Divrei Chaim

sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim as a kiyum of talmud Torah

2012-01-25T19:23:00.000-05:00

Hashem told Moshe at the opening of Parshas Bo that the makkos will be so great that the story of yitzias Mitzrayim will be something passed on and related to both children and grandchildren, "l'ma'an tisaper b'oznei bincha u'ben bincha." R' Leibele Eiger asks why the Torah goes out of its way here to emphasize not only children but grandchildren as well. When it comes to the mitzvah of Shabbos, but example, the Torah only mentions, "atah u'bincha," you and your children -- there is no added mitzvah to see that one's grandchildren observe Shabbos. When one's children grow up and have children of their own, they can take care of them -- children eventually become their own "atah" of the "atah u'bincha" of the next generation. Why here does the Torah go out of its way to add a responsibility for the third generation as well?

Rav Gifter (in Pirkei Torah) explains that the inclusion of grandchildren here hints to the nature of the mitzvah of sippur yetzias Mitzrayim. The gemara (Kiddushin) tells us that there are certain mitzvos that a father is obligated to do for his son, e.g. milah, pidyon haben, to teach him a parnasa (that's not too popular these days). The mitzvah of talmud Torah is unique in that it requires not only that a father teach his sons, but requires that he teach his grandsons as well. The Torah mentions the obligation to tell the story of yetzias Mitzrayim to grandchildren to convey that the mitzvah of sippur is itself part and parcel of the mitzvah of talmud torah -- the Torah commands us to engage in the talmud Torah of a particular sugya (yetzias Mitzrayim) on a particular night, leil haseder.

This idea helps explain why there is no birchas hamitzvah on the mitzvah of sippur or on the haggadah -- since sippur is a kiyum of talmud Torah, it is exempted by the birchas haTorah one recites in the morning.

Rav Gifter suggests that krias shema shares a similar geder. The Torah requires that we learn a particular parsha twice daily. There is no birchas hamitzvah on shema because again, krias shema is a kiyum of talmud torah of a specific parsha and is therefore exempted by birchas haTorah. (2 cents of mine: see the Sha'agas Arye siman 1.)

(Achronim discuss whether/how one can be yotzei sippur yetzias Mitzrayim through shome'a k'oneh. Does every person have to read every passage of the haggadah, or is listening to one reader enough? My first thought was that if the geder hamitzvah of sippur is one of talmud torah, the question is exacerbated. Surely there is no mitzvah in listening to someone else learn and having kavanah to be yotzei! But on second thought, maybe the question of shomea k'oneh is even easier to resolve now. There is a kiyum of talmud torah in just thinking about torah. If one person reads and everyone else is attentively listening and thinking about what is being said, even without saying the words themselves, isn't that talmud torah?)

talking to the walls makes a difference

2012-01-19T19:07:00.001-05:00

1. Bnei Yisrael was not receptive to Moshe's message that the redemption was immanent. Moshe Rabeinu went back to Hashem and argued (6:12) that his mission was futile: If Bnei Yisrael won't listen, kal v'chomer then certainly Pharoah won't listen either.

Everybody is troubled by this kal v'chomer. Bnei Yisrael didn't listen because they had no time to think and listen; they were being beaten and persecuted day in and day out. Why does the fact that they didn't get the message mean that Pharoah won't get it either? (Previous post on the torah of the Noam Elimelech on this.)

The Sefas Emes answers that the road to Pharoah's ears was through Bnei Yisrael's hearts. Pharaoh was not the real cause of Bnei Yisrael being freed or enslaved. As we see later in the parsha, Pharoah eventually lost even his bechira -- he was not in control of his own destiny or that of Bnei Yisrael. However, so long as Pharoah appeared to be in charge, so long as Bnei Yisrael believed that he controlled their destiny, there could not yet be a full geulah. Geulah means recognizing ain od milvado -- there is nothing other than ratzon Hashem. All the obstacles to freedom fall away once that one truth is accepted.

Hence Moshe's argument -- if Bnei Yisrael are not yet ready to accept that message, all the rest is moot and nothing will help.

2. Taking a step back, Hashem certainly knew that Bnei Yisrael wouldn't listen. Why then did he send Moshe only to be rebuffed?

Turning to the Sefas Emes again, he explains that this parsha was written to teach us that even when people don't listen -- even when the listener's mind is closed and words of Torah seem to bounce off a hardened shell of indifference -- those words still leave an impression. There is no such thing as wasted chizuk and hisorerus.

(A nice Sefas Emes to keep on your pulpit shtender to peek at when the you feel only the walls are listening : )

kedushas hayom of shabbos: definition vs. outcome

2012-01-18T18:51:00.000-05:00

R' Elchanan points out that there seems to be different views in Tos. with respect to the relationship between tosefes shabbos and the actual kedushas hayom. Tosfos (Kesubos 47) writes that the halacha of "ain me'arvin simcha b'simcha" does not apply during tosefes shabbos or yom tov and one can hold a wedding then. This seems to indicate that the kedushas hayom of shabbos/yom tov is not yet in effect during the time of tosefes. However, Tosfos elsewhere (Pesachim 99) quotes R"Y M'Korbil that if not for being barred by a special gezeiras ha'kasuv, one could theoretically fulfill the mitzvah of korban pesach, matzah, and maror during the time of tosefes. This seems to indicate that the full kedushas hayom of the upcoming day is in effect during the time of tosefes.

Rav Wahrman resolves this inconsistency by positing that there is a difference between halachos which define the kedushas hayom and halachos which are merely an outcome of there being a kedushas hayom. He offers the following example:

The gemara (Shabbos 69) says that it is possible to be chayav 39 different chata'os if one is aware that it is shabbos and violated each of the 39 different melachos b'shogeg. How is such a case possible -- if one doesn't know any of the 39 melachos are prohibited, in what sense can one be aware that it is Shabbos? The gemara answers (according to Reish Lakish) that one is aware that there is an issur of techumin.

Tosfos asks why the gemara did not answer that the case is where the individual is aware of the mitzvos aseh of shabbos. The Achronim go further: Why did the gemara not simply answer that the case is where the person made kiddush or knew there was a mitzvah of kiddush?

The answer, writes Rav Wahrman, is that melachos or techumin, are part of the definition of the kedushas hayom of shabbos. The mitzvah of kiddush is a result, an outcome of there being a kedushas hayom -- i.e. since it is shabbos, one must say kiddush, but the saying of kiddush does not define the day as shabbos.

"Ain m'arvin simcha b'simcha" is a result, an extension, of their being a kedushas hayom of shabbos or yom tov. The mitzvah of korban pesach, of matzah, or maror, are part of what define the kedushas hayom of pesach. (Seems to me that this is a very subtle distinction!)

(Rav Wahrman mentions that R' Hershel Shachter has a different approach to explaining why the gemara in Shabbos defines awareness of shabbos only by reference to the melachos but not the mitzvos aseh of shabbos. RHS suggests that the concept of kedusha is created specifically through added issurim. Kedushas kehunah (kedusha of people) is reflected in the fact that a kohen cannot marry a gerusha and other issurim. Mitzvos that are teluyos in kedushas ha'aretz (kedusha of place) like terumah create issurim -- tevel. Kedushas shabbos (kedusha of time) is reflected specifically in the awareness that shabbos carries with it varios prohibitions. This may explain why according to one view in Tosfos (Baba Basra 81) the mitzvah of bikurum is not a mitzvah ha'teluya ba'aretz -- since there is no issur of tevel created if bikurim are not separated, the mitzvah cannot be considered connected with kedushas ha'aretz.)

the source of Pharoah's zechuyos

2012-01-17T18:43:00.000-05:00

1. You have to be the Sefas Emes could ask the following question: What was the zechus that Pharoah had that allowed him to merit having a daughter like Batya and gave him the privilege of raising young Moshe Rabeinu in his house? He answers that this merit stemmed from the bracha that Ya'akov Avinu gave Pharoah when he met him. (We see the bracha of a tzadik can effect even the life of a rasha in ways that the rasha may not appreciate or even be aware of.)

