding continued to rise into the early 1980s, although at a much slower pace.

In 1984, federal transfers ($6.1 billion) and direct funding ($1.9 billion) were worth $8 billion. In 2024, transfers ($5.1 billion) and direct funding ($5.3 billion) totalled $10.4 billion. A funding increase of $2.4 billion over 40 years fell vastly short of what was needed to keep up with both inflation and growing student populations.

From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, successive governments enacted a series of austerity measures that began to hollow out federal transfers. The Chrétien government’s 1995 federal budget delivered a brutal blow, instituting a short-lived, controversial reorganization of the transfer system that resulted in the post-secondary transfer being cut from $5.2 billion in 1995 to just $3.4 billion by 1998. It would not reach $5 billion in real terms again until 2017.

Figure 2 displays federal funding, on a real and per full-time student basis, from the historical high in 1978 to 2024. A clear pattern emerges: collapsing transfers and stagnant direct funding. Total federal funding fell from $11,170 in 1978 to $5,610 per student by 2024, just half of what it was at the highest point. Most of the decline was driven by cuts to transfers, which dropped from $8,860 per-student in 1978 to just $2,760 in 2024.

Once enrolment and inflation are accounted for, direct funding, mostly for research activities, has been mostly stagnant over the recent history of Canadian post-secondary education. It amounted to $2,300 per student in 1978 and $2,800 in 2024, an increase of only $500 over 46 years.

Transfers: The hidden link between federal and provincial funding

Using transfer payments, the federal government has a strong influence on the direction of provincial post-secondary funding. In provincial budgets, post-secondary spending is usually treated as though it comes entirely from provincial governments. However, a portion of that spending is financed by a federal cash transfer. This means provincial government spending on post-secondary education can be broken down into two parts, by the source of money: cash from a federal transfer and the province’s own revenues.

For instance, if a provincial government reported $100 of post-secondary education spending in its annual budget and the federal government provided a post-secondary transfer of $20, it would only amount to $100 of total funding, rather than $120. In this example, the federal transfer finances 20 per cent of the total, while the remaining amount comes from the province’s own revenues, net of the transfer amount.

Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has typically not reported the post-secondary transfer amount, though it can be estimated from existing information. Nor do provincial governments report how much of their spending on the sector has been financed by the federal government. As a result, the federal role in funding post-secondary education tends to be obscured.

When the transfer system was designed to support and incentivize increased provincial funding, the provinces played their part and increased spending. As the transfer system was remade to restrain spending growth, federal and provincial spending predictably began a phase of long-term decline.

In the post-war years, the provinces prioritized post-secondary education on their own accord. From 1955 to 1967, provincial government funding more than tripled, from just $4,850 to over $16,000 per student. There were no significant federal post-secondary transfers to provinces at the time, so they were committing only their own revenues in response to a rising tide of mass enrolment.

Despite high levels of provincial investment, it was not enough to keep up with the rapid expansion of the size and scope of university and college education systems. In 1968, the federal government established the system of transfers to provinces, entering a funding partnership with provincial governments on a cost-sharing basis.

Under this arrangement, the amount of federal transfers was tied directly to the costs of post-secondary education institutions. The federal government would provide provinces 50 cents for each dollar spent on approved operating expenditures at universities and colleges, or $15 per capita, whichever was greater.

Supported by federal transfers after 1968, provincial government spending immediately increased by over $5,000 per student and began to climb even higher, hitting a historic high of $27,200 per student in 1978. Figure 3 shows how much of the $11,130 increase in provincial post-secondary education spending can be attributed to federal cash transfers versus the part funded only by the provinces’ own revenue.

Over the course of the cost-sharing era, most growth of provincial government post-secondary education spending was supported by federal cash transfers, which accounted for $8,860 per student, or 80 per cent, while provincial own-sourced spending grew by an additional $2,270.

With both levels of government seeking ways to curb spending, Canada’s federal transfer system was completely remade in 1977 under a new arrangement called Established Programs Financing (EPF). Transfers were untethered from post-secondary education operating costs and made into unconditional block grants set to increase based on economic growth rates.

Under the EPF model, and continuing under today’s transfer system, cash payments to support post-secondary education have virtually no strings attached, essentially becoming general revenue for provinces to spend as they see fit. Though an amount is made available “notionally” to support post-secondary education spending, there are no accountability mechanisms to track how provincial governments spend it.

The transition to EPF entailed a significant, one-time increase in cash transfers the following year. From that point onward, with few exceptions, growth of both federal and provincial post-secondary funding has not been enough to keep up with inflation and enrolment growth, leading to a steady, long-term decline.

Since 2004, the Canada Social Transfer (CST) has been the vessel for federal post-secondary education transfers. The 2007 federal budget provided a modest boost to the notional post-secondary education allocation of the CST and set the transfer to grow at a three per cent annual escalator. This was still not enough to keep up with inflation and enrolment, causing even further erosion of both federal and provincial funding.

Provincial government funding fell from a high of $27,200 in 1978 to $13,760 in 2024. Figure 4 shows how much of the decline in provincial post-secondary education spending can be attributed to federal transfers versus the part funded by the provinces’ own revenue. Federal transfers made up $6,110 or 45 per cent of the drop, while the province’s own-sourced spending accounted for $7,300, or 55 per cent. From 1999 to 2019, the decline of federal transfers made up more than half of the decrease in provincial spending.

Federal-provincial co-operation on making students pay

From the 1990s onward, a political consensus on post-secondary education financing emerged: that students and their families should be made to shoulder as much of the cost as politically possible, forcing them to go into debt if needed.

Both the federal and most provincial governments, with few exceptions, were willing collaborators in replacing government funding with student fees. To facilitate this movement, the federal government greatly expanded the provision of financial assistance to Canadian students in the form of student loans and non-repayable grants. Without the federal government playing this role, the potential to shift to student debt as a major source of education financing would have been very limited.

Nearly all post-secondary operating funding comes from either governments or student fees, so those can be considered the core sources of funding. Figure 5 shows this core funding on a real per full-time student basis from 1974 until 2024. The provincial government part has been calculated net of federal cash transfers, meaning spending funded by provincial revenues only.

At the peak of government funding in 1978, both levels of government contributed a combined $29,500 per student, which was 90 per cent of core funding. Though their per-student contributions had been declining, governments still provided 88 per cent of core funding as of 1990.

In the following years, government funding collapsed as severe cuts to federal transfers coincided with significant cuts by many provincial governments. A brief period of provincial reinvestment in the 2000s was crushed by a wave of austerity in response to the Great Recession in 2008, setting government funding tumbling downhill once again. By 2024, government funding fell to just $16,600 per student and 56 per cent of core revenues.

Due to declining government contributions, total core revenue fell from a high of $32,880 in 1978 to a low of $23,000 in 1998. Yet it began to recover to previous levels quickly, hitting $30,000 again by 2008, as provincial governments increasingly filled the gap with student fees.

In 1978, student fee revenue accounted for just $3,380 per student, or 10 per cent of core funding. Throughout the 1980s, tuition fees still played a small role in post-secondary education funding. By 1990, student fee revenue had fallen slightly, in real terms, to $3,140 per student.

As government revenue collapsed, universities and colleges began to aggressively maximize student fee revenue, especially post-2008. By 2024, revenue from student fees had risen to an average of $12,890 per student, contributing 44 per cent of core funding.

Adding in all other forms of non-core revenue, like ancillary or investment income, universities and colleges had more total revenue per-student than at any time before. Yet, it was only an illusion of prosperity, since it rested on unsustainable foundations.

Growth of tuition fees for domestic students proved to be politically sensitive and is regulated by policy in each province, to varying degrees. Fees for international students, on the other hand, had long been deregulated and could be raised easily at the discretion of university and college administrators. This made international student fees the path of least resistance in filling the gap left by government defunding.

Therefore, most recent revenue growth came from relying more heavily on revenue from international students, leading to massive increases in their student fees. In 2026, average fees for Canadian undergraduates were $7,730, compared to $41,750 paid by international students. The difference is not because international students are over five times more expensive to educate than their domestic peers, but because it has been politically convenient and financially lucrative for governments and institutions to treat them as cash cows.

Many institutions have become reliant on charging international students exorbitant fees to fund operations. For instance, at Ontario universities, international students were paying half of all tuition fees by 2023-24, despite only making up one-fifth of the student population. At Ontario’s public colleges, international students were nearly half of the student population in 2022-23 yet contributed 76 per cent of tuition revenue.

While both levels of government bear responsibility for this situation, the federal government played a key role. At each step of the way, it encouraged provinces to develop their international education industries. Without federal government policies, as the only body capable of issuing international study permits, it would not have been possible to turn international students into such a lucrative revenue source for universities and colleges.

Many experts and officials have noted the inherent vulnerability of this model to a disruption in the flow of international students and the high risks such an event would pose to Canada’s higher education systems. The federal government’s current approach to international education intentionally created that disruption. In 2024, the first wave of changes aimed at preventing or discouraging international students from coming to Canada were announced, cutting the number of permits issued, introducing stricter financial requirements, and limiting opportunities for work both during study and post-graduation.

Predictably, these policies have caused a significant decline in the number of international students on campuses, that will likely worsen over the next few years. The sudden drop in international student fee revenue caused an entirely foreseeable, and therefore preventable, financial crisis across Canada’s higher education sector, leading to mass layoffs, program losses, and campus closures.

To make matters worse, this course change in immigration policy unfairly frames international students as scapegoats for Canada’s real economic problems, especially the housing crisis. The of Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship’s official documentation plainly connects “reducing the number of students” with “easing ease pressures on housing, infrastructure, and services.”

Many advocates and experts have argued against this inaccurate association, which likely contributes to the troubling growth of anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and racist sentiment, especially directed against South Asian people, by incorrectly connecting them to the housing crisis and other social problems—a concern shared publicly by the Minister responsible at the time the policy was announced.

A much better approach would be for the federal government to once again accept that it has a major influence over and responsibility for the state of post-secondary funding across Canada, and to establish positive leadership backed up with action in terms of increasing funding levels.

Restoring federal leadership as a post-secondary funder

Funding levels have fallen far short of growing federal capacity to pay

Federal funding for post-secondary education has fallen considerably relative to the federal government’s growing capacity to spend and raise revenue.

Figure 6 shows federal post-secondary education funding calculated as a share of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) from 1964 to 2024, measuring it against the size of Canada’s economy. Once again, the familiar pattern of plunging transfers and long-stagnant direct funding arises.

In 1967, the year before federal transfers to provinces began, when the federal government played a growing, but still relatively small role as a funder, total federal post-secondary education funding amounted to 0.28 per cent of Canada’s GDP.

It would continue to grow over the period of positive federal funding leadership, prior to the austerity measures of the mid-1980s, hitting a peak of 0.67 per cent of GDP in 1984. It had fallen to just 0.34 per cent of GDP in 2024, about half of what it was at the historical high point.

Nearly all of that rise and fall can be attributed to federal transfers, which fell from 0.51 per cent of GDP in 1984 to just 0.17 per cent by 2024. Direct funding as a share of the economy has always been stagnant—it was 0.17 per cent of GDP in 2024, 0.16 per cent in 1984, and 0.12 per cent in 1978, when federal funding per-student was the highest.

The spending power of Canada’s federal government has grown greatly since the 1970s, yet almost none of that increased spending was prioritized for post-secondary education funding. In 1971, post-secondary education funding had the highest spending priority, at 3.6 per cent of total federal government expenditures. By 2024, it had fallen to just 1.9 per cent of federal expenditures.

Putting federal defunding into historical perspective

Today, Canada’s universities and colleges face a financial crisis of a far greater magnitude than the one that prompted the federal government to step in as a funder in the first place. To avoid the long-term decline of Canada’s universities and colleges, the federal government must demonstrate leadership in post-secondary education, as it did once before.

Restoring federal leadership will necessarily involve a large increase in the level of funding the federal government provides to support post-secondary education. What could that look like? Figure 7 presents the hypothetical value of federal post-secondary cash transfers in 2024, implied across a range of scenarios that answer the question, “What if the federal government retained its positive role as a funder, all else being equal?”

This exercise does suggest turning back the clock in an attempt to reproduce old funding models. The appropriate amount of funding should be based on the current and future needs and goals of higher-education systems. However, as a thought experiment, it can put the scale of federal defunding into perspective and help us to judge contemporary proposals for re-establishing federal funding leadership.

Federal cash transfers to provinces to support post-secondary systems were worth $5.1 billion in 2024. Restoring them to earlier funding benchmarks would require:

• $14.2 billion to match their 1980 peak as a share of federal spending—an increase of $9.1 billion.
• $15.7 billion to match their 1984 peak as a share of GDP—an increase of $10.6 billion.
• $17 billion to match their 1980 peak per full-time student—an increase of $11.9 billion.

While any of these amounts would mark a significant reinvestment that would greatly benefit the fortunes of Canada’s higher-education systems, none would even be enough to move Canada from near the bottom (45 per cent) of the OECD to merely average (67 per cent) in terms of the amount of post-secondary spending covered by all levels of government, which would require $14.6 billion in new government funds.

Regarding direct funding, which is mostly to pay for research activities, such a historical comparison does not work well, since it has been in a state of near permanent stasis. Given the over-reliance of the Canadian economy on universities to conduct research and development, the stagnation of research funding is a concerning finding.

Recent increases to research funding, not yet captured in financial data, have likely improved the situation, but many have argued that they do not go far enough. To preserve and strengthen the research capacity of Canada’s higher education sector, the federal government should get more research funding into the hands of scholars and students—especially those doing applied research at public colleges and CEGEPS, which typically take place outside of existing federal funding streams.

Toward a new federal-provincial funding framework

Just as provincial governments are unlikely to join a trend of reinvestment into post-secondary education in the absence of federal leadership and, more importantly, federal dollars, it is unlikely that the federal government will be willing or able to fund the entire cost of fixing the chronic underfunding of Canada’s patchwork of post-secondary systems.

Federal and provincial co-operation will, therefore, once again be required to ensure the viability of Canada’s universities and colleges. It is true that there are many barriers to greater federal participation in post-secondary education, namely that it remains the constitutional jurisdiction of provincial governments. Yet those tensions also exist in the field of health care, where the federal government has expended much political will to play a stronger and more accepted role as a funder and regulator.

For decades, education unions, student organizations, and advocacy groups have called on the federal government to pass a federal education act, which would establish federal leadership in the sector, set national standards for higher education, and create a dedicated transfer to provinces to support post-secondary education. Adopting such a framework would be a necessary step to the long-term restoration of government funding of post-secondary education in Canada.

The financial crisis at universities and colleges will not wait for a new national framework to be sorted out. As it once did long ago, the federal government should immediately begin working with provincial governments on emergency stabilization funding to prevent lasting damage to the vital sector.

Data sources

Extended transfer series

1. Statistics Canada Table 37-10-0081-01, federal government indirect support to provinces and territories for post-secondary education, by type of contribution.
2. Department of Finance Canada, Federal Support to Provinces and Territories: Major Federal Transfers dataset, used for EPF, CAP, CHST and CST transfer components.
3. Manually compiled canonical post-secondary education allocation anchors, including federal budget 2007 and the 2016 PBO publication, Federal Spending on Post-secondary Education.
4. Missing values have either been interpolated between known values or extrapolated at 3 per cent annual growth after 2020-2021.

Extended finance series

1. Statistics Canada Tables 37-10-0058-01 and 37-10-0061-01, college and university expenditures by direct source of funds and type of expenditure.
2. Statistics Canada Tables 37-10-0026-01 and 37-10-0028-01, university and college revenues by type of revenue and type of fund.

Extended enrolment series

1. Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics of Canada, Section W: Education, tables W1-9 and W466-474, full-time post-secondary enrolment and part-time university enrolment.
2. Statistics Canada, University Student Information System (USIS), 1972-2000, accessed via University of Toronto Library.
3. Statistics Canada Table 37-10-0071-01, archived – Full-time enrolments and graduates in postsecondary community college programs, by program field, year in program and sex.
4. Statistics Canada Table 37-10-0018-01, current post-secondary enrolment by registration status, institution type, student status in Canada and gender.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank his colleagues at the CCPA for their invaluable assistance, especially Erika Shaker, Ricardo Tranjan and Trish Hennessy. The CCPA also wishes to acknowledge the National Union of Public and General Employees for supporting this research.

The post Missing in action: Federal leadership on post-secondary funding appeared first on CCPA.

Unlike previous workforce initiatives, these new sectoral institutions are explicitly intended to support Canada’s evolving industrial strategy, particularly the federal government’s major projects agenda. Ottawa has announced six Workforce Alliance tables, which largely mirror the government’s industry, energy and transportation infrastructure initiatives. On a parallel track, a historic $6 billion funding stream to support Red Seal skilled trades training has also been launched. 

Unions have ample experience with supply-side training programs. Too many have focused solely on meeting the labour supply needs of employers, with limited benefits for workers and no opportunity to build union power. Could this iteration of workforce policy be an opportunity for the labour movement to do better? Does it create an opening to influence industrial policy, labour standards and worker rights? 

At a special panel during the 2026 conference of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association (CIRA) at Laval University in Quebec City, unions and labour academics came together to review the new Workforce Alliances and their associated training initiatives, and examine the opportunities for trade union engagement. 

The presentations to the CIRA conference are collected in this compendium. Our goal is to start a bigger discussion among trade unionists and progressive researchers about a labour strategy that links workforce policy with labour standards and conditionalities across the industries and sectors receiving federal funding, including a larger role for unions in shaping industrial policy. 

Several common themes emerge from the contributions collected here. First, workforce policy cannot be reduced to labour supply measures aimed solely at meeting employers’ skills needs. Second, sectoral institutions and public investments must be linked to stronger labour standards, worker retention and equitable employment outcomes. Finally, the Workforce Alliances raise broader questions about industrial governance and whether unions can use these new institutions to exercise meaningful influence over economic strategy and democratic decision-making. 

Fred Wilson’s introductory paper traces the evolution of workforce policies from the old sector councils, to industry-led labour market information programs and now back to partial joint governance in the Workforce Alliances. In each case, the primary purpose has been to provide “labour market information,” or LMI, and training programs to meet employer needs. Yet, in this latest version of workforce policy, to meet the government’s promise of “not just jobs, but careers” will require going well beyond the LMI model. Labour’s goals in the new workforce policies must address sector and industry-based standards and industrial policies that create and sustain high-quality, value-added jobs. 

Ken Delaney, the managing director of the Canadian Skilled Trades Employment Coalition (CSTEC), Canada’s longest-standing “sector council” model, speaks to the limits of the former sector councils that were confined by government agendas. CSTEC’s work highlights the promise of workforce programs to address worker transition, equity and inclusion, especially if workers are allowed to maintain EI benefits in training. The organization’s programs also demonstrate how the career-building potential of Red Seal training can be adapted to meet the needs of skilled workers in manufacturing and other sectors. Delaney encourages unions to seize the opportunity in the Workforce Alliances to integrate industrial policy with labour market policy. 

Professor Evelyn Dionne’s study of the construction sector in Quebec warns that sector programs to increase labour force supply and speed up construction can lead to “a downward spiral marked by declining skill levels, lower-quality housing, inefficient green buildings and high turnover.” Dionne calls for project labour agreements (PLAs) to be incorporated into housing and construction projects in order to establish common and high-quality terms and conditions governing all workers and contractors. “By embedding training, equity and labour standards into procurement processes,” she writes, “PLAs can help ensure that accelerated construction does not come at the expense of quality or working conditions.” 

After pressure from within the Liberal caucus, reinforced by advocacy from social policy and feminist advocates, the federal government agreed to establish a Workforce Alliance for the care economy. Laurell Ritchie, a member of the Care Economy Initiative, emphasizes that in the care economy, worker retention is as important as recruitment. Like industrial sectors, meeting workforce goals in the care economy will require sector-based programs and standards, and strong government leadership. The inclusion of the care economy among the Workforce Alliances is itself recognition that industry and workforce policy can be influenced by advocacy from unions and women’s organizations. 

Unifor Research Director Angelo DiCaro’s contribution on the interrelationship between industrial policy and workforce policy underscores the need for the state to act as a “conductor” of a complex orchestra involving multiple public and private players. A weak state role leaves the government as a passive enabler of the private sector, resulting in “industrial improvisation” rather than industrial strategy. For the Workforce Alliances to make a real difference, they must go beyond workforce development—filling vacancies, and sponsoring training—to become well-rounded tables for “peak-level social dialogue” with “a whole-of-supply-chain approach” to labour standards and industrial growth. 

As DiCaro aptly puts it, the Workforce Alliances could be “a vital cog in the wheel of industrial growth and rising workplace standards.” Alternatively, they could become an “unambitious and burdensome exercise, simply facilitating training fund transfers, and entirely delinked from future-facing industrial strategy.” 

Prime Minister Carney has described this as a “hinge moment” for Canada, as we collectively face up to the unprecedented threat posed by Donald Trump and aggression from Washington. It is also a hinge moment for labour. The potential reorientation of Canada’s economy away from deep dependence on U.S. export markets, with a greater role for active industrial policy and even public investment, carries both opportunities and risks for unions and the workers they represent. 

The Workforce Alliances are an opportunity for unions to shape this historic economic moment, leveraging workers’ position at the point of production to demand both material progress and democratic power as this pivot unfolds. Canada’s unions must demonstrate that they have the organizational capacity and political leverage to bring a working-class agenda to the Workforce Alliances, and help to shape this new era of industrial policy in favour of workers. 

The Centre for Future Work is a resource for Canadian researchers, unionists, and policymakers on the key issues underlying workforce and industrial policy, including economic policy, worker voice and sectoral bargaining. 

Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives intends to serve as an ongoing hub for research, dialogue and policy development on the Workforce Alliances and related questions of industrial strategy and labour market governance.

The post A hinge moment for unions in Canada’s new industrial era appeared first on CCPA.

