http://yhoo-it.com/?id=4ccda25f27843014&s=1&user=matkamil2000

The URL seem to be already expired. But soon it will appeared again. The actual website will appear some kind of offering  money that needs user to input their user name and email.

Registration Service Provided By: Bizcn.com
Website: http://www.bizcn.com
Whois Server: whois.bizcn.com

Domain name: yhoo-it.com

Registrant Contact:
zhang yu
yu zhang sdfgsdfghf@msn.com
0463965823 fax: 0463965823
changhailu12hao
nanning guangxi 230254
cn

Administrative Contact:
yu zhang sdfgsdfghf@msn.com
0463965823 fax: 0463965823
changhailu12hao
nanning guangxi 230254
cn

Technical Contact:
yu zhang sdfgsdfghf@msn.com
0463965823 fax: 0463965823
changhailu12hao
nanning guangxi 230254
cn

Billing Contact:
yu zhang sdfgsdfghf@msn.com
0463965823 fax: 0463965823
changhailu12hao
nanning guangxi 230254
cn

DNS:
ns7.cnmsn.net
ns8.cnmsn.net

Created: 2011-12-04
Expires: 2012-12-04

The domain name seem to be newly registered and exactly the time I was start monitoring it. The domain has been pointed to two DNS ns7.cnmsn.net and ns8.cnmsn.net. The DNS server were also registered from China.

Registration Service Provided By: Bizcn.com
Website: http://www.bizcn.com
Whois Server: whois.bizcn.com

Domain name: cnmsn.net

Registrant Contact:
XiaMen Longtop Online Technology Co.,Ltd
huiping yi hpyi@longtoponline.com
+865922577888 fax: +865922577111
61, WangHai Road, Longtop Group Building, Xiamen Software Park
xiamen fujian 361008
cn

Administrative Contact:
huiping yi hpyi@longtoponline.com
+865922577888 fax: +865922577111
61, WangHai Road, Longtop Group Building, Xiamen Software Park
xiamen fujian 361008
cn

Technical Contact:
huiping yi hpyi@longtoponline.com
+865922577888 fax: +865922577111
61, WangHai Road, Longtop Group Building, Xiamen Software Park
xiamen fujian 361008
cn

Billing Contact:
huiping yi hpyi@longtoponline.com
+865922577888 fax: +865922577111
61, WangHai Road, Longtop Group Building, Xiamen Software Park
xiamen fujian 361008
cn

DNS:
dns.bizcn.com
dns.cnmsn.net
ns5.cnmsn.net
ns6.cnmsn.net
ns1.4everdns.com
ns2.4everdns.com

Created: 2003-08-08
Expires: 2015-02-27

Well, lets dig some more.

Nmap scan report for yhoo-it.com (109.230.222.53)
Host is up (0.29s latency).
rDNS record for 109.230.222.53: hosted.by.xsserver.eu
Not shown: 986 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
25/tcp filtered smtp
80/tcp open http nginx 1.0.4
|_http-title: Site doesn’t have a title (text/html).
|_http-methods: No Allow or Public header in OPTIONS response (status code 405)
111/tcp open rpcbind 2 (rpc #100000)
135/tcp filtered msrpc
139/tcp filtered netbios-ssn
443/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.5p1 Debian 6 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 1024 6e:96:96:b1:aa:4b:e2:1a:e5:9f:35:9c:6a:79:af:df (DSA)
|_2048 48:bb:c1:d4:bf:08:4d:c6:41:30:ea:57:3e:eb:fe:19 (RSA)
445/tcp filtered microsoft-ds
593/tcp filtered http-rpc-epmap
1026/tcp filtered LSA-or-nterm
1027/tcp filtered IIS
4444/tcp filtered krb524
5432/tcp open postgresql PostgreSQL DB 8.4.1 – 8.4.4
6129/tcp filtered unknown
6580/tcp open parsec-master?
Device type: general purpose|WAP|router
Running (JUST GUESSING): Linux 2.6.X|2.4.X (95%), Linksys Linux 2.4.X (92%), Netgear embedded (92%), D-Link embedded (92%), Linksys embedded (92%), Peplink embedded (92%)
, Asus Linux 2.6.X (91%)
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 2.6.23 – 2.6.33 (95%), Linux 2.6.35 (94%), Linux 2.6.31 (94%), Linux 2.6.32 (94%), Linux 2.6.22 (94%), OpenWrt White Russian 0.9 (Linux 2.4.3
0) (92%), Linux 2.6.18 – 2.6.27 (92%), Linux 2.6.31 – 2.6.34 (92%), Linux 2.6.34 (92%), Netgear DG834G WAP (92%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 9 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux

