Child support is a legal obligation intended to establish a fair standard of support for children and ensure they benefit from the financial means of both parents. Typically, child support is paid between parents for the benefit of the child to provide for the basic support of the child. Such periodic payments are not deductible from the taxable income of the payor, nor are they deductible in the hands of the recipient.

How Child Support is calculated

Child support is calculated based on two primary factors:

• Each parent’s income; and
• The parenting arrangement, including how much time the child spends with each parent.

For most parents, the calculation is based on gross annual income and is reassessed on a yearly basis to ensure support remains fair and reflective of current financial circumstances.

Generally, all sources of income are included for the calculation of a child support quantum. For most people, the key factor is based on their gross annual income and is recalculated on an annual basis.

What counts as income?

The first step in determining child support is identifying a parent’s total income. Courts generally rely on the parent’s “total income” as reported on their T1 General Income Tax Return.

Income typically includes most sources of earnings, such as:

• Wages and salary from employment
• Contract or freelance income
• Overtime and vacation pay
• Bonuses and commissions
• Tips and gratuities
• Self‑employment income

As a general rule, all income sources are considered when determining child support obligations.

Self-employed Parties

Determining income for self‑employed parents can be challenging. Under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, courts may require additional financial disclosure to determine a parent’s true income for child support purposes.

This may include:

• Business or corporate tax returns
• Financial statements
• Details of business expenses or losses
• Salaries or benefits paid to the parent
• Other income related to the business

The goal is to ensure child support reflects the income actually available to the parent, not just what is reported on personal tax returns.

Under-employment or Unemployment

Parents are expected to support their children to the best of their ability. A parent cannot avoid child support obligations by intentionally earning less than they are capable of earning.

In some cases, a court may decide to impute income, meaning it assigns an income level based on what the parent should reasonably earn rather than what they currently earn.

When deciding whether to impute income, the court may consider:

• Whether the parent is caring for a young child
• Whether the parent is healthy and able to work
• The parent’s age, education, experience, and skills
• Job availability in the relevant labour market

There is no automatic rule. Each case is decided based on what is reasonable in the circumstances.

Unclaimed Income

Parents are required to fully disclose all sources of income. If a parent fails to do so, the court may impute income to account for unreported earnings.

This is particularly relevant where income is earned but not declared on tax returns, including cash income or income from non‑traditional sources.

Changes in Income

Child support typically is reviewed annually. Parents are expected to exchange updated financial information so support payments can be adjusted if income has changed.

If a parent’s income increases or decreases significantly, that change must be disclosed to the other parent and, if necessary, to the court.

Key Takeaway

The law places a strong emphasis on a parent’s obligation to financially support their child. This obligation generally takes precedence over personal preferences or lifestyle choices.

Parents must act responsibly and transparently when making decisions that affect their earning capacity and ability to pay child support. Courts will look at the full financial picture to ensure child support arrangements adequately meet a parent’s obligation to their child.

Legal Disclaimer

The information provided in this article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Child support obligations and outcomes depend on the unique facts of each case, including income, parenting arrangements, and applicable legislation.

The post Income and Child Support Payments: What You Need To Know appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

The Province of Nova Scotia (the “Province”) recently passed legislation that establishes the legislative framework for the development of a natural hydrogen industry in the Province.

Natural Hydrogen

“Natural” or “white” hydrogen refers to hydrogen that occurs naturally underground. This is opposed to “green” hydrogen (which typically refers to hydrogen produced using renewable energy sources) and “grey” hydrogen (which typically refers to hydrogen produced from natural gas and without the use of carbon capture).

Interest in natural hydrogen is rapidly growing across Canada, and exploration companies have begun to explore natural hydrogen potential in the Province. To support such interest, the Province has engaged Dalhousie University to oversee the new Subsurface Energy Research and Development Investment Program (the “Program”) and has allocated $30 million for such Program. The aim of the Program is to foster a collaborative research and development environment between proponents and Dalhousie University with respect to the Province’s onshore subsurface energy resources. At least seven proponents have expressed interest in the Program as of the writing of this article. The Program aligns with the recently passed legislation discussed below and demonstrates the Government’s significant interest in developing the Province’s subsurface energy sector.

Proponents maintain that natural hydrogen could represent a significant opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in, and be a significant source of resource development for, the Province.

The new Subsurface Energy Resource Extraction Act

Currently, natural hydrogen and associated mineral rights and claims are not captured under the Province’s existing mineral and petroleum regimes, being the Mineral Resources Act (“MRA”) or the Petroleum Resources Act (“PRA”).

In April 2026, the Province passed the Powering the Economy Act (“PEA”), which creates the Subsurface Energy Resource Extraction Act (“SEREA” or the “Act”). SEREA will come into force on proclamation (which has not yet been received) and will repeal the PRA by replacing it with SEREA, a broader legislative framework that extends beyond onshore oil and gas to include other subsurface energy resources, such as natural hydrogen, helium, carbon storage resources, and geothermal energy.

SEREA provides that all subsurface energy resources, including natural hydrogen, “are and are deemed always to have been vested in the Crown” and that rights to such subsurface energy resources may only be granted pursuant to SEREA. The Act introduces two forms of rights related to the exploration and production of natural hydrogen:

• Natural hydrogen exploration agreements. These agreements will have a term of three (3) years with renewal rights for the holder; and
• Natural hydrogen production leases. These leases will have a term of ten (10) years from the date that commercial production begins and contain renewal rights for the holder.

Pursuant to SEREA, license, lease and agreement holders can expect to pay royalties related to the production of subsurface energy resources. SEREA will also limit the free transfer and assignment of natural hydrogen rights.

Note on Future Regulations

While these legislative developments are not yet in force, they represent a clear intent from the Province to address the identified legislative gap related to the exploration, mining and production of natural hydrogen and other subsurface energy resources in the Province.

The Act does not, however, provide specifics on the process by which a proponent can apply for a natural hydrogen exploration agreement or a production lease, or details surrounding the planned royalty regime. It appears that the Province will introduce accompanying regulations to SEREA in the future, which will provide further details on these items and the natural hydrogen regulatory regime generally.

For any queries, please contact Matthew Dorreen or Guy Wellard in the Halifax office of Cox & Palmer. This article was written with contributions from Elliot Hernandez, Articling Clerk at Cox & Palmer.

This article originally appeared on Law360 Canada’s website published by LexisNexis Canada Inc.

