The 2026 Alternative Municipal Budget (AMB) finds Winnipeg at a moment of enormous risk and potential. The toxic drug and homelessness crisis is denying people their human rights to dignity and basic needs while making life more complex for local neighbourhoods and the downtown. Public safety is top of mind for many, and there is increasing recognition of the need for community-based solutions to help all achieve a good life, while addressing the root causes of poverty and crime. The major overhaul of the City transit system in 2025, without any increase to stagnant operating funding, left many transit riders angry as their commutes are much longer than before. Strategic investment in active transportation, public transit, and transit-oriented development is essential to Winnipeg’s quality of life and climate goals, yet the City continues to invest in low-density, car-dependent infrastructure.

For decades, Winnipeg’s municipal leaders have responded to financial pressures by keeping taxes low and directing new revenues primarily toward roads and policing, while other programs and infrastructure have seriously deteriorated. This approach is not sustainable. If Winnipeg is serious about its commitments to reconciliation, poverty reduction, community well-being, and climate action, it needs a new financial and policy strategy — and the courage to invest in it.

The 2026 AMB provides a realistic, fully-costed blueprint for doing just that. Co-written by 24 local experts from 17 community organizations, it proposes progressive approaches to raising revenue, placing a greater responsibility on those with the greatest ability to contribute while creating incentives that support broader policy goals.

Attachments

Introduction

1. Fiscal Framework

2. Active Transportation

3. City planning

4. Climate

5. Greenspace

6. Housing

7. Indigenous relations

8. Library services

9. Newcomer inclusion

10. Organic waste

11. Poverty reduction

12. Public art

13. Recreation

14. Safety

15. Transit

16. Urban forestry

17. Water

The post Weaving a Better Winnipeg: 2026 Alternative Municipal Budget appeared first on CCPA.

The Government of Manitoba has made progress on making child care more affordable and accessible. But we have largely left one enormous piece untouched: part-day kindergarten. Why is publicly funded education for kindergarten still only 2.5 hours a day? To date, British Columbia, Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island have all implemented full-day, publicly funded kindergarten. The Manitoba School Boards Association passed a resolution in 2025 to implement full-day kindergarten programming, but the province has not provided sufficient funding to implement it province-wide.

There are currently 13,600 children in kindergarten in Manitoba. With a coverage rate for licensed child care of 32.3 per cent, roughly 9,200 families with kindergarteners lack access to licensed child care during the part of the day when their child is not in school. That is a precarious position to put any family in. 

As Manitoba faces a continued child care space shortage, it is particularly inefficient for kindergarteners with child care spots to use only partial hours of the day. If a child attends 2.5 hours of kindergarten, is shuttled to their daycare spot, holding that spot open for the hours the child is at school each day pinches the system further. 

Creating full-day kindergarten has the potential to open up needed child care spaces to infants and preschoolers before they reach kindergarten age. Full-day kindergarten effectively makes the public education system cover the educational portion of the day while allowing the existing, mainly publicly funded child care system to concentrate its scarce resources on preschool and infant care.

The move to full-day kindergarten would do much to decrease the stress put on families struggling with affordability. Families living with lower incomes often face significantly less workplace flexibility. These families might struggle to pick up a child after their partial day in kindergarten to bring them to child care, if they have it. Some families might choose to forgo kindergarten and the school readiness benefits altogether, keeping their children at home or leaving their child in full-day child care for the kindergarten year instead. This might further affect school readiness and future school success by delaying children’s entry into school.

Child-care expansion remains a major provincial priority that benefits children, the workforce and the economy. Through the $10-a-day child care Canada–Manitoba Early Learning Agreement, Manitoba has continued to expand spaces and champion child care flexibility. According to the most recent publicly available information, between the start of the Agreement and last November, 5,419 new infant and preschooler spaces have been created. Tens of thousands more are needed. Full-day kindergarten should be part of the plan to complement a public, universal child care system.

Full-day kindergarten has been shown to yield positive results in numeracy, literacy, and social skills compared with part-day kindergarten. Moreover, the province’s kindergarten curriculum has been newly re-envisioned and is ready to be implemented for more than part of the day. School divisions are leading the way: the Winnipeg and St. James Assiniboia School Divisions offer full-day kindergarten at targeted schools. The Division Scolaire Franco-Manitobaine and Louis Riel School Division offer it across their divisions, funded by education property tax revenues. However, the province needs to step in and fund this to ensure equitable access across the province. 

Full-day kindergarten is essential infrastructure for working families, but Manitoba is currently asking families and the child-care system to solve a problem that the public education system could solve more efficiently and equitably. While it is families who might feel the stress of deciding between working or not and part-day kindergarten, no kindergarten, or shuttling between kindergarten and child care, those who suffer the most are the children. It is they who stand to benefit the most from this shift.

Catherine-Laura Dunnington is an Assistant Professor of Education at the University of Winnipeg, and Molly McCracken is the Manitoba Director of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. Both are members of the Child Care Coalition of Manitoba’s Steering Committee.

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Toronto: Diversity is our strength

That is the official slogan of a city where people have come from over 190 different countries around the world, speak over 100 different languages, and have worked hard to live together in relative harmony.

This diversity and acceptance of which we are so proud is the result of generations of struggle, as each wave of immigrants found they needed collective forms of representation to improve their lives. Those included unions but there were also other organizations that played vital roles in civil society, from tenant associations to immigrant aid groups.

One worth remembering is the Toronto Labour Committee for Human Rights, formed in 1947 by activists such as Kalman Kaplansky and Bromley Armstrong, which helped lead the efforts to challenge discrimination in housing, employment and elsewhere—intentionally “dismantling systemic racism” long before that phrase came into popular use.

In 1954, Bromley, Donald Moore and Stanley Grizzle were part of delegation of 50 Black women and men who went to Ottawa to challenge Canada’s racist immigration system. The brief for the government was written by the Joint Committee. Many of our human rights achievements in Ontario and Canada can be traced back to this vital work.

In 1960, the Hogg’s Hollow tragedy, where five young Italian men were buried alive in a sewage tunnel, sparked a social uprising by the entire Italian community. They were tired of the needless deaths in construction and industry, of the disrespect by police in their neighbourhoods, and the streaming of their kids into lower grades at school. Thousands turned out to Exhibition Stadium, and set in place a movement that won new labour and safety laws, elected politicians to city hall and school boards, and changed forever the dynamics of immigrant communities in relation to the established decision-makers.

Powerful movements like these brought about the social justice underpinnings of a decent society, just as the decision of the post-war generation to invest in infrastructure—such as schools, roads, transit and hospitals—gave us vital physical infrastructure. The subsequent investment in public health care, retirement security, housing and community services gave us the social infrastructure to provide for an inclusive and diverse city we are so proud of today.

Global corporations

But corporate globalization is a different matter. The first global joint-stock corporations were formed in the early 1600s. The Dutch East India Company had in its charter of 1602 three main features of its business operation: to explore and claim foreign lands in the name of the company; to raise a private army to secure those lands by force; and to enslave Indigenous Peoples to work the plantations and operations of the company. That business model provided a profit of 18 per cent for two full centuries.

The British East India Company had, at its peak, over 100,000 men under arms, conquering India, flooded China with opium, and  appropriated immense  of wealth back to Britain that helped fuel the industrial revolution. The uprising of 1857 against the company’s brutal regime changed its role and led the British government to take over and rule directly.  

Meanwhile, the Hudson’s Bay Company became the largest landowner in the world, haven been given the First Nations’ land in the watershed surrounding Hudson’s Bay.

Ever since, working people have been trying to restrain capital and the power of the market over our lives. Those attempts included slave revolts, the formation of trade unions, the struggles for universal suffrage, the revolutions in Russia and China, winning modern labour laws in the 30s and 40s, the anti-colonial struggles after WWII, the universal declaration of human rights, the civil rights movement, the fight for women’s equality, the focus on health and safety, the ecological movement, and, most recently, 2SLGBTQ+ struggles. Unions and union activists were often central in these struggles.

But corporations and their powerful allies never assented easily to these restrictions. They dreamed of returning to a time of absolute market supremacy, and with the help of politicians like Thatcher and Reagan, began rolling back our gains.  For a brief few months after the crash of 2008, it looked like they might be in trouble. Suddenly people started questioning the wisdom of unbridled capitalism, and Keynes vs. Friedman was the subject of intense debate. It didn’t take long for them to start applying the shock doctrine described so well by Naomi Klein, including a concerted application of the global austerity agenda. 

However, no amount of austerity can mask the three crises of globalization: the job, equity, and environmental crises.

The jobs crisis

During the 2007 fight for a $10 minimum wage, led by the Toronto and York Region Labour Council, we held a series of public meetings in low-wage neighbourhoods. Each featured a panel with local residents talking about their experience. 

One of the most powerful stories was of a South Asian woman who had left an abusive relationship, becoming a single mother with two children. She explained that she started working at minimum wage—$8/hour back then—had risen to a supervisory position at Wendy’s and now earned $9.26 an hour. But she couldn’t afford to raise her two kids on $9.26, so on Saturday and Sunday she worked another job at Value Village. Think of what that meant for her family life—working seven days a week trying to raise two small children. But that is the reality for hundreds of thousands of our neighbours, and it is neither acknowledged nor comprehended by mainstream society.

Not long after that, I got a call late Friday night from Jenny Ahn, a Canadian Auto Workers leader on our executive, asking me to come early the next day to a factory her members were about to occupy. The company Collins + Aikman owed millions in severance pay but was attempting to move the machinery out in the middle of the night. When I showed up at the plant, I was met by over a hundred workers, mostly Chinese, Eastern European, and Caribbean women, blockading access to the plant. Their union was busy negotiating with the big three automakers, who needed the machinery for their assembly plants to keep operating. Fortunately, the employees did get the money for severance, but the jobs were gone.

As I drove from that location, I had an overwhelming sense of déjà vu. Not four weeks before, I had been standing on a picket line at the national headquarters of media giant CTV, with 27 cleaners, mostly Tamil or Latin American. They had recently unionized, and CTV’s response was to terminate the contract of their employer and give it to a non-union company. These people were earning barely more than minimum wage, but now their jobs were gone and all they were asking for by picketing was to at least be re-assigned to another location instead of losing everything.

The juxtaposition of the two incidents was jarring. For decades, factory jobs were the entry point for immigrants to a “middle class” life in Toronto, but tens of thousands of jobs were being lost due to free trade and economic restructuring. What remained was the service sector, but if workers in that sector dared raise their heads above the poverty line, they risked them being cut off in reprisal.

Capitalism’s creative destruction of earlier means of production, combined with the new powers of globalization, meant that stable, secure jobs became a thing of the past. The future points to massive growth of precarious work, informal economies and income disparity.

Equity crisis

I will always remember growing up in Scarborough, listening to a radio interview with an author who travelled across the U.S. deep south to expose the terrible racism suffered by the Black population. I was filled with anger that people could be treated that way, and believed that it was everyone’s responsibility to challenge racism. 

Later, I joined the army reserve, where, as an infantry sergeant, I trained with people who had been in Vietnam. I was disgusted by what I heard of the American disdain for human life when it had a different colour of skin, and I saw the connection of that war with the oppression of people in the global south in places such as Angola, Mozambique, and the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Today, the majority of Toronto residents are people of colour, and most of us were born elsewhere. Working with hotel workers in their inspiring campaign to raise standards for workers in the hospitality industry, one discovers not just the challenges they face, but also an entire economic reality seldom reflected in mainstream media. Every month, those workers, and so many others, send millions of dollars home in remittances. The money sustains families and sometimes entire communities in the Philippines, Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere.

What are the geo-political factors that brought so many of our neighbours here? In many cases, they are leaving poor economies for the hope of better income, but many have fled wars, famine, persecution, economic collapse, or environmental disasters. Often those were the result of neo-colonialism, or structural adjustment programs, or a massive increase of slums as trade deals wiping out agrarian economy.

Then came temporary foreign workers. In fact, globalization has created an immense temporary workforce swirling around the globe that undermines standards of work and any chance of security for millions. In Toronto, despite our social commitment to diversity and equity, the hard economic reality is that, regardless of education levels, income inequality for people of colour continues to grow, as does the increased racialization of poverty.

