dara

Humanitarian Voices: Interview with Jock Baker

moderator — Tue, 27 Jul 2010 10:07:49 +0000

Jock Baker, independent consultant with an extensive career cooperating with the United Nations and major NGOs, speaks on his recent DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) mission to Zimbabwe.

HRI 2010 Missions

moderator — Tue, 27 Jul 2010 07:24:37 +0000

Yemen

A Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team visited Yemen in June 2010. The mission featured the participation of Dubai Cares, the UAE-based philanthropic, and examined how the international donor community responded to the crisis. Yemen has some of the worst vital indicators amongst the least developed countries and is heading towards a worsening humanitarian crisis. Protection of civilians and the respect for basic human rights were two key issues.

The Humanitarian Response Index
HRI 2010 missions calendar

The field mission
Dates: 4-11 June 2010
Team: David Bassiouni (Team leader)
Fernando Espada and Nahla Haidar.

Sudden massive displacement and growing refugee population
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is an under reported and underpublicized one. Since 2004, the Government has been caught in a civil conflict in the north with the Houthi group. As the clashes escalated and intensified, serious protection concerns for the civilian population arose. In 2009, the conflict caused the sudden displacement of over 300,000 people in the short span of two months. Current estimates indicate 350,000 IDPs, including those displaced by previous rounds of fighting. In addition, an increasing number of Somalis are seeking asylum in Yemen, thereby adding to the current caseload of 100,000.

The conflict has taken a disproportionate toll on civilians leading to widespread humanitarian crisis. Both sides of the conflict have inflicted untold atrocities on civilians and violated basic human rights. Infrastructure and property have been severely damaged. There are fears that a lack of a comprehensive peace agreement will lead to further turmoil.

Growing needs and beneficiaries
Donors in Yemen are preoccupied with a development agenda amidst the worsening security and humanitarian crisis. The challenge is to influence the adoption of a two-pronged approach that highly prioritizes response to the humanitarian crisis while simultaneously continuing development efforts in parts of the country that are stable and ready to engage.

Other key challenges include: growing needs and beneficiaries, critical underfunding, lack of preparedness and response capacity, constrained humanitarian access limiting the flow of humanitarian assistance across the lines of belligerency, and an unstable security situation violating basic humanitarian rights.

Response
The massive displacements and the large refugee caseload took the government, the donor community and the international aid organizations by surprise. They were not fully prepared to meet the overwhelming challenges posed by the daunting number of IDPs and refugees. There was a lack of action on the part of the international community to recognize the importance of early warning, contingency planning and preparedness for the next crisis, as well as a lack of overall coordination of humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, the Gulf countries compared well in performance against their OECD/DAC counterparts, especially in responding to needs. However, they were not so strong on transparency and accountability.

A word from the Director

moderator — Mon, 26 Jul 2010 08:50:00 +0000

The importance of coordination

Ross Mountain, DARA's Director General

Welcoming Valerie Amos, Incoming UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs

Coordination is sometimes seen as a series of meetings bringing people together to discuss and share information. It is that too. But above all, it must be about charting the most effective course using all available resources to address the lifesaving and other humanitarian needs of victims.

For years everybody thought that coordination was easy - “anybody can do it.” Yet in recent years, effective coordination is being recognized as indispensable in the humanitarian field for the speedy and efficient relief and support for victims of conflicts and natural disasters. OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) was born as UNDRO (United Nations Disaster Relief Organization) in the wake of the realisation of the importance of making the most effective use of resources in the aftermath of the Armenia earthquake in 1988. UNDRO then became DHA (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs) under Jan Eliasson as Under-Secretary General (now Member of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals Advocacy Group and DARA Board member). In 1998, it was rechristened as OCHA.

OCHA worked hard to bring coherence to a largely dysfunctional system led by strong sectoral actors. Now, more than ten years later, when a crisis breaks out, it is not only donors who ask for OCHA’s leadership but the agencies themselves in the countries concerned request their analysis, coordination, reporting and –yes, through effective Humanitarian Coordinators, their leadership.

Today the vital role of ensuring effective coordination of humanitarian response to the growing list of crises is fully recognized in the Security Council and the UN Secretariat - and the public at large and the media look to the UN to ensure this role. It is thus important that qualified staff and resources are available rapidly in crisis countries. The world has been traumatised by the immense loss of life and damage in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. The UN also lost staff. Despite massive pledges of resources, this has not been the international humanitarian system’s finest hour.

The task confronting the new Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Valerie Amos, is to reinvigorate OCHA so that it can meet the expectations of UN and NGO partners, as well as populations at risk.

Many of the changes needed have been identified by key international NGOs whose members are the indispensable players in the international humanitarian system and who call for greater access, safety and disaster preparedness. Much needs to be done within the structure itself to improve results-based coordination, humanitarian advocacy and the finding of good leaders.

Efforts to reform the office itself must take place so that the headquarters in New York and Geneva provide the necessary support to its staff and other humanitarian colleagues who work every day in dangerous circumstances. This task is substantial and urgent. All humanitarians wish Ms. Amos well in her new assignment.

HRI 2010 Crisis Report

moderator — Fri, 23 Jul 2010 11:36:50 +0000

Somalia

Executive Summary: Humanitarian needs unmet as counter-terrorism focus limits response

In 2009 Somalia, described in the Humanitarian Response Index 2008 as “possibly the world’s most extreme failed state”, faced its worst humanitarian crisis in years. This past year the number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance increased an additional 13%. In the southern and central parts of Somalia, ongoing conflicts severely limit humanitarian access and response. Political considerations and the so-called War on Terror have had undeniable impacts on the neutrality of donors and the independence of humanitarian action.

HRI 2010 Somalia Crisis Report
The Humanitarian Response Index
HRI 2010 missions calendar
HRI 2009 Somalia Crisis Report

Somalia©UNHCR

According to the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) 2010 mission, donor decisions in Somalia are shaped or affected by non-humanitarian interests. Main donors hesitate to support any activities in areas controlled by Islamist groups, like Al-Shabaab, and continue to support the Transitional Federation Government (TFG), a party to the conflict, without ensuring the minimum accountability. This has had serious consequences on humanitarian organizations, with severe restrictions on access to populations in need.

Donor funding dropped in comparison to previous years and decisions prioritized life-saving activities over long-term needs. The response continues to be insufficient and ineffective in most sectors and often provided too late and based on inaccurate data.

International Humanitarian Professionalisation Association (IHPA) proposed

moderator — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 15:42:27 +0000

ELRHA (enhancing learning & research for humanitarian assistance ) organized an international working forum on humanitarian professionalisation, chaired by DARA’s Director General Ross Mountain on June 22 in London.

The forum reviewed a comprehensive scoping study by Feinstein International Center and RedR UK on the need for internationally recognised humanitarian qualifications, as well as coherent training and professional development structures. It agreed to explore and develop a strategy for the establishment of an International Humanitarian Professional Association (IHPA), building on existing structures that would expand knowledge amongst members and be readily accessible to humanitarian workers from the South as well as the North.

The listing of humanitarian competencies identified, course content and standards at all levels will be further elaborated.

HRI 2010 Crisis Report

moderator — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 10:02:52 +0000

Occupied Palestinian territories

Desperation grows

2009 saw an intensification of the politically-induced humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). Damage inflicted on Gaza during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead offensive in December 2008-January 2009 has not been repaired and the enclave’s infrastructure, economy and social fabric are under tremendous pressure due to the ongoing Israeli blockade. In the West Bank protracted violations of human rights and humanitarian principles continued and the Government of Israel dashed prospects for peace by further building of settlements, despite growing international condemnation.

The Humanitarian Response Index
HRI 2010 missions calendar

The barrier, March 2010

Gaza remains in the grip of a chronic humanitarian crisis characterised by shortages of food, potable water and medicine. The human misery caused by the blockade is rarely mentioned in political debate around Gaza. The enclave has, in effect, become a “humanitarian welfare” state, almost fully dependent on foreign aid. As standards of education, culture and living decline, Gaza has become a classic example of “de-development”. Limited access to land and livelihood opportunities continues to prevent development.

To add to the problem, the blockade and international boycott of contact with Hamas exacerbate the feeling of isolation of the Hamas authorities and their suspicions of aid workers. Hamas’ occasional interference with their work, and persistent restrictions on human rights workers having contacts with those whose rights have been abused – many of them inflicted by the local police or Hamas militants – limit the humanitarian space.

Donor response: generous but not principled
Donors responded rapidly and generously in 2009 to the crisis, with 22 new donors pledging support to the appeal. Kuwait was a significant new donor, becoming one of the top five. The US was the top donor.

However, there is clear evidence that in many cases, donor political interests have overridden the humanitarian principle that support should be impartially provided on the basis of need. Donors did not coordinate robust calls on Israel to permit unrestricted access of humanitarian goods and workers. The “no contact with Hamas” policy adopted by key donors severely compromises delivery of humanitarian assistance along agreed principles of international humanitarian law. It excludes some vulnerable groups in Gaza in need of humanitarian aid. The ultimate effectiveness of donor assistance is dependent on the selective and unpredictable goodwill of the Israeli government to allow certain shipments and categories of aid into Gaza. On a positive note, several donors were cited as examples of good donorship as they provide multi-year commitments, remain flexible and offer un-earmarked funding.

The report includes lessons learnt and recommendations for the future.

The field mission
Dates: 7-17 March 2010
Team: Belén Camacho,
Lucía Fernández,
Magda Ninaber (Team leader) and
Soledad Posada.

"Feeding the inmates through the bars"

moderator — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 10:02:04 +0000

Humanitarian assistance in Gaza and the West Bank
Op Ed by Ross Mountain in Arabic in An Nahar, a leading newspaper in Lebanon on Saturday 19th June 2010.

The killing in "self-defense" of unarmed civilians during Israel's assault in international waters on a flotilla carrying humanitarian aid supplies to Gaza calls attention, once again, to the terrible situation of civilians living trapped under unbearable conditions in Gaza. Anyone asserting that these few boats could constitute a threat to the security of Israel is simply not credible.

It is also the latest in a series of actions that perpetuate an artificial humanitarian crisis –not only in Gaza, but also in the West Bank - in which Israeli impediments to the movement of people and goods, on a daily basis test the tolerance and patience of the Palestinians beyond limits. Israel's construction of the West Bank Barrier, based on its claim that it needs to secure its people, is a cornerstone of this unnecessary crisis. It is the largest infrastructure project in Israeli history, expecting to cost around US$4 billion on completion. Although Israel signed an agreement to reduce the number of checkpoints and obstacles, these increased from 390 in 2005 to 630 in 2008, of which 550 were still in place in February this year.