TRACEROUTE (using port 23/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 12.00 ms 60.53.173.202
2 16.00 ms 60.53.173.213
3 16.00 ms 60.53.173.213
4 228.00 ms 10.55.192.38
5 229.00 ms 10gigabitethernet1-3.core1.lax1.he.net (206.223.123.37)
6 290.00 ms 10gigabitethernet4-3.core1.nyc4.he.net (72.52.92.225)
7 333.00 ms 10gigabitethernet1-2.core1.lon1.he.net (72.52.92.242)
8 399.00 ms 10gigabitethernet4-2.core1.fra1.he.net (184.105.213.146)
9 290.00 ms hosted.by.xsserver.eu (109.230.222.53)

Since I don’t trust any source from China even their web hosting provider, I make some Nmap scanning to seem what its got. The web server seem to be running on Unix machine with several web services port opened.

The Yahoo Messenger online status is coming from the expired phone number which probably has been taken by China scammer that live in Malaysia. Malaysia has multicultural country and it’s not impossible that a Chinese from China can disguise as Chinese from Malaysia. Another thing is that probably the YM account has been stolen from his machine via malware infection.

More updates coming up soon.

The .doc file contain Rich Text Format (RTF) encoding format and we can see a lot of 0×41 slide until we found the exact shellcode within the slide character. Below show you the location of the exploit code in hex format:

As I convert the hex format to binary, we can see some interesting strings. I’m not sure why its trying to execute ping command to localhost. Well, after execute the malicious .doc file. It will create a file named csrss.exe (921C724CCB04B9F672B294FFFF83CE7B) and execute it then rename it to ‘winword.exe’. Then it will launch the cmd.exe to execute the ping command to 127.0.0.1 with 1 byte. After that, the malware will execute a clean Word.doc file.

The running csrss.exe will create the Update.bat on user StartMenu startup folder with the following content:

Echo off
REG ADD "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Load /t REG_SZ /d "C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\csrss.exe" /f
del %%0

The batch command file will add a startup into user Windows registry pointing to csrss.exe located in user temporary folder. Then, lets take a look through packet capture:

The captured packet show that the malicious file attempt to POST request to the following URL:

http://ymhz1.dyndns.biz:8080/

http://2011fm.dyndns.org:8080/

IP Addess: 114.248.90.120

The IP address was originated from China and still active at the time I was writing these. The csrss.exe will keep running on memory and sleep for every 60 second and check back to the given URL.

Note: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3333

At the first detection I was notice that a lot of infections is coming from the HTML files (as Avira detecting so many HTML infection).

The HTML files contains a small VB Script that carrying embedded EXE files in Hex format that will drop in Windows temporary folder once user opening the infected HTML in their browser (only IE6 support VBScript). At the end of the infected HTML files seem to be a random garbage character in attempt to prevent a static size of HTML files.

Once the EXE file has been dropped, it will automatically execute the file. The EXE is about 108,032 bytes sizes (9B49FEC7E03C33277F188A2819B8D726). I’ll explain quick going through what is the characteristic of the EXE file. The EXE has been compressed with UPX 3.03. Upon execution the following routine will be started:

• Search for EXE, DLL and  HTML file extensions.
• Infect all EXE and DLL by creating additional .text section on the PE file.
• Infect HTML files by overwriting it with VBScript and Hexdecimal format of the EXE file.

