– by International Campaign for Tibet, 8 April 2026

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) spotlights the enforced disappearance and secret sentencing of Venerable Dhargye, a 63-year-old Tibetan monk, as a stark illustration of China’s escalating campaign of religious repression and judicial secrecy in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and neighboring Tibetan prefectures. After more than four years of incommunicado detention, Dhargye has, according to credible reports made to ICT, been sentenced to seven years in prison. His case highlights Chinese authorities’ systematic criminalization of peaceful Buddhist religious practices and their routine violation of fundamental due process rights.

Arrest and enforced disappearance

Dhargye’s ordeal began on August 5, 2021, when he was arrested by Chinese police in Lhasa. He was detained alongside a relative named Tsering and a nun named Choekyi. While Tsering and Choekyi were released after several months, Dhargye remained in custody and was subsequently subjected to an enforced disappearance until traces of information began emerging in autumn 2025.

For over four years, Dhargye’s family was kept in the dark about his whereabouts. As soon as he was arrested in 2021, family members began regularly contacting Chinese authorities in Lhasa but they were given false assurances that Dhargye was well and would be released shortly. These false claims gave his family false hope for a speedy return and led them to avoid raising his detention with the international community.

Charges and sentencing

Information about Dhargye’s sentencing emerged in late January 2026. ICT believes he was charged with making traditional Tibetan Buddhist monetary offerings (Kyab-ten སྐྱབས་རྟེན་ and Ngo-ten བསྔོ་རྟེན་) to the Dalai Lama. Authorities also reportedly accused him of assisting Tibetan monks attempting to escape from Tibet.

The legal proceedings were conducted in complete secrecy. Dhargye’s family did not receive official notification of his charges, the date of his trial, the court that would deliver the verdict or the location of his detention. He has been denied all visits, and his current health status remains unknown, causing deep concern among his relatives given his advanced age.

In August 2022, nearly a year after Venerable Dhargye’s arrest, Chinese authorities detained his brother Tsedu along with four other Tibetans in a separate case. The five men were arrested for conducting traditional religious activities including smoke offerings to mountain deities and prayer ceremonies. While one of the five Tibetans died due to severe beatings, the other four were sentenced to two years imprisonment.

Contravention of legal standards

ICT’s analysis clearly shows that Chinese authorities handling of Dhargye’s case clearly violated China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and international human rights law. Article 85 requires authorities to notify a family of the reasons for arrest and the place of custody within 24 hours. Principle 16 of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988), Rule 58 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, and Articles 17 and 18 of the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance require states to provide families with basic information about the fate and whereabouts of a disappeared person without delay. Only narrow and time-limited exceptions are permitted. By holding Dhargye incommunicado for five years, which far exceeds any permissible limits, China is in violation of its own legal frameworks and international law.

Furthermore, the criminalization of traditional Buddhist monetary offerings strikes at the core of Tibetan Buddhist belief. In the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, offerings are an essential expression of devotion to religious teachers. Kyabten is an offering made for “taking refuge” dedicated to a religious teacher and Ngoten is a dedicatory offering typically made in the name of deceased persons or those who are seriously ill to generate positive karma for them. Under China’s “stability maintenance” policy, however, such expressions of devotion to exiled spiritual leaders are equated with “inciting separatism” or “subverting state power”.

The non-transparent sentencing of Venerable Dhargye exemplifies Chinese authorities’ egregious violations of religious freedom in Tibet. Through pervasive surveillance and the strategic use of enforced disappearances, the Chinese Communist Party continues to suppress religious freedom and sever the spiritual connections between Tibetans and their exiled leaders. The lack of transparency in the judicial system ensures that many such cases of repression against Tibetans never surface.

Born in 1962 in Serta in Golog, Wulshul (Amdo region), Dhargye is the son of Choephel and Choelha. He is a monk of the Serta Sera Monastery, an institution founded in 1736 that is noted for preserving both old and new Buddhist traditions. Prior to his arrest, he resided in Lhasa, where he was frequently sought by local Tibetan devotees to perform consecration rituals for sacred objects, scriptures and stupas.

The post China’s enforced disappearance and sentencing of Venerable Dhargye first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

The Dalai Lama’s East Asia representative says the law codifies assimilation, expands ideological control, and violates minority rights and UN conventions.

-By Tsewang Gylapo Arya For Japan Forward, 3 April,2026

The Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) has, on 11–12 March , passed a new law under a seemingly innocuous title of “Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress.”

The law is scheduled to be effective from 1 July, 2026. Unity and progress are the foundation of social and national development — making it, at first glance, a welcome initiative.

However, a pertinent question here is why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to come up with a new law on ethnic unity after more than seventy years since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Assimilation in the Name of Unity

A quick answer is that despite its claim of liberation, unity, and prosperity, the regime has still not won the trust and loyalty of the minority nationals of Tibet, East-Turkistan, Southern Mongolia, and others.

The regime is now forcing assimilation in the name of unity and demanding patriotism and loyalty not only from the minority nationals but also from the Chinese and the people of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. This loyalty, moreover, is not to China as a nation, but to the communist party, as the absolute authority.

The law has seven chapters with sixty-five articles. Despite saying ethnic unity, the display of Chinese (Han) chauvinism is conspicuous with repeated use of phrases like “Chinese national” and “Chinese nation,” nearly eighty times in the text.

If this Ethnic Law is all about forging a strong sense of the Chinese national community, then what is there for other nationals and ethnic communities?  The law only addresses the unity of Chinese nationals. It offers nothing to the minority nationals in the region.

A Manufactured National Identity

The new law is all about the Chinese nation and the Chinese national community and is irrelevant to the minority nationals. One need not look further than Article 1 of the law. It says, “This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution to promote ethnic unity and progress, forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, advance the building of the Chinese national community, and propel the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

The Article is illogical and incoherent. First, despite its claim, the law is not in accordance with the PRC’s Constitution (Article 4), where minority nationals are given freedom and autonomy to maintain and promote their identity, language, and culture. Therefore, it is a gross violation and misinterpretation of the Constitution to legitimize its assimilation policy.

Second, the Law mentions forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. We must note that China, right now, is not a nation-state. It is a colonial empire with occupied regions. People of the minority nationals are not Chinese, but they have their own distinct national identity. Therefore, the claim of China as a nation-state, and the minority nationals as Chinese nationals are not true. This is an outright invasion and derision of minority nationals’ identity and aspiration.

Thirdly, it talks of building the “Chinese national community.” If the CCP wants to promote and build a “Chinese nation”, it should first revert China to the Chinese people. As of now, China is under the dictatorship of the CCP, and it does not belong to the Chinese people.

If China is to belong to the Chinese people, the Chinese government should be a government of the people, for the people, and by the people. Is the regime ready for this?

Misinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism

Article 2 of the Law stipulates adhering to Marxism-Leninism. Yet what the regime is doing is contrary to what the two great helmsmen had taught. The essence of Marxism is based on the removal of labor exploitation, but the CCP regime is known best for labor exploitation, especially in Uyghur and other occupied regions.

Leninism talks of freedom and autonomy of the different nationals, but what the regime is doing is the eradication and assimilation of the minority nationals. So, with what authority is the regime talking about Marxism and Leninism?

“Those who do not agree with and support the equality of nationalities and languages and those who do not fight against nationality oppression and inequality are not Marxists or even socialists” (The Collected Work of Lenin, vol.20).

And Joseph Stalin said that “the people of a certain nationality use their own language because using their own language is the only way for them to develop their own culture, politics, and economy” (The Collected Works of Stalin, vol II) [A Tibetan Revolutionary, The Political Life of Times of Bapa Phuntso Wangye P-296]

Contrary to the principal teachings of Marxism and Leninism, the Law speaks of a singular objective of developing the Chinese national community, Chinese culture, Chinese people, Chinese image, and unity of the Chinese nation.

If the regime thinks that such a law will help achieve unity and the trust and loyalty of the minority nationals, it is totally mistaken. It will only fortify the minority nationals’ doubt that the law is made to destroy their identity and existence.

Article-15 is clear about how minority languages should be removed and how Chinese, as a “common and official language” for all purposes, should be promoted. It has made Mandarin mandatory in all educational institutions as a “common language and script” for teaching and learning. It has effectively criminalised the preservation and promotion of minority languages.

The Sinicization of Religions

Article 46 of the law openly and boldly calls for “Sinicizing religions in China, guide religions to adapt to socialist society, and guide religious personnel and believers to uphold patriotic traditions, thereby promoting ethnic harmony, religious harmony, and social harmony.”

It’s worth noting that “Sinicizing” means loyalty to the regime and adoption of Xi Jinping’s ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is an open secret that communist ideology and socialism with Chinese characteristics have no place for religious beliefs.

According to Boston University’s 2020 World Religion Database, there are 499 million folk and ethnic religionists, 288 million Buddhists, 106 million Christians, 23.7 million Muslims, 7.7 million Taoists and Confucians, 20,500 Sikhs, and 2,900 Jews in China and the occupied regions.

The figure comes to about 924 million believers. This is an enormous figure, nearly 1/8th of the world population. If the CCP is successful in its plan, the world will witness new religions under the same names with the CCP as the supreme guiding force. This will usher in a new era of religious wars between the world religions and the CCP-fostered religions.

Legal Contradictions and Violations

As noted earlier, the law is against the Chinese Constitution and the PRC’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. The new law is trying to override all the existing laws. It is a deliberate attempt to make and designate the existing minority nationals as ethnic minorities with Chinese as the supreme majority.

This is in violation of Article 4 of the Constitution and Articles 21, 37, and 49 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, which guarantee the preservation and promotion of minority languages, religions, and cultures. The NPC first needs to revise the Constitution and the Regional Autonomy Law before implementing the new law.

China invaded Tibet under the guise of “peaceful liberation” and flaunted the 17-point agreement of 1951 as a legal document to legitimize the occupation. The new law is a violation and blatant betrayal of this agreement.

As a member of the United Nations, the CCP regime is violating Articles 15, 26, 28, and 29 of the UN Charter of Human Rights. Therefore, the law is unconstitutional, a betrayal, and against the UN conventions.

What China has not been able to achieve through force, repression, and intimidation all these years, China is now establishing laws to achieve its goal by legitimizing its repressions.

Repression by Design

Recognizing the strong faith among Tibetans and Himalayan Buddhists in the reincarnation system of Tibetan lamas, the CCP enacted Religious Order No 5 in July 2007. The order requires state approval for the selection and recognition of reincarnated teachers.

To further legitimize religious interference and tighten control over religious teachings, the regime passed Religious Order No. 19 in July 2024. The measure makes the adoption of CCP ideology and Xi Jinping Thought compulsory in all religious instruction.

These Orders provided the regime with total control over the monasteries, churches, mosques, temples, and the religious teachers. The silence of the international community has emboldened the regime to come up with this new law, “Ethnic Unity and Progress,” to erase the minority nationals’ identity with impunity.

The international community should protest this law, because this is not about the minority nationals’ issue in China. It is not Chinese internal affairs. According to the International Campaign for Tibet (ITC) report, “The law provides a legal tool for the CCP to establish and enforce a unified national identity and singular idea of China, shaped by the CCP and authoritarian ideology.”

The successful implementation of this pernicious and disdainful law in China and the occupied region will ultimately bring the dragon’s fiery fumes to the neighboring countries and around the world, and engulf the people’s mind and consciousness with the CCP’s ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It would likewise force democracy and rule of law to go hiding behind the bush.

-Dr Tsewang Gylapo Arya is the former Secretary of the Department of Information and International Relations and former Director of the Tibet Policy Institute. He is currently the Representative of the Liaison Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Japan and East Asia. His books include Harnessing the Dragon’s Fume and The Ancient Tibetan Civilization. The view expressed above is the author’s own.

The post China’s New Ethnic Law Legalises Forced Assimilation, Violates Constitution first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

The new policy assaults the Tibetan language and thus Tibet’s cultural and religious foundations.

– by Tsering Dolma for Bitter Winter, 30 March 2026

On March 12, 2026, the People’s Republic of China introduced a new ethnic policy officially framed as promoting “ethnic unity” and a consolidated national identity. Despite this framing, the policy carries profound implications for Tibetan Buddhism. In Tibetan society, religion, language, and culture are not separate domains but form a deeply integrated whole. Any state intervention targeting a single element, particularly language or cultural expression, inevitably extends to the religious sphere as well. The policy, therefore, functions not merely as a political framework but as a direct mechanism shaping the transmission, practice, and long-term continuity of Tibetan Buddhist traditions.

The relationship between language and religion is particularly profound in the Tibetan context, though not entirely inseparable. The Tibetan language is deeply intertwined with Tibetan Buddhism, serving as the primary medium through which its teachings, rituals, and philosophical traditions are transmitted. Foundational texts such as the volumes of Buddha’s teachings, the “Kangyur” (bka’ ‘gyur), the collected words of the Buddha, and the “Tengyur” (bstan ‘gyur), comprising centuries of Indian and Tibetan philosophical commentary, are preserved in classical Tibetan, a linguistic system uniquely constructed to carry precise doctrinal meaning, layered philosophical interpretation, and symbolic depth that no translation has ever fully replicated and no simplification can preserve. These are often difficult to capture in translation fully. Consequently, any weakening of the language risks limiting access to the original teachings and diminishing understanding of their depth. For this reason, Tibetans both within Tibet and in exile regard the preservation of their language as a matter of utmost importance.

