For many, it is a life changing experience. Ask anyone who has taken on a volunteer assignment what is was like and they will usually gush out a string of positive adjectives. It is also a public relations boon for the aid program.

But in the bars and hangouts of the receiving countries, you sometimes hear different stories about volunteering to the ones that you hear back home. It also doesn’t take long moving around in the region and socialising with volunteers to hear stories about assignments that haven’t quite worked out.

I myself was one of the ones whose assignment didn’t quite work – and I know of a number of other volunteers who have left the program early for similar reasons.

Nobody expects volunteering in a developing country to be easy or without challenges. Nobody expects it to be as glossy as the brochures filled with success stories. However, improved design and implementation of AusAID-funded volunteering programs, and enhanced scrutiny, could improve their effectiveness.

The Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) has a review underway for the volunteer program, which is a welcome step and should provide some interesting insight into its development impact. The Literature Review is already online, which is a helpful primer. If you are unfamiliar with the Australian Volunteers program and its implementation, more details can be found here.

My own experience

I was in Timor-Leste for the first half of 2012 on an AVID assignment (delivered through Austraining International, one of three partners that implement the program – Austraining manages the largest cohort of the partners involved, sending two thirds of volunteers). The assignment was meant to be 18 months long, however I ended it early after six months – in part because I was offered a consultancy elsewhere, but mostly because I was very frustrated after receiving no support in-country to bridge problems.

I was not being fully used by my host organisation due to unwillingness of one of my counterparts to work with me. Without cooperation with this individual, it was impossible for me to make meaningful progress on the key outcomes for the assignment or to start the ball rolling on any kind of sustainable change, including that lofty goal of capacity building. Upcoming management changes in the host organisation also meant that the following six months would be a transition phase where these problems were unlikely to be addressed.

Despite notification of the problems to Austraining’s in-country office, I received no intervention or advice from them on how to improve the situation. The inflexible nature of the program meant that suggestions I made about volunteering part-time for other NGOs or changing the terms of the assignment were apparently not possible.

(It should be noted that during the period of time I was volunteering, Austraining were searching for a new country manager for Timor-Leste – we had a rotation of temporary managers in place during this time, which likely contributed to my concerns not being addressed.)

Making the decision to leave was very difficult – I loved Timor-Leste and there were many absolutely wonderful people in my organisation. I strongly believed in what they were trying to do and I originally took the volunteer assignment because I wanted to contribute. I felt incredibly guilty for leaving and I feel somewhat awkward about writing this blog post, because despite the frustrations, I was very appreciative of the opportunity to live in Timor-Leste and to work with people who so warmly welcomed me into their country and organisation.

But ultimately, I left early because I felt that I wasn’t able to have a tangible impact. I also felt uncomfortable about being financially supported to volunteer when I didn’t feel like I was actually doing anything because of roadblocks.

I’m not by any means implying that the majority of assignments don’t work out. I met many amazing AVIDs during my time living in Timor-Leste and Indonesia who were delivering strong outcomes for their host organisations, despite facing huge challenges and limited resources. Recruitment for the volunteer program is very competitive and all of the volunteers I have met have been skilled and motivated individuals. From what I have seen, the majority of assignments generate some positive impact.

But some assignments don’t work out — and when they aren’t working out, there needs to be adequate support for the volunteer and the host organisation. If steps aren’t taken to harness the enthusiasm and energy of a volunteer in-country before it fizzles out in the face of problems, people may just stick out the assignment without having any real development impact or prematurely end up on a plane back home.

Suggestions for improvements

Based on my experience, as well as informal conversations with other volunteers, there are a number of areas where the program could make improvements.

Improved assignment design and follow up

During our pre-departure training, we were encouraged to ‘tear up our assignment descriptions’ when we arrived at our organisations. But what do you if you have no objectives or goals? It’s a hard place to start from in organisations that can be very nebulous to begin with. The program’s implementing partners should be meeting with the volunteer and host organisation regularly in the first few months to make sure the assignment and volunteer’s skills are matching up with the organisation’s needs and that all counterparts to the assignment are engaged and willing to participate.

Faster turn-around from assignment design to volunteer mobilisation

If the assignment descriptions have been recently written, in true consultation with the proposed counterparts for the assignment (not just a manager in the organisation or a previous volunteer) then there should be little need to tear them up. Often there is a significant lag between an assignment description being written and a volunteer’s arrival in the country. There are also questions about the purpose of the assignment description – is it written to sound enticing to encourage competitive applications, or is it written with the goal of accurately describing what the position will involve?

Better communication between AVID partners and host organisations, and clearer guidelines

In my host organisation, there was still a lot of confusion about what a volunteer actually was. Some people thought I was an intern. Others thought I was a new manager. Some thought I worked for the Australian Government and could get them an Australian Development Scholarship. Some thought I was volunteering because I couldn’t find a ‘real job’ in Australia. In some organisations volunteers are expected to run projects while in others they are treated as little more than a work experience kid. It is very difficult to effect change or to transfer skills if people don’t understand your role or want your support. Setting up clearer expectations from the beginning would help facilitate improved outcomes.

Clarity about the goals of the volunteer program

The volunteer program is extremely diverse. For example, the experience of volunteers in international NGOs, multilaterals and UN agencies will be vastly different from those in grassroots or national NGOs. Some AYADs even refer to themselves as interns at their organisations, raising the question of whether an internship should really be funded by the aid program.

While the goal of the volunteer program is stated to be capacity building, who is really building capacity if the host organisation is a UN agency and the local counterpart has a Masters degree from an Ivy League university? And if capacity building is the goal, why have there been assignments where the ‘local counterpart’ is an expat?

There also seemed to be a subtle undertone that it was better to stick out your assignment than to go home early, even if you weren’t having an impact. The ‘Australia’s interests’ and PR aspects of the program at times seemed to be a bigger focus than capacity building or development outcomes.

Handling and responding to feedback effectively

It is very difficult for returned volunteers to critique the volunteer program. For starters, when you mention you volunteered abroad, people very wrongly start to treat you as if you were some kind of martyr – it’s very awkward to complain when you feel you probably got more out of the experience than the host organisation and when ‘volunteering’ actually meant living on a reasonable allowance and getting a pretty incredible personal experience out of the deal.

It’s also very hard to untangle your positive feelings about being overseas and the potential career benefits (these assignments do look great on CVs) from an assessment of the actual development impact of your assignment.

The volunteer program has reporting in place where you can voice concerns privately. But sometimes these reports are so private that it feels like nobody actually reads them. I was never contacted about any of the things I flagged in the reports I wrote and I strongly suspect they weren’t read.

