The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals decided United States v. Fulsom, No. 202500166, on May 29, 2026. Officer members at a general court-martial at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam convicted a 19-year-old Lance Corporal, contrary to his pleas, of attempted sexual assault of a child and attempted sexual abuse of a child by indecent communication, both under Article 80, UCMJ. The charges arose from an Army CID sting, Operation Keiki Shield-18, in which an agent ran a fictitious persona — “Chloe,” listed as 18 on an adult dating app but disclosed by text as “almos 15.” The members sentenced Fulsom to reduction to E-1, forty-five days of confinement, total forfeitures, and a dishonorable discharge. The military judge conditionally dismissed the indecent-communication specification as an unreasonable multiplication of charges, to ripen upon completion of appellate review. Fulsom’s sole assignment of error — that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient because the Government entrapped him — failed, and NMCCA affirmed.

The Issue That Matters: Why Entrapment Failed — and What’s Left of It

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals decided United States v. Durbin, No. 202400333, on June 2, 2026, over a dissent. A military judge sitting alone at a special court-martial at Camp Lejeune convicted Captain Durbin, contrary to her pleas, of one specification of conduct unbecoming an officer under Article 133, UCMJ, for manually stimulating a fellow Marine officer’s penis in her truck — on divers occasions, including once in a publicly accessible parking structure sixty yards from the squadron’s hangar, during working hours, in uniform. The military judge acquitted her of extramarital sexual conduct under Article 134 and excepted some of the charged conduct. The sentence: a reprimand. Durbin raised one assignment of error — legal and factual sufficiency — and a divided panel affirmed.

The Issue That Matters: The Substantive Limits of Article 133

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals decided United States v. Benton, No. 202400332, on June 5, 2026. A military judge sitting alone at a special court-martial at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point convicted Private First Class Benton, contrary to his pleas, of breaching restriction under Article 87b, UCMJ, and of attempting to escape from custody under Article 80, UCMJ. The escape charge arose at the base medical clinic. While two brig escorts walked Benton through pre-confinement screening, he kept pushing the revolving door, exited back into the parking lot, sprinted to a friend’s waiting car, and climbed in. A gunnery sergeant stepped in front of the car and ended the attempt.

The military judge sentenced Benton to fourteen days of confinement and credited him with eleven days of pretrial confinement. Critically, the judge also awarded day-for-day Article 13, UCMJ, credit after ruling that the commanding officer “inappropriately imposed punishment on the accused prior to trial” and that the CO’s justification for pretrial confinement “was unreasonable.” On appeal, Benton argued that the conviction for attempting to escape could not stand because the underlying custody was illegal. NMCCA affirmed the findings and sentence.

For Cave & Freeburg, LLP, the case also shows why an accused should bring experienced military defense counsel into the case early. Trial litigation, plea negotiations, mental-health evidence, and appellate preservation do not operate in separate boxes. Each decision changes the next one. A military defense lawyer who understands both trial and appellate practice can use that reality to protect the client when the case turns quickly.

The first Reimonenq decision changed the case

The unpublished NMCCA decision in Simmons is a modern, post-Military Justice Act application of a much older problem addressed in United States v. Palenius, 2 M.J. 86 (C.M.A. 1977): what does trial defense counsel still owe the accused after sentence is announced?

1. The Palenius baseline

The case matters even though AFCCA labeled the opinion unpublished and nonprecedential. It shows how quickly a negotiated plea can become an appellate problem when the charging theory does not match the UCMJ’s structure. It also shows why court-martial experience matters. A military defense lawyer must know the punitive articles, the limitations on Article 134, the Care inquiry, the waiver doctrine, and appellate remedies before advising a client to plead guilty or before deciding whether to challenge a specification.

At Cave & Freeburg, LLP, we look for these issues because they often hide in plain sight. The question is not merely whether the accused admitted misconduct. The question is whether the Government charged a valid offense, proved or obtained admissions to every required element, and used a theory Congress allows under the UCMJ.

(rentas-nmcca-providence-ineffective-assistance-military-defense-lawyer)

United States v. Rentas: When “Trash” Almost Sank a Plea—And the IAC Claim That Followed

United States v. Hurley: What a One-Line CAAF Denial Actually Means

On 29 November 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) denied the petition for grant of review in United States v. Hurley, 71 M.J. 468, 2012 CAAF LEXIS 1305. The entry is two words long: “Petition Denied.” That brevity hides a great deal of legal weight—and a great deal of professional opportunity for a service member who knows where the post-CAAF road actually leads. Any military defense lawyer who handles appeals will tell you a denied petition is rarely the end of the line. But it is a hinge moment, and what happens next determines everything.

(coram-nobis-bcmr-clemency-white-military-defense-counsel)

Coram Nobis After a Court-Martial: Lessons from In re White