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s firm, its clients, Law 360 Canada, LexisNexis Canada or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

The post A Legislative Pathway for Natural Hydrogen: Nova Scotia’s Subsurface Energy Resource Extraction Act appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

Recent amendments to Canada’s Competition Act (the “Act”) have extended the Act’s reach into a new area of business conduct: environmental claims. Businesses that advertise the environmental benefits of their products, services, or operations now face potential liability — and significant penalties — if those claims are not properly substantiated.

What is Greenwashing?

“Greenwashing” refers to the practice of making unsubstantiated claims about the environmental benefits of a product, service, or business activity. Common examples include labelling a product as “carbon neutral,” “eco-friendly,” or “net zero” without reliable data to support those representations.

The New Provisions

The greenwashing provisions, which came into effect in 2024, introduced two distinct obligations under the Act’s misleading advertising provisions:

1. Businesses making representations about a product’s benefits for protecting the environment or mitigating the effects of climate change must ensure those claims are based on an “adequate and proper test” conducted prior to making the representation.
2. Businesses making representations about the benefits of a business activity for protecting the environment or mitigating the effects of climate change must ensure those representations are based on “adequate and proper substantiation”.

No guiding Competition Tribunal decisions have yet been issued under these provisions. However, there are two key features that all businesses should keep in mind:

1. Intent to mislead is not required — the provisions apply to any environmental claim that cannot be properly substantiated, regardless of motive. Well-meaning businesses can unwittingly run afoul of the Act.
2. The burden rests on the business making an environmental claim to prove that the claim is properly substantiated, rather than on the Bureau to prove that it is not.

These provisions were revised in March 2026 by Bill C-15, which removed the requirement that business activity claims be substantiated by “internationally recognized methodology” and restricted (but did not eliminate) the ability of private parties to apply to the Competition Tribunal with claims of unsubstantiated environmental claims. These changes are a reminder that this area of law continues to evolve rapidly.

Why This Matters

As with the drip pricing provisions discussed in our earlier article, the greenwashing amendments are part of a broader legislative effort to ensure that consumers can make informed decisions in the marketplace. Just as hidden fees distort consumer choice at the point of purchase, unsubstantiated environmental claims can distort purchasing decisions by consumers and businesses who place genuine value on sustainability.

The stakes are significant. Violations of the Act’s misleading advertising provisions can attract administrative monetary penalties of up to the greater of $10 million ($15 million for repeat offences), three times the benefit derived from the conduct, or 3% of a company’s annual worldwide gross revenues — whichever is largest. For publicly traded companies or businesses with large revenues, the exposure can be substantial.

Finally, the changes made to the Competitive Act under Bill C-15 did not fully close the door to private parties (including potential competitors) bringing claims for unsubstantiated environmental claims. This means that any business can be subject to a greenwashing claim at almost any time.

Practical Guidance for Businesses

Businesses operating in Canada should review how they communicate about environmental performance. Making false or misleading representations in marketing materials remains “reviewable conduct” under the Competition Act. Our key takeaways:

• The provisions target specific claims: that a product or business activity protects or restores the environment or mitigates the causes or effects of climate change. For example, a claim that a product is made with 20% recycled materials, without more, will likely fall outside the greenwashing provisions (but it still must be accurate and not misleading). By contrast, a claim that a product releases fewer chemicals than a competitor’s and is therefore “better for the environment” would likely engage the greenwashing provisions and should be supported by “adequate and proper testing” conducted before the claim is made.
• Businesses should review their marketing practices to ensure environmental claims are appropriately limited in scope and are concisely worded. Broad statements such as “eco-friendly” without specifying how should generally be avoided; a more specific, verifiable claim (e.g., that a business uses 50% electric vehicles in its operations) is typically a safer approach.
• Consider having legal counsel review marketing materials, annual reports, and ESG disclosures for consistency with the Act’s requirements, and ensure supporting documentation is retained and readily accessible if challenged.
• Environmental claims made on social media, through influencer partnerships, or in ESG reports are subject to the same substantiation requirements as traditional advertising.
• Do not adopt environmental claims from suppliers or third parties without independent verification. Where a product’s environmental attributes depend on upstream inputs or supply chain practices, the business making the representation to consumers bears the substantiation burden under the Act.

For any queries related to competition law, please contact Sandy Jenkins or Richard W. Norman in the Halifax office of Cox & Palmer.

This article originally appeared on Law360 Canada’s website published by LexisNexis Canada Inc.

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s firm, its clients, Law 360 Canada, LexisNexis Canada or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

The post Greenwashing Now a Competition Law Issue: What Businesses Need to Know appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

What is Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)?

The Supreme Court of Canada defines IPV to include all abusive conduct (physical and psychological) by which one intimate partner coerces and controls the other, depriving them of their autonomy. The Supreme Court of Canada identifies the following examples:

• Physical and sexual violence
• Emotional and psychological abuse, including verbal abuse, harassment, humiliation, and denigration
• Financial control
• Stalking and surveillance
• Denying a partner access to educational, employment, and recreational opportunities
• Litigation abuse
• Threatening conduct, including threatening to harm children or take them away and threatening to commit suicide

Elements to Prove IPV

The Supreme Court of Canada explains that to prove a claim in IPV, a claimant must show:

1. The abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership “or its aftermath”;
2. The perpetrator intentionally engaged in that conduct; however, proof of intention to control their partner is not required; and
3. The perpetrator’s conduct amounts to “coercive control”, meaning a reasonable person fully informed about the relationship would have perceived the perpetrator’s conduct as an assertion of control, depriving their partner of their dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship.

Why is a new tort of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) being created?

The driving factors in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to recognize a new tort include the unique features of the wrongdoings and harms related to IPV.

The wrongdoings are unique in that they are centered around coercive control which can result from both visible and less visible actions. Namely, coercive control can result from incidents of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, but it can also arise from methods of control that can go unseen, including economic control of the victim and monitoring their day-to-day movements.

The harms caused by IPV are also unique. These harms include violation of the victim’s dignity, autonomy, and equality.  The victim is denied the ability to make fundamental choices about their life, free of interference of others.

In this decision, the SCC also recognizes IPV as a gendered issue: “women are overwhelmingly those most often harmed by their partners”.

Assessing Compensation

At trial, K. A. Ahluwalia, the victim of IPV, was awarded $150,000 in damages. Applying the new tort of IPV, the Supreme Court of Canada concludes that this award “should be modified to state that the entire damages award is included under the head of general compensatory damages”.

