The service’s cutters stationed in Hawaii have used naval exercises and deployments over the last year to show how it can punch above its weight while the U.S. Navy implements its distributed maritime operations vision.

During the recent Rim of the Pacific exercise, which ran from June 29 to Aug. 4, the Coast Guard cutter Midgett commanded an international task force overseeing maritime interdiction operations, while also providing its deck to a U.S. Navy helicopter in a display of joint service collaboration.

Another RIMPAC participant, the fast response cutter William Hart, last fall deployed to American Samoa for a mission with a 10-day transit time that well exceeded the typical range of that ship class. During last year’s Large Scale Exercise, the vessel embarked with Marines to establish a joint force communications node — showing across the two events how small cutters can play a pivotal role as the eyes and ears of the military in places the Navy visits less frequently.

The Navy envisions a network of joint and coalition assets scattered around the Pacific to contribute to an overall common operating picture of the region. The more of these assets that are lethal, the better, the thinking goes: given a single adversary couldn’t target all the coalition assets that pose a threat, these distributed lethality and distributed maritime operations concepts could provide a deterrent effect.

But the Navy can only keep so many ships sailing around the Pacific at any given time, which means partners and allies are key, as are Coast Guard ships and aircraft, something that was highlighted in the 2020 Tri-Service Maritime Strategy. The document specifically asks the Coast Guard to conduct freedom of navigation operations to challenge excessive maritime claims; conduct law enforcement operations against terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime and piracy; and enforce sanctions through maritime interdiction operations.

Vice Adm. Andrew Tiongson, who commands Coast Guard Pacific Area, told Defense News the service implemented that strategy by deploying Coast Guard liaisons on Navy ships as well as training with and operating the Navy’s equipment to bolster interoperability.

“As we prepare for high-end joint operations in the maritime domain, we will support naval efforts with complementary capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific with port security units, strategic asset escorts and other unique strengths to augment capacity. The more intertwined our services are prior to conflict, the easier we will adapt when needed,” Tiongson said.

Commanding a task force

Midgett and William Hart, along with other cutters based in Honolulu, are going beyond requirements of the tri-service strategy.

The former’s RIMPAC experience was unusual, achieving several firsts for the Coast Guard and pushing its own boundaries in terms of lethality and joint force interoperability. For example, Midgett commanded a RIMPAC task force — something no Coast Guard cutter has ever done. Its commanding officer, Capt. Willie Carmichael, led Combined Task Force 175 ships, including U.S. Navy destroyers Chafee and Gridley, French Navy frigate Prairial and Peruvian Navy frigate Guise.

This task force oversaw maritime interdiction operations for the combined maritime force at RIMPAC, and it also conducted anti-submarine warfare drills — something a Coast Guard cutter cannot do, but that Midgett was able to oversee through advanced Link 16 network connectivity.

“These national security cutters are built to interface with — from the technology, and the command and control, and the communication links — to fall right in line with the Navy and [Defense Department] counterparts. So these RIMPACs are awesome opportunities to exercise that,” Chief Matt Masaschi, a spokesman for Coast Guard Pacific Area, told reporters during a tour of Midgett.

Carmichael said during the tour that he spent nearly four weeks preparing to take command of the task force, which involved hosting Navy subject matter experts on the ship ahead of RIMPAC “to help us integrate more at a higher level for those higher-warfare areas.”

Midgett will soon depart Hawaii for a Western Pacific patrol under the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, highlighting the importance of that service interoperability.

Hunting submarines

Midgett also carried a Navy MH-60R helicopter for predeployment training, and then for the whole duration of RIMPAC. This was the first time that helicopter type embarked on a Coast Guard ship.

Carmichael said the MH-60 can fit in a national security cutter’s hangar if it folds up its blades and tail. The capability and range of the MH-60 could be of great value to the ship during law enforcement missions. And the Navy could benefit from this experience by conducting MH-60 anti-submarine operations from a cutter’s deck.

This experiment was partly meant to determine how to “sustain that particular airframe, how do you support it for a long-range, two-month or three-month deployment,” Carmichael said.

Midgett also showed off its lethal traits, taking what it learned from the MH-60 and Link 16 system to serve as an adversary in another at-sea scenario of RIMPAC.

The cutter collaborated with other opposing force ships to track and hunt vessels, earning nine “constructive kills,” which involved providing targeting data to allied assets that resulted in immediate simulated strikes.

Midgett also participated in a shooting competition among RIMPAC participants. Though a cutter would typically employ its weapons for self-defense or in a law enforcement context, this shoot-off gave participants a GPS coordinate for a simulated island and asked them to conduct a land-attack mission.

“That’s not typical for us, island targets,” said the ship’s weapons officer, Ensign Matthew Pindell, adding that the ship used its 57mm MK 110 cannon with an 8-mile range to go after the target.

Pindell said the crew recently used its Phalanx close-in weapon system to shoot at a missile target towed by a Learjet, noting that this type of experience is important for the upcoming deployment to 7th Fleet’s area of responsibility.

‘Filling a gap’

As Midgett pushes the boundaries of what a Legend-class national security cutter can do, the service has found areas that require improvement, Carmichael said. For example, the ship and its crew lack “the ability to plan and execute long-range planning efforts that are very complex in a maritime environment. So we’re learning some of those lessons from our Navy counterparts as well and their best practices. We actually brought some of their subject matter experts onboard” so the crew could learn and then share those lessons with the other ships in the class.

The Coast Guard’s fast response cutters in Honolulu — roughly a third of the length of national security cutters — have taken on presence missions in Oceania that were once conducted by much larger vessels.

Cmdr. Cynthia Travers, the commanding officer of William Hart, said her ship and crew of 24 — along with the two other fast response cutters based in Honolulu — have had an outsized impact on American presence in Oceania.

Though the ship class is usually called for law enforcement, search and rescue, and environmental protection missions around the Hawaiian Islands, “last fall we operated between Oahu and American Samoa. It’s about a 10-day transit for us, so it’s sort of doing a larger-ship mission with a small Coast Guard cutter,” she said.

That transit was uncomfortable for the crew, she acknowledged, and the cutter had to sail at just 10 knots (12 mph) to conserve fuel and ensure it could make it to American Samoa without refueling at sea, given no assets were available to sail with William Hart or link up midway.

Fast response cutters out of Hawaii and Guam are more likely taken on these longer-range transits.

During William Hart’s trip to Oceania last fall, it operated alongside ships from the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and France to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Though the mission itself wasn’t high end, it put the cutter in a location in which U.S. Navy ships were unlikely to operate, creating an opportunity for the joint force.

And during Large Scale Exercise 2021, William Hart and a team of Marines combined their sensors into a single, common-operating picture of the battlespace. Ships and aircraft the Coast Guard saw with its sensors were shared to the Marine Corps network, using both the Coast Guard’s Rescue 21 system and the Marines’ satellite communications technology, building a clearer picture for maritime domain awareness.

“We’re sort of filling a gap that exists right now. There are some larger cutters that are under construction that we’re hoping will be able to take on this mission in the years to come, but for right now the fast response cutter is the tool that we have here that can respond to that need,” Travers said.

The British company’s latest agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries and its subsidiary Elta Systems is aimed at proposing a long-range radar for the Defence Ministry’s Serpens program.

The program, valued in excess of £400 million (U.S. $486 million) is for the British Army’s next-generation weapon-locating system that needs to be able to detect and find hostile mortars, artillery and rockets.

The agreement will see Elta’s battle-proven Compact Multi-Mission Radar offered by Babcock in the U.K. Babcock said in an Aug. 11 statement that the system will be partly produced and integrated in the U.K.

Britain wants to replace its current capability, the Saab-supplied Mamba, around 2026. The Swedish company was awarded a £46 million deal in 2020 to extend the life of the program until Serpens is ready for deployment.

The agreement with IAI comes about two weeks after Babcock inked a deal with another Israeli company to propose technology to the British Army — on this occasion to offer a battle management, command, control, communications, computers and intelligence capability for a new ground-based air defense capability.

Babcock signed the memorandum of understanding with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to offer the latter’s Micad platform for the Defence Ministry’s Sky Sabre GBAD program, which is based on the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile built by the European consortium MBDA.

Babcock and Rafael have worked together in the delivery and maintenance of the Sky Sabre system since 2017, with the first units introduced to British forces in the Falklands.

“It makes clear sense for both parties to further develop the collaboration so that Micad can be readily offered into the wider land GBAD program,” Simon Holford, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance director at Babcock, said during the Farnborough Airshow last month when the tie-up was announced.

National Defense Department spokesman Arsenio Andolong said in a statement carried by the Philippines’ national news agency that the government is currently formalizing the termination of the contract with Russia’s Sovtechnoexport for 16 Mi-17 helicopters.

“We are also preparing to initiate a diplomatic dialogue with the Russian side regarding matters arising from the project’s cancellation,” Andolong said, adding cryptically that “changes in priorities necessitated by global political developments resulted in the cancellation of the project by the previous administration.”

He also said efforts are being made to retrieve the $48.2 million down payment for the helicopters made in January.

Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana previously told The Associated Press that the government was canceling the $322.3 million deal due to concerns over potential U.S. sanctions. He also said the decision was approved by then-President Rodrigo Duterte, whose administration had signed the contract for the helicopters in November 2021.

The Philippines insisted as recently as March 2022 that the procurement would go ahead despite the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began Feb. 24.

Those buying Russian arms could be hit with sanctions under the U.S. law Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. The law was passed in 2017 and is meant to discourage governments or entities from acquiring weapons as well as military hardware and parts from American adversaries like Iran, North Korea and Russia.

Without the Mi-17s, the Philippines would be left with an outstanding requirement for heavy transport helicopters. The Mi-17 was chosen because of its relatively spacious cabin as well as its rear ramp or clamshell doors (depending on the variant).

Transport helicopters are a vital component of the Philippine military; the country is an archipelagic nation made up of more than 7,000 islands and is beset with natural disasters and ongoing insurgencies. Its existing fleet of transport helicopters are often engaged in relief operations or transporting troops and equipment.

The Mi-17 has similar payload capabilities to several Western transport helicopter types, but its price was a draw for the Philippines, with the country seeking to modernize its aging and modest military in the face of a tight budget.

The cost of the contract is yet to be determined, but the government has allocated up to CA$5 billion (U.S. $4 billion) to purchase the planes.

Airbus was designated as the only supplier qualified to provide the tankers to the Royal Canadian Air Force. As a result, a formal request for its proposal for the planes was issued to the firm on May 13, 2022.

National Defence Department spokeswoman Jessica Lamirande said the government has not yet received the proposal.

“Once Airbus’ response is received, an assessment and negotiation will occur,” Lamirande said, noting that a contract is expected to be awarded by April 2023.

The Canadian Armed Forces found the Airbus A330 MRTT, a refueling and transport plane, is the only aircraft qualified for the job. The Air Force wants the first of the A330s operational by 2028.

The new aircraft are part of Canada’s Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project, meant to replace the existing CC-150 Polaris aircraft flown by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Those refueling and transport planes have been in operation since 1992.

Originally six new aircraft were to be purchased as part of the Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project. But on July 14, Canadian Defence Minister Anita Anand announced the military would acquire two used Airbus A330s and eventually upgrade those to become part of the Air Force’s tanker and transport fleet.

Canada acquired those used aircraft, built in 2015, from International Airfinance Corp., a global aircraft leasing company, in a deal worth about $102 million.

Lamirande said the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on the commercial aviation industry created favorable market conditions to procure the used A330-200 aircraft at the best value for Canada. The government is scheduled to receive the aircraft in December 2022 and April 2023, and then ferry them to the country shortly after, she added.

“There are a number of predelivery and acceptance activities that need to be completed before any used aircraft will arrive in Canada” Lamirande said. Those include scheduled preventive maintenance, limited retrofit to prepare for service within the Air Force, painting of the aircraft, final delivery inspection and acceptance checks.

The used aircraft are currently configured for long-haul commercial use. They will initially be used for an interim period to perform cargo and troop airlift operations, said Lamirande. The planes could also be used to transport civilian passengers during humanitarian relief operations, as well as fly VIPs, such as Canada’s prime minister.

These used aircraft will, after an interim period of operations, be turned over to Airbus for conversion to the MRTT configuration as the other four new aircraft expected to be purchased.

Increasing access to the Arctic due to warming conditions will likely result in more frequent economic and military competition with these nations, which will have homeland defense ramifications. To deter malign activities in the region, ensure the defense of North America, and realize a stable and secure Arctic, we must demonstrate a commensurate commitment to the region.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that competitors, such as Russia and the People’s Republic of China, desire to influence international norms and alter the behaviors of allies, partners and Arctic-focused countries for the benefit of these competitor nations. Russia and the PRC have made their intentions for the region clear through the promulgation of strategic documents that underline their commitment to the Arctic.

The Arctic is a top priority for Russia. Russia is aggressively militarizing the region while proclaiming intent to infringe upon freedom of navigation in the Northern Sea Route. Russia will likely continue enhancing its military capabilities and developing the region’s resources and infrastructure. These enhancements will strengthen Russian air and coastal defense capabilities, expand its nuclear deterrent credibility, and increase its ability to place North America at risk.

Russia’s geographic proximity to North America makes it the most acute security concern to U.S. interests in the Arctic; however, Russia’s irresponsible behavior in Ukraine highlights reasons why all Arctic nations should be concerned with Russian activities.

As a self-declared “near-Arctic nation,” the PRC is endeavoring to establish a foothold in the northern latitudes. The PRC has consistently increased its scientific, economic and military activities in the Arctic over the last five years, working toward increasing influence through economic exploitation to gain access to vital natural resources. The PRC is applying all instruments of national power to enhance its Arctic influence, including expanding initiatives such as the Polar Silk Road.