Policies implemented by the Chinese government are widely perceived as systematic efforts to erode Tibet’s cultural and religious foundations, targeting above all its language and spiritual institutions. The 2007 Order No. 5, formally titled “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism,” made this intervention explicit, requiring state approval for the recognition of reincarnated spiritual masters. What had long been a sacred, community-rooted process was thereby brought under political authority. The question this raises is not technical but fundamental: can a spiritual institution preserve its authenticity when its most sacred determinations require government sanction?

The displacement of Tibetan by Mandarin as the primary medium of instruction compounds this erosion. Language is not a neutral tool of communication. It is the root of cultural identity and the living medium through which spiritual knowledge is transmitted across generations.

The Dalai Lama addressed this directly during a media interaction at the Tibetan Canadian Cultural Centre in Toronto on October 24, 2010. He argued that China, with its own deep Buddhist heritage, stands to benefit from preserving Tibetan Buddhist culture rather than suppressing it. He pointed to India as a working example, a country that sustains profound linguistic diversity without treating it as a threat to national unity. The contrast with current Chinese policy could not be sharper.

Recent developments lay bare the true cost of resistance. According to the International Campaign for Tibet, Tibetan monk Palden Yeshi, aged 52, from a monastery in Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, was detained by Chinese authorities on May 17, 2021, and subjected to nearly five years of enforced disappearance. His family received no information about his whereabouts until late February 2026, when a relative was finally permitted to visit him at Chushul Prison, southwest of Lhasa. There, he disclosed that he is serving a six-year sentence believed to be directly linked to his efforts to preserve the Tibetan language.

His case is not an isolated incident. It is emblematic of a broader pattern in which cultural and linguistic preservation is treated as a criminal act. When a monk disappeared for nearly five years and was imprisoned for protecting his own language, the claim that these policies merely promote “ethnic unity” becomes impossible to sustain.

Tibetan Buddhist systems like Madhyamaka and Dzogchen rely on highly precise language to express subtle distinctions. Translation often reduces multiple terms to a single word, such as “mind” or “emptiness,” thereby losing both clarity and depth. Thus, language is not just descriptive but essential for guiding realization.

Furthermore, in Tibetan tradition, especially in Vajrayana practices, teachings are not regarded as complete through textual study alone. They require three essential modes of transmission: oral transmission (rlung), instruction (khrid), and empowerment (dwang). These are passed down from teacher to student in Tibetan, preserving lineage continuity and serving as the initial doorway for beginners to enter Vajrayana practices.

Therefore, if the language weakens, oral transmission declines, and the essential essence may be lost. If the language declines, these subtle instructions may disappear. This challenge is particularly significant in traditions associated with Padmasambhava, where teachings known as “terma” (hidden treasures) are revealed by “treasure revealers” (gterstons). These teachings often rely on the dakini script (mkha’drodgyig), requiring deep linguistic and cultural familiarity to interpret. A decline in Tibetan literacy could therefore prevent future generations from decoding the spiritual heritage.

This concern reflects core Buddhist principles like dependent origination, highlighting interdependence. The loss of language, therefore, risks the loss of an entire philosophical training system. Beyond doctrine, the Tibetan language preserves stories of saints and yogis, cultural metaphors, and elements of devotional poetry whose depth often fades in translation. It is thus not only religion that is at stake, but how it is experienced and lived.

In this light, the erosion of the Tibetan language does not eliminate Buddhism itself. Still, it poses a risk of losing the depth and continuity of Tibetan Buddhism as a living tradition.

In 2010 at Bodhgaya, the Dalai Lama urged Himalayan communities to learn Tibetan, emphasizing that Buddhist teachings cannot fully survive in translation and must be preserved through the language itself.

This position has since been corroborated at the highest levels of international scrutiny. In a report presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Nicolas Levrat warned that Chinese state policies are contributing to the systematic erosion of Tibetan civilisation, describing them not merely as discriminatory but as a form of “eradication in more subtle ways.” At the center of this concern is the large-scale boarding school system imposed on Tibetan children, through which Mandarin, state ideology, and assimilative practices dominate daily life. In contrast, the Tibetan language is structurally marginalised. Separated from their families and communities, these children are denied the natural conditions through which language, culture, and religious identity are transmitted across generations.

The relationship between the Tibetan language and Tibetan Buddhism is not one of convenience or historical accident. It is one of the constitutive interdependences. Language is not the medium through which Tibetan Buddhism is communicated; it is the condition under which it exists, is understood, and is transmitted. Every policy that erodes the Tibetan linguistic environment, therefore, strikes not at the periphery of the tradition but at its core.

The ethnic policy introduced by the People’s Republic of China on March 12, 2026, clearly reveals this reality. Framed as cultural consolidation, it effectively dismantles the conditions needed for Tibetan Buddhist knowledge to survive. The tradition may persist in name, but without its language, texts, and living transmission, it is not preserved; it is being erased. The preservation of the Tibetan language is therefore not a cultural preference or a political position. It is essential. Without it, the full depth, authenticity, and continuity of Tibetan Buddhism cannot survive, not because the religion lacks resilience, but because no tradition can endure the systematic destruction of the conditions that make it possible. It is the survival of one of humanity’s most profound and irreplaceable intellectual and spiritual inheritances.

-Tsering Dolma is a Research Fellow at the Tibet Policy Institute, a think tank and research center of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamshala, India. She earned her Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Delhi.

The post The New Law on Ethnic Unity: A Threat to Tibetan Buddhism first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

– By Tsering Yangkey for Tibetan Review, 19 March, 2026

The need to adopt a pro-active approach towards preserving the Tibetan national identity especially through the inculcation of linguistic skill has become ever more pressing today not only because of China’s ongoing coercive Sinicization drive in Tibet, which has seen the country’s Communist Party rulers adopt a new Law on ‘Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress’ recently, but also in view of the fact that the once closely-knit Tibetan communities in India, Nepal and Bhutan have been hollowing out with their youngsters dispersing across the free world in quest for better opportunities and life, writes Tsering Yangkey. *

I believe that, as Tibetans, we all share a deep and unwavering faith in His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, and an innate patriotism toward Tibet. To me, these two qualities are indispensable conditions for calling oneself Tibetan. Fulfilling the aspirations of His Holiness and serving the cause of Tibet are inseparable, for His Holiness and Tibet are like the two faces of the same coin. As Tibetans, the purpose of our lives is to serve these two sacred causes. The preservation and protection of the Tibetan language is not only our moral responsibility but also one of the four principal commitments of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

We all know that our forefathers fled their homeland, following His Holiness the Dalai Lama, with a single mission and purpose: to struggle for our freedom in exile and eventually return home. They did not leave Tibet in search of better jobs, improved educational opportunities, or a more comfortable livelihood, as many of us do today.

