Au cours de l’année, le gouvernement de l’Ontario n’a eu de cesse d’accuser les conseils scolaires de mauvaise gestion financière. Le ministère de l’Éducation a alors mis sous tutelle huit conseils scolaires et a grassement rémunéré des superviseurs pour remplacer les conseillers et diriger de main de fer les conseils. Ces huit conseils scolaires pris ensemble regroupent 733 000 élèves dans la province, soit 36 % de tous les élèves.

Les allégations pour justifier cette prise en charge ne sont pas étayées par des chiffres précis. Oui, les écoles de la province font face à des difficultés financières—n’importe quel enseignant ou parent vous le dira. Mais est-ce vraiment un problème de mauvaise gestion financière?

Le CCPA surveille étroitement le financement de l’éducation en Ontario et s’appuie sur des chiffres précis. Or, nous avons une explication différente. Nos analyses indiquent que l’on demande aux écoles année après année d’en faire plus avec moins. Nous avons atteint le point de rupture, les fissures dans la fondation sont littéralement visibles.

Les données sur le Financement principal de l’éducation rendues publiques hier corroborent malheureusement notre position.

Le financement par élève cette année, une fois ajusté pour l’inflation, est légèrement inférieur au niveau de l’an passé et 180 $ plus bas que celui de l’année scolaire 2018-2019. Dans un système scolaire comptant plus de deux millions d’élèves, chaque compression ajoute aux déficits budgétaires considérables. En 2026-2027, le gouvernement ontarien dépensera 362 millions de dollars de moins pour les écoles de l’Ontario qu’il ne l’a fait en 2018-2019 en dollars réels. Nous continuons de reculer.

L’autre problème des compressions financières, c’est qu’elles s’accumulent. Certaines compressions financières veulent tout simplement dire que des élèves font rater des occasions qui ne reviendront jamais. Mais d’autres créent des pressions financières pour les années à venir: les listes d’attente pour du soutien à l’éducation spécialisée continuent d’allonger, les ressources utilisées en classe ne sont jamais reconstituées, les fuites dans les toits ne sont jamais réparées, les programmes de lutte contre le racisme sont reportés à l’année prochaine, comme le sont les mesures de soutien additionnelles pour les élèves de familles à faible revenu, dont les fonds qui leur sont destinés sont affectés à d’autres priorités. La liste est longue.

Il y a des limites à déshabiller Pierre pour habiller Paul—à la fin, Pierre est flambant nu.

Le déficit de financement accumulé pour les écoles de l’Ontario depuis 2018-2019 a atteint la somme faramineuse de 6,4 milliards de dollars. Il s’agit du montant total qu’ont perdu les conseils scolaires de l’Ontario par rapport à ce qu’ils auraient reçu si leur financement avait suivi le rythme des inscriptions et de l’inflation au cours des huit dernières années, présumant qu’aucun financement additionnel ne sera accordé durant la prochaine année scolaire.

Les superviseurs des huit conseils scolaires sous la gouverne provinciale devront faire face à ces déficits budgétaires.

Comme les graphiques l’indiquent ci-dessous, les huit conseils ont été privés de sommes considérables au cours des dernières années: le Conseil scolaire du district de Toronto de 950 M$,  le Conseil scolaire catholique du district de Toronto 290 M$, le Conseil scolaire du district de Peel de 266 M$, le Conseil scolaire du district d’Ottawa-Carleton de 347 M$, le Conseil scolaire catholique du district de York de $123 M$, le Conseil scolaire du district de Thames Valley de 235 M$, le Conseil scolaire catholique du district de Dufferin-Peel de 221 M$ et le Conseil scolaire du district de Near North de 22 M$. Les sommes varient en fonction de la taille du conseil, mais la plupart des déficits représentent de vingt à trente pour cent du financement d’un an.

Ces déficits budgétaires considérables accumulés expliquent de façon beaucoup plus crédible les difficultés financières auxquelles font face les écoles et les conseils scolaires que les allégations de mauvaise gestion financière qui, par ailleurs, n’ont pas été corroborées par des éléments de preuve. Malheureusement, les allocations accordées aux conseils scolaires cette année ne renversent pas la tendance qui nous a mis dans ce pétrin.

Notes méthodologiques

• Le ministère de l’Éducation n’a pas publié les chiffres réels pour 2022-2023 et 2023-2024; notre analyse s’appuie sur des estimations révisées pour ces années.
• Le service de la dette et le financement ponctuel lié à la pandémie, qui ne fait plus partie du Financement principal de l’éducation, sont exclus pour toutes les années.
• Dans des analyses antérieures, les provisions de planification excessivement élevées étaient exclues, mais comme ces montants sont revenus à des niveaux raisonnables, ils sont inclus.

The post Le déficit de financement des écoles de l’Ontario continue de s’accroître depuis 2018, pour atteindre les 6,4 milliards de dollars appeared first on CCPA.

Over the past year, the Ontario government has repeatedly accused school boards of financial mismanagement. The Minister of Education then took over eight boards, appointing generously paid supervisors to replace trustees and run boards with an iron fist. These eight boards have a combined enrolment of 733,000, or 36 per cent of all students in the province. 

The allegations justifying the takeover have not been backed by hard numbers. Yes, schools across the province are facing financial challenges—any educator or parent will tell you that. But is mismanagement really the problem? 

The CCPA closely monitors education funding in Ontario, using hard numbers, and we have a different explanation. Our analyses show that, year after year, schools have been asked to do more with less; we have now reached a breaking point, where the holes in the foundation are literally visible. 

The Core Education Funding figures released yesterday further support our stance, regretfully. 

This year’s per-pupil funding, once adjusted for inflation, falls slightly below last year’s level and $180 below what it was in the 2018-19 school year. In a school system with more than two million students, every cut adds to substantial budget shortfalls. In 2026-27, the Ontario government will spend almost $362 million less on Ontario’s schools than it did in 2018-19, in real dollars. We continue to move backward. 

The other problem with funding cuts is that they add up. Some funding cuts simply mean that students miss opportunities they will never get back. Other cuts create financial pressures on future years: waitlists for special education supports continue to grow, in-class resources are never restocked, leaks in the roof are never fixed, the anti-racism programs continue to be kicked down the road for the next year, as do additional supports for students from lower-income families, whose allocated funds are diverted to other priorities. The list is long. 

You can take from Peter to pay Paul only so many times. 

The accumulated shortfall for Ontario schools since 2018-19 is now at a whopping $6.4 billion. This is the total amount that Ontario’s school boards have lost compared to what they would have received if their funding had kept pace with enrolment and inflation over the past eight years, assuming no additional funding injection in the next school year. 

The supervisors of the eight school boards under provincial supervision will have to face these impacts of budget shortfalls. 

As the charts below show, all eight boards have been deprived of considerable amounts of funding in the past years: $950 million in the Toronto District School Board, $290 million in the Toronto Catholic District School Board, $266 million in the Peel District School Board, $347 million in the Ottawa-Carleton District School Board, $123 million in the York Catholic District School Board, $235 million in the Thames Valley District School Board, $221 million in the Dufferin-Peel Catholic District School Board, and $22 million in the Near North District School Board. The amount varies by board size, but most shortfalls represent between 20 and 30 per cent of a year’s funding. 

These sizable cumulative budget shortfalls are a much more credible explanation of the financial challenges schools and boards are facing than allegations of mismanagement, which have not been backed with evidence. Regretfully, this year’s school board allocations are not reversing the trend that got us into this mess. 

Notes on method

• The Ministry of Education has not released the actuals for 2022-23 and 2023-24; this analysis uses the revised estimates for those years.
• All years exclude debt service and one-time pandemic-related funding, no longer part of the Core Education Funding.
• In previous analyses, I excluded unjustifiably large planning provisions, but since the amounts are now back at reasonable levels, they are included.

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The use of the term “AI factory” rather than “data centre” is telling. For all intents and purposes, the proposed facilities are hyperscale data centres that will perform both the training of AI models and their operation. But if the federal government and Telus had hoped to avoid public opposition simply by renaming data centres as something else, they will, no doubt, be disappointed. Indeed, the announced project raises more questions than answers—particularly for the residents of Vancouver, where two of these facilities are to be built.

As Jesse Cole reports, the proposed Vancouver facilities include a 100,000 square foot, repurposed facility in the Mount Pleasant neighbourhood, as well as a 400,000 square foot development at 150 West Georgia—adjacent to Vancouver’s B.C. Place stadium. Both locations are densely populated, meaning that the proposed facilities would have to be sited close to residential neighbourhoods. 

One must ask: Why are three levels of government encouraging energy-intensive server racks to be located in the middle of prime inner city locations? Are there not better social uses, like housing and businesses?

As we know from the U.S. experience, the closer these facilities are to residential neighbourhoods, the more public opposition they often generate. Data centres require large and extensive cooling systems to function, meaning they emit constant and repetitive noise from industrial fans and other mechanisms. Residents living in close proximity to data centres report difficulties sleeping and other health problems brought on by the incessant low-frequency drone of these buildings. 

Yet conventional noise by-laws are often insufficient to regulate the constant 24/7 noise of these buildings. Attempts at installing suppression devices or sound baffling to reduce noise have had mixed results. Consequently, more local governments are looking to increase the setback limit for these facilities to ensure they are a safe enough distance from housing, schools and hospitals so that they do not affect quality of life. Dropping one of these facilities in an already densely populated neighbourhood will make proper setbacks all the more difficult to achieve. 

In order for data centres to deliver on their promise to provide virtually continuous service, they must be able to operate under any circumstances. This means ensuring they have redundant back-up power requirements to weather black-outs or any other power interruption. Back-up power for these facilities almost always means diesel generators—sometimes hundreds of them. For a 100MW facility like the one proposed in downtown Vancouver, this could mean anywhere between 25 to 50 diesel generators on site, depending on their size. Diesel generators are notoriously dirty, emitting fine particulate matter associated with a host of health and breathing problems. It’s why diesel generation is often strictly regulated. 

However, as electricity grids strain under demands, the pressure to switch to diesel generation at the slightest hint of a potential energy disruption has been growing. Placing that many generators directly in the middle of the urban core could be a major public health issue. Due to these challenges, the state of Virginia—home to the largest concentration of data centres in the world—concluded that the “industrial scale of data centers makes them largely incompatible with residential uses.” 

That leads to the next question: Who asked for this? One would hope that extensive consultations of affected communities would be conducted before moving forward with a project that has the potential to be profoundly disruptive—both in the construction phase and the operational phase. And as it turns out, there was a consultation, just not one that captured what is actually being built. 

When the City of Vancouver rezoned 150 West Georgia in 2023, the applicant at the time—Creative Energy Vancouver Platforms Inc., which owns the site and operates the downtown steam heating network—sought to add ”bulk data storage” as a permitted use to an already approved commercial building. Six people submitted comments during the online engagement period. By the day of the September 28, 2023 public hearing, a single written submission was received (in support) and the rezoning passed. 

The only legally binding public benefit secured through that process was a community amenity contribution of $295,425 (found on page six of the referral report), which is less than the cost of a single affordable housing unit in Vancouver. The $9 billion in projected economic activity, the 525 permanent jobs, and the renewable energy commitments announced were not secured in the application with the city. 

This is precisely the problem that Community Benefit Agreements (CBA) are designed to solve. A CBA is a legally binding contract negotiated between a developer and the affected community before a project proceeds. Unlike a standard rezoning process, which captures only a narrow set of contributions calculated against a floor area, a CBA can require developers to commit to local hiring targets, living wages, noise mitigation measures, environmental monitoring, and ongoing community oversight. Critically, these commitments are enforceable, not aspirational talking points delivered at a press conference. 

For large-scale infrastructure projects with significant community impacts like data centres, CBAs are one of the few tools that shift bargaining power toward residents rather than investors. Voluntary commitments are only as strong as the incentive to keep them. 

The absence of these binding commitments is not incidental. B.C. Green Party Leader Emily Lowan has accused lawmakers of using a “build-first regulate-later model,” and called for a moratorium on new data centres in the province until stronger regulation and environmental policies are in place.

