Note: The following was a comment I wrote in reply to Michael Ardaiolo’s article titled “Cultural Voyeurism” on the EnjoyShanghai website. My comment wouldn’t submit (pressing the “Send” button didn’t do anything) but I’ve discovered it might be because of comment length (hah). Rather than splitting it up into pieces to post it all on their site, I’m just going to copy and paste it here in its entirety and leave a comment linking here, at the defunct blocked-by-the-GFW c/d site. To understand my response, you’ll of course need to read Mr. Ardaiolo’s article first.

Interesting article (as well as the Editor notes).

Obligatory potential conflict of interest disclaimer: The current design of chinaSMACK was done by myself and I’m involved in the management of the cS and its sister sites including koreaBANG and indoBOOM. I wouldn’t be involved if I didn’t subscribe to the basic point or “loose framework” of the site.

I’m not going to comment on China Whisper’s top 10 list except to say two things: a) Alexa is actually a very inaccurate tool for determining traffic but its unfortunately the best known free tool for such; and b) its tough to compare chinaSMACK vs. Tea Leaf Nation in terms of comment count (a proxy for size of community) and “public praises” (a proxy for authority) given that both are influenced in part by the former being nearly 4 years older than the latter.

That said, and as a reader of both cS and TLN, the two sites can definitely be compared on their similarities. However, it is more fruitful to compare their differences and discuss the pros and cons of their differences.

1. Translation

cS sticks to translation considerably more than TLN does. In my opinion, TLN is a lot more like traditional journalism, reporting, or blogging on China where the information is processed and infused with explicit commentary from a Westerner’s perspective. In contrast, cS for the most part does little editorializing or commentary, sticking to just translations of what the original Chinese author, journalist, media, or netizens wrote. cS does this because it aims to share the Chinese voices and perspectives, except translated into English. We discourage editorializing because we’re trying to offer what Chinese people themselves are saying, not what WE (even for our Chinese translators and bloggers like Fauna, Peter, Li, etc.) think about the matter.

2. Popularity

It’s very difficult to think cS and TLN are similar when it comes to the nature of the content that is published. cS aims to translate and publish what is trending on the greater Chinese language internet. Its content is dictated by what is popular and mainstream, according to a variety of metrics. It doesn’t always get the most popular stories and there are plenty of stories where a legitimate argument can be made that something else was more popular, but that’s its stated mission and I think its very hard to say TLN has the same mission. cS doesn’t employ a “crutch of sensation”, its simply the nature of what content is likely to become popular and trending with the masses. cS doesn’t apologize for using popularity as its editorial criteria.

TLN’s editorial mix is more similar to the mix of other Western news media, heavy on what Westerners are interested in reading about when it comes to China, with an overemphasis on Chinese politics, oppression, and censorship. TLN isn’t as narrative driven as most Western media reporting, but there’s a sense that their reporting invariably conforms to narratives whereas cS has narratives but they’re more organic, determined by Chinese netizens through the allocation of their attention and energies in discussion. Furthermore, similar to the Western (especially online news) media’s over-reliance on Twitter, TLN is also in my opinion over-reliant on Sina Weibo.

Though to be fair, I think cS has an over-reliance on NetEase but interestingly, my criticism for both hinges on both sources being distorted demographics and the inherent problems with their sampling methods. I think cS’s sampling methodology has serious confounding factors while I think TLN’s use of Sina Weibo quotes is more akin to the adage of journalists presenting their opinion through their choice of quotes rather than actual “sampling”.

3. Distortion

cS’s popularity filter does create a distortion or a “film” as Ardaiolo puts it but I think cS is also very up front about it (and even then people forget it). TLN also creates a distortion in its reporting (frankly, any time someone is curating anything, there is inevitable distortion) but its a different sort, one that is more distinctly and firmly “Western”. TLN looks at China with Western lenses and sensibilities far more than cS does.

cS tries to use popularity with Chinese netizens to determine representativeness and what should thus be translated and shared since there’s no way to translate and share everything. TLN, by contrast, is unapologetically active and subjective curation. They manually distill, gauge sentiment, and depend on their intuition from experiencing and studying China. Each story is handpicked, as they say, just like the best tea. The content of both sites are still subject to selection bias but they have different approaches which I think really illustrates the differences in content.

The people behind TLN are Western academics. The people behind cS are mostly local Chinese netizens. This inevitably colors what they produce. The question is what distortion you prefer when it comes to making sense of China and Chinese people through Chinese online social media?

4. Comments

Both sites include translations of Chinese netizen comments but I think cS emphasizes it whereas TLN uses it for flavor. cS often puts the netizen comments front and center; they ARE the story, in their variety or uniformity, in how simple or complex they may be, or in how banal or interesting they may be. As I alluded to above, TLN to me seems to use translated comments mostly to reinforce or justify a statement, argument, or conclusion being advanced in their posts. They are used as supporting characters, not the lead itself. This is fine for TLN because TLN is about proscribing to its readers what are the best, most interesting stories from their own subjective perspective. This brings me to…

5. Context

TLN provides its readers far more context. It is more friendly to the uninitiated because it spells things out, unconstrained by a mantra that emphasizes translation to provide background and some helpful explanations about what’s happening or hypothesizing to its readers what greater trends may be involved. cS doesn’t do this aside from a few explanatory notes here and there. It doesn’t step in to try explaining the greater possible significance of any thing or what conclusions you should walk away with. It gives you a snapshot, limited though it may be, and lets the reader come up with what they will. In my opinion, there is more “substance” and greater insights to be found from cS, but its subject to the efforts of the reader. There’s reading a book, and then there’s reading what someone else thinks about a book. cS is more the former and TLN is more the latter.

6. Rawness

cS is willing to publish things and language that wouldn’t be palatable to TLN and mainstream media, maybe because it is too violent, explicit, or subjectively distasteful or insignificant. Yet those are every bit a part of the landscape of the Chinese internet and the plurality and color of its denizens as complaints of injustice and political commentary is, and frankly, probably more so if we’re talking about mainstream China. Both sites invariably cannot escape some form of filtering, but I think there is value in the more raw and less filtered content of cS just as there is value in the more processed but contextualized content of TLN.

…

Now for a semantic quibble. The original use of cultural voyeurism by cS was that it enabled its readers to view something as it is, without being part of it. I understand the looser definition employed in applying the “voyeurism” motif to TLN but I don’t think its applicable because the content is less about viewing things as they are and more about viewing things as they’ve been processed and interpreted (not just translated) and where the conclusions are more explicitly offered. I think the “culture porn” description of cS is definitely applicable for some of its content, but the opposite of accusing cS as being culture porn is to accuse TLN of being pretentious. Neither is fair.

…

Finally, there are definitely reasons why TLN is palatable to The Atlantic as a content provider, and this is related to #6 above. Forget the fact that TLN’s writers have impressive Western academic credentials, that are more marketable clout to the Western readers of The Atlantic, compared to Fauna or the other Chinese nationals who insist on maintaining public anonymity. The most relevant reason is because cS content isn’t of The Atlantic’s format or style (or if you want, “up to their standards”). How many “stupid cunts” and “motherfuckers” do you think The Atlantic wants to publish?

And here’s the kicker. Fauna and chinaSMACK HAVE been approached by media outlets and publications, but there’s a reason why Fauna or cS has never gone ahead with any content partnerships or job offers. I won’t let you freely imagine what the reason is, I’ll tell you: Fauna wanted to keep her editorial independence.

She didn’t want to sanitize. She wanted to keep the SMACK (btw, that refers to the “rawness of the content”, not “shit-talking about China”). Nor did she think her own opinion on the story of the day was really that interesting. Now, I think she’s wrong, as people with expertise can offer meaningful insights to others, just like TLN does, but I also admire the humility. She just isn’t interested in writing what these foreign publications wanted her to cover, the angles they wanted her to pursue, and the Chinese voices they want her to highlight over others to advance any specific narrative. She turned them down because she thinks herself more an observer than a writer, reporter, or opinion-leader.

That’s the spirit of cS. It isn’t for everyone. It can be damnably low-brow but it is what you make of it and we know for a fact that different people find different value in the site, ranging from cultural insight to culture porn. It appeals to different demographics at different levels of familiarity with China, and not always successfully at that, but we know it does and believe in it.

My personal opinion of TLN is that it is less multifaceted, but occupies a nice sweet spot for those who are of moderate familiarity with China. TLN does indeed go “one level deeper”, but for a lot of more hardcore China watchers, it isn’t deep enough, the conclusions and observations somewhat obvious and trite to them as much as many of cS’s content are fundamentally translations of sensationalist garbage and the Chinese reactions to sensationalist garbage (there are still insights in that but it depends on who you are, what you’re open to realizing, and how you reconcile it with everything else you read about China to synthesize what you know of China and its people). Still, its good for those who aren’t China nerds already but are otherwise ready to leave Western media China cliches and become more knowledgeable and nuanced in their understanding of some aspects of Chinese society through Chinese activity on the internet (though again, using Sina Weibo as the predominant source and representation of Chinese “social media” is a bit dangerous).