2. The Sefas Emes and many others are bothered by Moshe's challenge to Hashem, "V'hein lo ya'aminu li," that Bnei Yisrael will not believe in him. Time after time after each cheit in the Torah Moshe Rabeinu comes to the defense of Klal Yisrael -- why here is he so reluctant to give them the benefit of his trust, even after Hashem promises him that they will listen?

My wife suggested that once Moshe accepted his role of manhig, he never gave up on "his" Klal Yisrael. We were like Moshe's baby -- our problems were his problems. However, at this point, before Moshe accepted his mission, there was not yet that relationship. When Moshe jumped into the job, he gave it 100% forever after, but that jump had to first occur to create that bond.

Moshe's questions

2012-01-17T18:37:00.000-05:00

The Shem m'Shmuel points out the incongruity of two of Moshe Rabeinu's questions that we learn about in parshas Shmos. When Moshe confronts one Jew striking his fellow and tries to intervene, he is rebuffed and challenged, "Who put you in charge?" (2:14) Moshe responds, "Achain noda ha'davar," now I know. What did Moshe now know? Rashi cites Midrash that Moshe had been wondering why the Jewish people deserved to suffer more than any other nation. After being verbally assaulted, after being informed on to Pharoah, after being the victim of lashon ha'ra, he now knew. Contrast that with the question Moshe asks later in the parsha, when he is charged by Hashem to serve as the go'el. There, he asks Hashem (Rashi 3:11) what merit Bnei Yisrael have that would warrant their being redeemed. Moshe seems to bounce from one extreme to the other. At first, he questions why any people deserve to suffer the fate of Bnei Yisrael. Later, he questions why Bnei Yisrael deserve to escape their fate. You can't have it both ways!

Before getting to an answer, I want to make some observations about the question. Firstly, I think modern readers might be troubled by Moshe's second question even without the background of the first. What do you mean, "In what merit do they deserve redemption?" Didn't Moshe ever hear of Thomas Jefferson, of inalienable rights? It would seem that the ba'alei Medrash may not have shared our political theories. Secondly, I wonder what troubled Moshe when he asked that first question. Was it simply the degree of suffering, i.e. there was some quantitative threshold which he perceived had been broken through, or was there [and is there] some qualitative difference to Jewish suffering that places it on a different plane? [I would suggest that it is the unconscious assumption of the latter position that causes such grief when the term 'holocaust' is used to describe tragedies other than that of our own.] Finally, cynic that I am, I wonder if Moshe's change in perspective is the result simply of maturity. Moshe the young man, perhaps still in the hold of idealistic notions of life, struggled to reconcile suffering and tragedy with his world view. Moshe the more worldly and wise has grown to accept suffering as the norm of life and it is freedom and happiness which he takes to be the exceptions that warrant explanation.

Rather than give the Shem m'Shmuel's answer (which you can look up), I want to suggest an approach based on a Maharal we discussed once before (and which the Shem m'Shmuel coincidentally cites in quite a few places). The gemara (Kesubos 66) tells us that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai came across the daughter of Nakdimon ben Gurion picking through animal dung looking for food after the churban. Recalling the tremendous dowry that was pledged in her kesubah and now seeing her so degraded, R' Yochanan exclaimed, “Ashrecha Yisrael! – When the Jewish people do G-d’s will, there is no one who can surpass them, but when they fall, they fall to the lowest depths of animal dung.” It’s understandable why R’ Yochanan ben Zakai would say, “Ashrecha Yisrael!” on the ability of Klal Yisrael to rise to the greatest heights, but the, “Ashrecha Yisrael!” seems to refer also their being in the lowest depths as well. How does that make sense?

Maharal explains that the fact that when we fall, we fall good and hard to the lowest depths, proves that our fall is not just some turn of history, just another accident of fate – the overwhelming force of our destruction can only be attributed to hashgacha. Therefore, we can be confident that the same guiding force that drags us down when reversed can carry us to the greatest heights. The neshoma of Klal Yisrael knows no passive middle ground -- it either unleashes a powerful thrust of positive energy, or leaves a gaping chasm that inevitably becomes filled with negative poison.

"Achain noda ha'davar" meant Moshe came to understand this idea of Jewish exceptionalism. If the reason why Bnei Yisrael suffers is because yad Hashem, hashgacha pratis, determines their fate, and therefore their downfall is so steep, then their freedom also must come not from some theory of inalienable rights, but rather must stem from that same well of hashgacha.

This is why Moshe asks Hashem, "In what merit have Bnei Yisrael earned a miracle being done for them to redeem them?" Who said anything about miracles? Hashem had just told Moshe that he would take Bnei Yisrael out of Mitzrayim -- he never said how, nor did me mention anything about the supernatural. Yet, Moshe understood that a redemption that comes b'hashgacha pratis is one which by definition deviates from the natural order.

One final point: The Sefas Emes also asks this same question aand gives his own short but striking answer. It was because Moshe came to understand that it is the cheit of lashon ha'ra in particular that was the root cause of Bnei Yisrael's suffering that he questioned whether they had any zechuyos that would warrant their being redeemed. So great is the evil of lashon ha'ra that Moshe thought it inconceivable that anything could overcome it.

everyone makes mistakes -- even nevi'im

2012-01-16T11:33:00.000-05:00

The Torah tells is that when stopped at an inn en route back to Mitzrayim with his wife and children, Moshe Rabeinu was attacked by some kind of angel. Tziporah came to the rescue by doing milah on newborn Eliezer.

The Ibn Ezra (4:20) writes that we learn a fundamental idea from this episode: A navi can be wrong! Moshe Rabeinu was the greatest of nevi'im, yet he obviously miscalculated in undertaking this journey with wife and children at that time.

(What exactly Moshe Rabeinu's mistake was is not clear from the text. See Rashi that Moshe should have done the mila on his son before leaving, but Ibn Ezra suggests that the problem was bringing his wife and children along. Their presence gave the impression that the geulah would not be immediate, but would take time to unfold, and Moshe did not want to be separated from his family for such a long period. Moshe had no right to dishearten the people in this way. Meshech Chochma along similar lines suggests that the Moshe brought his family as a way to prove to the people the geulah would happen -- he would not bring his family just to add to the slave population. The very fact that he thought such proof necessary demonstrated Moshe's doubt that the people would as a matter of course believe him, even after being told by G-d that they are ma'aminim. This lack of trust was an error.)

We find a similar idea in Sefer Shmuel (II:7). When David haMelech consulted Noson haNavi about whether to build a Beis haMikdash, Noson told him to go for it. (And let me remind you of the Minchas Chinuch (posted once before) that according to some Rishonim there is a mitzvah to listen to a navi even when he gives advice that was not received b'nevuah.) Yet, that very night Hashem appeared to Noson and told him to go back to David and tell him to stop, as he did not have Hashem's permission to build the Mikdash. Noson made a mistake in his original advice.

I don't think the Ibn Ezra means to throw out the mitzvah of listening to a navi, nor do I think he means to take a position in the Minchas Chinuch's safeik of whether there is a mitzvah to listen to the advice of a navi. What he means is that EVEN THOUGH there is no greater source of insight than a navi, EVEN THOUGH one is commanded to obey the navi, that does not mean that navi is guaranteed to come up with the right answer.