With his profound vision and determination, His Holiness requested the Government of India to allow the establishment of separate Tibetan communities. He did this with a single aim—to preserve our identity as Tibetans. As a result, despite living outside our homeland and being few in number, we have been able to preserve, promote, and nurture our religion, culture, and language. This achievement is largely due to His Holiness’s far-sighted leadership and tireless efforts, which won recognition for him with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.

Today, however, the situation is changing—both inside Tibet and in exile. First, His Holiness is advancing in age, even though he has reassured us that he hopes to live for several more decades. At the same time, Tibetans living in India, Nepal, and Bhutan—especially young people—are increasingly migrating to Western countries. As a result, Tibetan settlements, schools, and monasteries are gradually emptying. Since many people of reproductive age are leaving for work abroad, population growth within our communities in South Asia has slowed significantly.

Back in Tibet, the government of the Chinese Communist Party is determined to eradicate our identity. The establishment of so-called boarding schools in Tibet has led to Tibetan children being forcibly enrolled in them, depriving them of their right to study their own language and cultural heritage. Recently, authorities have implemented policies requiring preschool children to begin learning Mandarin and threatening criminal law action against individuals overseas seen as “undermining ethnic unity.” Private Tibetan language schools have been systematically shut down, and teachers associated with them have been detained or disappeared.  The message is clear: erase the language, erase the people.

The survival and identity of any people depends fundamentally on the preservation of their language. Religion, culture, history, and collective memory are all preserved and transmitted through language. If a language disappears, the identity of that people gradually fades with it. With Tibetan children in Tibet being denied the right to learn their own language, we are approaching a critical threshold that threatens our existence as a distinct people in the world.

Tibetans in Tibet are not in a position to preserve our language due to such restrictions. Meanwhile, many Tibetans in the diaspora—particularly those living in the West and in major Indian cities—are gradually losing their language, often citing a lack of environment or opportunities to learn and practice it. For many years, Tibetan communities in India, Nepal, and Bhutan have served as the guardians of our identity. But now, as more people move abroad, our once close-knit communities risk becoming increasingly dispersed. This raises a serious question: who will preserve and carry forward our identity in the future?

Until recently, the preservation of our identity was not considered an urgent issue. Today, however, it has become as serious as our political struggle. We must recognise the reality faced by Tibetans inside Tibet under Chinese control. Our brothers and sisters there are helpless. In contrast, those of us living in the free world have the freedom, opportunity, and resources to speak and learn our language. No one prevents us from speaking Tibetan at home or with fellow Tibetans.

I would like to emphasise that parents play the most crucial role in this effort. In addition to speaking Tibetan at home, parents can send their children to Tibetan weekend schools, encourage them to attend online Tibetan language classes, and take them to summer camps in India—such as programs organised by institutions like the Sarah College, Tibetan Children’s Villages, Sera Jey Monastic University, Gyumed Tantric Monastery, and the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts. If we do not encourage and support our children in learning Tibetan, how will they pass it on to the next generation when they become parents themselves?

Our religion and culture teach us morality, love, compassion, peace, harmony, universal responsibility, mindfulness, meditation, environmental protection, and many other values that benefit humanity as a whole. People around the world admire Tibetan culture, including scientists who are deeply interested in Buddhist philosophy—especially Buddhist psychology and the study of the mind. Therefore, learning and preserving our language and culture is not selfish—it is a service to the world.

Although we cannot directly change the situation inside Tibet, we can do our part to preserve our identity—an identity for which our brothers and sisters in Tibet continue to struggle. When Tibetan children in Tibet are prevented from learning their own language, we should speak and learn Tibetan even more actively in exile. When birth rates in Tibet are controlled, we should strengthen our communities abroad. When mixed marriages are encouraged to dilute our identity, we must marry within our community. In this way, we can respond peacefully, without hatred or violence.

To the Lhakar Gorshe groups, I also have a small request: please take some time—perhaps half an hour—to learn the lyrics of the songs you perform and understand their meanings. Through them, you will discover the richness of our culture: the lives of nomads and farmers, offerings and praises to our spiritual masters, the beauty of our snow-capped mountains, the purity of our rivers, the vast green grasslands, and the majesty of our animals—yaks, sheep, and the loyal Tibetan Mastiffs.

My dear fellow Tibetans, I urge you: speak Tibetan, learn Tibetan, think Tibetan, and act Tibetan. Make this your next birthday resolution. Remember that where there is a will, there is always a way. We have already seen many Tibetan children born in the West who can speak Tibetan fluently and read and write the language beautifully. This shows that it is indeed possible, if we truly care and make the effort.

The survival of our identity is in our hands now.  Let us not be the generation that breaks the chain.  Let us be the generation that strengthens it.

I may sound like a hypocrite for writing this appeal in English rather than in the Tibetan language. However, I chose to write it in English so that our younger generation can fully understand it and reflect upon it. Otherwise, I normally write in Tibetan when communicating with fellow Tibetans.

– Tsering Yangkey, the Representative of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) at the Office of Tibet, London, has written this piece in her personal capacity.

The post A Heartfelt Appeal to the Tibetan Diaspora Communities first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

China is amending its laws to weaken ethnic identities, including Tibetan language and culture. 

– By Jianli Yang for The Diplomat, 12 March 2026

In recent years, the Chinese government has intensified policies in Tibetan areas that aim to reshape Tibetan identity through language, education, and cultural control. These measures are not isolated administrative actions but part of a broader national strategy centered on what Beijing calls “forging a strong sense of the Chinese nation community.” Under this framework, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to strengthen a unified national identity by weakening ethnic identities that might compete with the political narrative of the “Chinese nation.” Increasingly, these assimilationist policies are not merely administrative practices; they are being codified into law.

For decades, the Chinese state maintained tight political control over Tibet, particularly over Tibetan Buddhism and religious institutions. Yet in the realm of language and education, earlier policies were comparatively more accommodating than those of today. In 1994, the “Measures for Implementing the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China in the Tibet Autonomous Region” stipulated that schools should “use Tibetan as the principal medium of instruction while gradually improving a bilingual Tibetan-Chinese education system.” Within this framework, Tibetan language education held a central place in the school system, while Mandarin functioned largely as a supplementary language.

At that time, Tibetan students also had institutional options in China’s university entrance examination system. Two separate examination tracks existed. One, known as “min kao Han,” required students to take exams in Chinese. The other, called “min kao min,” allowed ethnic minority students to take their exams in their own languages. While imperfect, this system acknowledged linguistic diversity and allowed Tibetan language education to retain meaningful institutional space.

This situation began to change dramatically after Xi Jinping came to power. Under the banner of achieving the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Beijing increasingly began to view minority languages – including Tibetan – as potential threats to national unity. The policy shift reflects a deeper transformation in China’s ethnic governance doctrine.