TLN’s editorial mission, format, and the resulting content is a great match for The Atlantic’s audience. This announcement is a coup for them, a great validation of their work and the value of that work. It’s great for The Atlantic as well, to offer their readers more quality content relevant to their interests, keeping them on the site (The Atlantic has a promising online strategy). However, I wouldn’t go so far as to say The Atlantic will improve TLN’s editorial content as I think it’s closer to a content-for-exposure arrangement than The Atlantic becoming TLN’s editorial mentor. I think the judgement there is a bit obvious but you’re entitled to it of course.

Admittedly, I also take umbrage on behalf of the site I’m involved with over any possible suggestion that TLN is somehow advancing or improving while cS is somehow content to just copy its framework for other Asian countries. I take offense personally because I’ve been directly involved in those expansions and because those expansions weren’t Fauna or cS’s idea either. They exist because cS fans actually approached cS themselves to do them and I was put in charge of helping set them up and make sure they operate smoothly. Prior to that I was just on hand to modify the site design and help with some English translations as needed, but since Fauna wants to focus on cS editorial only, she had me handle them (I’d like to think she thinks me competent to do so but I suspect its just her laziness).

However, if there was anything more validating to Fauna personally than influential mainstream Western media wanting her to work for them, it was the validation of people who wanted to help her and the validation of people wanting to copy the cS editorial mission and format, for China and other countries.

There will always be people who prefer one or the other but the thing is, such a question makes this into a popularity contest when readers who have a genuine interest in learning more about China and its people will find value in both sites and their very different approaches. Preferring one or the other reflects more about what kind of China watcher you envision yourself to be than the sincerity of your interest in China. They’re similar insofar as where TLN has taken inspiration from cS, but hey, cS itself had its own precursors (though I’m not sure how much they actually influenced Fauna when she started cS 4 years ago. I have a hard time imagining her having been familiar with Roland Soong’s ESWN, which I consider the closest analogue at the time).

Thanks for the opportunity to navel-gaze. Cheers.

Note: “Navel-gazing” because I’m an insider at one of the sites and I’m talking about the sites themselves. It goes without saying that this is all my own opinion and not necessarily the opinion or statements of anyone else involved in the cS family of sites. I also confess to wanting to respond to this because I regularly see some confusion about what cS is about (which I suppose could also be interpreted as a failing of the site) and wanted to voice what we believe internally and what we impart upon parties interested in joining the cS family.

"chinaSMACK vs. Tea Leaf Nation: Which Do You Prefer?" is a post from china/divide

DeWang at Hidden Harmonies brought to my attention this recent interview by German publication Spiegel with Fu Ying, China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. I initially planned on sharing my response to the interview as a comment on Hidden Harmonies but, given its anticipated length, decided to make it into a separate post here. Oh boy.

So, let’s see…

First off, do feel free to read the entirety of the interview on Spiegel before diving into my quote-and-comments below. Let me know if you get the feeling the interview was conducted over email as the lack of build up to rather pointed questions (which I felt Fu Ying handled quite gracefully in some responses) was something that stood out to me.

Here goes:

SPIEGEL: Madame Fu Ying, few countries are more interesting to the West right now than China — and few others alarm the West to the same degree, now that you have launched your first aircraft carrier. Why does China need to arm itself to this extent?

Fu Ying: The first aircraft carrier going to sea is a very exciting event in China. It’s something the Chinese people longed for. People think it’s a natural step in the growth of the Chinese military — although this so-called aircraft carrier was really just a framework of a second-hand aircraft carrier that we refitted and will only be used for scientific research and training purposes. It’s far, far from being a full-fledged aircraft carrier. In that sense, China is well behind other countries, let alone the United States which has had a mature and highly developed fleet of aircraft carriers for a long time now.

This first response is an example of what I felt was quite graceful, specifically for immediately reframing the audience in consideration from Western observers (who may be interested or alarmed) to Chinese observers. That’s good, because it changes the tone from one of “threat to others” to one of “achievement of a people”. Although it can be interpreted as being a bit “defensive” or “downplaying”, I do like the open humility that China’s current aircraft carrier was indeed a refit and is indeed far from what other countries have.

That said, I personally would’ve liked her to respond with something along the lines of “Why does any country who has armed itself to such an extent need to?” or “For the exact same reasons other countries have” and let the reader figure it out for themselves. Yeah, that’s a bit flippant (to something of a flippant question) but its also a direct and honest answer. “Our reasons are the same as what your reasons would be. What kind of stupid question is this? Do you guys really not know?”

To Fu’s credit, she actually does offer a similar response next…

SPIEGEL: Are there not more pressing areas where that money could go rather than towards increasing the military budget?

Fu Ying: A number of areas are given greater priority than the development of our defenses. The greatest emphasis is on economic development, the well-being of the people and the sharing of the wealth. My daughter’s generation is the first that never experienced hunger in this country. That is unbelievable progress. Your concern about the Chinese military appears to me to be clouded by stereotypes about China based in the Cold War thinking of the division between us ideologically. You feel comfortable with aircraft carrier ownership by your allies, like the United States and France, but you are more concerned if China also has one.

But I would’ve responded to this with a “See previous response”.

Joking aside (maybe), I like how Fu handled this initially. Yes, trite talking points, but a good response nonetheless. I would’ve left out the “That is unbelievable progress” part but maybe that’s just me, as I think that sounds a bit too self-congratulatory and no one really likes hearing someone praise themselves.

I don’t like the second part of Fu’s response however, mainly because it takes an accusatory tone when she could’ve done so without one. This accusatory tone puts the non-Chinese reader immediately into a defensive posture when it is critical to keep them receptive to questioning their own biases for who ought to have an aircraft carrier and who ought not.

That said, another response to this specific question could be: “Like every other country, we have multiple priorities competing for a limited amount of resources. We cannot avoid making certain compromises and while we try to make the most reasonable compromises in the allocation of our resources, we also understand we naturally must accept the consequences of our compromises. In other words, we can hold more than one thought in our heads. Next.”

SPIEGEL: How far will China go in terms of defending its interests? In the dispute over the sovereignty of the South China Sea, the tone can at times be quite sharp.

Fu Ying: We, too, are wondering why there is such strong rhetoric, since the countries involved are already engaged in dialogues on the basis of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. But this is a dispute of words, and what matters is that the shipping traffic in the South China Sea remains peaceful and there is no war or conflict going on.

SPIEGEL: The Americans clearly have doubts about your intentions. Pakistan is believed to have provided China with access to the wreckage of the high-tech US helicopter that crashed during the operation against Osama bin Laden. Are you in a position to confirm whether this is true?

Fu Ying: Both China and Pakistan have denied this rumor. I think the most important thing is the question of whether China and the US are enemies. Are we going to be in a war? Are we preparing for a war against each other? We certainly don’t see it that way. It is not very friendly that the US maintains a weapons embargo against China. We have no intention to threaten the US, and we don’t see the US as a threat to us. The West tends to place China in the framework of the Cold War. This puzzles China a lot.

One major thing I really disagree with Fu on and consider annoyingly disingenuous is the whole “This puzzles China a lot” response to these questions of “strong rhetoric” and the “Cold War framework”. The Chinese government is not that stupid. It understands politics and I wish they wouldn’t play stupid on this. Both sides know very well how and, more importantly, why the other side sees it the way it does. I think openly acknowledging such and arguing to overcome it is better than pretending to be baffled by it. The latter is a weak victim-card play that doesn’t actually improve the situation and just perpetuates it for at most some nodding heads from one’s existing base of nationalists. We don’t need those nods, we need nods from the other side because only when the other side starts nodding with us do we reach common ground and mutual understanding.

SPIEGEL: Many Germans, while respecting China’s development, see your country more as a rival than a partner. Is that something that you can understand?

Fu Ying: I’m grateful you raised that point because it is something that has been on my mind for a long time. If you fundamentally accept that China’s growth has lifted countless people in the country out of poverty, then you also have to agree that China has done things right. One must also accept that there can be a different political system. The countries in the West think they have the only system that works and they have narrowed down “democracy” to a multi-party election system, which works well for some countries, most of the time, but as we are now seeing with the latest financial crisis, they sometimes experience difficulties too. The West has become very conceited. At the end of the day, democracy alone cannot put food on the table. That’s the reality.

Likewise, I don’t like her answer to Spiegel here asking if she can understand why Germans see China as a rival. She instead changes the topic to rattle off a few tired talking points and avoids answering it, granted like many politicians do when faced with a question they don’t want to address. My personal opinion is that I don’t see why this question is to be avoided and I think the obvious way in which she avoided answering only hurts the receptiveness to what she has to say, as well as how people see China. Who can read that and not immediately think “Spiegel didn’t ask about whether or not China has done certain things right or whether or not democracy has its faults, it asked if you or the Chinese people can understand why Germans see the Chinese as rivals!”