As competitors invest in military infrastructure and Arctic capabilities in such close proximity to the U.S., allies and partners, they bring the threat even closer to home. Ultimately, the advanced threat capabilities that Russia and the PRC can bring to the Arctic region reduces key leadership decision space and erodes credible deterrence options.

The actions taken by strategic competitors in the Arctic necessitate a response. The National Defense Strategy outlines the importance of campaigning to strengthening deterrence capabilities and attaining military advantages through enhancing joint force capabilities. Both of these elements are essential toward achieving the National Defense Strategy’s goal of a stable Arctic region where threats to the U.S. homeland are deterred.

The purpose of Arctic campaigning is to deter strategic competitors and shape their behavior in order to remain in competition and avoid crisis and conflict. One prominent example of Arctic campaigning is exercises that demonstrate capability, readiness and the will to operate in the northern latitudes. Executing large-scale joint and multinational force exercises under Arctic conditions exhibits credible deterrence while broadcasting robust U.S. defense capabilities. These demonstrations, when messaged appropriately, have a profound deterrent effect on competitors, molding perceptions and shaping their actions.

Campaigning also entails collaborating with likeminded nations, organizations and institutions in pursuit of shared objectives. We will realize a key collaboration milestone this month with the official opening of the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies — the Department of Defense’s newest regional center. The Ted Stevens Center will focus on building strong networks with domestic and international Arctic-minded security leaders, and conducting focused analytical research, all aimed toward advancing the department’s priorities in the Arctic.

Aligned under NORTHCOM, the center will advance awareness on Arctic issues, address the implications of environmental change and emphasize the importance of maintaining a rules-based order in the region. The institutional capabilities that the Ted Stevens Center brings will help promote the Arctic as a peaceful and stable region, where international cooperation based on shared values is paramount.

Ceding the Arctic to competitors will result in accepting unnecessary risk to North America. The changing Arctic environment and increasing competitor activities in the region should invoke a sense of urgency in all of us. Efforts to develop and demonstrate Arctic capabilities, as well as establishing or strengthening multilateral organizations to address Arctic concerns, are clear indicators of progress.

More work remains, however, to effectively deter malign competitor activities, while also working together with likeminded nations to ensure an Arctic region governed by a rules-based international order.

U.S. Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck leads North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command. In this latter role, he serves as the Defense Department’s Arctic capabilities advocate.

The message in a lengthy policy statement issued by the Cabinet’s Taiwan Affairs Office and its news department followed almost a week of missile firings and incursions into Taiwanese waters and airspace by Chinese warships and air force planes.

The actions disrupted flights and shipping in a region crucial to global supply chains, prompting strong condemnation from the U.S., Japan and others.

An English-language version of the Chinese statement said Beijing would “work with the greatest sincerity and exert our utmost efforts to achieve peaceful reunification.”

“But we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities,” it said.

“We will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to interference by external forces or radical action by separatist elements. Our ultimate goal is to ensure the prospects of China’s peaceful reunification and advance this process,” it said.

China says its threatening moves were prompted by a visit to Taiwan last week by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, but Taiwan says such visits are routine and that China used her trip merely as a pretext to up its threats.

In an additional response to Pelosi’s visit, China said it was cutting off dialogue on issues from maritime security to climate change with the U.S., Taiwan’s chief military and political backer.

Taiwan’s foreign minister warned Tuesday that the Chinese military drills reflect ambitions to control large swaths of the western Pacific, while Taipei conducted its own exercises to underscore its readiness to defend itself.

Beijing’s strategy would include controlling the East and South China seas via the Taiwan Strait and imposing a blockade to prevent the U.S. and its allies from aiding Taiwan in the event of an attack, Joseph Wu told a news conference in Taipei.

Beijing extended the ongoing exercises without announcing when they would end, although they appeared to have run their course for the time being.

China’s Defense Ministry and its Eastern Theater Command both issued statements saying the exercises had achieved their targets of sending a warning to those favoring Taiwan’s formal independence and their foreign backers.

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party administration are “pushing Taiwan into the abyss of disaster and sooner or later will be nailed to the pillar of historical shame!” Defense Ministry spokesperson Col. Tan Kefei was quoted as saying in a statement on the ministry’s website.

Troops taking part in the exercises had “effectively tested integrated joint combat capabilities,” the Eastern Theater Command said on its Twitter-like Weixin microblog.

“The theater troops will monitor changes in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, continue to conduct military training and preparations, organize regular combat readiness patrols in the Taiwan Strait, and resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” spokesperson Col. Shi Yi was quoted as saying.

Taiwan split with the mainland amid civil war in 1949, and its 23 million people overwhelmingly oppose political unification with China while preferring to maintain close economic links and de facto independence.

Through its maneuvers, China has pushed closer to Taiwan’s borders and may be seeking to establish a new normal in which it could eventually control access to the island’s ports and airspace.

Along with lobbing missiles into the Taiwan Strait, the nearly week-long drills saw Chinese ships and planes crossing the center line in the strait that has long been seen as a buffer against outright conflict.

The U.S., Taipei’s main backer, has also shown itself to be willing to face down China’s threats. Washington has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in deference to Beijing, but is legally bound to ensure the island can defend itself and to treat all threats against it as matters of grave concern.

That leaves open the question of whether Washington would dispatch forces if China attacked Taiwan. U.S. President Joe Biden has said repeatedly the U.S. is bound to do so — but staff members have quickly walked back those comments.

Beyond the geopolitical risks, an extended crisis in the Taiwan Strait — a significant thoroughfare for global trade — could have major implications for international supply chains at a time when the world is already facing disruptions and uncertainty in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

In particular, Taiwan is a crucial provider of computer chips for the global economy, including China’s high-tech sector.

In response to the drills, Taiwan has put its forces on alert, but has so far refrained from taking active countermeasures.

On Tuesday, its military held live-fire artillery drills in Pingtung County on its southeastern coast.

Australia’s recent change of government is a chance to “reset” its troubled relationship with China, but the new administration must “handle the Taiwan question with caution,” a Chinese envoy said Wednesday.

China has brushed aside foreign criticism of its actions, and its ambassador to Australia said he was “surprised” that Australia had signed a statement with the United States and Japan that condemned China’s firing of missiles into Japanese waters in response to Pelosi’s visit.

Xiao Qian told the National Press Club that China wanted to resolve the situation peacefully, but “we can never rule out the option to use other means.”

“So when necessary, when compelled, we are ready to use all necessary means,” Xiao said. “As to what does it mean by ‘all necessary means?’ You can use your imagination.”

In London, the British government summoned Chinese Ambassador Zheng Zeguang to the Foreign Office on Wednesday to demand an explanation of “Beijing’s aggressive and wide-ranging escalation against Taiwan” following Pelosi’s visit.

“We have seen increasingly aggressive behavior and rhetoric from Beijing in recent months, which threaten peace and stability in the region,” said Foreign Secretary Liz Truss. “The United Kingdom urges China to resolve any differences by peaceful means, without the threat or use of force or coercion.”

Associated Press writer Jill Lawless in London contributed to this report.

The differences between South Korea and China underscored a reemerging rift between the countries just a day after their top diplomats met in eastern China and expressed hope that the issue wouldn’t become a “stumbling stone” in relations.

Bilateral ties took a significant hit in 2017 when South Korea installed a missile battery employing the U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, in response to nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.

The decision drew an angry reaction from China, which said the anti-missile system could be reconfigured to peer into its territory. Beijing retaliated by suspending Chinese group tours to South Korea and obliterating the China business of South Korean supermarket giant Lotte, which had provided land for the missile system.

South Korea’s previous president, Moon Jae-in, a liberal who pursued engagement with North Korea, tried to repair relations with Beijing by pledging the “Three Nos” — that Seoul wouldn’t deploy any additional THAAD systems; wouldn’t participate in U.S.-led missile defense networks; and wouldn’t form a trilateral military alliance with Washington and Tokyo.

Moon’s dovish approach has been discarded by his conservative successor, Yoon Suk Yeol, who has vowed stronger security cooperation with Washington and expressed a willingness to acquire more THAAD batteries to counter accelerating North Korean efforts to expand its nuclear weapon and missile programs.

Commenting on Tuesday’s meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his South Korean counterpart, Park Jin, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin in a briefing Wednesday reaffirmed Beijing’s stance that the THAAD system in South Korea undermines its “strategic security interests.”

He added that Seoul had committed to a policy of “Three Nos and One Limit,” the latter apparently referring to a pledge to limit the operations of the THAAD battery already in place, something Seoul has never publicly acknowledged.

“The two foreign ministers had another in-depth exchange of views on the THAAD issue, making clear their respective positions and enhancing mutual understanding,” Wang said. He said the minsters agreed to “attach importance to each other’s legitimate concerns and to continue to handle and control the issue prudently” to prevent it from becoming a “stumbling stone” in bilateral relations.

South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it understands that Wang was referring to the policies of the Moon government with the “Three Nos and One Limit” remark.

It said the Yoon government has maintained that THAAD is a defensive tool for protecting South Korean lives and property, and that it’s a national security matter that Seoul isn’t willing to negotiate with Beijing. It also insisted that the “Three Nos” were never a formal agreement or promise.

“During the meeting, both sides confirmed their differences over the THAAD matter, but also agreed that the issue should not become an obstacle that influences relations between the countries,” the ministry said.

South Korea, a longtime U.S. ally, has struggled to strike a balance between the United States and the increasingly assertive foreign policy of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s government.

Deepening conflicts between Washington and Beijing over a broad range of issues including Taiwan, Hong Kong, trade, and Chinese claims to large sections of the South China and East China Seas have increased fears in Seoul that it would become squeezed between its treaty ally and largest trading partner.

During his meeting with Park, Wang Yi said the countries should be “free from external interference” and shouldn’t interfere in each other’s domestic affairs, an apparent jab at Seoul’s tilt toward Washington.

Wang also called for the countries to work together to maintain stable industrial supply chains, a possible reference to fears that Chinese technology policy and U.S. security controls might split the world into separate markets with incompatible standards and products, slowing innovation and raising costs. South Korea is facing pressure from the Biden administration to participate in a U.S.-led semiconductor alliance involving Taiwan and Japan which China opposes.

Associated Press video producer Liu Zheng in Beijing contributed to this report.

The evaluation comes as some European armies are in the market to equip their soldiers with robots for anything from cargo carrying to surveillance and attack missions. Manufacturers hope the technology will one day be as ubiquitous as drones are in the air domain, though navigating the intricacies of earthly terrain has proved to be a harder nut to crack.

Spain’s robotic evaluation program, dubbed Scorpion, began in early 2021, though sporadic tests with THeMIS began as early as 2019 under the country’s Fuerza 35 effort, a major modernization program for the Army.

Milrem’s flagship product has been a staple at defense exhibitions for years, and the company displayed the THeMIS at last November’s FEINDEF show in Madrid, Spain.

“The THeMIS has already prove[d] itself to 12 countries, seven of which are members of NATO, as a capable, robust and versatile system,” said Kuldar Väärsi, CEO of Milrem Robotics. “We are glad that Spain has joined as the 13th user of THEMIS and chosen Milrem Robotics as a partner to build their robotic and autonomous systems capabilities.”

The company’s robot saw front-line action alongside deployed Estonian forces during the now-defunct Barkhane counterterrorism mission, led by France, in Mali. According to the manufacturer, the vehicle there logged 1,200 kilometers (746 miles miles) in harsh desert conditions.

Milrem, backed by the Estonian government, booked a major win in 2020 when it received the European Commission’s nod to lead a pan-European Union effort to create a standardized architecture for a new-generation unmanned ground system. While the effort is meant to be hardware-agnostic, it uses the THeMIS as a reference platform.

Angered by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan, China has sent military ships and planes across the midline that separates the two sides in the Taiwan Strait and launched missiles into waters surrounding the island. The drills, which began Thursday, have disrupted flights and shipping in one of the busiest zones for global trade.

Ignoring calls to calm tensions, Beijing instead extended the exercises without announcing when they will end.

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said that beyond aiming to annex the island democracy, which split with the mainland amid civil war in 1949, China wants to establish its dominance in the western Pacific. That would include controlling of the East and South China Seas via the Taiwan Strait and imposing a blockade to prevent the U.S. and its allies from aiding Taiwan in the event of an attack, he told a news conference in Taipei.

The exercises show China’s “geostrategic ambition beyond Taiwan,” which Beijing claims as its own territory, Wu said.

“China has no right to interfere in or alter” Taiwan’s democracy or its interactions with other nations, he added.

Wu’s assessment of China’s maneuvers was grimmer than that of other observers but echoed widespread concerns that Beijing is seeking to expand its influence in the Pacific, where the U.S. has military bases and extensive treaty partnerships.

China has said its drills were prompted by Pelosi’s visit, but Wu said Beijing was using her trip as a pretext for intimidating moves long in the works. China also banned some Taiwanese food imports after the visit and cut off dialogue with the U.S. on a range of issues from military contacts to combating transnational crime and climate change.

Pelosi also dismissed China’s outrage as a public stunt, noting on NBC’s “Today” show that “nobody said a word” about a Senate delegation a few visit months ago. Later on the MSNBC news network, she said Chinese President Xi Jinping was acting like a “scared bully.”

“I don’t think the president of China should control the schedules of members of Congress,” she said.

Through its maneuvers, China has pushed closer to Taiwan’s borders and may be seeking to establish a new normal in which it could eventually control access to the island’s ports and airspace. But that would likely elicit a strong response from the military on the island, whose people strongly favor the status quo of de-facto independence.