When a volunteer makes complaints or leaves early, the attitude seems to be that the volunteer couldn’t hack it or wasn’t suited to the task – even if this is the case, this shouldn’t impact on whether their feedback is taken seriously or not.

Fewer volunteers per country manager

As I mentioned, my volunteer assignment was delivered through Austraining International, which manages the largest cohort of Australian Volunteers, including the Youth Ambassadors. Australian Volunteers International (AVI) or Red Cross Volunteers tend to be part of smaller cohorts. From what I saw in Timor-Leste, and what I have heard anecdotally from others, the in-country managers (ICMs) for AVI and Red Cross have to manage far fewer volunteers than those from Austraining, meaning they have more time to provide support. Managing international volunteers is a stressful job where you are always on the clock, particularly in a difficult environment like Timor-Leste. The ratio of volunteers to ICMs needs to be at a level where there can be adequate support, guidance and communication — and where the churn of ICMs due to burnout is also minimised. This is especially relevant if the ICMs are responsible for other programs too.

The volunteer program represents many opportunities. Even though I was disappointed by the problems in my assignment and felt unsupported, I still have many positive memories of my time in Timor-Leste and an increased understanding of the country and its people, as well as the aid sector. I also have a lot of admiration for many of my fellow volunteers who really did have an impact. I’ve put forward these suggestions for the program in the spirit of improvement. I’d be interested to hear feedback from other volunteers, host organisations and stakeholders on their impressions of the program.

Austraining was given the opportunity to provide a response to this blog before publication:

“Austraining is pleased that the majority of Australian Volunteers we support on assignment have positive experiences and feel well supported during their time overseas. This is highlighted in a recent survey of returned volunteers commissioned by AusAID and several program reviews conducted in recent years. The Australian Government Volunteer Program Review in 2010 and AYAD Program review in 2012 revealed many examples of positive capacity building outcomes achieved by Australian Volunteers.

Austraining appreciates feedback from all program participants and we strive to learn from this input to continuously improve the program and ensure our in-country managements are appropriately resourced, trained and supported. We experienced an unusually high turnover of staff in our Timor Leste office in 2012 and recognise this may have inhibited development of ongoing relationships with volunteers and may have resulted in some volunteers feeling they did not have access to the level of support they required to resolve challenges with their assignments. Austraining is committed to ensuring that volunteers receive exceptional pastoral and assignment-related support in line with AVID program shared standards.”

Ashlee Betteridge is a Research Officer for the Development Policy Centre. She participated in the Australian Volunteers for International Development Program in 2012 in Timor-Leste.

Recently, Tess Newton Cain had an opportunity to talk with Sina Retzlaff. You can listen to a podcast of their conversation here and read the edited transcript here. For a summary of what they discussed, read on…

Sina is the Samoa country representative for the Pacific Leadership Program so we started by talking about her experience of leadership. Sina was previously the president of the Samoa Chamber of Commerce, the first woman to hold that post. Whilst in that position she was able to see examples of how the government exercised leadership in seeking to partner with the private sector: ‘…we certainly felt, as a private sector group, that it was a real partnership. That they did need a perspective of the private sector, they were asking what the impacts were to the private sector and from there, that was informing the decisions that were being made economically, sometimes even socially, going forward.’ Closer to home, Sina reflected on observations of the development of democratic processes in Samoa, which she gained as the daughter of a leading politician (Misa Telefoni Retzlaff served in the Samoan parliament between 1988 and 2011 and held a number of ministerial positions, including that of Deputy Prime Minister): ‘My father was in politics for 25 years, and over those years, we saw our country mature in terms of the voting system, improve the processes around elections. Also interesting to note, how our people responded in voting for candidates over the years’.

An area of particular interest for Sina just now is that of gender based violence and, more particularly, violence within the context of intimate partner relationships. In this area, she identified that there had been leadership in terms of legislative reform by virtue of the recent passage of the Family Safety Act. In addition, there have been some significant steps made in terms of providing support to victims through government and non-government agencies. However, there continue to be gaps in terms of understanding the issue and its significance: ‘I think there is a real need for an understanding and an awareness of first of all, what it is and secondly, the impacts. I’d really like to see research in the area where we are determining what the cost is of family instability, domestic violence in a family; what is that costing us economically?’

In terms of policy priorities, Sina made a couple of points. First, she noted that whilst there was a need to address both ‘service delivery’ for victims of domestic violence and ‘awareness raising’, the delivery of a ‘safety net’ of medical and legal services should take priority. ‘If we needed to prioritise … I would say we deal first with the response teams, that we deal first with what victims require, in terms of the legal services, in terms of the medical services and, of course, just general support to them’.

More generally, Sina stressed that she wanted to see family based violence made a top policy priority in Samoa: ‘I think if we continue to ignore that domestic violence does happen in Samoa; we continue to ignore that children are being affected by it, then it’s always going to have a negative contribution to all the other priorities that Samoa has set out, particularly in economic development because women have such a strong role to play in the economic development in our country’.

We also discussed the mood of the private sector in relation to the current state of the Samoan economy. Sina identified that tourism was considered to be the main driver of the economy at present and that many business were suffering, especially at this time of year when the number of visitors is significantly reduced. The tourism industry in Samoa is also up against competition from other destinations in the region and the impact of the global economic downturn: ‘So I think people are spending less, and the numbers in Samoa also reflect that. Tourism earnings have not been on the rise and the yield that the businesses are making are certainly less’.

She also identified some structural constraints that add significantly to the cost of doing business in her country: ‘…interest rates can be 12%, interest rates can be 14% on a business. That, in itself, puts us on the back foot of competing regionally, particularly in the area of tourism. I mentioned electricity; that impacts tourism; interest rates, that impacts tourism. What we really need is direct foreign investment’.

In relation to encouraging foreign direct investment, Sina talked about the challenges arising from customary land tenure in Samoa. This is a highly contested issue, which is affected by long and dearly held traditions. Sina acknowledges the strengths of the Samoan system of customary land tenure: ‘We have a wonderful customary land system where the entire family owns the land, and by birth you have rights to that land… It’s supposed to be a benefit, that everybody owns his land, and we all come and we work it’. However, she feels that this system is not supporting economic development: ‘Land that belongs to everybody is ultimately then owned by nobody. So if things want to move forward, and we want to actually develop a piece of land commercially, essentially you need the okay of the entire clan, of your entire extended family; right down to an untitled person who lives in New Zealand, Australia and America. They can fly home and stop the project, because that is their heritage. Now, whereas that has ways of protecting people’s ownership of their land, and protecting people’s heritage and ensuring that families have enough land to work and live subsistently; on the other side, it’s never going to solve our foreign investment issues. We have foreign investors who come and they want to secure a leasehold land, and our government does have now in place legislation’.

