If the hero who stood before the tanks in 1989 were to perform that same act in the United States in 2026, what do you think would happen? There is little doubt that many right-wing Chinese, who brandish anti-communist slogans, would shout: “Run him over!” 

Following the shooting of Minnesota resident Renée Good by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent, a segment of right-wing Chinese commentators argued that if one obstructs law enforcement or fails to follow orders, they should expect to be shot. One particularly bizarre individual even claimed that if his own wife were killed for stepping on the gas and “scaring” a police officer or ICE agent, he would neither protest nor shed a tear, asserting she would have deserved it. 

One must wonder if such a person even has a wife—and who would willingly be his family? Why does he not consider the possibility that he himself might one day face the “MAGA iron fist” and be harmed or killed by the excessive force of federal agents, rather than projecting this scenario onto a perhaps non-existent spouse? 

The Shield of Immunity and the Erosion of Rights

While U.S. law enforcement power is indeed extensive—protected by “Qualified Immunity” against civil claims—this does not grant agents the right to use unlimited force against citizens. If the logic of these commentators were true, such a country would be even more oppressive than the one they claim to oppose. These individuals are “naive supporters who inadvertently damage the cause”; they clearly love Trump more than they love the U.S. Constitution or civil liberties. 

More tragic still is that many among this group are Hong Kongers who personally experienced the consequences of excessive police power in 2019. They are not merely defending the agent who fired the shot, Jonathan Ross; they are defending Trump’s policy of mass deportation. To execute this “population clearing policy,” ICE has been granted excessive authority to act with impunity in communities. How are these agents any different from the “Big Whites” (pandemic workers) who ran rampant across China? It is ironic that “anti-communist” Trump supporters view them as a “force of justice,” exhibiting a servant-like obedience to a power that could easily infringe upon their own rights. 

Was the Use of Deadly Force Justified?

U.S. law enforcement agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have clear use-of-force guidelines. DHS Policy 044-05 states that deadly force may not be used solely to prevent a suspect’s escape and prohibits firing at drivers of moving vehicles unless there is a reasonable belief of an immediate threat to life. Furthermore, agents are cautioned against unreasonably placing themselves in situations where deadly force becomes the only option. 

The government, aware of the poor optics of agents shooting citizens, initially labeled Renée Good a “domestic terrorist” and attempted to “weaponize” her vehicle—a controversial legal tactic often used by the Trump administration to justify killings. Since last July, immigration agents have fired into vehicles at least six times, resulting in two deaths. 

As more video footage has surfaced, the official narrative has shifted toward “self-defense.” Under the 1989 Graham v. Connor precedent, force is evaluated from the perspective of a “reasonable officer” on the scene, providing significant leeway for agents to claim they felt threatened. 

However, the footage shows Renée Good was simply trying to drive away. While one agent reached into the car, Jonathan Ross—the agent who fired—was at a distance from the front left of the vehicle. Crucially, Ross was filming with a phone in one hand while shooting with the other. This highlights another controversy: agents were giving Good contradictory orders—was she supposed to “leave” or “get out of the car”? 

The Reality of the “Threat”

White House supporters refuse to acknowledge that even if Good had obstructed enforcement, her actions—turning the wheel to the right to leave—did not pose a danger to the agents. Under Tennessee v. Garner (1985), police may not use deadly force against a fleeing suspect unless they pose an immediate threat of death or serious injury. 

The video recorded by Ross himself confirms he was not in life-threatening danger. Good is seen calmly telling him, “I’m not mad at you.” A person fearing for their life does not walk around a “weaponized” vehicle while filming on a smartphone, even as they pull the trigger. Logic dictates that shooting a driver and causing a car to go out of control poses a far greater risk to the public. John P. Gross, a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School, noted that if an officer truly perceived a threat, they would not be casually filming with one hand. 

When the “threat” narrative faltered, the White House suggested Ross was suffering from PTSD due to a similar incident six months prior. If true, an agent with PTSD belongs at home, not at a high-conflict scene. While it is a relief that no bystanders were hit by the uncontrolled vehicle, a citizen still paid with her life. 

The Uphill Battle for Legal Redress

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” In legal terms, shooting or arresting a person is a “seizure.” In the George Floyd case, the prolonged kneeling on his neck was ruled an “unreasonable seizure,” leading to a $27 million settlement and a 22-year sentence for officer Derek Chauvin. 

However, Section 1983, which allowed for the Floyd settlement, only applies to state and local officials, not federal agents. By involving the FBI and excluding the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), the federal government has made it difficult for the state to prosecute Ross. The Justice Department now holds all the power, acting essentially as Ross’s defense counsel. 

