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Reinvigorating Alliances in the Western Hemisphere

Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:00:00 -0500

By Douglas Farah, Americas Program Senior Associate and Michael Miklaucic National Defense University Center for Complex Operations

Central American Gangs as a “Wicked Problem”

Tue, 24 Nov 2015 00:00:00 -0500

By Douglas Farah
Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Americas Program

In parts of the impoverished, dusty Choloma neighborhood on the outskirts of San Pedro Sula, Honduras, rag tag children stream down unpaved roads to a bare cinderblock community center where they receive a small bowl of soup and some bread, often the bulk of their daily nutrition.

Ecuador: An Election Primer

americas program — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By Gustavo Palacio

According to official statements, the outcome of Ecuador’s February 17 general election is already determined and there is little that competing candidates can do to stop Rafael Correa from serving another four-year term, thereby following the footsteps of role model Hugo Chávez who has stayed in office for 14 years in Venezuela. The president’s supporters are also convinced that Correa’s lead will ensure their candidates a place in the 124-seat National Assembly. However, not all of those polls show the president with a lead strong enough to have at least 40 percent of the vote and a 10-point advantage over the closest rival, which is what Correa must obtain to avoid a runoff on April 7.

Correa supporters base their anticipated victory on a group of polls from October to January that show a 50-60 percent preference for the president, followed by candidates Guillermo Lasso and Lucio Gutiérrez with generally less than 20 percent each. From the official perspective, this strong support is the result of Correa’s “citizen revolution” achievements: new highways, subsidies for the poor, as well as an increase in health and education spending, thanks to the high prices for Ecuadoran oil. Moreover, Correa supporters assume that a big part of the population that lives under the poverty line (about 30 percent) will vote for him.

Other surveys point to a different view. A November poll by the Market organization found Correa had 39 percent and Lasso 25 percent. Most recently, newspapers reported a survey by the Mexican firm Arcop that showed 38 percent of voters preferred the president to almost 30 percent for Guillermo Lasso, with all other competitors falling below 10 percent.

The polls also show that security and unemployment are the major public concerns. They coincide with a slow but steady decline in Correa’s popularity from 2007 to the present. That could be the consequence of the government’s problems addressing crime, unemployment and cost of living, and a long list of corruption scandals allegedly involving senior government officials. Worries over creeping authoritarianism connected to policies that seek to silence criticism within the media may also be a factor.

Some analysts believe true voter intentions may not be showing up in all the polls. They suggest that voter backlash against Correa is possible and that it could help Lasso and Gutierrez, or even Acosta and Rodas. Against that backdrop, the presidential ballot shapes up as follows:

Rafael Correa (PAIS Alliance): The incumbent is an economist who graduated from the Catholic University of Guayaquil and obtained a master’s degree in Belgium and a Master’s and PhD in the United States. He was minister of finance for four months during the administration of President Alfredo Palacio, and before that, taught at the University of San Francisco de Quito. He is considered charismatic and populist. With a mix of ideas from the left and right, he proposes an extractive model of development and an economic model of state-led capitalism. Politically, he tends to favor authoritarian government. At the international level, his government is a member of the Bolivarian alliance created by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.

Guillermo Lasso (Creating Opportunities Movement): So far, the strongest opposition candidate. Lasso is a self-made man who started to work when he was 16 years old. A former entrepreneur and banker, he has worked for short periods with previous governments. Lasso proposes a market approach to development, based on education and entrepreneurship, including microenterprise, with the support of the State. Lasso also proposes a centrist path, with a social democratic orientation, with an independent judiciary and freedom of expression. He has promised not to exploit the Yasuni National Park reserve, home of isolated indigenous tribes.