One more EVEN THOUGH, which I think is the more important lesson for us -- The argument that since talmidei chachamim have erred at times in their judgment, therefore QED their judgment is not superior to that of a layperson and can be ignored, does not follow. Just as a navi is the best person to consult on issues that relate to the future of Klal Yisrael, EVEN THOUGH he might err, a gadol b'yisrael is the best person to consult on those same issues EVEN THOUGH he might err as well.

These mistakes -- that of Moshe and that of Nosson -- were no small errors. Moshe Rabeinu's error put the plan of geulas Mitzrayim in jeopardy. Noson's error was with respect to Beis haMikdash, the kodesh kodashim, the central point of avodah. Hashem came to Noson and revealed his error; the geulah from Mitzrayim was directly guided by Hashem's hashgacha and would have worked out somehow anyway -- we don't have that benefit, so how can we trust our leaders? How can we place our faith in their judgment when they have been wrong about issues of great magnitude in the past? I think this question makes a wrong assumption. Just because Hashem is not speaking from burning bushes or coming to people in dreams does not mean he is not working behind the scenes, ironing our whatever errors are made. Jewish history and fate do not hang in the balance of our leaders' decisions alone, whether for good or bad.

is this really what "Torah hashkafa" is all about?

2012-01-14T22:48:00.000-05:00

In my home we hardly have any English language Torah literature. If it's important enough to learn, it's important enough to learn in the original Hebrew. If it's a biography or some other work, esp. magazines and newspapers, then sadly I have to say that I no longer have any trust in the accuracy of such works, and the ta'aroves of emes and sheker without birur is like an issur kilayim. I was reminded of why I avoid these books when saw one lying on a table in shul this morning and foolishly skimmed through it. The book in question is a transcription of questions addressed to an "adam gadol" (at least someone who is in the eyes of those who put out the book and/or read it) and his responses. A few pages in there was this gem of a question (and I can't remember it word for word, but I think I'm close) -- "If we don't provide an education for the colored people, when will it all stop?" I'm not sure what the questioner wanted stopped (no explanation is offered), but I haven't heard or seen the term "colored people" since I stopped watching Archie Bunker many, many moons ago. The answer in a nutshell was that "it" (whatever "it" is) won't stop because there are very few "Negoes" like Booker T. Washington who are willing to use an education to make a positive contribution to society. Now, I'm not even going to pass judgment or question whether this point of view was perhaps proper in a certain time and place. What I am going to wonder is why the editor would choose to include this in a book issued in 2011. Is this the sort of attitude, is this the idea of respect for the dignity and rights of all people, that is part of our hashkafa and that we want to pass on to our children and talmidim? (This is your MLK day inyana d'yoma post). This was just the beginning, as the topper came a scant less than five pages later. Question: Should we should be happy that the Reform movement favors abortion because that means there will be less Reform Jews in the world? I did a double-take. This is the type question a person addresses to a talmid chacham?! The bigger pliya I have is that this is the type question a talmid chacham entertains and answers!? And it gets recorded and put in a book for people to read in a section entitled "Torah Hashkafa," like these are the type Torah hashkafos we bnei Torah need hadracha and chinuch in! L'havdil, in the Telzer "Shiurei Da'as" there is a discussion of the idea of "she'eilas chacham chatzi teshuvah." How a person formulates a question, how he defines the safeik, often solves half the problem. The type questions put in this book are not a she'eilas chacham. If "bnei Torah" are really so dumb (and it's a coarse and blunt way to put it, but I'm at loss for words) that they need to ask these things to talmidei chachamim, if our generation is so dumb that these discussions pass for "Torah hashkafa," then woe to us. True, this is an English language book -- one might say it's not meant for someone who can appreciate, for example, a shtickel in the Shiurei Da'as. But kal v'chomer hu: The less educated and familiar the reader is with true Torah thought, the more harmful exposure to such nonsense is. If I thought this is truly what discussions of Torah hashkafa are all about, I would be even more appalled than I am.

One other point: Of course, these type works are just fodder for those in other camps who look for any opportunity to undermine, belittle, and destroy any notion of da'as Torah and kvod talmidei chachamim. Indeed, if it required consultation with da'as Torah to figure out whether we should be happy that Reform Jews have abortions, they certainly have a point. My reaction to this book is so strong precisely because I believe that real da'as Torah is not about issues like this. The only reason that point gets lost in the shuffle is because real talmidei chachamim have better things to do than write English language popular press books or report their thinking on blogs. The other side gets to win the PR war, but that's why this is called "alma d'shikra," isn't it?

the need for empathy

2012-01-12T19:15:00.000-05:00

There is a vort in the Oznayim laTorah that gives me an excuse to go off on a little soapbox tangent. Moshe Rabeinu as a baby was tossed into the river like any other baby, the only difference being that he was rescued. Couldn't Hashem have found some way to spare baby Moshe so that he would not even come close to suffering the same potential fate as all the other children? R' Zalman Sorotzkin answers the question with an anecdote from his family. He writes that his brother, who was leaning in Volozhin and was a tremendous talmid chacham, was conscripted into the Russian army. His mother had no doubt that his brother would be released, as "Kol ha'mekabel alav ol Torah..." is not burdened with the ol malchus, and so it was. But he was bothered by the question: Why did this happen? Why was there in shamayim a seeming hava amina of his conscription only to come to a different maskana? His mother explained that this too was part of Hashem's bigger plan. Since his brother would one day be a gadol, a rav u'manhig b'yisrael, he needed to taste the pain of his brothers, he needed experience in some measure what they experienced, so that he would later be able to empathize with their plight and understand their hardship.

I want to ask a "dangerous" question: Do talmidei chachamim sitting in kollel today empathize with me; can they understand and relate to my life experience? I don't know the answer to that, which I find scary. I certainly don't feel it is an unqualified, confident "yes." I think there is a vast difference between sitting in an ivory tower and writing a sefer on some narrow area of halacha (which we seem to see more and more of these days, with ever increasingly sophisticated chumros based in new lomdus and pilpul) and being a rav, a manhig, a real gadol. Rav Shach, for example, could appreciate the burden of any and every Jew because he struggled to learn Torah when he had no winter coat and not much food in harder winters than we ever have. I don't know if suffering is a prerequisite for the job of manhig, but appreciating the often harsh reality of life is. Perhaps it is just the nature of things the individuals who can do that are indeed rare.

differences between hotza'ah and ma'avir

2012-01-12T19:01:00.000-05:00

Continuing the series I started on Rav Wahrman's Oros Shabbos, this week I want to share something a little more technical from later in the sefer (siman 31). Aside from novel sevaras, Rav Wahrman also does an impressive job of collecting bekiyus. Watch what he does in putting together a Kapos Temarim with a teshuvah of the MahR"Y Asad:

We know that the source for melachos of Shabbos is the Mishkan (either building, or the work done therein -- different views in Rishonim). With respect to moving objects on Shabbos, there are two potential melacha elements: hotza'ah, carrying from one domain to another, and ma'avir, carrying an object 4 amos in a public domain. The gemara (Shabbos 96b) explains exactly where the melacha of hotza'ah occurred in the Mishkan. However, the gemara findd no source in the Mishkan for ma'avir and concludes it is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai.