For the Good family, seeking justice is nearly impossible. The “Bivens Principle,” which once allowed citizens to sue federal agents for constitutional violations, is virtually defunct. Courts often dismiss such cases if they involve “national security” or “border management” (as seen in Egbert v. Boule, 2022). 

The only remaining path is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows victims to sue the government for damages. ⁴⁵While this may result in a payout—as seen in the Sutherland Springs ($144 million) or Whitey Bulger ($20 million) cases—it allows the individual agent to escape personal accountability. For families seeking justice rather than just money, this is a bitter outcome. 

While taxpayer-funded settlements can sometimes pressure a system toward reform, the Trump administration may remain indifferent. As for the commentator who wouldn’t cry for his wife: if he understood the law, he might actually smile—her death could provide him with a settlement large enough to last a lifetime. 

There is an iron rule in the world of collecting: no matter how priceless or unique your collection is, you must be able to endure loneliness, especially if your collection might be of dubious origin. If you genuinely love the item, it is best to hide it deep, appreciating it privately with only yourself and trusted friends in the circle; if you only value its “worth” and hope to sell it for money to live lavishly, then you must conceal your identity and dispose of it discreetly, ensuring the buyer is also someone who can keep a secret. Otherwise, if they suffer, you will be implicated.

However, the Chinese cultural relic collecting community has a bad habit: they particularly love to show off. Once they acquire a “good item,” they are always impatient to tell others, invite people home to admire it, or even loudly announce it to the world, afraid that others won’t know their taste and capability.

Unfortunately, Lu Ting (陸挺), the original owner of Jiangnan Spring (《江南春》), was not a low-key person during his lifetime. He had long declared publicly that he held Jiangnan Spring and had invited people to view it. The medal in his hand finally turned into a bomb.

In 2010, Lu Ting’s “Yilanzhai Art Museum” (藝蘭齋美術館) in preparation for its upcoming inauguration, specifically displayed Jiangnan Spring among its collection to a reporter. In the article, “A Secret Exploration of Yilanzhai’s Treasures” (《藝蘭齋珍寶探秘》), the reporter also wrote a passage introducing how Jiangnan Spring was passed down to Lu Ting’s “Yilanzhai”:

“The person in charge of Yilanzhai produced a photocopied letter from the Shanghai Museum. The letterhead was stamped with ‘Social and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Culture of the Central People’s Government'(中央人民政府文化部社會文化事業管理局) . This was a letter written in 1953 by Zheng Zhenduo (鄭振鐸), then director of the State Administration of Cultural Heritage, to his old friend Xu Senyu (徐森玉), head of the Shanghai Cultural Relics Management Committee (上海文管會), stating that the Palace Museum (故宮博物院) was short of paintings and calligraphy from the Ming and Qing dynasties and asking him to solicit paintings. Among those listed as ‘absolutely necessary’ by Zheng Zhenduo was Qiu Ying’s (仇英) painting Jiangnan Spring, collected by the famous collector Pang Laichen (龐萊臣).”

This passage was as good as unwritten. Even though the letter produced by the person in charge of Yilanzhai had the impressive signature of the “Social and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Culture of the Central People’s Government,” the letter only stated that the Chinese Ministry of Culture at the time wanted Jiangnan Spring, but did not explain how Jiangnan Spring ended up in Yilanzhai’s hands. What is even more suspicious is: how did a cultural relic desired by the state end up in Lu Ting’s possession?

Even more ridiculous is that in 2015, when Pang’s descendants sued the Nanjing Museum, the curator Pang Ou (龐歐), who was the defendant, used this report as evidence to prove that Lu Ting and his wife from Yilanzhai had purchased Jiangnan Spring as early as the 1990s. This report buried a nuclear bomb for today’s exposure of the matter. The report described the box containing Jiangnan Spring in great detail. Pang’s descendants stated that the box was the original one from Pang Laichen’s collection, and this matching box was also clearly recorded in the donation list provided by the Nanjing Museum (南京博物院) that year.