Lucio Gutiérrez (January 21 Patriotic Society Party): A former president and important political leader, also has some potential to pass to the second round in the elections. A former army colonel, he is known for his participation in a coup that took former president Jamil Mahuad from office, with the support of Ecuador’s social movements. In 2002, he ran for president and won, pledging to reverse neoliberal reforms, policies he subsequently continued. In 2005, he dismissed the Supreme Court and was impeached by Congress. He sought asylum in Brazil, but returned to face justice, was jailed, then pardoned. Repentant for earlier mistakes, Gutiérrez proposes a free market model, keeping existing social programs, and fighting corruption. He has promised to eliminate the reelection clause introduced by Correa in the new constitution.

Alberto Acosta (Plurinational Union of the Left): An intellectual and a political leader with a long record of affinity with the social movements. He supported Correa’s presidential candidacy after he resigned as President Alfredo Palacio’s minister of finance in 2005. He was part of Correa’s cabinet as minister of energy and later presided over the Constituent Assembly that wrote the new constitution until Correa disagreed with his views and forced him to resign. Acosta has promised to restore democracy, to promote sustainable development with the participation of the state and private sector, and preserve Ecuador’s natural spaces. Acosta authored an initiative to protect the Yasuni reserve.

Alvaro Noboa (Institutional Renewal Party of National Action): Considered the wealthiest man in Ecuador, son of a successful entrepreneur who made his fortune in bananas. Noboa ran for president in 1998 with the support of the populist leader Abdala Bucarám and his party, losing to Jamil Mahuad. Running in 2006, he won the first round, though he lost in the second to Rafael Correa. Noboa proposes a free market economic model. Yet, he has promised to continue Correa’s extractive policies in order to finance health and education. He also has promised to change the constitution to eliminate the reelection.

Nelson Zavala (Ecuadoran Roldosista Party): Candidate for Abdala Bucarám’s populist Roldosista Party, which supported Correa until last year. Zavala is an assembly member and evangelical preacher with strong conservative beliefs. His main proposal is to restore ethical and moral values in the educational system. Like others, he has promised to respect democracy and human rights. And he has pledged to prosecute Correa and members of his government for corruption. Ecuador’s gay community has criticized Zavala for some of his social commentary.

Mauricio Rodas (Societal Movement for More United Action): An energetic attorney who founded an organization in Mexico for the promotion of democracy and development called “Ethos.” Rodas is an outsider and some analysts believe he could surge ahead, though polls show no such indication. He portrays himself as the only candidate with no links to the old political system. After his return to Ecuador to participate in the campaign, he founded the Societal Movement for More United Action (SUMA) to promote responsible government. He backs sustainable development and abolishing presidential reelection.

Norman Wray (Rupture 25): A young lawyer and environmental activist, Wray is a member of the movement Ruptura de los 25 that formed part of Correa’s Alianza PAIS coalition. He was member of the Constituent Assembly in 2008 and, later, the National Assembly. He was elected member of the Quito Metropolitan Council and supported Correa until 2011, when Ruptura broke with the Alianza. Wray advocates investment in health and education. He promises to restore democracy, respect the division of powers, and favors an independent judiciary.

Conclusions

Ecuadorans have plenty of choices. However, it is too hard to say at this point whether there will be a strong turnout on election day, and whether Correa, the leading candidate, will have enough votes to win on the first ballot.

Gustavo Palacio is a political analyst and former Ecuadoran diplomat.

Photo: Recinta Electoral
Credit: Valentina Brevi, FLICKR, Creative Commons

Colombia's Better Investment

americas program — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By Stephen Johnson

Since they were announced last August, peace talks between the FARC rebels and the government have put Colombia back in the headlines. Because of the large philosophical differences between the two sides, the talks are complex and could build up public expectations for a peace that cannot be achieved—at least not through negotiations. But there is something else running in the background, something banal and bureaucratic that offers much more promise. To be sure, a guerrilla demobilization would help this project immensely, but would not be an overwhelming obstacle if it did not occur. That project is a national development plan that contemplates improving land titling processes, building infrastructure, strengthening governance, and better integrating marginal rural communities and diverse population groups.