• On September 1, Alberta’s new two-tier health care system takes effect.
• A new Abacus Data public opinion survey of 1,500 Alberta residents and 1,500 respondents from the rest of Canada shows widespread opposition to U.S.-style, two-tier health care, where physicians and private facilities can bill patients and the public system for medically necessary health care.
• Nine in 10 Canadians are concerned about the future of public health care—half of them worry about the cost of health care in the future.
• This national survey shows that the Alberta government is pushing a policy direction that is not aligned with the research evidence nor does it have support in Alberta and across Canada.
• While the Alberta government continues to advance the idea that Albertans have distinct views from the rest of Canada, this poll finds that Albertans share similar views with the rest of the country.
  • At 86 per cent of respondents, Albertans overwhelmingly believe universal health care based on need, not ability to pay, is a core Canadian value.
  • Albertans also strongly believe (78 per cent) that public health care can meet the needs of Canadians if governments invest more in it. 
  • On the issue of whether corporations and doctors should have the unrestricted ability to charge patients for health care, Albertans are also on the same page with the rest of the country: 77 per cent disagree with that premise.
  • A clear majority of respondents across Canada and in Alberta want public solutions to reduce wait times, including a focus on health care workforce expansion (65 per cent for all of Canada and 68 per cent of Albertans).

Canadians aren’t clamouring for U.S.-style health care

New public opinion research shows that Canadian residents strongly oppose the introduction of U.S.-style, two-tier health care by the Alberta government.

On September 1, the Alberta government will bring Bill 11 (Health Statutes Amendment Act, 2025) into force. This legislation legislates a U.S.-style, two-tier health care system where physicians and surgeons can work in the public system and the private-pay market at the same time, charging patients for medically necessary health care, including surgeries. 

On July 31, Alberta’s Bill 29 (Health Statutes Amendment Act, 2026) established a two-tier model for medical imaging, including MRI scans, where providers can charge wealthier patients out of pocket for faster diagnosis and treatment. 

Together, Bill 11 and Bill 29 open the door to a U.S.-style private health insurance market for health care already covered under the public plan, which directly contravenes the Canada Health Act. The Alberta government likens its reforms to “European” health care, which careful analysis shows not to be the case.

The Alberta government claims that the public is frustrated with long health care wait times and that greater private-pay options will address these challenges. But a new national opinion survey challenges these arguments. 

The 3,000-person Abacus Data survey (1,500 respondents in Alberta and 1,500 in the rest of Canada) conducted for the Canadian Health Coalition offers insight into Canadians’ opposition to Alberta’s U.S.-style health care model and preference for investments in the public health care system. 

Most Canadians are quite concerned about the future of public health care

When asked if they are concerned about the future of public health care, nine in 10 Canadians are concerned about the future of public health care (44 per cent are somewhat concerned and 47 per cent are very concerned). In Alberta, the share of residents who are very concerned jumps to 53 per cent. Only nine per cent of those surveyed are not concerned. 

Long ER waits, workforce shortages, and access to providers—major concerns

Respondents across Canada identify the following as areas of major concern: emergency room delays (73 per cent), shortages of health care workers (72 per cent), wait times to see medical professionals, access to specialists (61 per cent), and the lack of long-term and assisted living (58 per cent).

Not far behind are concerns about having to pay out of pocket for health care (54 per cent) and the increased use of for-profit companies to deliver health care (45 per cent)—the very things that will increase under Alberta’s two-tier system.

Among Albertans, the major concerns are very similar to those in the rest of Canada. Even among United Conservative Party (UCP) voters, concerns about having to pay out of pocket for health care (44 per cent) and increased for-profit health care delivery (33 per cent) are significant. Health care wait times remain a concern that transcend party affiliation. 

Universal public health care is a core value in Alberta and across Canada 

The vast majority of respondents across Canada (85 per cent) strongly support universal health care based on need, not ability to pay, and believe this is a core Canadian value. Eighty per cent believe that Canada’s public health care system can meet our needs if governments invest more in it. 

Despite a significant body of research showing that for-profit health care delivery undermines—not strengthens—the public health care system, 59 per cent of respondents believe for-profit providers could be beneficial. 

However, when it comes to private health care financing and two-tier health care, 69 per cent disagree that corporations and doctors should have the unrestricted ability to charge patients for health care, as is the case under Alberta’s new private-pay model.

While the Alberta government continues to advance the idea that Albertans have distinct views from the rest of Canada, this poll finds that Albertans share similar views with the rest of the country. At 86 per cent of respondents, Albertans overwhelmingly believe universal health care based on need, not ability to pay, is a core Canadian value. Albertans also strongly believe (78 per cent) that public health care can meet the needs of Canadians if governments invest more in it. 

On the issue of whether corporations and doctors should have the unrestricted ability to charge patients for health care, Albertans are also on the same page with the rest of the country: 77 per cent disagree with that premise.

Alberta’s U.S.-style reforms are advancing with very little public understanding of the significance

The Alberta government is rapidly advancing two-tier health care while the Canadian public has very little understanding of the legislation and its implications. Only 22 per cent of Canadians say that they understand the legislation well, which jumps to 42 per cent in Alberta. A majority of Canadians—78 per cent—don’t understand Bill 11.

This finding demonstrates that the Alberta government is benefitting from advancing a highly unpopular, but seismic shift in health care policy, amidst limited public knowledge on the topic. This raises significant concerns about the lack of a public discussion and the role of the federal government to help Canadians understand the grave implications of Alberta’s reforms. The federal government—if it believes in upholding the Canada Health Act—needs to play a leadership role in fostering a public discussion about the risks of a U.S.-style health care system.

Once Bill 11 is explained to Canadians, the majority oppose it

When Bill 11 is explained to the public—allowing doctors and private facilities to charge both patients and the public system for medically necessary care—53 per cent of respondents oppose it. While 32 per cent of Canadians support this approach, 15 per cent are not sure.

Canadians are concerned about U.S.-style, private-pay health care spreading to other provinces

Nearly three-quarters of Canadians (74 per cent) are concerned about Bill 11 expanding or similar private-pay models spreading to other provinces. A greater share of Albertans (76 per cent) are concerned with this prospect. Only 26 per cent of respondents across Canada are not concerned. Clearly, this is an issue of national importance.

Alberta women, lower-income households, and even United Conservative voters are concerned about Bill 11

When drilling down into Albertans’ views on Bill 11, 84 per cent of women are concerned compared to 73 per cent of men. Lower-income households (less than $50k a year) are more concerned than higher-income households at 84 per cent, although three-quarters of higher-income households still remain concerned. 

Interestingly, 63 per cent of UCP voters in the province are concerned about Bill 11 remaining in place and expanding over time. This suggests that as Alberta UCP voters learn more about Bill 11, they are not supportive of the health care reform directions of the United Conservative Party. 

Across every area, Canadians are concerned about the consequences of Bill 11

Canadians top concerns about Bill 11 include: higher health care costs (85 per cent), unequal access to health care based on income (83 per cent), the additional cost of private health care insurance (83 per cent), longer wait times in the public health care system (81 per cent), and for-profit companies making money from health care (81 per cent) top Canadians’ concerns about Bill 11.

Canadians and Albertans strongly favour evidence-based public solutions to reduce wait times

A clear majority of respondents across Canada and in Alberta want public solutions to reduce wait times, including a focus on health care workforce expansion (65 per cent for all of Canada and 68 per cent of Albertans). 

Investing more in public health care, even if it requires additional funding, is the second-highest preferred solution, at 53 per cent across Canada and among 57 per cent of Albertans. Making better use of public operating rooms and better coordination of specialist referrals rank more highly among Albertans and across the country than allowing private clinics to provide more health care services.

Canadians and Albertans believe strongly in evidence-based public solutions to health care wait times, and do not favour greater private, for-profit involvement.

This national survey shows that the Alberta government is pushing a policy direction that is not aligned with the research evidence nor does it have support in Alberta and across Canada.

The post New poll shows strong opposition to Alberta’s two-tier health care reforms appeared first on CCPA.

The bully, once he’s got your lunch money, isn’t going to stop coming back for more. Any trade peace from the U.S., in the remainder of the Trump administration or whatever follows, would have been highly uncertain. Canada would inevitably be back to another negotiating table making further concessions to avert another round of tariffs a year from now. 

Thankfully, with a broad mandate from Canadians for an “elbows up” approach, and apparent agitation by at least a few premiers, Carney stood firm against U.S. pressure tactics. We review what comes next: the new section 338 tariffs of 50 per cent; Canadian retaliation against the new tariffs; and the need for deeper industrial and trade policies to pivot the Canadian economy away from the U.S. But first, a look at the bad deal on the table.

The deal, rejected

The draft text at the time negotiations collapsed will not likely be released. The centrepiece of the deal would have seen Canada drop its retaliation against American tariffs—removal of U.S. liquor from the shelves of most provinces, bans on government procurement from U.S. companies and tariffs on some American imports—in exchange for reduced but not eliminated sectoral tariffs in steel, aluminum and automotive. 

In steel, Canada would have disarmed, lowering its retaliatory tariffs on U.S. steel to zero while the United States applied a 25 per cent tariff on all Canadian imports up to a low tonnage quota, above which the tariff popped back up to 50 per cent. In other words, a very, very lopsided arrangement that maintained a terrible investment environment.

In automotive, the U.S. tariff on finished vehicles would have been reduced to 15 per cent, down from 25 per cent, but only for cars, not trucks, with the value of U.S.-origin parts exempted from the tariff. Unifor, the union representing Canadian autoworkers, warned that any effective tariff rate higher than four or five per cent creates a permanent incentive for U.S. and international auto manufacturers to leave Canada. 

Prime Minister Carney also flagged language that would have prohibited Canada from entering into other trade deals and that would restrict language and culture protections. Other sources report Canada was asked to change how it regulates dairy imports, concede ground on cultural policy and digital sovereignty, buy more U.S. armaments and give the American buyers the right of first refusal on Canadian critical mineral production. 

What comes next?

The deal, as reported, might have bought Canada time to strengthen our east-west linkages and engage in focused industrial policies that strengthen Canadian supply chains and diversify trade relationships. Yet, by locking Canada even further into the U.S. orbit, we may easily have lost interest in doing this hard work. And the concessions would have locked in a weakened Canadian position that deviates from what we signed under CUSMA. 

A top priority is worker and business support for sectors threatened by Trump’s new Section 338 tariffs on a wide range of manufactured goods. Many companies have claimed they will go out of business if they can’t sell into the United States. COVID-level worker subsidies and temporary layoff programs are in order, along with tailored shifts to Employment Insurance (to make it simpler to access) and more resources to the government workers who facilitate the program.  

Carney’s day-after speech emphasized dollar-for-dollar retaliation to protect the Canadian sectors affected by the Section 338 tariffs of 50 per cent. In a number of these areas, there should be good opportunities to transition Canadian exports to the domestic market. The new retaliatory measures will be announced shortly and will take effect after Labour Day. 

However, tariffs increase costs for Canadian households and businesses, so the key should be targeted retaliation in strategic areas, not achieving some dollar target. This is particularly important for tariffs on imported intermediate or capital goods. There may be Canadian substitutes for inputs currently sourced in the United States. More proactive supply chain information-gathering and match-making is needed to retool the Canadian economy and boost domestic capacity to service the Canadian market.  

Production lost to exports may be useful to businesses elsewhere in Canada, but distance and transportation costs are substantial (not alleged internal trade barriers, as some have argued). The government should urgently find ways to lower freight and trucking costs, through the introduction of public competition if necessary. The government’s recent freight subsidies for moving heavy steel products between provinces are a step in the right direction but too hands-off a strategy for encouraging domestic use of domestic industrial inputs and diversifying the kinds of steel products we make here.

In addition, just as removing alcohol from U.S. shelves hit a nerve in key producing locations, an overlay of strategic geography, with the U.S. mid-terms in sight, might focus some of the tariff pain in areas where there is strong Trump support. A number of key Republican border states, such North Dakota and Montana, send the vast majority of their exports to Canada, and for a large majority of U.S. states (36 out of 50), Canada is their top export destination. 

Defence procurement is another area where non-tariff measures could be effective. Dropping Canada’s proposed purchase of U.S.-made F-35s makes double sense, as it would be foolish to create an even deeper reliance on American hardware, software and long-term maintenance.

Canada should also not be shy about putting major resource sectors on the table, including oil and gas, electricity and potash. These areas have been carefully shielded from U.S. tariff actions and a Canadian export tax would lead to almost full pass-through into higher costs for Americans. Unfortunately, some of those costs would also be passed on to Canadian importers. For example, we buy about $20 billion worth of refined petroleum (fuels, but also condensate to ease the flow of heavy Alberta crude through pipelines) and tens of billions in chemical products from U.S. sources each year. 

An export tax should be designed carefully with the purpose of encouraging more domestic production of these goods in Canada. Paired with an import substitution strategy, an export tax would complement longer-term economic and employment goals and make Canada less reliant on the U.S. market.

Mining is also, er, critical. Rather than give the U.S. a first right of refusal over Canadian critical minerals development and exports, Canada needs to deepen its domestic capacity and, importantly, figure out what minerals we believe to be critical to our economic future—and how to develop and upgrade them sustainably, with full social licence. Crown corporations may be more appropriate to this task than private mining, with public spending directed to internal rather than export-based trade infrastructure. 

Another big, unanswered question is how this non-pre-deal relates to the ongoing CUSMA review or parallel U.S.-Mexico trade talks. Trump told the media Friday afternoon that talks with Mexico would restart after a deal is reached with Canada, while Mexico’s economy minister said he expected a similar agreement to be reached with the Americans. With the Canadian talks in limbo after Carney’s walk-out, could a door have opened to trinational conversations about some of the bigger picture items, including the CUSMA review? 

The CUSMA review, which may be postponed for a while, was to cover some technical (e.g., minimum North American content requirements for tariff-free automotive trade) and some very political demands from the United States, such as alignment with Trump’s investment screening and export restrictions for Chinese companies, alignment on artificial intelligence regulation and “critical” minerals, and common external tariffs. Canada and Mexico are stronger together in any circumstance. 

The vision thing

We can thank Donald Trump for one thing: he has brought Canadians together, from coast to coast and on the left and right. That energy needs to be funnelled into forging a better, unified Canada. Not just boosting the throughput of resources but building an economy that leverages those resources to strengthen the foundation of Canada’s economic life.

Canada may still be considering a leap of faith back into Fortress North America, as proposed by the Ontario government and large parts of the business community. Read between the lines of the prime minister’s Saturday announcement and the issue seems to be more with the lopsidedness of the deal on offer than with the content of renewed cooperation. 

Carney has, on several occasions, welcomed closer Canada-U.S. energy, security and military ties, including the participation in lavish military procurement and exercises like the Golden Dome. The delayed introduction of dollar-for-dollar retaliatory tariffs suggests the prime minister is open to concluding such a deal in the next week or so, prior to Labour Day.  

Canada is now on a high wire act without a net. And while there are legitimate fears about falling, Canadians need to remember that our country has the resources, infrastructure and know-how to use this moment and come out stronger on the other side. 

The post After the failed trade deal with the U.S., what comes next? appeared first on CCPA.

Five years into the Canada-Wide Early Learning and Child Care (CWELCC) program, this report analyzes the shifting landscape of licensed child care fees across 35 major Canadian cities, comparing 2026 data against the 2019 pre-program baseline.

There has been progress: Costs are lower now, but most child care fees in Canada are not at $10 a day. Six jurisdictions have committed to $10 a day as a set or maximum fee: Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Nunavut. Quebec’s low daily fee of $9.65 predated the CWELCC. An additional three provinces have set fees, but higher than $10 a day. The remaining four jurisdictions have a different fee at every provider.

Those jurisdictions without $10-a-day set fees argue that when you include their low-income subsidies, they have average fees of $10 a day.

Child care fees in key cities

Infant child care fees

Infant fees in 11 of the 35 cities in this study are now $10 a day, including in St. John’s, Charlottetown, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, and Iqaluit (they are $9.65 a day in Quebec cities of Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montreal and Quebec City). Infant fees in Lethbridge, Calgary and Edmonton are $15 a day, they’re $19 a day in Saint John, Moncton and Fredericton, $22 a day in all Ontario cities, and $23 a day in Halifax. B.C. cities are the laggards, where infant fees range from $28 a day in Kelowna to $52 a day in Richmond.

Preschool-age fees

As with infant spaces, most parents in the cities included in this report are not paying $10 a day for a preschool-age child care space. Some are: parents with preschool-age children in Quebec pay the set fee of $9.65 a day in 2026 in Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montreal and Quebec City. In Charlottetown, St. John’s, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Regina, and Iqaluit, parents pay $10 a day for a preschool-age space. Preschool-age child care fees are $15 a day in Edmonton and Calgary, $16 a day in Saint John, Moncton and Fredericton, and $22 a day in Ontario’s big cities and market-fee-based Halifax. Again, B.C. is the laggard: median preschool-age fees range from $24 to $42 a day in Kelowna and Richmond, respectively.

Substantial savings

By far the largest monthly savings for parents of infants have been in Toronto, where parents are saving more than $1,800 a month compared to the adjusted-for-inflation fees they would have been without the CWELCC. Parents in the suburban cities around Toronto (Mississauga, Richmond Hill, Brampton, Vaughan, Markham and Oakville) are also saving $1,300 to $1,500 a month for infant care. Ontario fees were so high pre-CWELCC, lowering and regularizing them yielded more savings in Ontario than other provinces that had kept fees in check up to 2019.

Iqaluit parents with infants are saving $1,374 compared to what infant care would have cost without CWELCC. In most other cities Canada-wide, parents are saving $500 to $1,000 a month on infant spaces due to CWELCC.

When it comes to cities in British Columbia, parents now pay the highest fees in the country for infant spaces. Despite that, they are still saving money compared to what they would have been paying without the CWELCC, although their savings are much smaller than elsewhere in Canada, with parents of infants in B.C. cities saving $300 to $500 a month.

British Columbia and Nova Scotia retain market fees, where each provider has a different fee structure. This has led to the most complex systems for parents and the highest fees. Micro data from B.C. illustrates that for-profit centres charge consistently more than non-profits and that B.C. parents are paying a wide variety of fees, some of which are $10 a day but most are many several times higher.

The next stage of building Canada’s child care system requires a long-term plan for achieving the commitments made by the federal government in 2021. In June 2026, the federal government increased its CWELCC funding by a third, worth $5.4 billion over two years. The first round of CWELCC funding has been federal, now it’s time for all provinces and territories to step up too.

Building a child care system that works for all—families, women, children and the economy—will require further stable funding, comprehensive policy and long-term planning to deliver on the promise of affordable, accessible, high-quality child care for all.

Introduction

The creation of the Canada-Wide Early Learning and Child Care (CWELCC) program changed the game on what Canadian parents pay for child care. In the 2021 federal budget, the Trudeau government announced the historic $10-a-day plan, which would be backed by substantial multi-year federal funding. Between 2021 and 2022, all provinces and territories agreed—with some variation in enthusiasm—to work with the federal government to transform Canada’s child care market into an early learning and child care system.¹

The new program applied to licensed child care in centres and regulated family child care homes serving children aged six and under; it could be full-day or part-day, centres and licensed family child care, including children attending kindergarten who require part-day before- and after-school care. The federal government and provinces/territories agreed it would be based on a set of common principles: affordability, accessibility, quality and inclusivity. It was envisioned and designed as a program “for all”—that is, universal.

At the very beginning, the federal government set out two specific goals for affordability: first, an initial reduction of parent fees by 50 per cent in the first year, and a second goal of reducing all parent fees to an average of $10 a day, per child, by 2026. All jurisdictions agreed to specific five-year numerical targets for expanding licensed child care, to be “primarily” in the not-for-profit and public sectors. Other key goals, such as improving wages and working conditions for the child care workforce, ensuring high quality, and strengthening inclusivity were identified but left relatively unspecified.

The introduction of CWELCC came at a time when child care fees across Canada had been increasing steadily, often at rates well above inflation.² At the end of the five-year period of the initial round of CWELCC agreements, which ended March 31, 2026, parent fees and fee structures have changed markedly across the country. Although most fees are not at $10 a day (as we shall see), they are substantially lower than they were before CWELCC. And, importantly, some key attitudes and ideas about early learning and child care have changed, as support for publicly funded child care as essential social and economic infrastructure has broadened.

Many parents who have accessed a reduced fee space report that it has been “life-changing”, enabling them to return to work, pursue an education, improve their financial stability, and reduce household stress.

Of course, lower fees are only part of the major change that CWELCC has brought to child care provision. Other elements include a significant expansion of spaces (although not yet enough), and improved, more regularized wages for early childhood educators (although not yet adequate nor comprehensive). Both pillars of a child care system, they are less visible to parents but are equally important building blocks in the development of a sustainable and equitable early learning and child care system.

This year’s fee report examines the median fees in 35 major cities in Canada. It examines “base” fees, not considering the additional or supplemental fees that have become increasingly common in some provinces. Thus, some centres charge for lunches, for joining a waiting list, or using extended hours. In previous years, we have examined the prevalence of these additional fees,³ but didn’t do so this year.

Additionally, most provinces and territories further subsidize fees beyond the base fees reported here for eligible low-income families. These income-contingent fee subsidies are not examined here. A more fulsome analysis of income-contingent fee subsidies both before and after CWELCC is sufficiently complicated to merit its own analysis.

The price differentiation based on age (infants, toddler and preschool-age categories) is much less common now than it was pre-CWELCC, so this report presents only infant and preschool-age fees.

Beyond many important achievements over the five years of CWELCC, one of the most striking findings is about what has not happened with regard to affordability in the last year: those jurisdictions that had market fees in 2025 still do; those that hadn’t brought down fees to $10 a day by 2025 still haven’t; those jurisdictions that had age-differentiated fees still use them. In addition, the important issue of affordability for low-income families has not changed by 2026, with Alberta⁴ and Saskatchewan⁵ having cancelled their low-income fee subsidy schemes.