A collector in Shanghai, in an interview with The Paper (澎湃新聞), claimed that he had seen Jiangnan Spring at Lu Ting’s home in 1999 when he went to demand repayment of a debt from Lu Ting. At the time, Lu Ting might have been unable to suppress his desire to show off, or perhaps he wanted to indicate to the person demanding payment that he was not without money to repay. In any case, he voluntarily showed this sensational collection to the visitor and said that the painting was sold to him by a descendant of Pang Laichen, who was studying at Nanjing University and sought him out after hearing his reputation. Lu Ting’s wife, Ding Weiwen (丁蔚文), also stated in her academic paper, “Textual Research on Qiu Ying’s ‘Jiangnan Spring’ Scroll” (《仇英“江南春“卷考辯》), published in the Journal of Nanjing Arts Institute （《南京藝術學院學報》） in 2007, that her husband’s collection of Jiangnan Spring was purchased from Pang Laichen’s descendants.

The Yilanzhai Art Museum has yet to open, and Jiangnan Spring remains a legend. The cultural relics circle is small, and people might not have taken it seriously, thinking Lu Ting was just bragging. However, after Lu Ting’s death in May 2025, the successor, Zhu Guang （朱光）, immediately put Jiangnan Spring up for auction, as if he couldn’t survive one more second without getting his hands on the 80 million yuan. Is there a possibility that they had an agreement during their transaction that Lu Ting could not publicly sell it while alive?

According to The Paper, Lu Ting had mortgaged Jiangnan Spring and other collections to a company due to a loan. Later, unable to repay the debt, the mortgaged painting was resold by the company to the current holder, Zhu Guang. Zhu Guang is not a well-known figure in the collecting world. He only switched to buying and selling paintings and calligraphy a few years ago and has lived abroad for a long time, possibly unaware of some of the unwritten rules in China’s domestic collecting circle.

The explosion of the Jiangnan Spring incident finally uncovered an embezzlement that spanned over 20 years, all thanks to this collector who was eager to exchange the painting for cash. Lu Ting is dead, free from all worries. Pitiful is Xu Huping （徐湖平）; people forgot that he is still alive. An 80-year-old man who served a few years in the military in his youth, his body is probably still robust. In his later years, he had been so low-key that he only won a Forbes-rated Outstanding Cultural Figure award last year, occasionally appearing on Douyin (TikTok) where people would film his home filled with rich collections of paintings and calligraphy. But how can he withstand having his reputation tarnished in his late years?

蔡瀾先生是個雜學家，見識廣，懂的東西多。說他是才子，另外三個「四大才子」身為他的朋友，自然不會有意見（蔡瀾也自稱算不上是才子）；但在我們這些外人看來，當年發明「香江四大才子」的人加他名字上去，就好像為了湊數似的。

蔡老先生確實寫了很多書，是很多人一輩子也寫不出來的篇幅，但他的文字多是散文隨筆，創作難度不大，也很難說出什麼名篇佳作。以前太多香港作家靠專欄文字謀生，誰沒點散文隨筆結集出版呢？我認識一些文藝青年，覺得純粹寫這種散文隨筆甚至連「作家」也算不上。我覺得這又未免過於嚴格了。

身為美食家，蔡瀾將自己做成了一個招牌，開食店的都想獲得他青睞，成為「蔡瀾推薦」。如今foodie泛濫成災，誰能到達蔡瀾的高度？曾經有個餐廳老闆在微博上問蔡瀾，為他的餐廳寫一篇食評要多少錢。老先生回覆說，他不白吃白喝，必定自己掏錢去吃，如果菜品做得好，也免費宣傳。最後又不客氣補充一句：「聽你這種口氣，不是一個用心做菜的老闆，餐廳遲早關門。」

但老先生有這麼愛惜自己的招牌嗎？你看大街上到處都是「蔡瀾推薦」，就知道是怎麼一回事。有多少是他自掏腰包去吃然後真心推薦的，有多少是別人花錢買的？他要不是年紀大了，可能還要開個YouTube，成為網紅foodie的一員——說不定，圍繞在他身邊的那些人可能早就有這麼建議過（經網民提醒，他其實有自己的Youtube，四個月前還拍了條片賣「蔡瀾點心」）。據他所說，他有一百個「護法」幫他篩選寄到他電郵的讀者來信。

他不在了，有多少人會因此沒有飯吃？上個月傳聞蔡瀾病逝，他的助理就在微博發表了一條措辭嚴厲的聲明，說網絡不是法外之地、造謠者要負刑事責任。江澤民多次被人誤報死訊，也沒有這麼惡吧？其實蔡瀾本人可能沒有那麼介意被人誤報死訊，畢竟近年目睹好友一一辭別，早已看透生死，奈何身邊有些人要靠他吃飯。有人說蔡瀾死了，蔡瀾聽了可能只是笑笑，但對於那些靠他吃飯的人，就是砸他的飯碗。