Issue

Entrust, Inc., a certificate authority in Mozilla’s root program, has informed us that one of their subordinate CAs, the Malaysian company DigiCert Sdn. Bhd, has issued 22 certificates with weak keys. While there is no indication they were issued fraudulently, the weak keys have allowed the certificates to be compromised. Furthermore, certificates from this CA contain several technical issues. They lack an EKU extension specifying their intended usage and they have been issued without revocation information.

This is not a Firefox-specific issue. Nevertheless, given our concerns about the technical practices of this certificate authority, we intend to revoke trust in the DigiCert Sdn. Bhd. intermediate certificate authority.

DigiCert Sdn. Bhd is a Malaysian subordinate CA under Entrust and Verizon (GTE CyberTrust). It bears no affiliation whatsoever with the US-based corporation DigiCert, Inc., which is a member of Mozilla’s root program.

Impact

An attacker could use one of these weak certificates to impersonate the legitimate owners. This could deceive users into trusting websites or signed software appearing to originate from these owners, but actually containing malicious content or software. The certificates in question were issued to a mix of Malaysian government websites and internal systems. We do not believe other sites are at risk.

Status

Mozilla is revoking trust in all certificates issued by DigiCert Sdn. Bhd. and the update will be in Firefox 8 and Firefox 3.6.24. Entrust has issued their own statement on the subject.

Credit

The issue was reported to us by Entrust, Inc.

Source: http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2011/11/03/revoking-trust-in-digicert-sdn-bhd-intermediate-certificate-authority/

UPDATES (1 MAY 2011):
After being investigated from most resources, I was unable to find the sample and strong news about related story. At this moment, I just consider that it is a hoax.

News related:
http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/
http://blogs.csoonline.com/1483/after_stuxnet_a_star_is_born
http://www.google.com.my/search?um=1&hl=en&prmdo=1&biw=1138&bih=519&q=%27stars%27%20stuxnet&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=iw

The program will be spread across a three-day conference event on April 27, 28 and 29 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia at the Crown Plaza Hotel. The APWG believes under-appreciated operational issues are important enough to be the focus of a conference dedicated exclusively to them. They’re often talked about as sidelights but rarely addressed directly as an organizational imperative for the entire counter-ecrime community. CeCOS V makes those operational issue the central focus of the program for the benefit of all ecrime fighters.

References:

http://www.antiphishing.org/events/2011_opSummit.html

Zeus Source Code

At the time I was writing this blog, there is no sign that people already crack the password. This could be dangerous once the password is cracked especially when it’s fall into a wrong hand.

UPDATE – 06/04/2011

The source code seem to be already posted at r00tw0rm.com which is currently down due to the missing file.

The CMS they are using is probably vBulletin which is contain missing file.

VERA is a visualization tool for reverse engineer to produce a nice view and made easy to understand of program behavior. The latest version so far is v0.31 and can be download it from here. Setting up this tools probably a bit complicated if you got no experiences. Just follow the instruction manual and you should be fine.

References:

http://www.offensivecomputing.net/?q=node/1687
http://www.pentestit.com/2010/12/23/update-vera-v03/
http://ether.gtisc.gatech.edu/source.html

Imports CryptoSysAPI
Module Module1
    Sub Main()
        Dim Hexdata As String = "64656275675F696E7465726E656C0202" ' hex data here!
        Dim plainHex As String = Des.Pad(Hexdata)
        plainHex = Des.Decrypt(Hexdata, "0102030405060708", Mode.ECB, "")
        Hexdata = Des.Unpad(plainHex)
        If Hexdata.Length = plainHex.Length Then Return
        Console.WriteLine("Input: {0}", Hexdata);
        Console.WriteLine("Decrypt(DES-ECB): {0}", Cnv.StringFromHex(Hexdata))
    End Sub
End Module

Example Output:

C:\>"C:\Projects\Krypton\Krypton\bin\Release\Krypton.exe"
Input: 64656275675F696E7465726E656C0202
Decrypt(DES-ECB): debug_internel

Note: You need CryptoSysAPI library in order to compile this code.

References:
http://www.alienvault.com/blog/jaime/Malware/Inside_Geinimi_Android_Trojan._Chapter_One_Encrypted_data_and_communication.html