The fact that these two elements have two different sources leads to a number of interesting differences between them:

1. The Kapos Temarim (Sukkah 43) writes that the ptur of melacha she'aina tzericha l'gufa (i.e. there is usually no issur d'oraysa if a melacha is done for some other purpose other than it was used for in the Mishkan) does not apply to the issur of ma'avir. The ptur of melacha she'aina tzericha l'gufa is derived from the fact that the Torah says only meleches machsheves, melachos done with intention, as they were done in the Mishkan, are chayav on Shabbos. Since the issur of ma'avir is not patterened after the Mishkan, but is rather a separate halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai, it does not need to conform to any Mishkan-use purpose to be chayav. (This is a tremendous chiddush, which R' Wahrman notes can be disputed from other sources in Rishonim.)

2. The definition of reshus ha'rabim, a public domain, for the purposes of hotz'ah is also based on the melacha's source. The Mishkan, where the paradigmatic melacha of hotz'ah took place, was the central point of Bnei Yisrael's camp of 600,000 people; therefore, a reshus ha'rabim is defined as an area where there are 600,000 people (there are lots of technical details to this point that are relevant for hil eiruvin, but lets keep it simple for now). What about ma'avir? When we speak about the issur of carrying an object 4 amos in a public domain, what do we mean by "public domain"? MahR"Y Asad writes that since ma'avir is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai and not derived from the Mishkan, the standard of 600,000 goes out the window and does not apply.

Using this foundation, we can now solve a difficulty raised by Tosfos. Chazal made a gezeirah not to perform the mitzvos of lulav, shofar, and megillah on Shabbos lest a person who does not know how to do the mitzvah carry the lulav, the shofar, or the megillah to an expert to teach him what to do. "Amar Rabbah: Gezeirah shema ya'avirenu 4 amos b'reshus ha'rabim" -- Rabbah taught that the gezeirah is in place lest a person carry 4 amos in a public domain.

Why, asks Tosfos, does Rabbah focus only on the potential issur of carrying 4 amos in a public domain? Wouldn't the person who carries in the street also violate the issur of hotza'ah, of taking an object from the public domain of the street into the private domain of the expert who is going to teach him how to do the mitzvah? Why does Rabbah not use this as the basis for the gezeirah?

Putting together what we learned from the Kapos Temarim and the MahaR"Y Asad, we can resolve Tos.' question. The issur of hotza'ah is learned from the Mishkan and applies only where the public domain encompasses 600,000 people; the issur of ma'avir is a seperate halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai with its own parameters that applies to any public space. Chazal may not have been motivated to create a gezeirah for the relatively rare cases of domains populated by 600,000 people. They were, however, still concerned about carrying in public areas using the broader definition of the term.

living up to expectations

2012-01-10T18:48:00.002-05:00

The Chiddushei HaLev (R' Henoch Leibowitz zt"l) uses an idea we once discussed in a different context (here from the Shem m'Shmuel and here from R' Simcha Zissel) to shed light on a Chazal that we have also discussed a few times (e.g. here), so I thought I would put 2 and 2 together here. Why did Ya'akov make Yosef swear to bury him in Eretz Yisrael? Didn't he trust Yosef? Ramban answers that Ya'akov did not distrust Yosef, but he was aware that Pharoah might not let Yosef carry out his wishes unless he backed them up with the force of an oath. Ramban then adds an additional consideration: Ya'akov knew that the force of an oath would serve as an added motivation for Yosef himself.

Of course Yosef would not try any less to fulfill his father's wishes without that oath. Were Yosef to fail, he would be blameless. However, human psychology being what it is, the fact is that a person works harder when his back is against the wall. A person who says he is giving 100% means he is giving 100% in context, ba'asher hu sham, according to the scale he uses the evaluate his ability at that moment. Put the same person in a dire situation, a do or die, and somehow they discover an extra 10% or 20% to give. When failure is not an option, a person discovers untapped kochos and a person can succeed even where he otherwise would have every justifiable reason not to even make further effort.

The Midrash tells us that had Reuvain known that the Torah would write that he saved Yosef, he would have run home with Yosef on his shoulders. Had Aharon known that the Torah would write that he went out with no jealousy to greet his brother Moshe (our parsha), he would have made a whole parade. Of course Chazal don't mean that the added attention and publicity would have served as a motivator for these giants. What Chazal mean, says R' Henoch, is that had Reuvain known that the Torah itself would testify that he had the koach to save Yosef, that Aharon known that the Torah itself would testify about his ability to overcome natural jealousy, then these giants would have pushed themselves even harder and found the added strength needed to do even what they themselves otherwise had no idea they were capable of.

ro'eh -- shepherd or friend?

2012-01-09T18:44:00.000-05:00

I want to share two linguistic observations on the parsha that shed light on two well known pesukim in Tehillim:

1) Most translations render Ya'akov's description of Hashem as, "Elokim ha'ro'eh osi," (48:15) as "G-d who has shepherded me," or something along those lines. The Targum uses the word for "fed," which fits nicely with the words of Yosef's bracha later in the parsha, "M'sham ro'eh even yisrael," as Yosef fed his father and brothers during the years of famine (there too, the translation "shepherded" is used, even though it does not really fit.) Ramban, however, suggests that the word "ro'eh" is like the word "re'ah," as in "V'ahavta l're'acha kamocha." The parsha is not metaphorically describing Hashem as Ya'akov's shepherd, but is poetically describing Hashem as Ya'akov's companion on his journey.

I thought this was such a brilliant insight that I am wondering why no one translates "Hashem ro'i lo echsar," as, "The L-rd is my companion," instead of, "The L-rd is my shepherd." (Tehillim 23) Granted that the imagery of the next pasuk that refers to pleasant pastures and water may describe the needs of sheep, but it may also simply be a poetic description of the idyllic needs of man. Does, "gam ki eilech b'gei tzalmaves," have anything to do with sheep? And I'll even grant you that the Midrash on that mizmor discusses the comparison of Bnei Yisrael to Hashem's flock, but Midrashic interpretation does not preclude another reading al pi peshuto shel mikra. Unfortunately, I haven't found a peirush that agrees with me, which means I'm probably too far out on a limb here, but if someone does find one it will brighten my day a little.

2) Turning to that bracha given to Yosef, "M'sham ro'eh even yisrael," many translate, "m'sham," as "from there." But where is "there?" The word seems to lack any antecedent. Ibn Ezra realized the problem and explains it as, "M'az," as "from then" -- it refers to a point in time rather than a point in space. Still, there is the ambiguity -- when exactly did "then" start?

The Ksav v'Kabbalah directs us to another famous pasuk in Tehillim: "Al naharos Bavel sham yashavnu gam bachinu..." We are told exactly where this incident takes place -- "Al naharos Bavel." Why repeat "sham," that we sat there? Why not just say, "Al naharos Bavel yashavnu u'bachinu?" I told this to my wife and she suggested that the pasuk needs the "sham" and "gam" for the poetic meter. I hear (pun intended) the point; however, the Ksav v'Kabbah has a different idea. He suggests that the word "sham" is the root or a shortened form of "shemama," destruction. There are no extra words in the pasuk -- it reads as follows: "Al naharos Bavel" -- on the banks of the rivers of Bavel, "sham yashavnu," in a state of destruction we sat, "v'gam bachinu," and there we also cried.

Now we can also understand the meaning of the pasuk at the end of VaYeishev when Yosef is thrown in prison and we read, "Vayehi sham b'beis ha'sohar." If Yosef was thrown in prison, obviously he was, "sham," there, in the prison! Many meforshim struggle to make heads or tails of the pasuk, but based on the Ksav v'Kabbalah, the meaning is plain -- Yosef was "sham," in a state of internal decay, "b'beis ha'sohar," when he found himself in prison.