Promising to be the “world’s most sustainable sovereign data centres,” Telus announced that these facilities will run almost exclusively on renewable power and will use state-of-the-art cooling technology to minimize water consumption, as well as recaptured heat. In his remarks, Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation Evan Solomon stated that “this is how you build right.” 

While it is important that these facilities be built to the highest environmental standards, it does raise the question of why we do not regulate to ensure that all future builds meet such standards. Instead, we seem to be relying on boosterism and wishful thinking that private corporations will prioritize the environment in their mad rush to cash in on AI infrastructure without asking the right questions about impact. 

The post Not up to code: The potential downside of hyperscale data centres in Vancouver’s downtown appeared first on CCPA.

Almost a quarter of Canadians are now experiencing food insecurity, including 2.4 million children. The burden is not shared equally: 35 per cent of Indigenous people and 41 per cent of Black people are experiencing some level of food insecurity—a glaring reminder that inequality in this country runs deep. 

Food insecurity has persisted for years. Although there was a slight decline in the share of individuals living in food-insecure households from 2024 to 2025, the 2025 figures remain among the highest recorded over the past two decades of tracking. 

Through our network of almost 450 organizations on the frontlines of this crisis, we’re hearing how people from all walks of life are struggling to keep up with the cost of living, even as they do everything to make ends meet. Sadly, the gap between what people earn and what life costs has widened to the point where even full-time work is no longer a guarantee of stability.

Most food-insecure households in Canada rely on employment income, not social assistance programs like welfare. In fact, in 89 per cent of these households, the primary earner works full-time yet still cannot afford the basics. If a full-time job can’t even cover basics like fruits and vegetables, something’s clearly broken.

The situation is much more dire for those on social assistance, disability supports and other fixed incomes where the average monthly benefit rates are below our current poverty threshold.

As food and fuel companies raise their prices, people are stretching their shoe-string budgets even further in order to get through the week. . Many are taking things on a day-by-day basis now. Parents are struggling to keep their children fed, clothed, and the rent paid. Of course, people are profoundly creative and resourceful, but there is a limit to what mac and cheese and instant noodles can do. 

Ultimately, food insecurity isn’t the result of personal failure. It’s the outcome of systems that fail to distribute income and resources fairly. Canada has more than enough food. Even in times of economic uncertainty like these, we have the wealth to ensure that no one in our country goes hungry.

The consequences of this crisis are too many to list. Food insecurity is linked to worse physical and mental health, higher rates of chronic illness, and increased strain on our health-care system. It affects children’s development, and limits people’s ability to work, learn, and participate fully in society. It absolutely undermines productivity. 

Recent analysis from Scotiabank demonstrates rising costs for essentials like food and energy are hitting lower-income households the hardest, precisely because they spend a greater share of their income on basic needs. Without targeted intervention, these pressures will continue to deepen inequality and push more people into poverty, homelessness, and hunger.  

And there is every reason to believe the situation will deteriorate. Global volatility—including ongoing conflict in the Middle East—is already driving up costs. The pressure on household budgets is intensifying precisely at a moment when things feel fragile, with kids experiencing unacceptably high levels of material deprivation.

Against this backdrop, Canada’s policy response has been lacklustre. The recent fiscal update introduced some affordability measures, but a serious, coordinated national plan to reduce food insecurity is still missing. For example, suspending federal excise taxes on gasoline until Labour Day will deliver just $59 in savings to households in the lowest income quintile, compared to $211 for those in the highest, according to analysis by the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), Canada’s independent fiscal watchdog. Broad-based measures like these stop short of making a meaningful difference, especially for the households facing the greatest financial strain.

Similarly, the Canada Groceries and Essentials Benefit—which organizations like Right To Food advocated for—also falls short of its potential as a serious cash-transfer program capable of reducing food insecurity. While the federal government committed an additional $12.4 billion over the next five years, the average increase for a single adult amounts to $136 per year—or $11 a month—and $272 for a family of four, or an additional $23 a month. Food prices were already expected to rise an additional $1000 this year, and that was before the war on Iran was launched. 

Hunger in the midst of abundance is ultimately indefensible. In a country as wealthy as Canada, this contradiction reflects political choices rather than scarcity. That Indigenous communities are so deeply affected only sharpens that reality, revealing a profound and ongoing failure of reconciliation.

We pride ourselves on being a fair and compassionate country. Yet nearly 10 million Canadians – people we live alongside every day–are navigating this cost-of-living crisis largely on their own. More than a policy gap, this is a test of our national priorities and whether the federal government, now buoyed by a majority, is prepared to meet the gravity of this moment.

The post New data shows food insecurity is still a national issue in Canada appeared first on CCPA.

Prior to formally taking the pledge, councillors asked city staff to review Brampton’s contracts and investments to determine if any were supporting companies complicit in Israeli apartheid. On April 8, a report from the city’s assistant commissioner of corporate support services recommended the city “not proceed with the Apartheid Free Communities Pledge due to the legal and financial risks arising from the pledge’s numerous principles.” 

One of the main reasons the report cites is Canada’s supposed commitments under a variety of free trade agreements, which would apparently be violated by the municipal government taking such a stand. In particular, the report cites provisions under the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), and the internal Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). It claims that these agreements contain provisions which ban governments from “discriminating” against specific countries using procurement restrictions. 

Those supposed problems do not line up with reality. The report contains a number of factual errors about Brampton’s procurement obligations and allowances in domestic law and international trade agreements. These inaccuracies discouraged elected officials from taking an action they felt morally compelled to take and for which there would be no serious financial or legal repercussions. 

Late last year, the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs sent a letter to Brampton Mayor Patrick Brown urging city council not to sign the pledge. That letter also erroneously states that the pledge asks cities and communities to take actions “far beyond municipal jurisdiction.” 

As other Canadian municipalities see campaigns to endorse the Apartheid Free Communities pledge, elected officials are likely hearing similar misinformation about their trade-related obligations with respect to public procurement. To clear the hot air, we sent a letter containing the following information to Brampton’s mayor and councillors and hope that it can be useful to other cities looking to become Apartheid Free Communities.

Israeli firms not covered by procurement commitments

 Canadian municipalities have no public procurement obligations to Israeli suppliers. Israel is not a party to any of the three trade agreements referenced in the report (the CETA, CUSMA, and CFTA). Israel and Canada are both parties to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) at the World Trade Organization, but this agreement does not cover municipal public procurement. Thus, Israeli suppliers have no reasonable expectation that they will be included in any municipality’s procurement and no recourse to dispute settlement under any trade agreement.

Brampton’s public procurement obligations

The Brampton report states that “the Purchasing By-law does not allow the City to impose restrictions on procurements based on the vendor’s location or the place where the goods or services are produced.” However, the by-law’s non-discrimination clause (Article 2.1) is tied to “the requirements of any applicable trade agreements.” In other words, if there are circumstances in the applicable trade agreements in which the non-discrimination rules do not apply to certain procurements, those exceptions would cover procurement by the City of Brampton. 

In his report, the Commissioner lists the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) and the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) as relevant applicable trade agreements. These agreements all contain exceptions that would safely shield procurement policies that directly or indirectly discriminate against firms profiting from Israel’s international law and human rights violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as could be aspired to under the Apartheid Free Communities Pledge.

Canada-EU CETA

The Canada-EU CETA contains the most extensive procurement commitments Canada has made in a trade agreement. Despite widespread municipal opposition, the federal government agreed to European demands to cover public spending down to the municipal, school board and hospital level. CETA prohibits covered public agencies from discriminating against EU firms or in favour of domestic firms in public tenders for goods, services and construction. The agreement also prohibits “any condition or undertaking that encourages local development … such as the use of domestic content.”

Notwithstanding these onerous terms, which frustrate governmental efforts to foster domestic economies of scale to withstand the U.S. trade war, CETA includes exceptions to these rules that should allow for the novel use of public spending to support local causes. Article 19.9 allows procurement agencies, including municipalities, to set “technical specifications to promote the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment,” for example. 

More relevantly, while CETA is silent on social or environmental procurement (i.e., public spending that takes into account working conditions, human rights or the environmental impact of bidding companies), the European Court of Justice has determined that such policies are acceptable under EU procurement directives derived largely from the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), on which the procurement chapter in CETA is based.

CETA contains further safeguards for the kind of procurement restrictions that could align with the aspirations of the Apartheid Free Communities Pledge. In language drawn from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article 19.3.2 of the procurement chapter grants public entities the right to take any measure necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, or necessary to protect human life or health.

Article 19.3.2

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Parties where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from imposing or enforcing measures:

a.    necessary to protect public morals, order or safety;

b.    necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

c.     necessary to protect intellectual property; or

d.    relating to goods or services of persons with disabilities, of philanthropic institutions or of prison labour.

A similar public morals exception in Article 28.3 of the CETA covers much of the rest of the agreement. States can rely on these exceptions in state-to-state disputes where a dispute panel finds that a policy has violated some aspect of the trade agreement. However, for two reasons, it is highly unlikely that a procurement policy at the City of Brampton would generate an international trade dispute of this kind.

First, European countries, including Spain and Slovenia, are taking much more trade-restrictive measures—including import bans on goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements—to exert pressure on Israel to end its violent occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. States have non-derogable obligations under the Genocide Convention to prevent further loss of life in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 

Dozens of European municipalities already have procurement policies that restrict bids from companies identified by the international Boycott, Divest, Sanction (BDS) movement as being complicit in Israel’s occupation, apartheid and genocide against Palestinians. Among the priority companies listed by the BDS movement are Dell, Reebok, Re/Max, Chevron and Teva Pharmaceuticals, while pressure targets include Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Siemens and Cisco. 

Second, under the procurement rules in CETA, Canada is only obligated to provide EU-based firms with an administrative or judicial means to dispute procurement tendering decisions they believe violate the terms of the agreement. Such a process exists in Brampton under the procurement by-law. Trade-related procurement disputes at the Canadian International Trade Tribunal rarely lead to fines against federal agencies.

Canadian Free Trade Agreement

The CFTA does not have a public morals exception, but the agreement allows provinces (and their cities) to deviate from its terms, including the procurement chapter, in the pursuit of legitimate objectives, which include “protection of human, animal, or plant life or health” and “protection of health, safety, and well-being of workers.” As the Apartheid Free Communities Pledge is concerned with stopping harms to people and protecting workers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, procurement restrictions emanating from the pledge should easily pass this test. 

Canada-US-Mexico Agreement

Contrary to the report, Canada is not covered by the procurement rules in the CUSMA. Canada’s procurement obligations to the United States are covered in the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) at the World Trade Organization, which does not apply to Canadian municipalities. This is how the City of Brampton itself was able to safely pass a “Buy Canadian” procurement policy in March 2025 to prevent U.S. firms from participating in city procurements while U.S. tariffs on Canadian imports remain in place. 

However, even if Canada had agreed to cover municipal procurement under the GPA or CUSMA, both allow plenty of room for the kinds of procurement restrictions that could align with the aspirations of the Apartheid Free Communities Pledge. As mentioned already, the WTO procurement agreement includes a public morals exception almost identical to Article 19.3.2 in the CETA. As opposition to genocide is a nearly universal moral belief and international law obligation on states, municipal actions aimed at ending genocide would likely survive a trade challenge.

Final comments

Brampton’s report grossly exaggerates the legal and financial risks to the city—and, by extension, all other Canadian municipalities—from signing the Apartheid Free Communities Pledge or from excluding bids from firms profiting from Israeli apartheid. The pledge does not ask the city to take actions that would be illegal or impossible under Ontario or Canadian legislation. Rather the pledge is aspirational in nature. As such, the assertion in the report that the city “does not have the authority to direct OMERS investment decisions or require divestment from specific countries, companies, or sectors,” while true, is beside the point.