The barrier and all the closures, differentiated passes and permits, settler- only roads and the enforced separation between Palestinians and Israelis resemble nothing so much as the laws and practices of racial segregation and forced removals that South Africa knew under Apartheid.

Perhaps more cruel than the barrier itself is the arbitrary system of the opening and closing of checkpoints. These often cut West Bank residents from their land, their neighbours and friends, deliberately impeding access between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank- let alone movement to and from Gaza. The Israeli authorities' arbitrary decisions determine when, or whether, different border crossings are opened or if the different permits they insist are required are valid for movement or not, and make predictable humanitarian access impossible. Indeed a direct product of this massive expenditure is the progressive impoverishment and heightened frustration of the Palestinian people!

The suffering of civilians in Gaza and frustration of the humanitarian organizations on the ground struggling to provide aid have only increased in the aftermath of "Operation Cast Lead", the military operation launched by Israel in December 2008. During this operation, houses, factories, wells, schools, hospitals, police stations, the recently built airport, and many UN and public buildings were destroyed and damaged - as were food supply warehouses and water and sanitation systems. More than a year later, families are still living amid the rubble of their former homes, since the continuing blockade has made meaningful reconstruction impossible despite the billions pledged by the international community.

Virtually no improvement has been possible due to the item-by-item restrictions and elaborate procedures insisted upon by the Israeli authorities. With a broken economy and collapsed infrastructure, Gaza's society has become increasingly destabilized. Over 1.5 million Palestinians remain trapped in Gaza, heavily dependent on restricted aid flows for basic necessities. Around 80% of the population now depends on food aid provided by the international community. As one humanitarian worker, struggling daily with this situation, graphically described it, "we are feeding the inmates through the bars." In 2009 the international community contributed US$765 million to United Nations appeals for Gaza and the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory. The UN appeal for 2010 seeks US$644.5 million. This huge amount of money would be unnecessary if the Israeli authorities removed the barriers, lifted the blockade and respected International Humanitarian Law as repeatedly demanded by the UN, the US, the EU, Russia- the members of The Quartet. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has exceptionally now also called for the Gaza closure to end.

During my recent mission to the region, humanitarian actors on the ground, amongst them donors, NGOs, UN agencies, and other partners shared with my team their concern that international humanitarian assistance was in effect subsidizing the Israeli occupation. How much better and more helpful to building peace between the two communities would it be to invest such money in improving the skills and future prospect of the Palestinian people instead of serving as a band aid to avert the absolute collapse of their living conditions. Let us be clear. This is a manufactured humanitarian crisis that need not exist, that does not need to demand hundreds of millions of dollars year by year.

The collective punishment the civilian population in Gaza is facing means that the international community has to deliver aid to cover needs brought about by the actions of the Israeli authorities. And at a high cost. As an illustration, the World Food Programme reports that the additional costs for procedures demanded by the Israeli authorities for the delivery of their food supplies to the citizens of Gaza has trebled their transport and handling costs. Who pockets this difference? Not the Palestinians, as purchases and storage take place mostly in Israel.

There are many examples of protracted and trivial negotiations to import items such as pencils for schools. Only after months of negotiations, progress was made with the Israelis allowing materials like glass into Gaza to repair windows shattered by the attack in December 2008. However, this was only achieved after involving the highest level of the UN and diplomatic missions.

Making matters worse, the application of the political "no contact" policy with Hamas by a number of key donors to humanitarian programs in the occupied Palestinian territories violates the basic humanitarian principle of dealing with all authorities - de facto as well as de jure - to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches the vulnerable on the basis of their needs. Indeed, as the International Crisis Group has emphasized the international donor community must shoulder its share of the blame for continuing to politically support the isolation of Gaza.

The thwarted efforts of the flotilla to bring humanitarian and building supplies have highlighted Israel's restrictive policies despite the outcry of the international community. In the wake of the Israeli killings, will donor countries now insist on the lifting of the blockade on humanitarian supplies for Gaza and the absurd limitations on movement including in the West Bank? None of these pose a credible threat to the security of Israel and would make all the difference to the health and welfare of the population of the occupied Palestinian territory. Or will the obstinacy of the Israel government and the spin of its skilled spokespersons be allowed to prevail once more?

Ross Mountain is DARA’s Director General. He visited oPt in March 2010 within the context of the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) 2010.

Humanitarian Voices: Interview with Aldo Ajello

moderator — Mon, 28 Jun 2010 16:15:26 +0000

Aldo Ajello was the European Union´s special envoy to the Great Lakes region for 11 years. He also was the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General responsible for the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique. Aldo Ajello believes that during a humanitarian operation, coordination between aid workers, the military and political institutions can be positive in terms of helping humanitarian action. Independence of aid is one condition donors must abide by.

Aldo Ajello

Question: Is there any situation when humanitarian actors can work with other actors on the ground, including the military?
Aldo Ajello: In the case of a peacekeeping operation, the coordination between the different elements of the mission - humanitarian and development actors, political and military components- can be quite positive as long as the humanitarian part of the mission can act on its own without involving the rest. In the case of an armed conflict, the political and military elements can be useful to open doors for humanitarian missions, but then humanitarian workers should be able to travel to areas alone, not with the military, so that their credibility is not compromised. The moment aid organizations are no longer considered neutral and independent actors, they will lose support from one of the parties involved in the conflict. So the situation becomes very partial and changes the nature of aid in the worst possible way. If there is room for independent humanitarian aid, donors should be very tough in imposing it.

Q: DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) missions consistently find that inadequate access to victims of humanitarian crises is one of the most serious problems facing the humanitarian community today. What do you see as the root cause of that?
AA: In the case of armed conflicts, the question of access is linked to the strategy of belligerents. For them the strategic control of territories is much more important than humanitarian aid. They want to control the territory and they do not want anyone to interfere with this. We also have the example of rebel groups who do not want any witnesses in areas where they are committing crimes, especially with the development of an international justice system that punish those who commit these crimes. They try not to be seen or monitored. So the job of humanitarian actors becomes more and more difficult, and more and more dangerous.

Q: Have you seen progress in terms of a more effective delivery of humanitarian aid?
AA: Yes. The improvement is visible. Humanitarian actors are more professional than they were before and this is a very positive thing. I think that humanitarian actors deserve the maximum possible support. Donors should be very vigilant about what can be done better in the way aid is delivered. Donors must also be very strong in imposing neutral and impartial humanitarian aid. This makes the difference, because if you are credible, people will trust you, and this will allow you to work well.

Other interviews in Humanitarian Voices

HRI 2010 Missions

moderator — Mon, 28 Jun 2010 11:10:22 +0000

Sri Lanka

A Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team travelled to Sri Lanka for the third year to analyze donor response to the displacement crisis one year after the end of the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

One year on
The quarter of a century-long conflict in Sri Lanka has devastated the northern and eastern regions of the country and claimed the lives of more than 80,000 people. After a major push, the government declared victory in May 2009. During the last months of the conflict, grave violations of international humanitarian law were committed by both sides. The conflict left hundreds of thousands of people displaced and seeking refuge with host families or in temporary camps and centres.

HRI team in Sri Lanka

After winning the war, the Sri Lankan government increased its control over the response, calling on the international community to “reprofile [their] presence”. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been trying to negotiate a framework agreement with the government since July 2009.

Over 280,000 IDPs who were previously in the conflict area of the north and fled were held in Sri Lankan Army (SLA) internment camps (with 250,000 in Menik Farm). There was no freedom of movement and humanitarian access was limited. In October 2009, the government announced its “Crash Resettlement Programme”- an accelerated release of IDPs from the camps. At the moment there is increased movement for the nearly 100,000 still in camps and some returnees are even trying to go back to the camps because of the conditions in their districts of origin: absence of public infrastructure, adequate shelter, medical services and access to basic services. There are huge needs for basic humanitarian support in the return areas and little response from the international community. Many of these regions were also damaged by the Tsunami five years ago.

Challenges: government control over the response
The main challenge that donor countries face in this crisis is the government’s tight grip on the response. With the Presidential Task Force having to oversee everything, international presence and aid are diminishing. Overcoming the resentment and aversion towards the international community and negative image of aid agencies prompted by the government in the national media is key. The absence and rejection of a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) created doubts on whether the government will favour or allow any international involvement. An overall framework for the response is lacking. These factors have limited access, making it a major constraint in the response. A weak UN system and uncertain funding in the future remain other key challenges.

The response: donor fatigue
There is now increasingly a lack of donor response to humanitarian needs. During the conflict, donors were viewed as attempting to follow a principled approach when responding to the humanitarian situation. However, since the government declared the end of the conflict, there has been complete shift in donor positioning. The government’s animosity towards international actors has meant a lower incentive for them to engage.

Under provisions for “rapid response funding” US$23.5 million (CERF) were allocated to Sri Lanka in 2009. The operation was well funded, considering that a lack of access also reduced agency expenditure and capacity to respond throughout the year. This year Sri Lanka has received US$13.7 million in CERF funds.

Major gaps to the response included a lack of planning and adequate assistance for the IDP influx and those accommodated in camps as of April 2010. There is also a huge shelter problem. Some state that the resettlement process has failed to meet international standards for safe and dignified returns. There has been little or no consultation with the displaced and no independent monitoring. With regards to protection, the lack of ICRC access to the “surrendered” population is a concern.

The field mission
Dates: 17-27 April 2010
Team: Daniela Mamone,
Silvia Hidalgo (Team leader), and
Riccardo Polastro.

Read the Sri lanka HRI 2009 crisis report
HRI 2010 missions calendar

Colombia HRI 2010: "Donors should engage with new government on protection and humanitarian needs"

moderator — Mon, 28 Jun 2010 10:14:14 +0000

As the country's presidency changes hands, DARA's HRI 2010 mission to Colombia finds that government efforts to deny the existence of an armed conflict have condemned millions of victims to invisibility and produced resignation within the donor and humanitarian community. Interview with Philip Tamminga, HRI Outreach Manager and Team Leader in Colombia.

Question: With no apparent end in sight to the Colombian conflict, last year’s HRI mission noted increasing donor fatigue. Is there a change in that?
Philip Tamminga: What we saw this year was not only donor fatigue but also a sense of resignation that the current political context makes it impossible to engage with the Colombian government in a meaningful dialogue on humanitarian issues. But it’s not just donor agencies. Many humanitarian actors we spoke with also seemed resigned to accept the situation, and try to maintain their programming as best they could in the current context. Donors and humanitarian organizations should look for common strategies to make the crisis visible to the world and find a shared platform to engage with the government to resolve important issues around access and protection of civilians.

