His actions to save his brothers under overwhelming hostile fire were gracefully described as intrepidity — a very seldom used word to describe “resolute courageousness” and it is very accurate in describing Leslie Sabo’s sacrifice.  The Medal of Honor was justly bestowed posthumously upon Leslie H. Sabo Jr. who served our country during the war in Vietnam.

There is no way to measure true heroism under harrowing enemy fire. It certainly cannot be taught. However at the absolute apex of battle a rare selflessness emerges.  I can only surmise seeing his fellow brothers dead, wounded or at great risk of being killed revealed his instinct.

Does time diminish his sacrifice more than 40 years ago? Read the description of his last moments of his life and pause to not just look — but to see photographs of him in his childhood with his family, his wedding day and with his brothers in Vietnam.  As I, you may be moved to tears recognizing today how especially devastating his loss has been for his wife, his family, his brothers in arms and our country.

I find his true selfless heroism deeply moving.

"Will printed books remain relevant in the future?"
Book/library aficionado/blogger Paul Everett Nelson joins WAN at 4:34pm.

While the discussion was simple and well targeted to their audience, there is certainly more to this story.  I understand the limited time allocated to interviews on radio — its Milwaukee’s WTMJ – not NPR.

My own experience and love of reading drew me to think deeper about the discussion of the publishing industry and their new demand to charge libraries unbeliveable fees.Some believe the publishing industry has been decimated in the internet age like the music industry.  Not sure that I completely agree with this statement.  A well run publishing business should be able to make significantly more profit from selling ebooks.  But in order to be successful the publishing industry must cannibalize itself.

One of the points of discussion regarded recent policies ebook publishers have demanded. They are changing their terms of use and actually charging libraries an additional full price for any ebook that has been checked out more over 25 times.  Yes you read that correctly – publishers plan to force any library that checks out any ebook 25 times to buy the same ebook at full price!

When exactly did those same publishers force those same libraries to purchase additional hardback copies of their books at full price after they were checked out 25 times?  Never, since the idea is just asinine.  Imaging a cable company requiring you to purchase a new cable package after watching 25 TV shows. Yep – now you know how stupid — or simply greed — is driving this decision.

Ever see a stack of 500 books on a shipping pallet?   Consider all the costs for print, assembly and shipping.  Now add costs to distribute those books to bookstores and big box resellers.  That is an expensive and time consuming process.  Oh yea…want it fast? — then pay extra for overnight shipping. And remember those books are only available during business hours.
Many publishers today print, assemble and ship their products from China to cut costs.  Surprised?  Take a look at your favorite hardcover books and look closer at the publisher’s credits. I was surprised to see so many children’s books manufactured in China.

However on-line ebook shopping is a radically different business model.  When a consumer purchases an ebook from Amazon or even iTunes they download the exact digital product repeatedly.  No added cost for the publisher!

The moment an ebook is exported from a publisher’s computer and uploaded to Amazon or iTunes server the profit begins….and never stops.  Sell 100 copies or 1 million — there is no added cost to download.  Oh yea…want it fast? eCommerce is 24/7 with immediately downloading
….especially with Amazon’s One Click policy.

So on the surface the book publishers demand libraries (for now) re-purchase any ebook.  Yet since the cost of producing and distributing ebooks is so profitable it just corporate greed to simply dictate new terms for the same content.  Consider how the personal printer industry has driven inkjet printers to that magical price point of $50 …. while selling a gallon of ink for $8,000!  And you think gasoline prices are outrageous.

I do agree that trying to actually read an ebook on a little smartphone was a joke.  It was more of a technical achievement. The iPad and the Kindle, Nook and others change this paradigm.  Actually reading of the Pentagon Papers (7,000+ pages in 47 volumes) on my iPad clearly proves to even me that the future is ebooks.  And the ebook vendors are not stupid.  You can download apps for the iPad that support purchasing ebboks from Amazon, Barnes and Noble for example.  It like getting a Kindle or Nook built into each iPad.

Although I love my physical book collection how many trees have been killed for this?  For this reason alone I will greatly reduce my dependance on paper.  I also enjoy carrying an iPad with a lot of books in such a small, light form factor.

So in the end, change happens at a glacial pace for most people.  We have come to develop (much to the relief of book publishers) an emotional “love” of physical books.  Just google bookcase and look at the hundreds of pages dedicated to the physical designs of bookshelves filled with hundreds of books.  While I also subscribed to this emotion and have enjoyed arraigning my favorite books at home — in all honesty I was raised and educated with the notion that printed books are the single source of knowledge and ultimate success.  Remember for me there was no other way.  This will be forever changed for my children.  Today I not only read to them but watch how interact with “ebooks” in a way never available to me in my childhood.  While human change is glacial, today’s tablet business models are not.