In our 2025 report, we noted that as parent fees had been significantly reduced, regularized and stabilized due to CWELCC’s influence, it was likely to be the last in this series of reports. Since publication of the 2025 fee report, however, the political climate regarding continued enhancement of child care has shifted, with additional ongoing federal funding uncertain and some provinces putting forward the idea of returning to more complex pre-CWELCC approaches, such as including higher, income-tested fees for middle-income parents.⁶

Significant changes to parent fees

One of the most significant achievements of CWELCC has been the transformation of how licensed child care is financed. Prior to CWELCC, the cost of licensed child care was borne primarily by parents through parent fees. Today, operating funding provided by federal and provincial/territorial governments has replaced a substantial portion of parent-fee revenue, making child care considerably more affordable for most families. Before CWELCC:

1. Almost all parent fees were significantly higher than they are today, and were regularly increasing above the rate of inflation;
2. Only four provinces had fees set by the government (which were at different levels, as they are today). The set fee provinces were Newfoundland and Labrador, P.E.I., Quebec, and Manitoba;
3. Fees were much more differentiated based on age, with different fees for infants, toddler and preschoolers in almost all jurisdictions. Fees were highest for infants and lowest for preschool-age children.

During its first five years, CWELCC brought about three fundamental changes to parent fees:

1. Parent fees in jurisdictions both with, and without, set fees are markedly lower, although in some jurisdictions they are still characterized by high-market fees with limited government intervention, as they were pre-CWELCC;
2. Provinces and territories have almost all implemented set fees across the board. The with the exceptions are Nova Scotia, British Columbia,⁷ the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, which still primarily use marketized fees that are set by, and are different across, licensed providers—although the annual increases in fees and what new fees can be are limited by governments;
3. Age-differentiated fees are now the exception, not the norm, with almost all provinces and territories opting for a common fee across all age groups. Of the provinces and territories with set fees, only New Brunswick retains different fees for different ages.

As we noted back in 2023, set parent fees greatly simplify the system for parents, providing administrative transparency and simplicity. Parents no longer have to ask every licensed centre or family child care provider what their fees are because they are identical, leaving parents to focus on choosing the program that best meets their child’s and family’s needs.

As Table 1 shows, four provinces and territories still retain aspects of market fees. This means that centres and regulated family child care providers (or their agency, in agency-model jurisdictions) set their own fees, which are offset by “fee reduction” schemes that transfer public funds to service providers. Thus, although each provincial or territorial government is the main contributor to covering the service provider’s cost of providing child care, it is the government’s contribution that is set, with the fee “at the gate” established by the service provider (albeit with some controls by the provincial or territorial government). For parents, this is a much less transparent, more complex system: parents may not be able to predict what their fees will be and could end up paying very different amounts, depending on where they manage to find an available space in conditions of short supply.

These fee reduction schemes are quite complex, as Table 2 shows, with the government contribution sometimes varying based on children’s age and by service type (family child care versus a centre), as is the case in British Columbia. Additionally, the province or territory may allow fees to increase over time, as in B.C., which allows a three per cent increase, with some exceptions, while others are locked in, as in Nova Scotia, and as Ontario’s fees were before the set fee was introduced. To further complicate matters, while most spaces in these four jurisdictions remain attached to market fees in some way, British Columbia has two fee-reduction systems. The first, in essence, pays a part of the pre-existing market fee. The second system of family child care homes and centres charge $10 a day but they are a small minority of the spaces.

As Table 2 shows, the market-fee provinces are much more complex to understand or navigate, with fees varying—sometimes substantially—from provider to provider even within one city.

This complexity acts as an access barrier for lower-income families who find it hard to navigate even generous income-subsidy programs.⁸

Apart from the level of fees, provinces and territories can be categorized into four categories based on their fee complexity, as Table 3 shows. Eight of the provinces and territories charge the same fee in every centre and regulated home that is part of CWELCC, no matter the age group (as long as it is for children aged six and younger). This is the simplest system for parents to understand: the fee is the same everywhere.

New Brunswick has provincially set fees but they vary both by age and region, making them more complex than the other set-fee provinces.

In British Columbia, a small minority of its licensed child care provision is in $10-a-day full-time spaces and $7 a day for part-time spaces, no matter the child’s age. Thus, this part of its system is easy to understand, while the majority of its licensed provision is made up of centres and family child care with different fees by service providers that vary further by age group. This part of the B.C. system fits into the “most complex” category in Table 3, where the fees may be different at every service provider, and are usually also different by age.

The most complex category includes the Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nova Scotia, where all providers charge different fees and those fees also differ by age within a centre.

It is noteworthy that this “most complex” category was the norm in almost all of Canada before the introduction of CWELCC.

As noted above, not all spaces are part of the CWELCC system. Some provinces have large minorities outside of the system, although always well under 50 per cent of spaces. Figure 1 outlines the proportion of spaces outside CWELCC that can charge whatever the market will bear. The proportion of non-set fee spaces is the largest in Quebec, at 20 per cent.

Has CWELCC achieved $10-a-day child care?

The most publicly visible goal of the CWELCC program was to reduce fees so parents were paying $10 a day per child. But the wording in the initial announcement and all subsequent accords was quite specifically an “average of $10 a day”.⁹ Six provinces and territories made the policy choice to make a commitment to $10 a day per child as a cap, or maximum fee. In those places, all parents now pay $10 a day. These jurisdictions include Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Nunavut. Quebec’s low daily fee of $9.65 in 2026 predated CWELCC.¹⁰

Two other provinces—Ontario and Alberta—also use a set maximum fee of $22 a day in Ontario and $15 a day in Alberta. Ontario also describes its fees as “on average” $19 a day, factoring in its fee subsidies, but non-subsidized parents all pay $22 a day.

In practice, two other factors determine how much parents pay. The first is the fee subsidy systems that cover some or all of the cost of parent fees for eligible low-income families, a practice that dates from the Canada Assistance Plan, although several provinces have since discontinued their low-income subsidy systems: Quebec did so in September 1997 when it began to fund child care operationally, with a parent fee originally of $5 a day.¹¹ Saskatchewan and Alberta discontinued their fee subsidy systems much more recently, following the introduction of CWELCC. This may make all the difference for low-income families—especially those with more than one child, for whom even a set fee of $10 or $15 a day is an insurmountable barrier to accessing licensed child care, if they are, for instance, taking training or seeking employment. This report is not examining parent fee subsidies in further detail.

A second cost factor to keep in mind are “additional” or “supplemental” parent fees, which haven’t been heavily researched, although our 2025 fee report provided some preliminary information on additional fees.¹² This report examines only “base” fees and excludes the additional add-ons that are becoming increasingly common in some provinces, where service providers may charge meal fees (some quite high), fees for non-standard hours, wait list fees, and others.

The remainder of this report examines parent fees in selected big cities across Canada in more detail.

Infant fees in 2026

The infant category generally includes children aged 18 months to two years and younger, although this differs somewhat by province/territory. It is the youngest age group and is the most expensive in a market system because it requires the highest staff-to-child ratios. Infant care is the least common type of full-time care, due, in large part, to higher staffing costs.¹³ So for parents looking for child care for an infant—typically to return to work following parental leave—it is generally very hard to find, no matter the fee.

As noted, the CWELCC program now means that there are indeed parents in many of Canada’s big cities who are paying $10 a day, or less, for an infant space. This is happening in all the Quebec cities included in this report, where the 2026 infant fee is slightly less at $9.65 a day. These include: Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montreal and Quebec City. Quebec parents are joined by parents in the east coast cities of St. John’s and Charlottetown, and parents of children in the Prairie cities of Winnipeg, Regina and Saskatoon—all of which offer infant spaces for $10 a day. Parents in the far-North capital of Iqaluit also enjoy $10-a-day care for infants.

For 11 of the 35 cities included in this report, $10-a-day care for infants is already a reality. For the remainder—both those with set fees and those with market-based fees—it is not.

The Alberta cities of Lethbridge, Calgary and Edmonton provide infant child care at a set fee of $15 a day, while roughly $20 a day is the most common daily fee for infants with fees in 16 cities close to this value. This is the case in the New Brunswick cities of Saint John, Moncton and Fredericton, where parents are paying $19 a day. Parents in all the Ontario cities now pay $22 a day for a CWELCC infant space.

Halifax (and Nova Scotia generally), along with the B.C. cities, are stuck between the old world of market fees and the new world of set fees. We see this reflected in Figure 2, where these market-fee systems retain the highest fees in Canada. Halifax has a median fee of $23 a day for infants.

B.C. cities are the laggards on reduced fees: infant fees range from $28 a day in Kelowna to $52 a day in Richmond, a suburb of Vancouver.

Preschool-age fees in 2026

There is often a toddler age category that falls between the infant and preschool-age categories in most jurisdictions. However, as fees have been simplified, this category has much less differentiation than it used to, even if it still has specific licensing requirements. We’ve excluded the toddler category from the fees comparison as a result.

Preschool-age is for children who are soon to enter public school and comprises roughly age three to four or five years, depending on availability of four-year-old and five-year-old kindergarten in that province or territory. In a market system, service providers usually charge lower fees for preschool-age children than infants because fewer staff per child are required. Preschool-age spaces are the most common type of space, so are much easier for parents to find than infant spaces.

As with infant spaces, most parents in the cities included in this report are not paying $10 a day for a preschool-age space. Some are: parents with preschool-age children in Quebec pay the set fee of $9.65 a day in 2026 in Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montreal and Quebec City. In the Atlantic Canada cities of Charlottetown and St. John’s, parents pay $10 a day for a preschool-age space. The Prairie cities of Winnipeg, Saskatoon and Regina also have preschool-age fees of $10 a day, and in the far-North, Iqaluit parents also pay $10 a day for a preschool-age space.

In the Alberta cities of Lethbridge, Edmonton and Calgary, parents pay 50 per cent more than the $10-a-day target, or $15 a day for a preschool-aged child. Parents in the New Brunswick cities of Saint John, Moncton and Fredericton (where fees vary by the child’s age) pay $16 a day for preschool-age. Parents pay $22 a day for a preschool-age space in Ontario’s big cities and market-fee-based Halifax.

Finally, in British Columbia, median fees range from $24 to $42 a day in Kelowna and Richmond, respectively. Despite the small minority of $10-a-day centres, market fees persist in B.C. cities, with new centres opening at higher fees, and fees are creeping up to erode the provincial fee reductions, which haven’t changed in value since December 2022.

Substantial savings for parents

In previous reports in this series on parent child care fees, comparisons have used 2019 fees (CWELCC’s baseline year) and compared them to current fees. But this underestimates the savings for parents. Between 2019 and 2026, Canada-wide prices overall rose by 24 per cent.¹⁴ In our reports before 2019, we observed that child care fees were rising faster than inflation. Thus, in this analysis, 2019 will be our comparison year for 2026 fees, but adjusted for general inflation over that period, not the higher-fee inflation child care fees were seeing prior to 2019. Therefore, the parent savings displayed in Figures 3 and 4 are likely conservative estimates.

Parents’ savings for infant care since CWELCC are much larger than for older children. Most of the cities included in 2019 had market fee systems in place, so their infant fees were much higher. Since most cities have now moved to one set fee across age groups, parents’ biggest saving has been for infant child care.

By far the largest monthly savings for parents of infants have been in Toronto, where parents are saving more than $1,800 a month compared to the adjusted-for-inflation fees they would have been paying without the CWELCC funds. Parents in the suburban cities around Toronto (Mississauga, Richmond Hill, Brampton, Vaughan, Markham and Oakville) are also saving $1,300 to $1,500 a month for infant care.

One might be tempted to conclude that CWELCC was “more successful” in Ontario in lowering fees, given these savings. But another interpretation would be that fees were so high pre-CWELCC, lowering and regularizing them yielded more savings in Ontario than other provinces that had kept fees in check up to 2019.

Iqaluit parents with infants are saving $1,374 compared to what infant care would have cost without CWELCC. For most other cities Canada-wide, parents are saving $500 to $1,000 a month on infant spaces due to CWELCC.

When it comes to cities in British Columbia, parents now pay the highest fees in the country for infant spaces. Despite that, they are still saving money compared to what they would have been paying without CWELCC, although their savings are much smaller than elsewhere in Canada, with parents of infants in B.C. cities saving $300 to $500 a month.

In Quebec—which has the longest experience with set fees, an operational funding formula and parent fees that are annually adjusted for inflation. There are essentially no savings for parents compared to pre-CWELCC, but fees are $9.65 a day in 2026, the lowest in Canada.

Parents’ savings for preschool-age child care are smaller than for infants, although still sizable. The savings are smaller because fees for preschool-age child care were lower in 2019 than infant fees in market and non-market systems. Thus, the move to more administrative simplicity by setting common fees across all age groups means somewhat lower savings for these parents.

Again, using 2026 fees adjusted for inflation, the biggest saving in preschool-age fees was in Calgary, where parents are saving over $1,300 a month as a result of CWELCC. Iqaluit is similar, with parents saving just under $1,300 a month for a preschool-age space. Toronto and its suburbs in Ontario show monthly savings due to CWELCC of $900 to $1,000 a month for a preschool-age space.

Savings from CWELCC of $400 to $800 a month for preschool age children are evident in many big cities.

Some of the smallest savings for parents are again in B.C. cities, particularly Richmond, where parents are saving only $264 a month compared to what they would have been without CWELCC (or CCRFI which is the provincial fee reduction program). In 2019, Winnipeg already had low set fees, which varied by age group at that time, so parents saved $335 a month there.

There were almost no savings for 2026 Quebec parents compared to those in 2019. Quebec had a common fee across age groups in 2019, and now annually adjusts its parent fees for inflation: preschool age-fees, like infant fees, are $9.65 a day in 2026.

These data and analyses show that most parents who are able to access a CWELCC-funded child care space are saving a substantial amount compared to pre-CWELCC parents, especially when inflation is taken into account. Before CWELCC, fees could differ in every centre and licensed family child home. Only four provinces had set fees in 2019 (although at different levels). Today, there are only four provinces and territories that do not have set fees. Additionally, in 2019, fees were much more differentiated based on age, maximizing the complexity.

Overall, when making the comparison between 2019 pre-CWELCC and 2026 parent fees, and adjusting for inflation, British Columbia and Nova Scotia—both maintaining market fee systems—have delivered the least savings for parents. Thus, it is worth examining these stalwarts of the old market system in more detail.

In many cities, as noted above, parents are paying considerably more than $10 a day. Six provinces and territories have decided that $10 a day shouldn’t be an average, it should be a maximum. If all the other provinces and territories followed suit, parents would see particularly large benefits in some cities.

For parents in Richmond, B.C., the move to a maximum of $10 a day for an infant space would save parents over $900 a month—the most of any city, given the high fees. Vancouver parents would save $648 a month with $10 a day fees, and parents in Burnaby and Surrey would save in the $500-a-month range for an infant spot. Halifax parents would save $282 a month for an infant space. Ontario parents would save $260 a month if $10-a-day fees were used instead of the $22 a day fees now paid. Parents in Alberta and Nova Scotia would see savings of $100 to $200 a month, respectively, if those provinces moved to $10 a day for infants.

The remainder of the cities in our study are already at or below $10 a day and so aren’t included.

Market fees and marketization persist

Both British Columbia and Nova Scotia retain market fees, although both provincial governments manage elements of parent fees, so service providers have somewhat less flexibility than they did before CWELCC. However, in both provinces, each centre and licensed family child care home may have different fees than its neighbour, so parents are paying quite a range of fees besides the medians reported above. The two provinces have different child care landscapes and have used different policy approaches since CWELCC began in 2021.

In British Columbia, parent fees have been rising, as the underlying fees increase but the provincial flat fee reduction—the value of which was set out in 2022—does not. The flat-rate reduction to fees in British Columbia has been the same since December 2022, but the underlying fees (the fees “at the gate”) have been rising at a regulated rate of three per cent a year (or more with specialized approval). With this approach, unless the dollar amount paid by the province increases over time, it is parents who cover the gap, so parents end up paying higher net fees.

We have already noted that fees are on the rise in B.C. cities and vary considerably from one provider to another. New spaces that have come online since 2021 have maximum fees set by region, although these can be negotiated higher in special cases. In addition, fees as shown in Table 4, apply only to new centres; family child care has a different fee schedule. These maximum fees are set at the 80th percentile of fees for children18 month or younger and the 75th percentile for all other age groups.

The net result of new spaces coming online is to raise the median of fees for parents. These new space maximum fees are higher than 80 per cent of the other fees (for 18 months and younger), (the definition of 80th percentile, as opposed to coming in at the middle, or the 50th percentile). Over time, this will put further upward pressure on fees. Overall, it means that understanding and dealing with parent fees is quite complex and not transparent for B.C. parents.

Centres and family child care homes in British Columbia’s growing, but still small, $10-a-day ChildCareBC sites charge all parents $10 a day per child for full day (or $7 a day for part-day care). There are 12,400 full-time, non-school age $10-a-day spaces in B.C.,¹⁵ representing 12 per cent of those space types. Parents lucky enough to get a space there benefit from the much lower, more transparent child care fee. These programs are not distributed equitably across cities: 45 per cent of Vancouver’s preschool-age spaces cost $10 a day while 18 per cent of Kelowna’s and 10 per cent or less of the in Richmond and Surrey centre spaces are at $10 a day. Some regions, like Fraser Valley, have only three per cent of their spaces at $10 a day.¹⁶ This has to do, in part, with Vancouver’s much larger proportion of service providers that are not-for-profit, which are more likely to receive the $10-a-day designation.

Figure 7 shows the distribution of the range of fees for preschool-age spaces across selected B.C. cities. It is derived from ranking all B.C. spaces from lowest to highest fee and creating benchmarks of 10 per cent from the lowest price, 25 per cent from the lowest price, and so on.

Figure 7 shows that Vancouver has the lowest fees for the most parents, with the bottom 45 per cent of preschool-age spaces costing parents $10 a day. Vancouver, is, however, a tale of two extremes, which also has some of the highest-priced spaces. In Vancouver, 25 per cent of families are still paying more than $46 per day for a full-time preschool age space. The top five per cent of spaces cost parents more than $69 a day.

Kelowna has the lowest median preschool-age fee, at $24 a day, despite its proportionately few $10-a-day spaces. Much of the middle of its fee spectrum is between $20 and $30 a day, while even Kelowna’s top five per cent of fees are far lower compared to the other cities, at $38 a day.

Surrey and Richmond have slightly less than 10 per cent of preschool-age spaces cost $10 a day, leading to few affordable options for parents. At the other end, Surrey’s highest fees aren’t as high as Vancouver’s or Richmond’s, which top out at $59 a day for the top five per cent of fees.

Richmond ties Vancouver at having the highest median fees among the B.C. cities, as noted above. This is, in part, because it has relatively few $10-a-day spaces. However, even above that point, fees are higher than elsewhere across most of the fee distribution. In Richmond, 25 per cent of parents are paying at least $57 per day. Overall, for most parents in Richmond, fees are much higher than in other large cities in B.C. no matter where they are in the fee distribution.

The impact of centre ownership on fees: The B.C. illustration

British Columbia’s fee data provides a good demonstration of the relationship between ownership and parent fees. The reports in this series have historically found, pre- and post-CWELCC, that ownership is correlated with parent fees; the average fees at for-profit centres in a city are almost always more expensive than those for not-for-profits.¹⁷

In this section, we group not-for-profit corporations, charities, public (municipal, school board and post-secondary) child care as “not-for-profit” and all privately owned and for-profit corporations as “for-profit”. Family child care homes are not included in this analysis.

As Figure 8 shows, at every point in the fee distribution, not-for-profits charge lower fees in all cities. The difference is most dramatic in Vancouver, where at almost every point in the figure, for-profit centres are charging at least $30 more a day than not-for-profits. In part, this is linked to the relatively higher proportion of $10-a-day spaces in Vancouver, with more than half of the not-for-profit spaces in the city being at $10-a-day sites. While Vancouver also has some of the highest fees of any of the cities, those very high fees are being driven by for-profit providers. It is noteworthy that long-term local planning policy in Vancouver has driven the city’s ownership pattern. Since Vancouver has twice as many not-for-profit spaces as for-profit ones, the lower fees can thus be accessed by more parents.

In both Burnaby and Richmond, we find that for-profit spaces cost parents substantially more—between $20 a day and $40 a day. The difference is particularly stark at the high end in Burnaby: not-for-profit spaces top out at $42 a day whereas for-profit spaces go up to $80 a day. Unlike Vancouver, Burnaby and Richmond both have far more for-profit spaces than not-for-profit ones, so parents are much more likely to face the at least $20-a-day for-profit burden.

The ownership differences are less stark in Kelowna, with both ownership types charging fees in the $20 -$30 a day range. Nevertheless, not-for-profits are still less costly for parents at every point.

If we were to compare the B.C. graphs to similar distribution graphs in Ontario or Alberta—other big provinces that now have set fees—there would be no ownership differences; there would be a straight line, at $22 a day for Ontario and $15 a day for Alberta.

It is worth considering that if British Columbia moves to a set-fee model for all aged five and under child care provision—not only for a small minority—the starting fee differences between for-profits and not-for-profits will create significant funding pressures. The provincial government will have to cover the extra for-profit cost burden if those spaces are to remain part of CWELCC.

The expansion in spaces over the CWELCC period has been overwhelmingly for-profit.¹⁸

Similar cost pressures also exist in other provinces that have moved to set fees, like Ontario and Alberta, although in a less visible way. Those pressures have moved behind the scenes as for-profit providers lobby governments for higher payments and the ability to charge more to maintain these for-profit cost burdens on parents.

Nova Scotia

Another illustration of a market-model for parent fees comes from Nova Scotia, with a post-CWELCC approach different from B.C.’s.