The U.S., Taipei’s main backer, has also shown itself to be willing to face down Beijing’s threats. Washington has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in deference to Beijing, but is legally bound to ensure the island can defend itself and to treat all threats against it as matters of grave concern.

That leaves open the question of whether Washington would dispatch forces if China attacked Taiwan. U.S. President Joe Biden has said repeatedly the U.S. is bound to do so — but staff members have quickly walked back those comments.

Beyond the geopolitical risks, an extended crisis in the Taiwan Strait, a significant thoroughfare for global trade, could have major implications for international supply chains at a time when the world is already facing disruptions and uncertainty in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine. In particular, Taiwan is a crucial provider of computer chips for the global economy, including China’s high-tech sectors.

In response to the drills, Taiwan has put its forces on alert, but has so far refrained from taking active counter measures.

On Tuesday, its military held live-fire artillery drills in Pingtung County on its southeastern coast.

The army will continue to train and accumulate strength to deal with the threat from China, said Maj, Gen. Lou Woei-jye, spokesperson for Taiwan’s 8th Army Command. “No matter what the situation is ... this is the best way to defend our country.”

Taiwan, once a Japanese colony, had only loose connections to imperial China and then split with the mainland in 1949. Despite never having governed the island, China’s ruling Communist Party regards it as its own territory and has sought to isolate it diplomatically and economically in addition to ratcheting up military threats.

Washington has insisted Pelosi’s visit did not change its “one China policy,” which holds that the United States has no position on the status of the two sides but wants their dispute settled peacefully.

Associated Press writer Ashraf Khalil in Washington contributed to this report.

Africa has emerged as a lynchpin of the global strategic balance of power. Renewed strategic competition and the proliferation of violent extremist organizations threaten to undermine the integrity of African states and key U.S. strategic interests. At the same time, these challenges present an opportunity for Morocco — America’s oldest treaty ally and a historical Maghrebi power — to come into its own as a regional leader and stability provider with the help of newfound Israeli technical and security support.

Following decades during which the United States’ focus has been diverted to other regions, U.S. competitors have achieved significant military entrenchment in Africa at the expense of the stability and political-economic independence of African countries. Beijing now refers to Africa as China’s “second continent,” according to AFRICOM commander Gen. Stephen Townsend.

Beyond its military inroads, China hopes to fuel its geoeconomic rise with African natural wealth, for example by increasingly monopolizing Africa’s rare earth minerals needed for the batteries and chips necessary for any green revolution. Meanwhile, Russian mercenaries are driving civil conflicts and military juntas across the continent.

At the sub-state level, Africa has seen a historic rise in violent extremist activity, destabilizing local African countries and creating openings for encroachment by U.S. competitors. The Sahel has become the global epicenter of jihadi extremist activity — with violent extremist organizations seizing territory and local economies, fomenting displacement crises, and compelling threatened regimes to turn to Russian and Chinese assistance. Iran also exploits this trend by equipping Islamic violent extremist organizations throughout Africa, from Somalia to West Africa.

The burgeoning Israeli-Moroccan partnership, with proper U.S. leadership and nurturing, can help address Africa’s great power and violent extremist challenges as well as unlock the continent’s promise.

Since their 2020 rapprochement, Israel and Morocco have taken significant steps toward balancing against the threat from Russia- and Iran-backed Algeria via their groundbreaking $500 million air defense deal in February 2022. Moreover, Morocco has become the largest source of foreign direct investment in West Africa, beating out even rising Chinese capital. By crowding out Chinese investments, an extension of Chinese military power, Morocco is helping to roll back China’s implicit challenge to U.S. security interests and local autonomy in these areas.

Morocco has also long stood out among the Islamic and African nations as a leader in counterterrorism, especially within the U.S.-led war on terror. If properly paired with Israeli counterterrorism expertise, Morocco is uniquely positioned to be a bulwark against terrorism in the Sahel and in Francophone Africa, where Morocco’s regional and Islamic credibility make it a fitting partner to take over from withdrawing French peacekeepers.

However, realizing the full potential of Israeli-Moroccan cooperation in Africa will require short-term U.S. investment and continuous U.S. strategic focus and political support. Despite their impressive progress, Israel and Morocco both lack certain advanced military systems and capital needed to fully operationalize their partnership. Likewise, the partnership itself is contingent on the U.S. respecting its commitments vis-a-vis the Western Sahara, which undergirded the 2020 Israel-Morocco normalization agreement.

The United States should provide more opportunities for these two partner militaries to train side by side. This should include upgrading Israel to full participation in African Lion — as well as incorporating Israel into other regional multilateral exercises — to optimize interoperability between Israel, Morocco and other regional partners. This is a crucial first step toward establishing a functional, semiautonomous security network.

The U.S. should also triangulate preexisting regional frameworks, such as the Utah National Guard State Partnership Program with Morocco and the bilateral agreement between the National Guard Bureau and the Israel Defense Forces, to maximize space for Israeli-Moroccan military coordination.

The Biden administration should also uphold Trump-era commitments to the Moroccan’s Western Sahara Autonomy Proposal — the critical underpinning for Israel-Morocco normalization — which have been rapidly adopted by the international community in recent months, reducing potential blowback from the policy.

Finally, the United States should help boost Morocco’s military-industrial capability. Most immediately, this entails equipping Morocco to overcome the menace of Russian and Iranian destabilization via Algeria, including fulfilling pending sales of precision-guided munitions and MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones. More broadly, the Biden administration should review short-term funding to help Israel and Morocco rapidly scale up their partnership in security, not to mention critical stability-providing domains like food, water and energy security.

These steps will not only allow Israel and Morocco to lead the way for a partner-led regional security strategy, but they will also create the stable geopolitical space necessary to unlock the potential of Israeli-Moroccan partnership in critical technological and financial domains. In a moment of both historic instability and opportunity, equipping our Middle Eastern and North African security partners to jointly shoulder the burden holds the key to setting a new course of mutual prosperity for the region.

Retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum served as deputy commander of U.S. Northern Command from 2008-2010 and as chief of the National Guard Bureau from 2003-2008. In 2015, he was a participant in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s Generals and Admirals Program. Samuel B. Millner is a policy analyst at JINSA.

The Senate’s overwhelming support reflects strong bipartisan agreement that Sweden and Finland will add great value to the alliance. They are militarily advanced and technologically savvy. Each country’s regional expertise on Russia and traditions of “total defense” will also add to NATO’s understanding of Northern European security challenges and ways in which allied societies can build resilience against disruptive threats.

The addition of Sweden and Finland will connect the entire High North outside of Russia in one of NATO’s strategic spaces, raising the threshold of risk for Russia should it contemplate further aggression. They will more than double the number of Nordic fourth- and fifth-generation fighters available to NATO. Accession will facilitate NATO defense of the Baltic states, which is currently constrained through a sliver of territory along the Polish-Lithuanian border known as the Suwalki Gap. Supply and support of the Baltic states by new Baltic Sea allies will enhance those countries’ ability to defend themselves.

But Sweden and Finland are not joining an alliance waiting at the station; they are boarding a moving train.

In June, NATO leaders already unveiled a new Strategic Concept that broadly charts the alliance’s next decade. They agreed to a fundamental shift in NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. They committed to invest more in defense, increase common funding, offer comprehensive support for Ukraine, address challenges posed by China, and advance a NATO Innovation Fund and a Defense Innovation Accelerator to help the alliance sharpen its technological edge. Sweden and Finland will be expected to sign up to these initiatives. And now NATO will need to implement its decisions with two new allies in mind.

Allies at Madrid essentially agreed that NATO must move away from its current posture of tripwire defense and provisions for reinforcement to forward defense and deterrence by denial — the operational implication when allied leaders say they will “defend every inch” of NATO territory. These commitments, coupled with Finnish and Swedish membership, require allies to develop a robust, integrated, multidomain Nordic-Baltic defense posture.

On the ground, allies at Madrid resolved to transform the relatively light presence of rotational, multinational forces deployed in the Baltic states and Poland into multidomain forces at the brigade level, and to station forward munitions and heavy material such as artillery. They committed to generate a “New NATO Force Model” intended to organize and mobilize up to 800,000 troops, 300,000 of which would be able to mobilize within 10-30 days.

These changes will require even more North American and European troops deployed to NATO’s eastern front, new infrastructure by host nations to receive those troops, a new command structure, and a revised concept for military operations. Not only will Sweden and Finland be expected to contribute directly to these efforts, but their accession opens new terrain for allied reception and staging operations, recasting Norway’s traditional role.

In the air, two important shifts are required. First, NATO should move to establish a new Nordic air operations center for air missions across the region. NATO air forces have exercised regularly with those of Sweden and Finland, and cross-border training arrangements are already in place. But full integration was not possible. Nordic allies now need to share radar and sensor data and conduct battle planning together.

Second, allies have supplemented their ongoing Baltic air-

cing missions with “air shielding” operations that add air- and ground-based missile defense assets, and place them under NATO command. Sweden and Finland should join those operations upon accession.

Allies also need to strengthen their maritime presence in the Baltic Sea region. At Madrid, allies agreed to strengthen their maritime posture and situational awareness. They will need to update their Maritime Strategy, which is over a decade old, and thus does not take into account Swedish or Finnish membership, despite a history of joint exercises. MARCOM, NATO’s maritime component command based in the U.K., is slated to move forward cells for the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea to headquarters in each region. Germany and Poland are each vying to host the Baltic headquarters, yet it remains unclear whether such an entity would actually command multinational forces or simply monitor developments and enhance situational awareness. There is still much to be sorted out.

All of these plans are heavily reliant on allies’ ability to move forces quickly forward across allied territory. Procedures for crossing borders need to be simplified and aligned, logistical hurdles must be addressed and transport infrastructure needs to be upgraded. The European Union’s military mobility initiative, which also includes the United States, Canada and Norway, was intended to address these challenges. Yet the initiative has stalled; in the EU’s 2021-2027 budget, the project’s funding was slashed from a proposed €6.5 billion (U.S. $6.62 billion) to just €1.7 billion (U.S. $1.73 billion). And while EU leaders agreed in March 2022 to accelerate these efforts, little progress has been made.

Now that EU members Sweden and Finland are joining NATO, and NATO member Denmark in June abandoned its long-standing opt-out from the EU’s common security and defense policy, Nordic pressure should be mobilized to accelerate military mobility.

Ultimately, however, the true test of Finnish and Swedish accession may be the degree to which these two new allies are prepared to support the alliance’s “360 degree” approach to defense, which means not only countering challenges from Russia in the north, but also addressing pressures emanating from NATO’s south and southeast.

Moreover, at Madrid, allied leaders underscored that NATO’s ability to address traditional and unconventional threats in Europe is becoming intertwined with related challenges to alliance security interests posed by China. It will be critical for Sweden and Finland, two technologically advanced countries, to work with other allies to bolster protection of defense-critical infrastructures and defense-related supply chains; enhance investment screening of foreign investment in security-related infrastructures, companies and technologies; and help NATO make good on its pledge to chart a road map for enhanced cooperation with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

This is an ambitious but realistic agenda. We should embrace it.

Daniel S. Hamilton is senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He previously served as U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for NATO and Nordic-Baltic affairs.

The announcement increases uncertainty in the crisis that developed last week with U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

The exercises will include anti-submarine drills, apparently targeting U.S. support for Taiwan in the event of a potential Chinese invasion, according to social media posts from the eastern leadership of China’s ruling Communist Party’s military arm, the People’s Liberation Army.

China claims Taiwan as its own territory and its leader, Xi Jinping, has focused on bringing the self-governing island democracy under the mainland’s control, by force if necessary. The two sides split in 1949 after a civil war, but Beijing considers visits to Taiwan by foreign officials as recognizing its sovereignty.

Xi is seeking a third term as Communist Party leader later this year. His control over the armed forces and what he has defined as China’s “core interests” — including Taiwan, territorial claims in the South China Sea and historic adversary Japan — are key to maintaining his nationalist credentials.

The military has said the exercises, involving missile strikes, warplanes and ship movements crossing the midline of the Taiwan Strait dividing the sides, were a response to Pelosi’s visit.

China has ignored calls to calm the tensions, and there was no immediate indication of when it would end what amounts to a blockade.

On Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said China would “firmly safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, resolutely deter the U.S. from containing China with the Taiwan issue and resolutely shatter the Taiwan authorities’ illusion of “relying on the U.S. for independence.”

China’s slowing economic growth, which has reduced options among migrant workers as well as college graduates, has raised the specter of social unrest. The party has maintained its power through total control of the press and social media, along with suppression of political opponents, independent lawyers and activists working on issues from online free speech to LGBQT rights.

China doesn’t allow public opinion polls, and popular opinion is hard to judge. However, it generally skews in favor of the government and its efforts to restore China’s former dominant role in the region that puts it in conflict with the United States and its allies, including Japan and Australia.

Taiwan’s defense ministry said Sunday it detected a total of 66 aircraft and 14 warships conducting the naval and air exercises. The island has responded by putting its military on alert and deploying ships, planes and other assets to monitor Chinese aircraft, ships and drones that are “simulating attacks on the island of Taiwan and our ships at sea.”

Meanwhile, Taiwan’s official Central News Agency reported that Taiwan’s army will conduct live-fire artillery drills in southern Pingtung county on Tuesday and Thursday, in response to the Chinese exercises.

The drills will include snipers, combat vehicles, armored vehicles as well as attack helicopters, said the report, which cited an anonymous source.