Sina sees this as a crucial topic for a new conversation in Samoa, a conversation in which all viewpoints can be heard and leadership can be exercised in going forward for the best interests of her country and its people.

Tess Newton Cain is a Research Associate at the Development Policy Centre. Based in Vanuatu, she specialises in developing knowledge connections to support policy-making in the Pacific island region.

POLITICS

French Polynesia re-inscribed on UN decolonisation list

Former president Oscar Temaru managed a last minute political victory, seeing French Polynesia re-inscribed into the United Nations decolonisation list on the same day he handed over his presidency to Gaston Flosse. The resolution was introduced to the 193-member UN General Assembly by Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, Samoa, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste. The United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and the Netherlands all disassociated themselves from the consensus vote and the French boycotted the meeting.

Temaru, who took Tahiti’s case to the UN in 2011, won just under 30 per cent of the territory’s recent elections, while Flosse’s Tahoeraa Huiraatira came first with 45 per cent, giving his party twice as many seats as all opposition parties combined, in accordance with the new electoral system rules. Flosse’s newly elected assembly voted to appeal to the UN to drop decolonisation from the General Assembly’s agenda in its first session. Flosse denounced the UN’s decision as dictatorial and vowed to never let the UN flag fly from his palace. Flosse risks losing his office (and his palace) later this year though, should the highest court in France reject his appeal on charges of corruption.

French Polynesia joins other Pacific territories on the UN decolonisation list: American Samoa, Guam, New Caledonia, Pitcairn Islands and Tokelau.

Major powers court Pacific leaders

China announced a major gathering of Pacific leaders, slated for November, with talk of USD$1 billion in soft loans being offered to island states at the meeting. This is China’s chance to host a dialogue with all the Pacific Island Forum nations in a similar way to Japan’s PALM meetings and demonstrates further courting of island states by China.

More courting of islands by the US and its allies Australia and New Zealand is also underway with a convoy of navy ships planning to visit six Pacific nations in coming months to provide medical and humanitarian assistance.

The PNGDF and Fiji military are meanwhile forging closer ties to train and potentially deploy together on UN peacekeeping missions. Growing defence ties between the two signal cooperation not just in UN operations but potentially within the Pacific as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) discusses creating a permanent regional force that could be deployed quickly in times of natural disasters or civil disturbances.

A bill and a prayer for violence victims

A nationwide coalition of women’s groups throughout Papua New Guinea (PNG) gathered in strategic locations to keep vigil from 14-15 May 2013 to honour victims of violence, including the late Kepari Leniata a young PNG mother publicly burned and tortured over accusations of witchcraft.

The PNG Haus Krai movement urged the government to intervene to stem the tide of vicious crimes against PNG women and children. The historic and peaceful protest was marked by a series of domestic and overseas traditional mourning ceremonies or Haus Krai.

PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill assured protestors that domestic violence will be codified as a distinct criminal offence. The Family Protection Bill before parliament would allow witnesses to report violent assaults against victims of domestic abuse. Attorney-General Kerenga Kua stated that the bill will not discriminate against men. Kerenga Kua spoke in defence of the bill, saying that the new laws will offer gender-neutral protections to the entire family.

Children most affected in Marshall’s drought

There are serious concerns over the health of children in the Marshall Islands as it experiences a severe drought affecting up to 10,000 people. Most have limited access to safe drinking water and sanitation. Forecasters have warned the drought could drag on until September. The government has declared a state of disaster, as the prolonged drought causes food gardens to whither due to lack of water. UNICEF has responded with some relief assistance for diarrhoea, gastritis, hepatitis and other health issues affecting mostly children.

Also in the Marshalls, there are indications of an atoll being ‘washed away’ as trees fall into the lagoon and major infrastructure is threatened by rising waters.

Australian visa complaints mar Gillard’s PNG visit

Australian visas, offshore processing, trade, defence cooperation and policing reforms were the core priorities reflected in the Joint Partnership Declaration between Australia and Papua New Guinea signed between Prime Minister Julia Gillard and her PNG counterpart during a three-day visit to Papua New Guinea recently. The two Prime Ministers also announced but failed to release an Australia-PNG Economic Cooperation Treaty, to replace the old Development Cooperation Treaty.

The PNG Prime Minister complained vociferously about the difficulties of getting Australian visas. It was also apparently agreed that retired Australian police would be hired for the PNG police force: like the Enhanced Cooperation Program of a year ago, but without the diplomatic immunity.

ECONOMICS

Growth of 9 per cent in Australian aid budget, but 0.5 per cent delayed  

Australian budget papers released last week showed an increase in development assistance of 9 per cent in 2013-14. However, the Government also delayed achievement of its 0.5 per cent GNI target for a second year in a row. The target, which had previously been postponed to 2016-17, will now be met in 2017-18. The NGO sector has been critical in response. The aid budget nevertheless did well in comparison with other sectors. The austere budget, designed to offset lower than expected revenue and pay for Labor’s legacy education and disability reforms, saw cuts over the forward estimates in funding for higher education, foreign affairs, and defence.

Australia aid to Pacific stable

There is little change in aid funding earmarked for the Pacific in the 2013-14 budget. Funding to the region will grow 2 per cent, from AUD $1.1 billion to AUD $1.13 billion compared to actual spending in 2012-13. This is a decrease of AUD $45 million compared to the 2012-13 budget estimates. The stabilisation of aid to the Pacific contrasts with aid allocations to East Asia, which increase by almost 12 per cent as a result of growth in aid to Indonesia and Myanmar. East Asia is now clearly the region which receives the most Australian aid, pulling ahead of the Pacific in the last 2 years. Indonesia has consolidated its position as the country that receives the most Australian aid, with PNG now a distant second.

Pacific ACP continue EPA negotiations with EU

The Pacific bloc of the ACP engaged in Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with European Union (EU) officials in Fiji last week. Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Tuiloma Neroni Slade suggested that the EU’s failure to respond to the unique situation faced by Pacific island countries has stalled EPA negotiations, a sentiment echoed and emphasised by Fiji’s acting prime minister Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, who made strong calls for negotiations to move forward and be concluded as soon as possible.