Conclusion

The SCC has made a monumental change in the decision in Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, by establishing the existence of the tort of intimate partner violence (IPV). This decision enables victims to bring claims against their perpetrators under a unique yet broader category of harm and wrongdoing that encompasses a wide range of abuse and coercive control.

The post Victims of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) can now sue their abusers for damages (Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16) appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

Nova Scotia (Minister of Opportunities and Social Development) v. RE, 2026 NSSC 80

Judge: The Honourable Justice Aleta C. Cromwell
Subject Matter: Child protection, permanent care and custody

Summary: This case concerns a young child, N, who was in the temporary care and custody of the Minister of Opportunities and Social Development following concerns related to parental substance use, neglect, and instability. At the expiry of the statutory timelines under the Children and Family Services Act, the Court was required to determine whether N remained in need of protection and whether he should be placed in the permanent care of the Minister or with the maternal grandmother, as proposed by the mother.

The mother acknowledged that N could not be returned to her care at the time of the hearing but proposed a parenting plan for placement with the maternal grandmother. The Minister opposed that plan, arguing that both parents had failed to address the core protection concerns, including substance use, mental health, housing instability, and family violence, and that the proposed placement had not been sufficiently developed or assessed.

Justice Cromwell found that N remained in need of protective services. The Court concluded that both parents had longstanding substance use issues, had demonstrated inconsistent engagement with services, and had been unable to sustain progress within the statutory timeframe. The evidence established ongoing risks of neglect and harm, and the Court rejected the mother’s position that housing was the only remaining concern.

The Court also declined to accept the proposed placement with the maternal grandmother. The parenting plan was filed late in the proceeding, lacked detail, and had not been meaningfully advanced. The maternal grandmother had not completed the necessary steps to allow the Agency to assess the placement, had her own stability and substance use concerns, and had limited recent involvement with the child. The Court found that the proposal was not a reasonable or viable long-term alternative.

Having determined that the statutory timelines had expired and that the circumstances were unlikely to change within a reasonable period, the Court concluded that the only appropriate order was permanent care and custody to the Minister. The Court found that this outcome best met N’s need for stability, safety, and long-term care.

Major v. Sharpe, 2026 NSSC 86

Judge: The Honourable Justice Moira Legere Sers
Subject Matter: Child support arrears, retroactive variation, shared parenting, section 7 expenses

Summary: The applicant father sought to reduce and recalculate longstanding child support arrears arising from a 2009 order, asserting a shared parenting arrangement and requesting partial or full forgiveness of arrears. The respondent mother sought enforcement of arrears, contribution to section 7 expenses, and prospective support.

Despite no formal variation application, Justice Legere Sers found the Court had jurisdiction to address both arrears and variation issues, as both parties had fully engaged those issues in the litigation.

The Court rejected the father’s claim of shared parenting, finding insufficient evidence that the children were in his care at least 40% of the time. The parenting arrangement was inconsistent and remained primarily dependent on the mother.

The Court declined to forgive the arrears, finding the father’s conduct to be blameworthy. He failed to make voluntary payments, did not provide adequate disclosure, and took no steps to vary the order despite years of non-payment. The Court emphasized that child support is the right of the child.

Arrears were recalculated and fixed at $108,961.76. The father was also ordered to contribute to retroactive and ongoing section 7 expenses, including childcare, orthodontic, educational, and post-secondary costs. Ongoing support was set at $933 per month, with $200 per month toward arrears.

Rice v. Rice, 2026 NSCA 22

Judges: The Honourable Justices Bourgeois, Scanlan and Van de Eynden
Subject Matter: Motion to admit Fresh Evidence, Best Interests of the Child

Summary: The parties are former spouses and parents to five children. They separated in 2019 and co-parented cooperatively until 2023, when Mr. Rice enrolled the children in public school and Ms. Rice withheld them. Interim orders placed the children in Mr. Rice’s primary care. In 2025, the Court determined that it was in the children’s best interests to remain in his primary care and granted him sole decision-making authority for medical and educational matters (A.R.R. v. A.R.R., 2025 NSSC 147).

Ms. Rice appealed that decision and sought to admit fresh evidence. She argued that the trial judge failed to consider all relevant evidence, made errors of law, and reached a result that was not in the children’s best interests. Mr. Rice opposed the motion and maintained that the decision disclosed no error.

Justice Bourgeois reviewed the legal principles governing the admission of fresh evidence on appeal. Such evidence, meaning evidence available at the time of trial but not introduced, may only be admitted where special grounds are established and the criteria in Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 759, are met, including admissibility and the potential to affect the result.

The Court dismissed both the motion and the appeal. The proposed evidence did not meet the Palmer criteria and could have been adduced at trial with proper diligence. The Court also found that much of the evidence was irrelevant or inadmissible. The Court concluded that the trial judge’s best interest analysis was supported by the record and disclosed no reversible error.

George v. George, 2026 NSSC 74

Judge: The Honourable Justice Pamela Marche
Subject Matter: Costs

Summary: Both parties sought costs following a two-day contested hearing addressing parenting, child support, and unequal division of matrimonial property. The Court noted that the parties achieved mixed success on the issues.

Ms. George sought costs of $39,000, representing 60% of her legal fees, arguing that she was the more successful party on parenting and property and that Mr. George’s litigation conduct warranted elevated costs. Mr. George argued that each party should bear their own costs given the mixed result.

Justice Marche determined that a lump sum award, rather than a tariff-based assessment under the Civil Procedure Rules, was appropriate. The Court rejected Ms. George’s position that she was the more successful party and instead found that both parties had mixed success on all issues. The Court also declined to find that Mr. George’s overall litigation conduct justified increased costs.

However, Justice Marche found that Mr. George’s failure to provide complete and timely financial disclosure was blameworthy. Despite multiple Court directives, he failed to provide updated financial information, which required Ms. George to subpoena an additional witness to determine his income. The Court awarded $10,000 in costs related to this conduct.

In total, the Court ordered Mr. George to pay $12,500 in costs, including an additional $2,500 arising from an adjournment of the March 2025 hearing dates requested by Mr. George after he had only recently retained counsel.