While the underlying fees are permitted to rise in British Columbia, fees for most service providers participating in Nova Scotia’s CWELCC system (which is most of the licensed child care) are quite managed. Service providers who became part of CWELCC in 2021 had their fees frozen at that time, and (like B.C.’s) the provincial flat rate fee reduction offsets for those fees have also remained unchanged since then. However, new spaces must enter the system at the set fees outlined in Table 5, although permission can be granted to charge more than those maximums. This fee schedule is complicated because the fees vary both by region and by a child’s age. In addition, there is a small minority of centres in Nova Scotia that are not part of the CWELCC system that are allowed to charge whatever the market will bear.

The Nova Scotia government points out that the average child care fee is $12.13 a day, including all low-income subsidy spaces and school age spaces (which is the next age group up from the preschool-age category and is the lowest fee).¹⁹ However, by examining the median in the city of Halifax, we can see what the fee is for the range of middle-class families with children in each age group, rather than averaging out differences.

Nova Scotia and British Columbia are both caught between the old market fees and the newer publicly funded set fees, with the result that their cities are not only the most expensive in the country, but are also the most complicated for parents to navigate, with different fees for every provider (albeit still lower than they would have been without CWELCC).

As we have pointed out, moving away from market fees, and towards provincially set fees, as most provinces and territories have now done, is an important first step. This needs to be accompanied by policy guard rails aimed at controlling the cost pressures driven by for-profit providers that have been used to charging higher fees without constraint of their margins.

Policy implications

The child care transfers to provinces and territories were identified in the spring economic statement at just over $8 billion a year for at least the next four years, through to 2030-31.²⁰ However, in June 2026, this was boosted by an additional $5.4 billion over two years—a boost of one third, a significant change in federal funding—at least for the next two years. This brings the federal investment up to $11 billion in each of 2026-27 and 2027-28.²¹ This major increase in funding—if it is continued after the next two years—could provide an opportunity to tackle the issues identified in this analysis.

The announcement of new federal child care investments is an encouraging signal, as convincing research continues to accumulate showing that publicly funded child care done right yields strong economic and fiscal returns. Recent analyses show^{22 23} that public investments in affordable child care can readily pay for themselves, particularly by increasing the labour force participation of mothers, who then pay taxes and contribute to economic growth. Thus, the ongoing and new child care investments are a key part of fiscally responsible economic strategy—an investment in social infrastructure, not merely an expenditure.

Parents can see that while child care fees have fallen, they are far from $10 a day in many places. Moreover, while there are more spaces, the reduced fees mean that parents’ demand has risen, and wait lists abound. Complex rules and systems create barriers for parents. Low-income parents are often left out due to policies that restrict their access to child care. Child care availability continues to be hampered by lack of capital funding and too few qualified educators to ensure that child care spaces can function. While CWELCC included evidence-based commitments to “primarily” not-for-profit expansion, the lion’s share of expansion under CWELCC’s public funding has been for-profit.

There is yet much work to be done, as this paper’s analysis outlines. Without modification to the basic approach, these trends will continue. The next stage of building Canada’s child care system requires a long-term plan for achieving the commitments made by the federal government in 2021 and in the new federal legislation, as well as more focused, evidence-based planning and implementation by provincial and territorial governments. While the first round of CWELCC funding has been federal, the vision was that provincial/territorial spending would represent 50 per cent of funding. There should also be a continued focus on reducing child care fees at least to the promised $10 a day, but as a maximum, not as a more problematic “average” fee.

While there have been many major successes in building Canadian child care’s first system, there was never an expectation that the program would be complete in five years. Building a child care system that works for all—families, women, children and the economy—will require further stable funding, comprehensive policy and long-term planning to deliver on the promise of affordable, accessible, high-quality child care for all.

About this report

This report, part of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives’ (CCPA) annual child care fee series, documents those changes over time, comparing fees before and after CWELCC while examining the different approaches jurisdictions have taken to improving affordability, and the implications for the future.

The CCPA fee report series is the sole Canada-wide data source of regularly collected and analyzed data on parent fees for regulated child care services. Beginning with the first survey in 2014, CCPA has annually reported on fees in child care centres and regulated family child care homes in Canada’s large cities, tracking parent fees across Canada and over time. One strength of the CCPA’s fee reports has been that the data have been collected using a consistent method, so year-to-year and city-to-city comparisons are possible.

The project was initiated to provide and analyze comparable, consistent data on the fees that parents are required to pay for licensed child care across Canada because it was not available from other sources. Working from provincial/territorial lists of licensed child care programs, the CCPA initially used a telephone survey to collect fee data from centres and regulated family child care providers in Canada’s largest cities. The survey grew from the initial 20 cities to 35 cities distributed across all provinces and territories.

The reports consider child care fees from the perspective of service providers and the fees they charge; they do not provide data on what parents say they pay for child care. Median fees have been used for making comparisons. These medians are weighted by spaces, so a centre with more spaces gets more weight than a centre or family child care home with fewer spaces. A median is less impacted by extreme fees than is a weighted average. The median is the point at which half of all spaces are more expensive and half are less expensive. In provinces and territories with set fees, the median is the set fee as long as at least half the spaces in the city are part of the set fee system. Note that although in cities in Quebec a substantial proportion of spaces is not part of the fee system, it never represents half of the spaces. Similarly in Ontario, although the proportion not part of the reduced fee system is much smaller than in Quebec. The number of spaces outside CWELCC is growing with the overall size of the child care system, but they’re always substantially less than half the spaces.

In most years, a small number of additional questions and analyses of interest were added to the report. We have asked questions about centre wait lists, wait list fees, and about not-for-profit and for-profit ownership. As the number of provinces/territories using fees set by government (with parent fee revenue replaced by operating funding to programs), has grown, the market fee child care services found in all jurisdictions (those not covered by the set provincial fee/territorial fee) were separately analyzed. In 2015, a separate analysis was included to examine out-of-pocket fees that lower-income families eligible for fee subsidies are asked to pay on top of government subsidies. In 2017, service providers in rural communities in Ontario and Alberta were surveyed to answer the question: “Are child care fees in rural communities lower than in larger cities?” Because expanding the supply of regulated child care has become a pressing issue on the child care policy agenda, in the 2023 survey we asked service providers a question designed to ascertain their capacity to expand: “Can you enroll an additional child in the next week?”

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the following readers for their valuable insight on an earlier version of the paper: Morna Ballantyne, Jane Beach, Ariane Hotte, Molly McCracken, Susan Prentice, Christine Saulnier, Eric Swanson, Ricardo Tranjan.

The post The $10-a-day divide: Child care fees in Canada in 2026 appeared first on CCPA.

Cinq ans après le début du Programme pancanadien d’apprentissage et de garde des jeunes enfants (PPAGJE), le présent rapport se penche sur le paysage mouvant des frais de garde en service de garde agréé dans 35 des grandes villes canadiennes et nous comparons les données de 2026 à celles de l’année de référence d’avant le PPAGJE (2019).

Certes, des progrès ont été réalisés : les coûts sont moins élevés maintenant, mais la plupart des frais de garde au Canada ne sont pas10 $ par jour. Cinq provinces et un territoire ont fixé leur tarif à 10 $ par jour au maximum : Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, Île-du-Prince-Édouard, Manitoba, Saskatchewan et Nunavut. Le bas tarif de 9,65 $ au Québec était en vigueur avant le PPAGJE. Trois autres provinces fixent leurs tarifs, mais ils sont supérieurs à 10 $ par jour. Dans les quatre provinces et territoires restants, les tarifs varient d’un fournisseur de services de garde à l’autre.

Ces provinces et territoires sans tarif à 10 $ par jour font valoir que, lorsque l’on inclut les subventions accordées aux familles à faible revenu, la moyenne des frais de garde est de 10 $ par jour.

Tarification dans les principales villes

Frais de garde pour poupons

Les frais de garde pour poupons dans onze des 35 villes sont maintenant 10 $ par jour, notamment à St. John’s, Charlottetown, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon et Iqaluit (et au Québec, ils sont 9,65 $ par jour dans les villes de Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montréal et Québec). À Lethbridge, Calgary et Edmonton, les frais de garde pour poupons sont 15 $ par jour, ils sont 19 $ par jour à Saint-Jean, Moncton et Fredericton, 22 $ par jour dans toutes les villes ontariennes et 23 $ par jour à Halifax. Les villes de la Colombie-Britannique font figure de retardataires : les frais de garde pour poupons vont de 28 $ par jour à Kelowna à 52 $ par jour à Richmond.

Frais de garde pour enfants d’âge préscolaire

Comme pour les poupons, la plupart des parents dans les villes incluses dans ce rapport ne paient pas 10 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire. Certains oui : notamment au Québec, en 2026, dans les villes de Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montréal et Québec, les parents d’enfants d’âge préscolaire paient un montant fixe de 9,65 $ par jour. À Charlottetown, St. John’s, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Regina et Iqaluit, les parents paient 10 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire. Les frais de garde pour les enfants d’âge préscolaire sont 15 $ par jour à Edmonton et Calgary, 16 $ par jour à Saint-Jean, Moncton et Fredericton, 22 $ par jour dans les grandes villes de l’Ontario et 23 $ par jour à Halifax, où les prix courants du marché s’appliquent. Ici encore, la C.-B. traîne derrière : les frais de garde pour enfants d’âge préscolaire varient de 24 $ à 42 $ par jour respectivement dans Kelowna et Richmond.

Économies substantielles

Les économies de loin les plus substantielles pour les parents de poupons sont à Toronto. Les parents épargnent plus de 1 800 $ par mois comparativement au prix ajusté à l’inflation qu’ils auraient dû payer sans le PPAGJE. Les parents dans les villes banlieues autour de Toronto (Mississauga, Richmond Hill, Brampton, Vaughan, Markham et Oakville) économisent également de 1 300 $ à 1 500 $ pour la garde de leurs poupons. Les tarifs étaient tellement élevés avant le PPAGJE que leur réduction et leur régularisation ont généré plus d’économies en Ontario que dans les autres provinces qui avaient gardé les frais de garde sous contrôle avant 2019.

Les parents de poupons à Iqaluit épargnent 1 374 $ en frais de garde à comparer à ce qu’ils paieraient sans le PPAGJE. Dans la plupart des autres villes du Canada, grâce au PPAGJE, les parents économisent de 500 $ à 1 000 $ par mois pour la garde de leurs poupons.

C’est maintenant dans les villes de la Colombie-Britannique que les frais de garde pour poupons sont les plus élevés au pays. Et malgré cela, les parents économisent comparativement à ce qu’ils paieraient sans le PPAGJE. Même si l’épargne est beaucoup moindre qu’ailleurs au Canada, les parents de poupons dans les villes de la C.-B. économisent de 300 $ à 500 $ par mois.

Les services de garde en Colombie-Britannique et Nouvelle-Écosse appliquent les tarifs courants du marché, chaque fournisseur ayant sa propre structure tarifaire. Ce sont les systèmes les plus complexes pour les parents et dans lesquels les frais de garde sont les plus élevés. Des microdonnées de la C.-B. indiquent que les tarifs dans les garderies à but lucratif (BL) sont systématiquement plus élevés que dans les garderies sans but lucratif (SBL). On voit aussi que les parents de la C.-B. paient des frais de garde très variés, certains 10 $ par jour, mais pour la plupart, beaucoup plus.

La prochaine phase de création au Canada du système de services de garde à l’enfance exige un plan à long terme pour remplir les engagements pris par le gouvernement fédéral en 2021. En juin 2026, le gouvernement fédéral a augmenté d’un tiers le financement du PPAGJE, ce qui équivaut à 5,4 milliards de dollars de plus sur deux ans. La première ronde de financement du PPAGJE a été fédérale. Il est temps que toutes les provinces et tous les territoires fassent leur part.

Bâtir un système de services de garde qui fonctionne pour tous—les familles, les femmes, les enfants et l’économie—nécessitera du financement stable et accru, des politiques détaillées et de la planification à long terme afin de tenir la promesse de services de garde abordables, accessibles et de qualité élevée pour tous.

Introduction

La création du Programme pancanadien d’apprentissage et de garde des jeunes enfants (PPAGJE) a changé la donne pour les parents canadiens pour ce qu’ils doivent payer afin de faire garder leurs enfants. Dans le budget fédéral de 2021, le gouvernement Trudeau a annoncé un plan historique de services de garde à 10 $ par jour, lequel recevrait du financement massif sur plusieurs années du gouvernement fédéral. De 2021 à 2022, les provinces et les territoires ont tous accepté (avec plus ou moins d’enthousiasme selon le cas) de travailler en collaboration avec le gouvernement fédéral à transformer le marché canadien des services de garde pour en faire un véritable système d’apprentissage et de garde des jeunes enfants.¹

Le nouveau programme s’appliquait aux garderies agréées (et CPE au Québec) et aux services de garde en milieu familial réglementés accueillant des enfants âgés de six ans et moins. Ce pouvait être des garderies et des SGMF réglementés offrant des services pleine journée ou à mi-temps. Et les enfants fréquentant la maternelle qui avaient besoin d’un service de garde avant et après l’école étaient inclus. Le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces et territoires ont convenu que le système serait fondé sur les principes communs suivants : abordabilité, accessibilité, qualité et inclusion. Le programme était imaginé et conçu pour être ouvert à tous, c’est-à-dire universel.

Au tout début, le gouvernement fédéral a fixé deux objectifs précis en matière d’abordabilité. Premièrement, une première réduction des frais de garde de cinquante pour cent au cours de la première année et deuxièmement, la réduction de tous les frais de garde pour atteindre en moyenne 10 $ par jour par enfant en 2026. Les provinces et les territoires se sont tous dotés d’objectifs chiffrés précis de nouvelles places à créer sur cinq ans et ont convenu que la croissance se déroulerait « principalement » dans les secteurs à but non lucratif et public. Il a été question d’autres objectifs importants, comme d’améliorer la rémunération et les conditions de travail du personnel, assurer la qualité des services et renforcer l’inclusion, mais on ne les a pas vraiment définis.

L’avènement du PPAGJE est survenu à un moment où les frais de garde au Canada augmentaient constamment et souvent à un rythme beaucoup plus accéléré que l’inflation.² En cette fin des premiers accords sur cinq ans du PPAGJE—ils ont pris fin le 31 mars 2026—on observe que les frais de garde et les structures tarifaires ont énormément changé partout au pays. Même si la plupart des tarifs ne sont pas10 $ par jour (comme nous le verrons), ils sont considérablement plus bas qu’ils l’étaient avant le PPAGJE. Et élément important, certaines attitudes et idées sur l’apprentissage et la garde des jeunes enfants ont changé. On constate effectivement une hausse de l’appui aux services de garde financés à même les fonds publics en tant qu’infrastructure sociale et économique essentielle.

De nombreux parents qui ont obtenu une place à tarif réduit déclarent que cela « a changé leur vie ». Ils ont pu réintégrer le marché du travail, poursuivre des études, consolider leur situation financière et réduire le stress dans la famille.

Évidemment, les tarifs réduits ne sont qu’une partie des changements importants au chapitre des services de garde attribuables au PPAGJE. Mentionnons notamment l’augmentation considérable du nombre de places (quoique toujours insuffisantes) et l’amélioration et la régularisation des salaires versés aux éducatrices et éducateurs de la petite enfance (quoique ni suffisants ni généralisés pour le moment). Ces deux piliers d’un système de garde à l’enfance (la rémunération et l’offre), bien que moins visibles pour les parents, sont des pièces essentielles pour bâtir et développer un système d’apprentissage et de garde des jeunes enfants viable et équitable.

Notre rapport de cette année sur les frais de garde examine les tarifs médians dans 35 grandes villes du Canada. Il s’intéresse aux tarifs de « base » sans prendre en compte les frais additionnels ou supplémentaires devenus de plus en plus fréquents dans certaines provinces. Ainsi, certaines garderies facturent les repas en plus, l’ajout d’un enfant à la liste d’attente ou la fréquentation à des heures non usuelles. Dans le passé, nous avons analysé ces frais additionnels et leur fréquence,³ mais nous ne l’avons pas fait cette année.

En outre, la majorité des provinces et des territoires accorde des subventions aux familles à faible revenu admissibles afin de réduire les tarifs de base à payer. Ces subventions établies en fonction du revenu de la famille ne sont pas examinées dans le présent rapport. L’analyse en profondeur des subventions pour frais de garde fondées sur le revenu, autant avant qu’après l’avènement du PPAGJE, est d’une telle complexité qu’elle mériterait sa propre étude.

La différence de prix en fonction de l’âge des enfants (catégories poupons, bambins et enfants d’âge préscolaire) est beaucoup moins fréquente maintenant qu’avant le PPAGJE, de sorte que nous présentons uniquement les frais de garde des catégories poupons et enfants d’âge préscolaire.

Au-delà des avancées importantes survenues au cours des cinq années du PPAGJE, un des constats les plus frappants est ce qui ne s’est pas produit en matière d’abordabilité au cours de la dernière année : les provinces et les territoires où les tarifs étaient aux prix courants du marché en 2025 ont conservé ce régime; les provinces et les territoires qui n’avaient pas ramené leurs frais de garde à 10 $ par jour en 2025 ne l’ont toujours pas fait; et là où les frais de garde variaient en fonction de l’âge, c’est toujours le cas. De plus, le problème criant de l’abordabilité pour les familles à faible revenu est demeuré inchangé en 2026, l’Alberta⁴ et la Saskatchewan⁵ ayant annulé leurs programmes de subventions pour les familles à faible revenu.

Dans notre rapport de 2025, nous avions indiqué que puisque les frais de garde avaient été considérablement réduits, régularisés et stabilisés avec l’avènement du PPAGJE, vraisemblablement ce serait le dernier de notre série de rapports sur le sujet. Toutefois, depuis la publication du rapport de 2025, le climat politique entourant les services de garde et leur amélioration continue a changé. Le financement accru et soutenu du gouvernement fédéral est devenu incertain et quelques provinces proposent un retour aux approches plus complexes d’avant le PPAGJE, comme d’appliquer des tarifs élevés fondés sur le revenu pour les parents à revenu moyen.⁶

Changements importants au chapitre des frais de garde versés par les parents

La transformation de la façon dont les services de garde agréés sont financés est une des réalisations les plus significatives du PPAGJE. Avant le PPAGJE, le coût des services de garde agréés était principalement couvert par les frais de garde que versaient les parents. Aujourd’hui, le financement de fonctionnement provenant du gouvernement fédéral et des gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux a remplacé en grande partie les recettes générées par les contributions parentales, rendant les services de garde beaucoup plus abordables pour la plupart des familles. Avant le PPAGJE :

1. Les frais de garde étaient presque tous beaucoup plus élevés qu’aujourd’hui et ils augmentaient sans cesse plus rapidement que le taux d’inflation.
2. Seules quatre provinces affichaient des tarifs déterminés (fixés) par le gouvernement (à hauteur différente, comme actuellement). Les provinces où les tarifs étaient fixés par le gouvernement étaient Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard, le Québec et le Manitoba.
3. Les tarifs variaient beaucoup plus en fonction de l’âge des enfants; les frais de garde pour les poupons, les bambins et les enfants d’âge préscolaire étaient différents dans presque toutes les provinces et tous les territoires. Les frais de garde étaient plus élevés pour les poupons et moins chers pour les enfants d’âge préscolaire.

Pendant les cinq premières années du PPAGJE, les frais de garde ont connu trois changements fondamentaux :

1. Dans les provinces et les territoires qui fonctionnent avec les deux régimes, à savoir des tarifs fixés par le gouvernement et des tarifs qui suivent le cours du marché, les frais de garde sont nettement moins élevés. Quoique, dans certaines provinces, les frais de garde suivent encore les prix courants élevés du marché avec peu d’intervention gouvernementale, comme c’était le cas avant le PPAGJE.
2. Les provinces et les territoires appliquent presque tous la formule des tarifs déterminés, sauf la Nouvelle-Écosse, la Colombie-Britannique,⁷ le Yukon et les Territoires du Nord-Ouest, où s’appliquent encore principalement les tarifs aux prix courants du marché, lesquels diffèrent d’un fournisseur de services de garde agréés à l’autre—bien que l’augmentation annuelle des frais de garde et les tarifs des nouveaux services de garde soient parfois contrôlés par les gouvernements.
3. Les frais de garde différents en fonction de l’âge des enfants ne sont plus la norme, ils sont l’exception. La presque totalité des provinces et des territoires a maintenant opté pour un tarif identique pour tous les groupes d’âge. Parmi les provinces et les territoires où les tarifs sont fixés par le gouvernement, seul le Nouveau-Brunswick a conservé des tarifs variables en fonction de l’âge des enfants.

Comme nous l’avions souligné en 2023, les frais de garde déterminés simplifient grandement le système pour les parents et ils assurent un certain niveau de transparence et de la simplicité du point de vue administratif. Les parents n’ont plus à s’informer auprès des garderies ou des services de garde en milieu familial agréés de leurs tarifs, car ils sont identiques partout. Les parents peuvent alors se concentrer sur choisir le service qui correspond le mieux aux besoins de leurs enfants et de leur famille.

Comme l’illustre le tableau 1, quatre provinces et territoires ont conservé certains aspects des tarifs aux prix courants du marché. Ce qui veut dire que les garderies et les services de garde en milieu familial réglementés (ou les agences de SGMF là où ce modèle est en vigueur) fixent leurs propres tarifs, lesquels sont réduits par des « subventions publiques » versées aux fournisseurs. Par conséquent, même si le gouvernement provincial ou territorial est le principal bailleur de fonds et assume en grande partie les coûts liés à la prestation des services de garde, c’est la contribution gouvernementale qui est déterminée; le tarif « à l’entrée » est établi par le fournisseur lui-même (quoique contrôlé dans une certaine mesure par le gouvernement provincial ou territorial). Pour les parents, cette formule est beaucoup moins transparente et plus complexe : les parents risquent de ne pas pouvoir prédire le montant qu’ils devront débourser et peuvent finir par payer des montants très variables, dépendamment de l’installation où ils parviennent à trouver une place dans un contexte d’offre limitée.