Environmental crisis

My family came from mill towns and mining villages in Lancashire. In the early 1960s, I visited London, England and saw, firsthand, the noxious smog that had just killed dozens of residents. It was a mix of coal smoke and fog; the heritage of an economy built on coal. At the turn of the last century, more than a million men toiled in Britain for coal, and I grew up listening to stories of the 1926 miners’ strike, when my father and his brothers would go out at night to the slag heaps to search for bits of coal to heat their home. Later, when my grandfather came back terribly injured in a mining accident, his wife lined up her three sons and made them promise to never go underground. Coal fuelled the industrial revolution, spawning massive amounts of pollution and greenhouse gas, just as oil fuelled the massive expansion of modern manufacturing and the movement of goods and people.

But those aren’t the only environmental issues to consider. Back in 1985, when the Eaton’s workers found themselves on strike for a first contract, I was joined on the picket lines every weekend by a construction tradesman named Neil Borland. Neil was an insulator who worked on massive pipes and boilers, applying coats of the miracle fibre know as asbestos. He would die, as many of his workmates did, of mesothelioma.

Today, thousands in the global south are being condemned to a horrible death sometime in the future due to the asbestos that Canada has mined and exported. Across the world, Canadian mining companies are rocked with controversy over their environmental practices and disregard for the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Industrialization has had huge health impacts—pesticides, chemicals and asbestos have created the epidemic of cancers that sweep my generation. For every advance made, such as cleaning up the Great Lakes, we in turn wipe out fisheries in our oceans. Whether it is the Tar Sands, agribusiness, or fish farming, capitalism cannot help but gorging on every opportunity to exploit nature. Capital drives the commodification and commercialization of all things—from water to genetically modified food and seeds. 

The most fundamental threat to humankind is the environmental crisis, particularly climate change—and this threat comes today from corporate behaviour and corporate power.

How to respond?

I believe the key responsibility of all Canadians is to help constrain and defeat corporate plans for this planet.

To do that, we must strengthen the labour movement and other forms of collective representation to match the obscene power of transnational corporations and their politicians. Just as unions were built by one-to-one conversations, it will take that same kind of patient dedication to build a fighting union movement for the 21^st century. Labour and our social justice allies need to develop a co-ordinated global campaign to re-regulate capital and production—and not be afraid to use the word socialism when we talk about our common future.

Bread—and roses, too!

Just over a century ago, thousands of women poured out of the textile factories in Lawrence Massachusetts demanding a living wage, dignity and union rights. Their cry—in a multitude of languages—for bread and roses, is captured forever in the anthem celebrated every year on International Women’s Day. In a way, that has always been the goal of working people, faced with the greed and power of the 1%—no matter what the century. But we can neither grow roses nor wheat for bread unless this planet is able to sustain itself, and humankind.

We need to shape history together, as we confront the crises of globalization, and seek to unlock the power that will truly make another world possible. 

John Cartwright delivered a longer version of this speech as the 2012 Sefton Memorial Lecture at Woodsworth College, University of Toronto.

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The proliferation of artificial intelligence systems is exacerbating every problem that these systems are purported to solve.

For readers of this newsletter, the climate and labour concerns of the AI boom are likely front of mind.

Far from solving climate change, the staggering global rush to build gas-powered AI data centres is reversing emissions reduction progress across sectors and jurisdictions. That has pulled the interests of big tech and the fossil fuel industry into an unholy alliance that puts future climate action at risk, as my colleague Simon Enoch writes for the CCPA.

And rather than empowering workers, the deployment of AI in workplaces is undermining the privacy, autonomy and dignity of experienced workers while hiring for entry-level workers dwindles. The AI “invasion” of workplaces, as Fred Wilson wrote recently for the CCPA, is also being used by employers as a tool to weaken worker power—with unions on the back foot.

Unfortunately, the (predictably) perverse consequences of AI for climate and labour only scratch the surface of the harms and risks posed by the AI rush. It is a similar story for human cognition, human rights, public services, democratic institutions, scientific research, digital sovereignty, Indigenous rights and more. In each of these areas, AI holds theoretical promise. In practice, it is causing serious, demonstrable harms.

That progressives need to take all of these issues seriously—and confront them—is the central plea of my latest major research report, Think Twice: A citizen’s guide to artificial intelligence in Canada, co-authored with my colleague Rachel Pettigrew. Canadian civil society organizations, on the whole, lack the capacity or expertise to meaningfully engage on AI issues. We hope this paper will contribute to more coordinated, strategic and nuanced advocacy moving forward.

If there is one message to take away from our new report, as I argued in the National Observer this week, it is that Canada needs to slow down on AI adoption.

Artificial intelligence, as a category of related technologies, holds genuine potential in many areas, from energy efficiency to medical research to agriculture. A pro-worker AI is possible, and there is a path forward for sovereign data centres that are built with clean power and community consent. AI need not be a threat to everything.

But the current race to adopt commercial AI systems indiscriminately across every sector of society and the economy—as the federal government is encouraging—is both baseless and reckless. It reflects a willingness to accept real human harm in exchange for speculative economic benefit, and it ultimately serves no one but the mostly-American corporations pushing AI products.

The CCPA is in the AI fight for the long haul, so stay tuned for more research in this area. But fear not for Shift Storm, which will continue to be primarily focused on climate and labour issues. You may also be interested in One Picket Line, a new research series from the CCPA on worker movements in Canada. Check out the latest issue here.

And if you’d like to come work with me(!), check out the job listing for the Errol Black Chair in Labour Issues, which is based in the CCPA’s Manitoba office.

Now let’s get into this month’s research.

Storm surge: this month’s key reads

Pipeline proposal is everything wrong with Canada’s industrial strategy

The finalized memorandum of understanding between Alberta and the federal government includes a commitment to building a new, million-barrel-per-day West Coast Oil Pipeline at a cost of $35-44 billion with 90 per cent public ownership. The announcement breaks two prior promises: that any pipeline would not be funded with public money, and that any pipeline would be paired with offsetting emissions reductions. On the latter point, the heavily-subsidized Pathways carbon capture project is going ahead, but with half the capacity that was previously suggested.

My colleague Marc Lee writes about these issues—as well as the side deal negotiated between BC and the federal government—in more detail. From a climate perspective, this new pipeline is a dismal development that will increase global emissions while locking Canada into even deeper fossil fuel dependency.

Why do Canadian governments continue to double down on planet-destroying megaprojects instead of investing in a diversity of value-added industries? That is precisely the question that Brandon Haley tackles in a valuable new report published by the Centre for Industrial Policy. There is a lot of useful history in this brief paper, which helps us to make sense of the economic trap of resource dependency.

If Canadian governments invested in and subsidized other sectors—especially value-added industries like technology and manufacturing—the same way they do fossil fuels, we could have a more productive, cleaner and future-oriented economy. As it stands, we are sinking into the past as other countries race ahead.

Research radar: the latest developments in work and climate

Carney formally abandons Canada’s climate targets… In a recent Youtube video Canada’s prime minister confirmed that we will not meet our medium-term emission reduction targets. Canada remains committed, in principle, to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, but there is no plan to do so. This would be bigger news if not for the year-long backslide on climate policy that inevitably led to this conclusion.

…and Canadians are noticing. New polling from the Angus Reid Institute finds that Canadians’ concern about climate change is rising once again, driven in part by the terrible wildfire season engulfing the world. That is having political implications as environmentally-minded voters drift away from the current government.

What the federal government can and cannot do on climate policy. Preeminent climate researcher Andrew Leach has written a very practical article in the journal Canadian Public Policy, “Constitutional Limits on the Design of Canadian Federal Climate Change Policy,” that I daresay is essential reading for activists. It may not be sexy, but we need to understand what different levels of government are actually capable of when we make demands.

Time to weigh in on Canada’s definition of sustainable finance. Business Future Pathways, an advisory body created by the federal government to develop Canada’s sustainable finance taxonomy, has released a methodology report draft. I’m encouraged that the draft takes a clear position on excluding oil and gas production from any definition of sustainable. You can weigh in with your comments by August 13.

Does Fort McMurray have a future after oil? The Institute for Research on Public Policy has been doing some great work on community transitions, so I was intrigued by their new case study of Fort McMurray, Alberta. It paints a thoughtful and detailed picture of the challenges facing the community, but falls short of advocating for meaningful diversification away from the oil industry. A separate case study of resource-dependent northern BC communities published by the Pembina Institute reaches a somewhat more ambitious conclusion in calling for investment in clean alternatives.

Carbon capture is—and has always been—a scam. The American journalism outfit ProPublica published a scathing (and beautiful) investigation into the fantasy of carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) at scale. Canada’s backsliding on the Pathways project is emblematic of the impracticality of this climate “solution” that industry has failed to deliver on despite decades of promises, as the Narwhal recently exposed. Why do we keep talking about CCUS then? Because it is the only way to square increased fossil fuel production with the fig leaf of net-zero emissions. CCUS is a political necessity, even if it doesn’t work practically or economically.

Energy addition is not energy transition. The latest Statistical Review of World Energy from the UK-based Energy Institute tells a complicated story about the global energy transition. While clean power is accounting for a greater share of the global energy pie—solar generation grew 30 per cent in 2025 alone—the total amount of fossil fuels being consumed is not falling at the same rate. Total emissions are thus still rising. It’s an important reminder that decarbonization won’t happen without both carrots and sticks.

National development banks could be the key to driving energy transitions. Oil Change International published Untapped Potential, which investigates how national/public banks around the world are implicated in the energy system. Many, including Canada’s institutions, are predominantly invested in fossil fuels today, but that could be reversed to prop up clean energy instead. It’s an approach to industrial strategy I’ve long supported.

There aren’t enough clean energy workers to meet growing demand. In Ensuring a Skilled Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Workforce, the International Energy Agency finds that the clean power sector is driving job creation just about everywhere, but that not enough new workers are entering the field. One of the big problems the IEA identifies is that women are severely underrepresented in growth occupations. It’s a longstanding issue, and the report doesn’t identify clear solutions, but it does provide a useful overview of women-focused training initiatives around the world.

Dark clouds: artificial intelligence on the horizon

A step-by-step guide to fighting data centres in your community… The Council of Canadians published Resisting Data Centre Development in Canada, which is a fantastic resource for concerned communities. It includes both big-picture context and practical strategies for engaging with new AI infrastructure proposals.

…and to fighting everything else to do with AI. The Luddite Lab Resource Hub by the U.S.-based Distributed AI Research Institute includes a wealth of case studies and tools for organizing against AI at all levels. A useful bookmark for civil society organizations.

AI makes us more confidently wrong. A new preprint study by academics in France and Italy finds that AI access makes users dramatically less likely to say “I don’t know,” even when they truly cannot answer a question. It’s the latest data point highlighting the erosion of critical thinking due to AI use.

Have your say on Canada’s AI transparency regulations. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada published a new discussion paper, Enhancing trust in artificial intelligence through increased transparency, and is welcoming public comments. Stay tuned for the CCPA’s formal response.

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To separate the wheat from the chaff, facts from political spin, we must look at the numbers. Ontario’s public school system serves two million students, employs 227,000 workers, and has a budget of more than $30 billion. In such a large system, it is easy for governments to point fingers, sweep dirt under the rug, or move funding around to disguise cuts. And that’s exactly what the Ontario government has done over the past eight years. In the 11 figures below, we present clear cases of funding failing to keep pace with needs and some examples of what that means on the ground. The pattern that emerges is clear: schools and educators are being asked to do more with less, and students are paying the price.

The primary funding envelope for public schools is Core Education Funding, formerly called Grants for Student Needs. Per-student funding, adjusted for inflation, has declined since 2018-19. It reached its lowest point in 2022-23 and has recovered since then, but it remains $220 lower than it was when the Progressive Conservative government came into power in 2018. In a school system with more than two million students, a $220-per-student cut adds to an estimated $453 million budget shortfall for the 2026-27 school year alone.

While some funding cuts mean that students miss opportunities they will never get back, like learning to play an instrument, other cuts create financial pressures on future years: wait lists for special education supports continue to grow, in-class resources are never restocked, leaks in the roof are never fixed, anti-racism programs are delayed, etc. The accumulated shortfall for Ontario schools since 2018-19 is now at a whopping $6.5 billion. This is the total amount that Ontario’s school boards have lost compared to what they would have received if their funding had kept pace with enrolment and inflation over the past eight years.