TB v CM, 2026 NSSC 85

Judge: The Honourable Justice Pamela Marche
Subject Matter: Parenting Arrangements, Voice of the Child Reports

Summary: The parties have two teenage children, C (17) and J (13). There is a history of family conflict, child protection involvement, and mental health challenges affecting the mother. The mother sought a return to shared parenting with equal time and joint decision-making, relying on Voice of the Child Reports indicating that both children wanted increased time with her. The father opposed, seeking primary care and final decision-making authority, citing concerns about the mother’s mental health, communication, and involvement of the children in conflict.

Justice Marche conducted a best interests analysis under the Parenting and Support Act, focusing on the children’s emotional well-being, stability, and expressed preferences. The Court found that the mother had experienced significant mental health challenges, including incidents requiring medical intervention, and had at times minimized their impact on the children. However, the Court accepted that she was currently stable, engaged in treatment, and capable of parenting safely. The father was found to have provided stability during periods of crisis.

While both parents were loving and capable, the Court identified ongoing communication concerns, particularly the mother’s failure to share important information regarding one child’s mental health and schooling. This weighed against joint decision-making.

The Court placed significant weight on the children’s clearly expressed views, given their ages and maturity, and concluded that it was not in their best interests to reduce time with their mother. A shared parenting arrangement with roughly equal time was ordered, with the father retaining final decision-making authority in the event of disagreement.

Power v Power, 2026 NSSC 70

Judge: The Honourable Justice Daniel W. Ingersoll
Subject Matter: Parenting, Custody, Relocation, Mobility, Joint Custody, Shared Parenting

Summary: The Court addressed an interim parenting and relocation dispute involving the parties’ eight-year-old child, J. The mother sought to relocate with the child from Timberlea to Colby Village and requested primary care and final decision-making authority. The father opposed both the relocation and any change to the existing shared parenting arrangement.

Although the matter was before the Court on an interim basis, the Court held that the determinative issue remained the child’s best interests, particularly given the length of time since separation and the extent of the evidentiary record.

Justice Ingersoll conducted a best interest’s analysis under the Divorce Act, with a focus on the child’s emotional and psychological well-being. The Court found the father’s conduct to be highly concerning, including repeated criticism of the mother in the child’s presence, undermining her authority, and involving the child in adult conflict. This behaviour was found to be harmful and constituted a pattern of coercive and controlling conduct amounting to family violence, despite the absence of physical abuse. In contrast, the mother was found to take a more child-focused and balanced approach to parenting, particularly with respect to the child’s education, activities, and overall well-being.

The Court concluded that the existing parenting arrangement did not adequately protect the child’s emotional and psychological safety. The father’s lack of insight into the impact of his conduct, and his inability to support the child’s relationship with the mother, weighed heavily against him.

The Court found that, although the child had a positive relationship with both parents, the father’s behaviour influenced the child’s resistance to spending time with his mother rather than reflecting an independent preference. The Court determined that the mother was better able to meet the child’s needs and support his overall well-being, and concluded that relocation was in the child’s best interests.

A.T. v A.S., 2026 NSSC 98

Judge: The Honourable Justice Scott R. Campbell
Subject Matter: Costs Decision

Summary: The respondent, as the successful party, sought a lump sum costs award representing at least 75% of his legal expenses, totaling $9,424.67 based on a baseline of $12,566.22. The applicant, who was self-represented, argued that each party should bear their own costs, relying on her personal circumstances, public policy considerations, and objections to aspects of the respondent’s position.

Justice Campbell confirmed that costs are presumptively governed by Tariff C, which would have resulted in an award between $750 and $1,000 for the half-day hearing. However, the Court noted that it retains discretion to depart from the tariff and award lump sum costs where appropriate. After reviewing the respondent’s accounts, the Court deducted amounts related to previously compensated work, unnecessary procedural steps, and unsupported disbursements, reducing the baseline to $6,668.32.

While 75% of that amount would have been approximately $5,000, the Court found that such an award was not just and appropriate in the circumstances. Justice Campbell emphasized that both parties contributed to inefficiencies in the proceeding and rejected the submission that the applicant had disregarded procedural rules.

The Court awarded lump sum costs of $2,500, in addition to a prior $750 award, for a total of $3,250 payable by the applicant. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that costs are intended to provide a substantial contribution to reasonable legal expenses, rather than full indemnity, and highlighted that affidavit evidence must be confined to facts, criticizing the inclusion of argumentative and opinion-based material.

Christie v. Dickson, 2026 NSSC 87

Judge: The Honourable Justice Theresa M Forgeron
Subject Matter: Granting of disclosure motion

Summary: The Court addressed a disclosure dispute arising from ongoing litigation involving property division and spousal support. The applicant sought an order compelling additional financial disclosure, particularly relating to the respondent’s shareholdings and employment-related financial interests connected to his corporate employer. She argued that the disclosure provided to date was incomplete and insufficient to properly assess income, matrimonial property, and potential settlement options. The respondent opposed the motion, maintaining that he had provided comprehensive disclosure, that he was a minority employee-shareholder with no corporate control, and that further production would be disproportionate and intrusive.

Justice Forgeron granted most of the requested disclosure. The Court found that several outstanding items, including shareholder registers relating to the respondent, partnership agreements arising from a corporate acquisition, confirmation of participation in employee share and deferred profit plans, and certain corporate financial statements, were relevant, proportionate, and not speculative. Any privacy concerns could be addressed through appropriate confidentiality protections.

One request relating to securities registers was not determined, as it was raised only after the hearing. The Court declined to award costs, citing mixed success and procedural considerations, and directed counsel to prepare the order. The decision resolves the parties’ disclosure dispute while leaving open the possibility of a future non-party production motion involving the respondent’s employer.

Nova Scotia (Opportunities and Social Development) v RP, 2026 NSSC 77

Judge: The Honourable Justice Theresa M Forgeron
Subject Matter: Whether children should be returned to their mother or a permanent care order from the Minister should be granted

Summary: This case concerns four children who were in the temporary care and custody of the Nova Scotia Minister of Opportunities and Social Development following prolonged child protection proceedings.

Although the mother had made progress in several areas, including securing stable housing, completing parenting education, and engaging in counselling, the Court was required to determine whether the children remained in need of protection at the expiry of the statutory timelines under the Children and Family Services Act. The Minister sought permanent care orders, arguing that unresolved substance use and mental health concerns continued to place the children at risk. The mother opposed, maintaining that her recent cocaine use was an isolated lapse and that the protection concerns had otherwise been addressed.