The report asserts that discriminating against companies that enable apartheid or Israeli violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories will “reduce the pool of qualified vendors” as well as “reduce quality” and “lead to service disruptions.” There is no data to support this claim. At the federal level, Israeli firms account for a fraction of contracts. Specific to 2025, only 29 of 56,092 contracts went to Israeli firms. This is one-twentieth of a percentage point. This number is likely much lower in provincial and municipal procurement where auctions are generally lower in value and salience. If the city has data that proves that the exclusion of Israeli suppliers and suppliers that profit from apartheid would meaningfully raise its procurement spending, it should supply that data to the public.

As it happens, the staff report’s line of critique contradicts both the city’s and Ontario’s own local procurement strategies. As mentioned above, Brampton excludes U.S. vendors under its “Made in Canada” preference. The city also has a local social returns policy (the “Community Benefits Policy”) that could potentially be challenged as a prohibited offset under the CETA or the GPA procurement rules. Meanwhile, Ontario purposefully restricts municipal procurement competition through the Buy Ontario Act. 

Finally, the report raises the potential of “reputational harm” in dropping Israeli suppliers from its procurement auctions. This is a baseless scare tactic that ignores the reputational harm of inaction in the face of apartheid and genocide. 

In municipalities across the country, residents are pressuring their municipal governments to adopt policies that ensure local governments are not materially supporting Israel’s crimes. If municipal elected officials aren’t interested in doing so, they should say so explicitly and defend their position, rather than hiding behind false interpretations of trade agreements.

The post There are no trade risks to becoming an Apartheid Free Community appeared first on CCPA.

Against a background of renewed nuclear tensions, two separate international studies examine steps towards bringing about the demise of nuclear weapons and the importance of recalibrating security thinking away from belief in their relevance.

Their analysis is of relevance to Canada as it grapples with the uncertain consequences of U.S. threats to withdraw the ‘nuclear umbrella,’ and has echoes of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s “strategy of suffocation” to end the arms race in 1978.

In 1986 the world came close to abolishing nuclear weapons at the Reykjavik summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, leaders of the Soviet Union and U.S., whose legacy was major arms control agreements.

But current weakening of nuclear restraints threatens a renewed arms race. U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous threat to Iran that “a whole civilization will die tonight” and Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats in the Ukraine war have fanned nuclear angst three decades after the end of the Cold War left the impression nuclear dangers had been interred with it. 

Planners tend to view contemporary nuclear risks through the prism of the 1950s and 1960s, says Nick Ritchie, a professor of international security at York University in the UK, part of a research program to determine how nuclear ‘abolition or relinquishment’ can be achieved.

The investigation, led by the Nuclear Knowledge Program at Sciences Po, a public research university in Paris, is examining the conditions under which nuclear-armed states would most likely give up their weapons. 

The lack of urgency regarding nuclear disarmament is illustrated by the absence of study it receives, the investigators point out. Research is hamstrung by the “relative scarcity of direct evidence of nuclear disarmament” to which specialists can turn.

The importance of the project stems from the fact that “we live in a different world from the Cold War and nuclear weapons aren’t going to provide stability,” says Ritchie. 

Separately, a policy paper, the conclusion of a two-year project coordinated by the London School of Economics Non-Nuclear Deterrence Project, draws the same conclusion: it urges a shift in security thinking away from nuclear deterrence, while warning against a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to current tensions.

The paper, produced by the Network for Effective Security, a group of scholars and practitioners from across Europe and North America including the former head of Britain’s Royal Marines, declares, “democratic resilience offers a safer, more effective path to securing Europe and defending democratic values than nuclear deterrence.”

“In response to Russia’s war against Ukraine and growing uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to European security, European countries have agreed to increase defence spending and are discussing the possibility of a European nuclear deterrent,” the paper says.

“There is, however, very little public discussion about the nature of current threats and about the most appropriate way to counter them. There is a risk that decisions being taken now may mis-frame the threat, with long-term dangerous implications for the future.”

Despite the widespread perception among policymakers that nuclear weapons are irreplaceable and alternatives unrealistic, growing opposition to the war with Iran—waged on dubious claims about that country’s nuclear activities—offers context for changing the narrative. While the war demonstrates the limits of military intervention and may reshape the global order, it offers no reassurance about the use of nuclear weapons and highlights the strain the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is under. 

Whether nuclear arms control has reached an inflection point may become clearer from the outcome of the five yearly review (April 27 – May 22) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the global bargain attributed with curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.   If its 191 member states cannot reach agreement, says Izumi Nakamitsu head of the UN’s disarmament office, it risks being ‘hollowed out;’ UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned the treaty is ‘eroding.’

A bookend to current discussion about nuclear weapons is provided by a new history examining the roles of experts who established the architecture of arms control in the Cold War. Benjamin Wilson’s ‘Strange Stability’ publication catalogues how disarmament was rejected in favor of the continued modernisation of weapons by strategists and science advisors, many in the pay of the US military industrial complex, in pursuit of so-called strategic stability.

“Strategic modernisation is not a failure of arms control. It is an accomplishment of arms control’s most important Cold War success: the intellectual marginalization and political defeat of disarmament,” Wilson writes. Tellingly, some estimates put the final bill for the 30-year modernisation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at three trillion dollars.

Canada appears to have forsworn its own nuclear option after Trump’s threat to deprive the 32 member NATO alliance, of which it is a prominent member, of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

But 81 years after the first atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the more than 12,000 thermonuclear nuclear weapons in possession of nine countries are more than capable of destroying life on earth, the nuclear Gordian knot becomes  tighter bound.

Time to recall an observation of the Cold War by Robert McNamara, the longest serving and reviled U.S. defense secretary who recanted after his support of the Vietnam war and became an opponent of nuclear weapons: “it was luck that prevented nuclear war.” 

The post Nuclear disarmament is more important than ever appeared first on CCPA.

Résumé

La crise financière croissante dans le secteur hospitalier de l’Ontario nuit aux patient(e)s et aux collectivités. Une nouvelle analyse des 136 hôpitaux de l’Ontario montre que, au cours des trois dernières années, la majorité d’entre eux avaient des déficits de fonctionnement. En 2024-2025, 55 pour cent des hôpitaux avaient des déficits.

Une analyse géographique des déficits dans les hôpitaux par région montre que les hôpitaux dans les régions du nord et de l’ouest de la province étaient plus susceptibles d’être déficitaires en 2024-2025. Dans les régions des RLISS d’Erie St. Clair et Mississauga Halton, tous les hôpitaux étaient déficitaires, suivies des régions de Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant (78 pour cent), Waterloo Wellington (71 pour cent) et du Nord-Est (63 pour cent).

Selon l’Association des hôpitaux de l’Ontario, les coûts dans le secteur hospitalier augmentent d’environ six pour cent par année en raison de la croissance et du vieillissement de la population et de l’inflation. Cependant, le budget de l’Ontario prévoit augmenter le financement total des soins de santé de seulement 3,5 pour cent en 2026-2027 et de 2,3 pour cent en 2027-2028¹. Ces augmentations sont insuffisantes pour répondre aux besoins de la population en matière de santé.

Les petits hôpitaux et les hôpitaux ruraux sont plus durement touchés

Lorsque les hôpitaux sont analysés en fonction de leur taille, les plus petits hôpitaux ayant des revenus d’exploitation de moins de 100 millions de dollars avaient des déficits disproportionnés en 2024-2025 : les plus petits hôpitaux représentaient 61 pour cent des hôpitaux déficitaires mais seulement 49 pour cent de tous les hôpitaux de l’Ontario (Graphique 3). Entre-temps, les plus gros hôpitaux ayant des revenus d’exploitation de plus de 100 millions de dollars représentaient 49 pour cent des hôpitaux déficitaires et 51 pour cent des hôpitaux de l’Ontario.

L’austérité financière dans le secteur hospitalier nuit aux soins aux patient(e)s

Les temps d’attente à l’urgence sont un signe avant-coureur pour le rendement du système de santé. On se retrouve avec de la « médecine de couloir » lorsque des patient(e)s attendent longtemps à l’urgence avant d’être hospitalisés parce qu’aucun lit n’est disponible pour les patient(e)s hospitalisés. Deux indicateurs montrent les risques pour les soins aux patient(e)s :

• en 2020-2021, 90 pour cent des patient(e)s ont attendu 2,7 heures à l’urgence jusqu’à l’évaluation initiale du médecin, pourcentage qui a augmenté à 4,5 heures en 2024-2025—une augmentation de 67 pour cent;
• en 2020-2021, 90 pour cent des patient(e)s ont passé 29 heures à l’urgence en attente d’être hospitalisés, pourcentage qui a augmenté à 44 heures en 2024-2025—une augmentation de 52 pour cent.

Affirmations trompeuses de la part du gouvernement de l’Ontario

Le gouvernement de l’Ontario a tort lorsqu’il affirme que les dépenses en santé sont « insoutenables ». La hausse des dépenses totales en santé en Ontario—de 53,9 milliards de dollars en 2014 à 84,8 milliards de dollars en 2023—semble majeure en termes absolus. Cependant, par rapport à la taille de l’économie (mesurées en PIB), les dépenses totales en santé représentaient 7,4 pour cent du PIB en 2014 et avaient augmenté modestement à 7,6 pour cent en 2023. Ces augmentations sont soutenables au cours de cette période et respectent très bien les normes historiques.

Le gouvernement de l’Ontario suggère également que l’économie axée sur les soins n’est pas l’économie ‘réelle’. Ces affirmations sont utilisées pour justifier le sous-investissement dans les soins de santé et la dévalorisation du travail dans l’économie axée sur les soins. En 2024, il y avait 1,4 million d’emplois dans l’économie axée sur les soins—représentant un emploi sur cinq en Ontario.

Ces idées sont préjudiciables pour les travailleuses et travailleurs, ainsi que pour les patient(e)s et les collectivités qui dépendent de leurs compétences et de leur engagement. Entre 2016 et 2025, le salaire moyen pour les postes vacants dans les hôpitaux était sept pour cent inférieur en 2024 par rapport à 2016, lorsqu’ajusté à l’inflation. Au cours de la même période, les postes vacants dans les hôpitaux par 100 000 habitant(e)s ont augmenté de 101 pour cent. Au cours des dix dernières années, l’austérité financière dans le secteur hospitalier a contribué à des défis constants et graves en ce qui a trait au recrutement et à la rétention.

Recommandations

En fonction des conclusions de ce rapport, le gouvernement provincial devrait mettre en œuvre un plan agressif pour régler la crise relative au financement et à la capacité dans le secteur hospitalier, soit :

• fournir un financement immédiat et continu afin d’améliorer les finances et la capacité d’hospitalisation : le financement des hôpitaux doit être augmenté de 3,2 milliards de dollars afin d’assurer la stabilité des hôpitaux. Le gouvernement provincial devrait offrir une augmentation annuelle de six pour cent au secteur hospitalier afin de tenir compte de la croissance et du vieillissement de la population et de l’inflation;
• élaborer une stratégie provinciale de la main-d’œuvre en santé et un plan provincial d’immobilisations : contrairement à d’autres systèmes de santé au Canada et à l’international, le gouvernement de l’Ontario ne dispose pas d’une stratégie provinciale de la main-d’œuvre en santé et d’un plan provincial d’immobilisations pour voir à ce que l’infrastructure matérielle, la capacité d’hospitalisation et la planification de l’équipement concordent avec une expansion de la main-d’œuvre.

Introduction

En mars, l’Association des hôpitaux de l’Ontario a prévenu que le secteur hospitalier a besoin d’une injection d’argent de 2,7 milliards de dollars afin de régler la situation financière précaire². Ce rapport offre une analyse géographique sur trois ans de la crise budgétaire croissante dans le secteur hospitalier de l’Ontario.

Pour cette analyse, une série de données type du Centre canadien de politiques alternatives (CCPA) des finances de 136 associations d’hôpitaux a été créée. Les revenus d’exploitation, les dépenses, les déficits, les excédents et les marges de tous les hôpitaux de l’Ontario ont été analysés. De plus, ce rapport s’appuie sur des données publiques de l’Institut canadien d’information sur la santé (ICIS), du Bureau de la responsabilité financière (BRF) de l’Ontario et de Statistique Canada.