In 2024, 37 per cent of Ontario schools were in a state of disrepair, up from 29 per cent in 2020. Over this four-year period alone, the number of schools in need of major repairs increased by 423, and that does not include the estimated 7,000 portable classrooms for which data is unavailable. Conditions vary significantly by school board. In 17 boards, 50 per cent or more of schools are in a state of disrepair. In four boards, 75 per cent or more of schools are in a state of disrepair, namely: Toronto DSB (84 per cent), Renfrew County Catholic DSB (77 per cent), Limestone DSB (76 per cent), DSB Ontario North East (75 per cent).

The fix is not in. The Financial Accountability Office of Ontario estimates that the Ontario government needs to spend $21.7 billion over 10 years to address the repair backlog and maintain schools in good repair. The current plan is to spend $12.5 billion, or 58 per cent of what is needed. Repairs will continue to pile up and become more expensive to fix.

In Ontario, special education funding is not based on the assessed needs of current students. Instead, almost 90 per cent of funding is based on general enrolment and a statistical model that produces poor estimates of needs. As a result, school boards receive largely arbitrary amounts, which they ration among schools. Within schools, funds are further rationed among students with special education needs. Operational factors, such as class sizes and physical infrastructure, also affect the level of funding allocated to a student, widening the gap between actual needs and supports. It’s an atrocious funding model that fails students with special education needs, their educators and families. 

One of the many indicators of this failed funding model is that, every year, school boards spend more on special education than they receive in funding. In the 2025-26 school year, nearly 10 per cent of the amount spent on special education came from other funding envelopes. This reallocation doesn’t mean students with special education needs received the supports they need. Far from it. The recent Auditor General report shows unacceptable levels of unmet needs. Recurring reallocations simply show that needs are so dire that boards and schools have to sacrifice other aspects of the education program.

Parents hear that class sizes are limited to 24.5 students for Grade 4 to 8, yet their children are often in much larger classes. So are half of the students in the province. That’s because there are no hard caps for Grade 4 to 8. The limit of 24.5 is simply the required average at the board level. This means that if some classes are smaller than the target average, other classes can be larger. In the 2025-26 school year, 3.4 per cent—or 1,054—Grade 4 to 8 classes had 30 students or more. This is the provincial average; some school boards have a larger proportion of crowded classes. For example, in the same year, the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) had 7.8 per cent of Grade 4 to 8 classes with 30 or more students—that’s 256 classes.

These numbers don’t account for class complexity. In a weighted analysis, students without special education needs would be assigned a weight of one, while other students would be assigned higher weights (e.g., 1.2, 1.5). If the education ministry made the necessary data available for this type of assessment, the numbers above would be considerably higher and better reflect the classroom experience.

While enrolment in online classes had been slowly growing since 2014-15, it began a fast upward trend in 2019-20. In the 2024-25 school year, enrolment reached 288,330, more than five times the 53,520 of 10 years earlier. For comparison, total enrolment in this period grew by only four per cent.

In 2019, the Ontario government approved a measure requiring students to take two online courses to graduate. At the time, the government argued that this measure would give students more course options. Recent data shows that compulsory online learning has not led to new learning opportunities; students take standard courses online. What has changed is the amount of classroom funding. The Ministry of Education funds online courses at a 30:1 student-to-teacher ratio, compared to a 23:1 ratio in in-person courses. Online courses save money.

While elementary schools squeeze more students into the same classroom to make up for cuts to classroom funding, secondary schools force students into online courses because funding is no longer available for 30 in-person class credits per student.

Less funding inevitably means fewer adults in the building. Between 2018-19 and 2025-26, total enrolment in Ontario’s public education system grew by three per cent. In contrast, the number of classroom teachers grew by only 0.8 percent. In a system as large as Ontario’s, that discrepancy amounts to 2,545 fewer teachers on the ground today than we would have had if the number of classroom teachers had also increased by three per cent.

Classroom teachers are not the only ones ensuring that students learn and develop in healthy, safe environments. It takes a village, and that village is shrinking. A number of other categories of workers have increased at a slower pace than total enrolment, including library and guidance staff; the monitors who supervise lunchrooms, lunch hours, buses, and yards; custodians who keep buildings clean and safe; and the maintenance personnel who keep schools operational.

Neither the education funding formula nor school operations require staffing to increase at the exact same pace as the number of students. In some cases, growth can be accommodated within existing capacity, and operations sometimes depend more on the number and characteristics of buildings. Still, the pattern is widespread and clear: there are fewer adults in the building, in a variety of vital jobs.

In the 20 years between 2002-03 and 2022-23, the share of young and early-career teachers has dropped dramatically. Workers under 40 years of age make up 30 per cent of the current teaching workforce, compared to 45 per cent in 2002-03. Workers who have entered the career in the past five years make up 13 per cent of the current teaching workforce, compared to 23 per cent in 2002-03.

In teaching, where internships and mentorship are key parts of training, experienced educators play a crucial role in helping new entrants reach their potential. Yet, an aging workforce presents risks. If too many workers retire at once, it could drastically reduce on-the-ground experience and lead to a teacher shortage. In 2026, the Ontario government reduced the duration of teacher training programs from two years to one year, hoping to attract more workers to the profession. This measure may not yield the desired results. Ontario has an estimated 48,000 certified teachers who completed their training but are not currently working in the province’s education system. Chronic underfunding of schools, specialized programs, and infrastructure may weigh more on the decisions of current and prospective teachers than one additional year of training.

In any given year, school boards may have a budget surplus because not all funds from every funding envelope were spent, because schools generated extra revenue through fundraising, or because of atypical inflows from financial activities, such as the sale of assets. The Ministry of Education allows boards to transfer surplus funds to reserves and use them gradually, as needed. Between the 2018-19 and 2025-26 school years, the surplus and deficit patterns visibly changed for Ontario’s 72 school boards. At the beginning of the period, around 10 per cent of boards ended the year in the red, but in subsequent years, that share tripled. For 2025-26, 57 per cent of boards expected to spend more than their allocated revenues.

The amount of reserves that boards hold has also shrunk over the years. In 2021-22, the combined accumulated surplus for all boards was $6.6 billion, while the projected amount for the end of the 2025-26 school year is $5.9 billion. In inflation-adjusted terms, reserves decreased by 19 per cent. As a share of total annual revenue, reserves fell from 23 to 17 per cent over this period. This is yet another clear sign of the chronic underfunding of public education in the province.

In the past two years, the Ontario government has launched a vendetta against school boards and trustees, alleging financial mismanagement and incompetence. The Ministry of Education has intervened in the direction of eight boards, appointing supervisors to temporarily manage them. Yet, a close analysis of administrative expenses—including trustee and board administration costs—reveals an uneventful trend. Between the 2018-19 and 2025-26 school years, administrative expenses as a share of total expenses ranged from 2.7 to 2.8 per cent, with little variation. What is more, in the 2025-26 school year, six of the eight school boards under intervention have a ratio below the provincial average. In sum, school boards show no signs of administrative bloat.

Students and families pay the price

More than two million students attend nearly 5,000 schools across Ontario. It’s a massive operation that requires a large number and a wide range of workers: those who drive students from home to school and back safely, those who teach regular classes, those who support students with special needs, those who keep buildings clear and operational, those who handle all the administrative tasks behind the scenes. The stakes couldn’t be higher. These workers are supporting children’s learning and development, preparing them for an ever-changing world and economy. The Ontario government should make sure educators have the tools they need to do the important work they signed up for. Instead, every year the Ontario government asks schools and educators to do more with less. Students and their families ultimately pay the price of an underfunded public education system. And that price is too high.

The post Doing more with less: 10 facts about school funding in Ontario appeared first on CCPA.

Pour séparer le bon grain de l’ivraie, ou les faits de la propagande politique, il faut regarder les chiffres. Le système scolaire public de l’Ontario accueille deux millions d’élèves, emploie 227 000 personnes et dispose d’un budget de plus de 30 milliards de dollars. Dans un système d’une telle envergure, il est facile de rejeter la faute sur autrui, de balayer les problèmes sous le tapis ou de réaffecter les fonds pour masquer les coupes budgétaires. C’est précisément ce que le gouvernement de l’Ontario a fait au cours des huit dernières années. Les 11 graphiques et tableaux qui suivent illustrent des situations où le financement n’a pas suivi l’évolution des besoins, ainsi que quelques exemples de ce que cela signifie concrètement sur le terrain. La tendance est claire : on demande aux écoles et aux enseignants de faire plus avec moins de moyens, et ce sont les élèves qui en pâtissent.

L’enveloppe principale du financement des écoles publiques est appelée « financement principal de l’éducation » (anciennement « subventions pour les besoins des élèves »). Le financement par élève, ajusté à l’inflation, est en baisse depuis l’année scolaire 2018-2019. Il a atteint son niveau le plus bas en 2022-2023, puis a remonté, mais il reste inférieur de 220 $ à ce qu’il était lorsque le gouvernement progressiste-conservateur est arrivé au pouvoir en 2018. Dans un système scolaire comptant plus de deux millions d’élèves, une réduction de 220 $ par élève équivaut à un déficit budgétaire estimé à 453 millions de dollars rien que pour 2026-2027.

Pendant que certaines coupes budgétaires privent les élèves d’occasions qu’ils ne retrouveront jamais, comme apprendre à jouer d’un instrument, d’autres coupes créent une pression financière qui se répercute sur les années suivantes. En conséquence, les listes d’attente pour le soutien en éducation spécialisée ne cessent de s’allonger, les fournitures scolaires ne sont jamais réapprovisionnées, les fuites dans les toitures ne sont jamais réparées, les programmes de lutte contre le racisme sont reportés, etc. Le déficit cumulé des écoles de l’Ontario depuis 2018-2019 s’élève désormais à la somme colossale de 6,5 milliards de dollars. Cette somme correspond à ce que les conseils scolaires auraient dû recevoir si leur financement avait suivi le rythme des inscriptions et de l’inflation au cours des huit dernières années.

En 2024, 37 % des écoles de l’Ontario étaient en mauvais état, contre 29 % en 2020. Rien que sur cette période de quatre ans, le nombre d’écoles nécessitant des réparations majeures a augmenté de 423. Ce décompte ne tient pas compte des quelque 7 000 classes préfabriquées pour lesquelles aucune donnée n’est disponible. La situation varie considérablement d’un conseil scolaire à l’autre. Dans 17 d’entre eux, 50 % ou plus des écoles sont en mauvais état. Quatre conseils comptent même plus des trois quarts de leurs écoles en mauvais état : le conseil scolaire du district de Toronto (84 %), le conseil scolaire catholique du comté de Renfrew (77 %), le conseil scolaire du district de Limestone (76 %) et le conseil scolaire du nord-est de l’Ontario (75 %).

La situation n’est pas près de s’arranger. Selon le Bureau de la responsabilité financière de l’Ontario, le gouvernement provincial devrait dépenser 21,7 milliards de dollars sur dix ans pour résorber l’arriéré de réparations et maintenir les écoles en bon état. Or, le plan actuel ne prévoit que 12,5 milliards de dollars, soit 58 % du montant nécessaire. Les réparations vont continuer de s’accumuler et deviendront de plus en plus coûteuses.

En Ontario, le financement de l’éducation spécialisée ne repose pas sur l’évaluation des besoins réels des élèves. Au contraire, près de 90 % du financement est attribué d’après le nombre global d’inscriptions, au moyen d’un modèle statistique qui estime assez mal les besoins. En conséquence, les conseils scolaires reçoivent des montants plutôt arbitraires qu’ils répartissent entre les écoles. Une fois remis aux écoles, ces fonds sont répartis entre les élèves ayant des besoins en éducation spécialisée. Des facteurs opérationnels, tels que la taille des classes et les infrastructures matérielles, influent également sur le niveau de financement alloué aux élèves, creusant encore l’écart entre les besoins réels et le soutien apporté. Ce modèle de financement est néfaste pour les élèves ayant des besoins en éducation spécialisée, ainsi que pour leurs enseignants et leurs familles.