Justice Forgeron concluded that the children remained in need of protection. The Court found that housing and cleanliness concerns had been adequately resolved. However, the mother’s history of substance use, lack of insight, ongoing self-medication, and failure to fully follow psychiatric recommendations created a continuing risk of physical harm, emotional abuse, and neglect.

As these concerns were not sufficiently addressed within the legislative timeframe, and no less intrusive alternatives or suitable family placements were available, the Court granted permanent care and custody of the children to the Minister, finding that outcome to be in their best interests.

The post This Month in Nova Scotia Family Law – March 2026 appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

Nova Scotia is positioning itself as a national leader in natural resource and offshore wind development, and its latest legislation marks a significant step forward.

On February 24, 2026, the Province introduced Bill No. 193, the Powering the Economy Act (the “Act”), which, once passed and in force, will create two new statutes, the Offshore Renewable Energy Revenue Act (“ORERA“) and the Subsurface Energy Resource Extraction Act (“SEREA“), amending the legislation governing Nova Scotia’s Independent Energy System Operator (the “IESO”).

Offshore Wind Development: A New Royalty Regime

Following the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Energy Regulator’s initiation of a call for bids for offshore wind in Fall 2025, ORERA will establish a royalty regime to support the development of offshore wind projects.

Under ORERA, developers will pay an annual levy of $7,000 per megawatt of installed turbine capacity for the first 10 years of commercial operation, after which the Province may maintain that levy or shift to a revenue-based model calculated as a percentage of gross revenue from the relevant facilities.

ORERA will also empower the Province, through regulation, to require applicants to pay a refundable $250,000 application deposit and a non-refundable $750,000 fee upon issuance of a submerged land license. The Act further addresses non-payment of fees and imposes record-keeping obligations on license holders.

Subsurface Energy Resources: Beyond Oil and Gas

The Act will repeal the Petroleum Resources Act, replacing it with SEREA, a broader framework extending provincial oversight beyond oil and gas to encompass geothermal energy, natural hydrogen (white hydrogen), helium, and carbon storage resources, filling a significant legislative void.

All subsurface energy resources under SEREA will be deemed to have always been vested in the Crown. Certain activities, including drilling, geophysical surveys, carbon sequestration, and subsurface disposal, require authorization under the Act. The Government will also have broad regulation-making authority over extraction activities, fees, and licensing, making future regulations under SEREA of particular interest to prospective developers.

The Independent Electricity System Operator: New Obligations and an Extended Timeline

The Act will also amend the Electricity Act to require the IESO, an independent, non-profit entity created by the Province under the More Access to Energy Act 2024, to plan energy needs, procure generation, and dispatch power, in order to comply with renewable electricity targets set by regulation or ministerial directive, including the Province’s legislated goal of 80% renewable energy by 2030.

The Act further clarifies that the Minister of Energy may require a public utility to enter into a power purchase agreement for electricity generated by an offshore wind project, and extends the timeline for transitioning grid management, including staff, equipment, and responsibilities, from Nova Scotia Power to the IESO.

For any queries, please contact Mohammad Ali Raza or Guy Wellard in the Halifax office of Cox & Palmer. This article was written with contributions from G. Elliot Hernandez, Articling Clerk at Cox & Palmer.

This article originally appeared on Law360 Canada’s website published by LexisNexis Canada Inc.

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s firm, its clients, Law 360 Canada, LexisNexis Canada or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

The post From Seabed to Grid: How Bill 193 Is Rewiring Nova Scotia’s Energy Future appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

Stanford v. Powder, 2026 NSSC 40

Judge: Justice Michelle K. Christenson
Subject Matter: Enforcement of out-of-province parenting orders; police enforcement obligations

Summary: This decision highlights the serious consequences of failing to comply with parenting orders and the Court’s willingness to issue strengthened enforcement measures when necessary.

Ms. Powder applied to enforce an Alberta parenting order requiring the return of the parties’ two children to Alberta. Although that order had already been incorporated into a Nova Scotia order three months earlier, Mr. Stanford refused to return the children following a summer visit. Despite clear enforcement language, the RCMP did not take steps to carry out the order.

The Court reviewed a lengthy litigation history marked by repeated incidents of Mr. Stanford failing to return the children after visits. Alberta had assumed jurisdiction in 2023 after a similar incident and granted Ms. Powder sole decision-making responsibility and primary care. When Mr. Stanford again failed to return the children in 2025, the Alberta Court issued an urgent enforcement order authorizing police to remove the children and arrest anyone obstructing enforcement.

Even after Nova Scotia issued a reciprocal enforcement order, the children remained with Mr. Stanford. The Court found evidence that he encouraged the children’s refusal to return, raised unfounded allegations against the mother, and failed to pursue proper variation proceedings in Alberta. Justice Christenson expressed concern about the children’ emotional well-being and the potential for parental alienation.

The Court emphasized that police have a statutory duty under s. 32G of the Judicature Act to enforce Family Division orders. Failure to comply with a court order may also amount to a Criminal Code offence. Justice Christenson cautioned against any perception that parenting orders are “optional.”

A strengthened enforcement order was granted. The children were required to be returned to Alberta by March 20, 2026, with proof of travel arrangements provided in advance. The order was directed to the local RCMP detachment and personally served on Mr. Stanford.

Amamio v. Fraser, 2026 NSSC 53

Judge: Justice Christine Doucet
Subject Matter: Relocation; primary care; parenting time; child support

Summary: This case addresses relocation in the context of a young child who had been spending equal time with both parents in different parts of the province.

Since separation, the three-year-old child followed a week-about schedule between Dartmouth and Cape Breton, a 425 km distance. Both parents agreed the arrangement was not sustainable once the child began school, but each sought primary care in their own community.

Justice Doucet determined this was a relocation case under the Parenting and Support Act, as either outcome would significantly change the child’s residence and relationship with the other parent. Because the child had been spending substantially equal time with both parents, each bore the burden of establishing that their proposed relocation outcome was in the child’s best interests.

The Court found both parents loving, capable, and strongly bonded with the child. The central concern was their limited ability to communicate effectively.

Primary care was awarded to the mother in Dartmouth, effective September 1, 2026, with the week-about arrangement continuing until then. The Court noted several factors supporting this outcome: the family’s historical connection to Dartmouth, the mother’s stable employment there, the child’s existing medical providers, and the possibility that the father’s academic career could require him to relocate in the future.

To preserve the father-child relationship, the Court awarded significant parenting time, including six weeks each summer, every March Break, alternating Christmas holidays, additional long weekends, and one weekend per month in HRM during the school year.