Les déficits des hôpitaux de l’Ontario et les préjudices pour les soins aux patient(e)s

Au cours des trois dernières années, la majorité des hôpitaux de l’Ontario étaient déficitaires

Une nouvelle analyse des 136 hôpitaux de l’Ontario montre que la majorité des hôpitaux étaient déficitaires au cours des trois dernières années. Des déficits de fonctionnement se produisent lorsque les dépenses sont plus élevées que les revenus. La plus importante source de revenus pour les hôpitaux de l’Ontario, c’est le financement public accordé par le ministère de la Santé et Santé Ontario. La plus importante dépense des hôpitaux de l’Ontario est la rémunération du personnel.

Au cours du dernier exercice financier (2024-2025), 55 pour cent des hôpitaux publics étaient déficitaires. En 2023-2024 et 2022-2023, 50 pour cent et 63 pour cent respectivement des hôpitaux publics avaient des déficits de fonctionnement (Graphique 1). En termes absolus, le Centre des sciences de la santé de London avait le déficit de fonctionnement le plus élevé avec 153 millions de dollars en 2024-2025³.

Les hôpitaux dans les régions du nord et de l’ouest sont plus susceptibles d’être déficitaires

L’analyse géographique des déficits des hôpitaux par région montre que les hôpitaux dans les régions du nord et de l’ouest étaient plus susceptibles d’être déficitaires en 2024-2025 (Graphique 2). Dans les régions de Erie St. Clair et Mississauga Halton, tous les hôpitaux étaient déficitaires, suivies des régions de Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant (78 pour cent), Waterloo Wellington (71 pour cent) et du Nord-Est (63 pour cent).

Les plus petits hôpitaux et les hôpitaux ruraux sont les plus durement touchés

Bien que la crise financière dans le secteur hospitalier affecte tous les hôpitaux, l’analyse des données financières des trois dernières années montre que les plus petits hôpitaux et les hôpitaux ruraux sont parmi les plus durement touchés par l’austérité financière (Graphique 3).

Lorsque les hôpitaux sont analysés en fonction de leur taille, les plus petits hôpitaux ayant des revenus d’exploitation de moins de 100 millions de dollars avaient des déficits disproportionnés en 2024-2025 : les plus petits hôpitaux représentaient 61 pour cent des hôpitaux déficitaires mais seulement 49 pour cent de tous les hôpitaux de l’Ontario (Graphique 3). Entre-temps, les plus gros hôpitaux ayant des revenus d’exploitation de plus de 100 millions de dollars représentaient 49 pour cent des hôpitaux déficitaires et 51 pour cent des hôpitaux de l’Ontario.

Les plus petits hôpitaux ont généralement moins de ressources dont ils peuvent bénéficier que les grands systèmes hospitaliers urbains, incluant les fonds de roulement, s’ils veulent combler les manques à gagner et maintenir les niveaux de service.

L’austérité financière dans le secteur hospitalier nuit aux soins aux patient(e)s

De multiples indicateurs importants suggèrent que l’austérité financière dans le secteur hospitalier nuit à la qualité des soins et met les patient(e)s à risque.

Les temps d’attente à l’urgence sont en hausse

Les temps d’attente à l’urgence sont un signe avant-coureur pour le rendement du système de santé. Les urgences ayant de longs temps d’attente et où il y a engorgement sont un signal que le système de santé en général a de la difficulté à répondre à la demande de soins de la part des patient(e)s. Les causes sont multifactorielles. Cependant, la capacité d’hospitalisation—incluant les lits dotés en personnel—est une influence significative.

On se retrouve avec de la « médecine de couloir » lorsque des patient(e)s attendent longtemps à l’urgence avant d’être hospitalisés parce qu’aucun lit n’est disponible pour les patient(e)s hospitalisés. Bien que Santé Ontario ait mis fin aux rapports publics sur son indicateur de médecine de couloir, il y avait une moyenne de 1 390 patient(e)s hospitalisés traités dans des « milieux non conventionnels » en mars 2024⁴.

Selon des données provinciales fournies par l’Institut canadien d’information sur la santé (ICIS), les indicateurs des urgences de l’Ontario font fausse route. Le Tableau 1 montre que le temps d’attente à l’urgence pour que les patient(e)s aient droit à une évaluation initiale par un médecin a augmenté de façon significative au cours des cinq dernières années. Le 90e percentile des patient(e)s ont attendu 2,7 heures en 2020-2021, chiffre qui a augmenté à 4,5 heures en 2024-2025—une augmentation de 67 pour cent. Le 90e percentile représente le temps d’attente maximum que 90 pour cent des patient(e)s ont attendu jusqu’à l’évaluation initiale du médecin à l’urgence.

Le deuxième indicateur—apparaissant au Graphique 4—montre que les temps d’attente pour être hospitalisé augmentent de façon dramatique pour les patient(e)s attendant à l’urgence. En 2020-2021, le 90e percentile des patient(e)s ont attendu 29 heures à l’urgence avant d’être hospitalisés dans un service de patient(e)s hospitalisés, chiffre qui a augmenté à 44 heures en 2024-2025. C’est une augmentation de 52 pour cent. Le 90e percentile représente le temps d’attente maximum que 90 pour cent des patient(e)s admis à l’hôpital à partir de l’urgence ont attendu à l’urgence.

Lorsqu’une analyse géographique est faite, le 90e percentile des patient(e)s ont attendu plus longtemps dans les régions du centre, de l’est et du nord-est en 2024-2025 (Graphique 5). La région du centre comprend des villes allant de Mississauga à Huntsville et d’Orangeville à Markham, la région de l’est comprend des communautés allant de Pickering jusqu’à la frontière du Québec au nord de la rivière Deep et la région du nord-est comprend des communautés allant de West Parry Sound, de White River, de Peawanuck, de la côte de la baie James, de Mattawa et de tous les endroits entre ces communautés⁵.

La hausse significative des temps d’attente pour que les patient(e)s soient hospitalisés montre un système où il y a une forte pression, incapable de répondre à la demande pour des services de soins actifs. Plus les patient(e)s se morfondent longtemps à l’urgence en attente d’être hospitalisés, plus les risques d’une détérioration de leur état de santé et de moins bons résultats pour leur santé augmentent⁶.

Les lits d’hôpital dotés en personnel sont de beaucoup inférieurs à ce qui est nécessaire—et on prévoit que les choses ne feront que s’aggraver

Il est complexe de prévoir la demande pour des lits pour l’hospitalisation de patient(e)s et cela dépend de facteurs multiples, dont la croissance et le vieillissement de la population et l’utilisation. Les soins de première ligne et communautaires, la prévalence des maladies et les déterminants socio-économiques de la santé sont tous des facteurs contributifs. Une population plus malade sans accès à des soins primaires et communautaires risque davantage de se rendre aux urgences et de nécessiter des services d’hospitalisation.

Il est largement admis parmi les analystes que le secteur hospitalier de l’Ontario est le plus petit au Canada par rapport à la taille de la population—et c’est un de ceux dont la capacité est la moins élevée lorsque comparé aux pays à revenu élevé⁷. En 2022, l’Ontario s’est classé 33e lorsque comparé à 38 pays de l’OCDE⁸. À 199 lits par 100 000 habitant(e)s, l’Ontario disposait de moins de lits que la moyenne canadienne (217 lits par 100 000 habitant(e)s) et accusait un retard par rapport à de nombreux autres pays à revenu élevé ayant des systèmes de santé universels financés par l’État, dont la Norvège, la Finlande, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni. Même si de nombreux pays du Nord de l’Europe ont généralement des systèmes de soins de première ligne et communautaires plus solides, ces pays ont tout de même plus de lits d’hôpital, par habitant(e), que l’Ontario.

Une nouvelle analyse montre que bien que la croissance et le vieillissement de la population aient augmenté de 27 pour cent entre 2014-2015 et 2024-2025, le nombre réel de lits d’hôpital a augmenté de seulement 14 pour cent (Tableau 2). En 2024-2025, l’Ontario disposait de 35 540 lits d’hospitalisation alors qu’il aurait dû en avoir au moins 39 892, si le nombre de lits d’hôpital avait augmenté de 27 pour cent. Il manquait 4 352 lits en Ontario en 2025.

C’est une estimation conservatrice du nombre de lits d’hôpital manquants en Ontario. Selon une croissance rapide de la population âgée de 65 ans et plus, le Conseil des syndicats d’hôpitaux de l’Ontario estime que 41 777 lits dotés en personnel étaient nécessaires en 2025—un écart de 6 237 lits⁹. Entre 4 352 et 6 237 lits dotés en personnel étaient nécessaires en 2025 afin d’éviter la médecine de couloir et de répondre à la demande de soins pour les patient(e)s hospitalisés.

Depuis de nombreuses années maintenant, le Bureau de la responsabilité financière (BRF) de l’Ontario a également soulevé des préoccupations au sujet de la réduction de la taille du secteur hospitalier par rapport à la demande pour des soins. L’analyse montre que le plan de financement budgétaire du gouvernement provincial pour 2025-2026 à 2027-2028 devrait entraîner une réduction des lits d’hôpital dotés en personnel, soit de 220 lits par 100 000 habitant(e)s en 2024-2025 à 203 lits en 2027-2028¹⁰.

L’austérité financière provinciale réduit la capacité des hôpitaux publics nécessaire pour voir à ce que les patient(e)s aient accès à des soins en temps opportun.

Vérification des faits quant aux affirmations du gouvernement de l’Ontario

Les dépenses des hôpitaux ne sont pas « insoutenables »

En février, le ministre des Finances de l’Ontario a affirmé que la hausse des dépenses en santé était « insoutenable »¹¹. Cependant, lorsque les augmentations des dépenses pour le secteur hospitalier et les augmentations totales des dépenses en santé sont mises en perspective—c’est-à-dire par rapport à la taille de l’économie (mesurées en PIB)—les affirmations du gouvernement ne résistent pas à un examen approfondi.

En nous appuyant sur les données au sujet des dépenses provinciales rapportées par l’ICIS, nous constatons qu’entre 2014 et 2023, les dépenses dans le secteur hospitalier de l’Ontario sont passées de 19,6 milliards de dollars à 30,7 milliards de dollars (Graphique 6). Cela peut sembler être une importante augmentation des dépenses, mais lorsqu’on examine les choses en fonction de la taille de la croissance économique, les dépenses dans le secteur hospitalier entre 2014 et 2023 représentent la même part de l’économie—soit 2,7 pour cent du PIB.

Dans le même ordre d’idées, l’augmentation des dépenses totales en santé en Ontario—de 53,9 milliards de dollars en 2014 à 84,8 milliards de dollars en 2023—semble importante, en termes absolus, mais elle représente une augmentation de seulement 0,2 points de pourcentage en proportion du PIB. En 2014, les dépenses totales en santé par rapport à la taille de l’économie étaient de 7,4 pour cent et avaient augmenté modestement à 7,6 pour cent en 2023.

Ces augmentations sont soutenables dans cet intervalle de temps et respectent les normes historiques. Les affirmations du gouvernement provincial sont trompeuses. En fait, l’Ontario se classe sous la moyenne canadienne en ce qui a trait aux dépenses provinciales dans le secteur hospitalier et les dépenses totales en santé (Tableau 3).

Le gouvernement provincial se classe également sous la moyenne canadienne quant aux dépenses dans le secteur hospitalier et aux dépenses totales en santé par rapport à la taille de l’économie. En 2023, l’Ontario a dépensé 7,6 pour cent du PIB sur les hôpitaux alors que le Canada a dépensé 8 pour cent. Il est clair que l’Ontario a la capacité d’investir dans des services de santé publics essentiels.

Cependant, afin d’investir dans les services de santé dont la population de l’Ontario dépend, le gouvernement provincial doit voir à ce que la province bénéficie de l’importante richesse qui y est créée en augmentant les impôts des ménages et des entreprises à revenu élevé et en générant des revenus qui peuvent augmenter l’accès aux soins de santé et renforcer l’économie des soins.