National development plans are not novel. Many countries have them. And although detailed blueprints can be misguided and confining compared to good policies, they are helpful in identifying goals or end-states. In 2010, the government of President Juan Manuel Santos introduced a plan called Prosperity for All. As a diagnostic, it identifies needs in security, law enforcement, infrastructure, education, social benefits, and business regulation. While it does not establish priorities or outline specific projects, it provides enough data for the government, private sector, and civil society to begin solving some of the problems that allowed insurgencies to develop in Colombia’s countryside in the first place.

Most of Colombia’s population lives along the central Andean ridge. To the west is the Pacific coast and rich farmland, known for coffee-growing. To the east is savannah suitable for ranching, oil exploration, and light industry. Only the riverine jungles of the southeast are inhospitable for settlement, but they offer a pristine environment for wildlife and conservation. These areas, including parts of the Andean ridge, have been playgrounds of guerrillas, drug traffickers, bandits, and paramilitary vigilantes for the last 50 years. In all, they comprise about two-thirds of Colombia’s countryside. Strengthening governments where they have been absent, establishing a framework for responsible resource use, and developing infrastructure to benefit people and industry will help alleviate poverty, lower unemployment, and take Colombia beyond middle-income ranks.

An end to the rural conflict will certainly produce a more propitious climate for all this to happen. However, it would be unwise for development to wait. Just as Colombia’s security forces are continuing to capture, demobilize, or kill FARC combatants. Their membership now reportedly numbers only about 8,000, and under pressure could dwindle to the point of irrelevance. The government could hasten that outcome by changing the rural landscape—by resolving land tenure issues, strengthening local governance, and providing transportation infrastructure to permit growth outside of the country’s urban corridor.

As in past attempts to negotiate with the FARC, it is in the rebels’ interest to string out talks to the maximum extent possible, as their strategy has always been to wait for the right moment to take over. That won’t happen if they demobilize now and opt to compete at the ballot box. Another rebel movement, the M-19 did that and disappeared as a political force. Odds are worse for the FARC. During the past decade, the guerrillas have had the lowest favorability rating of any institution in public opinion polls. Because of their criminal past, their top leaders are ineligible for public office. And they will have to make reparations to families of persons they killed, combatants they recruited as children, and civilians they injured with landmines and other explosive devices.

By keeping the talks going, they might hope for concessions on land use that will favor illicit moneymaking activities from continued drug trafficking to illegal mining. No doubt, some FARC leaders would like to integrate some of their combatants into rural security forces as well. While that may have worked in small, urban El Salvador, it would be risky in the vast Colombian countryside, where the span of accountability would be stretched.

Up to now, President Juan Manuel Santos has wisely said that the peace talks can’t go on forever, and specified next November as a deadline for concluding them. With the FARC still in army and police crosshairs, a negotiated end to Colombia’s internal conflict could happen, but is a remote possibility. In the meantime, Colombia’s development process needs to get rolling. Building up institutions and integrating rural populations into mainstream society looks ahead as much as ending the insurgency looks back. One course is more necessary than the other, and at the end of the day, halting the conflict can be accomplished whether the FARC cooperates or not.

Stephen Johnson is a senior fellow and director of the CSIS Americas Program.

Photo: Jesús Santrich, Narciso Isa Conde, and Iván Márquez

Credit: Globovisión, FLICKR, Creative Commons

Paraguay: A Political Milestone

americas program — Mon, 04 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By Johanna Mendelson Forman

The reported death in a helicopter crash of retired general and Paraguayan presidential candidate, Lino Oviedo, marks a turning point in that nation’s transition to democracy that carries important lessons. Oviedo, the one-time commander of the army’s First Division, was instrumental in the overthrow of dictator Alfredo Stroessner, the military ruler and staunch anti-Communist, who held sway over the small agrarian nation for over 35 years. Some say it was actually Oviedo who held the gun to the Stroessner’s head and told him that it was all over in 1989.