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has called on the international community to “support democratic Taiwan” and “halt any escalation of the regional security situation.” The Group of Seven industrialized nations has also criticized China’s actions, prompting Beijing to cancel a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Japanese counterpart, Yoshimasa Hayashi.

China has cut off defense and climate talks with the U.S. and imposed sanctions on Pelosi in retaliation for her visit.

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken told reporters on the sidelines of a meeting with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Cambodia over the weekend that Pelosi’s visit was peaceful and did not represent a change in American policy toward Taiwan. He accused China of using the trip as a “pretext to increase provocative military activity in and around the Taiwan Strait.”

The Biden administration and Pelosi say the U.S. remains committed to the “one-China” policy that extends formal diplomatic recognition to Beijing while allowing robust informal relations and defense ties with Taipei.

The U.S., however, criticized Beijing’s actions in the Taiwan Strait, with White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre calling them “fundamentally irresponsible.”

“There’s no need and no reason for this escalation,” Jean-Pierre said.

In Washington, Taiwanese de facto ambassador Bi-khim Hsiao said China had no reason to “be so furious” over Pelosi’s visit, which follows a long tradition of American lawmakers visiting Taiwan.

“Well, you know, we have been living under the threat from China for decades,” Hsiao told CBS News on Sunday. “If you have a kid being bullied at school, you don’t say you don’t go to school. You try to find a way to deal with the bully.

“The risks are posed by Beijing,” Hsiao said.

On a visit to Myanmar, whose Chinese-backed military government has been accused of murdering its opponents, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Washington was “taking the opportunity to build up its military deployment in the region, which deserves high vigilance and resolute boycott from all sides.”

“China’s firm stance” is aimed at “earnestly safeguarding peace across the Taiwan Strait and regional stability,” Wang was quoted as saying by the official Xinhua News Agency.

Meanwhile, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong called for a cooling of tensions. “Australia continues to urge restraint, Australia continues to urge deescalation, and this is not something that solely Australia is calling for, and the whole region is concerned about the current situation, the whole region is calling for stability to be restored,” Wong told reporters in Canberra.

Instead, it has been virtually all supplies the company uses to make key defense products, including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s engine.

“It’s components, it’s raw materials,” Greg Hayes, Raytheon’s chief executive, told analysts in October. “Think about aluminum prices going up, [think] of steel, all of the basic raw materials, lead times pushing out. And it’s just harder to get material in the door on time.”

See the Top 100 list here

Aerospace and defense firms faced a thorny mess in 2021, as pandemic-related supply chain snarls and worker shortages — plus fears of a U.S. government budget downturn — entangled the sector. Among the biggest American firms, sales growth last year was mostly flat, reflecting a multibillion-dollar dip in U.S. defense outlays at the end of the Trump administration, following several big increases.

The same day Raytheon, the world’s second-largest defense contractor, reported a more challenging supply chain, Lockheed Martin, the largest, disclosed that supply chain delays had struck its F-35 fighter and other programs, and lowered revenue expectations for 2021 and beyond.

Even so, the defense revenues of the top 100 defense companies climbed for a sixth consecutive year, a sign of the global industry’s continued resilience in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic shocks that stretch back to 2019.

Fiscal 2021 defense revenue recorded for the Defense News Top 100 list totaled $595 billion, up nearly 8% from last year’s list. (The increase does come with an asterisk because of an anomaly with the Emirati firm Edge Group’s revenue calculations last year, but its exclusion would only nudge the increase to 9%.)

The growth is partly driven by the 2021 list’s inclusion of Chinese defense firms for the third straight year, which account for just under 20% of the Top 100′s total defense revenues.

The top 10 firms on this year’s list represent roughly 52% of the total defense revenue; the top 25 firms account for 75% of total defense revenue for the year.

Geographically, 46 of the firms on the list are based in the U.S., which accounted for 53% of total defense revenue. Thirty-one firms are based in Europe (including Turkey but excluding Israel and Russia), and there are nine non-Chinese firms from the Asia-Pacific region on the list, three Israeli firms and one each from Brazil, Canada, Russia and Saudi Arabia.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s broader assessment of global defense spending for 2021 found that figure continued to grow, surpassing $2 trillion for the first time. The five largest spending nations in 2021 were the U.S., China, India, the U.K. and Russia, which together account for 62% of expenditures, according to its tally.

The labor shortages and supply chain challenges have continued in 2022, along with intensifying inflation. Earlier this year, the chief executive of Boeing, the third-largest defense company in the world, said the firm’s defense business was suffering after winning fixed-price programs and later facing dramatically increased costs.

“We took some risks not knowing that COVID would arise and not knowing that an inflationary environment would take hold like it has,” David Calhoun said in April. “And both of those things have impacted us fairly severely.”

US defense companies

The top 10 U.S. firms are Lockheed Martin ($64 billion), Raytheon Technologies ($42 billion), Boeing ($35 billion), Northrop Grumman ($31 billion), General Dynamics ($31 billion), L3Harris Technologies ($15 billion), HII ($9 billion), Leidos ($8 billion), Amentum ($6 billion) and Booz Allen Hamilton ($6 billion).

Lockheed, whose revenue represents nearly 11% of the total, topped the list for the 23rd year in a row.

The annual Defense News Top 100 list relies heavily on self-reporting from companies, many of which provide estimates rather than definitive data for their defense percentages. That means that while the list is the industry standard, the numbers come with some qualifiers.

The order of the top 10 U.S. firms was virtually unchanged from this year compared to last year. Given the White House’s unfriendliness toward defense mergers by the largest companies — as exemplified by the blocked Lockheed-Aerojet Rocketdyne merger last year — the list may be frozen for some time to come.

“If Lockheed can’t buy Aerojet, and you assume the primes can’t buy each other, and at least with this administration and their view of consolidation, this could be it,” said Roman Schweizer, a market analyst with research firm Cowen. “This could be the way they line up.”

U.S. military spending in 2021 amounted to $801 billion, down 1.4% from 2020, according to SIPRI. Defying market expectations, the defense budget under President Joe Biden’s administration rose. And driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, defense spending is expected to rise in European countries and again in the United States.

“There may be another growth spurt coming after this. That doesn’t even include the Europeans, who are definitely going to see a big increase,” said Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners, a research firm. “Even if there’s a cease-fire in Ukraine, you’ve still got a Russia that’s implacably hostile to the West.”

Below the top tier, the revenue of firms on the list is diversified — with an average of about 56% of their revenue coming from defense, noted Steven Grundman, a former Pentagon industrial policy chief now with the Atlantic Council think tank.

The Raytheon-United Technologies Corp. merger in 2020, for example, tied together Raytheon, primarily a defense firm, with UTC, a company more focused on commercial aerospace.

Diversification reflects one response to market volatility, Grundman said.

“The conventional wisdom holds that most companies in defense are pure-play, without much diversification, but that’s not what these data show,” Grundman said. “Once you get beyond the top 10, most companies have exposure to commercial [markets], primarily commercial aero. In addition to helping to manage volatility, diversification also gives defense companies better access to advanced technologies.”

Defying the conventional wisdom that the defense industry is barbell shaped — a few large and small firms with very few midsized firms in between — roughly half of the firms on the list fall between $1 billion and $5 billion in revenue. They fall on a scale considered mid- or small-cap by Wall Street (a measure of the size of a firm based on the market value of its outstanding shares).

“It’s an indication of industry health that you have a nice mix of small, medium and large companies among the Top 100,” Grundman said.

Great power competitors

China again had seven firms on the list, all in the top quarter and with a combined $117 billion in defense revenue. That’s more than the combined defense revenue for firms from NATO countries (excluding the U.S.) — $110 billion — and far more than that of the other Asia-Pacific firms (excluding Russia) on the list, at $23 billion.

Whereas most Western defense firms on the list disclosed their defense revenue, Chinese firms did not. That data and analysis came from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, which Defense News teamed with for the third consecutive year.

Russia, which historically accounts for 20% of global arms sales, this year had a sole participant: Tactical Missiles Corp., which reported a 36% increase in defense revenue from FY20 to FY21, from roughly $3 billion to about $4 billion.

No other Russian companies responded to requests for data, including Almaz-Antey, featured on the list for several prior years.

In 2021, Russia was building up its forces along the Ukrainian border and grew its military spending by nearly 3%, to about $66 billion, according to SIPRI. This was the third year of growth, and Russia’s military spending reached 4% of its gross domestic product in 2021.

The reaction from the West to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February won’t be reflected in 2021 data; neither will the fallout from retaliatory sanctions. But Daniel Gouré of the Lexington Institute expects the Russian market share to wane as its historic defense customers, like India, look elsewhere.

“The guys who have bought mostly Russian stuff are now shifting,” Gouré said, adding that beyond its economic isolation, there’s more competition from the U.S. and other global players.

“The Russians are going to find it tougher going forward,” he noted. “The West is going to be more of a competitor than it has been in the past because we may be willing to give out more stuff to keep the Chinese/Russians out [of markets], and then you’ve got more competition from middle-tier players like the Turks, the [South] Koreans.”

There are 31 European countries on the list (including Turkey but excluding Israel and Russia), whose defense revenues total about $120 billion, or 20% of the list’s total. BAE Systems ($26 billion), Leonardo ($14 billion) and Airbus ($11 billion) make up the top three.

Several European firms that weren’t on last year’s list — Polish Armaments Group, Ireland’s Eaton, Turkey’s Roketsan, Germany’s Diehl Group, Norway’s Nammo and Finland’s Patria — made it into the list’s bottom third.

France’s Dassault, whose revenues jumped 65%, primarily attributed the growth to its deliveries of Rafale aircraft, which increased from 13 in FY20 to 25 in FY21.

The evolving security environment in Europe this year is fueling increased demand for integrated missile defenses, early warning systems, air-to-air missiles, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. As Lockheed executives noted on a recent earnings call, those investments will likely bear out over the long term.

Bill Greenwalt, a former deputy undersecretary of defense for industrial policy, now with the American Enterprise Institute, said the “interesting data shifts may be seen in the next couple of years as the impact of the war in Ukraine manifests itself in the [Top 100] data as sales are registered and new orders for replacement systems are executed.”

“I would expect those companies who specialize in munitions will see large gains in the coming years,” the think tanker added.

Ukraine’s Ukroboronprom comes in at 89th place, with about $755 million in defense revenue — a 16% rise from FY20 to FY21.

Mergers and absenteeism

Not all of the defense revenue increases on the list came from organic growth, as some firms climbed the list due to mergers and acquisitions.

• Shipbuilding titan HII (17th this year), which in 2022 changed its name from Huntington Ingalls Industries, includes its acquisition of Alion Science and Technology (74th last year).
• Amentum (21st this year) acquired PAE (80th last year).
• Peraton (25th this year) acquired defense IT firm Perspecta (39th last year) and — for $3.4 billion — Northrop’s integrated mission support and IT solutions business. It reported a defense revenue jump from $651 million to about $5 billion.
• KBR (32nd this year) bought Centauri in 2020 to expand its space and military intelligence business as well as tech consultancy Frazer-Nash. It reported $2 billion more in sales over the previous year, some it attributed to its support of U.S. operations to house Afghan evacuees.
• Vectrus (57th this year) acquired both Zenetex and HHB Systems.
• Teledyne (83rd this year) acquired FLIR Systems (88th last year).

State-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries was a standout in terms of industry consolidation, reporting a revenue jump from roughly $20 million to $605 million, after its acquisition of the Advanced Electronics Co. The kingdom has been consolidating companies within SAMI to achieve a 50% technology transfer target, in line with the economic plan Saudi Vision 2030.

SAMI also attributes its growth to its weapons and missiles business, its emerging technologies division, as well as its joint ventures involving Saudi Aircraft Accessories and Components Co., Navantia and Thales.

The absence of several U.S. nontraditional defense firms on the list is partly a reflection of the state of Defense Department efforts to attract them through novel contracting methods, said Jerry McGinn, executive director of George Mason University’s Center for Government Contracting.

“The department is doing a lot of experiments, prototyping, [other transactional authority contracting]. But now we’re at the point of, ‘Does it scale?’” he said. “That’s how those companies start to get bigger. You’re starting to see it, but it’s not at this level yet.”

As the Pentagon invests in the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System and the Defense Enterprise Office Solution, information technology giants Microsoft and Amazon Web Services, which haven’t participated in the Top 100, are notable for their absence.

Gouré and other industry observers said high-profile tech firms might opt not to participate because they are sensitive to employee dissent. A group of Microsoft employees in 2019 demanded the company abandon a U.S. Army contract that relates to Microsoft’s HoloLens augmented reality technology, and protests from a group of Google employees in 2018 prompted it to pull out of Project Maven, a U.S. Air Force artificial intelligence project.

According to Gouré, the absence of such firms from the list will only become more glaring as the Pentagon spends more on artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and the development of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control project, or JADC2. Such cyber-centric capabilities, likely to come from the commercial side, are the “new arsenal of democracy,” he said.

“You’re now moving into a world in which these companies are providing higher-end products; they’re now participating in more important IT activities,” Gouré said. “The cloud computing backbone of JADC2, which seems like it will be billions upon billions of dollars — there may not be a single integrator, but a couple of companies with billions each for them.”

Jim Taiclet, the chief executive of Lockheed Martin, put it this way in a recent earnings call: “The clutch isn’t engaged yet.”

“It’s going to take two to three years,” he told analysts. “That’s for our allies as well because they not only have to go through their own processes internally, they then have to go through generally the [U.S.] Foreign Military Sales process.”

Indeed, these kinds of changes are slower to emerge when it comes to company revenue, and that may be why much of this year’s Defense News Top 100 list looks similar to last year. (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies and Boeing predictably take the top spots.)