EU Head of Delegation for the Pacific, Ambassador Andrew Jacobs, claimed that negotiations were far from over, citing significant disagreements surrounding global sourcing and rules of origin in the fishing industry and the EU’s desire to include ‘trade in services’ within the EPA framework— a move which took many Pacific ministers off-guard. While some commentators have argued that EPAs should be abandoned if the deals on offer prove inadequate, others argue that some Pacific countries have a lot to lose if negotiations fall apart. Fiji, for example, would risk losing the preferential sugar prices agreement it has with the EU.

The Office of the Chief Trade Advisor (OCTA) is expected to have closely followed the EPA negotiations hoping that solutions to difficult issues could be applied to PACER Plus negotiations. PNG’s Trade Minister, Richard Maru has suggested PNG is considering pulling out of PACER Plus negotiations and would instead focus on the MSG trade agreement.

ICT roundup

Pacific island countries had something to celebrate as they marked World ICT Day last week. Tonga took the opportunity to mark the imminent availability of much-improved broadband internet via a fibre-optic link to Fiji and the Southern Cross trans-Pacific cable. In Vanuatu, a November date was confirmed for its cable to make landfall, with a start to commercial operations slated for January 2014. Cook Islands, meanwhile, has become the first nation in the world to complete installation of a radically new satellite Internet service operated by O3b Networks. In related news, Fijian government, business and civil society stakeholders gathered in Suva to discuss cyber security.

Corruption concerns as PNG businessman has Australian visa revoked

Australia’s Foreign Minister Bob Carr has used his special powers to cancel the 457 visa of a PNG businessman who is accused of using the visa to avoid arrest and prosecution for corruption. This comes after criticism last year from Chairman of Papua New Guinea’s anti-corruption taskforce, Taskforce Sweep, that Australia was not being proactive enough in identifying and confiscating proceeds from corruption emanating in PNG.  Corruption concerns have also risen in relation to the appointment of Nathaniel Poya as chief of PNG Ports. According to the PNGexposed Blog, Poya has a  “history of corruption, failed businesses, debts and conflicts of interest”. His appointment comes as a large ADB-financed project to rehabilitate the Lae Port reaches its end, and calls into questions the PNG Government’s recent state-owned enterprise reforms intended to enhance “transparency and accountability”.

Fishing deals for Pacific nations

 A US $1.71 million deal between Kiribati and the EU has been criticised for undermining cooperation between PNA nations. The agreement represents a step away from the vessel day scheme, and comes a year after Kiribati broke ranks with PNA members by issuing more days than allocated under its quota. The agreement will see the EU deploy four purse seiner and long line vessels in Kiribati’s waters, increasing the allowable catch for EU vessels from 5,400 tonnes to 15,000 tonnes. It is estimated that under the agreement, Kiribati will receive $3,600 per fishing day, well below the $6,000 it receives under the PNA vessel day scheme.

This comes as US Tuna Treaty negotiations between Pacific Island Parties and the United States stall. Negotiations have been hampered by tension between PNA members wanting higher access fees consistent with those received under the vessel day scheme, and non-PNA members interested instead in US development assistance. A transitional agreement has been put in place in order to extend talks for a further 18 months.

In other news, the Cook Islands is reported to receive $14 million after doubling the fishing days of an American Samoan-based purse seiner. And in PNG, a new K85 million tuna facility has been announced which will enable the country to process its own fish.

IN BRIEF

West Papua’s application for membership at the MSG has been listed on the agenda.

Nauru MPs have failed to turn up, and the speaker Godfrey Thoma could dissolve parliament this week.

Diabetes among younger generations in Tonga has been increasing, according to a recent study.

Vanuatu Prime Minister Moana Carcasses is moving to ‘shake up’ its foreign relations.

Guam may have direct flights from Russia by the end of this year.

An activist group claiming the support of 7000 citizens in the Northern Marianas is resisting plans by the US to conduct live fire training on Pagan Island.

Guam Senators are seeking increased Compact Funds From the USA.

Editorial content is the responsibility of Derek Brien, PiPP Executive Director, and Stephen Howes, Development Policy Centre Director.

The ODA/GNI ratio compares a Government ODA expenditure allocation against a much broader statistic on a country’s total income, including a range of factors related to personal and business income, which are beyond the direct control of government. Wouldn’t a more accurate numerator for GNI to reflect a country’s generosity be the total amount ‘gifted’ by a country (companies, individuals as well as Government)? This would reflect other flows to the developing world, including donations, philanthropic and CSR activities and even some forms of investment. The obvious problem with this is the difficulty in estimating the relevant data.

So what about a more appropriate denominator for Government ODA expenditure? Wouldn’t a truer reflection of a Government’s stance and commitment to aid be the percentage of its budget – something entirely within its control – that is allocated to ODA. In theory a Government could oversee a period where the ODA/GNI improves, but the Government actually shows less commitment to ODA and allocates a smaller percentage of expenditure to it – for example during a period when GNI is contracting and therefore Government expenditures represent a larger percentage of the GNI.

Another advantage of reflecting ODA expenditure against total Government payments is it is more easily communicated to the general public. How much of your individual taxes would you be prepared to see utilised to assist those less well-off in the poorer nations of the world? If you paid $10,000 in taxes do you think the Government should allocated $50, $500 or more of that to the developing world? How much do you think the Government currently allocates to ODA out of your $10,000 in taxes?

Below is a graph showing Government allocations to ODA for every $100 it budgets to spend. The graph disaggregates expenditure budget allocations to ODA under Coalition and Labor Governments, and demonstrates a change of government can result in a dramatic impact on the amount allocated to ODA from the in-coming government. It also depicts the ODA/GNI ratio. I have scaled this to include 0.7 % ODA/GNI which I think still is the official OECD target, with Australia’s recent commitment being to reach 0.5% by 2016/17.

ODA budget allocation for every $100 of federal government expenditure

The government expenditure ratio appears to closely align with the ODA/GNI line below, and the overall picture of a Government’s commitment towards ODA is not dramatically different.

Of interest though is the period during times of economic downturn when this correlation does not hold. The budgets 1989/90 and 1995/96 both resulted in an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.30%, but the percentage of total expenditure actually fell from $1.27 to $1.15 per $100 of budgeted expenditure for the respective years. Similarly in its last budget in 2007/08, the Coalition allocated $1.17 to ODA per $100 of expenditure, compared to Labor’s second budget in 2009/10 which allocated a slightly less amount of $1.16. Yet ODA/GNI jumped from 0.28% to 0.31% for these years.

So in answer to the question above, in the 2012/13 budget it was estimated that $1.42 out of every $100 it spends would be on ODA related activities. Therefore out of your $10,000 in taxes, the Government has decided to invest $142 into ODA (the 2013/14 budget has taken this up to $1.45 out of every $100 the government spends, or $145 in the case of this example).  More or less than you thought? It will be interesting to see what the actual outcome for 2012/13 is against this original estimate, but one would expect it be less given budget re-allocations during the year.