Chinese policymakers and scholars now frequently refer to a transition from the “first-generation ethnic policy” to the “second-generation ethnic policy.” The earlier framework, developed during the Mao and Deng eras, formally emphasized ethnic regional autonomy and the protection of minority languages and cultures. Although implementation was uneven, the official policy at least recognized the legitimacy of cultural pluralism within the Chinese state.

The second-generation ethnic policy represents a significant departure from this approach. Rather than preserving ethnic diversity, it seeks to minimize the political and social significance of ethnic distinctions. Its central objective is the creation of a unified national identity centered on the concept of the “Chinese nation” (中华民族). In practice, this shift encourages linguistic assimilation, cultural homogenization, and tighter political integration of minority regions.

Language policy in Tibet provides one of the clearest examples of this transformation. Officially, the Chinese government continues to describe its education policy as “bilingual education.” In reality, Mandarin Chinese has increasingly become the dominant language of instruction, while Tibetan has been relegated to a secondary or optional subject. Core academic subjects such as mathematics, science, and history are now overwhelmingly taught in Mandarin.

This trend was reinforced by legislative developments at the National People’s Congress (NPC). In December 2025, the NPC Standing Committeerevised the National Common Language Law, removing earlier provisions that allowed minority languages to serve as primary mediums of instruction in schools. The revised law explicitly requires that Mandarin be used as the fundamental teaching language and mandates the use of standardized national textbooks throughout the education system.

These changes have had profound consequences for ethnic minority students. The “min kao min” examination track has largely disappeared, leaving only the Chinese-language examination system. Tibetan language proficiency, for example, is no longer central to university admissions except for students applying specifically to Tibetan-language academic programs.

Perhaps the most controversial element of the new policy has been the rapid expansion of the boarding school system in Tibetan areas. Research by human rights organizations suggests that roughly one million Tibetan children have been placed in state-run boarding schools. These institutions operate primarily in Mandarin and reportedly restrict the use of Tibetan language in daily life. Because students live on campus for extended periods, they are separated from their families and communities during crucial stages of cultural and linguistic development.

At the same time, private Tibetan language schools have been systematically closed. In several cases, teachers associated with independent Tibetan-language education initiatives have been detained or disappeared. Today, Tibetan language instruction within public schools has been drastically reduced, and private efforts to establish Tibetan language schools are rarely permitted.

The contrast is striking. Chinese immigrants around the world are free to establish Chinese-language schools. Tibetan immigrants abroad can organize Tibetan-language education in diaspora communities. Yet Tibetans living in Tibet itself increasingly lack the freedom to establish Tibetan-language schools in their own homeland.

The situations in other ethnic minority areas in China, such as Xinjiang and the Inner Mongolia, are similar.

The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, which was passed during the NPC’s annual session this week, further strengthens this assimilationist framework. Based on a draft version, the legislation requires that preschool children begin learning Mandarin and mandates that students “basically master the national common language by the end of compulsory education.” At the same time, it weakens provisions in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law that previously protected minority language rights.

The law also introduces provisions that allow authorities to pursue legal responsibility for individuals overseas accused of “undermining ethnic unity.” Such clauses extend the reach of China’s ethnic policy beyond its borders and further integrate identity issues into the country’s national security framework.

International concern about these developments has grown. In a 2026 report, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on minority issues warned that systematic restrictions on minority language education could lead to “linguistic erasure” and create a serious risk of cultural destruction. The report noted that policies designed to eliminate a language from public life may approach what international law describes as cultural genocide.

Viewed in this broader context, China’s current policies in Tibet represent more than a shift in language education. They reflect a structural transformation in the Chinese state’s approach to ethnic governance. The combination of administrative campaigns and legislative codification suggests that Beijing is moving to institutionalize the “second-generation” ethnic policy.

Through both political campaigns and legal reforms, China is steadily narrowing the space for minority autonomy in education, language, and religion. The legal codification of assimilation policies marks a new phase in Beijing’s frontier governance strategy – one that seeks not merely to manage ethnic diversity but to fundamentally reshape it.

Read the original report on The Diplomat here.

The post Beijing Is Legalizing the Assimilation of Tibetans and Other Ethnic Minorities first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

China’s disinformation machinery kicked into high gear to launch its latest attack against the Tibetan spiritual leader.

– By Tenzin Dalha for The Diplomat, 10 February 2026

China’s information operations represent a systematic, institutionalized approach to global narrative management that transcends conventional propaganda. China has built one of the most sophisticated sustained information warfare campaigns in contemporary history, deploying coordinated mechanisms including expansive digital surveillance, AI-generated content, and platform manipulation.

Bankrolled by enormous state investment, Beijing’s propaganda and online influence operations now extend far beyond its borders, seeking to normalize authoritarian governance and redefine reality itself, one algorithm, platform, and rewritten history at a time. And Tibetans – especially the Dalai Lama – are a prominent target. China’s information operations seek to erase Tibetan cultural identity while manufacturing consent for assimilationist rule.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 2024 Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment characterized these efforts as a calculated “wedge strategy,” designed to exploit existing societal fault lines, undermine trust in democratic institutions, and advance Beijing’s geopolitical agenda through a complex interplay of overt and covert tactics.

The recent viral claim that the Dalai Lama’s name appears between 69 and 169 times in court documents related to notorious sexual predator Jeffrey Epstein offers a revealing case study in contemporary information warfare. Although the figures originated from social media posts rather than verified legal analysis, they circulated widely across global platforms despite repeated debunking by independent fact-checkers and legal analysts who reviewed the publicly released Epstein materials.

A detailed review of the documents shows Epstein strongly desired to forge connections with the Dalai Lama – but there’s no evidence that his wish was fulfilled. The references to the Dalai Lama are largely incidental, appearing in mass-distributed newsletters, administrative contact lists, or discussions with third parties about potential ways to connect, without evidence of personal contact, financial ties, or awareness of Epstein’s crimes on the Dalai Lama’s part. Many of the 169 references are duplicates upon closer examination.

Yet the allegation gained traction. This reflects a broader vulnerability within digital information ecosystems, where numerical specificity can create an illusion of credibility even when substantive context is absent. In such environments, repetition often substitutes for verification.

The timing of the controversy is also significant. The claim resurfaced in February 2026, coinciding with the Dalai Lama’s receipt of a Grammy Award for his spoken-word album. Within hours, China’s Foreign Ministry publicly condemned the award as “anti-China political manipulation,” a response consistent with past official reactions when Tibetan identity or leadership receives international recognition.

Similar dynamics emerged in 2023, when a culturally specific Tibetan greeting gesture was detached from its cultural and religious context and reframed online as inappropriate conduct, generating global outrage. The distortion was later acknowledged by multiple scholars of Tibetan Buddhism and cultural studies.