Q: Colombia is one of the places in the world where militarization of humanitarian aid has become the norm. What can donors do to disengage humanitarian aid from the Colombian government’s military strategies and actions?
PT: The Colombian government is moving forward with implementation of its "Plan de Consolidación" aimed at recovering territory from FARC and re-instituting state control. In addition, Presidential decree 001 requires humanitarian actors to "coordinate" activities through the military and the state agency for IDP issues. But the policy is putting civilian populations at risk of reprisals from armed groups, and is seriously jeopardizing humanitarian space by compromising the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors. Donors should engage in dialogue with the incoming government and review its strategy of using the military and government agencies to coordinate humanitarian action.

Q: What sort of pressure and/or threats do humanitarian actors face in Colombia?
PT: Some paramilitary organisations have released communiqués specifically naming individuals working with humanitarian organisations, including local and international NGOs and UN agencies, and threatening them with reprisals if they continue to work on behalf of the people affected by the conflict. The HRI team also heard that sensitive information on programme beneficiaries had been stolen, and that work permits and visas for personnel of some organisations have been denied. Donor governments could do much more to advocate for safe humanitarian access and protection, but this would require finding a common voice and strategy amongst donors that don’t exist at the moment.

Q: How can donors be more effective in providing protection to Colombian civil society?
PT: Most donors have been supportive of efforts to ensure protection for victims of the armed conflict by funding the ICRC and UNHCR, for example. But very few are actively advocating on these issues. Donor governments have other agendas in Colombia. For example, the EU just signed a free-trade agreement with Colombia. The US has significant military and anti-drug interests in Colombia. So, humanitarian assistance and advocacy by donor governments on humanitarian issues don't seem much of a priority.

Q: Looking at the Colombian crisis as one of the longest lasting in the world, do you see any reason for hope?
PT: The new government has publically stated that it will continue the Uribe government's approach to the conflict. For their part, the FARC have been able to regroup and in fact may be growing in strength. So, in the short-term, it doesn't appear that a solution is in sight. However, the change in administration may create new opportunities to re-examine the conflict and look for some kind of settlement.

The field mission
Dates: 1-8 May 2010
Team: Eva Cervantes, Iñaki Martín,
Ana Martiningui and
Philip Tamminga (Team leader).

Read the Colombia HRI 2009 crisis report
HRI 2010 missions calendar

Humanitarian Voices

moderator — Fri, 25 Jun 2010 08:33:03 +0000

DARA launches "Humanitarian Voices", a series of interviews with a wide range of key humanitarian actors; aid workers, policy makers and academics engaged in improving humanitarian aid and its impact on affected populations.

Interview with Jock Baker, July 2010
Interview with Aldo Ajello, June 2010
Interview with Iain Levine, May 2010
Interview with Magda Ninaber, April 2010

HRI 2010 Missions

moderator — Fri, 25 Jun 2010 08:21:48 +0000

Colombia

An invisible long-running crisis
Colombia has suffered a 40-year long internal conflict, the longest in Latin American history and one of the longest running in the world. Throughout the four decades the characteristics of the crisis have remained the same: land dispossession, displacement and systematic violence against the civil population. The country has the second largest number of displaced persons, around 5 million or 8% of the population, after Sudan and serious issues around access and protection. However, the crisis has been invisible to, largely neglected or forgotten by major donors and international media. This is in part due to the overwhelming success of the government of Alvaro Uribe over the past eight years to very deliberately shift the discourse and focus away from the armed conflict and humanitarian situation to a more convenient security, anti-terrorism, anti-drug trade, development and trade agenda. The subsequent acceptance by most donor governments of this position, and their prioritization of trade, development and other issues, has contributed to keeping the humanitarian crisis invisible. This is despite evidence that the IDP situation is deteriorating and humanitarian needs are increasing as a result of the government’s policies.

"Donors should engage with new government
on protection and humanitarian needs"
Read the Colombia HRI 2009 crisis report
HRI 2010 missions calendar

Key challenge: the government does not accept the existence of an armed conflict
As highlighted in last year's HRI Colombia report, the Government is moving forward with implementation of its "Plan de Consolidación" aimed at recovering territory from FARC and re-instituting state control and services and Presidential decree 001 which essentially restricts humanitarian access by "requiring" humanitarian actors to "coordinate" activities through the military and the state agency for IDP issues, "Acción Social". Humanitarian actors in Colombia are very concerned about these measures, as they fear that they put the civilian population and humanitarian actors at risk of reprisals from armed groups, and compromise the neutrality and independence of humanitarian action. Yet despite the seriousness of the situation, there has been little coordinated action amongst humanitarian organizations, and even less so amongst donors, to advocate for safe humanitarian access and protection of civilians. This reflects the sense of fatigue and resignation amongst many of the actors interviewed that the situation will not change in the short term. However, the recent elections may open up new channels for dialogue, and opportunities for humanitarian actors to push for a more nuanced stance by the government.

The response
Due to the government's denial of armed conflict, there is no official appeal for Colombia. The Colombian government itself invests a significant amount of money through the state agency, "Acción Social", to provide services to displaced populations, arguing that it is fulfilling its obligations to its citizens and has no need for international assistance. Nevertheless, there is a core group of donors, mainly ECHO, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Canada and the US, that consistently contribute to humanitarian action in Colombia. FTS reports suggest there was an increase in funding from US$41.4 million in 2008 to US$54.8 million in 2009. However, it is difficult to assess the full extent of donor funding to Colombia for the crisis, as some donors fund humanitarian-related activities through other mechanisms and funding envelopes (such as post-conflict and development programmes). Regardless, humanitarian action is hardly a priority for most government donors. By way of example, according to a review of US government documents, the US spent nearly US$ 400 million in 2009 for military and police assistance (including anti-drug activities) and some US$ 240 million in economic and social assistance. Only US$ 5.1 million of this was designated for humanitarian action.

Compared to other crises, funding for protection and coordination is relatively high in Colombia. But the funding has not translated into effective action. There was a lack of attention to conflict preparedness and prevention. Medium to long-term strategies to anticipate and prepare for changes in the nature of the conflict are also largely absent in the response. Some positive areas of the response included support for integrated programmes, good monitoring and engagement of some donors like ECHO with their partners, and donor understanding of the context – although this did not lead to a more coordinated response amongst donors to advocate with the government on issues of access and protection.

The field mission
Dates: 1-8 May 2010
Team: Eva Cervantes, Iñaki Martín,
Ana Martiningui and
Philip Tamminga (Team leader).

A word from Ross Mountain

moderator — Fri, 25 Jun 2010 07:55:49 +0000

June 2010

Learning lessons in Haiti

The hurricane season is fast approaching in Haiti and shelter remains the main priority after the devastating earthquake on 12th January 2010. Although the international community has made considerable progress after a generous but rough start, it must maintain its level of commitment and attention to Haiti and the humanitarian community to provide an effective and adapted response.

Ross Mountain, DARA Director General

Op-ed published in El Pais, March 2010
HRI 2009 Haiti Crisis Report
DARA assists EU presidency aid efforts in Haiti
Evaluating the Haiti Response: Encouraging Improved System-wide Collaboration

Six months after the earthquake there are still 1.5 million people displaced living in settlements sites, hundreds of thousands of whom are highly vulnerable to floods, storms or hurricanes typical of this season in Haiti.

Many agencies are fielding missions to evaluate their individual responses. This is welcome and necessary. But it is imperative that such reviews are seen in the overall context of the response to the disaster- and do not disrupt ongoing efforts and add further demands on an already overstretched national administration. We must beware of technical evaluations that declare operations a success even though the patient may still be in intensive care! Evaluations therefore must not be just about how an individual agency operates but how it works with others to solve problems in different sectors- especially within the clusters and other mechanisms that were established to maximise the effectiveness of the overall response. ALNAP, OECD-DAC and the United Nations Evaluation Group are to address this challenge.

Previous DARA missions to Haiti pointed out the importance of investing in disaster preparedness and risk reduction efforts. While nothing could have prepared the country to face an earthquake of this magnitude, if efforts had been made to build up local structures and capacities to deal with annual hurricanes, many more lives would have been saved.

What happened with the “lessons learned” from previous disasters like the Tsunami? Were these applied? If not, why not? As extraordinary as international search and rescue efforts have been in saving an unprecedented 135 people in Haiti, we all know that in such circumstances, neighbours and national organizations save the overwhelming bulk of victims. And at a fraction of the cost.

The lessons that need to be learnt should not be for the evaluators involved- or for the bookcase. Somehow we need to find better ways of transferring such knowledge to those who will be called upon to exercise their judgement and leadership in different but similar situations elsewhere on the globe. Without integrating and applying lessons from past experience, mistakes that have been made are likely to be repeated- at high human cost!

"Respect for human rights is essential for effective humanitarian assistance"

moderator — Wed, 02 Jun 2010 11:23:57 +0000

Interview with Iain Levine, Program Director for Human Rights Watch. Iain Levine has worked both in the field of human rights and in humanitarian aid. In the mid 1980s and 1990s, he worked for Save the Children and UNICEF in North and South Sudan and in Mozambique. His experience has given him a valuable perspective on how the human rights and humanitarian communities can work together to better protect vulnerable populations facing humanitarian crises.

Question: Specifically, how does the defense of human rights contribute to humanitarian work?
Iain Levine: I think that both fields are very connected. The effectiveness of humanitarian aid is severely limited in highly repressive countries where human rights are violated, where freedom of expression and movement are restricted. We saw this two years ago with the Burmese military’s actions in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis: The country’s military government prevented both foreign disaster relief workers and urgently needed relief supplies from entering the delta during the crucial first weeks after the cyclone. And although there have been improvements since then, restrictions on access remain in place. We have just issued a report that looks back on Cyclone Nargis and the humanitarian response. Amongst our recommendations, we call on the Burmese government to release aid workers who were imprisoned for speaking out on the needs of the population, and we highlight the fact that respect for human rights is essential for effective humanitarian assistance.

Iain Levine

Also, in crises that generate large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, we are continuously looking at the issue of protection for these populations and asking whether more can be done, particularly for the most vulnerable groups such as women and children.

Q: Do the human rights and the humanitarian communities work together on these issues?
IL: When I began working in this field in the mid-1980s, the humanitarian and the human rights community were very far apart and distinct from one other. They had no language in common, they felt no need to work together. You could even say that there was a degree of tension between the two fields. All that changed in the 1990s, with the wars in Somalia and the Balkans, and the genocide in Rwanda. These were human rights crises that generated humanitarian crises. In Rwanda, a grave human rights situation had an immediate humanitarian impact: 800,000 people fled to the Congo. These were dramatic changes, which made the human rights and the humanitarian communities recognize their common concerns and acknowledge the need to work together towards providing effective protection for at-risk populations.