While the ODA/GNI is beyond its control, the priorities of budget deliberations during an election year will be clearly reflected in the ODA allocation to total expenditure ratio.

It would also be of interest to undertake an international comparison over time of this government expenditure ratio to see if this makes any difference to Australia’s international standing in terms of ODA commitments amongst DAC members. One would suppose countries where Government expenditure represents a greater proportion of GNI (e.g. Scandanavian countries) are represented better by ODA/GNI, whereas others may appear more generous under this alternate measure.

And in the lead up to the election, perhaps a more constructive conversation starter with the Australian public is to ask the question what percentage of their taxes would they be happy to see going to those less fortunate than ourselves in developing countries?

Angus Barnes is an independent consultant with 20 years’ experience in Australian aid and international development.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or EITI is one attempt to combat the corruption that is a major cause of this, but is it working? Are there complementary strategies that might be more effective?

Australia claims to be a “global leader in governance on natural resource industries,” and this week is hosting two major international conferences on different aspects of this theme in Sydney. But are we doing enough to establish leadership, and what more is needed?

These are the question we try to answer in our new Devpolicy Brief [pdf], which we summarise here.

Efficacy of the EITI

So far, the EITI has made significant progress in penetrating many of the countries with the most potential to benefit economically from their natural resources. Although many non-compliant countries remain, over half of all resource-rich countries (and people living in resource-rich countries) either already comply with the EITI or are in the process of becoming compliant.

Among developed countries, the USA has stated its intention to become EITI-compliant, and Australia has decided to pilot the EITI processes (which falls short of a commitment to become EITI-compliant).

Figure 1: EITI compliant and candidate countries as a proportion of all resource-rich countries, May 2013

Sources: World Bank, IMF, EITI, authors’ calculations

Of course, the above analysis of EITI adoption is not directly useful for evaluating the actual outcomes produced by the EITI, in terms of either improved governance or economic progress. To this end, a number of evaluations have been carried out to date, one of which is the review undertaken in 2011 by independent consultant Scanteam. Scanteam’s report, which was commissioned by the EITI Secretariat, recognises the EITI’s successes in increasing transparency and improving processes within implementing countries, but did not find conclusive evidence of the overall effectiveness of the EITI. To qualify this assessment, the report notes that “[e]xpecting any quantifiable impact from interventions that are only a few years old is in any case not realistic.”

The report also highlights the lack of any detailed theory of change (causality chain) that can explain how the EITI will contribute to societal transformations. EITI is an important reform but it is only one “piece in the puzzle” of converting natural resources into reduced poverty.

Figure 2: the natural resource value chain

Source: EITI Factsheet

The fact that it is difficult to establish a causal link from the EITI to development outcomes results from the “bite-size” nature of the EITI scheme. This is actually one of the EITI’s strengths: the ease with which governments can agree to implement this relatively simple reform is one of the reasons why the scheme has been able to achieve a significant level of adoption. But it is also one of its weaknesses. In the stages before and after “Publishing payments” there is still ample scope for a corrupt government to take actions that do not further development goals.

The EITI is currently debating whether to extend its transparency requirements, including to require “transparency of licenses, contracts, project-level payments.”  These issues will again come up at the EITI conference this week in Sydney.

Further, the current adopters of the EITI may simply represent the “low hanging fruit”. That is, those countries that have already adopted the EITI may simply be those that are the most amenable to the initiative. Vietnam and Myanmar are two resource-rich countries in our region which have not signed up to EITI. PNG’s statement of its intention to sign up is a recent bit of good news.

Regardless of its geographical and policy limitations, the EITI represents an important stepping-stone to improving transparency and governance in resource-rich countries in the future, including by “breaking the ice” for this type of international initiative.

Disclosure strategies to complement the EITI

The EITI is not the only method available for promoting transparency of natural resource revenue payments. Another strategy involves requiring extractive companies to disclose all payments made to individual developing country governments, regardless of the will of those governments. This is enforceable because the dominant international extractive companies are mostly governed by rules established by developed countries, e.g. stock exchange listing rules.

This additional strategy requires the co-operation of developed country governments. In this regard, the USA is the only country that has implemented such mandatory disclosure rules thus far; these will come into effect in 2014. Support has been building in the European Parliament for rules requiring similar reporting by companies domiciled in Europe. In Australia, submissions have been received by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in relation to similar rules. However, the ASX simply referred the matter to the Commonwealth Treasury in April 2012, and there has been no progress since.

Australia needs to do more

Australia sees itself as a “global leader in governance on natural resource industries,” as the head of AusAID, Peter Baxter, recently put it. AusAID is investing heavily in this area. It is one of the largest funders of EITI. At the end of this week there will be a large EITI conference in Sydney. Before that, on Monday and Tuesday this week, AusAID will host a massive mining and development conference in Sydney.

But if Australia wants to be a leader, we need to practice what we preach. We need to implement at home what we are funding overseas.

Australia’s actual practice of good mining governance currently lags significantly behind that of the USA. Unlike the latter, we have no commitment either to adopt the EITI or to require payment transparency from listed companies. Of the two strategies, the latter is probably the more important. Implementing EITI will set a good example, but will only ensure transparency in Australia, where corruption is in general low. Disclosure requirements will promote transparency where it is needed, in developing countries with weak governance.

The most common criticism of these transparency measures is the need to protect commercial confidentiality. But if the US can find a way forward, so can we. If Australia wants to be a leader rather than a follower in promoting good governance in natural resource industries, we need to step up by adopting the EITI and requiring payment transparency from listed companies.

Michael Wulfsohn is a Research Officer at the Development Policy Centre. Stephen Howes is Director of the Centre.

Of course, the Australian economy is much larger than New Zealand’s but, even taking this into account, the increases in Australian aid stand in stark contrast to a New Zealand aid budget that is barely growing. New Zealand’s budgeted ODA spend (announced on May 16 as part of the 2013/14 budget) for the 2013/14 financial year is $567 million NZD. That is an increase on the estimated spend of $558 million NZD for this financial year, but as an increase it is less than expected inflation (so actually a small aid cut in real terms), and less than anticipated GNI growth, meaning New Zealand’s aid to GNI ratio will fall. Figure 1 below illustrates this. (Note that future GNI figures are our estimates based on numbers from the last budget adjusted for changed GDP growth; we are awaiting official GNI data from Treasury and will update this post when we have it. We do not anticipate major adjustments.)As a percentage of GNI, New Zealand aid is still higher than it was for most of the 1990s and the first half of the last decade. And the government does deserve credit for at least coming close to maintaining the ratio. But looking at Australia’s efforts (see the rising black line in the last chart in this post) it’s clear that New Zealand could be doing better. It’s true the New Zealand economy is sluggish and the country is running deficits, but deficits are also present in Australia, our aid spend is small compared to total government spending, and the fiscal forecast is improving.