That said, there are some notable changes. Peraton, which made several major acquisitions, has jumped nearly 75 slots to join Leidos, Amentum and Booz Allen Hamilton as the largest U.S. government services contractors.

KBR, which is 32nd, also jumped up the list, while Ukrainian conglomerate Ukroboronprom surged eight spots.

Of course, the list doesn’t capture everything. Only one Russian company participated this year, giving us limited insight into the country’s defense industry. We rely on analysts to provide the data for Chinese companies.

And some of the major players in technology, from Amazon to Google, provide only limited windows into their defense work, meaning we can’t include them on the list because we don’t have a clear understanding of the scope of their defense work.

It’s a reminder that this list isn’t perfect, but what we hope it provides is a meaningful view of the industry and how it changes — or doesn’t — from year to year. It can show trends in sales, acquisitions and geopolitics. And this year’s list does that.

It’s a snapshot that we hope will serve as a useful tool for readers.

See the Top 100 list here

Sales in 2002 equated to about $1 billion, and annual exports stood around $248 million. But in 2021, Turkey’s defense and aerospace sector sales reached $10.1 billion, and exports totaled $3.2 billion, exceeding $2.6 billion in imports, the Defence Industry Manufacturers Association reported.

And Turkish companies won new orders worth $8.5 billion that same year, during which the industry employed 75,000 people and spent $1.6 billion on research and development, the association found.

“These numbers speak for themselves. This is a spectacular growth story,” said Ozgur Eksi, a defense analyst in Ankara. “Over the past two decades, Turkish engineering has taken several big steps with indigenous solutions, which later paved the way for lucrative export contracts.”

See the Top 100 list here

Furthermore, Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports in the first half of 2022 reached a record high of almost $2 billion, up 48% from the same period in 2021, official statistics revealed July 19. According to the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly, exports may come close to or exceed the $4 billion mark by the end of 2022, an annual all-time high.

Drone deals

“The rise in exports, which came after two years of decline during the pandemic in 2020 and 2021, should be attributed primarily to aerospace, and homemade drones in particular,” Eksi told Defense News. “These numbers tell us that the Turkish industry’s dependence on local sales is diminishing, and exports are helping Turkish companies to become self-sufficient.”

Ukraine, for instance, has become a regular buyer of Bayraktar TB2 drones, produced by Turkish firm Baykar. Deliveries of the drones began before Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, but has continued since. In May, Kyiv received 12 TB2s and related operating systems, then ordered another 24.

Overall, Turkey has supplied 96 TB2 drones globally, including to Poland, the first European customer. Two government officials working on defense industry exports told Defense News potential buyers include the United Kingdom, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Saudi Arabia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovakia, Uruguay and Albania.

In 2019, the drone maker teamed up with Ukrainian state-owned arms export organization Ukrspecexport to work on drone technology in the country. Through the relationship, Baykar hoped to procure from Ukraine turboprop engines from the MS-500V-S family that generate 950-1,050 brake horsepower as well as turboprop engines from the AI-450C series that provide 450-630 brake horsepower for the Akinci drone.

In 2021, Baykar secured land in Ukraine to build a testing, training and maintenance center as well as a factory for TB2 drone systems. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 has stalled those plans.

Although the company would not disclose the exact location for its planned project, citing security reasons, industry sources told Defense News the land is around Kharkiv and Donetsk, which have been the targets of Russian attacks.

“Such co-production plans between Turkey and Ukraine have been indefinitely postponed. Major delays should be expected and, in some cases, these may take years,” depending on how the Russian invasion plays out, Eksi said.

Central Asia is also becoming another marketplace for the TB2. Last year, Kyrgyzstan signed a deal to purchase the armed drone, becoming the first Central Asian country to buy the system, although it’s unclear how many were ordered.

In May 2022, Turkey and Kazakhstan agreed to co-produce Turkish drones the Central Asian country purchased in 2021. The Anka, made by Turkish Aerospace Industries, will be jointly produced at a facility in Kazakhstan, which officials expect to open in late 2022 or early 2023. TAI was ranked 67 in this year’s Top 100 list, along with two other Turkish companies: Aselsan at 49 and Roketsan at 86.

Also in May, reports emerged that Tajikistan, another Central Asian nation, had bought the TB2, with neighboring Kyrgyzstan voicing its alarm amid an arms race between the two countries.

More recently, Turkey’s ambassador to Bangladesh, Osman Turan, said July 25 that the Dhaka government and Baykar have agreed on contractual terms for the sale of the TB2 to the Asian nation. The ambassador did not provide a quantity nor a contract value.

By air, land and sea

While Africa is a new market for Turkish defense firms, defense and aerospace exports to the continent are rising, from $83 million in 2020 to $288 million in 2021. Turkish companies have sold various equipment and armored vehicles to 14 African nations: Burkina Faso, Algeria, Chad, Morocco, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somali, Rwanda and Uganda.

“Threats of terror, increasing geopolitical rivalry [and] growing conflict zones have dictated a major increase in defense spending in Africa, offering, among others, export opportunities to Turkish manufacturers,” wrote Mursel Bayram, an associate professor at the Ankara University of Social Sciences.

For its part, Nurol Makina, which makes the Yoruk and Ejder Yalcin four-wheel drive tactical armored vehicles, has sold its products to 18 countries, from Chile to Malaysia and from Senegal to Uzbekistan.

Both vehicles entered the inventory of European Union and NATO member Hungary in September 2019, and the company in March 2022 announced its debut in the European market by opening a location in the country. Nurol’s general manager, Engin Aykol, said the new facility aims to create solutions specifically for the Hungarian Ground Forces.

Also in March, Nurol delivered 40 Gidran tactical wheeled armored vehicles to Hungary, with 100 more to be produced there. Gidran is the name given to Nurol’s Ejder Yalçın mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle, which is in use by the Turkish military.

Turkey’s maritime market has also made moves in Ukraine. In November 2020, the two countries signed an industrial cooperation agreement, under which Turkey in 2021 began construction of the first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine, with delivery planned for 2023. A second Ada-class corvette is to be built by Ukraine’s OKEAN shipyard.

However, diplomatic snags are slowing down some of Turkey’s programs and bringing export deals to a halt.

In 2018, Pakistan chose Turkey’s T129 attack helicopter to replace its fleet of AH−1F Cobra gunships that were acquired in the 1980s. Pakistan signed a $1.5 billion contract with TAI for 30 T129 helos; however, the deal has not progressed as T129′s engine is a joint U.S.-U.K. product that requires export licenses before delivery can take place.

The 5-ton T129 is a twin-engine multirole helicopter produced under license from the Italian-British company AgustaWestland and based on the A129 Mangusta. It’s powered by two LHTEC T800-4A turboshaft engines, each of which can produce 1,014 kilowatts of output power.

The T800-4A is an export version of the CTS800 engine. LHTEC, the maker of the engine, is a joint venture between the American firm Honeywell and the British company Rolls-Royce.

U.S. lawmakers quietly froze all major U.S. arms sales to NATO ally Turkey for nearly two years, Defense News reported in August 2020, in order to pressure Ankara to abandon its Russian-built S-400 surface-to-air defense system, but the Turkish government has yet to do so.

Nevertheless, Turkey and the Philippines announced in May 2021 TAI would export six T129 helos to the Asian nation without U.S. restrictions; nearly a year later, in March, the Philippines received the first two aircraft, and the remaining four are scheduled for delivery in 2023.

Last last month, TAI announced new deals to export six T129s to Nigeria. The firm also announced the sale of an unspecified batch of its Hurkus HYEU, an advanced version of the Hurkus basic trainer aircraft, to Chad.

TAI has previously sold two HYEU platforms to Niger and is presently competing in a race to sell 18 of them to the Malaysian military. TAI declined to comment on the contract value for the Nigerian and Chad deals, and it would not provide a quantity for the aircraft deal with Chad.

Southeast Asia has also served as a market for Turkish radar technology. A procurement official with Turkey’s Presidency of Defence Industries said negotiations between the state-controlled defense organization ASFAT and the Philippine government reached a final phase in April for Turkish-made offshore patrol vessels. The source said Turkey anticipates a $600 million contract for the export deal.

The effort follows three other lists released by the Defence Ministry, which have banned a total of 310 foreign-made weapons and platforms. The import embargoes are part of an effort to bolster the domestic defense industry under the economic initiative Make in India.

But analysts and industry experts tell Defense News the private sector — which has long faced adverse conditions competing against foreign and state-run companies — is yet to see a significant change, with few exceptions. Neither SIDM nor the ministry would provide specifics about the forthcoming list, and it’s unclear when it will be released to the public.

Government action

It’s also unclear exactly how the embargo lists have affected the bottom line of Indian defense contractors. Certainly, there are cases where orders of banned items were made with local companies, but those were related to deals already in the works before the respective embargo.

For its part, the Ministry of Defence announced April 9 that 25% of the $12 billion budget meant for the procurement of new weapons and associated equipment would go toward private sector orders during fiscal 2022-2023.

See the Top 100 list here

The ministry also announced it reserved $214.28 million for buying products developed through the iDEX initiative — or Innovations For Defence Excellence, a government effort meant to foster innovation and technological development in the defense and aerospace sectors by engaging startups, individual innovators, academia, research and development institutes, and micro, small and medium enterprises.

Additionally, the government is encouraging private sector participation by simplifying the procurement process, raising companies’ hopes that they’ll see more contract awards in shorter time frames. Under the new changes, acquisition tenders that fall under the Make-II procurement project and involve domestic private companies will now progress to contract awards within four months after successful prototype testing. Previously, the decision-making process for awarding contracts took about two years following the completion of prototype trials.

Make-II is an industry-funded procurement initiative that receives no government funding and through which the prototype development cost must be borne by private companies.

The government also reserved 25% of its $800 million defense research and development budget for new R&D proposals by private industry, startups and academia for the FY22-23 time period.

The ministry issued new rules — which took effect April 6 — requiring any imported defense materiel, irrespective of value, to receive the approval of the Defence Acquisitions Council before entering the country. In other words, weapons systems that cannot be locally made may be procured from foreign firms only under exceptional circumstances.

However, the ministry noted, the military “will be encouraged to explore the procurement of these through indigenous sources.”

The MoD also said, going forward, the military must receive approval from the defense minister if an armed service wants to import defense equipment under capital procurements, which also can only take place if the materiel is unavailable domestically.

MoD officials said these efforts of the ruling National Democratic Alliance government are meant to enhance the role of private companies, small businesses and startups in manufacturing defense products and building a robust supply chain to reduce the country’s dependence on arms imports.

Embargo impact

Last year, the Indian military purchased $3.5 billion in weapons from overseas through emergency and fast-track procurement authorities. India spent $10.73 billion of its $16.41 billion capital procurement fund last year on weapons from domestic defense companies.

“To promote indigenization, the Defence Ministry has brought out three positive indigenization lists. With the first and second list, we have been able to award [defense] contracts worth $7.1 billion ... to Indian companies,” Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said at a May 9 industry event. “We hope that over the next five [to] seven years, the indigenous acquisition will provide $64.28 billion worth of orders for the industry.”

The ministry refers to the three arms embargo lists as positive indigenization lists.

But Vivek Rae, a former chief of acquisitions for the MoD, told Defense News India must adopt more nuanced strategies if the key objective is to bolster the private sector. He suggested the ministry reserve some competitions for contract awards solely for the private sector, as both state-run and private companies are allowed to participate in Make-II competitions.

The chief executive of a small private defense enterprise agreed. “While deciding the production order, the Indian government has to look away from state-run companies; otherwise there will be no confidence instilled in the private sector,” the executive told Defense News, speaking on the condition of anonymity out of fear of economic reprisal. The executive added that a significant number of new procurement projects fall under Make-II.

“What the [private] industry has developed — and has capabilities for — is only partially included in the lists released as yet and await inclusion in subsequent lists,” Jayant Patil, senior executive vice president of defense contractor Larsen & Toubro, told Defense News. The government, he argued, needs to make fair and quick decisions on contract awards and avoid bureaucratic red tape to lessen the cost of acquisition.

Patil, a former president of SIDM, also called for new economic models and processes that would benefit India’s defense export market.

The government opened defense business to private companies in May 2001. Since then, about 333 private companies were issued a total of 539 industrial licenses, according to an MoD news release in July 2021. Out of those companies, 110 supply arms to the Indian military, the release stated.

India’s private sector has supplied to the military over the last 15 years guns, rocket systems, ships, underwater platforms, sonars, drones, vehicles, radar systems, electro-optical systems, naval weapon systems, bridging systems, integrated platform management systems, and air defense missiles and launchers. The sector has also upgraded multiple types of weapon systems.

However, with the government continuing to prioritize state-run defense companies and its own Defence Research and Development Organisation, private sector contribution to overall defense production suffers. A few major orders have been placed with a handful of large private firms, but the private sector mostly serves as a supplier to state-run defense companies.

The Central Vigilance Commission, which serves as the government’s anti-corruption watchdog, released a memo in April 2021 calling for additional transparency in how contracts are awarded, particularly when they’re done so on a nomination basis — or where contracts are awarded to a state-run company without a competition, similar to sole-source contracts in the United States.

“The award of contracts/projects/procurements on nomination basis without adequate justification amounts to restrictive practice eliminating competition, fairness and equity,” the document read. “Hence, award of contracts through open competitive bids should remain the most preferred mode of tendering.”

And if an award is made on a nomination basis, the commission stated, details of the contract and justification for the decision should be posted online in the public domain.

But Rae said this should go further.