Q: How has that change come about?
IL: In the past decade or so, there has been a wider recognition that humanitarian action has to involve both assistance and protection for affected populations. Previously, the humanitarian community focused primarily on providing goods and services like food, water, shelter or sanitation. Now, humanitarian work also looks at issues such as protecting children from recruitment in conflicts, or protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence. Also important is the growing recognition by humanitarian actors that if humanitarian action is to be truly accountable and include full participation by beneficiaries, their rights to freedom of expression and association must be respected. If communities are to determine their own needs, they must have the freedom to express them.

It would be important for the humanitarian community to include human rights organisations in some of the fora where donors and organisations discuss the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. I believe that the human rights community can provide a useful assessment on how humanitarian aid can incorporate human rights more successfully and ultimately be more effective as a result.

Q: When looking at situations where human rights violations are taking place in the context of humanitarian crises, what areas of the world are you most concerned about?
IL: That is a very difficult choice, because there are so many places where this is happening. I could talk about Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan amongst many other countries. But the Democratic Republic of the Congo presents perhaps one of the gravest situations. We have documented so many kinds of human rights abuses by all parties – killings of civilians, sexual violence, forced displacement, recruitment of children. Although the UN peacekeeping forces seek to provide protection for civilian populations, it is also essential that the humanitarian community find ways to address the issue of protection in a much more sustained way. And as they fund humanitarian programmes, donor countries need to use their leverage with the Congolese government to push for measures to enforce protection for the population, and at the same time push for investigations into allegations of abuse and prosecution of those responsible. Donors must push all warring parties to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and to pursue justice and accountability.

Donors should also stress that humanitarian actors cannot be silent witnesses to human rights violations and encourage agencies to pass on information in ways that protect the security of humanitarian staff and allow them to maintain their ability to access and support populations in need.

Q: In the context of a natural disaster such as the earthquake in Haiti, what are Human Rights Watch’s main concerns with regard to human rights?
IL: Again, the main issue is protection for the most vulnerable populations. In Haiti’s case, the earthquake generated massive destruction of property, homelessness and overcrowding, as well as the breakdown of essential services; these are situations that expose people to dangers such as sexual violence. In the context of natural disasters, human rights concerns tend to be less prominent. Of course, we also understood that the devastation was tremendous, and that UN personnel, including human rights monitors, had been killed. The existence of a protection cluster alongside clusters for health, housing, water and sanitation, nutrition and so on, did help ensure that protection responses were integrated into the humanitarian response.

Q: Do donor countries tend to shy away from addressing human rights concerns with governments facing a humanitarian crisis?
IL: Absolutely, that is a generalized problem. Donor countries usually seem reluctant to address these issues because they do not want to damage their relationships with these governments, with whom they may share all sorts of political as well as humanitarian interests. That is a reality. But Human Rights Watch continues to share our findings and engage with donor governments to urge them to recognize that they have a critical role to play in advocating the respect for fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law.

And while we have made much progress in advancing the integration of human rights and humanitarian concerns in the 25 years that I have been working on these issues, we still have a significant way to go.

News from DARA

moderator — Thu, 27 May 2010 08:49:45 +0000

Evaluations

May-July 2010: Impact Evaluation: the World Food Programme in Cambodia. The aim is to measure the impact school feeding has on children’s schooling. DARA carried out a similar evaluation of WFP intervention in Mozambique in 2009
May-July 2010: DG ECHO, Evaluation of Protection in the Democratic Republic of Congo
June 2010: UN OCHA, Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) of the Humanitarian Response to Pakistan's Displacement Crisis

Humanitarian Response Index

May 2010: HRI field mission to Colombia
May 2010: HRI field mission to Sudan
June 2010: HRI field mission to Yemen
June 2010: HRI field mission to Iraq
July 2010: HRI field mission to Haiti

Agenda

May 2010, London: DARA participated in ALNAP-OECD DAC Evalnet-UNEG meeting "Evaluating the Haiti Response"
Keynote presentation by Ross Mountain, Executive Director of DARA.
28-30 July, San José, Costa Rica: ReLAC Conference, Evaluation and Systematization

DARA welcomes new Trustees

DARA is pleased to welcome three new members to our Board of Trustees: Emma Bonino, Aldo Ajello and Jan Eliasson

"We need to go back to basics"

moderator — Thu, 27 May 2010 08:49:13 +0000

Following the tragedy that struck Haiti on the 12th January of 2010, the evaluation and humanitarian community has held a series of meetings to analyze and improve collaboration in evaluating the international response. In May, during the ALNAP and European Policy Center meetings, Ross Mountain, executive Director of DARA, explained that despite the immediate and generous donor response, "today, tens of thousands of men, women and children remain trapped in or around Port-au-Prince amid the rubble and in makeshift camps."

What has failed?
Undoubtedly, aid efforts in Haiti could have been better coordinated. "Coordination is about achieving results," says Mountain, and "the situation in Haiti clearly shows that effective leadership is what drives effective coordination. We need to know if those who were responsible for coordination exercised leadership and delivered effectively. Did they focus on outcomes for the Haitians in need of humanitarian aid?" In addition to the insufficient coordination by the international community, the Haitian government's limited capacity also hampered the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian response.

Back to basics
Ross Mountain encouraged donors "to go back to basics, to support and implement the principle of neutral, impartial humanitarian action." He also stressed the need to empower the Commissioners and their humanitarian and development agencies. "In Haiti, the EC should play a leading role in creating a ‘coalition of the willing,’ advocating for the primary position of civilian organizations in implementing a neutral, independent and effective humanitarian action." And he concluded: "For the EU, Haiti is a human challenge, and it is also an opportunity to continually reform and improve the EU’s approach to humanitarian assistance."

Occupied Palestinian Territories: "A political crisis with humanitarian consequences"

moderator — Thu, 27 May 2010 08:48:39 +0000

Interview with Magda Ninaber, senior DARA evaluator.

Question: What is the humanitarian situation like in the Gaza Strip and in the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories? What are your main concerns?
Magda Ninaber: The situation in the Gaza Strip is like no other crisis, it is very different from those crises we know that produce the large tented camps in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a humanitarian crisis that has been created artificially, and that exists as a result of a political conflict. Israel closed access to and from the strip in 2007, and led a devastating three-week military operation from late December 2008 through January 2009 that killed more than 1,300 people and damaged or destroyed 15,000 houses. In the rest of the oPt, which is the West Bank including East Jerusalem, there is a long-lasting crisis in which Palestinians have to deal with constant harassment and violations of their basic human rights, with their mobility becoming more and more limited. Looking at the oPt as a whole, we are facing a unique crisis to which the world responds generously in material terms, helping to keep the population alive for so many years, but without much of an impact on the people’s freedom.

Q: In its 2009 HRI crisis report on the oPt, DARA found severe access problems due to a highly politicized international response. Have there been any changes in this regard one year later?
MN: I wish I could give you a positive answer, but unfortunately access has not improved at all. Gaza’s borders are sealed, with only one transit point for supplies in the south, close to the border with Egypt, and the Erez crossing for human transit, for which permits are needed. Meanwhile, the construction of the barrier separating East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank from Israel continues relentlessly. Only the most basic humanitarian supplies of food, medicines and fuel are allowed in to Gaza, but not even the simplest construction materials for the emergency repair of buildings and basic infrastructure can enter through legal channels. If it were not for the underground tunnel structure and the international relief aid, the people would be experiencing a slow but certain death. Gaza’s population is not allowed to export its modest production of flowers and fruit, so there are hardly any sources of income. A number of donors apply a ‘no-contact policy’ with Hamas; they make implementing agencies promise that they will make sure that no part of the aid will benefit Hamas and that they will not have any dealings with Hamas officials, so the aid to Gaza remains largely politicised. Immediately after the military operation in Gaza, a number of donors funded NGOs directly, but now they are channelling their funding once again through the Palestinian Authority, thus jeopardising their own impartiality in aid.

Q: Aid agencies are constantly blaming Israel for breaking International Humanitarian Law (IHL). After the HRI mission to the oPt, what are your views on this issue?
MN: Yes, this is the reality. Israel is to be blamed for violating International Humanitarian Law, but it is not the only guilty party in the crisis as long as Fatah (the Palestinian Authority) and Hamas do not settle their internal conflict. Israel is solely to be blamed for blocking entry of goods into Gaza, but it is often the Palestinian Authority that refuses to clear the requests for transit, so some of them do not even reach the Israeli authorities for clearance. Advocacy by the donor community for protection of the population and respect for IHL and human rights is critically falling short, probably because donors fear reprisals from Israel and want to avoid harming their bilateral relations and interests beyond the purely humanitarian sphere. A number of donors advocate for access for their own humanitarian assistance and workers, in most cases with success, but these are subject to extensive administrative procedures and checks, causing considerable delays and adding to costs.

Q: What should donors do to ensure greater respect for fundamental humanitarian principles in the oPt? what are your views on this issue?
MN: Several donors are quite active in advocating for respect for humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and see this as a priority in their response, at the risk of damaging their relationship with the government of Israel and the conflicting Palestinian parties. But it is simply not enough. If the international donor community is not ready to speak with one voice and consistently hammer the issues or come up with sanction-like steps, there will be no end to the violations of basic humanitarian principles, and Palestinians will continue to be harassed. As an example, Israel constantly changes the rules without any advance notice, which means that from one day to the next, people no longer have the necessary permits to move between their places of work and residence.

Q: DARA describes the situation in Gaza as a de-development process. Can you explain what that means concretely for the 1.5 million people living in the territory?
MN: Although before this last major crisis the people of Gaza had already long been suffering restrictions on their movement and access, they were quite well established and educated, and assistance could be provided to those who really needed it without too much hindrance. But since the blockade of 2007, the socio-economic conditions are deteriorating quite rapidly. Unemployment has gone up from 30% in 2007 to 40% at the end of last year, which means that family income has decreased because there is also a ban on exports. More families have become dependent on food aid, and basic services such as water, sanitation and health care are getting worse because materials to repair the systems are not allowed in through the formal way. The limited amount of fuel that comes in from Israel costs about four times as much as the fuel that comes in through the tunnels. What this means in day-to-day life is that there are more people in the streets, looking for a way to earn a buck, and that there is more dependence on the tunnels to bring goods in.

Q: What are the main recommendations to donors after this mission?
MN: Donors should speak with one common voice and they should have the courage to issue strong, joint statements and initiatives towards the authorities in charge. When we were in the oPt, Israel’s announcement of a plan to build 1,600 new houses on occupied Palestinian land in East Jerusalem caused an international outcry at the highest levels, including from the UN Secretary-General. Now, just one month later, those voices are silent despite the fact that Israel still insists that the construction will take place. This makes the creation of a Palestinian state more and more difficult, as little or no land remains for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Donors should be consistent in their approach and make sure that agencies can implement activities on the basis of the needs of all people, according to the humanitarian principle of neutrality, and irrespective of their political affiliation. Donors should continue to find ways to better coordinate their response and they should not avoid contact with Hamas, but rather engage their more moderate officials in negotiations that focus on humanitarian needs. Each side, not just Israeli forces but also the Palestinians, should refrain from any form of retaliation so that this negative spiral can come to an end.