Ironically, Oviedo, who led a reformist military group that helped move Paraguay from dictatorship to democracy, also had leanings like those of his former leader. In 1996, after being asked to step down from his military post, he was charged with plotting a coup against democratically elected President Juan Wasmosy. Oviedo actually served four years in prison for his role in the crime, demonstrating that the democratic system he helped set up was actually capable of defending itself.

Pardoned and released from prison by President Raúl Cubas—a former Oviedo running mate from an earlier presidential bid—he headed to Brazil. There, he and his cronies strategized on his political rehabilitation. In 2007, the Paraguayan Supreme Court overturned his treason conviction. This past year, he resurfaced as a presidential candidate for a party he helped create, the National Union of Ethical Citizens.

Some of Oviedo’s supporters are not so sure that his demise was an accident, coming as it did just before the twenty-first anniversary of Stroessner’s ouster. But until there is an investigation, the stormy late summer weather of the Southern Cone seems a more likely explanation of what happened Saturday night. In Paraguay, however, rumors are the stuff of political legend.

No matter what the cause, his departure marks a transition—from a time when military rule and coup-mongering was among the undocumented missions of the military to a gradual democratic civilian political system in a region that had often deferred to praetorian traditions. When Oviedo and his fellow senior officers overthrew the Stroessner government in1989, they saw themselves as leaders of new type of government that would ultimately end in free elections and civilian leadership. Governance was strengthened, judicial institutions improved (thanks to lots of U.S. aid) and efforts to shift the economy from one dominated by corruption to legitimate businesses was making progress.

Still, Paraguay’s democratic transition has hit many bumps along the way, including the most recent removal of its first left-of-center president, Fernando Lugo—technically impeached, although many believed this act of Congress lacked due process. That Oviedo was able to make a comeback in this new round of presidential elections is also testimony to the return of old line political beliefs that a “mano dura” approach to law and order is preferable to the hurly-burly of democratic political discourse. Yet even this demonstrates that elections are now more acceptable than military coups.

For me, the lessons of Paraguay are also personal. In 1992, as a director of a program that supported democracy with a focus on civil-military relations, I was sent to Asunción to meet with the generals who were the face of Paraguay’s new democracy. It was an education. These men (there were no women) saw themselves as the future of democratic leadership. One interview with General Oviedo made me nervous. In his huge conference room in First Division headquarters outside Asunción, he seemed less interested in talking about installing a democratic state than he was about warning the United States not to meddle in his nation’s internal affairs. Democracy building was neither welcome nor appreciated. My doubts were confirmed a few years later when he tried to overthrow elected officials. Not only did he plot a coup against an elected president, but he allegedly arranged the assassination of Vice President Luis Maria Argaña, a prominent Colorado Party figure.

When it comes to building democratic institutions we must look not only to those who oust dictators, but to citizens who want a better future. Paraguay is making progress, although it is plagued by narcotics trafficking and other illicit trades. Its tri-border location, adjacent to Brazil and Argentina, with porous boundaries and a weak police, opens the door to other types of threats. But as a new generation takes up its leadership role, and with time and patience, it will emerge as a more stable and democratic state among the nations of the Americas. And Oviedo’s odyssey will become part of the region’s dramatic history of democratic transitions after the Cold War, one that coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and for the most part endures.

Johanna Mendelson Forman is a senior associate with the CSIS Americas Program.

Photo Credit: Fernando Lugo Méndez, FLICKR, Creative Commons

Mexico: Pemex Tragedy Could Spur Reforms

americas program — Fri, 01 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By George W. Grayson

Conspiracy theorists are having a field day alleging that sabotage sparked the explosion of the Pemex headquarters in downtown Mexico City. The catastrophe, which occurred mid-afternoon on January 31, has taken at least 32 lives and injured 101 others. While not ruling out any causes, Pemex Director General Emilio Lozoya Austín, who quickly returned to the capital from a trip to Korea, downplayed—but did not dismiss—the possibility of foul play.