蔡瀾當然不缺錢花，頂著「香江四大才子」的名銜，收穫的名利也已經夠多。但老人家對於俗世並沒有看得那麼闊達，在微博上就有一個經典事件，史稱「蔡瀾為39元出賣林夕」。事源有人向蔡瀾提出一條付費問答的問題，怎麼看林夕（包括他的性向）。蔡瀾便領下39元，講了林夕當面向他們承認自己是gay的往事。

有天在佐敦看到一家賣糕點的小攤檔，也掛著「蔡瀾推薦」的招牌，下面用簡體字寫著一行「蔡瀾知己會」。後來在網上一查，「蔡瀾知己會」是蔡瀾於2008年設立的網站，現在已經無法訪問。從蔡瀾知己會還有編號這件事來看，大概是一個需要繳會費的網站。

蔡瀾雖然雜學，但他的認知不一定對。就以他最拿手的美食來說，他有次寫客家釀豆腐的標準做法是用鯪魚肉餡。我是客家人，我吃的釀豆腐從來都是豬肉餡的。

中國一些年輕人，有時候你分不清他們到底是真心惡毒，還是歷史虛無、道德虛無，視一切皆為可拿來開玩笑的素材，而他們稱之為「解構」，還有個詞叫「搞抽象」。

在我看來，後者比前者更令人討厭。小粉紅可能是無知，可能是被洗了腦，而去攻擊他們不認可的人，但這群「解構主義者」卻不是無知，而是對一切都無所謂——世界沒有是非黑白，別人的苦難在他們眼中也只是玩笑。可恥也可悲。

最近Steam上有中國人為《Mount & Blade: Warband》製作了一個模組，扭曲南韓歷史上的光州事件《光州 Running Man》。據查，在另一個遊戲《Left 4 Dead 2》的workshop裡，也有中國人發表了與「光州 Running Man」相關的內容。

「光州 Running Man」這個所謂的「梗」，最初應該是來自於bilibili去年10月發布的一條影片。影片稱光州事件為「光州第一屆無限格鬥大賽」，用這樣的名稱去定義一場大量平民死傷的事件，不管那是不是一場民主運動，都非常賤格。我相信，只要不會帶來任何後果，南京大屠殺也可以被他們「解構」為「劈砍競技大賽」。

知乎上有人發問，如何看待bilibili網民上將光州事件解構為「光州Running Man」？

你以為知乎是中國相對沒有那麼「抽象」而比較講究理性的網站嗎？早就不是了。那條提問下有1000多條回答，排在前面的幾條幾乎都一個比一個「抽象」。

倒是也有一個直來直去不玩抽象的網民，卻也並不覺開光州事件玩笑得有問題，反問：為什麼不提bilibili還拿北韓三個太陽來開玩笑，為何北韓可以玩，而南韓不可以玩？他們就是如此是非不分地認為，開光州事件玩笑和開北韓金氏一家，是同等性質的事，如果光州事件不可以開玩笑，那麼一個國家的最高權力也不可以被拿來開玩笑。

我們會認為，對一個高高在上、大權在握的人開玩笑，還真的就是在解構他的權力，尤其金家還是殘忍的獨裁者。那麼我想問，拿光州事件來開玩笑，是要解構什麼？

俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭已經三年，如今戰況如何？在眾多以俄烏戰爭為題材的電影裏，2025年香港國際電影節火鳥大獎紀錄片競賽單元的《塵埃不見基輔田》（Songs of Slow Burning Earth），給了我們不一樣的視角。整部電影，你不會看到任何戰鬥的畫面，不會看到任何一具人類的屍體。電影一直以數字來表示距離前線的距離，從一開始愈來愈接近前線，到後面慢慢遠離，鏡頭卻未曾捕捉前線的畫面。我們看到更多的是，烏克蘭人如何努力在戰爭中像尋常日子一樣維持生活。

戰爭已經成為了烏克蘭日常生活的一部分。麵包廠依然每天生產麵包，送到市民手上，人們領取了麵包後繼續在附近抽煙、閒聊，孩子們也依然在上學，在老師的帶領下暢想自己的夢想……如果不是那些不時傳來的砲聲、槍聲、空襲警報，你會以為烏克蘭已經結束了戰爭。