What distinguishes the Epstein narrative is the scale and coordination of its amplification. Analyses by digital disinformation researchers and open-source investigators point to patterns consistent with inauthentic behavior: clusters of newly created accounts, long-dormant profiles reactivated simultaneously, and coordinated posting of identical or near-identical messages across platforms including X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and Instagram. Many of these accounts presented themselves as Western users, employing AI-generated profile images or appropriated identities, tactics previously documented in studies of state-linked influence operations originating from China.

Chinese state media played a notable role in early dissemination. CGTN, China’s international broadcaster, was among the first major outlets to prominently cite the misleading “169 times” figure. This early coverage provided the claim with a veneer of journalistic legitimacy, enabling subsequent social media amplification to appear organic rather than orchestrated. Researchers of information operations have long noted this pattern: state media establishes narrative plausibility, while coordinated online networks generate volume and visibility.

These developments align with China’s expanding institutional commitment to external narrative management on Tibet. In September 2024, Beijing launched the Tibet International Communication Center in Lhasa, an initiative officially tasked with building a “foreign discourse system and narrative system related to Tibet,” according to Chinese state media reporting. The project signaled a shift from reactive messaging toward proactive narrative engineering aimed at shaping international perceptions of Tibetan history, culture, and political legitimacy.

The objective of such operations is not necessarily to persuade audiences of a single factual claim, but to erode moral authority through sustained association with controversy. In an information environment saturated with competing narratives, proximity becomes suspicion and repetition becomes memory. Over time, doubt itself becomes the outcome.

For Tibetan communities, this represents a challenge that extends beyond political repression. It threatens their ability to project a coherent narrative internationally and to maintain moral standing in global debates on human rights, religious freedom, and cultural survival.

For democratic societies, the implications are equally serious. Open information ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to actors that operate without constraints of transparency or accountability. When artificial amplification can simulate grassroots consensus at scale, distinguishing genuine public concern from coordinated manipulation becomes increasingly difficult, a problem repeatedly flagged by researchers studying online influence operations in Asia and beyond.

China’s campaign against the Dalai Lama reflects a strategic shift from controlling domestic narratives to actively contesting legitimacy in global digital spaces. The Epstein files episode was not an exercise in accountability but a case of narrative manipulation, in which incidental and non-substantive references were deliberately amplified to generate reputational doubt. The significance lies not in the documents themselves, but in how authoritarian actors exploit the openness of democratic information systems to convert trivial associations into lasting suspicion. If such campaigns go unrecognized, manufactured controversy, not evidence, will continue to shape international perceptions of human rights, cultural identity, and political legitimacy.

Click here to read the original report on The Diplomat.

The post The Epstein Files and China’s Information War Against the Dalai Lama first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

Shipki-La is a historic Indo-Tibetan trade pass shaped by centuries of exchange and modern geopolitics. Its revival highlights the intersection of border trade, tourism, and India–China strategic rivalry.

– By Dr. Tsewang Dorji Jeshong and Kalsang Dolma, 5 February 2025

The Shipki-La (Tibetan: སྲིབ་སྐྱིད་ལ།) is one of the highest cross-border trade passes in the Trans-Himalaya. La is a Tibetan term which refers to as Pass. It can be called either Shipki- La or Shipki Pass rather than naming it as Shipki-La Pass. It is situated on the Indo-Tibetan border in the western Himalayas, serving as a watershed boundary between the Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh, India, and Diya (Tibetan: བསྟི་ཡག་) town in the Zanda County of the Ngari Prefecture, Tibet. For centuries, it served as a vital trade and cultural corridor between India and Tibet.

Before the advent of modern state-sponsored infrastructure and the monitoring geopolitical maneuver, Shipki-La was a major corridor that facilitated economic and cultural exchanges between two civilizations – India and Tibet. However, following the Chinese occupation of Tibet and subsequent Sino-Indian border dispute, this centuries-old exchange was curtailed, causing many traditional trading communities to lose their livelihoods.

Despite partial geopolitical tensions, both India and China are cautiously seeking to revive the cross-border trade exchange for building the Asian century.

The opening of eco-tourism on the Indian side has further boosted the significance of Shipki-La trade and its surrounding border region. At the same time, China has been constructing “modern socialist villages” in Shipki village in Tibet for relocating its human settlements and building military infrastructure. This dichotomy of developments thwart a prospect of the Indo-Tibetan border trade.

This paper aims to explore the socio-economic and political-cultural significance of the Shipki-La trade corridor for bringing its ancient ties and current bonds between China, Tibet and India.

Historical roots of cross border exchange

Shipki-La stood as a historical witness to the region’s evolving socio-political developments and cross-border exchanges. For centuries, it was a vital passage for the movement of people, culture, knowledge, and trade between Tibet and India. These cross-border exchanges were well-established before the modern state-oriented capitalist system emerged.

Notable historical records dating back to the 17th century describe Shipki-La as a critical trade route connecting Tibet with the Kingdom of Bushahar (also known as Khunu), Ladakh, and Kashmir. In 1679, the Ganden Phodrang government of Tibet and Raja Kehari Singh (reigned 1661–1686) of Bushahar signed a treaty that guaranteed the safety of traders and ensured free and fair trade between in the regions.

Traders from Kinnaur, Spiti, Lahaul, Ladakh, and Punjab exchanged goods such as Indian tea, spices, and agricultural tools for Tibetan wool, salt, and livestock, including horses and goats. These exchanges were governed not by written contracts, but by gamgya, a traditional folk oath of mutual trust. These trading relationships were maintained across generations and often symbolically sealed by breaking a twig or a stone, with each party keeping one half as a token of their agreement.

This centuries-old system raptured following the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Subsequently, the pass was sealed, and cross-border interactions remained suspended for decades.

Formal resumption and modern trade

Following the normalization of India-China relations, the two countries signed a memorandum on 13 December 1991 to resume border trade. Shipki-La was formally reopened on July 16, 1994, under a regulated framework. In its first year, with 90 Indian traders crossing the border. As per a testimony revealed by an eyewitness of exchange during the 1996-1998, Tibetan traders demanded huge quantities of plastic materials from India rather than essential goods. The border trade continued under this system until happened the Galwan Valley confrontation between China and India in 2020.

Trade framework and economic dependence

On 16 December 2025, The New Indian Express detailed the 36 export items and 20 import items through Shipki-La which remain tightly regulated. Imports are restricted to 20 items notified by the Union government of India, including wool, pashmina, sheep skin, yak tails, yak hair, salt, shoes, blankets, quilts, carpets, and herbal medicines. Exports from India are limited to 36 items, such as coffee, tea, barley, rice, wheat, flour, dry fruits, tobacco, cigarettes, canned food, spices, watches, utensils, shoes, and handloom and handicraft products.