Q: What does the future look like for the Gaza Strip and the rest of oPt? Have you seen any positive signs of progress?
MN: The future for most Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the rest of the oPt looks very grim, with no respite of any sort in sight as long as the Gaza border remains closed and as long as there is a barrier separating the West Bank including East Jerusalem from Israel and basically the rest of the world. The population in the West Bank has some freedom of movement east of the barrier but is restricted to using the “fabric-of-life roads that were specifically built by Israel to connect the villages east of the barrier with Ramallah, the main commercial centre in the West Bank. But even there, Palestinians face humiliations on a daily basis. Palestinian registered vehicles or other forms of transport used by Palestinians are not allowed on the highway built by Israel on Palestinian land to connect the illegal Israeli settlements to Jerusalem and beyond. We were slightly hopeful that international pressure would make the conflicting Palestinian parties sit at the table, come closer to an internal agreement and reach a unified position. This would then make it possible to have a basis for the resumption of peace talks. I just heard that through quiet diplomacy the parties may have agreed to resume indirect negotiations, the proximity talks, and it is important that the Arab leaders continue to support Palestinian representatives in their work towards peaceful settlement.

DARA conducts real-time evaluation of the international response to two typhoons in the Philippines

moderator — Thu, 27 May 2010 08:47:41 +0000

During the third quarter of 2009, three typhoons swept across the Philippines. Typhoons Ketsana and Parma struck on the 26th of September and on the 3rd of October, causing extensive flooding. Typhoon Mirinae caused further casualties and destruction when it struck on the 31st of October.

Report: Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) of the Humanitarian Response to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in the Philippines
Read the interview to Riccardo Polastro
Read more about the evaluation

Laguna houses destroyed by Thiphoon Parma©DARA, Riccardo Polastro

The typhoons killed almost 1,000 people, destroyed over 46,000 houses and caused significant damage to over a quarter of a million homes. Over 10 million people were affected, with some 700,000 physically displaced.

The Philippines is among the 15 most hazard-prone countries in the world, with one third of its population living in at-risk areas. For this reason, the country has dedicated significant resources to its capacity for disaster management and response. Under normal circumstances, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GoRP) has the capacity to manage a response to natural disasters. However, because of the magnitude of the typhoons, assistance from the international community was requested.

The GoRP and the international community responded to the disasters by releasing emergency relief stocks and launching search and rescue operations. Teams, including the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), cluster leads and the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) carried out initial rapid assessments in order to identify priority needs.

Evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency
Given the exceptional magnitude of the disaster, the international community considered that there were valuable opportunities to commission an Inter-Agency-Real-Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) of the humanitarian response in Philippines. The purpose of a real-time evaluation is to provide immediate feedback on findings, conclusions and recommendations to on-the-ground humanitarian actors so that they can benefit from the information as quickly as possible.

DARA was commissioned to conduct the IA-RTE, which focused on the effectiveness and efficiency of the response including coordination, timeliness, analysis of clusters and management of systems.

Low overall donor commitment
In October 2009, after Ketsana, the UN launched a flash appeal for $74 million. A month later, after Parma and Mirinae, it was revised to $143.7 million. According to the UN's Financial Tracking Service, only 39.2 percent of that appeal has been funded.

Outside the UN flash appeal, the country also received bilateral support from donors such as the United States, Australia and ECHO. Nevertheless, the overall donor commitment remained low.

Because it is a middle-income country, donors do not consider the Philippines a priority destination for their humanitarian funding and tend to focus only on emergency relief. A factor that explains why donors just focused on short-term funding is the fact that the GoRP asked the World Bank to carry out a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment. Therefore the recovery needs were addressed by other funding channels, mainly through loans. The assesment estimated that $942.9 million were required to meet recovery needs, while $3.48 billion were needed for reconstruction.

Houses destroyed in areas at risk©DARA, Riccardo Polastro

More integrated coordination needed
The international community coordinated the response, together with the GoRP and the NDCC. DARA found that both national and international actors did not always understand the roles, mandates and mechanisms of clusters. The existing parallel coordination systems, one for national coordination and the other in charge of coordinating the international effort, mostly operated as one forum during the disaster.

Additionally, a series of needs assessments were carried out in the aftermath of the typhoons. DARA has found that many of them were not carried out in a coordinated fashion and lacked a common approach. These assessments also lacked analysis on the identified needs and on the linkages among them. This reduced the level of efficiency of the aid and hampered coordination and information flow among humanitarian actors.

Improving preparedness and planning
The evaluation team has found that assistance from the international community complemented the national response and was of significant value in areas where the emergency was prolonged.

However, several interviewees also said that international response was initially reactive and "running behind the challenges". The levels of preparedness among the humanitarian actors differed. When the disasters struck, the Red Cross and NGOs with longstanding presence in the country responded swiftly. Comparatively, it took more time for the UN to mobilize.

Key findings and recommendations
The report concludes that the international response to the typhoons arrived late. On a more positive note, it also found that humanitarian efforts did save lives weeks after the disasters, notably by preventing waterborne diseases through access to potable water.

DARA also found that some of the identified needs were not met, mainly due to lack of funding. Today, many people remain in a situation of displacement, with ongoing needs for shelter, protection, and the restoration of their livelihood.

DARA’s report has specific recommendations on how to improve donor and international response for disaster-prone, middle-income countries:

The Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA should limit the preliminary Flash Appeal to a two to three-week period in order to address the most critical needs.
The donor community should develop an emergency response fund in order to mobilize rapid responses to sudden crises.
The IASC, the HCT and the NDCC must develop a contingency plan before the next typhoon season in order to define the roles and responsibilities of response actors.
IASC, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the cluster leads should carry out more joint needs assessments. They should also adopt a common approach.
It is essential to recognize national capacity and to involve beneficiaries in the humanitarian effort.

"We draw lessons learnt that can be applied to other disaster-prone countries"

moderator — Thu, 27 May 2010 08:47:08 +0000

Three questions for Riccardo Polastro, team leader of the Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) in Philippines.

Question: What exactly is an IA-RTE and what value does it have?
Riccardo Polastro: An Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation is a snapshot of the response to a specific disaster. It usually takes place in the early implementation stages of the humanitarian response, right when the emergency response is taking place. Its purpose is to provide feedback that will support and facilitate strategic decision-making both for planning and implementation. Its emphasis is on lesson-learning.

Q: How did you associate the local population, victims of the typhoons, to your evaluation?
RP: The RTE team conducted focus group interviews with the local populations affected by the disaster in some 20 different locations. This included people who stayed in their homes, people who where still displaced, people who were displaced and living in transitional shelter, people who had been relocated to safe areas, and others who had returned to their places of origin.

The affected populations were interviewed so that we could better understand the disaster, how their needs where assessed, the type and level of response they received, and also know what their expectations for the future were. Without their views one could would not be able to fully understand the efficiency and effectiveness of the response.

Q: What do you see as the most critical part of this mission?
RP: In this particular case, the team was only fielded in February of 2010, four months after the typhoons struck the Philippines. This has limited the evaluation itself, as well as its capacity to influence the emergency response. Nevertheless, we managed to draw lessons learnt on needs assessments, funding, coordination and response that can be applied to other disaster-prone middle-income countries.

Stronger international coordination and leadership will provide better humanitarian aid to men, women and children in Haiti

moderator — Thu, 27 May 2010 08:46:30 +0000

After the International Donors' Conference in New York, DARA welcomes the outpouring of support but urges donors to address persistent and urgent humanitarian needs.

On January 12th, an earthquake ripped through Haiti and in just 35 seconds killed an estimated 250,000 people, wounded hundreds of thousands of others, and left over one million homeless. Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince, was left in ruins.

The immediate humanitarian response on the ground was a logistical "perfect storm", with major infrastructure devastated and international aid teams based in Haiti decimated by the earthquake. In the aftermath of the disaster, some countries sent humanitarian supplies and rescue teams to Haiti. Millions of dollars were raised by governments, organisations and individuals.

Between 900,000 and 1.2 million Haitians were left homeless and moved to temporary camps set up around Port-au-Prince. Providing shelter materials to this population remains a top priority. Sanitation is also a major concern. The current conditions in the camps increase the risk of outbreaks of malaria and dengue. As the hurricane season approaches, the situation of hundreds of thousands of people is still extremely precarious.

Haiti is facing enormous challenges
On March 31st, the international community came together in New York City to put together a plan to rebuild Haiti. Over 150 nations and institutions attended the Donors' Conference for Haiti's Reconstruction at UN headquarters. Donors pledged close to $10 billion. Of that amount, $5 billion were promised for 2010 and 2011, exceeding the established $4 billion target. The largest contributions came from the European Union and the United States.

©Getty Images

Op-ed published in El Pais
Haiti mission photos
Haiti context and recommendations
Allan Lavell's interview
HRI 2009 Haiti Crisis Report

The first $4 billion will be destined in the next 18 months to rebuild destroyed infrastructure, including government buildings, hospitals and schools.

DARA considers that these commitments by donors are important and reflect their recognition of the enormous challenges that lie ahead, but cautions that the pledges were not matched by specific operational plans and changes in aid provision. In that sense, the conference raised questions about whether donors' commitments will translate into meaningful improvements in the lives of Haitians who need the most urgent help.

Another key issue raised during the Conference was the international community's capacity and approach to the rebuilding of what has been considered to be a failed state as the immediate relief needs of millions of Haitian people are still unmet.

For that purpose, donors have also been called to respond to the $1.44 billion UN appeal for food aid and emergency shelter. The hurricane and rainy seasons are already underway, putting at risk an estimated 1 million Haitians made homeless by the earthquake.

A decentralization plan
Haiti lost more than 100,000 homes in the earthquake, and replacing lost housing is a top priority for the Haitian government and for the international community’s reconstruction plan. Both the Haitian government and donor countries insist that a decentralisation strategy is at the heart of the reconstruction plan. This plan aims to carry out reconstruction projects in parts of the country that are less vulnerable to natural disasters than Port-au-Prince.

Haitian president René Préval wants to use the reconstruction plan as an opportunity to decongest an overcrowded capital and revitalize the country’s agriculture. But weeks after the earthquake, those who left Port-Au-Prince are already returning to the capital. Relief aid was very slow in reaching rural areas, and Haitians probably suspect that things will not be any different in the reconstruction phase.