And how bad would it really be to say: “Yes, absolutely, just as we naturally see you as rivals as well! That’s the nature of competition and capitalism! We totally look up to Germans in areas of so and so and yearn to able to reach your levels of expertise and excellence in so and so one day”? And the key thing is that’s all true, honest, and something both German and Chinese and international readers can easily identify with, relate to, and accept. “OF COURSE the Chinese understand! But let’s be rivals in good ways, ways that push us both to become better, and partners in the things where we need to be partners in.”

Save the criticisms of a conceited West for a more relevant question. There were better places to bring it up in several pointed questions before and after. It was a mistake to waste this opportunity to give an honest answer that would actually resonate with the audience in positive depolarizing common-groundbreaking way.

SPIEGEL: China’s decision-making process appears to be shielded with black box secrecy, and even long-time observers are puzzled over how political decisions are taken. Does it really come as a surprise to you that many are wary of China’s intentions?

Fu Ying: China’s political system is a product of China’s history. It is based on the country’s own culture and is subject to a constant reform process, which includes the building up of democratic decision-making processes in China. In order to make the right decisions, you have to listen to the people and their criticism. No government can survive if it loses touch with the people and reality. And we have a very critical view of ourselves.

I like Fu Ying’s response to this following question about the black box of Chinese politics. I’ve said “pointed” before, but this question actually just comes off as slightly obnoxious to me with the “Does it really come as a surprise to you”. However, maybe it isn’t fair to say it is obnoxious when it may be a result of Chinese politicians playing stupid and saying how puzzled they are by how other countries see China. If you’re going to feign surprise by how other countries react, then you can’t really blame them for then responding with “are you really surprised?”

Nevertheless, I liked her response even though it too can be characterized as just the usual talking points. The main reason is because while it avoids the question, it does at least address the premise to the question, and it openly puts on record that China’s government must listen to its people and their criticisms. I firmly believe that the more the Chinese government promotes this message itself, the more it will ultimately hold itself accountable to it. I know not a lot of people are exactly heartened by China’s progress in this regard and with very understandable reasons, but the day you really have to worry is the day the government no longer cares to say what it holds itself accountable to. That the Chinese government openly predicts a government’s demise when it loses touch with the people and reality gives the people the moral high ground to declare when it has. That’s a good thing, better than divine right and heavenly mandates.

SPIEGEL: The West perceives a lack of transparency and rule of law in the Chinese model.

Fu Ying: I think at the moment it is the Western governments that are having problems. We are observing what is going on in the West. We try to understand why so many governments made so many mistakes. Why do political parties make commitments they cannot fulfill? Why do they spend so much more than they have? Has the West been stagnating since the end of the Cold War? Or has it just become conceited?

There’s something odd about this section. There’s no question. It may seem like it was an interviewer’s follow-up to an interviewee’s response but the rest of the interview doesn’t suggest that sort of format. I have to wonder if Spiegel’s statement here wasn’t edited it and if Fu Ying’s response wasn’t split up into two parts by it.

But anyway, this was a terrible response by Fu Ying because it goes on the attack and thereby looks like changing the topic. Imagine how we’d look at an American politician changing to topic to China when being questioned about issues regarding the American government. This isn’t the question to point at the West’s problems and this isn’t the way to do it either without making yourself look bad. Spiegel also isn’t the forum to score points with domestic or Chinese nationalists who share your criticisms of the West.

The best answer here is acknowledgement and humility first before seeking balance. The best answer is something along the lines of: “We Chinese also agree there can be a lack of transparency and rule of law in China. That is why we are constantly trying to reform and improve our government every year with new laws trying to tackle these difficult problems in a country that remains very large and populous, which I’m sure you can understand. For example, . Of course, much work remains to be done and the sheer size of China only make such work more difficult, but we are committed to improving China on both of these issues.”

That would defuse the matter, relay the truth, and not exacerbate it into a “well, your government is shitty too!” tit-for-tat sandbox fight. Fu’s response here was horrible. There’s no end to finding faults in each other. The only end is in being the grown-up that can acknowledge faults and openly commit to working on them. That’s what the people want, both your own and those abroad. That’s what they want from their politicians and their government too. Why squander the opportunity to establish common ground in an international forum like Spiegel?

SPIEGEL: Democracies are very complicated, and compared to tightly ruled systems, they are at a disadvantage. Do you feel superior?

Fu Ying: Superiority is the not the word we use. The Chinese are very modest. We respect your success and we learn from you. You are in the post-industrialized era. Many of the problems you encounter might occur in China later. So we want to see how you address those problems, and if we can learn from you.

Maybe I should recharacterize “pointed questions” to “maybe Germans are just blunt (or efficiently direct)”.

Fu’s response here is great. Right off the bat, it discards the “superiority” issue and acknowledges the success of democracies and that there are things to learn from democracies. But the problem unfortunately is that all of the modesty here is sabotaged by the previous attacks.

Part 2 of the Spiegel interview with Fu Ying discusses Ai Weiwei and the Dalai Lama. I note that the questions and answers in this section look more like a real back and forth interview than an list-of-questions asynchronously answered over email interview.

SPIEGEL: The case of recently arrested artist Ai Weiwei, who is well-connected in Berlin, was seen in Germany as a provocation. Was it intentional that he was arrested shortly after German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle attended the opening of an exhibition in Beijing with Chinese officials?

Fu Ying: That’s why I say you are conceited. You really take yourself very seriously. Why would a country like China decide on domestic matters and try to make them coincide with a visit by a foreign minister from a European country? I don’t see the linkage. The case you are discussing is a legal matter. I am not really interested in this case.

SPIEGEL: If it is a legal case, then why wasn’t Ai Weiwei publicly charged? Instead he disappeared for 81 days. The allegations of tax evasion don’t appear to be very convincing.

Fu Ying: If you have such great interest in this case and believe there has been a breach of law or rules in his case, you may very well raise it. We can pass it on to the authorities. But how many more Chinese artists, writers, singers and movie stars do Germans know? Your view of China is very narrow and negative, and that’s why we don’t feel comfortable discussing human rights with you. Our understanding of human rights is based on the UN Charter, which guarantees political rights, the right to life and the right to development. But in your view, human rights seem to concern only some individuals who are subverting the state or are breaching laws.

SPIEGEL: Some of these people symbolically represent hundreds of others.

Fu Ying: But please try to put things into perspective. We have 1.3 billion people living in China. Since day one of our relationship with the West, human rights have been a subject for discussion. Many issues were discussed and solved and the content keeps changing. But today the Western understanding of human rights is used as an instrument against China, regardless of the fact that China has improved very much in this area, and no matter how intensively we are working on the issue.

SPIEGEL: Can you say anything more concrete about the Ai Weiwei case?

Fu Ying: He is being investigated and he has been released after paying bail. I don’t have any further comment on him.

The interesting thing here is that some people are going to Spiegel as badgering Fu on a pet topic while others will certainly see Fu as being evasive. Both, I think, is true but very understandably so.

I like how directly Fu responds to the first question in this batch. It will seem combative and insulting that she accuses Westerners of being conceited, but I’d only beg those people to consider just how combative and insulting some of the Spiegel questions could be to her, and call it a wash. The four question exchange here is very human, I think, in that there are good points and bad points in what is said. I do however wish she could’ve responded without the bad points.

For example, a good point is explaining in very human language that some Chinese are uncomfortable discussing human rights with certain Westerners because they feel Westerners often have a very narrow and negative view of China. Another good point is directly asking for Westerners to remember to take a step back and “put things into perspective”. The follow-up of clearly stating that China has improved in human rights and are working on the issue is also good, conveying a sort of emphatic plea for extending some more understanding to China. Of course, not everyone will extend it, believing China to have had enough time or believing China to not genuinely or actually “intensively” working on the issue, but I think it strikes a chord with moderate audiences. This is the right amount of defensiveness without veering deeply into playing a victim card.

A bad point, for example, is mentioning the UN Charter. No Western audience is going to buy that, and even moderate Chinese audiences won’t either, especially if you mention political rights and maybe even the right to life. Mentioning the UN Charter and these broad “rights” just opens you up to new vectors of incredulous attack. Fu can’t possibly not know just how far the political rights Chinese actually enjoy is from those most Westerners enjoy. She also can’t possibly know how easily the right to life claim can be derailed by One Child Policy criticisms and ample examples of how cheap life can be in China especially in the hands of government officials. Therefore, simply invoking this makes Fu again look like she’s playing stupid or being disingenuous. She didn’t need to go here to make…

…her arguably valid point that some Westerners do seem to only think human rights concerns only subversion against the Chinese state. If I were Fu, however, I would have added the qualifiers I have here to carry my point without giving them the excuse to say “not me!”

SPIEGEL: As one dictator after another was chased out in the Arab world this year, critical journalists, attorneys and human rights activists in China have been experiencing a wave of repression, with some even speaking of a “Chinese Winter”. Does China fear a handful of activists?