The publishing industry must adapt or die.  Their choice.

Kinda thinking this would be nice while mowing the lawn or even better…working out.  Cannot tell you how many times my iPod headphones have been caught up on a treadmill arm.  Arg!  Time for my gym to install some wireless APs around their facilities.

Riddle me this: How does Nielsen, Billboard or any other entertainment resource accurately reflect the impact of torrents on sales?  Ah….they can’t. The fact that Nielsen/Billboard still lists “traditional chart history” tells me another analog business is choking to death on the globalized internet.

I have come to accept that illegal downloads are no different than drugs, ebooks, guns or music.  All are in heavy demand.  The only difference: ebooks and music use the internet. Supply and demand.  Nothing more.

Its been a long standing issue for me to see mainstream media really show how inept they are when it relates to the globalization of the internet.  So what exactly did Adam Graham miss?

If you really want to understand the way the world works…

In a single word: Globalization. Today a very large number of illegal P2P servers are hosted outside the United States.  Existing American copyright laws do not apply beyond our borders. The globalized internet will not enforce for example the Sonny Bono Copyright Act.

Within hours tens of thousands of users around the globe began illegally downloading MDNA before it was even lunch at your favorite old record store, big box retailer or even iTunes or Amazon. Once P2P sites download any new material its going to be replicated, shared and/or bartered … globally.

Pick a country — any country on the planet and today you will find a plethora of P2P servers.  Its the nature of the beast and has been for many years.  Yes the RIAA is trying to extend their reach across the globe but its slow in coming.

Didn’t realize torrents could be “offshored” as Tom Friedman wrote in his bestseller The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century?  If you want a more focused view I suggest reading Hot Property: The Stealing of Ideas in an Age of Globalization by Pat Choate and Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything by Don Tappscott.

Today just about all movies and music content is produced digitally.  To the surprise of many MTV reported MDNA had actually been leaked to sharing sites two weeks before the official release date.  Remember the last Star Wars movie was leaked to P2p sites …. way back in 2005?
Yea the internet had file sharing problems before 2005.  Still does.  Again — its the nature of the beast.

Regrettably Google makes stealing too simple:
1. Search ‘madonna mdna’ and look how Google auto-fills the results as you type:

2. Google ‘madonna mdna torrent’ and see how Google lists torrent sites with MDNA:

3. Take a closer look at the above yellow highlighted torrent site in Google’s results.  This search result states: “come and download madonna mdna absolutely for free.”
For many that’s too hard to pass up.

4. Simply copy/pasting the Google search result (kat.ph/search/madonna%20mdna/) into any browser

5. View the multiple listings for torrenting MDNA:
Hint: plenty to choose from — and this site is not the largest torrent site on the internet.

And finally:
5. Click a torrent icon and start downloading….Again thanks to Google for showing anyone how this process is so simple.

But who the heck is “KickassTorrents” anyway?  Lets go down the rabbit hole:
Open a terminal application on your computer and type the following: $ whois kickasstorrents.com

 Domain Name: KICKASSTORRENTS.COM
 Registrar: BIZCN.COM, INC.
 Whois Server: whois.bizcn.com
 Referral URL: http://www.bizcn.com
 Name Server: NS1.KICKASSTORRENTS.COM
 Name Server: NS2.KICKASSTORRENTS.COM
 Status: clientDeleteProhibited
 Status: clientTransferProhibited
 Updated Date: 27-sep-2011
 Creation Date: 25-sep-2004
 Expiration Date: 25-sep-2016
 Last update of whois database: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 17:18:34 UTC
 Registration Service Provided By: Bizcn.com
 Website: http://www.cnobin.com
 Whois Server: whois.bizcn.com
 Domain name: kickasstorrents.com

 Registrant Contact:
 Privacy-Protect.cn
 Henry Nguyen Gong contact@privacy-protect.cn
 +33.0466583875 fax: +33.0466583875
 26 Rue Jean Reboul
 Nimes Languedoc-Roussillon 30900
 fr

 Administrative Contact:
 Henry Nguyen Gong contact@privacy-protect.cn
 +33.0466583875 fax: +33.0466583875
 26 Rue Jean Reboul
 Nimes Languedoc-Roussillon 30900
 fr

 Technical Contact:
 Henry Nguyen Gong contact@privacy-protect.cn
 +33.0466583875 fax: +33.0466583875
 26 Rue Jean Reboul
 Nimes Languedoc-Roussillon 30900
 fr

 Billing Contact:
 Henry Nguyen Gong contact@privacy-protect.cn
 +33.0466583875 fax: +33.0466583875
 26 Rue Jean Reboul
 Nimes Languedoc-Roussillon 30900
 fr

 DNS:
 ns2.kickasstorrents.com
 ns1.kickasstorrents.com

 Created: 2004-09-25
 Expires: 2016-09-25

So it seems there are points of contact all over the globe:
1. The vanity URL is assigned to a business address in Nimes Languedoc-Roussillon France
2. The kickasstorrent email contacts are assigned to a Canadian ISP.
3. The website host currently redirects to www.kat.ph – an address assigned in The Phillipeans.
These global points of contact reflect how torrent servers have to shut down and move their around the globe to avoid law enforcement.