A better Haiti
In some aspects, the Haiti donors' conference went far beyond the issue of rebuilding the physical structures destroyed by the earthquake. DARA, whose Director General Ross Mountain led a team to Haiti to provided technical assistance to the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation in the aftermath of the earthquake, believes that there is a clear opportunity for Spain and the EU to play a pivotal role in defining how the aid will be structured. Spain can also play an important role in the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), which will be co-chaired by Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and former U.S. President Bill Clinton, and where Spain has both a presence and voting rights.

The IHRC will be tasked with coordinating efforts and with ensuring transparency and accountability throughout the process. These are seen as key steps to assuage donor concerns about corruption and political unrest, problems that have historically plagued Haiti. Furthermore, key actors should agree upon a common action plan and an agenda that reach beyond the physical reconstruction of Haiti and aim towards the creation of a new country.

Ross Mountain underscored that "the magnitude of the devastation in Haiti and the complexity of the situation on the ground demands that humanitarian actors improve their current mode of operation. The success of the plan to build a 'better Haiti' will depend on how Haiti's leaders will manage their responsibilities and coordinate reconstruction efforts with donors, the UN and the international development and humanitarian community. The effective use of international aid requires a clear disbursement strategy from donors, a better financial tracking system and close coordination among all actors, including recipients".

Mountain also stressed that "the first step to building a 'better Haiti' is to address immediate humanitarian needs, which will help to create a stable environment, increase respect for human rights and ensure basic protection for the population".

Afghan aid risks militarisation

moderator — Thu, 27 May 2010 08:44:30 +0000

In Afghanistan, humanitarian crises stem from chronic vulnerabilities whose origins are found in more than 30 years of war and conflict, poor governance, recurrent natural disasters and critically low levels of social and economic development. The year 2009 was marked by growing violence and insecurity. The spread of the conflict has had consequences on the humanitarian situation, creating displacements, destruction of houses and crops, violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and a shrinking of humanitarian access.

Fifty to 60 percent of the country is under uncertain control, and humanitarian access continues to deteriorate. The country presents an insecure environment for the implementation of aid programmes, and a number of aid workers, mostly Afghans, have been killed, kidnapped and intimidated. A deadly, targeted attack on a United Nations guesthouse in Kabul in October 2009 forced aid organizations to review security arrangements and to reassess the impact and criticality of their programmes. Conflict-affected areas of the country are virtual no-go zones, and information on the scope of needs is vague, if not null.

As a consequence, there is no humanitarian consensus nor comprehensive analysis of the conflict-related human suffering and of the effects of recurrent natural disasters among the population, and how both affect the vulnerability and coping mechanisms of Afghan communities.

Afghans face a deepening humanitarian crisis
Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan has received a massive injection of money. However, the infant mortality rate is 13%. Seventy-seven percent of the population lacks access to safe drinking water, 88% lacks access to sanitation and 54% of all children are considered chronically malnourished. One of the greatest concerns is the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The exact number is disputed, but the UNHCR estimates that there are 235,000.

Despite international laws and massive international presence, Afghan people are not protected. The year 2009 registered the highest number of civil casualties since the fall of the Taliban. In terms of protection, women and children are particularly at risk and neglected by international donors.

Militarisation of aid hinders humanitarian efforts
Afghanistan is the only complex emergency where almost all major donors –with the exception of Switzerland, Ireland and India - are also military actors in the conflict. In the field, military actors are engaged in assistance activities, mainly through the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The PRTs are units comprised of military officers and private contractors working to support stabilization efforts. Militaries commonly undertake activities that include “winning hearts and minds” operations intended to gain support from local communities that will enhance their military operations. These are conducted without necessarily adhering to core humanitarian principles of independence and impartiality.

For NGOs, this situation creates confusion, compromises their activities and puts their staff and beneficiaries in danger of possible retaliations from insurgents. The "militarisation" of aid means that many NGOs refuse to work with donors that have troops on the ground. The combination of military and humanitarian action is also seen by humanitarian organizations as detrimental to the future of humanitarian aid.

Good Humanitarian Donorship principles remain a key challenge for donors
The international community's original, basic premise of intervention in Afghanistan was the country's post-conflict situation. Thus, the emphasis was placed on development and reconstruction in detriment of humanitarian assistance. ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid) had a 2009 budget of €35 million, OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance) had a budget of $30 million. In comparison, USAID (United States Agency for International Development) had a budget of more than $2,5 billion for 2009.

Nevertheless, the humanitarian appeal of $665 million is well funded at 78%. However, a few NGOs and donors interviewed by the HRI team argued that the OCHA Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) is more a Development Action Plan, which is partly a reflection of the intervention scope granted to the humanitarian space. Humanitarian actors recognized that chronic vulnerability should be addressed with a long-term developmental strategy, but warned that it might not save the lives currently at risk.

As far as Good Humanitarian Donorship principles are concerned, in Afghanistan they have been seriously compromised. Some donors, especially those most involved in combat operations, have assumed and acknowledged the intrinsic link between military and humanitarian aid objectives. Donors are facing dificulties in detaching their humanitarian from their military agendas, with military interests often defining humanitarian actions.

General recommendations
In Afghanistan there is a general agreement among humanitarian actors interviewed for the HRI mission that aid has not delivered the expected results. Most recently, there have been concerns that funds have been misspent due to corruption, mismanagement and poor targetting. An in-depth dialogue between donors and humanitarian actors exploring future scenarios, such as the humanitarian consequences of a progressive withdrawal of ISAF (NATO-led forces), could be a major step in the right direction and would allow agencies to address urgent humanitarian needs in an effective manner.

Specific recommendations

Donors should direct attention to GHD principles. Initially, this could be done by selecting a number of relevant, key GHD indicators (i.e. neutrality, protection, access and independence) and develop strategies that will pursue acceptance of these principles from all actors of the conflict.
Donors should recognize that aid must be allocated based on a thorough analysis of community needs and capacities. Aid must be needs-based, as opposed to area-based. Therefore donors should promote the separation of military activities from humanitarian aid, and in this way empower national and international NGOs, as well as the Afghan Civil Society.
Donors must integrate the protection of civilians, particularly of women and children, as an essential part of humanitarian assistance and of the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Donors should advocate that Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) play an independent, neutral and impartial role. Donors should promote data collection and analysis that assess conflict-related assistance and humanitarian needs of the population.

HRI 2010 missions calendar

Cronología del conflicto de Somalia

moderator — Wed, 19 May 2010 07:23:32 +0000

Desde la caída del dictador Mohamed Siad Barre en 1991, la población somalí ha sido sometida a décadas de brutal violencia entre clanes y señores de la guerra, con frecuentes sequías y crisis económicas. Durante los últimos 18 años, Somalia ha permanecido en un estado de anarquía, sin el funcionamiento de un gobierno central. La comunidad internacional considera a Somalia un estado fallido, con un enorme porcentaje de población dependiente de la ayuda internacional.

En 1991 el dictador Mohamed Siad Barre es derrocado por clanes de señores de la guerra después de 22 años en el poder.
Poco después de la caída de Barre, la provincia del norte del país de Somaliland se separa de Somalia y declara su independencia.
En 1992 los Estados Unidos lideran un esfuerzo de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) por restaurar la paz. Sin embargo, la Operación de Naciones Unidas en Somalia (UNOSOM) no consigue evitar la hambruna y las luchas internas entre los señores de la guerra.
En 1998 la provincia norteña de Puntland sigue el ejemplo de Somaliland y declara su independencia de Somalia.
En 2004, después de 2 años de conversaciones de conciliación en Kenia entre varios señores de la guerra y representantes del fallido estado somalí, se establece el Gobierno Federal de Transición (GFT).
La transición política hacia la estabilidad queda socavada por las luchas entre clanes que componen el GFT, así como por el surgimiento del Consejo de las Supremas Cortes Islámicas (CSCI), cuya milicia armada se conoce como al-Shabaab.
En 2006 el CSCI desafía al GFT y a las milicias seculares de los señores de la guerra por el control del país.
En 2007 la invasión de Etiopía con respaldo de las tropas estadounidenses restaura el control del GFT del país. El CSCI oficialmente rinde Mogadiscio a las tropas de Somalia con apoyo de Etiopía.
Poco después, comienza una nueva guerra civil en Somalia entre los ocupantes etíopes y sus partidarios de las tribus del norte de Somalia por un lado, y los militantes islámicos, liderados por al-Shabaab y las tribus del sur, por el otro.
Ese mismo año, la Unión Africana despliega una misión de mantenimiento de la paz de 3.500 tropas (AMISOM). En la actualidad hay alrededor de 5.000 soldados de la AMISOM en Somalia, basados en Banadir/Mogadiscio.
En 2009 las tropas etíopes se retiran completamente de Mogadiscio. Desde entonces continúan teniendo una fuerte presencia en la frontera entre Etiopía y Somalia.
En los últimos dos años los combates entre las fuerzas progubernamentales y los grupos insurgentes islámicos han dado lugar a desplazamientos masivos de la población, tanto internamente como fuera de las fronteras de Somalia, así como miles de asesinatos y de otros abusos contra civiles de los derechos humanos relacionados con la guerra. El número de desplazados internos ha incrementado aún más como resultado de la prolongada sequía.
Recientemente el GFT, que controla la mayor parte de Mogadiscio, se ha aliado con un grupo islámico moderado, en oposición a las milicias más extremistas que controlan la mayoría de las provincias del sur y del centro del país. Gran parte del país está en manos de señores de la guerra.

Datos sobre la crisis humanitaria de Somalia

moderator — Mon, 17 May 2010 12:57:55 +0000

Desde principios de 2007, la violencia causada por el conflicto se ha cobrado la vida de al menos 18.000 civiles.
Hasta finales de 2009, 3.3 millones de personas (aproximadamente el 43% del total de la población) ha afrontado necesidades urgentes. (OCHA).
Según los trabajadores humanitarios, Somalia tiene más de 1.4 millones de desplazados internos.
Más de 560.000 somalíes están oficialmente registrados como refugiados en países vecinos. Hay cientos de miles más de refugiados sin registrar en Kenia, Europa, los EEUU y Canadá.
El acceso humanitario se deterioró dramáticamente en 2009 en el sur y el centro del país. El número de trabajadores internacionales en el terreno también ha disminuido.
Las agencias de ayuda sitúan a Somalia como uno de los sitios más peligrosos del mundo para trabajar. En el último año, 12 trabajadores humanitarios fueron asesinados, a pesar de la escasa presencia en el terreno de agencias y la adopción de medidas para reducir el riesgo.
Actualmente, la distribución de alimentos está entorpecida por los ataques de piratas en el mar, cortes de carreteras y ataques armados a convoyes de ayuda.
El porcentaje de población que vive con menos de 1 Dólar al día es del 43.2% (Somalia Millenium Development Goal Report for 2007).
Mortalidad adulta (edades entre 15-60): 381/1.000 (hombres 447/1.000; mujeres 312/1.000) (OMS Estadísticas de la Organización Mundial de la salud para 2009).
Mortalidad maternal: 1.400 /100.000 (OMS Estadísticas de la Organización Mundial de la salud para 2009).
Mortalidad en niños menores de 5 años: 142/1.000 (hombres 140/1.000; mujeres 144/1.000) (OMS Estadísticas de la Organización Mundial de la salud para 2009).
Malnutrición aguda en niños menores de 5 años: 19%.
Prevalencia de malnutrición en el total de la población: 71% (OMS Estadísticas de la Organización Mundial de la salud para 2009).