Fu Ying: What was happening in the Middle East is an event that attracted attention all over the world. We, too, are trying to understand what led to these revolutions. As for China, I don’t see any direct linkage. Again, it’s the habit of some Western analysts to connect everything bad with China. If you think your society is strong enough to avoid infection by the Arab revolution, what makes you think that the Chinese society is so weak that it has to be infected? Eighty-seven percent of Chinese surveyed in a poll by the Pew Research Center in 2010 said the government is on the right track. In the US, however, recent polls show that a lot of people think the country is not on the right path.

LoL, it’s amusing how loaded so many of these Spiegel questions are, and I like the (rhetorical) question Fu responds with here.

SPIEGEL: China always shows pretty strong reactions when Western leaders meet with the Dalai Lama. You recommend that other countries should solve their disputes through dialogue. Why hasn’t China succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Tibetan spiritual leader?

Fu Ying: Our difficulty with the Dalai Lama is his political views and demands for Tibet independence. If you read his website, you will see what he wants. In essence, he wants an independent Tibet.

SPIEGEL: He has explicitly rejected that, saying he doesn’t want separation, but instead greater autonomy.

Fu Ying: Tibet is part of China. But, of course, the door to dialogue is always open. Dialogue is always welcome. I am glad more and more people are visiting Tibet, and more and more people understand life in Tibet better now.

SPIEGEL: Unfortunately, journalists are not allowed to access Tibet.

Fu Ying: There is a bit of concern about the intentions and motives of Western journalists. Sometimes it’s as if some of them come to a wedding and only want to inspect the contents of a dark corner. They want to show the world there is no smiling bride, there is no groom and no happy friends — just darkness. They write about it extensively. They may be facts, but they are very selective facts.

SPIEGEL: The Dalai Lama has officially retired from his offices. Is this not a good point in time to seek a peaceful solution?

Fu Ying: The fact that he is withdrawing from his political offices shows that he does regard himself as the king and god in one and is thus the owner of Tibet. But those days are over. Tibet is finally undergoing development, and the region truly is doing better and better. So we will see whether the Dalai Lama can relinquish himself of his political demands.

I’m not a big fan of the whole China-Tibet issue, mainly because I’ve found too many people on both sides of the issue to be obnoxiously shrill and unreasonable.

The only exchange here I find interesting is that concerning journalists allowed access to Tibet. I like Fu’s analogy which I think can easily be understood by reasonable people: We get tired of those who seem to only report their agenda. I like that she openly admits this as the reason why the Chinese government does not allow access to Tibet to certain journalists. It is at least honest and not some lame excuse that has been peddled before like “oh, its not safe there” or “the weather is bad”. Honesty here is good because there isn’t plausible dishonesty available. Choose the lesser of two evils, and in this case that would be honesty. I like that she says the darkness may be facts, but that there is such a thing as selective facts. Good response.

SPIEGEL: It’s not only Tibet which is developing at a fast pace. Lately, the West has been up to its neck in debts, but China has experienced fantastic growth. Has communism ultimately defeated capitalism?

Fu Ying: We are not the Soviet Union. During the entire Cold War, the West and the Soviet Union were at each other’s throats. You each wanted to see the other side’s demise; that was your strategic objective. But China was not part of your fight and we have always supported Germany’s reunification.

Another loaded question set up by…LoL, is that the closest Spiegel can get to humility and self-deprecation? Seriously, that is a lame question that is more or less designed to pit the buzzwords of communism against capitalism leveraging continued ignorance that China isn’t really “communism” insofar as “communism” was theorized as some an economic model alternative to “capitalism” (it was actually theorized as a evolution but whatever).

I have to say here that Fu’s response is rather weak in that it devolves into irrelevance. The first part up to “strategic objective” is good and addresses the question but if we want to nitpick, China was definitely part of the fight and the comment about having always supported Germany’s reunification is like an odd interjection: “Oh hey, your shoes are nice!” I suppose we could infer that Fu is referring to how Germany was a symbolic battleground and divide between communism and capitalism, between the West and the Soviet Union, and that perhaps support for reunification is some abstract support for the end of a communism vs. capitalism dichotomy…but no, I’d still say Fu didn’t do a good job responding to this question and could’ve done a lot more dispelling of that Cold War framework.

Part 3 is subtitled as “‘China Has No Intention to Rule the World’”. Like the second part, the questions and answers here also look more natural than the very first part.

SPIEGEL: As of the end of June, China held US bonds with a total value of $1.165 trillion and European bonds worth $700 billion. Economically, China is already a superpower today. What does that mean for the political balance of power?

Fu Ying: Many say that power is shifting from the West to the East, but we believe that it is a process of diffusion. It used to be within the Western world, but now it is also diffusing to a wider world. There is a need to reform the current world structure, which was built after World War II to the benefit of around 1 billion people of the developed world. China is only one of the newly emerging countries. Brazil is growing. India is growing, as are parts of Africa. In the future, 3 to 4 billion people will be coming into this process of wider industrialization. But that reform needs to be an incremental process that is achieved not through war and not through conflict, but through dialogue.

SPIEGEL: Will the West wind up on the losing side?

Fu Ying: You are currently experiencing difficulties, but you have gone through so many difficulties in the past — Europe and the US — and you always bounce back. We are also interdependent, and your loss is not necessarily our gain. We’re in one boat. And we indeed worry when Western economies are experiencing difficulties. That’s why it is good that German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy are taking the lead. Very recently, my colleagues and I discussed the future of the European Union. The prevalent view was that if you work together to address the current difficulties, then the EU will go forward to become more integrated. If you do not, the euro zone might collapse.

SPIEGEL: What would it mean for China if the financial crisis in the West extends to other regions?

Fu Ying: Everyone would suffer.

Great responses here by Fu, mostly because she is fair in her appraisal of both history and what’s happening but also even flattering of the West, which engenders her to Western audiences. This mix, this balance of stating what is but also making it unoffensive to swallow, is what I wanted to see more of in some of her other responses that I criticize above. Its important that China stops the conversation from being about China vs. the West or–worse–vs. the rest of the world, and Fu does a good job of that here by talk of diffusion of power, emerging countries, being interdependent, being in one boat, and how it doesn’t need to be a zero-sum game.

SPIEGEL: Many observers believe that the legitimacy of the Chinese government hinges on its economic success. In the event of an economic crisis, would you need to be worried about your country’s stability?

Fu Ying: Do Western governments change their multi-party system during an economic crisis? I don’t think so. Why should we be worried? Having said that, our reform is an ongoing process and we will continue to move forward.

A deft parry by Fu on this one. The thing with this question is that it is actually premised on a lot of substantive issues of what makes the Chinese people tolerate all of the current failures or shortcomings of the Chinese government. The suggestion that the social contract in China is currently and primarily built on the government being able to deliver continued improvements to the standard of living. Most China watchers are already familiar with this and most people, including the Chinese, would likely agree that the question is a reasonable one.

The reason Fu’s response is a “parry” is because it ignores this and assumes by assertion that economic success isn’t the only thing or a critical underpinning of the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese. It’s a “deft” parry because she then follows up with an nod to ongoing reform, which can be interpreted as the government understanding the need to establish its legitimacy with more than just economic growth in the long-term.

SPIEGEL: For a long time, the West believed that the developments in China were a win-win situation for everyone involved. Now, however, the impression is solidifying — even within international institutions like the World Trade Organization — that the Chinese want to shift the balance of the global economy to their advantage. The long-term policy of keeping the Renminbi artificially undervalued is just one example of this that is often cited.

Fu Ying: China has no intention to rule the world. But if you continue to see yourself as the center of the world, if you see yourself as the monopoly of all truths, all the right beliefs and all the right values, then you will always find it uncomfortable when you realize that the world is diversified. There are different values and cultures. And if you believe you have won the Cold War, then the Cold War is finished, over, done. We are living in a new world. Get down off your high horse of being on top of the world. Come down to be equals and join us on a level playing field instead of creating a new rival in the style of the Cold War.

Another good response. Notice how big a difference makes when she leads off with something like “but if” instead of the more accusatory “you”. It is much more easily swallowed. Even the “get down off your high horse” sounds more human and emphatic than defensive and pettily indignant.

Granted, however, is that she doesn’t actually address the question of whether or not China wants to shift the balance of the global economy to her advantage, or the specific example of artificially undervalued RMB. She probably can’t really touch the example, but I do wonder what would happen if she said: “Of course we want to shift the balance of the global economy to our advantage! Why doesn’t? Let me ask you, would you say the global economy has been balanced towards certain countries’ advantage in the past, even now? We all want win-win, but we have to acknowledge that sometimes what we think as win-win may actually look like win-lose to others, and they will naturally seek to rebalance. Isn’t that reasonable? Finding win-win situations requires constant negotiation and competition. We should all seek to do this peacefully.”

SPIEGEL: You maintain very close relations with leaders like Kim Jong Il in North Korea, whose people are starving because he refuses to open up his country, or North Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, who is being sought for crimes against humanity. What is your philosophy regarding this?

Fu Ying: Our own sufferings in history have taught us that we should never try to impose on other countries or support others to impose. We have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; we have hundreds of Chinese UN peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan. If every time you don’t like the leader of a country and then move in and intervene, that would lead to chaos. Think of your own experience in intervention, which is not always successful.