“The only way private manufacturing companies can grow is through the steady flow of orders,” he said. “To establish a level playing field, orders on a nomination basis to state-run companies should be stopped completely, especially where the private sector has the infrastructure and capability to compete.”

Ashok Baweja, who leads a defense unit at Quest Global Engineering and previously served as chairman of the state-run company Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, took a more positive view of the arms embargoes, saying they have provided opportunities to both the private and public defense sectors. (HAL ranked 42 in this year’s Top 100 list, alongside one other Indian company, Bharat Electronics Limited, which ranked 56.)

Still, Baweja added, India’s private sector lacks access to defense projects that are based on realistic technical parameters, backed by government funding for prototype development and the support of manufacturing facilities, and involve timely orders.

But it’s not all bad. Private companies have access to several technologies — gyros, gimbals, image intensifiers, sensors, metallurgy techniques — through their relationships with foreign businesses, who are more reluctant to share with state-run organizations than private entities.

Additionally, the private sector has built up its capabilities in the design and development of defense electronics, software and artificial intelligence in recent years.

The head of SIDM, Satya Prakash Shukla, said India’s defense industry has welcomed the embargo lists.

Shukla, who also leads Mahindra Group’s defense, aerospace and agriculture unit, said creating these lists is complicated, as the Defence Ministry wants to focus on items it might need going forward but can also be locally produced.

Companies in the shipbuilding and electronics industries saw particularly high growth between 2020 and 2021. Chinese state-owned enterprises, or SOE, have reportedly also made significant progress toward fully implementing the State Council’s three-year SOE reform plan, due to be completed prior to the 20th Party Congress in the autumn this year.

In 2021, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China — otherwise known as AVIC — remained the top defense-related state-owned enterprise in China for a fourth year in a row, according to analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

See the Top 100 list here

Per the Defense News Top 100 lists, AVIC’s total revenue grew from $67.9 billion in 2020 to $80.4 billion in 2021, while its defense-related revenue grew by 18%, from $25.5 billion in 2020 to $30.2 billion.

In line with requirements in the 14th Five-Year Plan as well as PLA Air Force and PLA Navy requirements, Chinese securities firms expect continued growth for AVIC’s defense-related and civilian business. Owing to this strong rate of growth, AVIC held its position as the sixth-largest defense company in the world on the Top 100.

However, it was not the fastest rate of growth among Chinese SOEs. Between 2020 and 2021, defense-related revenues for China Electronics Technology Group (CETC) and China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC) is estimated to have increased by 40% and 28%, respectively.

The uplift in CETC’s revenue was due to the June 2021 acquisition of telecommunications rival China Putian Information Industry Group, also known as Potevio, whose 2019 revenues came to 116 billion yuan (U.S. $17 billion). The acquisition means CETC’s total revenue in 2021 reached $58 billion, of which IISS estimates that $14.7 billion is for defense-related activities, which sees the company jump from 15th to 11th place on this year’s Top 100.

Potevio’s activities primarily focus on the commercial sector, although one major subsidiary, Eastern Communications, does supply telecommunications systems to the Chinese military. The acquisition is in line with the “independent innovation” goal of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, which also includes a requirement for national defense entities to expand collaboration efforts — both among themselves and with the commercial sector — in order to bolster domestic defense-industrial capabilities and innovation.

CSGC’s estimated defense-related revenue grew by roughly 28% from $10.7 billion in 2020 to $13.7 billion in 2021; from 2019 to 2020, it grew 21%. Despite internal restructuring and streamlining reforms appearing to bolster performance over the last two years, CSGC revenues are still well below 2016 peak levels owing to annual declines of 25% annually between 2017 and 2019. Overall company revenue growth in 2021 can be attributed to growth in the automobile (including electric vehicle) sector, the optics industry, and the electronics and energy industries.

For the second year, shipbuilding giant China State Shipbuilding Corporation Limited, or CSSC Group, reported official numbers following the merger of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation and China State Shipbuilding Corporation in 2019. Following global economic recovery in 2021, China’s shipbuilding industry maintained a global lead in 2021 in terms of volume of ships built, new shipbuilding orders and holding order volumes.

In defense, too, Chinese shipbuilders had an active year supplying the PLA Navy. In 2021, the PLAN commissioned eight guided-missile destroyers, two amphibious assault ships and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. Construction was ongoing on PLAN ships that were commissioned by July 2022, including two more Type 052D destroyers, three Type 055 destroyers, a Type 075 amphibious assault ship and the PLA’s third aircraft carrier — the Fujian. IISS estimates that CSSC Group’s defense-related revenues increased by 16% from 2020 to 2021.

The defense-related revenue of NORINCO — or China North Industries Group Corporation Limited — grew by 16% from 2020, reaching $18 billion in 2021, nearly doubling the annual year-on-year growth seen by the company in the previous three years. According to NORINCO’s annual work report, this reflects a “good start to the 14th Five-Year Plan,” with the company reporting successful completion of delivery tasks for the PLA’s participation in the International Military Competition and for civilian use in the Beijing Science and Technology Winter Olympics.

The company also continues to play a leading role in application development research and construction of the BeiDou navigation satellite system. Internationally, the work report points to the company’s activity “rising against the trend,” with construction of major projects along the Belt and Road Initiative — a Chinese economic and investment program.

The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation saw defense-related revenue growth of 12% from 2020 to 2021, leading the company to hold steady in 18th place on the Top 100. At its 2022 annual work conference, the company highlighted success in “construction of national defense weapon models” as well as progress on space development with 48 launch missions and the first Mars exploration mission completed.

However, the company did note that the challenges in the “economic environment have increased significantly” while the task of enterprise reform is “still arduous.”

For the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, revenue growth was relatively muted for the third consecutive year, at just 9% from 2020 to 2021, causing the company to fall in rank from 11th to 14th place on the Top 100. Nonetheless, the company has managed to maintain overall company revenues in recent years, despite supply chain difficulties and significant exposure to commercial aviation, where performance is constrained by ongoing lockdowns over COVID-19.

In May 2022, Hao Peng, director of the State Council’s Office of State-owned Enterprise Reform Leading Group and the council’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, announced that more than 90% of enterprises have completed almost all of the necessary reforms according to the three-year SOE reform plan — 2020 through 2022.

Last year was seemingly an important one in achieving this level of progress, as 70% of reform tasks were completed in 2021 at central and local SOE levels. These reforms focus on improving governance structures and party leadership; improving efficiency and encouraging market-based measures; creating incentives for scientific and technological innovation; achieving technological advancements; slimming down and reducing risk; and improving capital oversight, among other objectives.

Though Chinese reports suggest that full achievement of these reforms is on track for the 20th Party Congress deadline, it is uncertain to what extent they may have played a role in the revenue growth seen across all defense-related SOEs in 2021.

Factors such as China’s wider economic context after the outbreak of COVID-19, the country’s civilian industry and the PLA’s procurement in line with 14th Five-Year Plan objectives are likely explanations.

However, following the Chinese government’s adherence to its so-called dynamic zero-COVID policy, a crisis in the property sector, a rural bank scandal and concerns about overseas debt repayments, China’s economic malaise thus far in 2022 could paint a different picture for next year’s results.

Fenella McGerty is a senior fellow for defense economics at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, where Meia Nouwens is a senior fellow for Chinese defense policy and military modernization.

Revenues for Defense News’ Top 100 list increased by 7.9%, rising to $595 billion; the benchmark SPADE Defense Index gained 6.6% for the year. But on the whole, 2021 was a volatile year for publicly traded companies.

The year began with optimism following a weak 2020 marked by the pandemic and the uncertainties of a presidential election year. Backed by a growing defense budget, continued Sino- and Russo-U.S. tensions, and a return to health for the commercial aerospace sector as passenger traffic began to return to pre-pandemic levels, defense stocks surged along with the broader market for the first half of 2021, hitting historic highs for the Index on June 8.

See the Top 100 list here

By midyear, however, some headwinds emerged as the Pentagon withdrawal from Afghanistan delayed some contract awards, and as companies reported the impact of supply chain disruptions. Some firms, such as Lockheed Martin, disappointed investors with guidance that predicted slow growth in the coming year.

As the stock market surged higher, driven by less than a dozen internet and technology firms, the defense sector gave up a portion of its gains — positive returns for the year but underperforming the broader market for the second consecutive year. Individual company returns for the year ranged from greater than 50% gains for Textron, Keysight Technologies and KBR to more than 30% losses in shares prices for Mercury Systems and Telos.

Everything changed in February 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Assets invested into defense sector stocks and funds have surged. The Invesco Aerospace and Defense ETF (NYSE: PPA) saw its assets and outstanding shares more than double by June. By midyear, as stock markets around the world crumbled in the face of multidecade-high inflation and the prospects of a recession, the benchmark for publicly traded defense stocks had declined just a few percentage points, offering stability to investors.

As one would expect, Russia’s actions in Ukraine are fueling international growth for the defense industry as nations prepare to protect their borders — particularly NATO and its allies. Security has moved to the front and center of political discussions in many European nations, the U.S. and American allies. Nearly $100 billion in new money was already allocated for equipment and supplies to combat this threat. Additional support is likely.

As 2022 progresses, the defense business environment is faced with a number of changes. In addition to meeting the challenges of wartime production needs, firms in the United States will need to reposition themselves to meet new Pentagon philosophies that aim to build back lost production capacity as well as compensate for crucial component and supply chain disruptions. After a decade of focusing on low-yield precision bombs and missiles used in counterterrorism actions, production of legacy munitions, such as Javelin and Stinger missiles, have suffered. Four months after the invasion of Ukraine began, U.S. stockpiles of these and smart munitions — such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System — were severely impacted.

Additionally, announcements of mergers and acquisitions that will impact the Top 100, a staple of prior years, will likely become increasingly rare. A proposed deal for Lockheed Martin to acquire Aerojet Rocketdyne was denied regulatory approval, and a recent Pentagon review of the consolidation of defense industry suppliers expressed concerns.

In total, Defense News’ Top 100 list contains 67 publicly traded companies that represent 72% of the list’s total revenues for 2021. This provides a wealth of data and a measure of transparency for a sector that has shown to be a solid investment in good times as well as troubled ones.

This year, through June 30, 2022, the SPADE Defense Index has declined by just 3.9%, outperforming the broader U.S. stock market, which is down by 20.6%.

Such performance is not atypical: Over the past 21 years, the sector outperformed in 17 of them, many times by double digits. It is one reason why defense sector funds, such as the Invesco Aerospace and Defense ETF, have attracted a collective $6 billion in assets to invest in the sector.

Scott Sacknoff manages the SPADE Defense Index, a modified capitalization-weighted index made up of companies operating in the defense, homeland security and government space sectors.

U.S. Naval Air Systems Command, known as NAVAIR, announced Wednesday the service transferred PTDI CN-235 to the Royal Malaysian Air Force nearly four years after the U.S. signed a letter of offer and acceptance for the project.

The aircraft was upgraded with an unspecified maritime surveillance mission suite. It also incorporates a maritime surveillance radar, electro-optical infrared turret, line-of-sight datalink and a roll-on/roll-off mission system operator station.

The Navy also delivered associated mobile and fixed ground stations.

“The effort was facilitated by the U.S. Navy’s Building Partner Capacity program, aligned with the U.S. government’s Maritime Security Initiative, which is intended to assist the Malaysian government in increasing maritime security and maritime domain awareness within the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone,” NAVAIR said.

In September 2020, the first of the Indonesian-built CN-235s were flown to Indonesia for “completion and testing.” The first flight of the upgraded aircraft took place just over a year later. The two remaining CN-235 aircraft and multiple ground stations are expected to be completed later this year.

Malaysia currently operates seven CN-235s with the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s No.1 Squadron, based out of Kuching in the eastern Malaysian state of Sarawak.

The RMAF operates three Beechcraft B200T King Airs in a maritime surveillance role, while the U.S. government has also delivered six Insitu ScanEagle drones to the Royal Malaysian Navy donated under MSI funding.

The RMAF has also previously used its Lockheed Martin C-130H Hercules transports and the CN-235 in the maritime surveillance role, but these lacked specialized equipment and relied on visual observations by personnel on board.

Malaysia is made up of two separate landmasses with coastlines along the strategic Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, and is also one of six claimants of ownership over the disputed Spratly group of islands.

The Malaysian military and coast guard has also had to deal with the issue of piracy along its coasts, and militancy and terrorism in the Sulu Sea that lies between eastern Malaysia and the southern Philippines.

China earlier announced that military exercises by its navy, air force and other departments were underway in six zones surrounding Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory to be annexed by force if necessary.

Five of the missiles fired by China landed in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone off Hateruma, an island far south of Japan’s main islands, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said. He said Japan protested the missile landings to China as “serious threats to Japan’s national security and the safety of the Japanese people.”

The drills were prompted by a visit to the island by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi this week and are intended to advertise China’s threat to attack the self-governing island republic. Along with its moves to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, China has long threatened military retaliation over moves by the island to solidify its de facto independence with the support of key allies including the U.S.

China fired long-range explosive projectiles, the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army, the ruling Communist Party’s military wing, said in a statement. It also said it carried out multiple conventional missile launches in three different areas in the eastern waters off Taiwan. An accompanying graphic on state broadcaster CCTV showed those occurred in the north, east, and south.

“All missiles hit the target accurately,” the Eastern Theater said in its announcement. No further details were given.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said it tracked the firing of Chinese Dongfeng series missiles beginning around 1:56 p.m. Thursday. It said in a statement it used various early warning surveillance systems to track the missile launches. It later said it counted 11 Dongfeng missiles in the waters in the north, east and south.