Misiones del HRI 2010

moderator — Mon, 17 May 2010 10:35:11 +0000

Territorios Palestinos Ocupados

Ross Mountain junto al muro

Por tercer año consecutivo, el equipo del Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) ha realizado una misión en los Territorios Palestinos Ocupados del 7 al 17 de marzo para analizar la respuesta de los donantes internacionales a esta crisis prolongada.

Magda Ninaber van Eyben, antigua jefa de la Sección de Relaciones con los Donantes de OCHA en Ginebra, lideró el quipo de DARA, que se reunió con 10 donantes gubernamentales y ECHO, y con representantes de 31 ONG internacionales y locales, cinco agencias de la Cruz Roja/Media Luna Roja, nueve agencias de la ONU y tres autoridades locales. Ross Mountain, Director General de DARA, participó el 16 de marzo en el debriefing a agencias humanitarias y donantes sobre los hallazgos iniciales de la crisis palestina.

La misión al terreno
Fechas: 7-17 March 2010
Equipo: Belén Camacho
Lucía Fernández
Magda Ninaber (Team leader)
Soledad Posada

Una crisis fabricada

La crisis de los Territorios Palestinos Ocupados puede ser calificada como totalmente única, ya que es una crisis completamente artificial y fabricada por el hombre. Se caracteriza por su larga duración, la generosidad de la respuesta, el gran tamaño del paquete de ayuda y el alto compromiso de la comunidad internacional.

Esta crisis es más una situación política con consecuencias humanitarias que una crisis humanitaria tradicional. Estamos ante una crisis de prolongadas y constantes violaciones de la dignidad humana, las leyes internacionales humanitarias y los derechos humanos de la población. Gaza está completamente aislada y bloqueada, mientras que la situación en Jerusalén Este y Cisjordania es una crisis prolongada, donde la movilidad y el espacio humanitario son cada vez más limitados.

Más de un año después de la operación israelí de Cast Lead, las necesidades humanitarias en Gaza siguen siendo elevadas debido al actual bloqueo y las sucesivas incursiones militares. Alrededor de 1,5 millones de palestinos siguen atrapados en Gaza, extremadamente vulnerables y dependientes de un flujo muy restringido de ayuda para necesidades básicas. Además, la inseguridad alimentaria es aún elevada, debido a la pobreza extendida y a la falta de poder adquisitivo.

Retos

A pesar de la abundante financiación, los territorios ocupados palestinos son un perfecto ejemplo de proceso de retroceso. No ha habido ninguna mejora más allá de cumplir con las necesidades iniciales básicas, sin que se haya materializado todavía un plan de reconstrucción. El acceso y la protección de la población necesitada es un reto crítico. El levantamiento del bloqueo sigue siendo el requisito clave para la recuperación de la economía de Gaza, la disminución de la pobreza y el desempleo, y la reducción de la dependencia humanitaria. Otro desafío clave es el respeto de las normas y los principios del derecho internacional humanitario, así como el seguimiento de la eficacia de la multitud de actores. A la vez, se debería prestar más atención al trauma psicológico y la situación de la salud mental en Gaza.

La respuesta

La respuesta ha sido muy generosa, con el paquete de asistencia per cápita más alto en el mundo. Sin embargo, sólo una parte limitada de los 4,5 millones de dólares prometidos para las necesidades humanitarias y de reconstrucción en Gaza se ha transferido. La aplicación de la política que prohíbe el contacto con Hamás y la cláusula de la lucha contra el terrorismo por un número de donantes clave a programas humanitarios en los Territorios Palestinos Ocupados han afectado la prestación de ayuda y violan los principios humanitarios básicos de la neutralidad, la imparcialidad y la independencia.

Calendario de misiones del HRI 2010
Fotos de la misión a oPT

Misiones del HRI 2010

moderator — Mon, 17 May 2010 09:53:03 +0000

Pakistán

El equipo del Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) de DARA visitó Pakistán del 3 al 12 de marzo y recogió información sobre la respuesta global de los donantes a la crisis de los desplazados en Pakistán. Es la segunda vez que DARA manda un equipo a Pakistán. Mientras en 2007 la organización analizó la respuesta de los donantes al terremoto de 2006), este año DARA ha recogido información a la crisis masiva de desplazados producida por los enfrentamientos entre el ejército pakistaní y los talibanes.

El equipo liderado por Matthew Kahane, antiguo Representante residente y coordinador humanitario de la ONU en Nepal, entrevistó a 28 ONG internacionales y locales, incluyendo autoridades nacionales y sociedades de la Cruz Roja/Media Luna Roja, 6 donantes gubernamentales y 11 agencias de la ONU. Para validar los hallazgos, al final de la misión el equipo realizó un debriefing ante el equipo humanitario del país sobre las tendencias de la respuesta inicial y los desafíos.

La misión al terreno
Fechas: 3-12 de marzo 2010
Equipo: Fernando Espada
Matthew Kahane (Team leader)
Nacho Wilhelmi

La crisis

Más de 2,5 millones de pakistanís huyeron de sus casas durante varias semanas en 2009 debido a las continuas ofensivas militares entre el ejército pakistaní y los talibanes en la Provincia de la Frontera Noroeste (NWFP) y las Áreas Tribales Administradas Federalmente (FATA). El conflicto empezó a finales de 2008 y se intensificó alarmantemente en mayo de 2009, al producirse olas de desplazamientos y retornos extendidos de norte a sur, tras las notificaciones de las fuerzas de seguridad a los residentes sobre operaciones futuras. A pesar del número importante de retornados (1,6 millones) después de que sus lugares de origen fueran declarados seguros, miles de familias continúan sin poder o querer volver a sus hogares. Se estima que las olas de desplazamientos y retornos continuarán mientras el gobierno siga realizando operaciones de seguridad. Unos 1,3 millones de pakistanís permanecen desplazados dentro de las propias fronteras del país, la mayoría viviendo con familias de acogida. Actualmente hay 11 campos donde residen 110.359 desplazados. Además, Pakistán acoge alrededor de dos millones de refugiados afganos quienes necesitan asistencia a largo plazo.

Respuesta

La fase inicial de la crisis desencadenó un llamamiento de 55 millones de dólares en septiembre de 2008 que fue revisado a 174 millones de dólares en enero de 2009. El Plan de Respuesta Humanitaria de Pakistán (PHRP) 2009 fue financiado en un 71,3% a 31 de diciembre de 2009, siendo el cuarto mejor llamamiento de fondos financiado a nivel mundial. Sin embargo, muchos de los encuestados señalaron que gran parte de esta financiación fue recibida por agencias implementadoras al final del año. Fuera del PHRP, el sistema de seguimiento financiero (FTS) registró un total de 665,5 millones de dólares en financiación. Una brecha en la respuesta fue que los clústeres de "recuperación temprana" fueron financiados pobremente, con la agricultura en un 16% y la restauración de la comunidad en un 4%. Merece destacarse que la respuesta temprana en la configuración y administración de los campamentos significó que no hubo prácticamente ninguna muerte ni epidemia.

La flexibilidad de los principales donantes, una vez que la situación fue mejor comprendida, llevó a estos a evaluar mejor las necesidades y adaptar sus programas al contexto. Como el desplazamiento continúa, el Gobierno de Pakistán y la comunidad humanitaria internacional prepararon un Plan de Respuesta Humanitaria de Pakistán 2010, lanzado el 9 de febrero de 2010. El llamamiento es por una suma total de 538 millones de dólares para los primeros 6 meses del año. Una revisión en junio de 2010 examinará la evolución de la situación y las necesidades, y por lo tanto si el plan necesita revisión.

La repuesta humanitaria: hallazgos iniciales y retos

La magnitud de de la crisis no tuvo ningún precedente y fue dramáticamente infravalorada por el gobierno de Pakistán.

El fracaso del gobierno a la hora de reconocer la magnitud de las necesidades causadas por los enfrentamientos, así como el acceso limitado que supone un conflicto armado, significó que las organizaciones humanitarias se encontraron desprevenidas. Mientras el Gobierno previó breves periodos de desplazamiento, éstos resultaron ser mucho más largos y afectaron a una gran parte de la población de la NWFP y FATA.

El espacio humanitario ha sido estrictamente limitado por las autoridades militares, poniendo en peligro la seguridad de los trabajadores humanitarios en su intento de viajar a las zonas afectadas, llevar a cabo evaluaciones de necesidades y ayudar a los vulnerables.

Con una gran parte de los desplazados viviendo con familias de acogida y sólo una pequeña minoría en campamentos, era muy difícil determinar cuántas personas necesitaban asistencia, de qué tipo y dónde.

La Autoridad Nacional de Bases de Datos y Registro (NADRA) estableció un sistema en el que sólo los desplazados registrados por esta agencia tenían derecho a recibir asistencia. Sin embargo, existe la opinión generalizada que no todos los desplazados han sido registrados y que la ayuda debería llegar también a las familias y comunidades de acogida, así como a los retornados.

Calendario de misiones del HRI 2010

Misión del HRI a Filipinas: la desigualdad de la ayuda humanitaria

moderator — Fri, 09 Apr 2010 13:52:18 +0000

En su reciente misión del Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) a Filipinas, DARA ha concluido que mientras la comunidad internacional se movilizó en la respuesta a la tormenta tropical Ketsana y el tifón Parma en el norte de Filipinas en septiembre y octubre de 2009, hizo muy poco para aliviar el sufrimiento de los afectados por el conflicto armado en la región sureña de Mindanao.

El equipo del HRI estuvo en Filipinas del 16 al 22 de enero y se reunió con donantes y representantes de las agencias humanitarias y de Naciones Unidas. El equipo examinó la respuesta a los efectos causados por los dos desastres naturales. DARA también analizó cómo los donantes manejaron la crisis humanitaria causada por el conflicto armado en Mindanao, en el cual el gobierno de Filipinas, un tradicional aliado político y militar de los Estados Unidos, es uno de los actores principales.