L’un des nombreux indicateurs de l’échec de ce modèle de financement est que les conseils scolaires dépensent chaque année plus que les fonds qu’ils reçoivent pour l’éducation spécialisée. Pour l’année scolaire 2025-2026, près de 10 % de ces dépenses ont été financées par d’autres enveloppes budgétaires. Cette réaffectation ne signifie pas pour autant que les besoins des élèves en éducation spécialisée ont été comblés. Loin de là. Un rapport récent du Bureau du vérificateur général fait état d’un niveau inacceptable de besoins non comblés. Tout ce que prouvent les réaffectations récurrentes, c’est que les besoins sont si pressants que les conseils scolaires et les écoles sont obligés de sacrifier d’autres aspects du programme éducatif.

Les parents sont informés que la taille des classes de la 4^e à la 8^e année est limitée à 24,5 élèves, mais constatent souvent que les classes de leurs enfants sont bien plus nombreuses. Et la moitié des élèves de la province sont concernés. Cette situation s’explique par l’absence de plafonds stricts pour ces niveaux. La limite de 24,5 élèves correspond simplement à la moyenne du conseil scolaire. Autrement dit, certaines classes peuvent être plus petites que la moyenne et d’autres plus nombreuses. Durant l’année scolaire 2025-2026, 3,4 % (1 054) des classes de la 4^e à la 8^e année comptaient 30 élèves ou plus. Ce pourcentage correspond à la moyenne provinciale; certains conseils scolaires présentent un pourcentage plus élevé de classes surchargées, par exemple, le conseil scolaire du district de Toronto, qui avait 7,8 % (256) de classes de 30 élèves ou plus dans les niveaux concernés.

Ces chiffres ne tiennent pas compte de la complexité des classes. Dans une analyse pondérée, les élèves n’ayant pas besoin d’éducation spécialisée se verraient attribuer un coefficient de pondération égal à 1, tandis que les autres se verraient attribuer un coefficient plus élevé (par exemple, 1,2 ou 1,5). Si le ministère de l’Éducation rendait disponibles les données nécessaires à ce type d’évaluation, ces chiffres seraient considérablement plus élevés et refléteraient mieux la réalité en classe.

Les inscriptions à la formation en ligne, qui augmentaient lentement depuis 2014-2015, ont connu une forte accélération à partir de 2019-2020. Pour l’année scolaire 2024-2025, elles ont atteint 288 330, soit plus de cinq fois les 53 520 enregistrées dix ans auparavant. En comparaison, le nombre global d’inscriptions n’a augmenté que de 4 % au cours de cette période.

En 2019, le gouvernement de l’Ontario a adopté une mesure obligeant les élèves à suivre deux cours en ligne pour obtenir leur diplôme. À l’époque, il avait fait valoir que cette mesure permettrait d’élargir les choix de cours proposés aux élèves. Or, les données récentes montrent que cette nouvelle obligation n’a pas débouché sur de nouvelles opportunités d’apprentissage : les cours suivis en ligne sont ceux du programme régulier. Ce qui a changé, c’est le montant du financement alloué à l’enseignement en présentiel. Le ministère de l’Éducation finance les cours en ligne selon un ratio de 30 élèves pour un enseignant, alors que le ratio pour les cours en présentiel est de 23 pour un. L’apprentissage en ligne permet de réaliser des économies.

Pendant que les écoles primaires entassent plus d’élèves dans les mêmes salles de classe pour compenser les coupes budgétaires, les écoles secondaires obligent les élèves à suivre des cours en ligne, car le budget ne suffit plus à financer 30 crédits de cours en présentiel par élève.

Une diminution du financement se traduit inévitablement par une baisse du nombre d’adultes présents dans les écoles. Entre 2018-2019 et 2025-2026, l’effectif total du système scolaire public de l’Ontario a augmenté de 3 %. En revanche, l’effectif enseignant en classe n’a augmenté que de 0,8 %. Cet écart, dans un système aussi vaste que celui de l’Ontario, signifie qu’il y a aujourd’hui 2 545 membres du personnel enseignant de moins sur le terrain que si l’effectif enseignant avait augmenté de 3 %.

Le personnel enseignant n’est pas le seul à veiller à ce que les élèves apprennent et s’épanouissent dans un environnement sain et sécurisé. Il faut tout un village, et ce village est en train de rétrécir. D’autres catégories de personnel ont vu leur effectif augmenter à un rythme plus lent que celui de l’effectif scolaire global. C’est notamment le cas du personnel de bibliothèque et d’orientation; des surveillants chargés de veiller à la sécurité à la cantine, pendant la pause de midi, dans l’autobus et dans la cour d’école; des concierges qui assurent la propreté et la sécurité des bâtiments; ainsi que du personnel de maintenance qui veille au bon fonctionnement des écoles.

Ni la formule de financement de l’éducation, ni les normes de fonctionnement des écoles n’exigent que le personnel augmente au même rythme que le nombre d’élèves. Dans certains cas, la croissance peut être absorbée par les capacités existantes; de plus, le fonctionnement des écoles dépend parfois davantage du nombre de bâtiments et de leurs caractéristiques. Néanmoins, la tendance est généralisée et évidente : il y a moins d’adultes présents dans les écoles, à divers postes essentiels.

Sur les 20 années écoulées de 2002-2003 à 2022-2023, la proportion de jeunes enseignants en début de carrière a chuté de façon spectaculaire. Les moins de 40 ans ne représentent plus que 30 % de l’effectif enseignant actuel, contre 45 % en 2002-2003. Ceux qui ont intégré la profession au cours des cinq dernières années ne représentent plus que 13 % de l’effectif actuel, contre 23 % en 2002-2003.

Dans le domaine de l’enseignement, où les stages et le mentorat sont des éléments clés de la formation, les éducatrices et éducateurs expérimentés jouent un rôle crucial pour aider les nouveaux venus à développer leur plein potentiel. Cependant, le vieillissement de la main-d’œuvre présente des risques. Si un trop grand nombre partent à la retraite en même temps, l’expérience de terrain pourrait considérablement diminuer, ce qui entraînerait une pénurie de personnel enseignant. En 2026, le gouvernement de l’Ontario a réduit la durée des programmes de formation en enseignement de deux ans à un an, dans l’espoir d’attirer davantage de personnes vers cette profession. Cette mesure pourrait toutefois ne pas produire les résultats escomptés. En effet, l’Ontario compte environ 48 000 enseignantes et enseignants certifiés qui ont terminé leur formation, mais qui ne travaillent pas actuellement dans le système scolaire provincial. Le sous-financement chronique des écoles, des programmes spécialisés et des infrastructures pourrait peser davantage qu’une année de formation de plus ou de moins sur les décisions des enseignantes et enseignants actuels et futurs.

Au cours d’une année donnée, les conseils scolaires peuvent afficher un excédent budgétaire, soit parce que les fonds provenant de chaque enveloppe budgétaire n’ont pas tous été dépensés, soit parce que les écoles ont généré des revenus supplémentaires grâce à des collectes de fonds, soit encore en raison d’entrées exceptionnelles provenant d’opérations financières, comme la vente d’un actif. Le ministère de l’Éducation leur permet de transférer cet excédent vers une réserve et de l’utiliser progressivement, en fonction des besoins. Entre 2018-2019 et 2025-2026, la tendance en matière d’excédent et de déficit a sensiblement évolué. Au début de cette période, près de 10 % des 72 conseils scolaires de l’Ontario étaient déficitaires en fin d’exercice, mais dans les années suivantes, cette proportion a triplé. Pour l’exercice 2025-2026, 57 % des conseils scolaires prévoyaient de dépenser plus que leurs revenus.

Le montant des réserves des conseils scolaires a également diminué au fil des ans. En 2021-2022, l’excédent cumulé de l’ensemble de ces conseils s’élevait à 6,6 milliards de dollars, mais les projections le chiffrent à 5,9 milliards de dollars pour l’exercice 2025-2026. Après ajustement pour tenir compte de l’inflation, le montant des réserves a diminué de 19 %. Leur proportion par rapport au total des revenus annuels est ainsi passée de 23 % à 17 % au cours de cette période. C’est un autre signe évident du sous-financement chronique du système scolaire de la province.

Ces deux dernières années, le gouvernement de l’Ontario a lancé une vendetta contre les conseils et les conseillers scolaires, leur reprochant une mauvaise gestion des finances et un manque de compétences. Le ministère de l’Éducation est ainsi intervenu dans la gestion de huit conseils scolaires en nommant des superviseurs chargés de les diriger temporairement. Pourtant, une analyse approfondie des dépenses administratives, y compris des coûts liés aux conseillers et à l’administration des conseils, révèle une tendance stable. Entre 2018-2019 et 2025-2026, la part des dépenses administratives dans le total des dépenses a oscillé entre 2,7 % et 2,8 %, avec de faibles variations. De plus, pour l’année scolaire 2025-2026, six des huit conseils scolaires ayant fait l’objet d’une intervention présentaient un ratio inférieur à la moyenne provinciale. En résumé, les conseils scolaires ne présentent aucun signe de surcoût administratif.

Les élèves et leurs familles écoperont

Plus de deux millions d’élèves fréquentent près de 5 000 écoles à travers l’Ontario. Ce système scolaire est une immense machine qui mobilise de nombreux professionnels aux profils variés : ceux qui assurent le transport des élèves en toute sécurité entre leur domicile et l’école, ceux qui dispensent les cours, ceux qui accompagnent les élèves ayant des besoins spéciaux, ceux qui veillent à la propreté et au bon fonctionnement des bâtiments, ainsi que ceux qui s’occupent des tâches administratives en coulisses. Les enjeux sont d’une importance majeure. Tous ces professionnels contribuent à la mission de soutenir l’apprentissage et le développement des enfants, et de les préparer à affronter un monde et une économie en constante évolution. Le gouvernement de l’Ontario doit veiller à ce que les enseignants disposent des outils nécessaires pour accomplir cette mission importante. Or, année après année, il demande aux écoles et au personnel enseignant d’en faire toujours plus avec moins de moyens. En bout de ligne, ce sont les élèves et leurs familles qui paieront le prix du sous-financement du système scolaire public. Et ce prix est trop élevé.

The post Faire plus avec moins : 10 faits sur le financement des écoles en Ontario appeared first on CCPA.

Workers are now rightly wondering what comes next as the full weight of new American tariffs are imposed on $27.6 billion of CUSMA-compliant goods on top of existing duties of 10 per cent to 50 per cent on autos, steel, aluminum, copper, lumber and their derivative products.

Nearly 90,000 additional jobs across Canada are on the line in sectors from agriculture and dairy to electronics, construction and industrial inputs—along with all of the services that support Canadian manufacturing and food production.

The retaliatory tariffs announced on August 25, 2026 will also create their own measure of economic uncertainty and challenge. The counter-tariffs are designed to offer some measure of protection to the same industries hit hard by Section 232 and 338 tariffs by attempting to price American competitors out of the market—but this won’t shield every business.

At the same time, the higher cost of key inputs that can’t easily be sourced in Canada may negatively impact other businesses that are struggling to keep afloat, raising the prospect of additional layoffs.

The solid economic growth Canada posted this spring will almost certainly slow this fall.

What’s on offer

A key question at this point is whether the $7.5 billion support package for workers and businesses, announced by the federal government alongside counter-tariffs, offers sufficient protection to weather the coming storm.  

For workers, the package builds on the temporary EI measures introduced last year. This includes extending the suspension of the one-week waiting period for benefits, extending the 20 extra weeks of support for certain “long-tenured workers” by another eight months, and encouraging uptake of a new Workforce Retention and Retraining Program that combines the existing EI Work-Sharing Program and Worker Retention Grant to help employers hang onto skilled staff.

The program’s goal is to support “work-sharing flexibilities” while providing employers with funding of up to $1,000 per participant to help offset training and administrative costs—to better position firms for the future. The maximum duration of the work-sharing program will be expanded to 150 weeks and the requirements for recovery plans relaxed. Workers’ schedules—as few as two working days a week—may be approved.

For businesses, beginning in September, the government will increase funding for the Regional Tariff Response Initiative by $1.5 billion. Delivered through Canada’s Regional Development Agencies, the program is intended to help small- and medium-sized employers (SMEs) respond to tariff pressures, adapt their operations and address liquidity challenges.