The ministry also said it tracked long-distance rockets and ammunition firing in outlying islands in Matsu, Wuqiu and Dongyin.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen criticized the drills in a public video address, saying China “destroyed the status quo and violated our sovereignty” with its “irresponsible actions.” She urged China to be “reasonable and restrained.”

“We are calm and not impulsive, we are reasonable and not provocative,” she said. “But we will also be firm and not back down.”

Tsai said Taiwan is in communication with its allies to ensure that things do not escalate further.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said its forces are on alert and monitoring the situation, while seeking to avoid escalating tensions. Civil defense drills were held last week and notices were placed on designated air raid shelters months ago.

China’s “irrational behavior” intends to alter the status quo and disrupt regional peace and stability, the ministry said.

“The three service branches will combine efforts with all the people to jointly safeguard national security and territorial integrity” while adapting to the situation as it develops, the statement said.

China’s official Xinhua News Agency reported the exercises were joint operations focused on “blockade, sea target assault, strike on ground targets, and airspace control.”

Ma Chen-kun, a professor at Taiwan’s National Defense University, said the drills were aimed at showing off the Chinese military’s ability to deploy precision weapons to cut off Taiwan’s links with the outside and facilitate the landing of troops.

The announced drills are “more complete” than previous exercises, he said.

“If the People’s Liberation Army actually invades Taiwan in an all-out invasion, the concrete actions it will take, it’s all in this particular exercise,” Ma said.

“The main thing is they will cut off Taiwan’s links to the outside world, from their sea, they would suppress the coastal defense firepower,” he said.

Meanwhile, the mood in Taiwan was calm.

In Keelung, a city on the northern coast of Taiwan and close to two of the announced drill areas, swimmers took their morning laps in a natural pool built in the ocean.

Lu Chuan-hsiong, 63, was enjoying his morning swim, saying he wasn’t worried. “Because Taiwanese and Chinese, we’re all one family. There’s a lot of mainlanders here, too,” he said.

“Everyone should want money, not bullets,” he quipped, saying the economy wasn’t doing so well.

Those who have to work on the ocean were more concerned. Fishermen are likely to be the most affected by the drills, which cover six different areas surrounding Taiwan, part of which come into the island’s territorial waters.

Most fishermen will continue to try to fish, as it is the season for squid.

“It’s very close. This will definitely impact us, but if they want to do this, what can we do? We can just avoid that area,” said Chou Ting-tai, who owns a fishing vessel.

In addition to the missile launches, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said 22 Chinese fighter jets flew toward the island on Thursday, crossing the midline of the Taiwan Strait.

While the U.S. has not said it would intervene, it has bases and forward-deployed assets in the area, including aircraft carrier battle groups.

On Thursday, the U.S. Navy said its USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier was operating in the Philippine Sea, east of Taiwan, as part of “normal scheduled operations.”

Secretary of State Antony Blinken addressed the drills Thursday saying, “I hope very much that Beijing will not manufacture a crisis or seek a pretext to increase its aggressive military activity. We countries around the world believe that escalation serves no one and could have unintended consequences that serve no one’s interests.”

U.S. law requires the government to treat threats to Taiwan, including blockades, as matters of “grave concern.”

The drills are due to run from Thursday to Sunday and include missile strikes on targets in the seas north and south of the island in an echo of the last major Chinese military drills aimed at intimidating Taiwan’s leaders and voters held in 1995 and 1996.

On the diplomatic front, China canceled a foreign ministers’ meeting with Japan to protest a statement from the Group of Seven nations that there is no justification for the exercises. Both ministers are attending a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Cambodia.

“Japan, together with other members of the G-7 and the EU, made an irresponsible statement accusing China and confounding right and wrong,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said in Beijing.

While China has given no word on numbers of troops and military assets involved, the exercises could be the largest held near Taiwan in geographical terms, experts have said.

The exercises involved troops from the navy, air force, rocket force, strategic support force and logistic support force, Xinhua reported.

“We went past experimentation and we went right into operational capability,” said Maj. Gen. Francis Donovan, the commander of the 2nd Marine Division and Task Force 61/2.

Force Design 2030 calls for the Corps to refashion itself into a lighter, faster and more lethal service — one that can integrate Marines and sailors into versatile “stand-in forces” that can respond to an array of crises. To that end, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa — otherwise known as U.S. 6th Fleet — stood up Task Force 61/2, named for Naval Amphibious Forces Europe/2d Marine Division, in April.

The task force oversees the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, known as an ARG-MEU when coupled. An experimental reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance force also falls under its purview.

The Naples, Italy-based task force made history in June when a vessel under its command, the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge, made a port visit to Stockholm in a show of support for Sweden’s bid to join NATO. It marked the first time a U.S. naval vessel of its size had visited the city.

In a July 21 interview, Donovan offered a detailed, insider’s view of force structure and equipment involved in the realization of Force Design 2030 — and how it was put into use amid increased Russian naval activity in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What does Task Force 61/2 do, and what is its connection to the Marine Corps’ stand-in forces concept and Force Design 2030?

A couple of things happened over the last few years here in the 2nd Marine Division. As the commandant came out with Force Design 2030 about a year before I got here, the division was already transitioning certain equipment, standing down certain elements of the division, standing up others. I inherited that, but it got exciting when we looked at two programs from Force Design 2030 that directly impacted us as far as experimentation.

One is called the Infantry Battalion Experimentation 2030, or IBX-30, where one of our battalions looked at a new structure, how we distribute infantry forces over a maritime littoral contact layer and how we operate. The second was reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance, or RXR. It’s a term brought forward by Force Design 2030 that’s about how we task and organize Marine forces to support a fleet commander’s requirements, primarily to increase a fleet commander’s maritime domain awareness.

For RXR, we had littoral exercises up and down the East Coast that tested tactics and procedures and put the core elements of RXR into action.

Since the beginning of this global war on terror, the 6th Fleet structure in Naples, Italy, had not had to command and control an amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit for a full deployment inside of U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. Typically, after a six-month work-up on the East Coast, we would sail from the Atlantic Ocean into the Mediterranean Sea and right into 5th Fleet, [which is responsible for the Middle East].

But about 10 months ago, the commander of U.S. 6th Fleet, Vice Adm. Eugene Black, was given that challenge and opportunity. He worked with II Marine Expeditionary Force’s commander, Lt. Gen. William Jurney, to form a command-and-control element in Naples, which led to Task Force 61/2, which meshed Navy and Marine Corps forces.

The task force was not directly tied to Force Design 2030 at first, but it became the venue for advanced exercises in theater for both some of our IBX forces and RXR forces. The RXR initially focused on theater exercises to continue to prove out the concept and construct, but the war in Ukraine brought with it increased Russian naval activity. So Marines on the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge were not only brought forward to exercise, but to prove the concept by increasing maritime domain awareness to the fleet commander.

Some have criticized Force Design 2030 as solely geared toward the Pacific. How did it fit — or not fit — into the European theater, and what fine-tuning took place to make it work in Europe?

We want to make RXR theater-agnostic, providing maritime domain awareness to a fleet commander who has to execute local and temporal sea-denial and sea-control lanes.

Whether that’s the Pacific, the Baltics or the Mediterranean, the Bab el-Mandeb or the Persian Gulf, we are a maritime nation, and our commerce has to transit global commons that have strategic chokepoints in that key maritime domain. We worked very hard to ensure that what we were developing for RXR could be exported anywhere.

I think it has great promise in the Pacific, but I thought we’d have a better chance to exercise along the European continent and littorals because often in the Pacific, our legacy training there puts us in the same areas and environments with the same partners. There was a fresh canvas in Europe, and we were able to go in and engage the fleet staff that runs both EUCOM and AFRICOM naval littoral [training] engagements and develop a campaign plan to test RXR in a very active, complex theater.

Throw in the increased Russian naval activity in the Mediterranean and the Baltics and you really got a chance to test this out. What started out as experimentation became: “Can we go into this NATO country and actually do this mission?” The answer was: “Absolutely.” The focus is on key maritime terrain, and we’ve got that in spades in the EUCOM and AFRICOM theater.

How did Europe’s terrain, especially littoral features like the small islands around Sweden, factor in?

The Pacific has large swathes of big, blue ocean that eventually condense down into narrow chokepoints, like the Strait of Malacca or the Sulu Sea, and in around the other places that maritime traffic has to travel. With Europe’s waterways ― you have the Suez Canal, the Dardanelles, the Bosporus, the Straits of Sicily, the Strait of Gibraltar, then all the way up to the Gulf of Finland ― there are numerous opportunities to get into that key maritime terrain and then develop access and placement of forces.

So what did we learn from experiments? With RXR, we knew right away we didn’t want to tie it to a certain wheeled vehicle or a certain platform because to be able to execute those operations, you have to have incredible flexibility and a dynamic approach. For example, when we brought RXR forces forward, we originally thought we’d get some C-17 aircraft, and we already had some utility task vehicles with radars mounted on them — some communications equipment, some command-and-control systems, and then off we’d go. Well, because presidentially directed actions to support Ukraine were using C-17s, we lost our C-17s, so right away we’re like: “How do we get to theater?”

Well, we packed up our stuff in Pelican cases and backpacks and we got commercial flights to fly into the theater. We were able to land in a NATO country and within hours start increasing the maritime domain awareness of the 6th Fleet commander. We worked with those nation forces in that littoral contact layer, which is where we believe the RXR fight is going to play out.

We didn’t bring UTVs, so we got rental cars. One of our cables went down on one of our radars, so we went to a local boating store and got a new cable. We ate in the host nation’s mess facilities.

At the same time, we also were able to link our RXR force to the ARG-MEU that maneuvered up into the Baltic Sea and leverage V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, the different mobility platforms of the ARG-MEU with our ground-based RXR forces, and it ended up being the perfect union. In one case, we had a radar team forward, backed by intel Marines in fleet headquarters ― so we had the sensing force forward in the NATO country with fleet headquarters providing the cueing.

Once we linked the ARG-MEU to those RXR forces, we had a much greater ability to stretch our legs on those islands, those key locations. And that keeps the potential enemy guessing: They don’t know where we’re going to be; and we don’t want to be a known entity in that contact layer, we want our radars blending in with the local noise; we want our intel communications to be passive; we want to do that kind of reveal/conceal thing on our terms. And so I think it’s very different.

We can have the big gray ships there, and that means one thing, but [RXR forces] can be there when they’re not there. Let’s say we keep a destroyer there that can shoot an SM-6 missile 100 nautical miles. We want them 100 nautical miles away, potentially, and then we’ll have Marines forward in those areas able to bring those fires to bear. Those maritime chokepoints are so important. The lighter, more dynamic, more flexible those forces are, the more access we can develop. In some cases, it might be very overt, and in other parts of the theater, you’ll have a clandestine approach where we’re using different naval platforms to put forces ashore where they’re least expected.

Describe those RXR teams and how they’re made up.

Our primary two core elements of the tactical action of RXR — those Marines and sailors came from 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion and 2nd Light Armored Recon Battalion. So one change we’re looking at hard in Force Design 2030 is the future of wheeled-vehicle reconnaissance. It’s very good in the open desert and open terrain, but can we look at that differently? We’re considering a second reconnaissance battalion that provided the reconnaissance Marines that did the hard-skill work: cold and wet, working on submarines or working on other surface platforms; working Zodiac boats; clandestine actions at night. That’s classic Marine reconnaissance work, and I’m excited.

As far as the 2nd Light Armored Recon Battalion, we developed it in experimental mode: a mobile reconnaissance company with a mobile reconnaissance team. These are Marines who might have been communicators, intel specialists, mechanics or scouts. We looked at who is best suited to do this, who could operate in a smaller team, and who has an interest in making some of these systems come together when they might not have been designed to work together. We had four mobile reconnaissance teams, and that was the primary sensing force that was out there. Each of those teams had about four to six Marines and sailors; we had a headquarters element forward, away from Naples, led by one of our O-6s, and below that an RXR element. We had some other sensing elements forward doing different types of intel collections. The key was all that was brought back and fused in the fleet headquarters, and that all together was recon/counter-recon.

The total force investment was probably 150 Marines and sailors, and that was spread between forward-sensing forces, and then inside fleet headquarters, driving collection and increased maritime domain awareness. Headquarters was also pushing indications, warnings and cueing down to the force.

How has the equipment for these Marines changed, as opposed to, say, the armored vehicles they’d previously used?

Because you’ve got to be able to get there and be flexible, “small form factor” was our theme. We have great communications systems, backpack radios and the Harris system radios — the AN/PRC-150, the AN/PRC-160, the AN/PRC-117. We’re able to leverage those and apply methodology to use them at the right time in the right place so we’re not revealing ourselves. We’re being smarter about how we’re using our current systems. That was one of our goals.

We originally wanted UTVs because they’re able to get us around quicker, and they are still very viable because they fit inside a CH-53 helicopter or V-22, and they can extend our reach and speed. What’s not viable is a larger vehicle that we would have to get strategic lift for or transport on a ship.

The key term for us, “small form factor,” was about the ability to tap into something called the Common Aviation Command and Control System, or CAC2S. It’s about linking into the Link 16 network, which would have in the past taken four or five Humvees, big radars or generators. Now, think about a couple laptops and a couple of small-scale PacStar-type terminals that can fit in a backpack or on a UTV. That CAC2S was the heart and soul of taking all this stuff we’re collecting and entering into a process, a system, that would then eventually kick out a Link 16 link between us and supporting assets, whether that’s an F-35 or a destroyer, or providing our ability to link back into a fleet headquarters, into that maritime ops center, and having our locations show up in a command post.