A careful read of the budget numbers hints at other causes for concern too. Figure 2 charts aid budget data in non-inflation adjusted New Zealand dollars. In its first term, when it abandoned the global ODA as a percentage of GNI metric, the National Government offered as an alternative target $600 million NZD by 2010. This is a target that has never been met. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows it is now only projected to be met in the 2015/16 financial year, and when one considers the increase in ODA required for this to happen, in contrast with the almost entire absence in increases in preceding years, even this looks unlikely.

Figure 2 also illustrates the projected amounts from last year’s budget: these are the red boxes (while the blue bars are the 2013 budget). As you can see in the 2011/12 financial year the aid program ended up spending approximately $32 million dollars less than anticipated. This is a big underspend, and the good news, we guess, is that it has been rolled forward into the new three year budget allocation. The bad news is that effectively it is the source of almost the entire growth in New Zealand aid over the next two years.

The underspend also begs the question: how did the aid program end up so far underspent? This isn’t the first time this has occurred, although it wasn’t a problem the aid program routinely had prior to 2008. It is something that has arisen since the change of government. The most likely explanation, we think, is the Minister’s reluctance to sign off on the aid program’s high-level allocations (agreement on the share of the annual aid budget different countries or regions will receive). One year, while one of us (Terence) was working for the aid program, it was not until close to the middle of the financial year that sign off was granted. Needless to say, it is very hard for the aid program to fully spend in a financial year if it doesn’t know how much it is allowed to spend in particular countries. Curious as to whether this was still an issue in 2011, Jo sent an Official Information Act request to the Minister’s office regarding sign-off dates. His reply was that there was no such thing as sign-off dates. This, to put it kindly, is rather implausible. So Jo appealed his reply to the New Zealand Ombudsman’s office, and is awaiting a ruling.

Which brings us to the other source of our trans-Tasman envy. While Australian budget documents afford detailed data that allows considerable aid analysis, in New Zealand these days we get little more than the headline figure. We can see allocation to overheads and the multi-lateral versus bilateral split, but that is about all. Nothing, for example, at the country level (although a little bit at a regional level). Fortunately, the aid program itself is still doing a good job trying to be transparent, and greater detail on spending is available in the International Development Group’s Strategic Plan 2012-2015 or on the New Zealand ODA website, and excellent work has been done with IATI data. This is great. But it all happens later in the year or after the fact, and it is not the same as getting detail on budget day. Also in terms of process and accountability, there’s an important issue in that that the budget is the only document that undergoes parliamentary scrutiny. Information in aid program documents or the website are not interrogated in the same way via our political system. This provides space for juggling in between budgets, such as  appears to have occurred last year, after the budget passed through parliament, with the probable cutting of funds to various country programs to make way for the newly invented ‘Pacific Transformation Projects’.

All of this from a Minister who, in 2009, claimed of the ODA budget: “This is public money. Its expenditure should be overseen by elected office-holders able to be held to account at the ballot box…Taxpayers are entitled to hold someone to account for efficient, effective expenditure of the budget. Under our system of government that person is me.”

We’re both New Zealand tax payers, and doubtless the Minister appreciates our efforts to hold him to account. But when we look at the data provided by the Australian government this budget and contrast it with the paucity of information on our side of the Tasman it’s hard not to feel that someone truly serious about being held accountable would be releasing more. Likewise, looking at the tiny increases in New Zealand aid, and comparing it to what you Australian’s have done, it’s hard not to feel that if we Kiwis were really serious about doing our bit in helping to fight global poverty we would be giving considerably more aid.

Terence Wood is a Research Officer at the Development Policy Centre and a PhD student in the State Society and Governance in Melanesia Program at ANU. Prior to commencing study he worked for the New Zealand government aid program. Joanna Spratt is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy. She is also a consultant and coordinator of NZ Aid and Development Dialogues (NZADDs), with a background in nursing and international development.

Not long after that post came out, Foreign Minister Carr announced a $500 million increase to lift the aid/GNI ratio to 0.37% in 2013-14 up from 0.35% currently, as promised in last year’s budget. The response of the aid community has nevertheless been overwhelmingly negative because of two other things Mr Carr said. First, he again deferred the aid/GNI target by another year to 2017. And he announced that the Government would again be using $375 million from the aid program in support of asylum speakers.

So, I was wrong. We had the third largest increase ever, but the aid community was still disappointed. Why? That’s what I discussed at my presentation at the aid budget breakfast we held this morning. You can find my slides here.

Given that some commentators had predicted that the sector was heading for a fiscal cliff, that $500 million is a significant gain. It’s also worth taking a historical perspective. Go back 10 years, and you’ll find that, even after accounting for inflation, the aid program was only $2.7 billion (in 2011-12 prices; $2.0 billion in current prices). Today it is double that at $5.4 billion (again in 2011-12 prices; $5.7 billion in current prices). That’s an impressive bipartisan achievement of which we should all be proud.

It is certainly an achievement which has transformed our international standing. Traditionally, we have not been a generous donor (as measured by our aid/GNI ratio), but now we are about as generous as the typical OECD donor, which is progress. And, because of the growth of our economy, the strength of our dollar, and that increasing generosity, we have become an important donor: we were only the 15^th most important OECD donor 10 years ago, last year we were the 8^th, and this year we might become the 6^th most important. We’ll still be well outside the top five (the US, UK, Japan, Germany and France), but whereas our budget continues to increase, both Canada and Netherlands (which have been 6^th and 7^th) are cutting.

So what about the two negatives, the deferral of the 0.5% and the continued asylum-seeker diversion?  In my presentation, I argued that the 0.5% target was not credible, and showed that the Government has been pushing back the scale-up of aid not just for the last two years, but in fact since 2008. Five of the last six budgets have seen a delay in the scale-up. The resulting back-end loading has led to a situation in which, even with a delay, the 0.5% target can only be achieved by a series of implausibly massive aid increases, of close to a billion dollars annually for several years. From this point of view, the deferral of the 0.5% target is not an aid-quantity issue (since it wouldn’t have been achieved anyway), but an aid quality one since absence of funding clarity undermines aid effectiveness.