A spokesman for the state oil monopoly attributed the blast to malfunctioning electrical and air-conditioning equipment. In addition to Lozoya, President Enrique Peña Nieto, Government Secretary Miguel Osorio Chong, and Energy Secretary Pedro Joaquín Coldwell immediately visited the site and sought to comfort those hospitalized. The Permanent Commission of Congress held a minute of silence to show respect for the victims.

What affect will the tragedy have on the new administration’s plans to reform aspects of the 75-year old firm—renowned for corruption, inefficiency, and feather-bedding—is not yet clear. So far politicians have offered their condolences without tipping their hands on forthcoming legislation.

The multiple deaths and injuries will make it difficult for Senator Carlos Romero Deschamps, head of the petroleum workers’ union, to oppose revamping the company. He, better than anyone, realizes that old structures, faulty maintenance, and an indifference to safety puts members at risk. After all, Pemex suffered the death of 30 workers at a gas distribution center fire in Reynosa, across from McAllen, Texas, last September 18. A fireball from an illegally tapped pipeline in Puebla took the lives of 28 civilians, including 13 children, in 2010.

Romero Deschamps’ backing of root-and-branch changes will help solidify support for reforms within the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as well as that of the Ecological Green Party of Mexico (PVEM). Provided there are openings for the private sector in any legislation, the National Action Party (PAN) should throw its collective weight behind the initiative.

Some leftist congressmen may join the effort; however, they might well be taunted as “traitors” by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the messianic, populist leader of the National Resurgence Movement (MORENA), a mishmash of disgruntled leftists he recently organized into a political party.

Overall, making political calculations at a time of national mourning is distasteful. Yet, after the smoke dissipates, President Peña Nieto is more likely to accomplish a robust reform than before the crisis. As the firm’s chief, Lozoya Austín assured reporters, “Pemex is going to emerge stronger from the blow. And it will project the best face of Mexico.”

George W. Grayson is the Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary and a senior associate with the CSIS Americas Program. He can be contacted at gwgray@wm.edu.

Photo Credit: JEDIKNIGHT1970, Wikimedia Commons

Crime and Violence: Caribbean Economies Feel the Pain

americas program — Tue, 29 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By Anton Edmunds

Recent statements attributed to the Jamaican Minister for National Security Peter Bunting should help reverse a misguided belief by some that crime and violence in the Caribbean has little impact on the region’s economic growth. Speaking at the launch of the Jamaica Employers’ Federation’s thirty-first annual workplace convention and expo, the minister made the argument for increased investment in Jamaica’s national security linking it directly to economic growth and development. He pointed out that investor confidence is eroded by crime and the cost of doing business is being driven up.

Quoting a University of the West Indies study, the minister said that if the country had a “normal” crime rate over the last four decades, its economy would have been 3-10 times its current size. A recent series of studies commissioned by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) also highlighted the impact of crime and violence on the region with Latin American and Caribbean citizens citing this as their top concern.

The response was somewhat different in June 2011 at an IDB conference entitled “International Forum on Caribbean Investment & Development” in Washington, when a panel that included two ministers from the Caribbean and senior representatives from the banking community and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), appeared to play down the impact of crime and violence on regional economic development. The banking executive did not see it as a major issue and neither did one of the ministers. ECLAC’s representative indicated that it did not include crime as an indicator when analyzing regional economic growth.

Sadly, there was only one panelist that acknowledged the impact on investor confidence and economic development—all this while the majority of the countries in the region had been experiencing a significant rise in crime rates, with the citizenry increasingly retreating to the safe confines of their homes at sunset and all countries seeing the explosive growth of security service companies.

The reality for the Caribbean is that despite its bucolic image, crime is a growing problem. The region’s strategic positioning for the drug trade, porous borders, a growing and disenfranchised young population, and weak social infrastructure have all contributed to the rise in crime and corresponding violence. In an interconnected world where the visitor and investor conduct extensive online searches, the region can no longer hide from the truth. Beyond the real possibility of capital staying away there is the increasing movement of money and people from the region.