The tide for Yosef eventually turned, as we read in our parsha, "M'sham ro'eh even yisrael." From the depths of destruction, from that prison cell, Yosef rose to feed his brothers and father when times were most bleak.

smichas geulah l'tefilah and why we say baruch shem kvod malchuso quietly

2012-01-05T19:34:00.000-05:00

Last week we started what I hope will be a series based on R' Wahrman's Oros Shabbos. I want to continue this week with a piece (siman 5 in the sefer) that relates to parshas hashavu'a as well as hilchos shabbos.

The halacha is that one may not interrupt between the bracha of ga'al yisrael and shmoneh esrei in shacharis -- one is required to have smichas geulah l'tefilah. The same holds true for ma'ariv, except that there is the additional bracha of hashkiveinu (and baruch Hashem l'olam) after ga'al yisrael. The gemara explains that this is a "geula arichta", a long geulah, meaning the bracha of hashkiveinu continues the theme of geulah and is therefore not considered an interruption. What about on Shabbos and Yom Tov, where we add V'shamru Bnei Yisrael es haShabbos and VaYidaber Moshe es Moadei Hashem... between hashkiveinu and our amidah -- why are these insertions not considered interruptions? How on these days do we satisfy the requirement of smichas geulah l'tefilah?

The Rishonim offer various answers to this question. The Tur writes that V'Shamru... is also a form of geulah, as Hashem has promised to redeem Bnei Yisrael if only we observe two Shabbosos. The Prisha sees these pesukim not as connected to geulah, but as part and parcel of our teflah, as they describe the kedushas hayom of Shabbos / Yom Tov. Rav Wahrman focusses his attention on the interesting answer of the Rokeach, who writes that these pesukim are not considered an interruption because they are recited quietly. Putting aside the fact that our minhag is not like the Rokeach, how can we explain this view? What difference does it make whether the pesukim are recited aloud or in a whisper?

There is a well known machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos (Brachos 21) regarding what to do if one is in the middle of shmoneh esrei and the tzibur is saying kedusha. Rashi writes that one should remain silent and simply attend to the recitation of the tzibur -- based on the principle of shome'a k'oneh, hearing can substitute for actually saying the words. Tosfos disagrees. If hearing is equivalent to saying the words, argues Tosfos, then listening to the words of kedusha would be no less a hefsek, an interruption, than actually reciting the words themselves. According to Rashi, obviously this is not the case -- there is a distinction between a recitation done aloud and recitation done quietly or by listening.

To explain this idea found in Rashi and the Rokeach, as he does in many places, R' Wahrman cites a novel explanation from his rebbe, R' Leizer Silver. The gemara Pesachim (56) explains the reason we say the words, "Baruch shem kvod malchuso..." after Shema in a whisper as follows: Ya'akov Avinu became worried when he wanted to reveal the day of geulah to his children and his ruach hakodesh departed. The Shevatim consoled Ya'akov by declaring, "Shema Yisrael (meaning their father), Hashem Elokeinu, Hashem echad," and Ya'akov responded to their declaration of faith by saying, "Baruch shem kvod malchuso..." However, says the gemara, when Moshe Rabeinu wrote and said the parsha of Shema, he did not add "Baruch shem..." Ya'akov said it; Moshe didn't say it; we compromise and recite it in a whisper.

The Tzlach asks what the whole tumult in the gemara is about. There are many praises and expressions that we have in our davening that were not said by Moshe. Just because Moshe didn't say, "Baruch shem...," doesn't seem to be enough of a reason to leave it out.

Tzlach answers that the difference here is context. To insert in davening additional praises not recited by Moshe, like chapters of tehillim, of course needs no justification. But here, in the case of "Baruch shem...," the additional phrase is being stuck right in the very middle of Moshe's words. What gives us the right to create a hefsek, an interruption, right in the middle of the parsha of Shema as told to us in the Torah by Moshe Rabeinu?

The gemara's answer is that there is no problem of creating an interruption because we say, "Baruch shem..." quietly. In other words, a quiet recitation, a recitation that is different in tone than the normal tefilah voice, does not consititue a hefsek.

The is exactly the point Rashi and the Rokeach were making. Through shome'a k'oneh listening counts the same as a recitation of kedusha, but since that recitation takes place silently, it does not count as an interruption. Since "V'shamreu Bnei Yisrael es haShabbos" is recited quietly, it also therefore does not count as an interruption that would break smichas geulah l'tefilah.

R' Wahrman notes that his rebbe said this derech derush and he goes on to provide a more detailed halachic analysis, but it's nonetheless a clever and enjoyable vort.

remembering what's important

2012-01-03T19:48:00.000-05:00

There are two Midrashim in VaYigash that I think everyone knows, but I don't think most people know that they go together hand in hand. Everyone knows that Ya'akov sent Yehudah to set up a yeshiva in Goshen before he got there. Everyone also knows that Yosef sent agalos, wagons, to Ya'akov to hint to him that he remembered that the last thing they learned together was the parsha of eglah arufah (eglah and agalah sound the same). What I don't think people know is that this second Chazal is brought as a proof to the first. After telling us that Ya'akov sent Yehudah to set up a yeshiva, the Midrash continues, "Teida lecha she'hu kein....," Know that this is so...," and the Midrash then tells us that Ya'akov was not convinced that that Yosef was alive until he saw the agalos that were the reminder of eglah arufah.

What does one thing have the do with the other? How does the fact that Ya'akov knew it was Yosef because he remembered the last sugya they were last learning prove that Yehudah was sent to setup a yeshiva?

R' Michel Yehudah Lefkowitz (and I later found it in Ohr Yahel as well) explains that a person whose first question about his son is, "Does he know what sugya were we last holding in?" is a person whose whole world revolves around nothing but Torah. We remember things by what stands out as important to us. For Ya'akov Avinu, what stood out about Yosef, the one thing he had in his mind about his son and what he was sure his son would have in mind about him, is the sugya they were last holding in together. For such a person, it's not important whether his house in Goshen would have a one or two car garage -- he didn't need to send a remodeling team down ahead of time to make sure the kitchen counter had the right shade of granite and the basement was finished. What such a person obviously needs (hence the proof of the Midrash) is to make sure his future home is a makom Torah.

Torah is not just legal reality

2012-01-02T13:35:00.002-05:00

The Midrash (90:5) writes that Yehudah argued to Yosef that the Torah says, "V'im ain lo v'nimkar b'gneivaso," only if someone has no money to pay his debts is he sold into slavery. Since Binyamin can pay, he should be freed.

Yosef was posing as the viceroy of Egypt; the issue at at hand was what Binyamin's penalty should be under Egyptian law. Why did Yehudah think it would make any difference to Yosef/ the viceroy what the din Torah in this case should be?

Chazal tell us that Hashem looked into the Torah and created the world -- everything in creation functions according to Torah. I saw in the sefer Bein HaMishpisayim that this idea was so ingrained in the consciousness of the Shevatim that they could not imagine that Binyamin would receive a punishment that was at odds with what the Torah dictated. Yehudah's was not making a legal argument to Yosef, but was simply stating a metziyus -- no other punishment is conceivable.

did Ya'akov have an easy life?

2012-01-01T13:51:00.001-05:00

When Ya'akov appeared before Pharoah, Pharoah apparently was shocked at how old he looked and asked Ya'akov his age (47:7-10). Ya'akov replied that the reason he looks so frail and old is because life had not been easy for him. Chazal tell us that since Ya'akov complained about the difficulty of his life, he was punished and had 33 years taken off his life (he lived 33 years less than Yitzchak), one year for every word in the pasuk. The Da'as Zekeinim m'Ba'alei Tosfos quotes the Midrash: Hashem said in response to Ya'akov's complaints, "Didn't I save you from Eisav? From Lavan? Didn't I deal with Dinah's attackers? And didn't I return Yosef to you? And you complain?!"