What about the continued use of aid to support asylum seekers? This has been extensively debated. The budget puts a cap on support for asylum seekers at $375 million, which is welcome from the point of view of predictability. Whether this sort of support should be counted as aid depends on the use of those funds, on which the Government has so far said very little. The budget does say that the asylum seeker funding will be used for “accommodation, food, clothing, and other basic necessities,” but whether, as the DIAC Secretary earlier suggested, this means it will help fund the detention network is unclear, and is a fundamental issue which requires clarification. More generally, an issue this important can’t be satisfactorily resolved by a one paragraph statement. More detail is surely needed, and eagerly awaited.

Overall , my summary take on the 2013-14 aid budget is the opposite to my assessment of last year’s budget. This one is strong  in relation to quantity, but not quality. It increases aid by a significant amount, but doesn’t resolve the uncertainty concerning future aid funding or go far enough to clarify the rules around the funding of asylum seekers. With these issues lurking in the background, it is not surprising that the Government’s achievements in relation to aid are overshadowed by reactions of disappointment.

Whichever government is elected in September will face the important task of rebuilding consensus around aid, along a trajectory which not only is consistent with increasing generosity, but also is credible and has political buy-in.

The targets in this aid budget for the next two years to get aid to 0.39% of GNI and then 0.41% not only have greater immediacy than the 2017 0.5% target, but are also more realistic and doable. They might perhaps serve as useful benchmarks around which some new confidence in and support for a growing aid budget can be built.

There is much more to be said about the Australian aid budget. My colleagues Matt Dornan and Tony Swan have written about country allocations and the macro economic context respectively, here and here. ACFID has released a detailed brief [pdf]. And videos, presentations and more blogs from our budget breakfast today will be available shortly.

This post is part of our series of analysis of the 2013-14 Australian aid budget. The rest of the series can be found here.

Stephen Howes is Director of the Development Policy Centre.

The Treasurer announced on Tuesday May 14 a budget deficit of over $19 billion for 2012-13, a turnaround of $21 billion compared to the last budget, to be followed by two more years of deficit before small surpluses in 2015-16 and 2016-17. The recovery from budget deficits is projected to take three more years than previously expected. If you listen to budget commentary there is a lot of doom and gloom about the Government’s fiscal position, particularly related to revenue. I have a slightly more optimistic perspective of the macro context, particularly for the Australian aid program, although there are significant downside risks to be aware of.

Movements in total revenue and expenditure as a share of GDP (Fig. 1) provide a good summary of the government’s fiscal position. A declining revenue share was a feature in the first half of the last decade but was matched by tight spending controls. Revenue dramatically increased with the resource boom and was quickly followed by high spending during the period prior to the end of the last Coalition Government. Revenue quickly fell away as the GFC took hold but the Government’s stimulus package ensured that expenditure remained high. From this year to 2017, revenue is expected to recover and spending to be reined in.

Figure 1: Total revenue and expenditure as a share of GDPSource: Budget 2013-14 documents.

The so called “black hole” surrounding government revenue is reflected in Fig. 2. However, despite the rhetoric by the Government, there is no fall in projected revenue or even a blip – it is only a fall relative to expectations in previous budgets. Lower levels of company tax and resource rent taxes (around $23 and $19 billion over the four years from 2012-13, respectively) are the greatest contributors to the lower revenue expectations. These lower expectations reflect a terms of trade that has eased off only around 10% in the last two years as well as lower economic growth assumptions (3.25% nominal growth for 2012-13 in this year’s budget vs 5% in the previous budget).

Figure 2: Total revenueSource: Budget 2013-14 documents.

The Government announced around $18 billion in savings to expenditure in an effort to minimise the size of the projected budget deficits. However, projected total expenditure contained in the 2013-14 budget is largely unchanged relative to projections in previous budgets. New spending has essentially offset these savings.

In this context the aid budget has fared well compared to other spending areas. Figure 3 shows that Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending, although relatively small, has increased as a share of total expenditure. Year on year growth in ODA spending is projected to be at double digit levels over the forward estimates period. In contrast, government spending in each of the health, education and defence sectors is expected to grow at around 5% per year.

Figure 3: Sector shares of total expenditureSource: Budget 2013-14 documents.

A useful benchmark to evaluate the size of the aid budget is to compare ODA spending as a share of GNI (target of 0.5%) to defence spending as a share of GDP (target of 2%), noting that GNI is only around 3% higher than GDP.  Figure 4 shows that the defence spending share has fallen from near 2% in 1995 to 1.4% this year, with this level being maintained over the following four years. In contrast, the ODA spending share has increased almost every year since 2000 from 0.24% to 0.35% this year, with further increases factored in to take the share to 0.5% of GNI by 2017.

Figure 4: Defence vs. ODA spendingSource: Budget 2013-14 documents.

Overall, the 2013-14 budget has been favourable to ODA spending in the context of current macroeconomic conditions. However, the most difficult task for the government as it strives to bring future budgets into surplus will be to keep tight controls on total expenditure. Failure of the government to control overall spending represents a significant risk to the aid budget in terms of further delays to achieving the 0.5% target or removal of the target completely.

This post is part of our series of analysis of the 2013-14 Australian aid budget. The rest of the series can be found here.

Anthony Swan is a Research Fellow at the Development Policy Centre.

Other countries that receive large increases in aid are Myanmar and Fiji. The Myanmar program will grow by 29 percent on last financial year to reach $82.8 million, the majority of which be channelled through multilateral trust funds. Fiji will see an increase 18.3 percent with total Australian development assistance reaching $58.2 million. This increase is on top of a doubling of aid to Fiji in 2012-13. The increase in aid to Fiji had previously been announced by Government, and a large proportion of the program will be channelled through 70 civil organisations.

At the regional level, the largest increase in funding is directed towards East Asia. Indonesia and Myanmar benefit most, with the remainder of the increase spread across other countries. East Asia is now clearly the largest recipient of Australian aid, pulling ahead of PNG and the Pacific since 2011-12.

Aid allocations to other regions are flat in comparison. Funding to PNG and the Pacific increases by $21.9 million, or 2 percent on actual allocations last year. This represents a $45 million decrease compared to the 2012-13 budget estimates.

It is interesting to compare regional budget allocations with the direction outlined by the Comprehensive Aid Policy Framework, which was released alongside last year’s budget (an updated version of the CAPF will be released later in the year). That document forecast aid in 2015-16 of $1.6 billion to Pacific and PNG, $1.95 billion to East Asia, $725 million to South and West Asia, $625 million to Africa and Middle East, and $50 million to Latin America and the Caribbean. Those figures have presumably been delayed by one year (or more).