L’économie axée sur les soins, c’est l’économie

En février, le ministre des Finances de l’Ontario a affirmé que « 85 pour cent des dépenses contenues dans le budget sont en fait pour les dépenses sociales [et] environ 15 pour cent pour l’infrastructure et l’économie »¹².

Cette déclaration suppose que les emplois dans l’économie axée sur les soins ne font pas partie de l’économie ‘réelle’. C’est une croyance très dépassée et sexiste quant à ce qui est considéré comme faisant partie de l’économie de l’Ontario. Le travail dans l’économie axée sur les soins est effectué principalement par des femmes dans le secteur public qui paient des impôts, soutiennent des familles et contribuent au bien-être des collectivités. L’économie axée sur les soins comprend des emplois dans les soins de santé, l’aide sociale et les services éducatifs¹³.

Lorsque nous examinons les données sur l’emploi, un tableau très différent de ce que le gouvernement présente émerge. En Ontario et au Canada, il y a plus d’emplois dans l’économie axée sur les soins que dans de nombreuses industries, y compris les finances et l’assurance, la construction et les services professionnels et techniques. En 2024, il y avait 1 410 087 emplois dans l’économie axée sur les soins—représentant un emploi sur cinq en Ontario (Tableau 4). Au Canada, il y avait 3 857 142 emplois dans l’économie axée sur les soins en 2024—représentant également un emploi sur cinq.

Suggérer que ce travail ne fait pas partie de l’économie ‘réelle’ dévalue les contributions essentielles de centaines de milliers de travailleuses et travailleurs de première ligne en Ontario dans les services de santé et les services sociaux. À une période de grande incertitude géopolitique, les gouvernements doivent reconnaître l’importance centrale de l’économie axée sur les soins dans la capacité du Canada à prendre soin de sa population et à assurer sa subsistance dans le monde.

Dévaluation de l’économie axée sur les soins—les chiffres

Le problème de la dévaluation de l’économie axée sur les soins—et des personnes qui travaillent dans le secteur des soins—existe malheureusement depuis longtemps au Canada¹⁴. Ces idées nuisent aux travailleuses et travailleurs, aux patient(e)s et aux collectivités qui dépendent de leurs compétences et de leur engagement. La dévaluation de l’économie axée sur les soins prend la forme de coupures dans les établissements d’enseignement postsecondaire, de diminution des objectifs d’immigration, de privatisation d’hôpitaux et de réductions des dépenses réelles dans les services de santé.

Nous pouvons examiner la relation entre les salaires dans les hôpitaux et les postes vacants afin de comprendre de quelle façon la dévaluation des soins par le gouvernement de l’Ontario nuit à la capacité des hôpitaux de recruter et de retenir de la main-d’œuvre dont la population de l’Ontario dépend. Entre 2016 et 2025, le salaire moyen pour les postes vacants dans les hôpitaux était sept pour cent plus bas en 2024 qu’en 2016, ajusté à l’inflation (Graphique 7). Au cours de la même période, les postes vacants dans les hôpitaux par 100 000 habitant(e)s ont augmenté de 101 pour cent (Graphique 8).

L’histoire récente des restrictions salariales dans le secteur public est importante. Adopté en 2019, le projet de loi 124 a été une tentative explicite du gouvernement de restreindre les salaires et, ultimement, il a été jugé inconstitutionnel. Ce projet de loi sur la restriction salariale et l’austérité financière dans le secteur hospitalier au cours des dix dernières années ont contribué à des défis constants et graves en matière de recrutement et de rétention.

Conclusion et recommandations

Au cours des trois dernières années, la majorité des hôpitaux publics de l’Ontario avaient des déficits de fonctionnement—c’est un signal clair d’une crise financière croissante dans le secteur hospitalier de l’Ontario. Cela démontre que les ressources disponibles sont insuffisantes pour répondre aux besoins de la population. Bien que la crise financière soit ressentie dans les collectivités rurales et urbaines et les petits et grands hôpitaux, les hôpitaux dans les régions du nord et de l’ouest de la province risquaient davantage d’être déficitaires au cours du dernier exercice financier.

La crise financière nuit aux soins aux patient(e)s. De multiples indicateurs du système de santé émettent des avertissements alarmistes quant aux préjudices grandissants. Les temps d’attente à l’urgence ont augmenté de manière spectaculaire, laissant l’Ontario à court de milliers de lits pour les patient(e)s devant être hospitalisés. Plutôt que de laisser la « médecine de couloir » appartenir au passé, c’est devenu une installation permanente dans les hôpitaux de l’Ontario. Malheureusement, le gouvernement de l’Ontario affirme à tort que les dépenses en santé sont « insoutenables » alors qu’en fait elles sont demeurées relativement stables par rapport à la taille de l’économie.

Selon les conclusions de ce rapport, le gouvernement provincial devrait mettre en œuvre un plan agressif pour répondre à la crise financière et de capacité dans les hôpitaux.

Augmenter immédiatement le financement afin d’améliorer les finances et la capacité des hôpitaux

Le Bureau de la responsabilité financière (BRF) de l’Ontario estime qu’un montant de 6,4 milliards de dollars en nouvelles dépenses en santé est nécessaire en 2026-2027 uniquement pour maintenir les niveaux de service de 2024-2025¹⁵. Le budget 2026 n’ajoute que 3,4 milliards de dollars en dépenses additionnelles, ce qui fait en sorte qu’il y a un manque à gagner de 3 milliards de dollars dans le système de santé pour cet exercice financier.

Selon l’Association des hôpitaux de l’Ontario, les coûts pour le secteur hospitalier augmentent d’environ six pour cent par année en raison de la croissance et du vieillissement de la population et de l’inflation¹⁶. Cependant, le budget de l’Ontario prévoit que le financement total des soins de santé augmentera de 3,5 pour cent en 2026-2027 et de 2,3 pour cent en 2027-2028¹⁷. Ces augmentations sont insuffisantes pour répondre aux besoins de la population en matière de soins de santé.

L’Association des hôpitaux de l’Ontario (OHA) estime que les hôpitaux avaient besoin de fonds de stabilisation financière de l’ordre de 2,7 milliards de dollars en 2025-2026. Bien que le gouvernement provincial ait offert un montant additionnel de 1,1 milliard de dollars pour 2026-2027, cela ne permet pas de régler la situation financière préoccupante. Une analyse détaillée faite par le Conseil des syndicats d’hôpitaux de l’Ontario (SCFP) conclut que le financement de base dans le secteur hospitalier devait être augmenté de 3,2 milliards de dollars au cours de l’exercice financier se terminant en mars 2026.

En 2026-2027, le gouvernement provincial devrait augmenter le financement de base et ciblé dans le secteur hospitalier de quatre pour cent, ce qui est inférieur au six pour cent annuel nécessaire pour tenir compte de la croissance et du vieillissement de la population et de l’inflation—et pour simplement maintenir les niveaux de service.

Élaborer une stratégie de la main-d’œuvre et un plan d’immobilisations provinciaux en santé

L’Ontario n’a pas de stratégie de la main-d’œuvre dans les soins de santé avec des solutions provinciales et régionales afin de régler les pénuries de personnel. Le plus important, le gouvernement provincial et les employeurs du secteur de la santé doivent reconnaître que les conditions de travail sont les conditions de soins aux patient(e)s et que l’amélioration de l’environnement de travail est associée à des organisations qui performent mieux, offrent des soins plus sécuritaires aux patient(e)s et assurent de meilleurs résultats¹⁸.

Une stratégie de la main-d’œuvre devrait être accompagnée d’un plan d’immobilisations de l’infrastructure dans le secteur hospitalier afin de voir à ce que l’infrastructure matérielle, la capacité d’hospitalisation et la planification de l’équipement concordent avec une expansion de la main-d’œuvre.

Le ministère de la Santé et Santé Ontario devraient mettre sur pied une table de consultation provinciale, comprenant des chercheur(euse)s, des syndicats, des éducateur(trice)s, des représentant(e)s de la partie patronale, des associations professionnelles, ainsi que des groupes de défense des patient(e)s et des citoyen(ne)s, afin de contribuer à l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre d’une stratégie de la main-d’œuvre et d’un plan d’immobilisations provinciaux en santé.

The post Conçu pour échouer: La crise financière croissante dans le secteur hospitalier de l’Ontario appeared first on CCPA.

Summary

The deepening Ontario hospital funding crisis is harming patients and communities. New analysis of Ontario’s 136 hospitals shows that the majority of hospitals had operating deficits over the last three years. In 2024-25, 55 per cent of hospitals had deficits.

Geographical analysis of hospital deficits by region show that hospitals in northern and western regions of the province were more likely to be in deficit in 2024-25. In the LHIN regions of Erie St. Clair and Mississauga Halton, all hospitals were in deficit, followed by Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant (78 per cent), Waterloo Wellington (71 per cent), and the North East (63 per cent).

Costs in the hospital sector have been increasing by about six per cent per year due to population growth, aging, and inflation, according to the Ontario Hospital Association. However, the Ontario budget plans to increase total health care funding to by only 3.5 per cent in 2026-27 and 2.3 per cent in 2027-28.¹ These increases are insufficient to address the health care needs of the population.

Smaller and rural hospitals hardest hit

When analyzed by size of hospital, smaller hospitals with operating revenues under $100 million disproportionately had deficits in 2024-25: Smaller hospitals made up 61 per cent of the hospitals in deficit but made up only 49 per cent of all Ontario hospitals (Figure 3). Meanwhile, larger hospitals with operating revenues over $100 million made up 49 per cent of hospitals in deficit and accounted for 51 per cent of Ontario hospitals.

Hospital funding austerity harms patient care

Emergency department (ED) wait times are a canary in the coal mine for health care system performance. “Hallway medicine” occurs when patients have long waits in the ED, waiting to be admitted because there are no inpatient beds available. Two indicators demonstrate the risks to patient care:

• In 2020-21, 90 per cent of patients waited 2.7 hours in the emergency department for their initial physician assessment, which increased to 4.5 hours in 2024-25—an increase of 67 per cent.
• In 2020-21, 90 per cent of patients spent 29 hours in the emergency department while waiting to be admitted, which increased to 44 hours in 2024-25—an increase of 52 per cent.

Misleading claims by the Ontario government

The Ontario government is wrong when it claims that health care spending is “unsustainable.” The increase in total Ontario health care spending—from $53.9 billion in 2014 to $84.8 billion in 2023—appears large in absolute terms. However, as a share of the economy (measured as GDP), total health care spending was 7.4 per cent of GDP in 2014 and increased modestly to 7.6 per cent by 2023. These increases are sustainable over this time range and well within historical norms.

The Ontario government also suggests that the care economy is not the ‘real’ economy. These claims are used to justify underinvestment in health care and the devaluing of work in the care economy. In 2024, there were 1.4 million jobs in the care economy—representing one in five jobs in Ontario.

These ideas are harmful to workers as well as the patients and communities who depend on their skills and commitment. Between 2016 and 2025, the average wage for vacant hospital positions was seven per cent lower in 2024 than 2016, when adjusting for inflation. Over the same period, hospital job vacancies per 100,000 people increased by 101 per cent. Over the past decade, hospital funding austerity has contributed to ongoing and severe workforce recruitment and retention challenges.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this report, the provincial government should implement an aggressive plan to address the hospital funding and capacity crisis:

Provide immediate and sustained funding to improve hospital finances and capacity: Hospital funding needs to increase by $3.2 billion to put hospitals on stable footing. The province should provide six per cent annual increases to the hospital sector to account for population growth, aging, and inflation.

Develop a provincial health workforce strategy and capital plan: Unlike other health systems in Canada and internationally, the Ontario government does not have a provincial health workforce strategy and capital plan to ensure that physical infrastructure, bed capacity, and equipment planning align with workforce expansion.

Introduction

In March, the Ontario Hospital Association warned that the hospital sector requires a cash infusion of $2.7 billion to address the dire financial situation.² This report provides a three-year geographical analysis of the deepening hospital funding crisis in Ontario.

For this analysis, a custom CCPA dataset of the finances of 136 hospital corporations was created. Operating revenues, expenses, deficits, surpluses, and margins for all hospitals in Ontario were analyzed. In addition, this report draws on publicly available data from the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), the Ontario Financial Accountability Office (FAO), and Statistics Canada.