With the recent proliferation of citizen security programs within the multilateral community, there is an opportunity to address the issue—as long as agencies talk to each other. Nothing less than a coordinated approach on addressing youth underemployment, a floundering legal and penal system, and the development of a rehabilitation framework amongst other things is needed. Entities like the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the State Department amongst others can only be helpful if they synchronize programs to prevent duplication and effectively utilize the limited resources available.

Caribbean governments and their private sectors also need to partner with each other and the multilateral community, investing in initiatives that tackle the identified root causes of the issue. There is a very short window of opportunity to save a generation of youth and to assure the local and international community that the Caribbean is a region safe to live in and invest.

Anton Edmunds heads The Edmunds Group International, LLC (TEG), an advisory services firm that focuses on the Caribbean Basin region and is a senior associate with the CSIS Americas Program.

Photo Credit: bbcworldservice, Flickr, Creative Commons

Venezuela: Democracy in the Balance

Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By Johanna Mendelson Forman

Watching events in Venezuela over the past two months has been like going to a magic show and trying to figure out all the tricks. There’s the president with the mysterious illness, then various disappearances followed by miraculous materializations and claims of cure. There is a vigorous campaign for re-election, but the president vanishes again, this time so long he misses his own inauguration. The stagehands know what has happened, but the audience is clueless.

Fortunately legerdemain comes to the rescue. Although the constitution demands that the incoming executive be present to take the oath of office, the Supreme Court waives this requirement on the grounds that, as a sitting president, he never left office. Many of his regional supporters from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, make a beeline to Caracas to attend an affirmation of his new term, even though he is not present himself. Proof of life appears in the form of a decree bearing the leader’s signature, like the creak of a floorboard at a séance.

If this storyline appeared in a novel by Colombian author Gabriel García Márquez no one would bat an eye. It’s what you would expect in his fictional town of Macondo. Sadly, Venezuela is not Macondo, and what the world is witnessing is the downward spiral of a democratic state so hollowed out as to make procedural gestures and court decisions on a presidential inauguration a fig leaf to cover up the creep of dictatorship.

While these matters of succession are indeed the internal affairs of the people of Venezuela, their government made an international commitment in 2001 to the Inter-American Democratic Charter that calls for adherence to constitutional order. The Charter was a watershed moment in the struggle to get past a legacy of military dictatorship in order to create a hemisphere of democracies that respects citizen rights and civil liberties. So far, with the exception of Cuba and the core Bolivarian Alliance countries, it has been largely successful—a post-Cold War phenomenon that has transformed so many of the regions’ nations into middle-income states with open markets, freer trade, and blooming middle classes.

Unfortunately, the forum that approved the Charter has been largely silent on what has just transpired, much as it was when Honduran president Mel Zelaya was hastily removed from office then illegally deported from his own country in 2009, and as it was when Paraguay’s congress impeached Fernando Lugo with little deliberation in June 2012. Speaking to reporters on January 10, Secretary General José Miguel Insulza summed up his views on the Venezuela situation this way, “the OAS participates when there is an institutional crisis between the powers of a state, but here there is no need. . .” He added that it was up to Venezuelan authorities to “interpret the Constitution and how they interpret it is their prerogative.” No matter if they are all loyalists to the president. No matter that the Charter is law (by way of treaty) in Venezuela.

The weakness of the inter-American system to defend democracy has been evident many times during the last decade or so. It is on display again as events unfold in Caracas. Sadly, one has to ask if this will turn out to be another disappearing act. But what will it be—Venezuela’s democracy, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the OAS, or all three? Just like at the magic show, only the illusionists and backstage assistants know what’s going on for sure.

Johanna Mendelson Forman is a senior associate in the CSIS Americas program.