Ces programmes de réduction de frais de garde sont plutôt complexes, comme on peut le voir dans le tableau 2, où la contribution gouvernementale varie parfois en fonction de l’âge des enfants et du type de service de garde (milieu familial vs garderie), comme c’est le cas en Colombie-Britannique. En outre, la province ou le territoire permet parfois d’augmenter les frais de garde au fil du temps, comme en C.-B., où la province autorise une hausse de trois pour cent, avec quelques exceptions. Ailleurs, en Nouvelle-Écosse notamment, les frais de garde sont gelés comme ils l’étaient en Ontario avant l’adhésion à la formule des tarifs déterminés. Et pour compliquer les choses encore davantage, alors que les prix courants du marché s’appliquent à la plupart des places dans ces quatre provinces et territoires, en Colombie-Britannique, il y a deux systèmes de réduction des frais de garde. Dans le premier système, on réduit essentiellement une partie du prix courant en vigueur. Dans le deuxième système, les frais de garde des services de garde qui font partie du programme sont de 10 $ par jour, mais cela ne s’applique qu’à une faible minorité de places.

Comme l’illustre le tableau 2, les systèmes dans les provinces qui fonctionnent avec des tarifs aux prix courants du marché sont plus difficiles à comprendre et à naviguer, les frais de garde variant—parfois considérablement—d’un fournisseur de services à l’autre, et ce, dans une même ville.

Cette complexité s’avère un obstacle à l’accès des familles à faible revenu qui ont du mal à se démêler dans le système de subventions fondées sur le revenu, même lorsqu’il est généreux.⁸

Hormis le niveau de leurs tarifs, les provinces et les territoires peuvent se répartir en quatre catégories en fonction de la complexité de leur structure tarifaire, comme on le voit dans le tableau 3. Dans huit des provinces et territoires, le tarif est le même dans chaque garderie et service de garde en milieu familial (SGMF) participant au PPAGJE, peu importe le groupe d’âge (pourvu que ce soit pour des enfants âgés de six ans et moins). Il s’agit du système le plus facile à comprendre pour les parents : le tarif est le même partout.

Le Nouveau-Brunswick affiche des tarifs provinciaux déterminés, mais ils varient en fonction de l’âge et de la région, ce qui les rend plus difficiles à comprendre que dans les autres provinces à tarifs déterminés.

En Colombie-Britannique, une petite minorité des services de garde agréés est offerte dans des garderies et des SGMF à 10 $/jour pour une place en journée complète et à 7 $/jour pour une place à mi-temps, peu importe l’âge des enfants. Par conséquent, ce volet du système est facile à comprendre. Par ailleurs, une majorité des services de garde agréés est offerte dans des garderies et des SGMF affichant chacun des tarifs différents et qui varient aussi en fonction des groupes d’âge. Ce volet du système de la C.-B. correspond à la catégorie la « plus complexe » du tableau 3; les frais de garde peuvent varier pour chaque fournisseur et sont également habituellement différents selon l’âge des enfants.

La catégorie la plus complexe inclut les Territoires du Nord-Ouest, le Yukon et la Nouvelle-Écosse, où tous les fournisseurs appliquent des tarifs différents, des tarifs qui varient également dans la garderie en fonction de l’âge de l’enfant.

Il est intéressant de souligner que la catégorie la « plus complexe » était la norme presque partout au Canada avant l’avènement du PPAGJE.

Comme mentionné précédemment, ce ne sont pas toutes les places qui font partie du PPAGJE. Dans certaines provinces, une minorité importante de places se trouve à l’extérieur du programme, quoique toujours beaucoup moins que cinquante pour cent. La figure 1 présente le pourcentage de places à l’extérieur du PPAGJE qui peuvent demander le prix que le marché est prêt à supporter. Le pourcentage le plus élevé de places aux tarifs non fixés par le gouvernement se trouve au Québec, à vingt pour cent.

Le PPAGJE a-t-il tenu la promesse de fournir des services de garde à l’enfance à 10 $ par jour?

L’objectif le plus visible du PPAGJE pour le grand public était celui de réduire les frais de garde afin que les parents paient 10 $ par jour pour leurs services de garde. Mais le libellé dans l’annonce initiale et dans tous les accords subséquents mentionnait spécifiquement « une moyenne de 10 $ par jour ».⁹ Six provinces et territoires ont fait le choix stratégique de s’engager à imposer un plafond ou un maximum de 10 $ par jour par enfant. Dans ces endroits, tous les parents paient maintenant 10 $ par jour. Il s’agit de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard, du Manitoba, de la Saskatchewan et du Nunavut. Le bas tarif de 9,65 $ au Québec en 2026 était en vigueur avant le PPAGJE.¹⁰

Deux autres provinces—l’Ontario et l’Alberta—appliquent aussi des frais de garde maximum déterminés, soit 22 $ par jour en Ontario et 15 $ par jour en Alberta. L’Ontario décrit aussi ses frais de garde comme étant « en moyenne » 19 $ par jour, incluant ses subventions pour frais de garde. Mais, les parents non subventionnés paient tous 22 $ par jour.

En pratique, deux autres facteurs déterminent le montant que paient les parents. Le premier facteur ce sont les régimes de subvention qui couvrent une partie ou l’ensemble des frais de garde pour les familles admissibles à faible revenu. Il s’agit d’une pratique qui date de l’époque du Régime d’assistance publique du Canada, même si plusieurs provinces ont depuis abandonné leurs programmes de subvention pour les familles à faible revenu : Le Québec l’a fait en septembre 1997 lorsqu’il a commencé à subventionner le fonctionnement des services de garde et a fixé au départ les frais de garde à 5 $ par jour.¹¹ La Saskatchewan et l’Alberta ont aboli leurs programmes de subvention des frais de garde beaucoup plus récemment, après l’avènement du PPAGJE. Ce qui peut faire toute la différence pour les familles à faible revenu, surtout celles qui ont plus d’un enfant et pour qui même des frais de garde fixés à 10 $ ou 15 $ par jour sont un obstacle insurmontable pour accéder à un service de garde agréé, s’ils suivent, par exemple, une formation ou sont à la recherche d’un emploi. Le présent rapport n’étudie pas plus en détail les programmes de subvention des frais de garde.

Le deuxième facteur qu’il faut avoir l’esprit, ce sont les frais « additionnels » ou « supplémentaires », lesquels n’ont pas été analysés en profondeur. Quoique notre rapport sur les frais de garde en 2025 fournisse des données préliminaires à leur sujet.¹² Le présent rapport porte uniquement sur les tarifs « de base » et exclut les frais ajoutés qui deviennent de plus en plus fréquents dans certaines provinces, où des fournisseurs de services de garde peuvent facturer les repas (plutôt élevés parfois), les heures de garde non usuelles, l’inscription à une liste d’attente, ainsi de suite.

Dans cette dernière partie de notre rapport, nous examinons en détail les frais de garde dans certaines grandes villes au Canada.

Frais de garde pour poupons en 2026

La catégorie des poupons inclut généralement des enfants âgés de 18 mois à deux ans et plus jeunes, mais ces critères varient quelque peu par province et territoire. Il s’agit de la tranche d’âge la plus jeune et qui coûte le plus cher à servir dans un régime aux prix courants du marché, car le ratio éducatrice-enfant (l’encadrement des enfants) est le plus élevé. La garde des poupons est le type de service de garde en journée complète le moins fréquent à cause, en grande partie, du coût plus élevé des effectifs requis.¹³ Donc, pour les parents à la recherche d’un service de garde pour leurs poupons—généralement pour retourner au travail après un congé parental—il est habituellement très difficile de trouver une place, peu importe le tarif demandé.

Comme nous l’avons mentionné, grâce au PPAGJE, il y a effectivement des parents dans beaucoup de grandes villes au Canada qui paient maintenant 10 $ ou moins par jour pour une place poupon. C’est le cas dans toutes les villes du Québec incluses dans notre rapport, le tarif poupon en 2026 étant légèrement inférieur à 10 $ par jour, soit à 9,65 $ par jour. Ces villes sont Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montréal et Québec. Se joignent à ces parents du Québec, des parents des villes de St. John’s et de Charlottetown sur la côte est et des parents des villes de Winnipeg, Regina et Saskatoon dans les Prairies, des villes qui offrent des places pour poupons à 10 $ par jour. Les parents qui habitent la capitale Iqaluit dans le Grand Nord profitent également de places poupons à 10 $ par jour.

Dans onze des 35 villes incluses dans notre rapport, la garde de poupons à 10 $ par jour est déjà une réalité. Pour les villes qui restent, autant celles où les frais de garde sont fixés par le gouvernement et celles où s’appliquent les prix courants du marché, ce n’est pas le cas.

Dans les villes de Lethbridge, Calgary et Edmonton en Alberta, les frais de garde pour les poupons sont de 15 $ par jour, tandis que le tarif quotidien le plus fréquent pour la garde de poupons est autour de 20 $ par jour dans seize villes de la province. C’est le cas aussi dans les villes de Saint-Jean, Moncton et Fredericton au Nouveau-Brunswick, où les parents paient 19 $ par jour pour une place poupon. Les parents dans toutes les villes de l’Ontario paient maintenant 22 $ par jour pour une place poupon comprise dans le PPAGJE.

La ville de Halifax (et en Nouvelle-Écosse en général) ainsi que les villes de la C.-B. sont coincées entre l’ancien monde des tarifs aux prix courants du marché et le nouveau monde des tarifs fixés. On constate le phénomène dans la figure 2 où ce sont les villes qui ont des régimes aux prix courants du marché qui affichent les frais de garde les plus élevés au Canada. À Halifax, les frais de garde médians pour poupons sont de 23 $ par jour.

Les villes de la C.-B. traînent pour ce qui est de la réduction des tarifs : les frais de garde pour poupons varient de 28 $ par jour à Kelowna à 52 $ par jour à Richmond, une banlieue de Vancouver.

Frais de garde pour enfants d’âge préscolaire en 2026

Il y a souvent une catégorie « bambins » qui s’insère entre les catégories « poupons » et « enfants d’âge préscolaires » dans la plupart des provinces et territoires. Toutefois, avec la simplification des structures tarifaires, cette catégorie se différencie beaucoup moins que par le passé, même si elle comporte des exigences réglementaires qui lui sont propres. Nous avons donc exclu la catégorie « bambins » de notre comparaison des frais de garde.

La catégorie « enfants d’âge préscolaire » correspond aux enfants sur le point d’entrer à l’école publique et regroupent en gros les enfants âgés de trois ans à quatre ou cinq ans, tout dépendant si dans la province ou le territoire en question on offre la maternelle quatre ans et cinq ans. Dans un régime de tarifs aux prix courants du marché, les fournisseurs de services appliquent souvent des tarifs moins élevés pour les enfants d’âge préscolaire que pour les poupons parce que le ratio éducatrice-enfant est moins élevé. Les places destinées aux enfants d’âge préscolaire sont les plus fréquentes, de sorte qu’elles sont plus faciles à trouver pour les parents que les places poupons.

Comme pour les places poupons, la plupart des parents dans les villes incluses dans notre rapport ne paient pas 10 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire. Certains oui : notamment au Québec, en 2026, dans les villes de Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montréal et Québec, les parents d’enfants d’âge préscolaire paient la somme fixe de 9,65 $ par jour. Les parents des villes de Charlottetown et de St. John’s du Canada atlantique paient 10 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire. Les parents des villes de Winnipeg, de Saskatoon et de Regina dans les Prairies paient également 10 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire, tout comme les parents d’Iqaluit dans le grand Nord.

Les parents des villes de Lethbridge, Edmonton et Calgary en Alberta paient 15 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire, soit cinquante pour cent plus cher que l’objectif de 10 $ par jour. Les parents des villes de Saint-Jean, Moncton et Fredericton au Nouveau-Brunswick (où les frais de garde varient selon d’âge des enfants) paient 16 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire. Les parents des grandes villes de l’Ontario et de Halifax, où s’appliquent les tarifs aux prix courants du marché, paient 22 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire.

Enfin, en Colombie-Britannique, les frais de garde médians varient de 24 $ à 42 $ par jour à Kelowna et Richmond respectivement. En dépit d’une petite minorité de garderies à 10 $ par jour dans la province, le régime de tarifs aux prix courants du marché persiste dans les villes de la C.-B. Les nouvelles garderies appliquent des tarifs plus élevés et les frais de garde grimpent. Les réductions de tarifs consenties par la province—dont la valeur n’a pas changé depuis décembre 2022—s’érodent.

Économies substantielles pour les parents

Dans les rapports précédents de cette série sur les frais de garde, nous comparions les frais de garde de 2019 (année de référence du PPAGJE) aux frais de garde en vigueur l’année du rapport. Mais cette comparaison sous-estime les économies pour les parents. De 2019 à 2026, les prix dans l’ensemble du Canada ont augmenté en général de vingt-quatre pour cent.¹⁴ Dans nos rapports d’avant 2019, nous notions que les frais de garde augmentaient à un rythme plus accéléré que l’inflation. C’est ainsi que dans la présente analyse, 2019 sera notre année de comparaison pour les frais de garde de 2026, mais ajustée à l’inflation générale au cours de cette période et non les frais de garde élevés attribuables à l’inflation d’avant 2019. Par conséquent, les économies pour les parents affichées dans les figures 3 et 4 sont vraisemblablement des estimations prudentes.

Les économies des parents pour la garde de leurs poupons depuis l’avènement du PPAGJE sont beaucoup plus importantes que pour leurs enfants plus âgés. Dans la plupart des villes incluses dans notre rapport de 2019, les tarifs aux prix courants du marché s’appliquaient, de sorte que les frais de garde pour poupons étaient beaucoup plus élevés. Puisque la plupart des villes ont maintenant adopté la formule d’un tarif fixé et unique pour tous les groupes d’âge, ce sont les services de garde pour poupons qui génèrent le plus d’économies pour les parents.

Les économies mensuelles de loin les plus importantes pour la garde des poupons ont été à Toronto où les parents épargnent plus de 1 800 $ par mois à comparer aux tarifs ajustés à l’inflation qu’ils devraient payer sans le financement du PPAGJE. Les parents dans les villes de la banlieue autour de Toronto (Mississauga, Richmond Hill, Brampton, Vaughan, Markham et Oakville) économisent également de 1 300 $ à 1 500 $ par mois pour la garde de leurs poupons.

On pourrait être tenté de conclure que le PPAGJE a connu plus de succès en Ontario relativement à la réduction des frais de garde, vu ces économies. Mais cela peut aussi signifier que les tarifs étaient tellement élevés avant le PPAGJE que leur réduction et leur régularisation ont généré plus d’économies en Ontario que dans les autres provinces qui elles avaient contrôlé le coût des services de garde jusqu’en 2019.

Les parents de poupons à Iqaluit économisent 1 374 $ en frais de garde par rapport à ce qu’ils auraient eu à payer sans le PPAGJE. Dans la plupart des autres villes du Canada, grâce au PPAGJE, les parents économisent de 500 $ à 1 000 $ par mois pour la garde de leurs poupons.

Quant aux villes en Colombie-Britannique, les parents qui s’y trouvent paient maintenant le plus cher au pays pour la garde de leurs poupons. Malgré cela, ils économisent à comparer à ce qu’ils devraient payer sans le PPAGJE et même si leurs économies sont bien moindres qu’ailleurs au Canada, les parents de poupons en C.-B. épargnent de 300 $ à 500 $ par mois.

Au Québec, la province qui a la plus longue expérience de frais de garde fixés par le gouvernement et d’un programme de financement de fonctionnement et d’indexation annuelle des frais de garde, il n’y a pratiquement pas d’économies pour les parents si on compare avant le PPAGJE; néanmoins, en 2026, les frais de garde sont à 9,65 $ par jour, les plus bas au Canada.

Les économies des parents pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire sont moins importantes, mais non négligeables. Les épargnes sont moindres parce les frais de garde pour les enfants d’âge préscolaire étaient moins chers en 2019 que pour les poupons dans les régimes aux tarifs déterminés comme dans les régimes aux prix courants du marché. Par conséquent, la plus grande simplicité du point de vue administratif qu’implique un même tarif pour tous les groupes d’âge génère en quelque sorte moins d’économies pour ces parents.

Une fois de plus, utilisant les frais de garde de 2026 ajustés à l’inflation, c’est à Calgary que les économies pour la garde d’enfants d’âge préscolaire ont été les plus considérables, les parents épargnant plus de 1 300 $ par mois grâce au PPAGJE. À Iqaluit, la situation est semblable : les parents épargnent un peu moins de 1 300 $ par mois pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire. À Toronto et dans ses banlieues, grâce au PPAGJE, les parents économisent de 900 $ à 1 000 $ par mois pour la garde de leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire.

Dans beaucoup de grandes villes, les épargnes pour la garde d’enfants d’âge préscolaire attribuables au PPAGJE varient de 400 $ à 800 $ par mois.

Une fois de plus, les parents économisent moins dans les villes de la C.-B., notamment à Richmond, où les parents épargnent seulement 264 $ par mois comparativement à ce qu’ils paieraient sans le PPAGJE (ou le Programme provincial de réduction des frais de garde—CCRFI). En 2019, les frais de garde à Winnipeg, qui sont fixés par le gouvernement, étaient peu élevés. À l’époque, ils variaient selon le groupe d’âge, donc les parents épargnent 335 $ par mois dans cette ville.

Pour les parents du Québec, il n’y a pratiquement pas d’économies en 2026 par rapport aux tarifs de 2019. Le même tarif fixe s’appliquait à tous les groupes d’âge au Québec en 2019. Maintenant, les frais de garde sont indexés annuellement en fonction de l’inflation. En 2026, les frais de garde pour les enfants d’âge préscolaire, comme pour les poupons, sont de 9,65 $ par jour.

Ces données et notre analyse démontrent que la plupart des parents qui ont accès à une place en service de garde financée par le PPAGJE économisent substantiellement comparativement à ce que payaient les parents avant le PPAGJE, surtout lorsque l’inflation est prise en compte. Avant le PPAGJE, les frais de garde pouvaient varier d’une garderie et d’un service de garde en milieu familial agréé à l’autre. Seulement quatre provinces fixaient les tarifs en 2019 (quoique à hauteur variable). Aujourd’hui, seulement quatre provinces et territoires n’ont pas de tarifs déterminés par le gouvernement. En outre, en 2019, les frais de garde variaient beaucoup plus en fonction de l’âge des enfants, ce qui augmentait la complexité.

Dans l’ensemble, lorsque l’on compare les tarifs de 2019 d’avant le PPAGJE à ceux de 2026, le tout ajusté à l’inflation, c’est en Colombie-Britannique et en Nouvelle-Écosse, deux provinces qui ont conservé les tarifs aux prix courants du marché, que les parents économisent le moins sur leurs frais de garde. Ainsi, il vaut la peine d’examiner de plus près ces provinces fidèles à l’ancien régime des prix courants du marché.

Dans de nombreuses villes, comme nous l’avons mentionné précédemment, les parents paient beaucoup plus que 10 $ par jour. Six provinces et territoires ont décidé que le montant de 10 $ par jour ne devrait pas être une moyenne, mais bien le maximum à payer. Si les autres provinces et territoires suivaient, dans certaines villes, les avantages seraient considérables pour les parents.

Pour les parents de Richmond en C.-B., le passage à un tarif maximum de 10 $ par jour pour la garde de poupons générerait des économies de plus de 900 $ par mois, la somme la plus importante de toutes les villes de la province, vu les frais de garde élevés dans cette ville. Les parents de Vancouver épargneraient 648 $ par mois si les frais de garde étaient à 10 $ par jour, et les parents de Burnaby et Surrey épargneraient 500 $ par mois pour la garde de leurs poupons. Les parents de Halifax épargneraient 282 $ par mois. Les parents de l’Ontario épargneraient 260 $ par mois si on appliquait un tarif de 10 $ par jour plutôt que les 22 $ par jour qu’ils paient actuellement. Les parents de l’Alberta et de la Nouvelle-Écosse feraient des économies de 100 $ à 200 $ par mois, respectivement, si ces provinces adoptaient le tarif de 10 $ par jour pour la garde de poupons.

Les autres villes de notre étude ont déjà adopté un tarif de 10 $ par jour ou moins, de sorte qu’elles ne sont pas incluses dans le tableau.

Persistance des tarifs aux prix courants du marché et commercialisation

La Colombie-Britannique et la Nouvelle-Écosse conservent les tarifs aux prix courants du marché quoique les deux gouvernements gèrent certains aspects des frais de garde. Ainsi, les fournisseurs de services n’ont pas autant de marge de manœuvre qu’ils avaient avant l’avènement du PPAGJE. Toutefois, dans les deux provinces, les garderies et les services de garde en milieu familial agréés peuvent appliquer des tarifs différents d’un service de garde à l’autre. Les parents paient donc tout un éventail de prix outre les médianes susmentionnées. Dans les deux provinces, le paysage des services de garde est différent. Elles ont utilisé des approches stratégiques différentes depuis le début du PPAGJE en 2021.

En Colombie-Britannique, les frais de garde sont en hausse, car les prix à l’entrée augmentent, mais la réduction forfaitaire accordée par la province—dont la valeur a été établie en 2022—n’augmente pas. La réduction forfaitaire des frais de garde en Colombie-Britannique n’a pas changé depuis décembre 2022, mais les frais de garde de base augmentent eux à un taux contrôlé de trois pour cent par année (ou plus avec autorisation spéciale). À moins que le montant forfaitaire en argent versé par la province n’augmente au fil du temps, ce sont les parents qui assument l’écart et pour qui, en fin de compte, les frais de garde nets à payer sont plus élevés.