SPIEGEL: You’re referring to the military deployment in your neighbor country, Afghanistan.

Fu Ying: You need to reflect on your own experience.

LoL, this exchange is funny though I think she could’ve been a bit more indulgent with her wording while still remaining firm on her point. The obvious weakness of this response is that China can be arguably accused of imposing on other countries and supporting others to impose when it has suited her interests just as she has refused to do so when it hasn’t…just like other countries. It’s good that she keeps the point on “Hey, you guys need to reflect on your own experiences” or maybe I would elaborate on that by explicitly discussing not just the intentions of intervention but also the ultimate results, in success and failure as well as cost and benefit.

SPIEGEL: China weakens institutions like the United Nations, in particular, because you frequently water down joint resolutions against Iran, North Korea or Syria, whose President Bashar Assad allows the army to fire against his own people, to the point of ineffectiveness. Where are the limits to China’s tolerance of human rights violations?

Fu Ying: The case of Iran is part of the whole security situation. That’s why we have the five-plus-one discussions on Iran. In the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, we have the six-party talks. I believe patient diplomacy will pay off in the end.

SPIEGEL: With regard to Iran, this patience could result in us losing a race against time in the end.

Fu Ying: We don’t have a better solution.

LoL, great response.

SPIEGEL: Given differences of opinion like that, how are powers like China and the USA supposed to cooperate in dealing with global challenges like cyber security, financial stability, food security and nuclear proliferation?

Fu Ying: We need to overcome the wall of distrust. If we only allow ourselves to be led by our own views, our own feeling, our own emotions, even our own values, then we will only create more problems. Be it peacekeeping missions or the protection of shipping channels off the coast of Somalia or climate change, I think you will find China to be an enthusiastic participant in world affairs.

Good as well, keeping it about opening our minds, putting ourselves in each others shoes, etc.

SPIEGEL: How does it feel to be viewed as a new economic superpower?

Fu Ying: It is flattering.

SPIEGEL: Does it make you nervous, as well?

Fu Ying: Not at all. We don’t view ourselves as a superpower. You are not going to see a USA or a Soviet Union in China. You are going to see a culturally nourished country with a big population, being more content, being happy, being purposeful — and it will be a friend to the world. There is no reason to worry about China.

SPIEGEL: Madame Fu Ying, we thank you for this interview.

The “we don’t view ourselves as a superpower” line is a good one to stress because for the most part, China doesn’t. It has moments of pride and aspiration, sure, but deep down it isn’t self-assured of being a super-power yet (or again, as it once was way back in the day). Whether we’ll see a USA or Soviet Union in China remains to be seen I think but I think the final comments become too saccharine and a unrealistic. Instead of “it will be a friend to the world”, I’d humanize it to “we genuinely want to be a friend to the world and for the world to be a friend to us.” Instead of “there is no reason to worry about China”, I’d humanize it to “we understand why many worry about China, just as we worry about others, that’s normal, but we sincerely hope we can find a peaceful, mutually beneficial, and mutually respectful way of seeing the future together.”

Fu Ying is engaged in political PR with this interview, and China stands to benefit from all of the basic rules of PR, including being aware, sensitive, and acknowledging of what the audience knows as well as what biases the audiences have that need to be placated. On Spiegel, you’re not going to get away with “let’s be friends!” You have to respect the audience to be intelligent enough to know that China knows why they have reservations, fears, or criticisms of China. You can’t win them over with false smiles and superficial denials like “there is no reason to worry”. You MAY win their respect if however you acknowledge their worries, express your own, and propose working on them together.

Image Credits: The images in this post are the same images included on the Spiegel article and credited to Katharina Hesse/DER SPIEGEL, DPA, Reuters.

"Fu Ying Spiegel Interview: “The West Has Become Very Conceited”" is a post from china/divide

Two days ago, I waded into the rip-roaring controversy over the New York Times publishing an article ostensibly reporting that quoting Shakespeare during a conversation on your cell phone could get your call disconnected. I came in disagreeing with ChinaGeek’s Charles Custer’s defense of the NYT.

Kenneth Tan at Shanghaiist just posted an update that the New York Times has “appended” an Editor’s Note, the entirety of which reads:

An article on Tuesday about Chinese censorship of digital communications began with a description of two interrupted cellphone calls, which were cited as possible examples of “a host of evidence over the past several weeks” that the authorities were increasing their efforts out of concern that antigovernment sentiment might spread from Arab countries. In one call, a Beijing entrepreneur lost his cellphone connection after he used the English word “protest” twice. In the second, a call was lost after the speaker twice used the Chinese term for protest.

The article did not point out that in both cases, the recipients of the calls were in the Beijing bureau of The New York Times. Because scrutiny of press communications could easily be higher than for those of the public at large, the calls could not be assumed to represent a broader trend; therefore, those examples should not have been given such prominence in the article.

Kenneth wants a correction but I’ll take this as an acceptable clarification. Of course, you’ll still have a lot of people who read the initial story and will never know about this addendum, but this is definitely better than no note or acknowledgement at all.

So it seems the reason these two incidents were assumed to be “possible examples of ‘a host of evidence over the past several weeks’” (lots of outs in that one) is because the fiancée of the Beijing entrepreneur works for or was at least physically in the Beijing Bureau of the NYT, and so was the recipient of the caller who said the same Shakespearean line but in Chinese later. The suggestion here then is that the press are being bugged or tapped or otherwise monitored. Is it an automated system that interrupts calls when it recognizes certain spoken words? Or is there a human intelligence/censorship operative with some earphones in a rape van out on the street?

In the interest of entertaining what is plausible, I lean towards agreeing with Custer that the government would have to be using pretty incredible speech-recognition software to catch the word “protest” in English and Chinese. I’m still wondering what Chinese translation of the “The lady doth protest too much, methinks” the caller in the second instance used. The problem is, if it were a human monitoring the calls, you’d think they’d assign someone with enough English and Chinese fluency to recognize when a call is actually (even coded) communications propagating “protests” in China, rather than a banal discussion of what to eat for dinner. Unfortunately, we have no context for the second instance so we can’t judge that one.

I’m just saying, what could have been the motivation for a human eavesdropper to hit the disconnect button when he heard that conversation? “妈了个比，你他妈的敢再说一遍！哥不玩这套！给他切了！” Oh wait, this is in Beijing, right? Maybe have to add a few 儿s in there, unless these government operatives aren’t locals. I know labor is cheap in China but does the government really just employ monkeys trained to listen only for specific words regardless of context with their semi-opposable thumb on a “disconnect the call” button?

Now, I’m of the persuasion that believes governments can definitely tap, bug, monitor, and eavesdrop the electronic communications of journalists if they want to, and I’m pretty good at offering a smorgasbord of plausible explanations for a government to do exactly what these anecdotes may be suggesting. But, it isn’t my job to explain how these anecdotes are “possible examples of ‘a host of evidence over the past several weeks’ that the authorities were increasing their efforts out of concern that antigovernment sentiment might spread from Arab countries.”. It’s the NYT’s job, to their readers, in the pursuit of being reporters who responsibly inform the public.

I get it, it isn’t uncalled for that the NYT Beijing Bureau would have a persecution complex in China (that’s a freebie), that they suspect they’re being scrutinized by the Chinese government for their potential reporting of things they know are sensitive to that government. I get that “paranoia”. I get the context of this being around the joke that was the Jasmine Revolution.

What I don’t get is the certainty that these two instances are connected to what the NYT says they are connected to: increased efforts to tighten the grip on electronic communications. Let’s put aside the misleading vividness problem of the NYT publishing such anecdotes in such an article: Is there enough information to suspect that these calls were being monitored, that “protest” in either English or Chinese is a word that will trigger a disconnect, and that this is all in relation to controlling antigovernment sentiments from spreading (amongst NYT reporters) to China from the Arab world?

Let’s go back to this:

A host of evidence over the past several weeks shows that Chinese authorities are more determined than ever to police cellphone calls, electronic messages, e-mail and access to the Internet in order to smother any hint of antigovernment sentiment.

First, I want to say that I don’t really think the government is “more determined than ever” to “smother any hint of antigovernment sentiment.” That’s a grossly exaggerated statement given how much antigovernment sentiment is not only accessible but pervasive on the Chinese internet. Yes, the authorities police electronic communications to control threats, but they’re not red-eyed fanatics out to silence all dissent. That sort of generalization just isn’t very useful.

Second, and more importantly, note that while the rest of the NYT article rehashes a lot of stuff about email monitoring and internet blocking, the only “evidence” presented about Chinese authorities policing cellphone calls is the lead anecdote that the NYT editor now acknowledges as not representing a broader trend and “should not have been given such prominence in the article.”