Ontario hospital deficits and the harms to patient care

The majority of Ontario hospitals had deficits over the last three years

New analysis of Ontario’s 136 hospitals shows that the majority of hospitals had deficits over the last three years. Operating deficits occur when expenses are greater than revenues. The largest source of revenue for Ontario hospitals is public funding from the Ministry of Health and Ontario Health. The largest expense for Ontario hospitals is staff compensation.

In the last fiscal year (2024-25), 55 per cent of public hospitals ran deficits. In 2023-24 and 2022-23, 50 per cent and 63 per cent of public hospitals had operating deficits (Figure 1). In absolute terms, London Health Sciences had the largest operating deficit of $153 million in 2024-25.³

Hospitals in the northern and western regions more likely to be in deficit

Geographical analysis of hospital deficits by region show that hospitals in northern and western regions were more likely to be in deficit in 2024-25 (Figure 2). In Erie St. Clair and Mississauga Halton, all hospitals were in deficit, followed by Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant (78 per cent), Waterloo Wellington (71 per cent), and the North East (63 per cent).

Smaller and rural hospitals are the hardest hit

While the hospital funding crisis affects all hospitals, analysis of financial data from the last three years shows that smaller and rural hospitals are among the hardest hit by provincial funding austerity (Figure 3).

When analyzed by size of hospital, smaller hospitals with operating revenues under $100 million disproportionately had deficits in 2024-25: Smaller hospitals made up 61 per cent of the hospitals in deficit but made up only 49 per cent of all Ontario hospitals (Figure 3). Meanwhile, larger hospitals with operating revenues over $100m made up 49 per cent of hospitals in deficit and accounted for 51 per cent of Ontario hospitals.

Smaller hospitals generally have fewer resources to draw upon than large urban hospital systems, including working capital, if they want to backstop shortfalls and maintain service levels.

Hospital funding austerity harms patient care

Multiple important indicators suggest that hospital funding austerity is undermining care and putting patients at risk.

Emergency department wait times are on the rise

Emergency department (ED) wait times are a canary in the coal mine for health system performance. EDs with long wait times and overcrowding signal that the overall health care system is struggling to meet patient demand for care. The causes are multifactorial. However, hospital capacity—including staffed beds—is a significant influence.

“Hallway medicine” occurs when patients have long waits in the ED, waiting to be admitted because there are no inpatient beds available. Although Ontario Health discontinued public reporting of its hallway medicine indicator, there were an average of 1,390 inpatients being treated in “unconventional spaces” in March 2024.⁴

According to provincial data reported by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), Ontario ED indicators are moving in the wrong direction. Table 1 shows that the ED wait time for patients to receive an initial physician assessment has significantly increased over the last five years. The 90th percentile of patients waited 2.7 hours in 2020-21, which increased to 4.5 hours in 2024-25—an increase of 67 per cent. The 90th percentile represents the maximum length of time that 90 per cent of patients waited for an initial physician assessment in the ED.

The second indicator—shown in Figure 4—demonstrates that wait times to be admitted to an inpatient bed are dramatically increasing for patients waiting in the ED. In 2020-21, the 90th percentile of patients waiting in the ED spent 29 hours to be admitted to an inpatient ward, which increased to 44 hours in 2024-25. This is an increase of 52 per cent. The 90th percentile represents the maximum length of time that 90 per cent of patients admitted into hospital from the ED spend in the ED.

When analyzed geographically, the 90th percentile of patients waited the longest in the Central, East, and North East regions in 2024-25 (Figure 5). The Central region includes cities from Mississauga to Huntsville and Orangeville to Markham, the East region includes the communities from Pickering to the Quebec border north to Deep River, and the North East region includes the communities of West Parry Sound, White River, Peawanuck, the James Bay Coast, Mattawa and all points in between.⁵

The significant increase in wait times for patients to be admitted demonstrates a system under immense strain, unable to cope with the demand for acute care services. The longer patients languish in the ED waiting to be admitted, the risks of deteriorating health status and poorer outcomes increase.⁶

Staffed hospital beds are far below what is required—and projected to get worse

Projecting inpatient hospital bed demand is complex and depends on multiple factors, including population growth, aging, and utilization. Primary and community care, disease prevalence, and the socio-economic determinants of health are also contributing factors. A sicker population without access to primary and community care is more likely to access emergency departments and require inpatient hospital services.

There is widespread agreement among analysts that Ontario’s hospital sector is the most undersized in Canada relative to size of the population—and it is one of the most under capacity when compared to high-income countries.⁷ In 2022, Ontario ranked number 33 when compared to 38 OECD countries.⁸ At 199 beds per 100,000 people, Ontario had fewer beds than the Canadian average (217 beds per 100,000 people) and fell behind many other high-income countries with universal, publicly financed health systems, including Norway, Finland, New Zealand, and the U.K. Even though many northern European countries generally have stronger systems of primary and community care, these countries still have more hospital beds, per capita, than Ontario.

New analysis shows that while population growth and aging increased by 27 per cent between 2014-15 to 2024-25, the actual number of hospital beds increased by only 14 per cent (Table 2). In 2024-25, Ontario had 35,540 inpatient beds when it should have had at least 39,892 beds, if the number of hospital beds increased by 27 per cent.

Ontario had a gap of 4,352 beds in 2025.

This is a conservative estimate of the missing hospital beds in Ontario. Based on rapid growth of the population 65 and older, the Ontario Council of Hospital Unions estimates that 41,777 staffed beds were required in 2025—a gap of 6,237 beds.⁹ Between 4,352 and 6,237 staffed beds were required in 2025 to avoid hallway medicine and meet demand for inpatient care.

For multiple years now, the Financial Accountability Office of Ontario (FAO) has also raised concerns over the shrinking size of the hospital sector relative to demand for care. Analysis shows that the provincial government’s funding budget plan for 2025-26 to 2027-28 is projected to result in a reduction in staffed hospital beds from 220 beds per 100,000 people in 2024-25 to 203 beds in 2027-28.¹⁰

Provincial funding austerity is shrinking the public hospital capacity required to ensure patients receive timely access to care.

Fact checking the Ontario government’s claims

Hospital spending is not “unsustainable”

In February, the Ontario finance minister claimed that health care spending growth is “unsustainable.”¹¹ However, when the hospital and total health care spending increases are put into perspective—that is, relative to the size of the economy (measured as GDP)—the government’s claims do not withstand scrutiny.

Drawing on provincial expenditure data reported by CIHI, we see that between 2014 and 2023, Ontario’s hospital spending increased from $19.6 billion to $30.7 billion (Figure 6). This may seem like a big jump in spending, but when we look at it in relation to the size of the growing economy, hospital spending in 2014 to 2023 represents the same share of the economy—2.7 per cent of GDP.

Similarly, the increase in total Ontario health care spending—from $53.9 billion in 2014 to $84.8 billion in 2023—appears large, in absolute terms, but represents an increase of only 0.2 percentage points as a share of GDP. In 2014, total health care spending as a share of the economy stood at 7.4 per cent and increased modestly to 7.6 per cent by 2023.

These increases are sustainable within this time range and well within historical norms. The provincial government’s claims are misleading. In fact, Ontario ranks below the Canadian average for provincial hospital and total health care spending (Table 3).

The province is also below the Canadian average when it comes to hospital and total health care spending as a share of the economy. In 2023, Ontario spent 7.6 per cent of GDP on hospitals versus eight per cent in Canada. Clearly, Ontario has the capacity to invest in critical public health services.

However, in order to invest in the health care services that Ontarians depend on, the provincial government must ensure that the province benefits from the significant wealth created in the province by increasing taxes on higher-income households and corporations, and generating revenue that can increase health care access and strengthen the care economy.

The care economy is the economy

In February, Ontario’s finance minister stated that “85 per cent of the spending in the budget is actually for social spending [and] about 15 per cent is for infrastructure and the economy.”¹²

This statement assumes that jobs in the care economy are not part of the ‘real’ economy. This is a very outdated and sexist belief about what counts as Ontario’s economy. Work in the care economy is overwhelmingly performed by women in the public sector who pay taxes, support families, and contribute to community wellbeing. The care economy includes employment in health care, social assistance, and educational services.¹³

When we look at the employment data, a very different picture emerges than what the government presents. In Ontario and Canada, there are more jobs in the care economy than in many industries, including finance and insurance, construction, and professional and technical services. In 2024, there were 1,410,087 jobs in the care economy—representing one in five jobs in Ontario (Table 4). In Canada, there were 3,857,142 care economy jobs in 2024—also one in five jobs.

To suggest that this work is not part of the ‘real’ economy devalues the critical contributions of hundreds of thousands of frontline Ontario workers in health and social care. At a time of great geopolitical uncertainty, governments must recognize the central importance of the care economy to Canada’s ability to care for its population and sustain itself in the world.

Devaluing of the care economy—by the numbers

The problem of devaluing the care economy—and care workers—unfortunately, has a long history in Canada.¹⁴ These ideas are harmful to as well as the patients and communities who depend on their skills and commitment. Devaluing of the care economy comes in the form of cuts to post-secondary training institutions, lower immigration targets, hospital privatization, and real spending cuts to health care services.

We can examine the relationship between hospital wages and vacancies to understand how the devaluing of care work by the Ontario government is detrimental to the ability of hospitals to recruit and retain the workforce that Ontarians depend on. Between 2016 and 2025, the average wage for vacant hospital positions was seven per cent lower in 2024 than 2016, when adjusting for inflation (Figure 7). Over the same period, hospital job vacancies per 100,000 people increased by 101 per cent (Figure 8).

The recent history of public sector wage suppression is important. Passed in 2019, Bill 124 was an explicit attempt by the government to suppress wages and was ultimately found to be unconstitutional. This wage suppression legislation and hospital funding austerity over the past decade have contributed to ongoing and severe workforce recruitment and retention challenges.

Conclusion and recommendations

The majority of Ontario public hospitals had operating deficits over the last three years—this is a clear sign of a deepening hospital funding crisis in Ontario. It demonstrates that the available resources are insufficient to meet the population’s needs. Although the funding crisis is felt in rural and urban communities and hospitals large and small, hospitals in northern and western regions of the province were more likely to be in deficit in the last fiscal year.

The funding crisis harms patient care. Multiple health care system indicators provide dire warnings of the growing harms. Emergency department wait times have dramatically increased, leaving Ontario short thousands of inpatient beds. Rather than “hallway medicine” becoming a thing of the past, it has become a permanent fixture in Ontario’s hospitals. Unfortunately, the Ontario government mistakenly claims that health care spending is “unsustainable” when, in fact, it has remained relatively stable as a share of the economy.

Based on the findings of this report, the provincial government should implement an aggressive plan to address the hospital funding and capacity crisis:

Immediately increase funding to improve hospital finances and capacity

The Financial Accountability Office of Ontario (FAO) estimates that $6.4 billion in new health care spending is required in 2026-27 just to maintain 2024-25 service levels.¹⁵ Budget 2026 only adds $3.4 billion in additional spending, which leaves the health care system short by $3 billion in this fiscal year.

Costs in the hospital sector have been increasing by about six per cent per year due to population growth, aging, and inflation, according to the Ontario Hospital Association.¹⁶ However, the Ontario budget plans for total health care funding to increase by 3.5 per cent in 2026-27 and 2.3 per cent in 2027-28.¹⁷ These increases are insufficient to address the health care needs of the population.

The Ontario Hospital Association (OHA) estimates that hospitals require financial stabilization funding of $2.7 billion in 2025-26. While the provincial government offered an additional $1.1 billion for 2026-27, this falls short of addressing the dire financial situation. Detailed analysis by the Ontario Council of Hospital Unions (CUPE) finds that core hospital funding needs to be increased by $3.2 billion in the fiscal year ending March 2026.

In 2026-27, the provincial government is projected to increase base and targeted hospital funding by four per cent, which falls short of the six per cent annual needed to account for population growth, aging, and inflation—and to simply maintain service levels.