其中一個長鏡頭實實在在頭喚起了我2019年的記憶，那些似乎已遠去的往事。

飄著雨的寒冬，一輛汽車行駛於烏克蘭鄉間道路，鏡頭的視角是從駕駛室透過前面的擋風玻璃往外拍，而觀眾一開始並不知曉這到底是一輛什麼車，只會好奇，為何每次迎面而來的車輛見到這輛車時，都必然靠邊停下。車上的人有時還會下來，單膝跪地。車子駛過人們聚居的村莊時，道路兩旁已經跪著很多的人，有些身板不太好的老人，仍然試圖彎下自己的腰。

直到這輛車即將到達目的地時，鏡頭一轉。我們擁有了更廣闊的視野，看到這是一輛運送烈士遺體的車。天地間白雪皚皚。

紀錄片拍攝於2022年俄烏戰爭爆發至2024年，由烏克蘭導演Olha Zhurba執導。導演似乎刻意不標明拍攝每一個鏡頭、事件的時間，反而代之以每次拍攝地點離前線的距離，而通過距離，我們能大概了解戰爭的推進一一戰爭初期，前線愈來愈近，你感覺到不是導演為了拍攝戰爭而在追著戰爭跑，而是戰爭不斷逼近；及後，戰況逆轉，前線離拍攝地越來越遠。有人覺得本片散亂，我卻以為結構其實非常清晰。

從俄羅斯軍隊中解放的村莊，幾個小孩在經歷過家園被佔領、親友被屠殺後，拿著假槍玩戰爭遊戲，好似重獲兒童遊戲的快樂，卻其實已經找不回戰爭未爆發前的童稚。

本片中後段相當多篇幅其實是拍攝烏克蘭在恢復，儘管戰火至今仍在延燒。鏡頭帶我們去看後勤清點遺體、親屬領回烈士的遺物，而在戰爭中失去腿腳的士兵裝上義肢、穿上新鞋，重新站立了起來，正練習行走。

電影落在兩組場景的對比而結束：一邊是烏克蘭學生在課室裡探討烏克蘭的未來，另一邊是俄羅斯中部一家中學的學生正在步操。大概所有人都會好奇，導演身為烏克蘭人，到底是怎麼到俄羅斯拍攝這些鏡頭的。她在映後回答了很多人心中的疑問，她說俄羅斯學生步操並不是什麼秘密，事實上他們學校就會將這些實況錄像放到網上。

哈佛中國女生蔣雨融的畢業演講火爆半個地球，演講中談到與習大大「人類命運共同體」不謀而合的價值觀，說別人的貧窮也是她的貧窮、「敵人也是人」等等，她大概以為祖國同胞也會為她喝采。結果家人們並不領情，甚至挖出她背景很深，上哈佛也主要靠父幹。不只如此，放眼望去，華人無論什麼立場，幾乎無人不對她的演講反感。能讓當代華人的反應如此一致，也是近年世間罕有。

為什麼？不是她說的東西不對，而是她的東西和她身上所表現出來的精神氣質太不相符，簡單來說，就是矯揉造作，內容看似高尚卻空洞無物。連畢業袍都穿成慈禧太后模樣的人，嘴裏略帶哭腔地說著「別人的貧窮也是我的貧窮」，有什麼說服力？她在微博被家人們罵，她撰文反擊，炫耀自己在哈佛多受歡迎，連保安都找她合影，大有一種你們鄉下人沒水平欣賞我的感覺，不禁令人想起走進酒館的孔乙己。她的回擊，不正更證明了她的虛偽嗎？沒有她這麼好運生在官宦之家的人，就不是人嗎？

她不是真正為那些與自己不同的人發聲——事實上，放在美國當今語境下，她才是那個「不同的人」——白人為她鼓掌，大概也是在這樣一種語境之下：為一個「不同的人」發出聲音而鼓掌。白人當她是「少數族裔」、「弱者」，卻不知道她在中國其實是一個背景深厚的特權階層。

她也不具備真正的大愛和同理心，以目前的她來說，她不可能明白為何連中國人自己都不喜歡她。她的眼裡似乎只有自己，「我這次演出太棒了」的洋洋得意幾乎洋溢而出。不過，正好，習大大其實也並不真正相信「人類命運共同體」。她和他已經成為一個共同體了。

1981年9月9日，美國加州一所中學的老師Ron Gordon設立了第一個平方根日，據說靈感來自於他在八月填寫支票時，想起再過幾週就是9月9日，9的平方正好是當時年份的最後兩個數字81。據Ron Gordon的妻子回憶，她最初聽到丈夫要為此設立一個節日的時候，可能翻了白眼。一般而言，每一百年只有九個平方根日（每個平方根日之間相差的年份能夠組成連續的奇數）；但有些世紀會比較特別，比如2200世紀會多出一個2200年10月10日。而2025年比較特別的是，2025本身也是45的平方數。