So the anecdote that two calls involving people physically at the NYT Beijing Bureau were dropped after one person said “protest” in English a second time and another person said “protest” in Chinese just once was the only evidence these journalists saw fit to substantiate their claim that the Chinese authorities are policing cell phone calls. Again, I know the Chinese government (amongst other governments) is capable of and has policed all these forms of communications before. I don’t doubt that. But I do think the inclusion and presentation of the anecdote in this article was inappropriate and irresponsible to NYT readers because there just isn’t enough information to warrant the conclusion. There’s more suspicion than there is information, and the moment you veer into presenting suspicion as fact (“shows”), you become liable to accusations of insufficient “fact-checking” and questioning of your “credibility”.

UPDATE: Adam Minter of Shanghai Scrap brings up a couple more points, including questioning if the inclusion of the entire anecdote may have something to do with the author, Sharon LaFraniere, being the wife of the NYT Beijing Bureau Chief Michael Wines.

"NYT Acknowledges Mistake With Shakespeare “Protest” Anecdote" is a post from china/divide

A news organization like the New York Times is going to have its hits and misses. It’s inevitable. There are different people with different talents, different expertise, and different competencies on different days. There’s been a lot of good reporting and writing that has come from the NYT, as well as a lot of bad.

Recently, Sharon LaFraniere and David Barboza wrote in the NYT an article titled “China Tightens Censorship of Electronic Communications” that leads off with the following:

BEIJING — If anyone wonders whether the Chinese government has tightened its grip on electronic communications since protests began engulfing the Arab world, Shakespeare may prove instructive.

A Beijing entrepreneur, discussing restaurant choices with his fiancée over their cellphones last week, quoted Queen Gertrude’s response to Hamlet: “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.” The second time he said the word “protest,” her phone cut off.

He spoke English, but another caller, repeating the same phrase on Monday in Chinese over a different phone, was also cut off in midsentence.

A host of evidence over the past several weeks shows that Chinese authorities are more determined than ever to police cellphone calls, electronic messages, e-mail and access to the Internet in order to smother any hint of antigovernment sentiment. In the cat-and-mouse game that characterizes electronic communications here, analysts suggest that the cat is getting bigger, especially since revolts began to ricochet through the Middle East and North Africa, and homegrown efforts to organize protests in China began to circulate on the Internet about a month ago.

“The hard-liners have won the field, and now we are seeing exactly how they want to run the place,” said Russell Leigh Moses, a Beijing analyst of China’s leadership. “I think the gloves are coming off.”

Quite a few of us here in China picked up on the story and were immediately skeptical. I first saw Adam Minter lay into the story at “Shanghai Scrap, and then Kenneth Tan over on Shanghaiist. I thought their combination of snark and pseudo-scientifically rigorous experiments had adequately shamed the NYT article for whatever egregious assumptions it may have been guilty of in cobbling together its latest “China has ridiculous censorship, yo” piece for American consumers.

That was until I saw former china/divide partner-in-crime Charles Custer’s blog post “In Defense of the NY Times and Paranoia” over on his equally blocked China blog ChinaGeeks. Now, I love Custer, and not only because his last name is Custer, but I had to agree with Julen Madariaga of Chinayouren fame who responded in the comments that Custer was “defending the indefensible”.

There are two things Custer is arguing in defense of the NYT:

1. Criticisms of the anecdote as false is due to critics’ mistaken assumption that the NYT suggested the calls were cut off by “automated censorship”.
2. Some critics are being overzealous in attacking the credibility of the article or authors.

First, I agree with Custer that, technically, “more determined than ever to police” does not necessarily mean automated censorship and that’s why the tests Adam and Kenneth ran don’t necessarily “confirm” or “disprove” the anecdote in the NYT article. I would agree that “automated censorship” is something many of us assumed given the subject of the article, and that this could be a fatal assumption on our part. However, I also think this assumption can be at least partially explained by the NYT article not specifying if it was automated censorship or not, and that the article also discusses automated censorship.

For example:

Beyond these problems, anecdotal evidence suggests that the government’s computers, which intercept incoming data and compare it with an ever-changing list of banned keywords or Web sites, are shutting out more information. The motive is often obvious: For six months or more, the censors have prevented Google searches of the English word “freedom.”

Of course, if I was playing defense, I’d be the first to say it leads off with “Beyond these problems”. But I do believe this could contribute to the assumption that the anecdote at the top of the NYT article was suggesting automated censorship.

Here’s another:

Hu Yong, a media professor at Peking University, said government censors were constantly spotting and reacting to new perceived threats. “The technology is improving and the range of sensitive terms is expanding because the depth and breadth of things they must manage just keeps on growing,” Mr. Hu said.

China’s censorship machine has been operating ever more efficiently since mid-2008…

Again, it can certainly be argued that these statements weren’t meant to and shouldn’t be convoluted with the initial anecdote.

However, I feel Custer made an equally fatal assumption in his defense:

The anecdote isn’t meant to be evidence of voice-recognizing censorship software, it’s evidence of increased police surveillance of the phone calls of anyone they consider suspicious.

I don’t see how that is supported by the NYT article. The NYT article doesn’t say the individual (“Beijing entrepreneur” and “another caller”) mentioned in the anecdotes were considered suspicious by the government or that the NYT believes they were considered suspicious by the government. So we can’t assume that they are or were just as we shouldn’t have assumed the anecdote was referring to automated censorship.

Just as many like Adam and Kenneth assumed the anecdote was about automated censorship in action, I think Custer mistakenly assumed the individuals involved had to have been considered suspicious by authorities.

Ultimately, I think we can apply Occam’s Razor here: The calls could’ve been cut off simply because someone lost reception, Antennagate, or someone’s fat cheek accidentally pressed the “end call” button. In fact, just as Custer argues that it would be extremely improbable that China’s government has computer systems capable of recognizing the same sensitive words spoken amongst the “diversity of accents and dialects throughout China”, I would say it is extremely probable that with so many cell phone calls and conversations going on every day in China, there’s bound to be at least two instances of a call being dropped after the same word (but one in English and another in Chinese) was uttered.

An extra detail:

A Beijing entrepreneur, discussing restaurant choices with his fiancée over their cellphones last week, quoted Queen Gertrude’s response to Hamlet: “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.” The second time he said the word “protest,” her phone cut off.

So he said “protest” and her phone cut off?

What about the other guy who was also cut off “in midsentence” when he said the same line from Shakespeare but in Chinese?

Second, are people being overzealous in attacking the credibility of the article’s authors? I don’t know, as I haven’t seen the extent of the criticisms that Custer may have. However, I can explain why I think their inclusion and presentation of this anecdote is questionable and will affect the “credibility” I could extend to them, especially with regards to what they’ll sling to get a reader interested in their piece.

Ultimately, the authors of the article failed to provide enough information or evidence to actually justify the anecdote as being relevant to what Custer says is “the point they were trying to make in the article”, which is that “Shakespeare may prove instructive” to for anyone who “wonders whether the Chinese government has tightened its grip on electronic communications since protests began engulfing the Arab world.”

Semantically, they qualified with a “may” in there.

However, this is on the level of saying:

“If anyone wonders whether God is determined to punish the Japanese for their continued whaling and dolphin hunts, the recent Sendai earthquake and tsunami may prove instructive.”

Hey, I said “may”, right?

Now, Custer acknowledges that it wasn’t a great anecdote but he does argue in defense of the authors’ decision to use such an anecdote:

I think it’s actually fair to include the story in the piece — it’s interesting, telling, and connects what’s happening in China to something American readers (kinda) know. Or rather, it would have been a good addition to the piece if it had been framed differently. Unfortunately, the way it was written (or, very possibly, edited) makes it sound like they’re suggesting this happens all the time, and the end result is misleading depending on how you read it.

I disagree. I don’t think it is fair unless we judge “fair” by “whatever will get people interested in reading my article”. It’s less “telling” than it is specious. “Interesting”, maybe, but a lot of things can be interesting without being appropriate especially when you’re dealing with value-laden issues such as censorship. That the use of such an anecdote “connects what’s happening in China to something American readers know” is more an indictment of American journalists and media catering to what American readers “know” rather than actually, I dunno, informing them.

That the anecdote may mislead readers into thinking such a thing happens all the time is unfortunate, yes, but what is more unfortunate is that the anecdote and all of its suggestions become accepted as fact by many simply because it was published in the New York Times. We have zero information from the journalists that the word “protest” in English or Chinese was actually a trigger for an automated system or a human eavesdropper in the government tapping into phone calls to cut the phone connection. All we can tell is that they’ve made that conclusion and now they’re passing it onto their readers as “instructive” of the tightening of electronic censorship in China, with all the authority they carry.

…is it fair to call the article “false” or accuse them of poor fact checking because yelling “PROTEST!” into your phone didn’t get you disconnected? No. We’ve all had fun playing with our phones. But let’s call off the witch hunt until we have some actual evidence that they’re making things up.

Yes, it’s a mistake to judge the anecdote “false” or accuse the NYT authors of poor “fact-checking” if we’re mistakenly assuming that they were saying it was an example of “automated censorship”. Even if the authors really thought it was “automated censorship”, they fortunately didn’t actually write it, so they have an “out” there.