Beginning September 1, 2026, the father was ordered to pay table child support of $842 per month based on his income. Childcare costs are to be shared equally.

Minister of Opportunities and Social Development v. C.L., 2025 NSSC 427

Judge: Justice Terrance G. Sheppard
Subject Matter: Child protection; party status; statutory extensions; Customary Care

Summary: This child protection decision underscores the importance of culturally appropriate permanency planning for Indigenous children.

The case involved a three-year-old child who is a member of Alderville First Nation. As the 12-month statutory deadline under the Children and Family Services Act approached, the First Nation sought party status and a three-month extension to finalize a Customary Care Agreement.

Justice Sheppard granted both requests. The Court held that Alderville First Nation had a direct and significant interest in ensuring the child’s cultural connections were preserved, consistent with federal legislation respecting Indigenous children and families.

Although extensions beyond statutory timelines are reserved for “rare and unusual” circumstances, the Court found this threshold met. The extension was not sought to give the parents additional time, but to allow the First Nation to secure a culturally appropriate placement that preserved community ties and supported potential parental contact.

At the next court appearance, a Customary Care home with an extended family member had been secured, and both parents consented. The child protection proceeding was terminated.

Ocean v. Bennett, 2026 NSSC 33

Judge: Justice C. LouAnn Chiasson
Subject Matter: Family violence; coercive control; unjust enrichment; spousal support

Summary: This decision demonstrates how findings of family violence can affect credibility and financial claims but do not automatically determine property outcomes.

The parties were in a 27-year common-law relationship. Ms. Ocean sought spousal support and relief for unjust enrichment. Ms. Bennett denied support and advanced her own claims, including damages based on family violence.

After extensive evidence, the Court rejected Ms. Ocean’s allegations of coercive control by Ms. Bennett. Instead, the Court accepted that Ms. Ocean engaged in a pattern of family violence and coercive control, supported by corroborating witnesses and a prior criminal peace bond.

Despite these findings, the Court held that misconduct does not automatically bar a claim for unjust enrichment unless there is a financial nexus between the misconduct and the property in question. Applying established Supreme Court of Canada principles, the Court found unjust enrichment relating to one property and awarded a monetary remedy, but not a proprietary interest. No joint family venture was established.

Likewise, the Court declined to award prospective spousal support, but did award a lump sum of $15,000. The Court reviewed the limited jurisprudence concerning claims for spousal support by perpetrators of family violence against their victims. It ultimately found that, on the facts of this case, there was no connection between the family violence and the support claim. In closing, the Court expressly acknowledged the difficulty of the issue and emphasized that the analysis must be guided by principle, not reactive empathy.

RBC v. Campbell, 2026 NSSC 37

Judge: Justice Christa M. Brothers
Subject Matter: Judgment creditor priority; Land Registration Act; matrimonial property

Summary: This case addresses the tension between matrimonial property orders and creditor rights under Nova Scotia’s land registration system.

A 2016 Corollary Relief Order required Mr. Campbell to transfer his interest in the former matrimonial home to his former spouse “forthwith.” He failed to register the transfer for several years. During that time, RBC obtained and recorded judgments against him.

When the property was eventually transferred, the bank sought to record its judgment against it. Ms. MacDonald argued she had acquired an equitable interest upon issuance of the court order and that recognizing the bank’s judgment would undermine fairness in matrimonial property division.

The Court disagreed. Under the Land Registration Act, interests in land are determined by registration. Until the deed was recorded, Mr. Campbell remained the registered owner. The Court held that properly recorded judgments attach to the registered owner’s interest unless displaced by fraud or statutory breach.

RBC’s motion was granted, and its judgment was ordered recorded against the property.

Archibald v. Rountree, 2026 NSCA 17

Judge: Van den Eynden J.A. (author), Bryson J.A., Scanlan J.A.
Subject Matter: Travel arrangements and allocation of parenting-time expenses

Summary: This appeal concerned travel logistics and cost allocation for children visiting their father in the United States.

The trial judge had ordered that the children be accompanied by their mother or an approved chaperone for visits to Alabama, that the mother arrange and initially pay for travel, and that the father reimburse his proportional share of the airfare.

The mother appealed, arguing the order was financially unfair, unsupported by evidence, and biased.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, fact, or discretion. The trial judge had carefully considered the children’s best interests and the financial circumstances of the parties. The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the father.

The post This Month in Nova Scotia Family Law – February 2026 appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

Changes to the Competition Act

The Act empowers the Government of Canada to prevent anti-competitive practices in the marketplace. Anti-competitive practices include agreements not to compete, acquisitions that lessen competition, and misleading advertising.

Between 2022 and 2024, the government introduced amendments to the Act strengthening merger review, expanding prohibited conduct, enhancing the Competition Bureau’s investigative powers¹, lowering thresholds for findings of violations, and increasing penalties. One key change, central to this article, is the introduction of “drip pricing” as prohibited conduct under the Act’s misleading advertising provisions. Drip pricing is when a company advertises a product or service at a price that is unattainable due to unavoidable fees being added at the point of purchase.

Unclear Booking Fee Pushes Cineplex Offside of the Act

The FCA recently considered whether Cineplex Inc. engaged in drip pricing on its website and mobile app when charging a $1.50 per ticket booking fee to customers buying movie tickets through its website or mobile app (Cineplex Inc. v. Commissioner of Competition, 2026 FCA 10). The booking fee was not mentioned in the ticket prices advertised on Cineplex’s website or app. Rather, it was at the bottom of the ticketing page, requiring consumers to scroll down to discover the fee.

The Tribunal found that Cineplex’s digital platforms gave no obvious reason or incentive for the consumer to scroll down beyond the pricing information that would initially appear on the consumer’s screen displaying the ticket prices. On appeal, Cineplex argued that consumers using its online services should be considered aware of the requirement to scroll all the way through a page to see additional pricing information. Cineplex further argued that the Tribunal erred in not examining the entire ticket page and focusing on the pricing content at the top of the page.

The FCA noted one objective of the Act is to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices. Drip pricing and other misleading advertisements are prohibited under the Act because when consumer information is distorted by misleading representations the proper functioning of the market is necessarily harmed, and the Act is rightly engaged, given its stated goals.