That Link 16 architecture is the joint architecture, that’s how you bring aviation and surface fires to bear. Beyond hand-held Link 16 radios, we’re able to use the Stalker unmanned aerial system — a program of record for us right now — which belonged to the MEU. That gave us about a 100-mile radius and longer loitering time and better collection equipment.

We bought commercial off-the-shelf FLIR [maritime recreational] radar systems that we were able to link into Link 16. That was kind of the missing link in the sense that no one had ever done that before. So you’d have these off-the-shelf radars that can, yes, acquire a target, but it took those Marines a number of different littoral exercises to figure out how to connect it into that CAC2S system. So light, mobile, very flexible forces; low numbers of very highly trained Marines that really trained themselves specifically for this kit. Then we’re able to reinforce it with support from the fleet headquarters, and then mobility assets from the ARG-MEU. Other supporting platforms across the task force and 6th Fleet enhanced what we’re able to do in recon/counter-recon.

How much of it was experimentation and exercises, like the multinational Baltic Operations drill, versus real-world need?

RXR wasn’t tied to BALTOPS at all; the ARG-MEU was tied to BALTOPS. But in the end, as things developed over time, with a lot more Russian naval forces in the Baltic Sea, specifically in the Gulf of Finland — that’s a normal transit lane for Russian naval forces in and out of St. Petersburg.

We originally were going to do RXR in a different country. Once we got there, we were asked: “Could you go to this NATO country and help increase the maritime domain awareness of 6th Fleet?” This is before BALTOPS. And the answer is: “Yes.” And that’s exactly what we did. We went past experimentation and we went right into operational capability.

Not everything was perfect; we learned a lot each time, we adjusted, we moved folks around. But it directly increased the maritime domain awareness in key maritime terrain for that fleet commander before BALTOPS. We were able to double down and keep an eye on the increased Russian naval force presence in action in that area, in the Gulf of Finland, into the Baltic Sea.

What was the NATO country?

I can’t say because of the sensitivities of NATO and partnerships and all that.

Editor’s note: In late May, forces from the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group and 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit under Task Force 61/2 participated in the Hedgehog military exercise in Estonia, a NATO country on the Gulf of Finland.

Langley, who will now lead U.S. troops in Africa as the commander of U.S. Africa Command, was widely expected to land the confirmation following a hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee in late July.

In the Marine Corps’ 246-year history, more than 70 white men have risen to the four-star ranking, according to The Washington Post.

The Senate unanimously confirmed Langley and a series of other military leaders to new roles Monday evening, according to a Tweet from the Senate cloakroom.

His confirmation was celebrated by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-New York, on social media.

NEWS: The Senate has just confirmed Michael Langley to be a four-star general in the United States Marine Corps. He’s been a Marine for more than 35 years. He's led an impressive career.

And he’s now the first Black four-star general in the history of the Marines. pic.twitter.com/LKyszXVxnE

— Chuck Schumer (@SenSchumer) August 2, 2022

Before receiving his nomination to the new role by President Joe Biden in June, Langley, a native of Shreveport, Louisiana, held several leadership roles during his 37 years in both the Pentagon and Marine Corps, according to his Marine Corps bio.

Langley will replace the outgoing commander of U.S. AFRICOM, Army Gen. Stephen J. Townsend. In late July, Townsend shared that the threat of violent extremism and strategic competition from China and Russia remain the greatest challenges to the combatant command, according to a Department of Defense news release.

“Some of the most lethal terrorists on the planet are now in Africa,” said Townsend, according to the release.

Langley’s promotion comes as U.S. troops are once again operating in Somalia.

U.S. AFRICOM reported no new civilian casualties in its most recent quarter as of June 30 this year, according to a casualty assessment report released in July.

The 30-country transatlantic alliance has long flown “air policing” missions that dispatch fighter jets to keep unfriendly aircraft at bay. Air shielding, however, began in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a neighbor it shares with NATO nations.

“NATO air shielding is an increased air and missile defense posture along the alliance’s eastern flank, implemented in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine. It is purely defensive,” a NATO military official told Air Force Times on Monday.

The policy brings together disparate allied air and missile defense units under NATO’s command, rather than relying on them in a more reactive, piecemeal fashion.

“It will provide a near-seamless shield from the Baltic to the Black Sea, ensuring NATO allies are better able to safeguard and protect alliance territory, populations and forces,” the alliance said.

Organization leaders say that Russia’s unprovoked assault on the former Soviet territory, now in its sixth month, has fundamentally altered European security. Stronger defenses will remain in place for the long run as a result, said Allied Air Command deputy commander Lt. Gen. Pascal Delerce in a July 21 press release.

As fighting continues, NATO is concerned about errant missiles straying into its territory and about the manned combat aircraft and drones flying near its borders.

“This increases the air and missile threat to NATO territory and populations, primarily due to potential miscalculation or loss of guidance or control,” the organization said July 28.

Under Article 5 of the group’s founding treaty, an attack on one ally is seen as an attack on all allies.

Tom Karako, a missile defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, believes it indicates growing worries about an intentional Russian attack elsewhere in Europe, too.

Multiple American and European missile defense units have arrived in countries bordering Russia or Ukraine over the past few months. Air shielding deployments can last up to several months at air bases and other locations across Eastern Europe, the NATO official said.

The United States, Germany and the Netherlands have set up Patriot anti-missile systems in Slovakia and Poland; France brought its “Mamba” surface-to-air missile defense system to Romania; and Spain is operating its National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System in Latvia. The equipment can take out cruise and ballistic missiles as well as manned and unmanned aircraft.

“All of these systems have been added this year,” the military official confirmed.

Still, it’s far short of the allied defensive buildup during the Cold War, Karako said. The focus on advanced air and missile defenses has waned as the U.S. instead prioritized counterterrorism operations for decades.

“We’re now seeing just how disproportionate our air defense investments have been relative to the threat when it becomes palpable,” he said. “A small number of air defenses over the eastern flank is, in the face of a real threat, astonishingly limited.”

Additional fighter jets are bolstering eastern defenses as well. The U.S. recently sent its F-35A Lightning II jets from Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, to Estonia, and F-22 Raptor fighters from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, to Poland as part of the expanding mission.

“The Raptor performs both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions,” the Air Force said in a June 27 release. “It cannot be matched by any known or projected fighter aircraft, making it a highly strategic platform to support NATO air shielding.”

American F/A-18 jets and Czech Gripen fighters are also currently deployed in support of air shielding, the NATO official said. German, Hungarian and Italian fighters are patrolling the skies over the Baltic states.

“This comes on top of other NATO deployments, including our standing air policing missions, and air and missile defense elements deployed to support our battlegroups,” the official said. “Our allied fighters are on alert 24/7 to respond to aircraft which may pose a threat in or near allied airspace or challenge the integrity of NATO airspace.”

At the beginning of March, more than 100 combat aircraft were assigned to air policing shifts — almost twice as many as there were in December.

NATO did not provide an update on how many aircraft are tasked with air policing or shielding, or how many interactions Russian and allied jets have recently had.

Air policing planes identify and address renegade aircraft, such as when allied pilots intercept Russian military jets that veer near their airspace or if a civilian plane is unresponsive or hijacked. They’re not allowed to fire unless fired upon when flying over a foreign country; most interdictions take place without incident and do not enter allied airspace.

Russia’s war in Ukraine, plus its threats against other non-NATO countries, spurred Finland and Sweden to ask to join the alliance in May. Their membership will become official once each allied country individually approves the decision.

Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia also want to join.

The United Nations has recorded more than 12,500 civilian casualties in Ukraine, including over 5,000 deaths, since the war began Feb. 24. It believes the true toll is much higher.

U.S. intelligence estimates another 15,000 Russian troops have died, while the Ukrainian government said earlier this summer that up to 200 Ukrainian service members were being killed each day.

Under the first deal, Saudi Arabia would buy 300 Raytheon Technologies-made MIM-104E Patriot missiles for more than $3 billion. Control stations, fire control and other equipment would be included.

This batch of Patriot missiles would replenish a dwindling stockpile for Riyadh. According to DSCA, the sale is meant to defend against attacks by Houthi rebels from Yemen, who shoot ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial systems into Saudi territory.

The arms sale to Saudi Arabia comes after years of rocky relations between Washington and Riyadh over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, with then-candidate Joe Biden pledging in 2019 to make the country a “pariah” on the international stage. In February of last year, Biden banned U.S. offensive weapons sales to Riyadh.

On the same day of the foreign military sale, a Yemeni truce was extended. Reuters recently reported the administration is discussing whether to lift the offensive arms ban.

Saudi Arabia has historically played an outsized role in foreign military sales for the U.S. defense industry. The lead importer of U.S.-made weapons, Saudi Arabia bought 23% of all U.S. weapons sold between 2017 and 2021, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Meanwhile, the State Department on Tuesday also cleared a potential $2.2 billion sale of 96 Lockheed Martin-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system missiles as well as related equipment to the United Arab Emirates.

“The proposed sale will improve the UAE’s ability to meet current and future ballistic missile threats in the region, and reduce dependence on U.S. forces,” DSCA said.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is meeting Aug. 3 to consider S.4428, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, a bill introduced by committee Chairman Bob Menendez, D-N.J., and Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C. In a joint press release, their offices describe the legislation as “the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. policy towards Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.”

As Menendez and Graham rightly note in their bill, the “security of Taiwan and the ability for the people of Taiwan to determine their own future is fundamental to United States interests and values.”

The problem is Beijing believes that the relative ability of Taiwan and the United States to defend those interests and values has declined precipitously and is weaker than ever. Not surprisingly, as the People’s Liberation Army has become more powerful and the Chinese Communist Party’s confidence has grown, Beijing has employed its military forces more aggressively near Taiwan.

Chinese warplanes reportedly made 969 incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in 2021, more than double the previous year’s total. In one day alone last year, Beijing sent 56 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ.

If Washington and Taipei permit the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait to continue to erode, Beijing may decide in the next few years that it can accomplish its political objectives on the island with military force. In fact, Adm. Philip Davidson, then the top U.S. military officer in the Indo-Pacific, warned in March 2021 that Beijing could conduct military aggression toward Taiwan “in the next six years.”

Even if Beijing backs down this week during Pelosi’s trip, Americans should not assume that things will turn out so well next time if the United States doesn’t act quickly to reverse dangerous trends.

The United States and Taiwan, therefore, should urgently build their combined military strength to change Beijing’s assessment of the relative combat power of the potential combatants, and thereby deter the Chinese Communist Party from initiating aggression.

Such an approach would support American interests and values, but it would also be consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, a long-standing pillar of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Indeed, the law states that Washington shall “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and maintain the American military capacity necessary to ensure “the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”

Thankfully, there is growing appreciation in Congress regarding the need for urgent action, as demonstrated by the proliferation of Taiwan-related bills. In addition to the Menendez-Graham bill, Sen. Jim Risch, R-Idaho, Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., and others have introduced their own bills attempting to strengthen deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

The Menendez-Graham bill, however, is particularly noteworthy because Menendez is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As the Aug. 3 markup may demonstrate, he enjoys disproportionate power to obtain committee approval and advance the bill to the full Senate for consideration.

The Menendez-Graham bill includes elements of the other Taiwan bills and some unique attributes of its own, with the most significant elements included in Title II of the legislation. Sections within that title would create, among other things, a Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative, a Comprehensive Training Program, Military Planning Mechanisms and multiple iterative assessment efforts.

The security assistance program would provide $4.5 billion over four years in much-needed appropriations. This will enhance Taiwan’s own growing contribution to its defense. Taiwan’s defense spending as a percentage of its gross domestic product has grown from less than 2% to about 2.3% over the past four years ($17.3 billion in defense spending on a projected GDP of $764.2 billion) and is expected to grow even more as Taipei pays to acquire the numerous U.S. systems approved for sale under the Trump and Biden administrations.

Importantly, the provision requires that Taiwan’s defense spending continues to grow to unlock U.S. funds. For those who think that Taiwan is a rich country and should handle Chinese aggression on its own, it’s good to remember China’s GDP is more than 20 times that of Taiwan.

The supporters of the bill, however, may want to make explicitly clear that the security assistance funding will be used to buy weapons from the United States, strengthening our own defense-industrial base and enabling better interoperability between the two forces.

Title II would also create a foreign military loan program for Taiwan as well as authorize and fund a “War Reserve Stockpile” for Taiwan, similar to the one that exists in Israel — another beleaguered democracy supported by the United States.

In addition, Title II would establish a much-needed program for U.S.-Taiwan training; it includes a detailed section on U.S.-Taiwan military planning. As we have argued before, combined training and planning that particularly emphasizes the coordination of U.S. and Taiwanese air and naval forces is the most cost-effective way to improve war-winning capabilities. American and Taiwanese forces can have the best weapons available, but they will both be much more effective in a crisis if they have trained, operated and planned together before the shooting starts.

As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers the bill tomorrow, the title on sanctions may need to be amended or dropped. While the bill’s attempt to use sanctions to strengthen deterrence against Chinese aggression is laudable, the current draft lacks sufficient clarity on what would trigger the sanctions, and the bill’s sanctions may not be strong enough to achieve the desired effect.

If the bill is passed by the committee, Menendez will either seek to have it considered as a stand-alone bill on the floor or try to include it in the National Defense Authorization Act. Both approaches entail certain challenges, but the latter may be difficult if the bill passed by the committee includes the sanctions language, especially if it is not amended from its current formulation.

One hopes that Pelosi’s trip this week does not result in military conflict. If deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is not strengthened without delay, we may not be so lucky, or ready, next time.

Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior director of its Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation. Bradley Bowman serves as senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the FDD think tank.