But here’s the thing, it isn’t us who need actual evidence that they are making things up, it is them who should have initially presented (and still ought to provide) some actual evidence that their anecdote is relevant much less “instructive” to the messages of their article. What affects the credibility of Sharon LaFraniere and David Barboza is their ability to respect the authority they carry to rationally and accurately connect an anecdote with a broader phenomenon. That’s something good reporters and journalists do for a reputable news organization.

UPDATE: The New York Times has “appended” an “Editor’s Note” acknowledging that “the calls could not be assumed to represent a broader trend; therefore, those examples should not have been given such prominence in the article.“

"Criticizing the NY Times’ Shakespeare “Protest” Article" is a post from china/divide

A few months ago, I took a brief trip to China’s rural northeast. With the speed of China’s urbanization evident every day I passed in Beijing, I had begun to wonder what China’s rural villages looked like. Was it just opportunity drawing millions of migrant workers to China’s cities? Or was something pushing them out of the countryside, too? Here’s what we found:

(Viddler direct link)

If you enjoyed that, please consider helping us with our next project. We’d like to take a lot more time and make a film about the kidnapping and selling of children in China, and the ways those kids find their way home. The project is called Finding Home, and if you’re interested you can find out more information about it and make a pledge to help our project get off the ground. We would be very, very grateful!

(We’re accepting donations through Kickstarter, a rather unique website. Basically, we set a goal and a time limit. If we get pledges that total that amount or greater within the time limit, we get the funding. If we don’t, then all the people who pledged to donate their money can keep it. Making a pledge is easy; if you’ve bought something from Amazon before in your life, the process will be a breeze.)

Let us know your thoughts on Kedong County in the comments. And please, tell all your friends about it and about our next project!

"An Original Documentary: “Kedong County”" is a post from china/divide

Just saw several posts on several anti-Japanese protests that were reportedly held in Chengdu, Xi’an, and Zhengzhou today. Depending on your source, the number of participants seemed to range from several thousand to several tens of thousands. John Kennedy has a post up at Global Voices Online with translated Twitter tweets by Chinese users about Chengdu and Xi’an. David Bandurski’s post over at China Media Project covers Chengdu with a collection of photographs with translated captions like:

I find myself scratching my head over what directly motivated the organization of these demonstrations because, quite frankly, I thought the Diaoyu Islands issue had already blown over.¹ Obviously, that doesn’t seem to be the case for these people.

What struck me on a personal level was the contrast between this news and the throngs of Chinese people I witnessed yesterday happily visiting the various Japanese pavilions² at the 2010 World Expo here in Shanghai. Apparently, today even saw a massive increase in daily visitors, culminating in breaking the previous World Expo record set by Osaka in 1970. The wait times for these pavilions must’ve reached even more ludicrous levels.

The Japan Industry Pavilion. Wait time at ~8pm Friday, October 15th was ~2 hours. Yeah, not one of my finer photographic works.

On one hand, you have the thousands of Chinese university students calling for boycotts against Japanese goods and reportedly³ engaging in some vandalism fitting the popular narrative of the nationalistic fenqing. On the other hand, you have thousands of Chinese visitors waiting hours in monstrous lines to get into Japanese pavilions while throngs of Chinese youth line up waiting to shell out 40 RMB for “the most favorite TAKO-YAKI brand in Tokyo”⁴.

TAKO-YAKI TIME! 40 RMB for 8 octopus balls and a drink. Sorry hapless bystander caught in my flash. Overexposure is your fate.

Do I sound as if I find the juxtaposition to be strange? I hope not but wait, which group represents China and the Chinese people? To you? To others?

To the Japanese who protested at the Chinese embassy today⁵?

And vice versa?

"Anti-Japanese Protests In Chengdu, Xi’an & Zhengzhou" is a post from china/divide

1. Well, except for this, I guess.
2. Japan Pavilion, Japan Industry Pavilion, Osaka Pavilion, etc.
3. by Twitter users, not Xinhua.
4. I think that was the tagline they had up, not sure.
5. See here. Warning, linked website has mature content. I’m looking at you, KT.

Just a few quick comments because I’ve been shamelessly enjoying the National Day “golden week” and now I’m enjoying the weekend following it.

I don’t really have much to say about the recent Nobel Peace Prize winner. Other people do. I didn’t follow the selection process nor did I read up on the other 236 candidates. Therefore, I can’t make any arguments on the “did he deserve it or not over so and so” side of things, which seemed to dominate the Obama win.

The side that is dominating the discourse right now, however, are the political ramifications surrounding China (or perhaps more accurately, the Chinese government). Honestly, it is unfolding exactly as expected. The Nobel is given to someone the Chinese government doesn’t like and — indulge my generalization here — the West and Western media cheers. China expresses its displeasure in its fairly unique way and the West and Western media cheers — and jeers — louder. Life goes on. For the vast majority of people, their awareness of human rights issues in China peak and then return to some pre-existing default level as they refocus on the trials and tribulations of their own daily lives. The cycle repeats.

I don’t think this award really advances human rights in China in any substantial practical sense. I do think it is a lightning rod that carries a lot of symbolism for the politics involved, and I think it is often used as such. I also think that’s understandable and that the symbolism of support and encouragement that comes from a Nobel Peace Prize does still mean something.

The other comment I feel compelled to make should really be posted over on chinaSMACK but since I no longer comment these days and especially not there, I’ll make it here: To all of you people expecting, demanding, and even harassing Fauna over their lack of coverage on the above Nobel Peace Prize story, knock it off. How completely oblivious, insensitive, and selfish are you guys?

1. chinaSMACK translates what is popular or trending amongst Chinese netizens on the Chinese internet¹. The idea is for non-Chinese readers to see what Chinese people are talking about as opposed to what foreigners are talking about. That’s their value proposition.
2. Despite the buzz in “the West” over the Nobel Peace Prize, there aren’t a lot of Chinese netizen posts or comments to translate. Part of it is because the Chinese government is actively censoring media coverage and internet discussion about it and about Liu Xiaobo in general.
3. I don’t blame newer readers of chinaSMACK but the older readers should already know that chinaSMACK has always avoided highly political topics. The current more generic About page doesn’t say so but those who have been following chinaSMACK since its younger days should remember the more personal About page where Fauna explicitly expressed a disinterest in political topics.
4. If we ignore Fauna’s personal interests as the editorial force behind chinaSMACK, let’s talk about the very real consequences she could face as a Chinese citizen living in China publishing something the Chinese censors are on the prowl for. The least of her worries would be having her blog blocked from China². That would suck as it is — trust me, I know — and over what? A topic that doesn’t even live up to her blog’s value proposition or her own interests?
5. Now imagine what the worst of her worries could be. She’s not a foreign national nor is she even safely residing abroad, unlike the Dalai Lama or Rebiya Kadeer, or even Roland Soong. Nor does she owe it to anyone to be their political martyr.

Every so often, you might get a translated Chinese netizen comment that criticizes the Chinese government or the less than ideal living situations in China…but don’t get your hopes up. chinaSMACK covers some news, but it isn’t and never was a political news site, much less a “general” news site. It is and has always been an internet gossip site, and quite frankly, it’s pretty good at being what it is. For example, the biggest thing on the Chinese internet right now is indeed Xiao Yue Yue. Granted, chinaSMACK‘s post on her is a bit impotent since it doesn’t exactly convey just why she’s such a big deal right now. But, to be honest, even if Liu Xiaobo’s news wasn’t being censored, I’d still place my bets on Xiao Yue Yue being the bigger news item. Is this a tragedy? I don’t think so. It’s just life. Think about it, more people know about Old Spice Guy than any jailed human rights activist or dissident.

"Liu Xiaobo Wins Nobel Peace Prize, chinaSMACK Silent" is a post from china/divide

1. Actually, sometimes those stories aren’t even really that popular but are apparently interesting enough for some of them to translate anyway.
2. It wouldn’t likely be “harmonized” or deleted since it is actually physically hosted outside the country.

1. That it has been circulating amongst Chinese internet users, and
2. Chinese internet posts with similar content and images have been deleted or “harmonized”…

…and the vague suggestion that I’d make something interesting out of it. Let’s take a look:

日本爆发大规模反中游行,要求与中国断交，媒体在封锁消息!!!我们还能忍么！！！！(看到立即就转了)

Large-scale anti-China demonstrations break out in Japan, demand severing diplomatic relations with China, the media is refusing to report this news!!! Can we still put up with this!!!! (Look and immediately forward)

中日断交求之不得啊～～。借用希特勒的原话：与这种国家为伍是我的耻辱。

If only China and Japan could sever diplomatic relations. To use something one said by Hitler: Associating with this kind of country is my shame.

不为跟风 不做粪青 只求认清真相，中国人就转发出去！

Not to follow the trend, not to be fenqing, only to ask [others] to see the truth clearly. If you’re Chinese, then forward this on!

There’s plenty to talk about with the understanding that this email is, as Fauna describes it, getting forwarded around by Chinese people. There’s also some significance that can be interpreted out of Chinese discussion forums actively deleting posts with these images, echoing the accusation that the media is not reporting on it as if to hide some truth from the Chinese people.