I don't understand what Chazal mean. True, Hashem saved Ya'akov from Eisav, from Lavan, he re-united him with Yosef, etc., but the happy ending doesn't mean there wasn't agmas nefesh, pain and suffering along the way. Being saved by Eisav at the end of the day doesn't erase the years spent in hiding from Eisav or the tension of dealing with the threat he posed. The fact the Ya'akov left Lavan's home whole does not mean he had any pleasure in the years he spent under Lavan's roof. The revelation of Yosef does not wipe away the 22 years Ya'akov suffered with the thought that Yosef was dead.

Chazal don't say Ya'akov is being punished for airing his complaints in public. Were that the case, I would have no question -- it would mean aliba d'emes life was lousy, but you don't need to tell others about it. But that's not what the Midrash says -- Hashem's response is that Ya'akov's life was good and he had no reason to complain at all. I'm stumped -- any ideas?

(Thanks to Great UnKnown for pointing out that this is discussed in the Sichos Musar of R' Chaim Shmuelevitz and I just found it discussed in Rav Gifter's sefer as well here.)

take no prisoners

2012-01-01T13:37:00.000-05:00

When Egypt runs out of cash during the famine years described in Parshas VaYigash, the populace comes to Yosef and asks him to buy them as slaves and buy their land in exchange for food (47:19). The Torah tells us:
וַיִּקֶן יוֹסֵף אֶת-כָּל-אַדְמַת מִצְרַיִם, לְפַרְעֹה,
Yosef bought up all the land for Pharoah...
Ramban notes the omission: Yosef buys the land, but he does not buy the people as slaves. Even in the continuation of the parsha, we read:
וַיֹּאמֶר יוֹסֵף אֶל-הָעָם, הֵן קָנִיתִי אֶתְכֶם הַיּוֹם וְאֶת-אַדְמַתְכֶם לְפַרְעֹה
The pasuk distinguishes between the purchase of the people, which was done "hayom," on a temporary basis -- meaning they were the equivalent of hired workers -- and the purchase of the land, which is not qualified with that same adjective of "hayom," and apparently was a permanent sale (see Meshech Chochma).

The Ramban does not address himself to why Yosef did not take the people up on their offer to become slaves, but I think the reason is obvious in light of Yosef's background. Yosef was sold by his brothers and was bounced from the Midyanim to the Egyptians and then finally even landed in prison before becoming appointed viceroy by Pharoah. Having personally suffered the degradation of being sold as a slave, it would be an anathema to Yosef to buy and sell other human beings as slaves.

the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos

2011-12-29T19:23:00.000-05:00

On hebrewbooks.org I found a sefer call Oros Shabbos by R' Shlomo Wahrman that I am enjoying immensely. I remember years ago R' Wahrman's seforim (he has a number of volumes titled She'eris Yosef) were very popular among the YU / Morasha Kollel chevra, no doubt in part because in addition to being a gaon atzum, he is a Rosh Yeshiva at HANC (Hebrew Academy of Nassau County) -- there was a certain feeling that he is one of us, or at least knows where we are coming from. Anyway, I thought it would be nice to do a series on some of the torah in his sefer so that I remember it better (the self-serving motive here) and so that you can share in the enjoyment. (I'm open to comments if you think this is not a good idea or a waste of time, and it goes without saying that summaries are only a taste and not a replacement for the sefer and any mistakes in the posts are mine alone.)

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 250) writes that there is a mitzvah on Friday to prepare for Shabbos. R' Wahrman discusses three different possible sources for this din:

1. The meforshim on the S.A. (see GR"A) point to the gemara in the beginning of the second perek of Kiddushin (41), where, in the context of discussing "mitzvah bo yoseir m'bshlucho"(Rashi: because one gets greater schar for personally attending to the mitzvah), the gemara mentions how various Amoraim would personally attend to Shabbos preparations in their home. Given this context, it seems that the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos is no different than any other mitzvah which should preferably be done personally rather than through an agent.

2. Rav Wahrman points out that there may be an additional element to the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos that is unique to hilchos Shabbos. Rashi elsewhere explains (Shabbos 119a) that the reason for the elaborate preparations for Shabbos is because it shows the importance of the day, similar to the preparation one would make for one's rebbe or an important guest. Preparing for Shabbos is not just a means to an end, a way to make sure one can fulfill the mitzvah of oneg Shabbos properly with cholent and kugel, but rather it is an end in its own right -- the very act of preparation demonstrates the importance of Shabbos. Personal involvement is necessary not just as a function of mitzvah bo yoseir mbshlucho, a means of getting extra schar, but rather personal involvement is an essential component of the etzem hamitzvah because it is this personal attention which demonstrates kavod for Shabbos.

3. Aside from the divrei kabbalah elements of kavod and oneg Shabbos there is a d'oraysa kiyum in preparing for Shabbos based on the pasuk of "V'haya bayom hashishi v'heichinu es asher yavi'u" (see Biur Halacha).

One nafka minah between these sources might be when preparation should be done. The M.B. (250:5) writes that it is better (if possible) to make preparations on Friday for Shabbos rather than on the preceding day. If the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos was just a means to the end of ensuring one has food, then it would seem to make little difference if cooking is done on Thursday, Friday, or any other day. However, if preparing for Shabbos is itself a fulfillment of kavod Shabbos, then it is understandable that preparations should be made davka on Friday when they stand out as being undertaken specifically for the honor of Shabbos.

This factor of kavod can also help resolve another difficulty. The Chavos Ya'ir writes that even though kavod habriyos overrides mitzvos derabbanan, the Amoraim put aside their kavod to personally be involved in making ready for Shabbos because of its great kedusha. If preparing for Shabbos was just a means to an end, then it would not seem to matter how it got done, whether personally or through an agent, and there would seem to be little reason to sacrifice one's kavod to do the mitzvah. However,if personally being involved is what defines preparations as being l'kavod Shabbos, if personal involvement is part of the definition of the etzem hamitzvah, obviously it is impossible to delegate the chore.

Yosef's wagons

2011-12-29T19:12:00.000-05:00

"Ani Yosef achichem asher machartem osi...." (45:4)
"I am your brother Yosef whom you sold into slavery..."
The Ohr haChaim says a fantastic vort here. Yosef told his brothers that even when they sold him, he still felt towards them as a brother and bore no animosity.

Why does the Torah tells us, "Vatechi ruach Ya'akov," only after he saw the wagons which Yosef sent from Mitzrayim? Chazal tell us that when Yosef left home he was learning the sugya of eglah arufah with his father. By sending agalos, Yosef was hinting that he was still holding in learning despite his 22 years of seperation. The Divrei Shaul adds an additional point which ties together nicely with this post on the parsha of eglah arufah. The reason an eglah arufah is brought by the closest city to where a dead body is found is because even if no one in that closest city is guilty of murder, the fact that such a heinous act occurred on that particular city's doorstep indicates that something is rotten. Hashgacha, not chance, dictates the location the body is found. It was this element of hasgacha pratis that Yosef was hinting to his father. Whatever his brothers had done, Yosef did not want Ya'akov to lose sight of the fact that yad Hashem dictated his fate.

The Beis Ya'akov of Ishbitz takes a different approach in an amazing torah here. A little more background on eglah arufah: The gemara asks why the eglah arufah ceremony is done by the elders of the city -- surely we don't suspect them of doing wrong? The gemara answers that the zekeinim are accountable because perhaps this stranger who is found dead came to their city and they allowed him to pass through without a greeting, without an escort ("leviya") to the road, without being made to feel at home. Who is more vulnerable than a stranger left alone in a strange place?