Nous avons déjà mentionné que les frais de garde sont en hausse dans les villes de la C.-B. et varient considérablement d’un fournisseur de services de garde à l’autre. Les tarifs demandés pour les nouvelles places ajoutées aux réseaux depuis 2021 sont plafonnés en fonction de la région, mais on peut les négocier à la hausse dans des circonstances spéciales. De plus, les tarifs indiqués au tableau 4 ne s’appliquent qu’aux nouvelles garderies. La structure tarifaire des services de garde en milieu familial est différente. Ces tarifs maximums sont fixés au 80e percentile de la fourchette des frais de garde pour les enfants de 18 mois et moins et au 75e percentile pour les autres groupes d’âge.

La mise en service des nouvelles places a pour résultat net d’augmenter la médiane des frais de garde. Les tarifs maximums de ces nouvelles places sont plus élevés que quatre-vingt pour cent des autres tarifs pour les enfants de 18 mois et plus (définition du 80e percentile par rapport au 50e percentile). Au fil du temps, cela exercera plus de pression à la hausse sur les frais de garde. Dans l’ensemble, comprendre et composer avec les frais de garde est un exercice complexe et opaque pour les parents de la C.-B.

Les garderies et les SGMF dans le secteur en croissance—mais au demeurant restreint—des installations à 10 $ par jour en C.-B. perçoivent 10 $ par jour par enfant pour une pleine journée de garde (ou 7 $ par jour pour un mi-temps). La C.-B. compte 12 400 places pleine journée (pour des enfants d’âge non scolaire) à 10 $ par jour,¹⁵ ce qui représente douze pour cent de cette catégorie de places. Les parents qui ont la chance d’obtenir une place dans une de ces installations profitent de frais de garde beaucoup moins élevés et d’une formule de tarification plus transparente. Ces programmes ne sont pas répartis équitablement dans les différentes villes de la province : quarante-cinq pour cent des places pour enfants d’âge préscolaire à Vancouver sont à 10 $ par jour, tandis que seulement dix-huit pour cent des places à Kelowna et moins de dix pour cent des places dans Richmond et Surrey sont à 10 $ par jour. Dans certaines régions, comme dans la vallée du Fraser, il n’y a que trois pour cent des places à 10 $ par jour.¹⁶ Il faut y voir en partie le fait que Vancouver compte un pourcentage beaucoup plus élevé de fournisseurs de services de garde à but non lucratif qui sont plus susceptibles d’être retenus pour participer au programme des places à 10 $ par jour.

La figure 7 présente la répartition de la fourchette de tarifs des places pour enfants d’âge préscolaire dans certaines villes de la C.-B. Nous avons classé les places en C.-B. à partir des tarifs les plus bas au plus élevés, avec des points de repère à dix pour cent du coût le moins élevé, ensuite à vingt-cinq pour cent et ainsi de suite.

La figure 7 montre que Vancouver affiche les frais de garde les plus bas pour la plupart des parents : quarante-cinq pour cent des places pour enfants d’âge préscolaire coûtent aux parents 10 $ par jour. Par contre, Vancouver illustre deux extrêmes : la ville compte également les places qui coûtent le plus cher à Vancouver, vingt-cinq pour cent des familles continuent de payer plus de 46 $ par jour pour une place pleine journée (temps plein) pour leurs enfants d’âge préscolaire. Les places situées dans la tranche supérieure des cinq pour cent coûtent plus de 69 $ par jour aux parents.

Kelowna affiche le tarif médian pour enfants d’âge préscolaire le moins élevé à 24 $ par jour, et ce, malgré le nombre proportionnellement moins élevé de places à 10 $ par jour qui s’y trouvent. Une bonne part des tarifs au centre de sa fourchette joue entre 20 $ et 30 $ par jour et les tarifs dans la tranche supérieure des cinq pour cent sont moins élevés que dans d’autres villes, à 38 $ par jour.

Surrey et Richmond où un peu moins de dix pour cent des places pour enfants d’âge préscolaire coûtent 10 $ par jour, offrant par conséquent moins d’options abordables aux parents. Par contre, les frais de garde les plus élevés dans Surrey ne le sont pas autant que dans Vancouver ou Richmond, qui plafonnent à 59 $ par jour dans la tranche supérieure des cinq pour cent.

Richmond est à égalité avec Vancouver pour ses tarifs médians les plus élevés des villes de la C.-B., comme indiqué précédemment. C’est en partie parce que la ville compte relativement peu de places à 10 $ par jour. Toutefois, même au-delà de ce point, les frais de garde y sont plus élevés que n’importe où ailleurs sur toute l’échelle de distribution des tarifs. À Richmond, vingt-cinq pour cent des parents paient au moins 57 $ par jour pour la garde de leurs enfants. Dans l’ensemble, pour la plupart des parents de Richmond, les frais de garde sont beaucoup plus élevés que dans d’autres grandes villes de la C.- B, peu importe où elles se situent dans l’échelle de distribution des tarifs.

Incidence du type de propriété sur les frais de garde : illustration en C.-B.

Les données sur les frais de garde en Colombie-Britannique fournissent une bonne démonstration de la relation qui existe entre le type de propriété et les frais de garde. Les rapports de cette série sur les frais de garde ont trouvé qu’il y avait historiquement, avant et après le PPAGJE, une corrélation entre le type de propriété de la garderie et les frais de garde. En effet, les tarifs moyens des garderies à but lucratif (BL) dans une ville sont presque toujours plus élevés que ceux des garderies sans but lucratif (SBL).¹⁷

Dans cette section, nous regroupons les sociétés à but non lucratif, les organismes de bienfaisance et les garderies publiques (municipalité, conseils scolaires et établissements postsecondaires) dans la catégorie « sans but lucratif » (SBL) et toutes les garderies appartenant à des particuliers et les entreprises commerciales dans la catégorie « but lucratif » (BL). Les services de garde en milieu familial ne font pas partie de cette analyse.

Comme le montre la figure 8, à tous les points sur l’échelle de distribution des tarifs, dans toutes les villes, les frais de garde dans les garderies SBL sont moins élevés. La différence la plus marquante est à Vancouver où sur presque tous les points de la figure, les frais de garde des garderies BL sont au moins 30 $ plus chers par jour que ceux des garderies SBL. La chose est attribuable en partie à la proportion relativement plus élevée de places à 10 $ par jour dans Vancouver; en effet, plus de la moitié des places SBL dans la ville sont dans des installations participant au programme à 10 $ par jour. Vancouver affiche, par ailleurs, parmi les frais de garde les plus élevés de toutes les villes, mais ce sont les garderies à but lucratif qui en sont le moteur. Il convient de souligner que les politiques locales de planification à long terme à Vancouver ont mené à ce modèle de propriété. Puisque Vancouver compte deux fois plus de places SBL que de places BL, un nombre plus grand de parents ont accès à des tarifs moins élevés.

Dans Burnaby et Richmond, on constate que les places BL coûtent beaucoup plus cher aux parents—entre 20 $ et 40 $ par jour. La différence est particulièrement désolante dans la fourchette élevée à Burnaby : les places SBL plafonnent à 42 $ par jour, tandis que les places BL atteignent jusqu’à 80 $ par jour. À la différence de Vancouver, Burnaby et Richmond comptent plus de places BL que de places SBL; ainsi, les parents sont beaucoup plus susceptibles d’avoir à payer 20 $ de plus au moins par jour en raison du facteur BL.

Les différences attribuables au type de propriété sont moins frappantes dans Kelowna, les deux modèles (BL et SBL) appliquant des tarifs dans une fourchette variant de 20 $ à 30 $ par jour. Néanmoins, les garderies SBL demeurent moins chers pour les parents à tous les points de la figure.

Si nous comparions les graphiques de distribution des tarifs de la C.-B. à ceux de l’Ontario ou de l’Alberta, d’autres grandes provinces qui ont maintenant adopté les tarifs fixés par le gouvernement, il n’y aurait pas de différences attribuables au type de propriété; la ligne serait droite à 22 $ par jour pour l’Ontario et 15 $ par jour pour l’Alberta.

Il convient de considérer que si la Colombie-Britannique adoptait un régime de tarifs déterminés pour tous les services de garde destinés aux enfants de cinq ans et moins, et pas uniquement pour une petite minorité, au début, les différences de tarifs entre les garderies BL et SBL créeraient d’importantes pressions financières. Le gouvernement provincial devrait supporter le fardeau des coûts supplémentaires attribuables au facteur BL si ces places devaient demeurer dans le giron du PPAGJE.

Les nouvelles places créées depuis l’avènement du PPAGJE l’ont été massivement dans le secteur à but lucratif.¹⁸

Des pressions similaires sur les coûts existent aussi dans d’autres provinces qui ont fait la transition vers un régime de tarifs déterminés, comme l’Ontario et l’Alberta, quoique d’une manière moins visible. Ces pressions se font en coulisse. Les fournisseurs BL pressent les gouvernements de leur verser des paiements plus élevés et de leur permettre d’augmenter leurs tarifs afin de faire porter aux parents le fardeau des coûts attribuables au facteur BL.

Nouvelle-Écosse

La Nouvelle-Écosse est une autre illustration des tarifs aux prix courants du marché, mais l’approche de la province suivant l’avènement du PPAGJE a été différente de celle de la C.-B.

Même s’il est permis en Colombie-Britannique d’augmenter les tarifs de base, en Nouvelle-Écosse, les tarifs de la plupart des services de garde participant au PPAGJE (ce qui comprend presque tous les services de garde agréés) sont assez contrôlés. Les tarifs des fournisseurs de services de garde qui ont adhéré au PPAGJE en 2021 ont été gelés à ce moment-là et (comme en C.-B.) la réduction forfaitaire provinciale des tarifs pour compenser les coûts est également demeurée au même niveau depuis. Par contre, les frais de garde des nouvelles places ajoutées au système sont fixés comme il est indiqué dans le tableau 5, bien que l’on puisse obtenir l’autorisation de percevoir plus que ces maximums. Cette structure tarifaire est compliquée parce que les frais de garde varient d’une région à l’autre et selon l’âge des enfants. De plus, la Nouvelle-Écosse compte un petit nombre de garderies qui ne participent pas au PPAGJE et qui peuvent demander le prix que le marché est prêt à supporter.

Le gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Écosse souligne que les frais de garde moyens sont de 12,13 $ par jour, incluant toutes les places subventionnées pour les familles à faible revenu et les places pour enfants d’âge scolaire (la tranche d’âge qui suit celle des enfants d’âge préscolaire et pour qui les frais de garde sont les moins élevés).¹⁹ Toutefois, en examinant la médiane dans la ville de Halifax, on constate que ce tarif s’applique à la fourchette de familles de la classe moyenne avec des enfants dans chaque tranche d’âge et qu’elle n’est pas la moyenne des différences.

La Nouvelle-Écosse et la Colombie-Britannique sont toutes deux coincées entre l’ancien système de tarification fondé sur les prix courants du marché et le plus récent régime de tarifs fixés par le gouvernement, ce qui fait que les frais de garde dans leurs villes ne sont pas seulement les plus chers, mais sont aussi les plus difficiles à gérer pour les parents, chaque fournisseur de services de garde étant susceptible d’appliquer des tarifs différents (quoique moins chers qu’ils ne l’auraient été sans le PPAGJE).

Comme nous l’avons indiqué, remplacer le système des tarifs aux prix courants du marché par le régime de frais de garde fixés par le gouvernement, comme l’ont fait la plupart des provinces et territoires, est une première étape importante. La mesure doit s’accompagner de politiques strictes visant à contrôler les pressions de coûts dictées par des fournisseurs BL, habitués à appliquer des tarifs élevés sans limites à leur marge de profit.

Implications au chapitre des politiques

Les transferts fédéraux aux provinces et territoires pour la garde d’enfants ont été établis dans l’Énoncé économique du printemps à un peu plus de 8 milliards de dollars par année, à tout le moins pour les quatre prochaines années, jusqu’en 2030-2031.²⁰ Toutefois, en juin 2026, à ce montant s’est ajoutée une somme additionnelle de 5,4 milliards de dollars sur deux ans—un surplus d’un tiers, ce qui représente un changement important du financement fédéral, à tout le moins pour les deux prochaines années. Ce qui amène l’investissement fédéral à 11 milliards de dollars pour l’année financière 2026-2027 et l’année financière 2027-2028.²¹ Cette hausse de financement majeure, si elle se poursuit après les deux prochaines années, pourrait permettre de surmonter les difficultés que souligne notre analyse.

L’annonce de ces nouveaux investissements fédéraux dans la garde d’enfants est un signe encourageant. En effet, des recherches probantes s’accumulent sans cesse et démontrent qu’un système de services de garde bien conçus et financés par les fonds publics génère de solides retombées économiques et financières. Des analyses récentes^{22 23}montrent que les investissements publics dans des services de garde abordables s’autofinancent facilement, notamment en ce qu’ils accroissent la participation des mères au marché du travail qui, à leur tour, paient des impôts et contribuent à la croissance économique. Par conséquent, les investissements soutenus et accrus dans la garde d’enfants sont un volet essentiel d’une stratégie économique fiscalement responsable—il s’agit d’un investissement dans l’infrastructure sociale et pas uniquement d’une dépense.

Les parents peuvent constater que même si les frais de garde ont diminué, ils sont loin d’être à 10 $ par jour à bien des endroits. De plus, même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de places, parce que les frais de garde sont moins élevés, la demande a augmenté et les listes d’attente se sont multipliées. Des règles et des systèmes complexes créent des obstacles pour les parents. Les parents à faible revenu sont souvent laissés pour compte en raison de politiques qui limitent leur accès aux services de garde. L’offre de places est souvent entravée par le manque de financement pour les immobilisations et par un nombre trop restreint d’éducatrices et d’éducateurs qualifiés pour faire fonctionner les services de garde. Sur la base de données probantes, les engagements du PPAGJE donnaient préséance à la création des nouvelles places principalement dans le secteur sans but lucratif, mais la part du lion de la croissance a eu lieu dans le secteur à but lucratif, et ce, avec l’apport des fonds publics du PPAGJE.

Il reste beaucoup de travail à faire comme en témoigne notre rapport. À moins de modifier l’approche de base, ces tendances vont se poursuivre. La prochaine phase pour bâtir le système de services de garde du Canada exige un plan à long terme pour remplir les engagements pris par le gouvernement fédéral en 2021 et énoncés dans la nouvelle loi fédérale et cela exigera aussi plus de planification concertée et fondée sur la recherche de la part des provinces et des territoires. La première ronde de financement du PPPAGJE a été fédérale, mais l’optique était que les dépenses provinciales et territoriales représentent cinquante pour cent du financement. De plus, on devrait continuer de mettre l’accent sur la réduction des frais de garde jusqu’à ce qu’ils atteignent au maximum 10 $ par jour comme promis et non simplement se contenter d’une « moyenne ».

La création du premier système canadien de services de garde à l’enfance a connu de nombreux succès importants. Par contre, personne ne s’attendait à ce que tout le travail se fasse en cinq ans. Bâtir un système de services de garde qui fonctionne pour tous—les familles, les femmes, les enfants et l’économie—exigera du financement stable et accru, des politiques détaillées et de la planification à long terme afin de tenir la promesse de services de garde abordables, accessibles et de qualité élevée pour tous.

À propos de ce rapport

Le présent rapport, l’un d’une série de rapports annuels produits par le Centre canadien de politiques alternatives (CCPA) sur les frais de garde au Canada, documente les variations au fil du temps, compare entre eux les frais de garde d’avant et d’après l’avènement du PPAGJE et examine les différentes approches des provinces et territoires pour améliorer l’abordabilité. Il se penche aussi sur les implications pour l’avenir.

Cette collection de rapports sur les frais de garde du CCPA est l’unique source de données pancanadiennes recueillies et analysées régulièrement sur les tarifs appliqués dans des services de garde à l’enfance réglementés du pays. À partir de son premier sondage réalisé en 2014, le CCPA a rendu compte tous les ans des frais de garde perçus dans les garderies agréées, les CPE et les services de garde en milieu familial réglementés de grandes villes canadiennes, surveillant les tarifs demandés dans l’ensemble du Canada et au fil du temps. Une des forces des rapports sur les frais de garde du CCPA est que la méthode de collecte de données a été uniforme pendant toutes ces années, de sorte que les comparaisons sont possibles d’une année à l’autre et d’une ville à l’autre.

Cette initiative a été lancée afin de produire et d’analyser des données comparables et cohérentes sur les frais de garde payés par les parents pour un service de garde agréé au Canada étant donné qu’aucune autre source de données n’existait à cet égard. En s’appuyant sur les listes provinciales et territoriales de services de garde agréés, le CCPA a utilisé au départ un sondage téléphonique pour recueillir un ensemble de données auprès des fournisseurs de services de garde en garderie et en milieu familial réglementés situés dans les plus grandes villes du Canada. Le sondage a commencé par vingt villes pour en arriver à trente-cinq, réparties dans l’ensemble des provinces et territoires.

Les rapports examinent les frais de garde du point de vue des fournisseurs des services et des tarifs qu’ils appliquent; ils ne contiennent pas de données sur le montant payé par les parents pour leurs services de garde. Des frais de garde médians sont utilisés pour les comparaisons. Ces médianes sont pondérées en fonction du nombre de places; ainsi le poids d’une garderie avec une plus grande capacité d’accueil est supérieur à celui d’une garderie ou d’un service de garde en milieu familial comptant un plus petit nombre de places. Une médiane est moins influencée par les tarifs extrêmes qu’une moyenne pondérée. La médiane est le point où la moitié de toutes les places sont les plus chères et la moitié sont les moins chères. Dans les provinces et territoires qui ont un régime à tarifs déterminés (fixés par le gouvernement), la médiane est le tarif déterminé, pourvu qu’au moins la moitié des places dans cette ville fasse partie du régime à tarifs déterminés. Il convient de souligner que même si les villes au Québec comptent de forts pourcentages de places qui n’adhèrent pas au tarif déterminé par le gouvernement, ces pourcentages ne représentent jamais la moitié des places. De même en Ontario, quoique le pourcentage de places qui ne font pas partie du système à tarifs réduits est beaucoup moins élevé qu’au Québec. Les places en dehors du PPAGJE augmentent avec la croissance du système de services de garde globalement, mais elles sont toujours loin d’atteindre la moitié des places.

La plupart des années, nous ajoutions quelques questions à nos rapports sur les frais de garde et nous réalisions des analyses d’intérêt particulier. Nous avons posé des questions à propos des listes d’attente dans les garderies, des frais pour s’inscrire à ces listes d’attente et de la propriété des garderies—but lucratif et sans but lucratif. Comme le nombre de provinces et de territoires adhérant aux régimes de tarifs déterminés (et que la contribution des parents aux recettes des services de garde a été remplacée par le financement public) a augmenté, les services de garde aux prix courants du marché dans toutes les provinces et tous les territoires (ceux non assujettis aux tarifs déterminés par le gouvernement) ont été analysés séparément. En 2015, une analyse distincte a été réalisée afin de déterminer combien devaient débourser de leurs poches les familles à faible revenu admissibles aux subventions pour frais de garde pour payer la différence entre la subvention reçue et le tarif demandé. En 2017, les fournisseurs de services de garde dans les collectivités rurales de l’Ontario et de l’Alberta ont été sondés dans le but de répondre à la question suivante : « Les frais de garde en milieu rural sont-ils moins élevés que dans les centres urbains? ». Parce que l’augmentation de l’offre de services de garde réglementés était devenue un enjeu déterminant, dans notre sondage de 2023, nous avons posé la question suivante aux fournisseurs de services de garde afin de déterminer leur capacité de croissance : « Pourriez-vous inscrire un enfant de plus au cours de la semaine prochaine? »

Remerciements

Les auteurs souhaitent remercier les lectrices et lecteurs suivants pour leurs précieux commentaires entourant une des premières versions du présent document : Morna Ballantyne, Jane Beach, Ariane Hotte, Molly McCracken, Susan Prentice, Christine Saulnier, Eric Swanson, Ricardo Tranjan.

The post Division des places à 10 $ par jour : les frais de garde d’enfants au Canada en 2026 appeared first on CCPA.

Ontario’s new Data Centre Playbook will be open to a 30-day public comment period. There’s time for the public to ensure future AI data centres are operated in the public interest. The draft playbook falls short in these key ways:

• It doesn’t guarantee municipalities the right to turn down a data centre proposal because it gives the provincial government the final say. It also fails to put limits on big lobbyists’ power to manipulate municipalities into saying yes to data centres.
• It doesn’t guarantee full transparency about who owns the data centre, what it will be used for, or how many resources (like electricity and water) it will consume.
• It doesn’t establish binding limits on the use of fossil fuels as behind-the-meter power sources, cooling practices, waste disposal, or noise—problems that are plaguing communities that already have data centres.
• It doesn’t do enough to ensure that the economic benefits of AI data centres are captured by Ontario workers, businesses and communities.

This analysis identifies ways to improve Ontario’s data centre playbook and provides tools for the public to judge whether an AI data centre in your community is right for you.

Who benefits from AI data centres in Ontario?

Ontario says it wants to attract the “best” data centres. But best for whom?

On August 13, the Ontario government released a draft of its Data Centre Playbook alongside a 30-day public comment period through the Environmental Registry of Ontario (ERO) and Ontario Regulatory Registry (ORR). The playbook presents data centres as a cornerstone of the future economy, arguing they can strengthen Canadian digital sovereignty, create jobs and generate tax revenue. Ontario is positioning itself as a discerning host, promising to only select projects that offer the greatest economic benefits while meeting the highest environmental standards.