Development assistance to East Asia in this year’s budget is consistent with a steady increase towards the CAPF forecast. This is not the case for other regions, where there will need to be sharp increase in the next two years for estimates to be achieved. This is especially evident for PNG and the Pacific, where aid would need to increase by $474 million to reach the $1.6 billion forecast. It will be interesting to see whether forecasts are revised in the updated CAPF when it is released later this year.

This post is part of our series of analysis of the 2013-14 Australian aid budget. The rest of the series can be found here.

Matthew Dornan is a Research Fellow at the Development Policy Centre.

Devpolicy week

We have a feast of events next week from Paul Collier on the bottom billion to Francois Bouguignon, former World Bank Chief Economist, on globalization and inequality; and several more:

• Tuesday May 21 (3pm at Finkel Theatre, John Curtin School of Medical Research, ANU) Paul Collier on “How can the private sector help the bottom billion?” Register here.
• Wednesday May 22 (12.30pm at Acton Theatre, Crawford School, ANU) Uma Wainetti, who leads the campaign opposing violence against women in PNG will speak on “Combatting family and sexual violence in PNG: what has been achieved and what is needed?” Register here.
• Thursday May 23 (12pm at Barton Theatre, Crawford School, ANU) Francois Bourguignon, Director of the Paris School of Economics and former Chief Economist of the World Bank, on how to prevent inequality derailing globalisation. Register here.
• Friday May 24 (12:30pm at the Griffin Room, Crawford School, ANU) David Booth, who headed ODI’s five-year Africa Power and Politics Program, will challenge orthodox thinking and explain the politics behind economic success in Africa. Pre-register here.

Budget analysis and breakfast

Devpolicy Director Stephen Howes sets out the big issues of the looming 2013-14 budget in this blog post. For the best aid budget analysis, come to the 2013-14 aid budget breakfast, on Wednesday May 15. Tony Swan will explain the overall fiscal and macro context. Stephen Howes will dissect the aid budget. Helen Szoke, the new head of Oxfam, and Angus Barnes, an independent consultant and on the Executive of the International Development Contractors (IDC) Australia will also speak. Details and registration here.

Pacific and PNG Update Program

The Program for the Pacific and PNG Update on June 28 and 29 is now available [pdf]. Registration will be available shortly, but you can pre-register here.

Disability-inclusive development – Q&A

Members of AusAID’s Disability-Inclusive Development Reference Group will be speaking at an ANU public forum on Thursday May 30 (12:30 at Weston Theatre, Crawford School, ANU). Using a Q&A format, they will be reflecting on their own personal stories, and on reforms and programs they have been involved in. Pre-register here.

Speakers include: Mr Monthian Buntan, a Thai Senator, and President of Thailand’s Association of the Blind; Mr Setareki S. Macanawai, CEO of the Pacific Disability Forum; Ms Charlotte McClain-Nhlapo, Coordinator, Office for Disability and Inclusive Development, USAID.

PNG – poverty and gender-based violence

On June 5, Professor John Gibson will present his analysis on PNG’s latest (2009/10) Household Income and Expenditure Survey. It’s our first opportunity at ANU to hear about this important work. Registration will be available soon. Pre-register here.

Also, just in case you missed it above, don’t miss Ume Wainetti, National Coordinator of PNG’s Family and Sexual Violence Action Committee who will be speaking on the enormous challenge of family and sexual violence in PNG, what is being attempted, and what more is needed on Wednesday May 22 (12.30pm at Acton Theatre, Crawford School, ANU). Register here.

Aid stakeholder survey

As announced in our last newsletter, in June we will be conducting a survey of Australian aid stakeholders. While we will be targeting specific stakeholders (large NGOs and contractors), anyone and everyone who wishes to participate is welcome to. The survey will run in June and July, will be analysed in August and September, and will be released after the September election.

The future of international development in Asia and the Pacific

This conference, co-hosted by the Asia Foundation, the Australian National University, the Lowy Institute for International Policy, and the University of Melbourne, was carried off successfully last week. Stay tuned to the blog for related posts, our website for video of the conference, and the ABC’s Big Ideas for the panel it televised.

DP 28 When business meets aid: analysing public-private partnerships for international development

Devpolicy’s Margaret Callan and Robin Davies provide a roadmap for how donor agency resources, whether cash or in-kind, can most effectively be used to increase the development impact of business activity.

DP 29 Pollard’s Pacific reflections

In a series of Devpolicy blogs, now completed, collected in this Discussion Paper, Steve Pollard shares his personal reflections, after almost 40 years’ experience in development, on what is needed for a better future in the Pacific islands.

Blog posts

Here is a list of Devpolicy blog posts (organised thematically) since our last newsletter, a month ago.

Blog digest

April blog digest: Partnerships, nous and patronage by Robin Davies.

Aid

Australia’s 2013 aid budget: third time disappointed or the third largest increase in aid ever? By Stephen Howes.

Good news: the DAC likes Australia’s aid program by Robin Davies.

Greens go Tory on aid by Stephen Howes and Jonathan Pryke.

Agriculture good, employment better: a regional employment strategy for Timor-Leste by Richard Curtain, Robin Davies and Stephen Howes.

Enhancing aid cooperation – the Australia-China Development Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding by Sam Byfield.

Development

A ‘wicked problem’: using high stakes testing of student learning in development – Part 2 by Robert Cannon.

Final Report of the Solomon Islands Truth & Reconciliation Commission unofficially released by Tess Newton Cain.

Orphanage tourism: cute kids, cashed up tourists, poor outcomes by Ashlee Betteridge.

There’s smoke, but is there fire?—Pondering public-private partnerships for development by Robin Davies and Margaret Callan.

Careers in development: an interview with Susan Harris Rimmer on a career spanning the private sector, public sector, NGOs, and academia by Susan Harris Rimmer and Jonathan Pryke.

Pacific

Participate to grow by Steve Pollard.

Managing fiscal risks amid resource booms: lessons from Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste by Aaron batten and Christopher Edmonds.

Would an Independent Service Delivery Authority accelerate service delivery in Solomon Islands? By Marcus Pelto.

Service delivery in Solomon Islands: a good start, but where to from here? By Marcus Pelto.

Speed-dating, solar panels and the importance of process by Joanna Spratt and Terence Wood.

Visible and invisible hands: developing the Solomon Islands economy by Ashley Wickham.

PNG

Resource development and peace building in Melanesia by Kylie McKenna.

Leadership for the next generation: Deakin University’s Symposium on PNG by Grant Walton.