The word "leviya" means more than escort -- it means connection. When Levi is born, Leah says, "Hapa'am yilaveh ishi eilei," now Ya'akov will really connect with me. What Chazal are telling us is that the job of the zekeinim is to build and strengthen the connections between us. Someone recently told me about his experience coming to a Beis Medrash to look into a certain yeshiva for his son and no one came over to say "shalom aleichem," no one asked who he was or what he was doing there. Those zekeinim failed to do their job. When there is a sense of belonging, of connectedness, among members of Klal Yisrael, then no evil can befall us. When their is divisiveness and strife, then bad things follow and you need eglah arufos.

Yosef knew that relations between himself and his brothers were frayed, so he had immersed himself in this parsha of eglah arufah -- the "ben zekunim" needed to take the role of the zakein and ensure that there was no sheivet left out in the cold by his dreams. When it came time to reunite with his brothers, to reunite with his father, he reminded them that he was still holding by this same parsha. These wagons were Yosef's eglah arufa -- a kaparah on the strife that might have left any one of the brothers without "leviya," without that feeling of connection to each other.

(I don't really need to go into detail about current events and how they relate to this idea.)

I thought I had once posted it, but I can't find it, so I'll mention it here. The Midrash compares Sarah Imeinu to an eglah temimah, a beautiful calf. R' Tzadok quotes his rebbe, the Ishbitzer, as explaining that the word eglah is like the word "agol," round. Sarah's life did not have high points and low points in her avodah -- it wasn't like a wave -- but rather every point around the circle from beginning to end was the same. Any point might be labelled the beginning, any point the end.

Yosef perhaps sent agalos to signal to his father this idea that his life had come around full circle -- he remained the same Yosef haTzadik that started the journey from home 22 years earlier.

the brothers' admission of guilt and Reuvain's response

2011-12-27T19:24:00.000-05:00

There is a tremendous mussar to be learned, says the Sifsei Tzadik, from the Shevatim's admission of, "Asheimim anachnu...," "We are guilty... [of selling Yosef]," when faced with the accusation of being spies. How do most of us (myself included) usually respond when things don't go our way? We yell that life's unfair. We wonder why G-d has it in for us. We ask why we have it so bad and the other guy has it all. The Shevatim were tzadikim; they deliberated over every detail and possible repercussion of their actions. Surely they had a right to clamor that life's unfair if, despite all their tzidkus, they suffer! Yet, rather than blame G-d or blame fate or wonder why they suffer more than others, their response to adversity was to look at their own shortcomings and blame only themselves.

Following the brothers' admission of guilt, the Torah tells us that Reuvain spoke up. "Vaya'an Reuvain osam leimor, 'Halo amarti aleichem al techetu bayeled....'" (42:22) Reuvain spoke, saying to them, "Didn't I tell you not to harm the child [Yosef]..." Just what everyone needs when they finally admit that they messed up -- someone to jump in with an 'I told you so!' What is Reuvain doing? How can he callously rub salt in the brothers' wounds at this crucial moment?

The Ksav Sofer explains that the Torah here is telling us a "din" in hilchos teshuvah. It's far worse to do something wrong after you were warned not to do it than to do something wrong without being advised or aware of the consequences. That's why a person can only be chayav misa or malkos if they were given has'ra'ah, a warning of what the penalty would be. Reuvain was telling his brothers that if they truly wanted to do teshuvah, they would have to admit not only to doing wrong, but to doing wrong even after being warned of the consequences. Hence the double language, "Vaya'an... leimor," in the pasuk: Reuvain said to the brothers that to do teshuvah properly they must say and acknowledge that they ignored his warning.

It's still a hard pasuk to digest, so let me give you a little Ishbitz torah to make it go down easier. The Beis Ya'akov writes that had the brothers really been convinced that Yosef deserved to die, Hashem would have gone along with their psak. The Rishonim write based on the pasuk, "Elokim nitzav b'adas K-l," that the Sanhedrin has Hashem's backing in every decision they make (see Ramban on the parsha of eidim zomimim, Derashos haRan 11); kal v'chomer Hashem would support the psak of a Beis Din of the Shevatim, even if it meant Klal Yisrael would have one less sheivet. But truth be told, the brothers were not really convinced of their own judgment. No sooner had they paskened than they began to have doubts and hedge their bets. Reuvain had rachmaus and wanted to save Yosef; Yehudah had rachmanus and said to sell, not kill Yosef; none of the other brothers spoke up in opposition and insisted on sticking with the original death penalty. Hashem didn't need to prove the brothers wrong, as in their heart of hearts, the rachmanus they felt for Yosef already told them that they were wrong. Hashem will go along with whatever Beis Din feels is emes, but Hashem will not go along with the plan when everyone really knows it's sheker from the get go.

When the brothers said, "Asheimim anachnu...., " "We are guilty...," they finally acknowledged the rachmanus they felt for Yosef and had been trying to sublimate and ignore for years; they finally admitted that the doubts they felt from the get-go proved that their plan was not just. And who had the most guilt to confess? Reuvain, as it was Reuvain who most felt in his heart that they should have mercy on Yosef; it was Reuvain who begged them from the get-go not to harm Yosef; it was Reuvain who was most aware from the outset that the plan being hatched was a big mistake. Therefore, it is Reuvain who follows the brothers admission of "Asheimim anachnu...," with his own admission of added guilt. When he says, "Didn't I say not to harm the child...?" he is not criticizing his brothers. Rather he is criticizing himself -- if only I had paid more attention to those feelings of mercy and followed through with the rescue of Yosef, how different the situation would be.

What a world of difference the Ishbitzer's perspective makes. Rather than foisting more guilt on his brothers, Reuvain was accepting greater personal responsibility for the events that transpired.

girsa d'yankusa

2011-12-22T18:50:00.001-05:00

Abayei said (Shabbos 21b) that he wished he had learned the din of kavsa ain zakuk lah earlier in life and not only in his later years. Asks the gemara: What difference does it make if you learned the din then or learned the din now -- as long as you know the din? Answers the gemara, the difference is girsa d'yankusa -- what you learn as a child sticks with you.

Why is it davka here, in the middle of the sugya of Chanukah, and nowhere else in sha"s, that an Amora bemoans not having learned a din earlier in life?

The Kozhiglover explains that the lesson of kavsa ain zakuk lah is that it's not the effect produced by having candles burning or how long they burn which is significant, but rather it's the initial act of lighting which defines the mitzvah. Chanukah is about beginnings -- the rededication of the Mikdash, the first lighting of the menorah in the Mikdash. So long as you get off on the right foot, no matter what happens afterwards, you've have accomplished something.

The Achronim (see R' Yosef Engel in Gilyonei haShas) explain that even through tumah hutra b'tzibur and a pure jug of oil would ordinarily not be necessary to light the menorah when everything is tamei, nonetheless, when it comes to chinuch hamikdash there is no din of hutra or dechuya, i.e. when it's the first lighting that we are talking about, it must be done without shortcuts.

Therefore, it is precisely in this context of Chanukah that the gemara stresses the importance of girsa d'yankusa, what we accomplish in learning and avodah when we are young and what we put into our children so that they can grow in Torah when they are young. The initial steps in our chinuch make all the difference.

(I have had an impossible day at work and don't have anything important to say about the parsha yet.)

Why no recitation of "Al HaNissim" in Al HaMichya?