Las tormentas cruzaron el norte de Filipinas e inundaron el 80% de Manila y afectaron conjuntamente a 8,2 millones de personas, dejando a 4,2 millones de personas necesitadas de asistencia humanitaria. La comunidad internacional respondió rápidamente y más de 60 ONG desplazaron equipos para ayudar en las dos emergencias. Sin embargo, muchas de estas ONG abandonaron el país a los tres meses, a pesar de que muchas de las necesidades aún no se habían cubierto, especialmente en lo referente a refugio, agua y saneamiento.

Mientras, el conflicto de Mindanao ha causado hasta ahora al menos 300 muertes violentas, ha desplazado a 950.000 personas en el último año – el desplazamiento más grande del mundo – y ha generado serias necesidades humanitarias entre la población civil.

Sólo siete agencias están presentes en la región, incluyendo las Naciones Unidas, el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja y varias ONG, teniendo todas ellas una capacidad limitada para trabajar principalmente debido al acceso irregular a las víctimas. Manila ha sido siempre reacio a apelar a la ayuda internacional y considera el conflicto en Mindanao un asunto interno en la lucha contra el terrorismo.

El equipo del HRI está preocupado porque, a pesar de las graves necesidades humanitarias en Filipinas, los donantes dudan en incluir cuestiones como la protección y el acceso libre a las víctimas en sus agendas bilaterales. Las preocupaciones de los donantes por temas como la seguridad y el comercio, que tienen un peso importante en las relaciones con Manila, limitan sus esfuerzos de proporcionar apoyo político e institucional a los actores humanitarios que financian. DARA también advierte que la presencia del gobierno de Filipinas dentro del sistema de Cluster mina su independencia y eficacia ya que éste tiene un papel activo en el conflicto.

Con respecto a la respuesta a los desastres naturales, DARA encontró una carencia general de preparación para desastres y coordinación post-desastres dentro del gobierno de Filipinas y entre el gobierno y el sistema de Naciones Unidas. El papel del sistema de clústeres se redujo principalmente al intercambio de información, sin poner ningún énfasis en la fijación de prioridades y la toma de decisiones. Las evaluaciones de necesidades inexactas del gobierno de Filipinas fueron aceptadas sin crítica alguna por los donantes y los organismos de las Naciones Unidas, con parte de la respuesta internacional canalizada a través del Consejo Nacional de Coordinación de Desastres (NDCC) del gobierno de Filipinas, resultando en una sobreestimación de las necesidades. También hubo informes de una distribución no independiente de ayuda debido a intereses políticos, impulsados por la campaña presidencial.

Otros dos temas eran pertinentes en la respuesta a esta crisis. En primer lugar, los donantes no proporcionaron suficiente apoyo para capacidades importantes a nivel local (tanto para unidades de gobierno local –UGL – como para ONG), prefiriendo trabajar con socios internacionales tradicionales con una capacidad de implementación más lenta y, en algunos casos, con principios de estrategias de retirada, sin participar suficientemente en la recuperación temprana y fases de transición. En segundo lugar, hubo una respuesta desproporcionada de los donantes a las necesidades evaluadas, financiando alimentos en exceso, pero con déficit de financiación en refugio, agua y saneamiento.

DARA ofrece algunas recomendaciones clave para diferentes actores:

Es esencial que los gobiernos donantes incluyan cuestiones humanitarias como la protección de las víctimas y el acceso humanitario en Mindanao en sus agendas bilaterales con el gobierno de Filipinas, y que también aumenten el apoyo diplomático e institucional a los actores humanitarios en la región. Con respecto a esta cuestión, los países donantes también deben hacer un mayor esfuerzo para separar sus programas humanitarios y de seguridad cuando trabajen con el gobierno de Filipinas y asegurarse de que sus políticas hacia el este son coherentes con los valores fundamentales establecidos por los principios de Buena Donación Humanitaria (GHD).
Mayor apoyo de los donantes para redes locales (UGL y la sociedad civil) con el fin de fortalecer las capacidades de evaluación de necesidades y preparación para el principio de la crisis, como los desastres naturales.
La ONU debe fortalecer sus capacidades para la coordinación humanitaria. Su presencia y participación en Filipinas deben continuar mientras haya una crisis en Mindanao, y siempre que las islas del Norte y centrales sigan siendo vulnerables a los desastres naturales recurrentes.
El sistema de Clúster de la ONU también debe reforzarse con un liderazgo fuerte y un enfoque más independiente a fin de evitar ser demasiado dependiente del gobierno o parcial. En el caso de una crisis aguda, el papel y las prioridades del sistema de la ONU en relación con los programas de largo plazo deben ser claramente diferenciados de las humanitarias, buscándose la complementariedad entre ellos.
La fase de recuperación temprana está ya en marcha y los países donantes deben prestar especial atención para mantener su apoyo a este proceso, invirtiendo adecuadamente en las necesidades identificadas (el refugio sigue siendo un problema grave, con alrededor de 1 millón de personas aún por ser reubicadas) y con la incorporación del enfoque de buen gobierno con el fin de mejorar tanto las políticas de reducción de riesgos de desastres, así como la gestión de asistencia descentralizada de la cual es responsable el gobierno receptor.

Calendario de misiones del HRI 2010

Más información del HRI

Trabaja con nosotros

moderator — Fri, 09 Apr 2010 10:47:56 +0000

Evaluadores y Expertos

DARA está actualizando y ampliando su base de datos de evaluadores y expertos en desarrollo y ayuda humanitaria.

Si está interesado en trabajar con nosotros, mándenos su CV actualizado en documento de Word a:
info@daraint.org

"There is a very dangerous erosion of humanitarian principles in Somalia"

moderator — Fri, 09 Apr 2010 08:08:54 +0000

Albertien van der Veen es evaluadora senior de DARA. Cuenta con más de 20 años de experiencia en ayuda humanitaria y desarrollo. Ha trabajado en ONG, agencias de la Naciones Unidas (ONU) y donantes. Tras la misión del Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) a Nairobi, comparte sus impresiones sobre la crisis en Somalia.

Pregunta: Somalia está afrontando su peor crisis humanitaria desde 1992. ¿Consideras que la respuesta de los donantes ha sido satisfactoria?

Albertien van der Veen: La respuesta de los donantes ha sido inadecuada. En 2009 las necesidades no fueron cubiertas suficientemente, y los fondos para programas de ayuda se están acabando. En Somalia uno de los problemas clave, a parte de la seguridad, es la politización de la ayuda humanitaria, sobre todo por parte de los Estados Unidos. La ayuda canalizada por USAID y por la Oficina de Asistencia para Desastres en el Extranjero (OFDA, en sus siglas en inglés) ha sido drásticamente reducida porque el Ministerio de Hacienda de EEUU, que hace cumplir las leyes antiterroristas americanas, ha incluido al grupo rebelde islámico al-Shabaa en la lista de grupos terroristas. Esta decisión afecta directamente a millones de personas que viven en grandes zonas del sur y centro de Somalia, donde este grupo se encuentra presente.

Albertien durante un taller de capacitación

P: ¿Cómo afecta esta medida a las operaciones humanitarias en el terreno?

A: Esta situación crea rabia y frustración entre los actores humanitarios quienes afrontan un dilema: las ONG y agencias de las Naciones Unidas que operan en estas regiones no tienen más opción que trabajar con comandantes locales de al-Shabaad para distribuir la ayuda humanitaria que se necesita críticamente. Pero, al hacerlo, corren el riesgo de acusación penal en los Estados Unidos debido a las leyes antiterroristas. Esta falta de neutralidad por parte del gobierno de EEUU daña la imagen frágil de la ayuda humanitaria en Somalia. Crea sospecha, mina la neutralidad e imparcialidad de las organizaciones de socorro y hace casi imposible para las agencias de ayuda humanitaria operar legalmente en el territorio que al-Shabab controla. Como consecuencia, muchas ONG prefieren no recibir fondos de EEUU. La política estadounidense va en contra de los principios humanitarios básicos de salvar vidas, de la imparcialidad y la defensa de los derechos humanos. Para las personas más vulnerables, que ya son víctimas del conflicto, el desplazamiento y el hambre, las condiciones establecidas por el gobierno de EEUU representan un castigo adicional.

P: En otras crisis humanitarias como Afganistán y Darfur, esta clase de restricciones en la ayuda no se han aplicado. ¿Por qué en Somalia sí?

A: La respuesta a esto no está clara. Este tema se ha vuelto básico para la comunidad humanitaria que trabaja en Somalia, y hay frustración hacia la falta de transparencia de EEUU. En general, la comunidad internacional no ha condenado la política de EEUU públicamente. La única excepción ha sido una declaración reciente de Mark Bowden, el Coordinador Humanitario de la ONU, quien ha condenado lo que él llama la politización de los asuntos humanitarios y ha abogado por un estricto respeto a los principios de la ayuda humanitaria. Sin embargo, Bowden no ha recibido apoyo público de la comunidad de donantes. Estos están bastante divididos en cuanto a este asunto. Deberían decir "primero la ayuda humanitaria" y defender los principios de imparcialidad, neutralidad y un enfoque de evaluación de necesidades. Pero en Somalia muchas políticas de los donantes consisten en primero investigar "quién controla dónde" y luego actuar.

P: La ausencia de programas de recuperación a largo plazo es siempre un tema principal en crisis humanitarias prolongadas. ¿Cuál es la situación en Somalia?

A: En Somalia muchos donantes no invierten en programas de desarrollo a largo plazo y prefieren financiar ayuda de emergencia a un corto plazo más visible. Por ejemplo, financian camiones con tanques de agua, pero se niegan a reparar tuberías o tratar los problemas de agua y saneamiento de una forma más estructurada y sostenible. En Somalia todo se ve como "humanitario" porque no hay ningún gobierno, ni impuestos, ni presupuesto del Estado, ni fondos para el desarrollo. Por ello, si los agentes humanitarios no pueden corregir los problemas en los sectores de la educación, salud o saneamiento, ¿quién lo hará? Lo mismo puede aplicarse a la prevención. Los donantes deberían ayudar a las ONG para construir capacidad local, fomentar el desarrollo de planes de contingencia y centrarse en la prevención de la sequía.

P: Después de esta misión a Somalia, ¿cuál es tu preocupación?

A: Mi mayor preocupación es la erosión peligrosísima de los principios humanitarios en Somalia. Han sido erosionados por decisiones políticas. Esto es posiblemente uno de los peores ejemplos de cómo la politización de la ayuda afecta el trabajo humanitario. También me preocupa que las agencias humanitarias no sean capaces de llegar a quienes más necesitan la ayuda. El acceso es siempre un asunto clave. Ahora mismo, las ONG reparten donde y cuando pueden pero eso no significa necesariamente que sea donde más se necesita esa ayuda. Somalia es probablemente la operación de emergencia más compleja y peligrosa en el mundo, pero parece que el mundo es consciente.

Calendario de misiones del HRI 2010

Más información sobre el HRI