Develop a provincial health care workforce strategy and capital plan

Ontario lacks a health care workforce strategy with provincial and regional solutions to address staffing shortages. Importantly, the provincial government and health care sector employers must recognize that the conditions of work are the conditions of patient care, and that improving the workplace environment is associated with better-performing organizations that deliver safer patient care and better outcomes.¹⁸

A workforce strategy should be accompanied by a long-term hospital capital infrastructure plan to ensure that physical infrastructure, bed capacity, and equipment planning aligns with workforce expansion.

The Ministry of Health and Ontario Health should establish a provincial advisory table, including researchers, unions, educators, employer representatives, professional associations, and patient and citizen advocacy groups, to inform development and implementation of a provincial health workforce strategy and capital plan.

The post Failure, by design: Ontario’s deepening hospital funding crisis appeared first on CCPA.

The key announcement was a new (so-called) sovereign wealth fund to finance physical infrastructure and $6 billion for apprenticeships in the trades. By contrast, the SEU was notably silent on investments in health and education, affordable child care, caregiving leave, and growing economic precarity—all issues of consequence to mothers and families. 

On any number of metrics, Canadians are struggling, young people and low-income families in particular.  A year ago, four in 10 adults reported that their household found it “difficult” or “very difficult” to meet their financial needs, more than double the level in 2021. In 2022, 38 per cent of young adults (aged 20 to 29) said that they wouldn’t be able to afford to have a child in the next three years. 

Little left for food and basic needs

The soaring cost of rent, lack of affordable housing, and overstretched health and community services have left many overburdened. 

The situation of single mothers is particularly precarious. Single mothers were hugely impacted by the pandemic. The economic lockdown in 2020 wiped out two decades of economic progress at a stroke. Concentrated in “flexible” occupations such as sales and service, over one-third (37.5 per cent) of single mothers with kids under 12 lost their jobs or a majority of their working hours when the economy shut down in the spring. 

Without access to supports such as child care, many were forced out the labour market altogether, reducing their autonomy and entrenching their poverty—to say nothing of the individual toll on the women’s aspirations and hopes for the future. 

Five years later, single mothers (25-54 years) with kids 0 to 12 years have still not recouped their employment losses (down -43,000 between 2019 and 2025), coinciding with a sizable drop in their overall numbers (-63,500).  

A key part of this story is that single mothers are having a much more difficult time living on their own. There’s been little change in their after-tax incomes since 2021. And little change in the sizeable wage gap between single mothers (especially never-married mothers) and mothers in couple families. 

In 2023, “unpartnered” mothers with young children earned 19 per cent less, on average, than their “partnered” peers. This was true among Canadian-born, immigrant and Indigenous mothers—a reflection of deep-seated occupational segregation. Absent meaningful community and family support, single mothers will always be forced into low paid service work, low paid precisely because these workers have no choice. 

High poverty rates among single mother families is another economic indicator that has changed little over the years. It is about four times higher than in couple families, up 10 percentage points from 22.8 per cent in 2020 when pandemic-era benefit programs dramatically halved poverty in Canada. 

An even higher share of single mother families (47.4 per cent) reported being food insecure in 2024 compared to 27.3 per cent of couple families with kids according to the most recent Canadian Income Survey. It’s up from 2020 particularly among Black single mothers and those that rely on government transfer programs.  

Glaring holes in Canada’s economic plan

Mothers looking for relief in the April 28 Spring Economic Update were sorely disappointed. A one-time top of 50 per cent to the Goods and Services Tax Credit, announced in January, will certainly deliver relief to low-income families this summer. As a result of this change, 172,000 adults and children will be lifted out of poverty. 

But temporarily suspending federal excise taxes at a cost of $2.1 billion in foregone revenues, like the cut to the lower income tax bracket last year, will deliver little relief to low income households, just $59 on average for those in the bottom quintile according to the Parliamentary Budget Office. 

Likewise, new measures to boost the construction of private homes and the HST rebates on these new unaffordable homes benefit housing developers and wealthy investors, not those in acute housing need. Where were the measures to expand non-market housing for low-income households or new protections for renters, both of which would make a huge difference for single parents and other low-income households.  

For single mothers, indeed all women, the failure of the Spring Economic Update to prioritize poverty reduction and economic resilience is further compounded by the government’s austerity efforts that are  eroding access to critical public services.  

The government’s silence on the renewal of funding for the Canada-wide Early Learning and Child Care (CWELCC) program as well as the National Action Plan to End Gender-based Violence and the national pharmacare program is profoundly troubling. It’s hard not to question the government’s commitment to gender equality with these programs on the chopping block, set to quietly expire in the next one to two years.

Care work doesn’t make the cut in today’s Ottawa

Research on family policy conclusively shows that where there is affordable, accessible, high quality care services, mothers, children and families all benefit—especially those such as single mothers who confront the largest barriers.

Federal investments in child care, for instance, have greatly reduced child care fees for the lucky parents who have access to “federal” spots. The creation of new spaces, however, has fallen woefully short of targets, unable to respond to heightened demand. Perversely, low income parents now have less access to low cost child care than before the federal program, pushed out by higher income families because of faulty implementation. 

Shortages of qualified staff due to low wages, minimal benefits, and poor working conditions are compounding the problem. New capital and operational funding is urgently needed for the expansion of nonprofit and public spaces, including in Indigenous communities, as well as resources for improving staff recruitment and retention. 

Instead, the Spring Economic Update noted that the federal $625-million infrastructure fund launched in 2023 to support creating non-profit, licensed child-care spaces will end this year. 

It appears among policy-makers in Ottawa that you need to wear a hardhat to qualify as a nation builder. Child care workers and the millions of women who work in Canada’s care economy don’t make the cut. 

Investments in the care economy are precisely the type of “dual purpose” investments we need, not only supporting and sustaining communities across the country but generating tremendous economic benefit for all. This Mother’s Day, let’s keep fighting for progressive family policies and income security programs that hold up all families. These are the gifts that keep on giving. 

The post No gifts for single mothers in Canada’s Spring Economic Update appeared first on CCPA.

Canada did not similarly manage its petro wealth. Our federal structure means that provinces control their resources, so provinces have created their own fund, which they mostly use to lower taxes and reduce deficits. In contrast, the federal government subsidizes the oil and gas sector with direct funding, tax breaks and financing to the tune of tens of billions of dollars.

The federal government announced last week the intent to create what they call a Sovereign Wealth Fund, but rather than use the publicly owned profits from our oil and gas industry, they want to create the fund with debt financed by Canadians to build infrastructure like oil and gas pipelines that will improve the bottom line of private companies. 

Where will the debt to finance the fund come from? Well, the federal government put in an initial $25 billion, but if you have some extra money sitting around, you can ‘invest’ in the fund. If the fund doesn’t make money then, no doubt, the government will cover your losses. 

Another idea floated by the federal government last week is to use what we already own as Canadians, namely our airports, and turn these over to private investors. 

Canadians, through Transport Canada, currently own 26 airports, most of which are managed by private not-for-profit local airport authorities. They operate airports from Iqaluit to Gander, including Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax. Canada wouldn’t be the first country to completely privatize its airports. That was the UK back in 1987. They definitely made profits for investors, but it meant higher prices for travellers, because private airports are more expensive. And in some countries, private airports have meant poorer working conditions and lower pay for the thousands of airport employees. 

With investor schemes like subleases and subcontracts, each private company gets a slice of the pie, but workers find that employers’ contracts and collective agreements are cancelled as companies look for cheaper options. That usually means lower pay, often without union protection. 

Airports look like a sure thing investment for financiers and a safe bet for governments looking to offload the costs of airport upgrades. But airports are an essential service, a requirement for travellers. They are not suited to the creation of a monopoly that has a captive audience and can charge what it wants. 

But even these ‘sure thing’ investments can be problematic. During the COVID-19 epidemic, airport investors found that their investments were not without risk. As air travel tanked, so did profits. 

The real risk of airport privatization, however, is for the public. The history of selling off public assets, from airports, to highways, to hydro, is that the sale price is too low. It’s a boon to investors. And the costs charged by these private entities can escalate with no public accountability. If a private company decided to reduce service or even close the airport in, say, Thunder Bay or Charlottetown, that would be a business decision without government control.

One example is the Ontario firesale of the publicly built highway 407. This was a badly needed commuter highway across the top of Toronto. A Spanish investment consortium bought the highway for a mere $3.1 billion in 1999 with a 99-year lease. Today, Ontarians pay about $2 billion a year in tolls. A sweet deal for the highway owners, and an infuriating loss for Ontarians. The non-tolled highway 401 is usually jammed bumper to bumper all day long while the 407 offers an easy driving experience—for a steep price. 

A more recent example is the Metrolinx Crosstown Eglinton LRT. It was delayed by five years, was $1 billion over budget and is plagued with deficiencies and service delays.

Canada is not Norway, and we can’t pretend to build a sovereign wealth fund with debt. However, if we want to invest in infrastructure like upgrading airports or harbours, we get a better price as a sovereign country because of our government’s ability to tax. We could start with raising taxes on oil and gas companies and cutting their subsidies. 

The government should not sell off our public assets to create monopolies so that investors can jack up prices and skim off profits. The lesson is that once we lose ownership over our common assets, the price is high for the public to use these assets, and, once we understand what we’ve lost, the price to regain what we’ve lost is usually too steep.  

The post Keep Canadian airports public appeared first on CCPA.

“The clause was designed to be invoked by legislatures in exceptional situations, and only as a last resort after careful consideration. It was not designed to be used by governments as a convenience or as a means to circumvent proper process.”—Roy Romanow and Roy McMurtry Attorneys General Saskatchewan and Ontario, 1981

The “clause” in question is the “notwithstanding clause,” also known as Section 33 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Over the past few years, premiers have come to see it as a handy tool to avoid court challenges over questionable or controversial legislation. The practice is making a joke of democracy, and the problem is getting worse.

What the notwithstanding clause does

Section 33 allows Parliament or provincial legislatures to enact laws notwithstanding some of the rights provisions of the Charter. These include fundamental freedoms: of conscience, belief and expression; of the press; of peaceful assembly and association such as the right to strike (Charter, Section 2).

Using Section 33 in relation to a particular law, governments may bypass basic rights like that of life, liberty and security of the person, protection from unreasonable search and seizure, arbitrary arrest and detention and right to trial within a reasonable time. This applies also to protections from cruel and unusual punishment and self-incrimination. Section 33 allows governments to suspend Charter principles of equality before the law (Charter, Sections 7 through 15). Governments have used it to pass laws they fear might not meet the constitutional smell test of Canada’s court system.

Section 33 stays in effect for five years, but may be renewed indefinitely. With respect to a certain piece of legislation it can render key rights in the Charter meaningless.

Section 33: A pistol on the wall

Peter Biro is a lawyer and founder of Section 1, an organization formed to stave off democratic backsliding. In conversation, he explained the dramatic principle of Chekhov’s pistol. The writer once noted: “If in Act 1 you have a pistol hanging on the wall, then it must fire in the last act. Otherwise, don’t put it there.”¹ Biro likens this to psychology of the political theatre: if a tool is available it’s going to be used.

That pistol was hung on the wall in November 1981 when the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau was searching for a way to get provincial buy-in for the proposed Charter. Premiers wanted a balance between Charter rights and provincial power in areas like those prescribed in Sections 2 and 7 through 15. Section 33, the “notwithstanding clause”, was a compromise between the federal and provincial governments to insure the Charter came into being.² At the time, Biro explained, the Charter’s framers thought it would be used rarely—only as a last resort.

But some politicians found Section 33 just too tempting. It has been invoked over two dozen times since its inception, and while nearly half of these instances were in the 80s as part of Quebec’s protest against the constitution, there has been a significant uptick in governments using Section 33 as a relatively recent and worsening phenomenon to justify the violation of rights.  