There is also a new $500-million liquidity stream, under the Business Development Bank of Canada’s Pivot to Grow program, aimed at helping SMEs manage immediate cash-flow pressures, along with targeted programs for the forestry, steel and aluminum sectors. The minimum revenue threshold to access BDC tariff-related programs will be lowered to from $2 million to $1 million.

There are improved terms for the $10 billion Large Enterprise Tariff Loan facility as well, and a new $2 billion Canada Strong Diversification Fund available to medium-sized companies in tariff-impacted companies with shovel-ready projects.

A counter-tariff exemption framework is expected to be announced shortly to assist businesses that can’t source U.S. inputs domestically or from another country, or where the counter-tariffs might generate severe impacts on selected Canadian industries (as we saw with the walk back of seafood retaliatory tariffs on August 27).  

Does the federal package measure up?

As my colleagues, Stuart Trew and Marc Lee, wrote last week, the consequences of the rejected deal would have fundamentally undermined our economic capacity and our political sovereignty, entrenching our status as a vasal state. In rightly rejecting this ruinous course, workers and communities deserve a fulsome response.

While the federal government has moved quickly, the measures on offer only tinker at the margins. The extension of EI programs is important, but very narrow in scope, certainly not equal to the task of protecting Canadians in this moment of crisis.

The COVID-19 pandemic graphically revealed the EI’s sizable gaps—forcing the government to bring in entirely new programs through the Canada Revenue Agency to offset massive earnings loss.

Instead of finally fixing the well-documented problems in the years following, the government settled on doing nothing. It did not address the high eligibility threshold that effectively screens out thousands upon thousands of workers (less than four in 10 unemployed workers access EI benefits today). It did not improve the very low earnings replacement rate (only 55 per cent) or introduce a minimum benefit.

Nor did it improve the provisions for selected “long-term workers” introduced last year and now extended, which exclude the vast majority of unemployed. The new work-sharing programs and funds to assist and retrain displaced workers are useful—but these efforts need to be massively scaled up (there are only 266 work-sharing agreements currently in place!!).

Likewise, the narrow focus on manufacturing is hugely problematic. As the economic impacts reverberate through the economy, many more workers will need sustained support. This is critical if Canada wants to strengthen its domestic market to replace dependence on U.S. trade. We urgently need an EI system for the 21st century, not a series of temporary fixes.

An additional word to the federal government: Stop laying off workers. Pursuing austerity at this moment is a massive own-goal—not only in terms of the state’s capacity to deliver critical public services, but as an economic stabilizer during difficult times.

And what of business?

Small- and medium-sized businesses are also worried about the rescue package weighted towards loans and employers with larger payrolls. Trump’s latest 50 per cent tariff is focused largely on goods manufactured and shipped by smaller firms. Businesses with $1 million in revenues are eligible to apply, but this threshold will still exclude most small businesses, according to business groups.

Other firms will be deterred from taking on more debt—not an appealing prospect for those still digging out from COVID-related debt and facing an uncertain future thanks to tariffs.

The government has signalled that it will respond quickly on remissions and is keen to assist businesses diversify their supply chains and client base. It remains to be seen how this will play out, whether more support will be forthcoming.  

The Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS) program delivered crucial support to business, accounting for 60 per cent—or $97 billion—of all federal pandemic spending. But it was also poorly targeted: millions of dollars flowed to large or profitable companies that used the cash to boost profits, buy back shares, or pay out executive bonuses and dividends.We can’t forget the lessons of COVID in our urgency to respond to this crisis.

Private profit over public interest

The immediate challenge is to address short-term effects of this assault, but it raises fundamental questions about where we are going: what is the government’s vision not only on the future of CUSMA but the Canadian economy as a whole?

Prime Minister Mark Carney declared at the January 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos that this moment represents “a rupture, not a transition” in the international rules-based order. Yet in Canada, there’s been no shift in the government’s commitment to neoliberalism that has delivered stagnant wages, skyrocketing levels of income inequality and public sector austerity over the past 30+ years.

The federal government will host sovereign wealth funds and large private equity firms around the world next month. In its quest to finance its agenda, public assets like airports, ports, toll roads, power grids, and water systems are rumoured to be on the table. In our efforts to disentangle ourselves from the rapacious grasp of the U.S. government, we seem to be leaping from one frying pan into another.   

Confronting American aggression, Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood argued last year, “cannot be met using the same laissez-faire approaches that got us into this mess. Canada-U.S. integration is, after all, the product of a half-century of free trade, deregulation and privatization. By giving capital free rein, unhindered by borders and emboldened by the erosion of taxation and regulatory regimes, governments have facilitated the concentration of economic power into the hands of multinational corporations with no loyalty to Canada or concern for the public interest.”

As we work toward the next federal budget—with an estimated $7 billion in new tariff revenue in hand—we need a comprehensive plan that takes back control of our economic future not only from an imperialist United States but from financial elites that have no loyalty to Canada or its people.

This starts with prioritizing the needs of workers and communities from the coming storm.

The post Standing up to Trump requires standing up for workers appeared first on CCPA.

From leader to laggard: Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the federal government took an active and growing role in funding post-secondary education in Canada. At one point, the federal government was a solid funding partner, splitting the costs of post-secondary education with provincial governments. From the mid-1980s onward, but especially in the 1990s, the federal government greatly reduced its role as funder, instead leading a gradual process of government defunding that continues today.

Per student funding: In 1955, total federal funding was worth $1,580 per full-time student. By 1967, those payments had risen to $5,470 per student. When federal transfer to provinces started the next year, total federal funding immediately jumped to $8,530 per student. Federal funding continued to grow, hitting an all-time high of $11,170 per student in 1978. By 2024, it had fallen to just $5,610 per student, just half of the historic peak. Most of the decline was driven by cuts to federal cash transfers to provincial governments, while federal funding for research has long been stagnant once inflation and enrollment are accounted for.

A preventable crisis: As government funding collapsed, universities and colleges made up the difference by aggressively maximizing student fee revenue. Average student fee revenue per student grew from just $3,140 in 1990 to $12,890 by 2024. Most growth has come from international students, causing a massive increase in their tuition fees. With the loss of international student fee revenue due to federal restrictions, post-secondary education institutions are being hit hard with mass layoffs, program closures, and the shuttering of campuses. It was an inevitable result of government underfunding combined with growing overreliance on revenue from international students and could have been prevented with adequate government funding.

Funding fell far behind economic growth: Federal funding has declined relative to the government’s rising financial capacities and Canada’s growing economy. At a high point in 1984, federal funding represented 0.67 per cent of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP). By 2024 it had fallen to just 0.34 per cent of GDP. In the early 1970s, federal post-secondary education funding represented over 3.5 per cent of all federal government spending. In 2024, it had fallen to just 1.9 per cent of total federal spending.

Today, Canada’s universities and colleges face a financial crisis of a far greater magnitude than the one that prompted the federal government to step in as a funder in the first place. To avoid the long-term decline of Canada’s universities and colleges, the federal government must demonstrate leadership in post-secondary education, as it did once before.

Introduction

Canada’s universities and colleges have been shaken by a severe financial crisis, triggered by the loss of international student fee revenue. Across the country, post-secondary education institutions are being hit hard with mass layoffs, program closures, and the shuttering of entire campuses.

The federal government of Canada bears significant, but often underappreciated, responsibility for this situation. First, by leading generations of government defunding of post-secondary education systems, while encouraging and enabling the turn to student fee-based funding models. Then by abruptly cutting the number of international study permits issued in 2024 and following up with further cuts the next year, without any plan for dealing with the inevitable revenue crisis that would follow.

Canada’s federal government once played a more positive leadership and funding role, which was essential to the creation of the country’s modern higher-education systems. For a brief time, the federal government prioritized higher education as in the national interest, establishing itself as an active funding partner to the provinces. Since the late 1970s, it has vacated that role, leading the long retreat from government funding.

Despite its diminished role, the federal government remains the actor with the greatest financial capabilities to support post-secondary systems across the country. It is difficult to imagine a renaissance of public post-secondary funding in Canada without the federal government becoming a credible funding partner to provincial governments once again. It must summon the political will to begin that process immediately.

The rise and fall of federal post-secondary funding

The federal government once embraced an important role as a funder

The federal government’s role in post-secondary education was forged in the first financial crisis in Canadian higher education. Prior to the 1950s, before post-secondary systems had matured into their modern form, the federal government had little part to play in the sector.

In the aftermath of World War II, the federal government provided educational subsidies to returning veterans, covering tuition fees and the cost of living, allowing mass numbers of working-class people to enrol at universities, which had previously been the near exclusive domain of the elite.

Universities struggled to serve the massively expanding student population. A financial crisis loomed, as described in the 1949 report of the Massey Commission, which named rising operating costs, insufficient government funding, and over-reliance on student fees as threats to the viability of the system: “Our universities are facing a financial crisis so grave as to threaten their future usefulness.”

The report called for swift intervention, recommending that the federal government step in to prevent a national crisis. In the following year, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent declared the financial health of universities to be in the national interest and established a formal system of federal funding for universities.

From 1951 to 1966, the federal government made payments to universities themselves, using the National Council of Canadian Universities—the precursor to today’s Universities Canada—as an intermediary to distribute the funds as operating grants. This arrangement helped to keep universities afloat, but eventually proved untenable, viewed by some provinces, particularly Quebec, as an infringement on their constitutional authority over education.

By the mid-1960s, it was becoming clear that the significant funding increases needed to keep up with expected enrolment growth would soon outstrip the financial capabilities of provincial governments. In 1965, Prime Minister Lester Pearson stated that the government “accepts the federal responsibility” of assisting the provinces with rising post-secondary costs, “in order that the opportunities for higher education should be adequately improved for all Canadians, in all parts of the country.”   

In 1968, the federal government stopped grants to institutions and began making transfer payments to provincial governments to support their post-secondary spending. Such transfers are the most meaningful tool the federal government has to exert positive leadership on higher-education funding.

Some of this transfer was provided in the form of federal tax abatement that allowed provinces to raise more tax revenue, while the rest was a cash payment. Experts have debated the extent to which the tax transfer counts as a federal contribution. This analysis focuses only on the cash payments.

Federal direct funding continued after 1968, but in a different form. From that point until today, most direct funding exists as grants, contributions and contracts to support the research activities of institutions and individual scholars. Direct funding also contains a much smaller capital funding component to support investment in post-secondary infrastructure like buildings, laboratories and specialized equipment.

Figure 1 shows federal government post-secondary funding, adjusted for inflation and full-time enrolment, from 1955 to 1978, broken down into direct funding to institutions and transfer payments to provincial governments. All funding amounts herein are net of spending on student financial aid, so funding for systems only. All dollar amounts are inflation adjusted to 2025 dollars unless indicated otherwise.

In 1955, total funding was worth $1,580 per full-time student, which was entirely direct funding to institutions. By 1967, those payments had risen to $5,470 per student. When federal transfer to provinces started the next year, total federal funding immediately jumped to $8,530 per student.

Despite losing ground to very high inflation in the mid-1970s, federal funding rebounded to hit an all-time high of $11,170 per student in 1978. The total amount of federal funding grew massively, from $162 million in 1955 to over $6.4 billion by 1978. Most of that increase was due to transfer payments, which had grown from $1.6 billion in 1968 to $5 billion a decade later.

Federal post-secondary funding has collapsed over time

The tide began to turn with the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, which the federal government responded to with harsh austerity measures, curbing growth of spending on public services. From that point, the federal government began a long, gradual retreat as a funder, a path it still walks today.

Growth of post-secondary transfers was capped at 15 per cent a year in 1972, a rate that would seem extremely generous by current standards. In 1977, growth of transfers was pegged to the rate of economic growth. Total federal funding continued to rise into the early 1980s, although at a much slower pace.

In 1984, federal transfers ($6.1 billion) and direct funding ($1.9 billion) were worth $8 billion. In 2024, transfers ($5.1 billion) and direct funding ($5.3 billion) totalled $10.4 billion. A funding increase of $2.4 billion over 40 years fell vastly short of what was needed to keep up with both inflation and growing student populations.

From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, successive governments enacted a series of austerity measures that began to hollow out federal transfers. The Chrétien government’s 1995 federal budget delivered a brutal blow, instituting a short-lived, controversial reorganization of the transfer system that resulted in the post-secondary transfer being cut from $5.2 billion in 1995 to just $3.4 billion by 1998. It would not reach $5 billion in real terms again until 2017.