2011-12-21T18:49:00.000-05:00

Why do we recite Al HaNissim in birchas hamazon but do not insert any mention of Chanukah in Al HaMichya, even though we mention other significant days like Shabbos and Rosh Chodesh? Rav Shternbruch suggests that the chiyuv to mention Al HaNissim stems from the chiyuv to give hoda'ah on the nes; therefore, it belongs in Birchas HaMazon where we have Nodeh lecha..., a specific bracha of hoda'ah. Al HaMichya is an abbreviation of bentching and has no specific bracha of hoda'ah; therefore, hoda'ah on the nes does not fit.

I think this approach may depend on how you learn the sugya in Shabbos 24a. The gemara raises the question of whether Al HaNissim must be recited in birchas hamazon or not. Why did the gemara take as a given that Al HaNissim must be recited in tefilah, in shmoneh esrei, but have a doubt about whether it belongs in bentching? Rashi explains that takanah to celebrate Chanukah with "hallel v'hoda'ah" by definition implies commemoration of hoda'ah in tefilah. (I think what Rashi means is that mentioning the nes of chanukah is clearly apropos in tefilah, where we give thanks for "al nisecha she'b'chol yom imanu." It is less clear that this type of hoda'ah for nes fits the theme of bentching.) Tosfos, however, explains that reciting Al HaNissim in tefilah was a given because tefilah is done b'tzibur and therefore there is a kiyum of pirsumei nisa. One can learn the gemara's conclusion on one of two ways: either pirsumei nisa applies even in meals, or perhaps the fact that we recite Al haNissim in bentching is evidence that the entire premis that the obligation Al HaNissim stems from pirsumei nisa is wrong.

It sounds to me like R" Shternbruch's chiddush fits better with Rashi's view. According to Tosfos, Al HaNissim is potentially a din in pirsumei nisa and is as much an intrusion into bentching as it would be in Al HaMichya.

Rav Soloveitchik (Igros haGRI"D, Hil Brachos) has an ingenious answers to this question of why Al HaNissim gets no mention in al hamichya. He suggests that the chiyuv of mentioning Ya'aleh V'yavo or Retzei, the obligation to mention mei'ein ha'meora, is an additional kiyum tacked on to the mitzvah of Birchas Ha'Mazon. Al HaNissim, however, is not an additional kiyum, but is part of the nusach habracha of birchas hoda'ah of Birchas HaMazon. In other words, Chazal dictated that a different nusach habracha be said for Nodeh lech... on Chanukah. Saying Al HaMichya instead of full bentching does not suspend the need to fulfill the additional chiyuv of mentioning me'ein ha'meora. However, given that Al HaMichya is a shortened form of bentching, just like other parts of Nodeh lecha... are cut out, Al HaNissim can be cut out as well.

(There is supposedly an answer to this same question given by the Brisker Rav -- if someone knows where it is and can explain it, please let me know).

the nes of Chanukah

2011-12-20T18:58:00.000-05:00

In his Moadim u'Zmanim (7:60), Rav Shternbruch asks why we commemorate the Chanukah miracle of finding the oil and lighting menorah with hallel and hoda'ah -- what's so extraordinary? There were many other miracles that occurred on a daily basis in the Beis haMikdash. One might even say that to not have a nes in the Mikdash would be something out of the ordinary, not the other way around.

I don't understand his question. True, when the Beis haMikdash was functioning properly, nisim were the norm. But the Chanukah nes occurs against the background of "ba'u ba pritzim v'chililuha," the desecration and defilement of the Mikdash by the Greeks (Avodah Zarah 52). To find an untainted remnant when the Mikdash was in a state of ruin is certainly an extraordinary nes. It is the fact that we found ohr amidst choshech which we are celebrating.

dmus deyukno shel aviv

2011-12-19T21:52:00.000-05:00

When Yosef was faced with the test of not succumbing to Eishes Potifar, he was aided by a visage of his father which appeared to him -- "dmus d'yukno shel aviv nirah lo." Why do Chazal use the passive voice, "nirah lo," instead of the active voice, i.e. "Ra'ah Yosef dmus d'yukno...?"

My wife suggested that Chazal use the passive voice to highlight the fact that Yosef was rescued through no merit or action of his own. It was only through isarusa d'leila, only by virtue of Divine intervention, that Yosef was spared.

In the footnotes to the sefer Shemu'os Rei'Ya"h (essays on Sefer Braishis based on torah said by Rav Kook) there is another suggestion quoted from an unnamed talmid chacham. Yosef was a carbon copy of Ya'akov in many aspects of his life (as Rashi notes at the beginning of VaYeishev), with one glaring exception. While Ya'akov was "yoshev ohalim," removed from the world and cloistered in the ivory tower of the beis medrash, Yosef felt he could maintain his tzidkus and also blend into society. These were two different philosophies of life. When Yosef was faced with the test of dealing with Eishes Potifar, he finally acknowledged, "nirah lo," as in the sense of being modeh to another point of view, that his father's approach had the advantage over his own.

eating a bechor which one made a ba'al mum

2011-12-19T21:45:00.000-05:00

Rashi (Devarim 14:3) writes that the issur of eating a to'evah prohibits 1) shechting and eating a bechor which a Jew has caused a blemish to, as well as 2) eating basar b'chalav.

Tosfos (Chulin 115) asks: Why does the issur of eating a bechor which was intentionally blemished apply only when a yisrael causes the blemish? Just like basar b'chalav cannot be eaten even if cooked by an aku"m, so too, even if the blemish to the bechor was caused by an aku"m, shouldn't it be called as toevah?

Tosfos answers that we know a blemished animal is not a toevah because animals which are blemished pesulei hamukdashim are allowed to be eaten. Therefore, the pasuk cannot prohibit eating any bechor which has a mum -- there has to be a case which is permitted.

Tosfos seems to straddle the fence -- M'mah nafshach: If a mum is a toevah, then every case of mum should be assur. If mum is not a toevah, as we see from psulei hamukdashim, then even if a yisrael causes the mum, the animal should be able to be eaten. How can you split the baby?

Maharal in Gur Arye rejects Tos.' answer and offers in its place a bit of lomdus. He explains that it is the metziyus of basar b'chalav which is prohibited, irrespective of who does the cooking. You can't say the say the same thing about a mum. The proof is simple: Were mum a toevah b'metziyus, then even an animal born with a mum should have issurim attached it it. That's obviously not the case -- an animal born with a mum simply lacks kedushas bechorah; there is no status attached to it. It's not the mum itself which is the problem, but rather it is the ma'aseh aveira of creating the mum which the Torah prohibits. Therefore, the din of toevah applies only where a yisrael does a ma'aseh aveirah and causes the mum, but not where the mum is produced by an aku"m.

emor me'at v'aseh harbeh

2011-12-18T21:04:00.000-05:00

R' Nachman opens his famous "azamra" torah (Likutei Moharan 282, link) by explaining the pasuk, "V'od me'at v'ain rasha,v'hisbonanta al mekomo v'einenu." Every person has some good in him/her. By finding that goodness and judging another favorably, the individual being judged is actually transformed into a better person. "V'od me'at," if you can find just that little bit of good, then "v'ain rasha," the rasha will be no more. (R' Nachman goes on to say that this applies not just to others, but to oneself as well. It is easy to fall into despair and feel that one's avodah has no value, but this road of despair leads to becoming a rasha. One needs to remind oneself that every drop of avodah has value to Hashem -- there is no greater motivator).

My wife suggested that this idea may also be alluded to in the expression, "Emor me'at v'aseh harbeh." If one speaks about and praises that "me'at" of goodness that can be found even in the rasha, it will produce enormous results, "v'aseh harbeh."