This regulated barter trade sustains at least 14 border villages in upper Kinnaur, including Namgia, Chuppan, Nako, Pooh, and Chango. Trade passes, which allow registered traders, are mostly from Nako, Chuppan, Chango, and Namgia to travel to Tibet. This trade trip typically happens during the months of September and October. According to data provided by The New Indian Express on December 16, trade participation has fluctuated, 71 Indian traders crossed in 2015, 75 in 2016, 34 in 2017, 37 in 2018, and 45 in 2019. The peak year was in 1994, when 90 traders participated and crossed through Shipki La to Tibet. The trade was suspended during the covid-19 pandemic, subsequently terminated aftermath of the Sino-Indian border clash in the western sector in 2020.

Recent developments in the region

After a five-year suspension, India and China agreed in August 2025 to resume trade through Shipki-La and other designated border passes. A review meeting of concerned departments and stakeholders was held on 15 December 2025 under the chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner-cum-Trade Authority Amit Sharma to assess institutional and logistical preparedness.

In a significant shift from India, Shipki La was officially opened to domestic tourists on 10 June 2025, for the first time since 1947 as part of a broader strategy to promote border tourism. While tourism has begun, cross-border trade between Namgia on the Indian side and Jiuba (CH:) on Tibet side has not yet resumed. Following political clearance from the Ministry of External Affairs in December 2025, trade operations are scheduled to officially restart in June 2026 after a six-year hiatus. Local authorities in Kinnaur are currently conducting preparatory reviews for logistics, security, and trader registration to facilitate this upcoming 2026 trading season.

Zero point border tourism

According to reports from The Indian Express and official data from the Himachal Pradesh Government, single-day footfalls reached a record 282 visitors on 22 June 2025. This surge followed Himachal Pradesh Chief Minister Sukhvinder Singh Sukhu’s formal launch of the “Border Tourism” initiative on 10 June 2025.

China’s infrastructure development near the Shipki La in Zanda (CH: Zhada) County, Ngari (CH: Ali) Prefecture, is highly advanced and strategically oriented. It consists of a network of Xiaokang (well-off) border defense villages that are deliberately designed for dual-use purposes for supporting both permanent civilian settlement and rapid military mobilization.

Among these settlements, Shipki Border defense village (CH: Shibuqi), which is situated 5km away from Shipki La zero point watch post. It is a primary frontline village on Tibet’s side. It has been upgraded with modern housing and administrative facilities. The Shipki well-off border village is one of the first line of 427 border villages which China have been constructed along the Indo-Tibet border regions to consolidate its territorial claim.

Another prominent Xiaokang village is Zabujang. It also refers as Zaburang, which is clearly visible to Indian tourists from the Shipki La zero point. Zabujang is categorized as a model village, which has featured by dense row-house construction. Such layouts not only support civilian habitation but can also serve as physical obstacles or fortified positions in potential conflict scenarios.

These border villages are well connected by high quality motorable roads linking them to major transportation corridors, including the G-219 highway. They are further supported by advanced telecommunications infrastructure, such as 5G networks and surveillance towers, enhancing both civilian connectivity and military command and control capabilities.

Chinese narrative on Shipki-La and border trade

The Chinese state-affiliated media and think tanks perceived the Shipki-La (CH: Shibuchi or Sibgyi La) as a historically significant Himalayan corridor and an important branch of the ancient Silk Road linking to Tibet with South Asia. According to Chinese accounts, the pass lies in Zada County in Ngari region of Tibet and was formally designated in 1993 as a Sino-Indian border crossing connecting Jiuba in Tibet with Nako in Himachal Pradesh to facilitate the movement of people and goods.

Chinese official has stated that India-China border trade has a long history that dated back to the 7th–9th centuries. China tries to link Shipki-La trade route with the Silk Road. This narrative asserts a Chinese supremacy over the pre-modern diplomatic, commerce and religious exchanges in the region. Backing these claim, Chinese historians have manipulated Tibet’s historical relations with the Ming and Qing dynasties, which project Tibet as a commercial bridge between China and South Asia. These exchanges were indeed conducted under Tibet’s own political authority and commercial institutions as independent nation.

Later, Chinese blames the British to disrupt the traditional trans-Himalayan trade by signing “unequal treaties” with Tibet and other Himalayan states.

A Tibetan scholar, Professor Tsering Shakya, argues that the People’s Republic of China’s administrative and military consolidation after 1951 was the primary driver in dismantling these centuries’ old networks across the Himalaya.

After signing the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement, China regarded the agreement on “Trade and Intercourse” with India as a normalization that abolished colonial era privileges. In fact, it was the formalization of new restrictions imposed on previously autonomous trade practices between Tibet and the Himalaya.

In the preamble of 1954 agreement, India formally recognized Tibet as the “Region of China”. Since then, China perceived border trades including through Shipki La is portrayed as a stabilizing mechanism for frontier regions and a “barometer” of Sino-Indian relations.

While acknowledging that border trade constitutes only a small share of overall bilateral trade. Chinese media underscore its political and social importance in easing border tensions, rebuilding mutual trust, and sustaining the livelihoods of border communities. At the same time, Chinese commentary frequently features the underdevelopment of border trade to harsh geography, infrastructure constraints, and what it characterizes as unilateral restrictions imposed by India on trade items, participants, and operating periods. Continue reading.

The post Exploring Shipki-La Corridor: A Hidden Trade Pass in the Indo-Tibet Border first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

– By International Campaign for Tibet, 3 February 2025

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) welcomes the retention of Tibet-related foreign assistance in the fiscal year 2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 7148), which passed both houses of Congress and was signed into law by President Trump on February 3, 2026. The bill’s preservation of Tibet funding at the traditionally appropriated levels clearly reaffirms enduring bipartisan US support for the Tibetan people.

The bill also restores Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) by funding the US Agency for Global Media, thereby reviving VOA and RFA’s essential broadcasting and reporting activities.

“ICT thanks the members of the Appropriation Committees and their staff for their dedication to supporting the Tibetan people and is glad to see that Congress remains firmly committed to providing these vital funds,” said ICT President Tencho Gyatso. “We hope to see the swift resumption of VOA and RFA Tibetan-language broadcasts. Their closure dealt a harsh blow to Tibetans in Tibet and Tibetan communities around the world, depriving them of a vital and trusted source of independent information. We also encourage Congress to sustain Tibet-related funds during the FY2027 budget process.”

The law appropriates the following amounts for Tibet-related programs:

• $10,000,000 for nongovernmental organizations with experience working with Tibetan communities to support activities which preserve cultural traditions and promote sustainable development, education, and environmental conservation in Tibet
• $8,000,000 for programs to promote and preserve Tibetan culture and language in the refugee and diaspora Tibetan communities, development, and the resilience of Tibetan communities and the Central Tibetan Administration in India and Nepal, and to assist in the education and development of the next generation of Tibetan leaders
• $5,000,000 for programs to strengthen the capacity of the Central Tibetan Administration, of which up to $1,500,000 may be made available to address economic growth and capacity building activities, including for displaced Tibetan refugee families in India and Nepal to help meet basic needs.