Figure 2 displays federal funding, on a real and per full-time student basis, from the historical high in 1978 to 2024. A clear pattern emerges: collapsing transfers and stagnant direct funding. Total federal funding fell from $11,170 in 1978 to $5,610 per student by 2024, just half of what it was at the highest point. Most of the decline was driven by cuts to transfers, which dropped from $8,860 per-student in 1978 to just $2,760 in 2024.

Once enrolment and inflation are accounted for, direct funding, mostly for research activities, has been mostly stagnant over the recent history of Canadian post-secondary education. It amounted to $2,300 per student in 1978 and $2,800 in 2024, an increase of only $500 over 46 years.

Transfers: The hidden link between federal and provincial funding

Using transfer payments, the federal government has a strong influence on the direction of provincial post-secondary funding. In provincial budgets, post-secondary spending is usually treated as though it comes entirely from provincial governments. However, a portion of that spending is financed by a federal cash transfer. This means provincial government spending on post-secondary education can be broken down into two parts, by the source of money: cash from a federal transfer and the province’s own revenues.

For instance, if a provincial government reported $100 of post-secondary education spending in its annual budget and the federal government provided a post-secondary transfer of $20, it would only amount to $100 of total funding, rather than $120. In this example, the federal transfer finances 20 per cent of the total, while the remaining amount comes from the province’s own revenues, net of the transfer amount.

Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has typically not reported the post-secondary transfer amount, though it can be estimated from existing information. Nor do provincial governments report how much of their spending on the sector has been financed by the federal government. As a result, the federal role in funding post-secondary education tends to be obscured.

When the transfer system was designed to support and incentivize increased provincial funding, the provinces played their part and increased spending. As the transfer system was remade to restrain spending growth, federal and provincial spending predictably began a phase of long-term decline.

In the post-war years, the provinces prioritized post-secondary education on their own accord. From 1955 to 1967, provincial government funding more than tripled, from just $4,850 to over $16,000 per student. There were no significant federal post-secondary transfers to provinces at the time, so they were committing only their own revenues in response to a rising tide of mass enrolment.

Despite high levels of provincial investment, it was not enough to keep up with the rapid expansion of the size and scope of university and college education systems. In 1968, the federal government established the system of transfers to provinces, entering a funding partnership with provincial governments on a cost-sharing basis.

Under this arrangement, the amount of federal transfers was tied directly to the costs of post-secondary education institutions. The federal government would provide provinces 50 cents for each dollar spent on approved operating expenditures at universities and colleges, or $15 per capita, whichever was greater.

Supported by federal transfers after 1968, provincial government spending immediately increased by over $5,000 per student and began to climb even higher, hitting a historic high of $27,200 per student in 1978. Figure 3 shows how much of the $11,130 increase in provincial post-secondary education spending can be attributed to federal cash transfers versus the part funded only by the provinces’ own revenue.

Over the course of the cost-sharing era, most growth of provincial government post-secondary education spending was supported by federal cash transfers, which accounted for $8,860 per student, or 80 per cent, while provincial own-sourced spending grew by an additional $2,270.

With both levels of government seeking ways to curb spending, Canada’s federal transfer system was completely remade in 1977 under a new arrangement called Established Programs Financing (EPF). Transfers were untethered from post-secondary education operating costs and made into unconditional block grants set to increase based on economic growth rates.

Under the EPF model, and continuing under today’s transfer system, cash payments to support post-secondary education have virtually no strings attached, essentially becoming general revenue for provinces to spend as they see fit. Though an amount is made available “notionally” to support post-secondary education spending, there are no accountability mechanisms to track how provincial governments spend it.

The transition to EPF entailed a significant, one-time increase in cash transfers the following year. From that point onward, with few exceptions, growth of both federal and provincial post-secondary funding has not been enough to keep up with inflation and enrolment growth, leading to a steady, long-term decline.

Since 2004, the Canada Social Transfer (CST) has been the vessel for federal post-secondary education transfers. The 2007 federal budget provided a modest boost to the notional post-secondary education allocation of the CST and set the transfer to grow at a three per cent annual escalator. This was still not enough to keep up with inflation and enrolment, causing even further erosion of both federal and provincial funding.

Provincial government funding fell from a high of $27,200 in 1978 to $13,760 in 2024. Figure 4 shows how much of the decline in provincial post-secondary education spending can be attributed to federal transfers versus the part funded by the provinces’ own revenue. Federal transfers made up $6,110 or 45 per cent of the drop, while the province’s own-sourced spending accounted for $7,300, or 55 per cent. From 1999 to 2019, the decline of federal transfers made up more than half of the decrease in provincial spending.

Federal-provincial co-operation on making students pay

From the 1990s onward, a political consensus on post-secondary education financing emerged: that students and their families should be made to shoulder as much of the cost as politically possible, forcing them to go into debt if needed.

Both the federal and most provincial governments, with few exceptions, were willing collaborators in replacing government funding with student fees. To facilitate this movement, the federal government greatly expanded the provision of financial assistance to Canadian students in the form of student loans and non-repayable grants. Without the federal government playing this role, the potential to shift to student debt as a major source of education financing would have been very limited.

Nearly all post-secondary operating funding comes from either governments or student fees, so those can be considered the core sources of funding. Figure 5 shows this core funding on a real per full-time student basis from 1974 until 2024. The provincial government part has been calculated net of federal cash transfers, meaning spending funded by provincial revenues only.

At the peak of government funding in 1978, both levels of government contributed a combined $29,500 per student, which was 90 per cent of core funding. Though their per-student contributions had been declining, governments still provided 88 per cent of core funding as of 1990.

In the following years, government funding collapsed as severe cuts to federal transfers coincided with significant cuts by many provincial governments. A brief period of provincial reinvestment in the 2000s was crushed by a wave of austerity in response to the Great Recession in 2008, setting government funding tumbling downhill once again. By 2024, government funding fell to just $16,600 per student and 56 per cent of core revenues.

Due to declining government contributions, total core revenue fell from a high of $32,880 in 1978 to a low of $23,000 in 1998. Yet it began to recover to previous levels quickly, hitting $30,000 again by 2008, as provincial governments increasingly filled the gap with student fees.

In 1978, student fee revenue accounted for just $3,380 per student, or 10 per cent of core funding. Throughout the 1980s, tuition fees still played a small role in post-secondary education funding. By 1990, student fee revenue had fallen slightly, in real terms, to $3,140 per student.

As government revenue collapsed, universities and colleges began to aggressively maximize student fee revenue, especially post-2008. By 2024, revenue from student fees had risen to an average of $12,890 per student, contributing 44 per cent of core funding.

Adding in all other forms of non-core revenue, like ancillary or investment income, universities and colleges had more total revenue per-student than at any time before. Yet, it was only an illusion of prosperity, since it rested on unsustainable foundations.

Growth of tuition fees for domestic students proved to be politically sensitive and is regulated by policy in each province, to varying degrees. Fees for international students, on the other hand, had long been deregulated and could be raised easily at the discretion of university and college administrators. This made international student fees the path of least resistance in filling the gap left by government defunding.

Therefore, most recent revenue growth came from relying more heavily on revenue from international students, leading to massive increases in their student fees. In 2026, average fees for Canadian undergraduates were $7,730, compared to $41,750 paid by international students. The difference is not because international students are over five times more expensive to educate than their domestic peers, but because it has been politically convenient and financially lucrative for governments and institutions to treat them as cash cows.

Many institutions have become reliant on charging international students exorbitant fees to fund operations. For instance, at Ontario universities, international students were paying half of all tuition fees by 2023-24, despite only making up one-fifth of the student population. At Ontario’s public colleges, international students were nearly half of the student population in 2022-23 yet contributed 76 per cent of tuition revenue.

While both levels of government bear responsibility for this situation, the federal government played a key role. At each step of the way, it encouraged provinces to develop their international education industries. Without federal government policies, as the only body capable of issuing international study permits, it would not have been possible to turn international students into such a lucrative revenue source for universities and colleges.

Many experts and officials have noted the inherent vulnerability of this model to a disruption in the flow of international students and the high risks such an event would pose to Canada’s higher education systems. The federal government’s current approach to international education intentionally created that disruption. In 2024, the first wave of changes aimed at preventing or discouraging international students from coming to Canada were announced, cutting the number of permits issued, introducing stricter financial requirements, and limiting opportunities for work both during study and post-graduation.

Predictably, these policies have caused a significant decline in the number of international students on campuses, that will likely worsen over the next few years. The sudden drop in international student fee revenue caused an entirely foreseeable, and therefore preventable, financial crisis across Canada’s higher education sector, leading to mass layoffs, program losses, and campus closures.

To make matters worse, this course change in immigration policy unfairly frames international students as scapegoats for Canada’s real economic problems, especially the housing crisis. The of Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship’s official documentation plainly connects “reducing the number of students” with “easing ease pressures on housing, infrastructure, and services.”

Many advocates and experts have argued against this inaccurate association, which likely contributes to the troubling growth of anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and racist sentiment, especially directed against South Asian people, by incorrectly connecting them to the housing crisis and other social problems—a concern shared publicly by the Minister responsible at the time the policy was announced.

A much better approach would be for the federal government to once again accept that it has a major influence over and responsibility for the state of post-secondary funding across Canada, and to establish positive leadership backed up with action in terms of increasing funding levels.

Restoring federal leadership as a post-secondary funder

Funding levels have fallen far short of growing federal capacity to pay

Federal funding for post-secondary education has fallen considerably relative to the federal government’s growing capacity to spend and raise revenue.

Figure 6 shows federal post-secondary education funding calculated as a share of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) from 1964 to 2024, measuring it against the size of Canada’s economy. Once again, the familiar pattern of plunging transfers and long-stagnant direct funding arises.

In 1967, the year before federal transfers to provinces began, when the federal government played a growing, but still relatively small role as a funder, total federal post-secondary education funding amounted to 0.28 per cent of Canada’s GDP.

It would continue to grow over the period of positive federal funding leadership, prior to the austerity measures of the mid-1980s, hitting a peak of 0.67 per cent of GDP in 1984. It had fallen to just 0.34 per cent of GDP in 2024, about half of what it was at the historical high point.

Nearly all of that rise and fall can be attributed to federal transfers, which fell from 0.51 per cent of GDP in 1984 to just 0.17 per cent by 2024. Direct funding as a share of the economy has always been stagnant—it was 0.17 per cent of GDP in 2024, 0.16 per cent in 1984, and 0.12 per cent in 1978, when federal funding per-student was the highest.

The spending power of Canada’s federal government has grown greatly since the 1970s, yet almost none of that increased spending was prioritized for post-secondary education funding. In 1971, post-secondary education funding had the highest spending priority, at 3.6 per cent of total federal government expenditures. By 2024, it had fallen to just 1.9 per cent of federal expenditures.

Putting federal defunding into historical perspective

Today, Canada’s universities and colleges face a financial crisis of a far greater magnitude than the one that prompted the federal government to step in as a funder in the first place. To avoid the long-term decline of Canada’s universities and colleges, the federal government must demonstrate leadership in post-secondary education, as it did once before.

Restoring federal leadership will necessarily involve a large increase in the level of funding the federal government provides to support post-secondary education. What could that look like? Figure 7 presents the hypothetical value of federal post-secondary cash transfers in 2024, implied across a range of scenarios that answer the question, “What if the federal government retained its positive role as a funder, all else being equal?”

This exercise does suggest turning back the clock in an attempt to reproduce old funding models. The appropriate amount of funding should be based on the current and future needs and goals of higher-education systems. However, as a thought experiment, it can put the scale of federal defunding into perspective and help us to judge contemporary proposals for re-establishing federal funding leadership.

Federal cash transfers to provinces to support post-secondary systems were worth $5.1 billion in 2024. Restoring them to earlier funding benchmarks would require:

• $14.2 billion to match their 1980 peak as a share of federal spending—an increase of $9.1 billion.
• $15.7 billion to match their 1984 peak as a share of GDP—an increase of $10.6 billion.
• $17 billion to match their 1980 peak per full-time student—an increase of $11.9 billion.