Photo credit: pengrinâ„¢, FLICKR, Creative Commons, http://www.flickr.com/photos/pengrin/5091081202.

Venezuela: Viva Chávez

americas program — Fri, 11 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By Phillip McLean

Venezuela held a presidential inauguration January 10 without a president to swear-in. President Hugo Chávez, re-elected by an ample margin to a third term last October, remains out of the country in Cuba recovering, it is reported, from a “complex” surgery and a post-operative infection. As he has for the past 14 years, Chávez continues to dominate Venezuela’s political stage, even when absent, even when weakened by cancer and perhaps on his death-bed. Venezuelans live with a belief that, with its vast oil reserves, theirs is a rich country. A resentful majority long wondered why they hadn’t shared the benefits. Chávez assured that they would and was elected in 1999 on a wave of popular enthusiasm. And with rising oil prices in the following years he took steps to keep his promises and won a solid base of support to stay in power thereafter. “Chavismo” will not easily go away.

In the run up to inauguration day there was frantic discussion of the legal predicament of having the president’s term expire and not having him present to re-take the oath of office and receive the tricolor sash of office. Before his departure for Havana in mid-December Chávez made clear that his strong preference was that his appointed vice president Nicolas Maduro should assume the presidential mantle in his absence. Analysts found that too simple and debated the meaning of articles 231, 232, and 233 of the constitution that spell out provisions for assuming the presidency and allowing for his absence. Government insiders proposed various elaborate solutions, including flying the Supreme Court to Havana to administer the oath at Chávez’s bedside to postponing the inaugural event until his return (or unspoken, his death). Article 233 would have had the presidential powers fall into the hands of Diosdado Cabello, the president of the legislative assembly until after new elections are held, but that view seemed likely to breach divisions among loyalists rather than promote a more widely agreeable course of action. Cabello himself has backed away from the codicil, at least for the time being.

Even so, most vocal outsiders seemed to favor following a path that would lead to new elections within 30 days. Bond holders fear that constitutional uncertainty will undermine confidence in the country’s considerable international float of financial paper. There is also concern that an unstable government, faced with unsustainable chavista policies of the past few years, will not be able to take the hard decisions (i.e., devaluation and program cuts) needed to avoid a looming economic crisis. The opposition, which lost the October presidential race by 11 points and did only slightly better in the December gubernatorial contests, has complained loudly of the failure to closely follow the constitutional provisions and forwarded their complaint to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, José Miguel Insulza, with little result.

Venezuela - because of its size, economic weight and ideological leadership - is important beyond its borders. But the reaction of the international community is mixed. Presidents of three ideological allies (Bolivia, Nicaragua and Uruguay) attended the “inauguration” in Caracas, an impressive event even without its host attending with a military show and tens of thousands of citizens paraded with “I am Chávez too” shirts. The president of Argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, flew directly to Havana January 10 to check on Chávez’s health, certainly something her neighbor in Brazil president Dilma Rousseff, who is suffering domestic criticism for her support for Chávez, would also like to know. The United States, clearly aware of the delicacy of what appears to be a crucial transition, continues as in recent years its cautious—perhaps too cautious—policy of making little comment about Chávez and Venezuela.

For now, the Venezuelan Supreme Court has declared that since Chávez was already the president he did not have to repeat the ceremony. In reality, all the important levers of political power in Venezuela are creatures of Chávez, including the Supreme Court and even the now debated constitution that his lawyers wrote a decade ago. The media is largely under chavista control and, as recent elections showed, can sway the largest segment of public opinion.

Outsiders like the OAS and the United States have few tools to change course of events. Chávez has made both the object of his venom. The United States must take care to avoid being besmirched by the widespread corruption that is the glue holding the Chávez movement together. (Cabello, for example, is a former minister of defense and suspected of involvement in the Venezuelan military’s dealings with the Colombia’s FARC guerrillas and narcotic traffickers.) U.S. diplomats have made known they are at least talking with Maduro, thought to be as much of a “21st century socialist” as Chávez but as a former labor leaders accustomed to negotiations.