後來，他又根據日曆中其他有趣的數學現象，不斷設立了奇數日（odd day）、全一日（ones upon a days或all ones day，如11/11/11）、喇叭日（Trumpet Day）等眾多的節日，並且為每一個節日都設立了獨立的網站。他的女兒小時候還為自己父親設立的節日感到疑惑：「如果這些真的是節日，那我為何還要上學？」

2016年時，第44任美國總統奧巴馬成為「平方根總統」。成為一個「平方根總統」，比「平方根日」出現的機率還要小，Ron Gordon說奧巴馬是第一位也可能是唯一一位「平方根總統」。

每一次平方根日到來之前，Ron Gordon都會以如何慶祝平方根日為題，舉辦有獎徵集活動。比如這一次平方根日，從徵集開始到結束，一共25天，最終從美國和全世界各選出25個勝出者，兩個組別分別共享價值552.5美元的獎品（放心，即使是現金也能夠平分）。他和家人曾做過的慶祝方式是將牛扒切成方塊，再配上根莖類蔬菜，有時他還會喝上幾口根汁啤酒（root beer）。

也許你不禁好奇，為何有奇數日而沒有偶數日？這難道不是男權思想作祟吧？我猜，奇數日的趣味性，除了在數學上，年份尾二數與月日組成連續的奇數（如2015年11月13日，以美國的日期書寫格式即爲11/13/15，這種現象一個世紀僅出現六次）之外，還有命名上的語言趣味，odd既是奇數，也意指「奇怪的」。像「全一日」的命名，同樣玩了一語雙關的語言趣味，「Ones Upon a Days」諧音「Once Upon a Day」（從前某天）。

Ron Gordon實在是個有趣的人。九年前有傳媒問他可以如何慶祝平方根日，他來一句：「It’s a good day to get things squared away（將事情處理好），try to fit a square peg into a round hole, go square dancing。」

到下一個平方根日時，這位有趣的退休教師將年屆90。他希望，如果他無法活到那一天，會有人接手平方根日的慶祝。

特朗普準備向引進美國的「外國電影」徵收100％的關稅，他是在保護美國電影嗎？不，反而更有可能是在報復荷里活。眾所周知，荷里活娛樂圈的大部分人都未給予大總統他想要的「尊重」，而向「外國電影」徵收100％關稅，不僅無法幫助美國電影，反而可能有反效果。

美國電影不是懦弱的大雄，特朗普也不是隨手能從兜裏拿出寶貝的叮噹。美國電影不僅不需要特朗普的保護，它還是最有影響力和競爭力的「美國製造」。有數據顯示，美國電影每年佔據過半全球票房，在外國賺取一百多億美元的收入（當然這些收入並不是美國片商一家獨賺，當地發行商、院線也分紅）。向來都是某國為了保護本國的電影製作而限制美國電影進口，比如中國。

中國對本土電影的保護，也不是通過關稅，而是入口限額。對本土電影保護力度如此之大的中國，本土電影的製作能力確實有所提升，但審美跟不上國際，加上擁有世界第一的審查，中國電影依然停留在自娛自樂的階段，國際影響力甚至不如韓國、印度。而且全球電影市場萎靡的當下，中國電影的製作、票房也大為萎縮。

雖然美國國內電影市場也非常龐大，但美國電影的海外收入其實高於本土市場。相反，外國電影佔據美國本土電影票房的份額非常小，每年可能不到百分之一。美國電影擁有完整且全世界最先進的產業鏈，有時美國片商投資的電影需要到外地製作，並不是產業鏈的問題，而是電影製作的特性決定了，有些美國電影就是需要到外國製作，比如《魔戒》到新西蘭取景拍攝。

這又牽涉另一個問題，美國投資的電影常常是「國際製作」，如何區分那些電影是否屬於「美國電影」？

美國向那些根本無法對本國電影製作、市場構成威脅的「外國電影」征收高額關稅，只會給那些不願引進太多美國電影的國家提供更多藉口，阻礙美國電影進入自己的市場。如今全球電影市場都不景氣，反而美國可能依靠國際市場，尚能維持製作規模和賺到點錢。特朗普拿電影來打關稅戰，要麼是愚蠢到家，要麼是壞到極點，想害死荷里活。

現在最好看的「美國電影」，可能是由每天由特朗普自導自演的白宮大戲，給全世界提供了太多既好笑又苦澀的娛樂。