The rapid expansion of hyperscale data centres elsewhere has shown Canadians what can happen when governments prioritize development without establishing adequate safeguards. In the United States, electricity prices have risen more than 200 per cent for some residents. The use of behind-the-meter gas turbines has raised concerns about increased emissions and poor air quality. Constant low-frequency noise has disrupted sleep and quality of life. Community involvement has been minimal. Developers have lobbied local officials, used non-disclosure agreements to sidestep public consultation, and targeted rural jurisdictions that have less political power to resist when they come looking for cheap land, electricity and water.

Premier Doug Ford has dismissed growing public opposition to data centres as NIMBYism and misinformed social media politics. The province announced the playbook as a good faith commitment to ensure Ontarians capture the benefits of data centres while bearing the fewest possible costs. The playbook’s existence is itself a notable step. It acknowledges that the current policy vacuum, and the near total absence of minimum guidelines, cannot continue. 

As data centre proposals move through municipalities across the country, all levels of government will increasingly face pressure to establish common standards for how these facilities are approved and regulated. So, what would a public interest data centre policy framework require? Drawing on our research into the data centre boom and its impacts, we assess the Ontario draft against four basic thresholds.  

1. Does it require full transparency?

A framework meets this threshold if the public can find out, by default and before approval, who owns the data centre, what it will be used for, and the types and quantities of resources it will consume. This information should be publicly available throughout the facility’s operation and should not require a freedom of information request.

Ontario’s playbook describes two internal assessments (the Strategic Priority Assessment and the System Impact Assessment) that the government will use to evaluate proposed projects. However, it does not specify whether or when the results will be made public. Nor does it mention requiring developers to disclose their ownership structures, publish records of meetings between proponents (or the lobbyists representing them) and government, or prevent non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) from shielding important financial or environmental information from public scrutiny.

This transparency gap is particularly significant given the playbook’s emphasis on achieving digital sovereignty. It is important to note that a Canadian-owned data centre on Canadian soil does not, on its own, guarantee digital sovereignty. Canadian data can still be exposed to U.S. law under the CLOUD Act, depending on whether the provider also services U.S. clients or relies on U.S. software. Canadian ownership tells us very little about what kinds of data a facility is processing or who may ultimately have access to it.

Assessment: As currently drafted, Ontario’s playbook does not meet the transparency threshold.

2. Does it establish real environmental limits, or just commit to using better technology?

A framework meets this threshold when it sets enforceable limits on environmental impacts and clear restrictions on how data centres meet their electricity needs. Governments are notorious for treating newer technologies as a substitute for actual limits. Closed-loop cooling, waste heat recovery and renewable energy sourcing may all be improvements over the alternatives, but none establishes a limit on how much water, electricity or other resources a data centre can consume.

Ontario’s playbook gets one important piece right: it requires data centres to pay the full cost of their electricity, including generation and transmission upgrades, rather than passing those costs onto other ratepayers. But it says much less about how data centres will meet their electricity needs when grid capacity is constrained, or how they will maintain continuous operations when grid power is unavailable.

For facilities designed to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, backup power is a central operational requirement. A data centre can pay the full cost of connecting to the grid while still relying on gas, diesel or other carbon-intensive backup sources to provide additional or emergency power. Even limited fossil-fuel use can produce significant emissions when multiplied across hyperscale facilities. If backup systems are regularly tested or used during periods of peak demand, they become a source of emissions that runs counter to Ontario’s clean electricity narrative.

If Ontario wants to promote its clean and reliable grid as a cornerstone of sustainable data centre development, its playbook should also set limits on behind-the-meter generation and fossil-fuel backup. For example, after a four-year moratorium, Ireland now requires data centres to meet 80 per cent of their annual electricity demand from additional renewable energy sources. 

Meanwhile, the operational impacts of data centres are brushed over through technological solutionism. The playbook presents closed-loop and direct-to-chip cooling as clear environmental improvements, emphasizing that they can reduce water consumption to “less than a golf course”. New cooling technologies can reduce one environmental impact while creating or shifting others. For example, closed-loop cooling uses significantly more energy and relies on chemicals such as glycol and anti-corrosives that require management and periodic discharge. In Cheyenne, Wyoming, wastewater from a closed-loop system at a Meta facility was discharged into the city’s water system, forcing the municipality to adopt stronger regulations for its disposal.

The same logic applies to noise. The playbook’s appendix refers to “noise-reduction engineering” but does not establish clear decibel thresholds, setbacks from residential areas, or standards calibrated for continuous operation. Quieter equipment and noise mitigation are important (yet costly) design choices, but a framework should establish a minimum standard that the public—and local governments—can use to hold developers accountable.

Assessment: Ontario’s playbook falls short on this threshold. While the draft sets clear rules on electricity cost recovery, it does not establish binding limits on the use of fossil fuels as behind-the-meter power sources, cooling practices, waste disposal, or noise. 

3. Can communities hosting these projects actually say no?

A framework meets this threshold when communities and local governments have a meaningful role in deciding whether a data centre proceeds, not simply a role in negotiating the terms of a project that has already been prioritized by higher levels of government. Community benefit agreements are good, but they are not a substitute for the ability to refuse a project.

Ontario’s playbook raises questions about who gets to make these decisions. Under the Protect Ontario by Securing Affordable Energy for Generations Act, the province has given itself final authority over which large-load projects, including data centres, can connect to the electricity grid. The playbook says these projects will be assessed through a “whole-of-government” process that weighs grid considerations alongside economic development, community investment and public confidence.

But what does this mean for municipalities? If the province has the final say over whether a data centre can connect to the grid, what meaningful decision-making power remains with the communities that will host it? The playbook does not answer this question.

Municipalities are already facing significant pressure when trying to slow or stop data centre development. Hamilton’s recent experience, where city council reversed course on a proposed moratorium amid lobbying and the threat of an Ontario Land Tribunal appeal, demonstrates how difficult it can be for municipalities to protect the public interest when faced with well-resourced lobbyists.

Assessment: Ontario’s playbook does not currently clear this threshold. If anything, it risks centralizing more decision-making power within the provincial government without clearly defining or protecting the role of municipalities in determining whether and how these projects proceed in their communities. It also fails to ensure strong checks and balances against big lobbyists.

4. Are the proposed economic benefits legitimate, or just plausible?

A framework meets this threshold when jobs, tax revenue, local procurement, compute access and supply chain participation come with binding commitments, specific allocations and reporting requirements. It should not simply assume these benefits will follow from large investments.

Ontario’s playbook treats community benefit agreements as central to project approval, which is a good starting point. But a community benefits agreement (CBA) only provides material benefits when communities have enough leverage to negotiate them, and the previous threshold shows how limited that leverage can be. The playbook’s other economic promises have a similar problem in that they are described as desired outcomes rather than secured through specific mechanisms.

For example, Pillar 1 of the Strategic Priority Assessment identifies helping Ontario businesses become “more productive and innovative, including through compute for Ontario SMEs [small and medium enterprises]” as a measure of success. Yet the playbook does not yet explain how this would work. There is no requirement for data centres to allocate compute capacity to Ontario SMEs, no pricing commitment and no mechanism for access. Without these measures, “access to compute” assumes that building data centres in Ontario will somehow translate into affordable compute for Ontario businesses. It’s not a policy commitment.

The approach to supply chains is similar. Pillar 1 calls for data centres to “support Ontario and Canada’s domestic supply chains and local supplier participation where feasible.” But “where feasible” leaves the commitment largely to the discretion of developers. More importantly, much of the material and equipment required to build and operate data centres, including servers, chips and other specialized hardware, is sourced through global supply chains. Canada has limited domestic capacity to produce many of these components. It is, therefore, difficult to know how much of this investment in data centres will actually remain in Ontario or Canada.

Furthermore, the 17,000 new jobs annually cited in the draft is not broken down by role, wage tier or permanence. It is unclear how many of these are long-term operational jobs or whether they will offset losses elsewhere in the labour market as AI adoption accelerates the potential for automation.

Assessment: Ontario’s playbook does not currently meet this threshold. It identifies economic benefits that could result from data centre development, but does not do enough to ensure that those benefits are captured by Ontario workers, businesses and communities.

What kind of AI economy is Ontario choosing to build? 

The four gaps identified in this analysis illustrate how Ontario is approaching data centre regulation through a technical and economic lens. The draft is primarily designed to make data centre development possible, not to ensure the AI economy underpinning the data centre boom is serving the public interest.

The playbook is framed almost entirely in economic terms, emphasizing $122 billion in projected growth, new jobs, and the goal of making Ontario the most competitive economy in the G7. Yet this does not account for the jobs AI may displace, or the  workers whose jobs are deskilled, surveilled or degraded by the AI systems these data centres are built to train and operate.

This narrow focus on data centres as an economic investment opportunity ignores how these projects are increasingly experienced by the communities that host them. Data centres have come to represent something much larger than a piece of infrastructure or a utility demand. For communities opposing these projects, they can represent the material reality of the AI economy: workplace disruption, the concentration of economic power, the erosion of privacy, and the growing role of private technology companies in public institutions and everyday life. These consequences are top of mind for many Canadians, and have yet to be adequately addressed.

At the moment, governments have failed to demonstrate that they can responsibly manage the electricity, water and economic impacts of data centres, let alone the larger questions about what that data centre makes possible. The growing movement opposing data centres is calling for more information and transparency—to ensure a well-informed public, and their governments. 

If governments want to build public confidence in AI, public interest policies and thresholds governing the infrastructure that enables it need to move alongside public interest policies governing how AI is developed and deployed. This requires all levels of government to ensure data centre policies are matched by stronger protections for workers, robust public education, personal privacy, information integrity, public sector capacity, environmental stewardship, and other areas where AI is already creating social risks.

A sustainable data centre strategy cannot be separated from the question of what kind of AI economy Ontario is choosing to build, and who that economy is meant to serve. And it’s the public that will pay the price.

The post Ontario’s new AI data centre playbook is flawed. We can fix it. appeared first on CCPA.

In P.E.I., renters are more likely to experience core housing need and struggle with affordability compared to home owners.¹ According to the last census, 14.1 per cent of renters were in core housing need compared to 3.8 per cent of homeowners. Further, 30.3 per cent of renters were paying 30 per cent or more of their income on their shelter costs (which means their housing wasn’t affordable), while a far lower percentage of homeowners in the province were doing the same (8.8 per cent). For renters, it is therefore of critical importance that they don’t face rent increases at this time, just as it was in 2023 when the government froze rents.²

Data from Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) also show that rents in the province are very high. On average, and based on data from the Fall of 2025, rents for a one-bedroom apartment are $1,067/month, which increase to $1,483 for a three-bedroom.³ Of course, we know, based on the Canadian Housing Survey, that rents often don’t include utilities, so on top of these amounts many tenants would have to pay some (or all) of their heat, lights and water bills.⁴ Meanwhile, about one quarter of all households in the province experience energy poverty. ⁵

We also know that while the overall average provincial vacancy rate appears to have gone above two per cent (in 2025), it remains below one per cent for units in the first quartile or those in the lowest 25 per cent of rent–the most affordable rentals.⁶

The 2025 P.E.I. living wage report⁷ showed that food and shelter are the two largest expenses for Islanders. It also showed that there’s a gap of almost six dollars between the living wage of $22.77 (calculated for 2025), and the current minimum wage. Implementing a rent freeze can serve as one of the many cost-of-living measures that are needed to assist low-income households in the context of this gap. A rent freeze is also needed for those in receipt of income assistance, since the welfare incomes of these individuals and families fall below the poverty line (the Market Basket Measure⁸) and amounts are not indexed to inflation.⁹ We know that most workers, and especially those precariously employed and low-waged, are also not receiving cost of living increases equal to the overall CPI; in 2025, average hourly wages in P.E.I. grew by $0.55, or 1.9 per cent, and were the lowest in the country.¹⁰

Overall, rent control is critically important because so much of the rental housing stock in P.E.I. is owned and operated by private, for-profit landlords (approximately 82%, based on the 2021 census¹¹). Research shows that, unsurprisingly, private sector landlords operate with the goal of profit maximization, while public and non-profit providers of different kinds keep rents lower, and keep the well-being of tenants in mind in other ways (such as by connecting their housing to community services or building new housing in neighbourhoods where for-profit developers can’t establish a business case to do so).¹² Since housing is so fundamental to the well-being of individuals and families, it is important to have legislation in place that constrains or limits the behaviour of for-profit actors, and rent control is certainly key to this. The evidence shows that rent control can keep downward pressure on the cost of rent, promotes long-term tenure, and helps bring stability to neighbourhoods with less displacement of current residents.¹³

We also want to highlight how important it is that P.E.I. has vacancy control in place (tying allowable increases to the unit) versus rent control that only applies to the tenant, and how a lack of vacancy control can negatively impact renters.¹⁴  For example, with the introduction of a rent cap in Nova Scotia tied only to leases rather than units, landlords have increasingly turned to using fixed term leases. This lease type leads to tenant turnover, at which point landlords can increase rents by whatever amount they choose. Of course, from the tenant’s perspective, this creates housing instability, and also makes renters less likely to report repair needs on the chance their landlord might agree to putting a new fixed-term lease in place for them. 

New housing construction doesn’t simply decrease when rent control is introduced or increase when rent control is removed. CMHC shows substantial increase in housing starts and completions, including for rentals on P.E.I.¹⁵ Supply is affected by many factors, including demographics, land-use policy, other regulations, input costs and developer decisions made for profiteering, especially for large investors like Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Of course, supply is also impacted by the will of governments to make significant and necessary investments in non-market housing, like public units. 

In addition to implementing a rent freeze for the 2027 year, we recommend that the P.E.I. government make significant investments in the construction of non-market stock, and that they legislate housing as a human right in order to provide a legislative framework for housing policies and programs. In addition to contributing to housing affordability for renters, this would also be consistent with the province’s goal of eliminating poverty.¹⁶

We also recommend that the P.E.I. government develop and administer a rent registry which would make previous rents for units publicly available and easily accessible, as well as historical information for each unit related to applications for above guideline increases in rents. 

Recommendations:

• Institute a rent freeze for the 2027 year, meaning a maximum allowable rent increase of zero.

While we recognize that this consultation is primarily about allowable rental increase, this decision should be part of a comprehensive policy package, and as such we also recommend that the P.E.I. government should:

• Make significant investments in the construction of non-market stock.
• Increase the income threshold and the amount of support provided to low income renters.
• Legislate housing as a human right in order to provide a legislative framework for housing policies and programs.
• Develop and administer a rent registry which would make previous rents for units publicly available and easily accessible, as well as historical information for each unit related to applications for above guideline increases in rents.

The post Housing is a human right: P.E.I. renters deserve a break appeared first on CCPA.

In Alberta, a new Memorandum of Understanding between the federal and Alberta governments—along with the big five oil sands giants—stated their joint commitment to the new West Coast Oil Pipeline and the Pathways Carbon Capture and Storage Project. The MOU outlines new steps forward on a bigger deal from last November between the feds and Alberta on energy development, and comes in the context of Alberta’s separation referendum on October 19. 

In BC, the new Canada-British Columbia Cooperative Prosperity Agreement details new federal support for resource development and infrastructure projects, in exchange for BC’s blessing on the new pipeline. BC also won some concessions around the pipeline route, and a promise for some revenues from the “economic upside” of the pipeline. 

Within a couple weeks, fire season erupted across the country, with wildfire smoke smothering eastern North America. In full climate change denial, President Trump and other U.S. politicians blamed Canada and threatened tariffs in retaliation. The cognitive dissonance between wildfires fuelled by a warming planet and the promotion of more fossil fuel megaprojects has been palpable in Canada as well. 

Even as fossil fuel corporations have record profits at their back, it is the federal government largely underwriting the expansion of oil and gas development, while removing barriers intended to protect the public interest and lower greenhouse gas emissions. Meanwhile, clean energy has landed as a viable, scalable alternative, suggesting Canada wants to become the wrong kind of energy superpower. 

New pipeline to BC coast

The new West Coast Oil Pipeline (WCOP) is technically still in its early development stages and a final investment decision will not be made until 2028 or 2029. According to the Alberta government’s submission to the federal Major Projects Office, the WCOP would cost between $35.2 and $43.7 billion, a cost that “compares favourably” to the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion (TMX). 

The TMX, of course, went wildly over budget—from $7.4 billion when the federal government took over the expansion project from Kinder Morgan in 2018 to more than $34 billion upon completion. The WCOP will also have substantial federal involvement, although ownership will be through “a new entity” that includes the Alberta Petroleum Marketing Commission and Pembina Pipeline Corporation.

A concession to BC is that the pipeline will not take a northern route and the federal North Coast tanker ban will remain in effect. Instead, the WCOP will largely follow the Trans Mountain pipeline system before terminating at Roberts Bank on the coastal outskirts of Metro Vancouver. This echoes the situation a decade ago when mass public opposition to Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway pipeline led the federal government, then under Justin Trudeau, to take it off the table in favour of the TMX.  

As a result of the cost over-runs, the tolls pipeline shippers pay have not reflected the full cost of building the TMX. Tom Gunton at Simon Fraser University estimates a subsidy to Canada’s oil industry between $9-19 billion based on comparing Trans Mountain’s interim tolls to what a private sector firm would charge to cover operating and capital costs. While Trans Mountain recently announced a settlement with the industry around the tolling structure, it’s unlikely the public subsidy will be fully eliminated. 

Trans Mountain will also be increasing pipeline capacity through a “mainline optimization project” that will enable an additional 300,000 barrels per day on its system. The WCOP would add one million barrels per day. In both cases, the federal government has promised BC a form of fiscal benefit or royalty, although the feds have not provided any further details.

The federal commitment to pipeline construction is also embodied in the new Major Projects Office itself. Inclusion of the WCOP in the major projects inventory would enable fast-tracking of permits and approvals. The MOU speaks to the federal government implementing a one year approval process for major projects, while Alberta feels it only needs 120 days. This runs the risk of running over Indigenous rights and circumventing environmental protection.

A carbon capture fig leaf

The federal government required that the new pipeline be accompanied by carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology whose feasibility has yet to be demonstrated at scale or at reasonable cost. The Pathways CCS project would take carbon dioxide from 13 oil sands sites and transport them via pipeline to underground storage. At best, it’s a very expensive exercise, estimated at $20-30 billion, in branding Canadian oil as “low emissions” per barrel while simultaneously boosting overall production and emissions.

Oil and gas companies have already been using the Pathways project to promote a greener public image, though the companies have tried to put the onus on the federal government to pay for it. Through generous investment tax credits, the feds will be paying fifty cents on the dollar for capital investment in carbon capture equipment and 37.5 per cent on transportation and storage equipment. These tax credits are reduced to 25 per cent and 18.75 per cent respectively if used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR), a process of pumping carbon dioxide (CO₂) to repressurize older wells to extract more oil. 

Pathways would not be fully operational until 2035, at which point the MOU claims it would sequester a net 6 million tonnes (Mt) of CO₂ per year, which could increase to 16 Mt by 2045. The “net” refers to carbon sequestration after any EOR and is why the promised sequestration is so underwhelming. In context, Canada’s emissions from the oil sands were 89 Mt in 2023 and from the oil and gas industry as a whole, 208 Mt. 

Canada will see higher emissions from the oil and gas industry in line with increased pipeline capacity. It’s much worse in global terms, as exported oil and gas is counted where it is combusted, i.e. in another country’s inventory. For example, if the new combined 1.3 million barrels of pipeline capacity described above represented incremental production from the oil sands, this would translate into 185 Mt per year of CO₂ when combusted—the equivalent of one-quarter of all of Canada’s emissions economy-wide (694 Mt in 2023). 

Federal support is not limited to capital costs and the MOU commits Ottawa to “offer financing or support mechanisms that provide for operating cost support for carbon capture and storage projects”. Oil sands companies participating in Pathways will also get preferential treatment in Alberta’s industrial carbon pricing system (TIER) through a slower implementation of emissions pricing requirements. Agreement between the feds and Alberta earlier this year also weakened the targets for TIER, which is already insufficient with oil sands companies currently paying a mere nine cents per barrel on average as a “price on carbon.”

BC’s grand bargain

BC Premier David Eby heralded the July 2 Canada-BC Prosperity Agreement as “a big day for BC.” A new pipeline has been deemed the price of national unity in the age of Donald Trump’s trade war, so was there really any other choice? BC locked down federal financial support for key elements of the province’s resource-heavy Look West plan which it released last November (reviewed here). We can also count additional new federal spending in BC for housing and community infrastructure that was announced in June (including the controversial plan to bail out condo developers). 

The Prosperity Agreement is a major boost for liquefied natural gas and mining development in BC’s Northwest. BC Hydro has been planning a major electricity transmission line upgrade to power multiple new mining and liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. The feds will contribute $3.9 billion toward this North Coast Transmission Line (NCTL)—out of a total price tag of $6 billion—although the federal money includes investment tax credits, lower-cost financing and First Nation equity support. The BC government has already exempted the NCTL from environmental assessment and review by the BC Utilities Commission.

BC intends for the NCTL to provide renewable electricity supply to future LNG facilities to reduce the gas they would otherwise burn to power their operations. This “clean LNG” would keep emissions within BC in check (albeit at the cost of rising electricity prices for other ratepayers), but the lion’s share of emissions would be outside of BC. LNG Canada, which has been in operation for a year, is a conventional facility burning gas, boosting BC’s annual emissions by more than 4 Mt per year (an increase of 7% for BC’s annual emissions). The facility has also had start-up challenges with excessive flaring and venting of “waste gas” into Kitimat’s air shed.

Also under construction in the Kitimat area is Cedar LNG, which has received $200 million from each of the federal and BC governments, which will use new electricity supply for its operations. Other LNG projects on the North coast are still awaiting a final investment decision, with LNG Canada Phase Two and Ksi Lisims LNG most likely to advance. Decisions have been held up by uncertainty about future LNG markets, and unless buyers are already lined up, few companies are going to approve capital investments in the tens of billions of dollars.