The post US FY2026 Budget Preserves Crucial Tibet Funding first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

The album won in the category of Best Audio Book, Narration, and Storytelling Recording, at the 68th Annual Grammy Awards held in Los Angeles, US

– by Dar Ovais for Hindustan Times, 2 February 2026

At 90, the Tibetan spiritual leader, Dalai Lama, has won his first Grammy, a global award for his spoken-word album, Meditations: The Reflections of His Holiness the Dalai Lama’.

The album won in the category of Best Audio Book, Narration, and Storytelling Recording, at the 68th Annual Grammy Awards held in Los Angeles, US, on February 1, 2026.

In the category, other nominations included Kathy Garver (Elvis, Rocky & Me: The Carol Connors Story), Trevor Noah (Into The Uncut Grass), Ketanji Brown Jackson (Lovely One: A Memoir) and Fab Morvan (You Know It’s True: The Real Story of Milli Vanilli).

The Dalai Lama had collaborated with sarod maestro Amjad Ali Khan and his sons, Amaan Ali Bangash and Ayaan Ali Bangash, on the album, blending spoken word and music to celebrate universal values of peace, compassion, kindness and hope.

The Dalai Lama — a title held by Tenzin Gyatso as 14th in the spiritual line of succession — joined other first-time winners at the 68th Grammys, including filmmaker Steven Spielberg.

Reacting to the award, the Dalai Lama said, “I receive this recognition with gratitude and humility. I don’t see it as something personal, but as a recognition of our shared universal responsibility. I truly believe that peace, compassion, care for our environment, and an understanding of the oneness of humanity are essential for the collective well-being of all eight billion human beings. I’m grateful that this Grammy recognition can help spread these messages more widely.”

Musician Rufus Wainwright accepted the award on the Dalai Lama’s behalf during the ceremony.

About the album, an official from the Dalai Lama’s office told HT: “They have used His Holiness Dalai Lama’s key messages taken from various talks given by him on compassion, peace, sense of oneness of humanity, and environment.”

Amjad Ali Khan had posted on social media at the time of nomination announcement, “Our album, Meditation: Reflection of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, is a project close to our hearts. It brings together the spoken wisdom of His Holiness with original music that invites reflection, stillness and compassion. Throughout our lives we have been inspired by his teachings and this collaboration allowed us to create something that carries his message of peace and hope in a new way.”

“Working with His Holiness was a profound privilege. We are grateful to every artist who contributed their voice, creativity, and spirit to this vision,” he added.

The album, produced with the involvement of Glassnote Records, features the Nobel Peace Prize laureate’s meditative reflections interwoven with Indian classical music and contributions from global artists across diverse traditions.

The post Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama wins Grammy for spoken-word album; collab with sarod maestro Amjad Ali Khan, sons first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.

At 90 years old, the Dalai Lama achieved a historic first, winning a Grammy for Best Audio Book, Narration & Storytelling Recording. His spoken-word album, Meditations: The Reflections of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, mixed his teachings with music from acclaimed artists, aiming to spread messages of peace and compassion to a global audience. Read on!

– by The Economic Times, 2 February 2026

Music’s biggest night unfolded today in Los Angeles, with the 68th Grammy Awards delivering plenty of headline-making moments. From Kendrick Lamar rewriting rap history to K-pop securing a breakthrough win, the ceremony celebrated global sounds in all their diversity. Amid these pop culture milestones, one unexpected name stood out. At the age of 90, the Dalai Lama won his first-ever Grammy, leaving many viewers curious about how a Buddhist spiritual leader found his way onto music’s grandest stage.

The Dalai Lama took home the award for Best Audio Book, Narration & Storytelling Recording for his spoken-word album Meditations: The Reflections of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The project beat other nominees, including Milli Vanilli’s Fab Morvan, US Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, Grammys host Trevor Noah, and actor Kathy Garver.

While the win itself was historic, it also sparked questions among fans unfamiliar with how such projects qualify for the Grammys.

How Dalai Lama got nominated for Grammys?

Meditations is not a conventional music album. Instead, it mixes spoken reflections by the Dalai Lama with carefully composed music, turning decades of his teachings into an immersive listening experience. The album draws from his talks on compassion, peace, environmental responsibility, and the idea of shared humanity, values that have defined his public life for over seven decades.

According to Rolling Stone report, several tracks stand out for their timely themes. On Water, the Dalai Lama shared the environmental changes he has witnessed since childhood in Tibet, pointing to the urgent need to protect natural resources.

Another track, Peace, revolves around compassion, which he describes as essential not just for spiritual growth but for human survival itself.

The project’s musical dimension plays a key role in its Grammy eligibility. The album features contributions from internationally acclaimed artists such as Rufus Wainwright, Maggie Rogers, and Andra Day, who lend their voices to selected tracks. Producer Kabir Sehgal explained that the choice of collaborators was intentional, as he wanted artists whose work or academic interests intersected with philosophy and spirituality. According to Kabir, the goal was to frame the Dalai Lama’s wisdom in a in a soundscape that feels contemporary while remaining respectful of its roots.

Indian classical music forms the backbone of the album. Sarod maestro Amjad Ali Khan and his sons, Amaan and Ayaan Ali Bangash, collaborated closely on the project, bringing depth and continuity to the compositions. The Bangash family has performed for the Dalai Lama multiple times over the past two decades, making their involvement deeply personal. Amaan Ali Bangash noted that the Dalai Lama’s office remained engaged throughout the process and offered its blessings at every stage.

Kabir Sehgal also revealed that shaping the album was an intensive process. He said he spent more than 100 hours listening to the Dalai Lama’s speeches and conversations to curate the final 10 tracks. The aim, he added, was to present messages of love, kindness, and peace in a form that resonates with modern audiences, especially at a time when global tensions feel particularly high.

More about Dalai Lama’s album

Released in August 2025, shortly after the Dalai Lama turned 90, Meditations arrived at a moment of reflection in his life and legacy. While the Dalai Lama didn’t attend the ceremony due to his age and limited travel, his office welcomed the recognition. According to those close to the project, the nomination, and eventual win, was seen less as a personal accolade and more as an opportunity for his message to reach younger generations.

Nearly four decades after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the Dalai Lama’s Grammy win adds another unexpected chapter to his journey.

The post At 90, Dalai Lama Wins His First Grammy. How Did the Buddhist Leader Get Nominated for Music’s Biggest Night? first appeared on Tibetan Magazine for Tibet News & Issues.