The Chávez movement has been a personal, not an organizational triumph that will certainly begin to show cracks as Chávez’s presence dims. It is a time for the best in Venezuela to come forward, not the worst, and time to lower the level of rhetoric and look for common practical solutions. And, with emotions running high, it is probably a bad time for new elections.

Phillip McLean is a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and is a senior associate in the CSIS Americas Program.

Image Credit: Flickr User nicholaslaughlin

Haiti—Building Back Better in 2013?

americas program — Fri, 11 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

By Johanna Mendelson Forman

In the 30 seconds that it took for an earthquake to devastate Port-au-Prince on January 12, 2010, the fate of this small Caribbean nation of 10 million people became the rest of the world’s concern. Three years later there has been progress in rebuilding Haiti. Decentralization of the economy has slowly taken root, especially with the opening in October of the Caracol Industrial Park in the northeast region. New jobs and new investments have started, with a goal to create more than 20,000 positions by 2015. Port-au-Prince, still the center of government, is recovering slowly, with its national palace finally demolished and plans for a new cathedral moving forward.

Yet, of more than $6 billion in aid disbursed by the international community since 2010, almost 90 percent has gone to foreign NGOs and private contractors, according to the Center for Global Development. With little transparency in the aid system, the government of Haiti must work harder to ensure that 300,000 people without permanent homes receive benefits, and that there is local material procurement so that more jobs will be created in the rebuilding.

This could be the beginning of a retreat from the “disaster capitalism” that has pervaded Haiti for the last 30 years, that stems from NGOs and local businesses that specialize in temporary fixes never meant to last. President Martelly appears to be convincing those within his own government and the international community that self-help is better than charity, and that local efforts must lead to permanent solutions as opposed to unblocking sewers, then plugging them up to make more money unblocking them again—a favorite Port-au-Prince pastime.

While the mantra of the government is “Haiti is open for business,” the road ahead to make it an investment-friendly nation is still very long. Yet even touting this refrain may be a first step toward healing the wounds of generations of Haitians who have been the victims of so many development schemes gone awry, and of so many business deals enriching only the investors.

Martelly’s cabinet, a group of technocrats and younger leaders, plus those from the private sector, are connecting with a younger generation of business leaders who get it, that this is a pivotal moment in Haiti’s history where a commitment to better governance and self-help could move Haiti toward a brighter future. The economist Paul Collier, who had been recruited by the UN to assess the potential for Haiti’s development, has suggested that Haiti has a strategic asset in its geographic location as a Caribbean crossroads close to the huge U.S. market. Coupled with low labor costs, it should have no problem attracting investment.

However, there are those who say Haiti was doomed when it won its independence from France. This historic event—arising from a revolt against slavery and inequality, supposedly led Haitians into a world that they were unprepared to manage—one with prejudice and few friends to lend a helping hand.

Regardless of whether that is a fair assessment, Haiti’s institutions do not provide justice, education, or health benefits to the majority. Haitian leaders must now lay down the foundation for democratic rule, and soon. UN peacekeepers can’t stay forever. And, while helping to maintain security, they can’t give Haitians a sense of self-identify. As Haiti scholar Laurent Dubois thoughtfully noted, a different Haiti is always and still possible. That is because the Haitians have never accepted what so many have announced, over and over again, that democracy is not for them. Haiti can still surprise us, and will move forward, but it will do so only if the international community encourages local capacity and authorship.

As we enter the second term of the Obama administration, the United States should remain committed to a vision that nobody can build back better than Haitians, themselves. Others can be enablers, but it will take the citizens of Haiti and its leaders to build a nation in their own, original image—a place where there is freedom, equality, and justice, and no place for corruption, greed, or poverty.

Johanna Mendelson Forman is a senior associate with the CSIS Americas Program.

Photo Credit: U.S. Government