The FCA upheld the Tribunal’s conclusion that Cineplex’s website and app encouraged consumers to move quickly through the purchase process without noticing the booking fee. Features such as a countdown timer (creating urgency), a prominent proceed button appearing with no scrolling once tickets were selected, and a false floor created by a subtotal ribbon at the foot of the screen all reduced the likelihood that users would scroll far enough to find the fee disclosure. The subtotal ribbon also bundled the ticket price and booking fee in one amount without a breakdown thereby shrouding the fact that the fee was applied and requiring consumers to calculate the true cost themselves.

The FCA also agreed that Cineplex’s advertised prices were not attainable for online purchases because the booking fee was unavoidable in that setting. Although consumers could avoid the fee by buying tickets in person, the Court held that advertised prices must reflect the medium through which the purchase is made.

Ultimately, the FCA upheld the Tribunal’s order that Cineplex pay $38,978,00, representing revenues earned from the fee between 2022 and 2023 (the period under review in the case), and cease its reviewable conduct for 10 years.

Takeaways

This decision provides practical guidance for businesses designing online purchase flows: unavoidable fees must be clearly disclosed upfront (not applicable to taxes) and any fees included in a subtotal should be itemized in an easy‑to‑read format.

The recent amendments to the Competition Act have broadened prohibited conduct, expanded the Competition Bureau’s powers, and increased penalties. The Cineplex decision illustrates the need for businesses to continuously assess their practices to remain compliant in a rapidly evolving competition law environment.

For any queries related to Corporate & Commercial law, please contact Sandy Jenkins or Richard Norman in the Halifax office of Cox & Palmer.

1 Relevant to Nova Scotia, the first market study undertaken by the Bureau under these new powers looked into competition in the retail grocery sector, and you can find the Bureau’s final report here: Canada Needs More Grocery Competition. A portion of this investigation focused specifically on George Weston Limited’s (Superstore’s parent company) and Empire Company Limited’s (Sobey’s parent company) use of “property controls” that limit how real estate can be used by third parties, with a particular focus on Nova Scotia. See: Competition Bureau advances investigations into Sobeys and Loblaw’s use of property controls – Canada.ca

This article originally appeared on Law360 Canada’s website published by LexisNexis Canada Inc. The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s firm, its clients, Law 360 Canada, LexisNexis Canada or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

The post Federal Court of Appeal Decision Highlights Need for Transparency in Pricing appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

The Case

The Employee, a Chartered Professional Accountant with ten years of service, was terminated by his Employer without cause.

The Employee filed a human rights complaint and a wrongful dismissal action.

The Employer learned from disclosure at the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal that the Employee had been secretly recording hundreds of meetings and conversations with supervisors and other employees in the workplace throughout his ten years of employment.

The Employer amended its wrongful dismissal defence, alleging that the Employee’s surreptitious recordings constituted after-acquired cause for dismissal. The trial judge found that the Employee’s conduct constituted just cause for termination and that the Employer had established after-acquired cause for dismissal. The wrongful dismissal action was dismissed and the Employee appealed this decision. We previously reported on the trial judge’s decision linked here: Secretly Recording Workplace Conversations Can Result in Termination.

The Court of Appeal reinforced the contextual analysis of the trial judge, assessing whether the nature and degree of the employee’s dishonesty warranted dismissal. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was just cause for dismissal as the Employee’s recording activity was “underhanded and would be regarded by most employers as misconduct undermining the trust relationship between employer and employee.”[1]

The Employee’s actions were also found to violate the privacy of the individuals in the recordings as well as the privacy of individuals who were discussed in the recordings.

When Might Secret Recordings Be Justified?

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that in some circumstances surreptitious recordings in the workplace may be justified if an employee has reason to believe they are being discriminated against on a protected ground and the recordings would protect their legal position. In this case, the Employee’s recordings were not rationally connected to any discrimination and were not justified.

Takeaways for Employers

This case reinforces that surreptitious recordings in the workplace may constitute just cause for dismissal when it causes a breakdown of trust in the employment relationship.

However, in each case, the Court will assess the circumstances in which the recordings were made by the employees as the recordings may be justified if an employee has reason to believe they are experiencing discrimination in the workplace.

Employers should have clear written policies on confidentiality and privacy in the workplace to reinforce expectations surrounding surreptitious recordings in the workplace.

[1] Shalagin v. Mercer Celgar Limited Partnership, 2023 BCCA 373 (CanLII) at para 42.

The post Secret Recordings in the Workplace Can Lead to Dismissal appeared first on Сox & Palmer.

Evans v Larocque, 2025 NSSC 337

Judge: The Honourable Justice Cindy G. Cormier
Subject Matter: Grandparent contact; wrongful denial of contact time

Summary: The applicant is the child’s paternal grandmother. She applied under the Parenting and Support Act for relief related to grandparent contact, alleging she was wrongly denied her court-ordered time with her grandchild. The child lives primarily with the mother.

The parties had recently negotiated a Consent Grandparent Contact Time Order (the “Order”) which was issued June 25, 2024. The Order provided the grandmother with regular overnight contact time tied to the father’s parenting schedule. The Order prescribed approximately one visit per month, with additional dates in some months depending on the calendar.

The mother asserted that the grandmother picked up the child on December 12, 2024 which was not the grandmother’s scheduled night. The child was subsequently returned to the mother. Justice Cormier found that the parties’ communications that day were “neither cordial nor child friendly”. The mother maintained she was confused because December involved more than one potential grandparent visit and believed the second December visit should fall on December 26, 2024.

Justice Cormier held that December 12, 2024, was in fact the grandmother’s scheduled contact date and did not fall within the “holiday parenting time” scenario that would trigger the rescheduling clause. The Court emphasized that being flexible requires prior agreement and that parties must take active steps to comply with court orders. The Court was also noted that, even after the application was filed, the mother remained confused about the next scheduled grandparent visit in January 2025, suggesting either intentional manipulation or a serious failure to properly inform herself.

Ultimately, Justice Cormier found the mother’s failure to properly track and follow the Order amounted to a wrongful denial of grandparent contact time. The Court declined to change the Order and was not prepared to impose a fine. The Court cautioned the mother to be mindful of the grandmother’s concerns and concluded the existing Order and the Court’s comments should provide sufficient guidance going forward.

Brodie v Getson, 2026 NSSC 15

Judge: The Honourable Justice Terrance G. Sheppard
Subject Matter: Costs following relocation trial

Summary: Following a two-day relocation trial in which the mother’s application to move the children was dismissed, the Court was asked to determine costs. The father was the successful party at trial.