While any of these amounts would mark a significant reinvestment that would greatly benefit the fortunes of Canada’s higher-education systems, none would even be enough to move Canada from near the bottom (45 per cent) of the OECD to merely average (67 per cent) in terms of the amount of post-secondary spending covered by all levels of government, which would require $14.6 billion in new government funds.

Regarding direct funding, which is mostly to pay for research activities, such a historical comparison does not work well, since it has been in a state of near permanent stasis. Given the over-reliance of the Canadian economy on universities to conduct research and development, the stagnation of research funding is a concerning finding.

Recent increases to research funding, not yet captured in financial data, have likely improved the situation, but many have argued that they do not go far enough. To preserve and strengthen the research capacity of Canada’s higher education sector, the federal government should get more research funding into the hands of scholars and students—especially those doing applied research at public colleges and CEGEPS, which typically take place outside of existing federal funding streams.

Toward a new federal-provincial funding framework

Just as provincial governments are unlikely to join a trend of reinvestment into post-secondary education in the absence of federal leadership and, more importantly, federal dollars, it is unlikely that the federal government will be willing or able to fund the entire cost of fixing the chronic underfunding of Canada’s patchwork of post-secondary systems.

Federal and provincial co-operation will, therefore, once again be required to ensure the viability of Canada’s universities and colleges. It is true that there are many barriers to greater federal participation in post-secondary education, namely that it remains the constitutional jurisdiction of provincial governments. Yet those tensions also exist in the field of health care, where the federal government has expended much political will to play a stronger and more accepted role as a funder and regulator.

For decades, education unions, student organizations, and advocacy groups have called on the federal government to pass a federal education act, which would establish federal leadership in the sector, set national standards for higher education, and create a dedicated transfer to provinces to support post-secondary education. Adopting such a framework would be a necessary step to the long-term restoration of government funding of post-secondary education in Canada.

The financial crisis at universities and colleges will not wait for a new national framework to be sorted out. As it once did long ago, the federal government should immediately begin working with provincial governments on emergency stabilization funding to prevent lasting damage to the vital sector.

Data sources

Extended transfer series

1. Statistics Canada Table 37-10-0081-01, federal government indirect support to provinces and territories for post-secondary education, by type of contribution.
2. Department of Finance Canada, Federal Support to Provinces and Territories: Major Federal Transfers dataset, used for EPF, CAP, CHST and CST transfer components.
3. Manually compiled canonical post-secondary education allocation anchors, including federal budget 2007 and the 2016 PBO publication, Federal Spending on Post-secondary Education.
4. Missing values have either been interpolated between known values or extrapolated at 3 per cent annual growth after 2020-2021.

Extended finance series

1. Statistics Canada Tables 37-10-0058-01 and 37-10-0061-01, college and university expenditures by direct source of funds and type of expenditure.
2. Statistics Canada Tables 37-10-0026-01 and 37-10-0028-01, university and college revenues by type of revenue and type of fund.

Extended enrolment series

1. Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics of Canada, Section W: Education, tables W1-9 and W466-474, full-time post-secondary enrolment and part-time university enrolment.
2. Statistics Canada, University Student Information System (USIS), 1972-2000, accessed via University of Toronto Library.
3. Statistics Canada Table 37-10-0071-01, archived – Full-time enrolments and graduates in postsecondary community college programs, by program field, year in program and sex.
4. Statistics Canada Table 37-10-0018-01, current post-secondary enrolment by registration status, institution type, student status in Canada and gender.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank his colleagues at the CCPA for their invaluable assistance, especially Erika Shaker, Ricardo Tranjan and Trish Hennessy. The CCPA also wishes to acknowledge the National Union of Public and General Employees for supporting this research.

The post Missing in action: Federal leadership on post-secondary funding appeared first on CCPA.

Unlike previous workforce initiatives, these new sectoral institutions are explicitly intended to support Canada’s evolving industrial strategy, particularly the federal government’s major projects agenda. Ottawa has announced six Workforce Alliance tables, which largely mirror the government’s industry, energy and transportation infrastructure initiatives. On a parallel track, a historic $6 billion funding stream to support Red Seal skilled trades training has also been launched. 

Unions have ample experience with supply-side training programs. Too many have focused solely on meeting the labour supply needs of employers, with limited benefits for workers and no opportunity to build union power. Could this iteration of workforce policy be an opportunity for the labour movement to do better? Does it create an opening to influence industrial policy, labour standards and worker rights? 

At a special panel during the 2026 conference of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association (CIRA) at Laval University in Quebec City, unions and labour academics came together to review the new Workforce Alliances and their associated training initiatives, and examine the opportunities for trade union engagement. 

The presentations to the CIRA conference are collected in this compendium. Our goal is to start a bigger discussion among trade unionists and progressive researchers about a labour strategy that links workforce policy with labour standards and conditionalities across the industries and sectors receiving federal funding, including a larger role for unions in shaping industrial policy. 

Several common themes emerge from the contributions collected here. First, workforce policy cannot be reduced to labour supply measures aimed solely at meeting employers’ skills needs. Second, sectoral institutions and public investments must be linked to stronger labour standards, worker retention and equitable employment outcomes. Finally, the Workforce Alliances raise broader questions about industrial governance and whether unions can use these new institutions to exercise meaningful influence over economic strategy and democratic decision-making. 

Fred Wilson’s introductory paper traces the evolution of workforce policies from the old sector councils, to industry-led labour market information programs and now back to partial joint governance in the Workforce Alliances. In each case, the primary purpose has been to provide “labour market information,” or LMI, and training programs to meet employer needs. Yet, in this latest version of workforce policy, to meet the government’s promise of “not just jobs, but careers” will require going well beyond the LMI model. Labour’s goals in the new workforce policies must address sector and industry-based standards and industrial policies that create and sustain high-quality, value-added jobs. 

Ken Delaney, the managing director of the Canadian Skilled Trades Employment Coalition (CSTEC), Canada’s longest-standing “sector council” model, speaks to the limits of the former sector councils that were confined by government agendas. CSTEC’s work highlights the promise of workforce programs to address worker transition, equity and inclusion, especially if workers are allowed to maintain EI benefits in training. The organization’s programs also demonstrate how the career-building potential of Red Seal training can be adapted to meet the needs of skilled workers in manufacturing and other sectors. Delaney encourages unions to seize the opportunity in the Workforce Alliances to integrate industrial policy with labour market policy. 

Professor Evelyn Dionne’s study of the construction sector in Quebec warns that sector programs to increase labour force supply and speed up construction can lead to “a downward spiral marked by declining skill levels, lower-quality housing, inefficient green buildings and high turnover.” Dionne calls for project labour agreements (PLAs) to be incorporated into housing and construction projects in order to establish common and high-quality terms and conditions governing all workers and contractors. “By embedding training, equity and labour standards into procurement processes,” she writes, “PLAs can help ensure that accelerated construction does not come at the expense of quality or working conditions.” 

After pressure from within the Liberal caucus, reinforced by advocacy from social policy and feminist advocates, the federal government agreed to establish a Workforce Alliance for the care economy. Laurell Ritchie, a member of the Care Economy Initiative, emphasizes that in the care economy, worker retention is as important as recruitment. Like industrial sectors, meeting workforce goals in the care economy will require sector-based programs and standards, and strong government leadership. The inclusion of the care economy among the Workforce Alliances is itself recognition that industry and workforce policy can be influenced by advocacy from unions and women’s organizations. 

Unifor Research Director Angelo DiCaro’s contribution on the interrelationship between industrial policy and workforce policy underscores the need for the state to act as a “conductor” of a complex orchestra involving multiple public and private players. A weak state role leaves the government as a passive enabler of the private sector, resulting in “industrial improvisation” rather than industrial strategy. For the Workforce Alliances to make a real difference, they must go beyond workforce development—filling vacancies, and sponsoring training—to become well-rounded tables for “peak-level social dialogue” with “a whole-of-supply-chain approach” to labour standards and industrial growth. 

As DiCaro aptly puts it, the Workforce Alliances could be “a vital cog in the wheel of industrial growth and rising workplace standards.” Alternatively, they could become an “unambitious and burdensome exercise, simply facilitating training fund transfers, and entirely delinked from future-facing industrial strategy.” 

Prime Minister Carney has described this as a “hinge moment” for Canada, as we collectively face up to the unprecedented threat posed by Donald Trump and aggression from Washington. It is also a hinge moment for labour. The potential reorientation of Canada’s economy away from deep dependence on U.S. export markets, with a greater role for active industrial policy and even public investment, carries both opportunities and risks for unions and the workers they represent. 

The Workforce Alliances are an opportunity for unions to shape this historic economic moment, leveraging workers’ position at the point of production to demand both material progress and democratic power as this pivot unfolds. Canada’s unions must demonstrate that they have the organizational capacity and political leverage to bring a working-class agenda to the Workforce Alliances, and help to shape this new era of industrial policy in favour of workers. 

The Centre for Future Work is a resource for Canadian researchers, unionists, and policymakers on the key issues underlying workforce and industrial policy, including economic policy, worker voice and sectoral bargaining. 

Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives intends to serve as an ongoing hub for research, dialogue and policy development on the Workforce Alliances and related questions of industrial strategy and labour market governance.

The post A hinge moment for unions in Canada’s new industrial era appeared first on CCPA.

• On September 1, Alberta’s new two-tier health care system takes effect.
• A new Abacus Data public opinion survey of 1,500 Alberta residents and 1,500 respondents from the rest of Canada shows widespread opposition to U.S.-style, two-tier health care, where physicians and private facilities can bill patients and the public system for medically necessary health care.
• Nine in 10 Canadians are concerned about the future of public health care—half of them worry about the cost of health care in the future.
• This national survey shows that the Alberta government is pushing a policy direction that is not aligned with the research evidence nor does it have support in Alberta and across Canada.
• While the Alberta government continues to advance the idea that Albertans have distinct views from the rest of Canada, this poll finds that Albertans share similar views with the rest of the country.
  • At 86 per cent of respondents, Albertans overwhelmingly believe universal health care based on need, not ability to pay, is a core Canadian value.
  • Albertans also strongly believe (78 per cent) that public health care can meet the needs of Canadians if governments invest more in it. 
  • On the issue of whether corporations and doctors should have the unrestricted ability to charge patients for health care, Albertans are also on the same page with the rest of the country: 77 per cent disagree with that premise.
  • A clear majority of respondents across Canada and in Alberta want public solutions to reduce wait times, including a focus on health care workforce expansion (65 per cent for all of Canada and 68 per cent of Albertans).

Canadians aren’t clamouring for U.S.-style health care

New public opinion research shows that Canadian residents strongly oppose the introduction of U.S.-style, two-tier health care by the Alberta government.

On September 1, the Alberta government will bring Bill 11 (Health Statutes Amendment Act, 2025) into force. This legislation legislates a U.S.-style, two-tier health care system where physicians and surgeons can work in the public system and the private-pay market at the same time, charging patients for medically necessary health care, including surgeries. 

On July 31, Alberta’s Bill 29 (Health Statutes Amendment Act, 2026) established a two-tier model for medical imaging, including MRI scans, where providers can charge wealthier patients out of pocket for faster diagnosis and treatment. 

Together, Bill 11 and Bill 29 open the door to a U.S.-style private health insurance market for health care already covered under the public plan, which directly contravenes the Canada Health Act. The Alberta government likens its reforms to “European” health care, which careful analysis shows not to be the case.

The Alberta government claims that the public is frustrated with long health care wait times and that greater private-pay options will address these challenges. But a new national opinion survey challenges these arguments. 

The 3,000-person Abacus Data survey (1,500 respondents in Alberta and 1,500 in the rest of Canada) conducted for the Canadian Health Coalition offers insight into Canadians’ opposition to Alberta’s U.S.-style health care model and preference for investments in the public health care system. 

Most Canadians are quite concerned about the future of public health care

When asked if they are concerned about the future of public health care, nine in 10 Canadians are concerned about the future of public health care (44 per cent are somewhat concerned and 47 per cent are very concerned). In Alberta, the share of residents who are very concerned jumps to 53 per cent. Only nine per cent of those surveyed are not concerned. 