On the South coast of BC, just outside Squamish, Woodfibre LNG is also progressing through construction with operations likely to commence in 2028. While originally planned to be a smaller project, the federal Natural Resources Minister Tim Hodgson mused earlier this year that the plant’s capacity could be doubled or tripled. 

The Prosperity Agreement also pledged support for mining in BC, dubbed the Northwest Critical Mineral and Conservation Corridor. The main federal contribution is $500 million towards an underground expansion of the Red Chris copper mine. It’s not clear if this is financing, tax credits or cash, nor is it clear why the feds need to subsidize this mine when copper is increasingly in high demand. 

Mining is a dirty business and there’s no getting around tailings ponds and potential spills. The Mount Polley tailings dam collapse in 2014 released 25 billion tonnes of “toxic sludge” into the local watershed, including 134.1 tonnes of lead, 2.8 tonnes of cadmium and 2.1 tonnes of arsenic, making it the worst mining waste disaster in Canadian history. While the mine was back up running by 2015, charges were not filed against the company until late 2024 and the case is still before the courts. The BC government failed to implement promised regulatory reforms, and recently agreed to allow an increase in the height of the tailings dam (to an astonishing 77 metres) to extend the mine’s life another eight years.

While this looks like a win for mining and oil and gas companies, the fiscal benefits to governments are likely to be muted after we consider the vast subsidies at play. Employment benefits to workers and communities are largely on the construction side, as these are very capital intensive projects, with relatively few jobs once operational. 

As for conservation of “irreplaceable ecosystems”, the BC and federal governments merely commit to “undertake the development of a strategy.” 

The Prosperity Agreement will also have a large footprint in the Metro Vancouver area. Topping the list is a $10 billion federal expansion of the Roberts Bank shipping terminal to handle the new WCOP and other export commodities. The Port of Vancouver is also seeking to dredge Burrard Inlet to accommodate more capacity on oil tankers. The Tsleil-Waututh First Nation, who live on the inlet, are challenging this action in court. 

Potash exports were a sore point in 2025 when Saskatchewan’s Nutrien stated it would use Washington state ports due to lack of capacity at the Port of Vancouver. Federal officials have been scrambling to keep this activity within Canada. 

All of this ship traffic is bad news for endangered Southern resident killer whale populations.

The feds plan to spend about $50 million per year to mitigate impacts. Inevitably, additional oil and LNG tankers along with other increased shipping through the Salish Sea will be a big negative for marine life and will impact other industries like transportation and tourism.

Last but not least, the feds will also support up to $3 billion towards a new, higher-capacity Massey Tunnel under Fraser River to boost goods movement and alleviate congestion. Estimated costs have ballooned to $8.5 billion for the full project. The incoming NDP government in 2017 cancelled a planned bridge to replace the existing tunnel but progress has since been limited.

Wither climate action

All of this planned megadevelopment in the West might make sense in light of geopolitics in a world where carbon emissions did not matter. But the carbon implications are simply enormous and must be set against the real climate change the world is experiencing. Wildfires are again a top story but also floods had earlier raged Manitoba and Ottawa. In Europe, the death toll reached into the thousands due to unprecedented heat. 

Boosting oil and gas production and therefore global CO₂ emissions will cause damages into the future. Estimates of the “social cost of carbon”—the economic damages arising from greenhouse emissions—range from $50 to $250 per tonne of CO₂. Expanded oil and gas production in Western Canada could add as much as 200 MT of CO₂ per year to the atmosphere, or about $10 to $50 billion of damages every year. In light of the ongoing heat waves and wildfires, this is Bond villain territory.

The sad part is that both David Eby and Mark Carney get it on climate change. They do not deny the science and have been advocates for climate action in the past. Back when he was Bank of England governor in 2015, Carney made an important and influential speech on the mismatch between cause and effect: 

Climate change is the Tragedy of the Horizon. We don’t need an army of actuaries to tell us that the catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most actors—imposing a cost on future generations that the current generation has no direct incentive to fix. That means beyond: the business cycle; the political cycle; and the horizon of technocratic authorities, like central banks, who are bound by their mandates.

Then, as now, Carney gave a great speech. But today’s speeches are more likely to trumpet Canada’s role as an energy superpower. Climate action has been deemed a loser at the polls. After patting ourselves on the back for our greenhouse gas emission targets and planning frameworks, Canada has dropped most of our climate policies. Contrast that with China, who never really made any public commitments, but then quietly took over clean energy technology supply chains.

But it’s much worse than not acting: Eby and Carney are championing a major expansion of the industry that is causing climate change, and propose to subsidize them even as they have profited so handsomely from recent supply shocks, whether from Iran or Ukraine. It doesn’t get more petro state than that. Apparently, the only thing that will stop Canada’s relentless march to produce and export ever more fossil fuels is if other countries stop buying. 

If anything, President Trump’s Iran war, and the vulnerability of supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, has also changed the calculus for Asian countries—upon whose purchases future Canadian oil and gas growth depends—to invest heavily in renewable technologies to become more self-reliant. Even before the Iran war, this overhang of uncertainty explains why no private sector proponent wants to build the pipeline given its massive price tag. 

Canada shifting into full-blown petro state mode is painful to watch for those of us who’ve been working on clean energy and climate policy for (in my case, 17!) years. How much of the future must we sacrifice for the sake of the present? The real lost opportunity is that this massive fiscal effort could alternatively transition Canada to a fully renewable, circular economy, build housing for all and make other investments that would raise our collective standard of living.

The post Fuel for the fires: Western Canada as an “energy superpower” appeared first on CCPA.

Ottawa is pursuing trade, investment, and security agreements that privilege corporate access and geopolitical leverage, even when doing so aligns Canada with governments implicated in repression, environmental harm, or grave humanitarian crises. The prime minister has described this approach as “principled and pragmatic,” as “values-based realism.”

The question Canadians should be asking is simple but uncomfortable: what values are we actually exporting? Consider Canada’s newly signed free trade and investment deals agreements with Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

UAE: Partnering with human rights abusers

Canada signed a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) with the UAE in November 2025. This was complemented on July 24 with a rapidly negotiated Canada-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Prime Minister Mark Carney framed these agreements as a gateway to “billions in bilateral investment,” particularly in critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, AI, and ports. 

The message was that Canada is positioning itself as open for business—and, more importantly, for investment, no matter where the money is coming from. But the UAE is hardly a neutral or benign partner. It has a documented record of suppressing dissent, restricting free expression, and exploiting migrant labour. It is also expanding fossil fuel production at a time when climate urgency demands the opposite.

More troubling still is the UAE’s role in the war in Sudan—one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes. Since April 2023, Sudan has been devastated by mass displacement, famine, and widespread violence, much of it perpetrated by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). 

The RSF has been accused of ethnic cleansing and atrocities, particularly in West Darfur. Sudan brought proceedings against the UAE at the International Court of Justice in 2025, alleging that Emirati financial and logistical support had helped sustain the group’s campaign of violence (the proceedings were rejected on jurisdictional grounds). Investigative reporting has shown that the RSF controls gold-rich territory and that much of Sudan’s gold flows through UAE markets, providing a critical revenue stream that prolongs the conflict. 

Against this backdrop, Canada’s decision to deepen investment ties with the UAE raises serious questions about complicity and accountability. 

Ecuador: Attacking the constitution

The same can be said for Canada’s recent free trade agreement (FTA) with Ecuador, also signed last Friday.

The Trudeau government formally launched free trade talks with Ecuador in April 2024 (though exploratory discussions started in late 2022), while Ecuador’s democratic and human rights situation deteriorated sharply. The government has only become more authoritarian and heavy-handed since then.

Under current President Daniel Noboa, the government has relied extensively on militarization to suppress protests and dissent. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment of detainees, and enforced disappearances linked to sweeping states of emergency that suspend fundamental rights.

Ecuador’s government has used its security strategy to advance mining projects owned and operated by Canadian companies. In Cotopaxi province, communities opposing projects such as La Plata and Curipamba–El Domo have faced violent dispersals, criminalization, and state repression. At least 29 environmental and human rights defenders have been targeted with criminal proceedings, often resulting in convictions and harsh fines for peaceful protest that effectively recast community defenders as alleged “terrorists.” 

In Azuay province, Canadian mining company Dundee Precious Metals has brought criminal charges against community leaders following a peaceful cleanup “minga” (a traditional communal work gathering) in the páramo, a unique ecosystem in the highlands. These actions followed setbacks for the company, including the revocation of its environmental license and a complaint with the Ontario Securities Commission regarding undisclosed project risks. 

Public resistance has been widespread. Tens of thousands of Ecuadorians have mobilized to defend water, land, and Indigenous rights, particularly in Cuenca and across Azuay, where communities oppose mining in highland páramos that supply critical water sources. Human rights organizations have raised alarm over the state’s repression of social protest, including freezing activists’ bank accounts, and targeting civil society and Indigenous leaders. UN experts  have called on Ecuador to protect Indigenous rights, peaceful assembly, and due process—cornerstones of democratic governance.

Yet Canada’s trade strategy with Ecuador, far from showing “values-based realism,” will lock  in investor privileges precisely as democratic safeguards erode. Negotiated despite strong opposition from Indigenous nations, environmental defenders, and civil society groups, the FTA threatens to deepen socio-environmental conflict by strengthening corporate leverage while communities face repression and weakened rule of law.

Even more concerning, Canada’s agreement undermines the clearly expressed democratic will of Ecuadorians themselves in at least two ways.

First, the FTA contains an investor-state arbitration process that grants foreign investors the right to bypass Ecuadorian courts and sue the State before international tribunals—a mechanism Ecuador’s Constitution explicitly prohibits. 

That prohibition was the result of a long struggle. By 2008, investors had sued Ecuador more than a dozen times under various investment treaties, draining public finances and limiting regulatory space. 

The years that followed vindicated that caution. In 2012, a tribunal ordered Ecuador to pay U.S. oil company Occidental Petroleum roughly USD 2.3 billion, including interest, after the state terminated its concession for breach of contract. The award amounted to 59 per cent of Ecuador’s education budget and 135 per cent of its healthcare budget. These experiences led Ecuador to audit and terminate all its investment treaties by 2017.

Second, the agreement overrides a ban that Ecuadorians have since reaffirmed twice at the ballot box. Successive governments—from Lenín Moreno to Guillermo Lasso and now Daniel Noboa—have attempted to reintroduce international arbitration into Ecuadorian law. Voters have refused them each time.

In April 2024, 65 per cent voted against removing the constitutional ban. In November 2025, nearly 62 per cent rejected a proposal to draft a new constitution, widely seen as a backdoor attempt to reinstate international arbitration and roll back protections for Nature (“Pachamama”) and collective well-being (“Buen Vivir”). Extractive companies openly describe those protections as “obstacles to foreign investments.” Two referendums in less than two years, two decisive “no” votes.

The message could not be clearer. Yet Canada’s FTA cynically re-embeds precisely the system Ecuadorians have repeatedly rejected, allowing corporations to challenge public interest laws before private tribunals made up of trade lawyers moonlighting as arbitrators. In doing so, Canada risks aligning itself not with democratic sovereignty or environmental justice, but with predatory corporate interests—at a time when many countries around the world, including within the EU, are rethinking or abandoning these regimes altogether.

What “values?”

Taken together, these agreements with Ecuador and the UAE reveal a troubling trajectory. Rather than standing apart as a principled actor, Canada is deepening ties with states whose legal systems and human rights records are deeply flawed, prioritizing resource extraction, corporate access, and security cooperation with minimal or inadequate public debate. Where the Canadian state once spoke of people and the planet, it now answers to capital. 

Is Canada truly acting in defence of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, or is it prioritizing short-term profit and geopolitical advantage? If the latter, how can the government possibly say its foreign policy is principled or “values-based?” When Canada consistently partners with repression, environmental destruction, and the erosion of sovereignty, Canadians must ask whose values policymakers are advancing, and at what cost.

The post Diversification against democracy in Canada’s latest global agreements appeared first on CCPA.

“Red tape” is the bogeyman of neoliberal economics, and cutting that red tape is a perennial call-to-arms for conservative politicians.

Over the past year, the federal government has attempted to get rid of pesky rules that “cause delays for major projects or economic growth,” leveraging such vehicles as the Major Projects Office and aptly-named Red Tape Reduction Office to accelerate deregulation. Reducing Canada’s regulatory “burden” will, allegedly, facilitate increased foreign investment and improve competitiveness for the Canadian economy by allowing private industry to flourish.

Putting aside the fact that “red tape” often exists for very good reasons—I, for one, would prefer that the federal government not be able to ignore environmental and human rights laws whenever it pleases—the appeal to competitiveness is equally suspect, and no more so than in the context of energy.

The federal government has lately taken to calling Canada an “energy superpower,” a phrase that was first popularized by Stephen Harper back in 2006. For the federal government then, as now, being an energy superpower means resting on the laurels of Canada’s existing clean energy infrastructure—most of which was built in the 1960s through 1990s—while aggressively promoting new public and private investment in the fossil fuel industry. For Harper, it was the oil sands. For Carney, it’s gas (and also the oil sands).

Crucially, this is not an economic vision that can be realized simply by cutting red tape. The Harper/Carney energy agenda requires the liberal application of what we might call black tape—the state subsidies, regulations and market facilitation that hold the fossil fuel industry together.

We see this at every stage of the supply chain today. On the upstream side, for example, the federal government is burning tremendous political capital to facilitate new oil and gas transportation infrastructure. On the downstream side, for example, the Privy Council recently admitted that one of the main arguments for accelerating Canada’s data centre build-out is that it creates a new market for Canadian gas producers.

These are not appeals to market forces. Indeed, if Canada’s energy sector was truly governed by market forces, we would be joining the rest of the world in going all in on solar, wind and batteries, which are cheaper, cleaner, faster to deploy and increasingly more reliable (as we will see below). Instead, we are artificially propping up industries, such as oil sands extraction, liquefied natural gas processing and nuclear power that would not otherwise be economically competitive. For example, expanding the nuclear sector in Ontario, as the federal government endorsed in its new nuclear strategy, could have a public price tag of $300 billion—three times the cost of producing the same amount of power using renewables.

Modern economies may be held together with tape, but it’s not all red tape. In Canada’s case, there is just as much black tape propping up whole sections of the economy.

And if our scissor fingers are itching to start cutting tape, that’s probably where we should start.

Storm surge: this month’s key reads

Battery breakthroughs are changing everything about the energy transition

Solar and wind are intermittent power sources. The sun doesn’t always shine and the wind doesn’t always blow, as fossil fuel backers like to remind us. And, for a long time, intermittency has been one of the key arguments against the adoption of solar and wind even where they are the cheapest sources of new power generation on paper.

There are two solutions to intermittency: stable baseload power (typically from hydro, nuclear or gas plants) and long-range power transmission. The wind may not always be blowing here, for example, but it is always blowing somewhere, so the bigger the grid the more you can moderate the effects of intermittency.

However, all of that is changing with the revolution in battery storage. You may already be aware that the cost of solar has fallen by 87 per cent since 2010 and the cost of wind has fallen by 55 per cent, but as a new report from the International Renewable Energy Agency, 24/7 renewables, highlights, the cost of batteries has also fallen by 93 per cent in the same period. Pairing solar and/or wind with on-site batteries at scale now can now provide “firm” (i.e. round-the-clock) power that is as reliable as a coal or gas plant for a fraction of the cost. A 100% clean grid is now the cheapest way to deliver reliable power around the globe, as Australia is already demonstrating.

In a new report, Power Play, the Canadian Climate Institute argues that Canada is in an especially good position to double down on solar and wind. Because we have so much hydro power delivering baseload, we can reap the benefits of cheap renewables while only requiring batteries to plug the gaps. Add in more long-range transmission and Canada can drive down costs even further while expanding generation—no nuclear or gas required.

Investing in renewable electricity is about as close as we get to a no-brainer in public policy. I agree with CCI’s recommendations to strengthen the Clean Electricity Regulations and back grid expansions with public money. The faster we expand clean power generation, the faster we can electrify (and decarbonize) the rest of the economy.

Research radar: the latest developments in work and climate

As Europe swelters, scientists prepare for worse. Temperatures in excess of 40 degrees Celsius are cooking France, the UK and other parts of Europe right now, which has already led to dozens of deaths. Things are likely to get worse, including in Canada, once El Niño fully takes hold in the coming months. The last El Niño in 2023-2024 led to the hottest year in recorded history. 2026 is likely to be worse.

Can the law save Canadian climate policy? A group of ENGOs and youth activists is suing the federal government for backsliding on climate policy, which is a violation of the government’s legislated commitments under the Net-Zero Act. Last year, I (reluctantly) called the legal system the last bastion of climate action, and we’ll see if that proves to be the case here. I’ll be following developments closely.

Canada-Alberta MOU will not, in fact, reduce emissions. It probably goes without saying, but, according to a new analysis from the Canadian Climate Institute, the pipeline-for-carbon pricing agreement negotiated between the federal and Alberta governments is unlikely to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions compared to the previous policy trajectory. The good news, I suppose, is that the trajectory is not substantially worse than it was before, either. The bottom line is that this deal does not help climate action and, by locking in new fossil fuel infrastructure, will make it harder and more costly to transition later on.

The green buildings sector employs ten times as many workers as oil and gas. In Building Prosperity, the Canada Green Building Council quantifies the economic benefits of green construction, which refers to both retrofits and new builds with explicit energy efficiency and environmental goals. They peg the sector at half a million direct jobs, which is ten times more than direct jobs in oil and gas extraction. I’d argue it’s probably more like five times, but, even still, it’s an important reminder that the clean economy is already a larger employer than the fossil fuel industry and the gap is only widening. A new study from UK-based CBI Economics, The Race for Net Zero, similarly concludes that net-zero-aligned sectors employ more people at higher wages and with greater productivity than other sectors.

Alberta coal workers were left behind even as coal companies received big subsidies. The managed phase-out of coal-fired electricity generation is Canada’s greatest climate policy achievement. It was also a test run of the idea of a just transition for coal workers displaced by climate policies. How did it fare? In Workers Perspectives on Alberta’s Coal Workers Transition Program, the Labour Education Centre finds that the $40 million made available for workers was both insufficient and unjust in the context of a $1.1 billion support program for coal companies. The paper offers a variety of important recommendations, including more holistic transition programs co-developed with workers and their unions. Ian Hussey and I reached a similar conclusion in our 2019 analysis of the program.

Canadians are confused and complacent when it comes to climate change. Re.Climate’s 2026 update to their What Do Canadians Really Think About Climate Change? report finds that climate concern remains high but that climate action continues to fall as a public priority in this country. I’m especially worried about declining scientific literacy. For the first time since this report began, fewer than half of Canadians can correctly identify that climate change is primarily caused by human activities. We have a lot of work to do as climate communicators, but we’re also up against a disinformation machine with ludicrously deep pockets.

Climate change is driving up home insurance rates. A new report from Environmental Defence, Mounting Costs, finds that home insurance rates are rising by 12 per cent per year and that half the increase—equal to about $500 per year for the typical household—can be attributed to climate impacts. 

Fossil fuel financing is concentrating among the biggest banks. The 2026 edition of the Banking on Climate Chaos report reaches the interesting conclusion that global fossil fuel finance continues to increase even as many banks are scaling back their support for the fossil fuel industry. What that means is that the biggest, dirtiest banks are taking on a greater share of coal, oil and gas financing. All five of Canada’s big banks remain among the top 25 fossil fuel financiers globally, with RBC leading the charge.

Dark clouds: artificial intelligence on the horizon

Federal AI strategy wants Canadians to stop worrying and learn to love AI. The federal government released its long-delayed artificial intelligence strategy, AI for All, this month. It decries low levels of AI adoption in Canada, which the government blames on “low literacy and low trust.” Rachel Pettigrew and I had a lot to say about the government’s fevered commitment to AI adoption in spite of widespread concerns surrounding AI, so go check out our full analysis over on the CCPA blog. I also joined Paris Marx on the Tech Won’t Save Us podcast to break down the strategy in depth.

UK provides a better model for grappling with AI uncertainty. The Government of the UK released AI Scenarios 2030, which is a brilliant bit of forecasting and a model other governments should emulate. The report describes five distinct possibilities for AI impacts over the coming years, ranging from the air going out of the AI balloon (slow burn scenario) to radical social transformation (take-off scenario). The key takeaway here is that governments have an obligation to prepare for each of these scenarios, rather than banking on the best case scenario alone—which has been Canada’s approach to date.

One of the biggest risks of AI is one of the least discussed. To my chagrin, the federal AI strategy does not once acknowledge the risks to cognition and mental health associated with AI use. Yet, as a new article in the journal Nature explains, a growing body of evidence is finding precisely that AI is causing problematic deskilling in medicine, computer science and other fields. A separate study published this month by researchers at Stockholm University and the University of Hong Kong finds that AI use in secondary schools leads to faster homework completion times but a staggering 20 per cent drop in student exam scores. In my view, this is one of the most underappreciated long-term risks of the AI era, with widespread consequences that will be difficult to identify before it’s too late.

AI experts see catastrophic risks everywhere. The MIT AI Risk Initiative published a study, Prioritization of Risks from Artificial Intelligence, based on interviews with 272 international experts. It’s a rich and interesting attempt to quantify the many different risks associated with AI. The experts view AI misalignment (i.e., evil robots) and AI warfare (i.e. killer robots) as having the greatest potential downsides, but the report identifies potentially catastrophic risks in dozens of different domains, including power centralization, disinformation and environmental harm.

Generative AI systems are a human rights minefield. A new report from Amnesty International, Unlawful by design, documents the myriad human rights concerns associated with generative artificial intelligence, including privacy, discrimination and environmental impacts. The paper concludes with a long list of thoughtful recommendations, but it basically boils down to “regulate the damn thing.” It should be obvious, yet governments around the world are failing to do so.

The post Canada’s black tape economy appeared first on CCPA.