Justice Sheppard confirmed that, in non-monetary family matters, a principled lump-sum approach based on reasonable legal fees is often preferable to tariff calculations. The Court found the father’s legal fees to the end of trial were reasonable and supported by the case law.

A key factor was the father’s November 29, 2023, offer to settle, which would have granted the mother the substantive relief she was seeking. The offer was not accepted or meaningfully responded to. Relying on Civil Procedure Rule 77.07(2)(b) and Court of Appeal guidance encouraging settlement, the Court awarded 66% of the father’s fees up to the date of the offer and 80% thereafter to the end of trial.

No costs were awarded for the post-trial period, during which the parties resolved parenting and child support by consent. Given the mixed nature of those later negotiations, it was not possible to identify a clear successful party.

Total costs of $39,250 were awarded to the father, payable forthwith. The Court declined to order payment by instalments due to insufficient evidence regarding the mother’s financial circumstances.

The decision underscores the financial consequences of failing to respond to reasonable settlement offers, particularly in relocation cases where early resolution can significantly reduce costs.

Nova Scotia (Minister of Opportunities and Social Development) v LP, 2026 NSSC 14

Judge: The Honourable Justice Jean M. Dewolfe
Subject Matter: Permanent care and custody; child protection; return of children to parent

Summary: The Minister sought an order placing five young children in permanent care and custody under the Children and Family Services Act (“CFSA”), following a lengthy protection history centred on domestic violence between the mother and the father, concerns about supervision, and the children’s exposure to abuse.

The children were removed in April 2025 after reports that the mother continued associating with the father despite court-ordered restrictions. The father has since been missing and is presumed deceased. At the time of the permanent care hearing, the children were in temporary care in a mix of kinship and foster placements.

The central issue was whether the children remained in need of protective services at the final review stage. Justice Dewolfe emphasized that the Minister bears the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the children would face a substantial risk of physical or emotional harm if returned.

While the Court was critical of the mother’s past judgment including minimizing abuse, poor decision-making during access, and limited engagement with services prior to April 2025, it focused on the significant changes since the children were taken into care. The mother obtained safe housing, secured employment, consistently engaged in counselling, and developed meaningful community supports in East Preston. Expert evidence from her therapist confirmed marked progress in insight, particularly regarding the impact of domestic violence on her children.

Although the mother’s parenting was described as “not optimal”, the Court found this did not rise to the level of a substantial risk of harm. The removal in April 2025 had been justified at the time, but circumstances had materially changed. With the father no longer involved and the mother demonstrating increased stability and insight, the Minister had not met the test for permanent care.

The application for permanent care and custody was dismissed, and the children were ordered returned to the mother’s care. The Court stressed the importance of raising the siblings together in a culturally supportive environment.

The paternal grandmother’s request to have the oldest child placed with her was denied. She had not had a meaningful relationship with the child for over five years. Therefore, she did not meet the statutory criteria for a family placement. The Court noted that future applications under the Parenting and Support Act remain available if circumstances warrant.

McGrath v Jones, 2025 NSSC 365

Judge: The Honourable Justice Cindy G. Cormier
Subject Matter: Parenting (decision-making and parenting time); family violence/high conflict; child support

Summary: The parties have two children (ages 9 and 7) and separated in November 2023 after a turbulent relationship marked by significant conflict. This case concerned the mother’s application for the primary care of the children, permission to relocate the children, and the father to pay child support.

The father acknowledged opioid abuse through late January 2024. After separation, the parties’ co-parenting relationship deteriorated, with each at times threatening to withhold either parenting time or financial support. The father was also subject to a criminal undertaking restricting contact, and child protection had substantiated concerns related to family violence and risk of emotional harm.

The central issue was what parenting plan was in the children’s best interests. Justice Cormier found that the level of conflict and inability to regulate emotions made joint decision-making and shared parenting unworkable. Although both parents were capable of being child-focused at times, the evidence showed repeated escalations and behaviour harmful to the children (including inappropriate comments made in the children’s presence). The Court concluded the children’s best interests required stability, and that they should remain in the mother’s primary care.

On parenting, the father was granted parenting time every second weekend from Friday after school to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. The Court also crafted practical exchange provisions given the no-contact undertaking, including authorizing exchanges at a neutral location when confirmed through an online parenting app.

On child support, the father’s disclosure was a concern. Based on the evidence accepted at trial, the Court ordered table child support based on income of $71,000, being $1,002 per month effective June 1, 2025. By the end of trial, the mother withdrew spousal support, and the father withdrew any claim for repayment/recalculation of past child support.

Tobin v. Smith, 2026 NSSC 9

Judge: Justice D. Timothy Gabriel
Subject Matter: Admissibility of evidence in an affidavit and necessary permissions to file supplementary affidavits

Summary: This decision arises from an application under the Intimate Images and Cyber Protection Act. In the course of that proceeding, the Respondent brought a motion under Civil Procedure Rule 39.04 seeking to strike portions of, or entire, affidavits filed by the Applicant, arguing they contained inadmissible material, speculation, and legal argument.

Justice Gabriel reviewed the governing principles, including Rule 39.04 and the Waverley requirements that affidavits be confined to admissible facts based on personal knowledge (or properly identified information and belief), rather than argument or opinion. The Court also considered Rule 5.17, which requires prior judicial permission before filing supplementary affidavits.

Applying these principles, the Court struck several paragraphs of the Applicant’s October 2, 2025 affidavit that contained argument, speculation, and opinion, while permitting one factual paragraph to remain. A subsequent “Response to Notice of Contest” was not struck, but the Court noted it was unsworn and consisted largely of submissions, leaving any determination of admissibility to the hearing judge.

Two supplementary affidavits filed later in October 2025 were struck in their entirety. No leave had been obtained to file them, and they consisted exclusively of legal argument — which is not proper affidavit content.

The motion was therefore granted in part. The Respondent was directed to prepare a draft order, and costs were fixed at $750. Although the Applicant filed materials opposing the motion, she did not attend the hearing.

On child support, the father’s disclosure was a concern. Based on the evidence accepted at trial, the Court ordered table child support based on income of $71,000, being $1,002 per month effective June 1, 2025. By the end of trial, the mother withdrew spousal support, and the father withdrew any claim for repayment/recalculation of past child support.

The post This Month in Nova Scotia Family Law – January 2026 appeared first on Сox & Palmer.