Long ER waits, workforce shortages, and access to providers—major concerns

Respondents across Canada identify the following as areas of major concern: emergency room delays (73 per cent), shortages of health care workers (72 per cent), wait times to see medical professionals, access to specialists (61 per cent), and the lack of long-term and assisted living (58 per cent).

Not far behind are concerns about having to pay out of pocket for health care (54 per cent) and the increased use of for-profit companies to deliver health care (45 per cent)—the very things that will increase under Alberta’s two-tier system.

Among Albertans, the major concerns are very similar to those in the rest of Canada. Even among United Conservative Party (UCP) voters, concerns about having to pay out of pocket for health care (44 per cent) and increased for-profit health care delivery (33 per cent) are significant. Health care wait times remain a concern that transcend party affiliation. 

Universal public health care is a core value in Alberta and across Canada 

The vast majority of respondents across Canada (85 per cent) strongly support universal health care based on need, not ability to pay, and believe this is a core Canadian value. Eighty per cent believe that Canada’s public health care system can meet our needs if governments invest more in it. 

Despite a significant body of research showing that for-profit health care delivery undermines—not strengthens—the public health care system, 59 per cent of respondents believe for-profit providers could be beneficial. 

However, when it comes to private health care financing and two-tier health care, 69 per cent disagree that corporations and doctors should have the unrestricted ability to charge patients for health care, as is the case under Alberta’s new private-pay model.

While the Alberta government continues to advance the idea that Albertans have distinct views from the rest of Canada, this poll finds that Albertans share similar views with the rest of the country. At 86 per cent of respondents, Albertans overwhelmingly believe universal health care based on need, not ability to pay, is a core Canadian value. Albertans also strongly believe (78 per cent) that public health care can meet the needs of Canadians if governments invest more in it. 

On the issue of whether corporations and doctors should have the unrestricted ability to charge patients for health care, Albertans are also on the same page with the rest of the country: 77 per cent disagree with that premise.

Alberta’s U.S.-style reforms are advancing with very little public understanding of the significance

The Alberta government is rapidly advancing two-tier health care while the Canadian public has very little understanding of the legislation and its implications. Only 22 per cent of Canadians say that they understand the legislation well, which jumps to 42 per cent in Alberta. A majority of Canadians—78 per cent—don’t understand Bill 11.

This finding demonstrates that the Alberta government is benefitting from advancing a highly unpopular, but seismic shift in health care policy, amidst limited public knowledge on the topic. This raises significant concerns about the lack of a public discussion and the role of the federal government to help Canadians understand the grave implications of Alberta’s reforms. The federal government—if it believes in upholding the Canada Health Act—needs to play a leadership role in fostering a public discussion about the risks of a U.S.-style health care system.

Once Bill 11 is explained to Canadians, the majority oppose it

When Bill 11 is explained to the public—allowing doctors and private facilities to charge both patients and the public system for medically necessary care—53 per cent of respondents oppose it. While 32 per cent of Canadians support this approach, 15 per cent are not sure.

Canadians are concerned about U.S.-style, private-pay health care spreading to other provinces

Nearly three-quarters of Canadians (74 per cent) are concerned about Bill 11 expanding or similar private-pay models spreading to other provinces. A greater share of Albertans (76 per cent) are concerned with this prospect. Only 26 per cent of respondents across Canada are not concerned. Clearly, this is an issue of national importance.

Alberta women, lower-income households, and even United Conservative voters are concerned about Bill 11

When drilling down into Albertans’ views on Bill 11, 84 per cent of women are concerned compared to 73 per cent of men. Lower-income households (less than $50k a year) are more concerned than higher-income households at 84 per cent, although three-quarters of higher-income households still remain concerned. 

Interestingly, 63 per cent of UCP voters in the province are concerned about Bill 11 remaining in place and expanding over time. This suggests that as Alberta UCP voters learn more about Bill 11, they are not supportive of the health care reform directions of the United Conservative Party. 

Across every area, Canadians are concerned about the consequences of Bill 11

Canadians top concerns about Bill 11 include: higher health care costs (85 per cent), unequal access to health care based on income (83 per cent), the additional cost of private health care insurance (83 per cent), longer wait times in the public health care system (81 per cent), and for-profit companies making money from health care (81 per cent) top Canadians’ concerns about Bill 11.

Canadians and Albertans strongly favour evidence-based public solutions to reduce wait times

A clear majority of respondents across Canada and in Alberta want public solutions to reduce wait times, including a focus on health care workforce expansion (65 per cent for all of Canada and 68 per cent of Albertans). 

Investing more in public health care, even if it requires additional funding, is the second-highest preferred solution, at 53 per cent across Canada and among 57 per cent of Albertans. Making better use of public operating rooms and better coordination of specialist referrals rank more highly among Albertans and across the country than allowing private clinics to provide more health care services.

Canadians and Albertans believe strongly in evidence-based public solutions to health care wait times, and do not favour greater private, for-profit involvement.

This national survey shows that the Alberta government is pushing a policy direction that is not aligned with the research evidence nor does it have support in Alberta and across Canada.

The post New poll shows strong opposition to Alberta’s two-tier health care reforms appeared first on CCPA.

The bully, once he’s got your lunch money, isn’t going to stop coming back for more. Any trade peace from the U.S., in the remainder of the Trump administration or whatever follows, would have been highly uncertain. Canada would inevitably be back to another negotiating table making further concessions to avert another round of tariffs a year from now. 

Thankfully, with a broad mandate from Canadians for an “elbows up” approach, and apparent agitation by at least a few premiers, Carney stood firm against U.S. pressure tactics. We review what comes next: the new section 338 tariffs of 50 per cent; Canadian retaliation against the new tariffs; and the need for deeper industrial and trade policies to pivot the Canadian economy away from the U.S. But first, a look at the bad deal on the table.

The deal, rejected

The draft text at the time negotiations collapsed will not likely be released. The centrepiece of the deal would have seen Canada drop its retaliation against American tariffs—removal of U.S. liquor from the shelves of most provinces, bans on government procurement from U.S. companies and tariffs on some American imports—in exchange for reduced but not eliminated sectoral tariffs in steel, aluminum and automotive. 

In steel, Canada would have disarmed, lowering its retaliatory tariffs on U.S. steel to zero while the United States applied a 25 per cent tariff on all Canadian imports up to a low tonnage quota, above which the tariff popped back up to 50 per cent. In other words, a very, very lopsided arrangement that maintained a terrible investment environment.

In automotive, the U.S. tariff on finished vehicles would have been reduced to 15 per cent, down from 25 per cent, but only for cars, not trucks, with the value of U.S.-origin parts exempted from the tariff. Unifor, the union representing Canadian autoworkers, warned that any effective tariff rate higher than four or five per cent creates a permanent incentive for U.S. and international auto manufacturers to leave Canada. 

Prime Minister Carney also flagged language that would have prohibited Canada from entering into other trade deals and that would restrict language and culture protections. Other sources report Canada was asked to change how it regulates dairy imports, concede ground on cultural policy and digital sovereignty, buy more U.S. armaments and give the American buyers the right of first refusal on Canadian critical mineral production. 

What comes next?

The deal, as reported, might have bought Canada time to strengthen our east-west linkages and engage in focused industrial policies that strengthen Canadian supply chains and diversify trade relationships. Yet, by locking Canada even further into the U.S. orbit, we may easily have lost interest in doing this hard work. And the concessions would have locked in a weakened Canadian position that deviates from what we signed under CUSMA. 

A top priority is worker and business support for sectors threatened by Trump’s new Section 338 tariffs on a wide range of manufactured goods. Many companies have claimed they will go out of business if they can’t sell into the United States. COVID-level worker subsidies and temporary layoff programs are in order, along with tailored shifts to Employment Insurance (to make it simpler to access) and more resources to the government workers who facilitate the program.  

Carney’s day-after speech emphasized dollar-for-dollar retaliation to protect the Canadian sectors affected by the Section 338 tariffs of 50 per cent. In a number of these areas, there should be good opportunities to transition Canadian exports to the domestic market. The new retaliatory measures will be announced shortly and will take effect after Labour Day. 

However, tariffs increase costs for Canadian households and businesses, so the key should be targeted retaliation in strategic areas, not achieving some dollar target. This is particularly important for tariffs on imported intermediate or capital goods. There may be Canadian substitutes for inputs currently sourced in the United States. More proactive supply chain information-gathering and match-making is needed to retool the Canadian economy and boost domestic capacity to service the Canadian market.  

Production lost to exports may be useful to businesses elsewhere in Canada, but distance and transportation costs are substantial (not alleged internal trade barriers, as some have argued). The government should urgently find ways to lower freight and trucking costs, through the introduction of public competition if necessary. The government’s recent freight subsidies for moving heavy steel products between provinces are a step in the right direction but too hands-off a strategy for encouraging domestic use of domestic industrial inputs and diversifying the kinds of steel products we make here.

In addition, just as removing alcohol from U.S. shelves hit a nerve in key producing locations, an overlay of strategic geography, with the U.S. mid-terms in sight, might focus some of the tariff pain in areas where there is strong Trump support. A number of key Republican border states, such North Dakota and Montana, send the vast majority of their exports to Canada, and for a large majority of U.S. states (36 out of 50), Canada is their top export destination. 

Defence procurement is another area where non-tariff measures could be effective. Dropping Canada’s proposed purchase of U.S.-made F-35s makes double sense, as it would be foolish to create an even deeper reliance on American hardware, software and long-term maintenance.

Canada should also not be shy about putting major resource sectors on the table, including oil and gas, electricity and potash. These areas have been carefully shielded from U.S. tariff actions and a Canadian export tax would lead to almost full pass-through into higher costs for Americans. Unfortunately, some of those costs would also be passed on to Canadian importers. For example, we buy about $20 billion worth of refined petroleum (fuels, but also condensate to ease the flow of heavy Alberta crude through pipelines) and tens of billions in chemical products from U.S. sources each year. 

An export tax should be designed carefully with the purpose of encouraging more domestic production of these goods in Canada. Paired with an import substitution strategy, an export tax would complement longer-term economic and employment goals and make Canada less reliant on the U.S. market.

Mining is also, er, critical. Rather than give the U.S. a first right of refusal over Canadian critical minerals development and exports, Canada needs to deepen its domestic capacity and, importantly, figure out what minerals we believe to be critical to our economic future—and how to develop and upgrade them sustainably, with full social licence. Crown corporations may be more appropriate to this task than private mining, with public spending directed to internal rather than export-based trade infrastructure. 

Another big, unanswered question is how this non-pre-deal relates to the ongoing CUSMA review or parallel U.S.-Mexico trade talks. Trump told the media Friday afternoon that talks with Mexico would restart after a deal is reached with Canada, while Mexico’s economy minister said he expected a similar agreement to be reached with the Americans. With the Canadian talks in limbo after Carney’s walk-out, could a door have opened to trinational conversations about some of the bigger picture items, including the CUSMA review? 

The CUSMA review, which may be postponed for a while, was to cover some technical (e.g., minimum North American content requirements for tariff-free automotive trade) and some very political demands from the United States, such as alignment with Trump’s investment screening and export restrictions for Chinese companies, alignment on artificial intelligence regulation and “critical” minerals, and common external tariffs. Canada and Mexico are stronger together in any circumstance. 

The vision thing

We can thank Donald Trump for one thing: he has brought Canadians together, from coast to coast and on the left and right. That energy needs to be funnelled into forging a better, unified Canada. Not just boosting the throughput of resources but building an economy that leverages those resources to strengthen the foundation of Canada’s economic life.

Canada may still be considering a leap of faith back into Fortress North America, as proposed by the Ontario government and large parts of the business community. Read between the lines of the prime minister’s Saturday announcement and the issue seems to be more with the lopsidedness of the deal on offer than with the content of renewed cooperation. 

Carney has, on several occasions, welcomed closer Canada-U.S. energy, security and military ties, including the participation in lavish military procurement and exercises like the Golden Dome. The delayed introduction of dollar-for-dollar retaliatory tariffs suggests the prime minister is open to concluding such a deal in the next week or so, prior to Labour Day.  

Canada is now on a high wire act without a net. And while there are legitimate fears about falling, Canadians need to remember that our country has the resources, infrastructure and know-how to use this moment and come out stronger on the other side. 

The post After the failed trade deal with the U.S., what comes next? appeared first on CCPA.