I wrestled with the idea of using this for a small social experiment but eventually decided it was too sinister of me so I’m just going to come out and tell you what I know before opening it up for discussion.

First, sure enough, there have been Chinese discussion forum posts with the same text and images that have been deleted. Here’s an example of one that was deleted there from Tiexue, an online community well-known for having a nationalistic slant¹, and here’s another example from the arguably more mainstream NetEase forums². Given that anti-Japanese rhetoric and sentiments are hardly rare on either forums, there must be some reason — perhaps government encouraged — for the moderators and administrators of each forum to take them down. That said, it must be noted that other posts with similar content and images still remain on other Chinese discussion forums like bbs.news.ifeng.com and club.china.com.

Second, at least one post on the popular Tianya discussion forum shares the same title as the email’s subject, except it was dated July 3rd, 2006. The same images have also appeared on various web pages published on various websites at different times throughout at least the past 3-4 years. For example, most of the images can be seen on this broken Chinese portal page. We can be certain these pictures are quite old and don’t show any large-scale demonstrations that have “broken out” in Japan recently³.

That said, what are your guys’ thoughts?

"Chinese Forwarding Photos Of Anti-China Protests In Japan" is a post from china/divide

1. cached copy
2. cached copy
3. …though like China, there have definitely been plenty of online nationalistic anti-Chinese rhetoric, organized protests, and even some deplorable acts by certain individuals in Japan recently.

Now for something that might be more familiar for most of our quite-Western or Westernized readers:

This is a map of how the United States views Europe and part of a collection by graphic designer and illustrator Yanko Tsvetkov titled “Mapping Stereotypes: The geography of prejudice”¹.

Judging by how often I hear foreigners complaining about how smelly Chinese people are, I had forgotten that the French were victims of that stereotype as well. Commies, St. Patrick’s, and Godfather are kinda banal but Mexico and Brazil are a nice touch, as well as Resident Evil.

Here are a few more as a taste:

Anyone who has studied European history and modern society will probably recognize quite a few of the jokes in these maps. Go see the whole collection (and yes, there’s one for Gay Men too).

So now, a question: Anyone know of any similar maps for Asia. Most of us long-time observers of the region are already familiar with the stereotypes and prejudices that have arisen from the tensions and history between Asia’s major countries. Many “Westerners” certainly have a few of their own for the region. Did anyone out there ever make funny maps about them?

P.S. – While I’m at it, might as well throw this one in for good measure. I should probably relocate.

"Europe As Seen By Americans, Europeans, & Gay Men?" is a post from china/divide

1. via Joe Xu, thanks.

Sacred cultural tradition

The Mid-Autumn Festival is upon us, not to mention the entire Fall/Winter holiday season, which will seemingly last from now until February. In the spirit of the holidays, therefore, I thought I’d take a few minutes to rant about how holidays are meaningless and why expat culture fetishists are annoying. Not the most intellectually stimulating thesis, perhaps, but I control the page. This post will no doubt piss off many of my fellow expats, but I for one am tired of my fellow foreigners who constantly pat themselves on the back for their cultural awareness.

Right, let’s get down to it, so I can finish this post, and you readers can send me hate mail. Why wait?

Typical Chinese holiday celebration

I’ll start with a cranky rant about holidays before I move on to the expat experience. Most cultural/religious based holidays are a joke with respect to modern day observance. I probably don’t need to elaborate on why I have a problem with religious holidays in general, but I don’t even have to go in for my usual critique of religion. Just look at your average religious holiday, such as Christmas or Hanukkah. The vast majority of folks who celebrate these holidays have no connection with the underlying mythology (many are not even aware of it), rendering them merely an excuse for family gatherings, gift-giving, and perhaps time off work (all laudable past times, but not really dependent upon the specific holiday).

Religious holidays are arbitrary with respect to timing. Those that commemorate a birth, death, anniversary of a battle or miracle in ancient times may have had some connection with historical events (I’d leave the miracles out of that category, though), but the dates were long lost to history. Those that are not arbitrary as far as the calendar is concerned were often chosen according to events like the Winter solstice as opposed to miraculous happenings. Very pragmatic, but not so awe inspiring.

Groundhog Day: which is more famous, the movie or the holiday?

Public holidays that commemorate actual events from recent history, or those that are designed to make us appreciate the contributions of a particular group of people are much more useful. Think of Martin Luther King Day in the United States, Labor Day, or the recent Teachers Day. If observance of these holidays actually meant anything to people, they would be laudable. Too bad they are usually just excuses for a day off from work/school or, in the case of Teachers Day, one of those rather sad “Hey, wasn’t today a holiday?” events. Perhaps China’s National Day or the American July 4th holiday are exceptions to the usual apathy — that’s debatable.

So, yeah, I’m not so big on holidays in general. If you enjoy some time off on a particular holiday, or otherwise derive some sort of meaning out of the commemoration of a social, political or religious idea or historical event, good for you. But let me now turn to the whole expat experience and local holidays.

An opinion column in today’s Global Times, written by an expat, leads off with this:

Many foreigners don’t feel connected to the Chinese holidays and the Mid-Autumn Festival is no exception. How many foreigners actually give each other moon cakes, anyway? I think many foreigners look at some Chinese holidays like this with a mixture of curiosity, fascination, and humor, if they pay attention to it at all. It would be good if laowai could better understand these holidays and feel more integrated into the society at large. I for one, would like to feel that way.

This is a fairly innocuous column about the holiday, a variation of which is sort of obligatory for each festival or celebration. That being said, I do have a problem with the numbskull who decided on the headline: “Moon festival leaves most expats baffled or amused.” This of course makes foreigners out to be either hopelessly clueless about a relatively simple matter (i.e. stupid) or culturally insensitive/condescending. Nice going, editor.

But the article, and others of its kind, is really about cultural integration. This discussion has become polarized in the U.S. and EU in recent years, with one camp bemoaning the flood of strange folks who can’t speak their language, don’t celebrate their holidays, don’t practice their religion and are different in 100 other ways they think are important. The other side says that people should be allowed to maintain their culture when they emigrate without being treated like second-class citizens.

So what’s so great about cultural integration? Well, some things are obvious. If you live in another country, you should at least learn a bit of the language so you can get things done. You might wish to learn something about local customs so you don’t inadvertently offend someone. If you’re a businessperson, you may wish to learn a lot more about local culture, tastes, and history so you can be successful professionally.

I’ll draw the line on holidays, though. As someone who doesn’t even celebrate American or Jewish holidays, I take exception with the notion that expats do not really understand the “real China” unless they thoroughly grasp the historical basis of the Mid-Autumn Festival. One should definitely consider exchanging mooncakes with friends and colleagues — it’s expected, amongst some people — but unless you are into history or are just plain curious, there is little value in additional exploration.

A serious commitment to cultural integration

Long-term expats or China groupies will no doubt find my position pathetic or outrageous, but this does not surprise me. People like to fit in, and to the extent that observance of local customs allow people to feel “connected,” this can be very important psychologically, particularly if one is living alone in a foreign country (this was the point of the Global Times piece, which is fine). Unfortunately some people take it one step further, placing so much  value in cultural integration and awareness that they look down on others who choose to opt out or prefer to spend their time learning about Roman aqueduct engineering or Martian geography.

Someone attempted to engage me one time in a discussion about the Lantern Festival. It was a thinly-veiled attempt to regurgitate the holiday origin story he had learned from his Chinese tutor. Knowing this made him feel more connected to local culture, to be sure, but the number of times he repeated it to other foreigners that evening told me that he was even more interested in looking like a knowledgeable China expert in front of his peers. To what end, I’m still not sure.

We’ve all known that expat who is learning Chinese and takes every opportunity to use it in casual conversation, particularly when he/she is speaking to other foreigners who have little or no knowledge of the language. Sometimes it is a natural desire to use a new skill, but other times is it an excuse to feed their ego and draw attention to their “mastery” of local culture. We are now supposed to respect that person more and defer to their judgment on everything China, from politics to fashion. (For some reason, by the way, most long-term expats I know who are fluent in Chinese do not flaunt it.)

This is ridiculous. I once had a friend here in Beijing who didn’t like Chinese food. We all thought he was a bit strange, and he was asked many times what he was doing here in China with that sort of attitude. But in the end, although his eating habits were odd given his choice of places to live, there was no basis for a legitimate normative judgment. Not eating Chinese food while in China is a big missed opportunity perhaps, but no one can say that it is somehow “wrong.”

Holidays are a bit silly. Most observers of Christmas think more about Santa Claus than Christ, and I have my doubts that many Chinese are thinking about the Yuan Dynasty when they eat their mooncakes. There’s not much of value in any of this. However, for expats who have fun with the holidays, I say more power to you. Enjoy. For those that use mooncakes and zongzi not to feed their stomachs, but rather their fragile egos in an attempt to appear “local,” I have nothing to say but “Bah humbug, and piss off.”

"Bah Humbug: the Expat Cultural Integration Fetish" is a post from china/divide