It has been used over the years to enable: 

• Quebec to limit the use of English in outdoor signs to that of half the size of French (Bill 178, 1988)

• Saskatchewan to enact back-to-work legislation (Bill 144, 1986 p52) and overrule a court decision to cut funding for non-Catholic students attending Catholic schools (2017)

• Alberta to declare that marriage was legitimate only between two people of the opposite sex (Bill 202, 2000). Section 33 lapsed in 2005 and wasn’t restored

• New Brunswick to override non-medical exemptions to its vaccination rules (2019)

• Quebec to ban public sector workers like educators, lawyers and peace officers from wearing religious garb—“clothing, a symbol, jewelry, an adornment, an accessory or headwear…” (Bill 21, 2019). In 2025, the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) government introduced Bill 9 to extend these secularism rules to ban praying in public parks and streets without a permit and serving so-called religious food without a secular option. Section 33 was applied pre-emptively to shield the bill from legal challenge.

• The Ford government of Ontario to set time limits for third party political advertising (Bill 307, 2021). Bill 307 was overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court in March 2023. That decision was based on Canadians’ constitutional right to vote, something not covered by Section 33.

• Québec to investigate alleged breaches of its language laws regarding the amount of French used by the public and businesses—notwithstanding protections from arbitrary search and seizure held within the Charter (Bill 96, 2022)

• Ontario to pass back-to-work legislation against low-paid education workers (Bill 28, 2022)

• Saskatchewan to require schools to obtain parental permission for students to use their preferred names or gender identity. Saskatchewan also allowed parents to opt their children out of sexual health education. (Bill 174, 2023)

• Alberta to protect four pieces of legislation: one that broke a strike and three that interfered with the rights of trans youth.

Where are the righteous causes, imperative to preserve fragile provincial rights described in the above examples? The Ford government was facing an election and was worried about the amount of money public groups could raise to oppose them. Saskatchewan, Ontario and Alberta used Section 33 to avoid the hassle of defending union-busting in the courts.

Whatever Québec lawmakers might say about diversity and respect, it’s meaningless in light of its authoritarian moves to preserve “laicity of the state.” How does the CAQ credibly justify any of its protected legislation designed to shelter independent-minded people from predations like praying in public, eating religious food or wearing religious symbols? Labour lawyer Susan Ursel calls this secular posturing “hypocritical.” The state-as-religion is invoked in the place of what practices people choose to observe. She adds that using Section 33 to pull this off, undermines the political structure, social norms and consensus of what we value in this society.

What about Alberta’s justification for shutting down challenges to its laws concerning gender? Where is the evidence to support this intrusion into doctor-patient relationships? What overwhelming social need justifies restricting kids from choosing their names and pronouns? From excluding Trans women from playing in women’s sport? Questions like these are swept off the table with Section 33.

Section 33 enables governments to keep ill-conceived and malicious laws in place while muffling courts’ fundamental democratic role of challenging them. Its use is becoming a fact of life rather than cause for outcry. Peter Biro calls this habituation—one of several major threats to democracy he outlined in a recent Massey Lecture. Autocracy doesn’t only march in a column of ICE agents; it enters politics gradually, tolerated as people become used to suppression of liberal democratic norms and lower their standards for what is permissible.

Alberta: A closer look—four bills in a month

At the end of October, Smith’s United Conservative Party (UCP) broke a 3-week strike of 51,000 teachers by applying Section 33 pre-emptively to back-to-work-legislation. So, in case the legislation was challenged in court, Section 33 would kick-in automatically and override it. Alberta teachers were forced back to work notwithstanding Charter protections over all of the sections noted above as well as . The UCP also ignored the Alberta Bill of Rights.

It was clear from the outset of the strike that the UCP was not in the mood to negotiate a settlement with teachers. It responded to teachers’ demands, by immediately locking them out. After breaking their strike, it imposed a contract.

Smith and the UCP used the same tactic last in November 2025 to make sure that previous assaults on transgender rights wouldn’t be jeopardized by appeals to the Charter. The provincial government It applied Section 33 to two pieces of legislation passed in 2024: Bill 26 banning the use of puberty blockers and reassignment surgery for trans youth, Bill 27 mandating permission from parents for kids under 16 to use their preferred name or pronoun in school; students over 16 would have to inform their parents. These two laws face court challenges: Bill 26 for interfering in doctor-patient relations and Bill 27 for its “unconstitutional attack on the rights of gender diverse youth in Alberta.” More recently, Bill 29, prohibits athletes not designated female at birth from participating in women’s sports. Danielle Smith said in a recent press conference that it was necessary to use Section 33 to avoid years of litigation—possibly to the Supreme Court.

These four pieces of legislation deserve the scrutiny of court challenges. But like other provincial legislatures, Alberta chose to avoid the inconvenience.

Regarding the back-to-work legislation, the Canadian Bar Association responded: “The government has invoked the notwithstanding clause before the Court has had an opportunity to examine the law and determine whether it constitutes a reasonable limit (to the Charter)…If the notwithstanding clause is to be invoked, it should only be used as a tool of last resort, after the Courts have had a chance to examine the legislation.”

Section 33 was not a tool of last resort. The legislation was embargoed so the press couldn’t release it to the public. The bill was a done deal.

Pushing back against Section 33

It’s going to take a huge public outcry to preserve the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. When Ontario used Section 33 to suspend the right to strike for low-paid education workers in 2022, it sparked a furor. CUPE members went on strike anyway, supported by the labour movement threatening a general strike. The Ford government beat a rapid retreat and repealed the offending Bill 28.

There are other options. Section 33 has no effect until a court rules that a law breaches certain Charter rights. Yet a law that might trip a Section 33 remains in force until it’s challenged—even if it violates the Charter. So, challenging the offending law illuminates the violation of Charter rights. That’s what happened when the 2SLGBTQ+ rights group UR Pride contested Saskatchewan’s 2023 policy requiring teachers to refer to students under age 16 by their birth names and pronouns. UR Pride argued this constituted a breach of the Charter’s security of the person and equality provisions.

The Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench paused the policy, so the governing Saskatchewan Party promptly turned it into law and protected it with a pre-emptive application of Section 33. UR Pride came back with the argument that the law violated the Charter right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment. Even though this wouldn’t stop the law from being enacted, UR Pride did get the Court to declare that it violated these students’ Charter rights. Saskatchewan challenged that declaration, raised it to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and lost. Unwilling to let go of Chekhov’s pistol, Saskatchewan has appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The result? Saskatchewan has shone a bright light on its policy that harms vulnerable young people. Perhaps this case, while unfortunately not prompting the demise of Section 33, might help to stiffen the spines of those in a position to limit it. Some options:

• Introducing term limits to the application of Section 33 to laws so that it can’t be used over and over to deny people Charter rights

• Declining to use Section 33 pre-emptively—at least waiting for courts to rule against a law that may violate people’s rights.

• Limiting the Charter rights that may be violated by Section 33. Shield freedom of the press, belief, speech and association (Section 2), Life, liberty and security of the person protections (section 7), the prohibition of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment (section 12) and equality rights in (section 15).

Actions like these might impede the erosion of liberal democracy in Canada, but they won’t happen without serious pressure on provincial governments that reach for autocracy to replace the inconvenience of governing with respect for people.

The post The “notwithstanding clause:” Or, how to avoid the Charter of Rights appeared first on CCPA.

Between 1999 and 2023, the average debt of post-secondary students who borrowed to pay for their studies rose from $17,600 to $20,400 (adjusted for inflation), while the total student debt held by Canadian households ballooned from $25.3 billion to $41.2 billion (adjusted for inflation).

Student debt has also become more widely accepted as the norm. 

Statistics Canada’s data shows that high-income parents are saving ever more aggressively for their children’s education, while a recent public opinion survey found that 53 per cent of post-secondary students believe “graduating with debt is part of the student experience.” 

While struggling to pay for post-secondary education and training is often portrayed as a noble sacrifice, the reality is that high tuition fees and the resulting student debt constitute a massive wealth transfer. They shift the cost of workforce training onto working families, whose skilled hands and minds make Canada (and its corporations) rich. 

High tuition fees and reliance on loans also prevent many from accessing or even considering post-secondary education and training. For people struggling financially, education costs are often out of reach, and debt financing is risky given low and volatile incomes.

Post-secondary education and training is a strategic, nation-building investment that should be paid for with tax revenues.

Using the best available data, this report paints a picture of the impact of this wealth transfer: financial insecurity for indebted households of all ages, and a growing wealth gap between low-income households burdened by bad debt and higher-income households building wealth and financial security. 

Who has student debt? 

According to the 2023 Survey of Financial Security (SFS), 12.1 per cent of Canadian households carry student debt. This percentage varies by region. British Columbia (8.9 per cent) and Quebec (9.6 per cent) are below the national average, Ontario (13.9 per cent) and the Prairies (14 per cent) are above it, while the Atlantic region is close to the average.

Debt burden is not evenly distributed. Across Canada, racialized families are more than twice as likely as non-racialized families to have student debt. The reasons for this discrepancy vary. It is, however, clear that the impact of higher tuition fees and weaker student aid programs will be felt more strongly among families that have historically been underrepresented in higher education and high-paying jobs.

Regarding age breakdowns, households with a main income earner aged 35 or younger are 2.2 times more likely to carry student debt, as expected. That said, in only 42.2 per cent of households with debt, the primary income earner is under 35; in 42.1 per cent of households with debt, they are between 35 and 54; and in 16 per cent, they are aged 55 or older. The large share of households in the 35 to 54 category is due to this group including older adults who are still paying off their student debt, households with students living with their parents, and households where both parents and their children have debt. 

The takeaway from these age breakdowns is that, although younger people are more likely to have student debt, this is not only a young person’s problem. The financial burden of student debt spreads across families with varied age compositions.  

Households with student debt face greater financial challenges

High-income earners often borrow to invest and build wealth, so not all debt is tied to everyday financial difficulties. However, student debt is. As shown below, families with student debt are more likely to miss bill payments, borrow from payday lenders, and live paycheque to paycheque. They’re not building wealth; they’re falling behind.

Student debt versus mortgage debt 

Some debt is part of a wealth-building strategy, like a mortgage on a house whose value is expected to rise above inflation. Some debt is outright bad, like a missed credit card payment that accrues high interest. Student debt is not as bad as a credit card balance since post-secondary training is associated with greater opportunities and higher incomes, but it is not a straightforward wealth-building strategy either. 

Student debt is a burden that thwarts the financial security of families of all age compositions. Families in the bottom 40 per cent of the wealth distribution carry a disproportionate share of that burden—63 per cent of all student debt. 

Meanwhile, families in the top 20 per cent are heavily invested in real estate, which, because of the regrettable financialization of the sector, is the main wealth-building strategy in Canada.

There is no nation building without post-secondary education and training

The past couple of years in Canadian politics have seen the re-emergence of terms like nation building, industrial policy, and generational investments—popularized by slogans like Elbows Up and Buy Canadian. Oddly, post-secondary education and training has not been part of this conversation.

Provincial governments are raising tuition fees while cutting back on financial aid, turning post-secondary education into a privilege for children of wealthy parents or a lifelong debt sentence for others. At the household level, this approach worsens the financial insecurity documented above. At the aggregate level, it will weaken Canada’s economy as workers of all ages postpone or forgo further training, ultimately exacerbating inequality. It’s an extremely short-sighted approach, even from the most fiscally conservative perspective. 

The federal government is doing very little—or practically nothing—to address this situation. In March 2026, it announced changes to the Canada Student Financial Assistance (CSFA) program that allow students to receive up to 40 per cent of their aid as grants and borrow up to $300 per week of study. While ultimately insufficient given the scale of the crisis, these changes should have been made permanent once and for all. Instead, the federal government is making piecemeal concessions while failing to address the key problem driving unaffordability: high tuition fees.

Despite all the talk of nation building and generational investments, the federal and provincial governments are failing to invest in the most important factors of production: labour. 

Debt does not have to be an inevitable part of the student experience. It is the result of short-sighted policies that limit funding and access to post-secondary education and training, thwarting the country’s ability to reach its full social and economic potential and reinforcing the divide between those for whom debt is part of the student experience, and those who had the foresight to choose wealthy parents.

The CCPA would like to thank the National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE) for supporting this research.

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