Again kickasstorrents is just one of thousands of P2P servers.  Google can have you downloading MDNA within minutes. Depending upon your ISP’s download speed a perfect digital copy of MDNA will be yours in less time than it takes to read this post. This happens every minute of every day — 24 hours a day. Adam Graham’s article projected only 46,000 sales for MDNA in its second week.  I believe over 150,000 illegal downloads of MDNA have already occurred globally.

BTW the future of online piracy is magnet links. With fast internet connections the process is not only getting faster — pirates are getting smarter.

Chuck was a member of the Watergate Seven and will be forever tied to the illegal actions of breaking into the private offices of psychiatrist Dr. Lewis Fielding and stealing files relating to patient Dan Ellsberg who leaked the Pentagon Papers. We should not look past his role of authoring Nixon’s Enemies List and his role in the Vietnamization of the war in SouthEast Asia.

But Colson’s role as Nixon’s Special Counsel to the President goes much deeper. Colson and John Ehrlichman created the White House Plumbers while serving on the Committee to ReElect the President (CRP or more popularly known as CREEP) that accelerated Nixon’s downfall.

I applaud his actions in pleading guilty and turning his life around. But today even at the state level, our country is filled with too many with a blind ambition to party over country and the democratic values it was founded upon.

His lasting impression should be his most famous quote: “Once you have them by the balls their hearts and minds will follow.”   Hope his actions that violated our constitution will never be forgotten. That’s why I embedded the photo of his booking.

After 3,500-ish pages I reached a breaking point. I set aside the remaining volumes of  the Pentagon Papers and began reading Matterhorn: A Novel of the Vietnam War.  Much to my surprise this book has been very highly recommended:

Sebastian Junger in the New York Times wrote “one of the most profound and devastating novels ever to come out of Vietnam—or any war.”

And Mark Bowden who wrote Black Hawk Down commented “(it is) so authentic, so moving and so intense, so relentlessly dramatic, that there were times I wasn’t sure I could stand to turn the page…There have been some very good novels about the Vietnam War, but Matterhorn is the first great one, and I doubt it will ever be surpassed.”

What struck me in The Matterhorn that has been echoing in my mind about the Pentagon Papers was the intentional misleading of enemy killed.  At the end of the third chapter a firefight with canon fire killed two NVA soldiers. However as author Karl Marlantes described in the post battle briefing the number of enemy dead was increased as it was sent further up the chain of command.

In the end the total number of enemy killed was raised to 10 — all based on assumption that the NVA drag away dead comrades from the battlefield.  As described in The Pentagon Papers the early efforts to focus on “body counts” as a measure of success is loudly echoed here as well.

Was the accepted rational when American troops locate dead enemy soldiers, then senior officers “automatically” increased that body count. Insanity.  This passage in chapter three clearly supports reports from the Pentagon Papers regarding the military’s approach to reporting American success in the war. And in the end it was all a lie.

Additional merit for Matterhorn:

• Matterhorn debuted on the New York Times bestseller list in April (2010)
• Ranked #7 Fiction in Time Magazine’s Best Books of the Year (2010)
• A New York Times Notable Books of the Year (2010)
• It won the 2011 William E. Colby Award
• An ALA Notable Book (2010)
• Won the Pacific Northwest Booksellers Association Award (2011)
• Won the Indies Choice Book Award (2011)

But consider this: would a public auction of commerical time before, during and after be more accurate? Steven Dubner from Freakonomics fame takes a deeper look.

American sentiments to look back and reflect every December are just as striking in this volume.  This is the first volume that acknowledges a growing domestic anti-war sentiment throughout 1966.

It must have been considered “strong enough” to influence policies in early 1967. Volume IV C-6-b opens with the examination of key news correspondents, examining the impact of journalists reporting against the war:

Pentagon Papers:  Part IV. C6b: Evolution of the War.
Extracted pages 1-22
1. Hedged Public Optimism Meets the New Year
Harrison Salisbury’s dispatches from North Vietnam were generating an explosive debate about the bombing. Not only had he questioned the “surgical” precision claimed for the bombing of military targets in populated areas, but he questioned the basic purpose of the strategy itself. In his view, civilian casualties were being inflicted deliberately to break the morale of the populace, a course both immoral and doomed to failure. The counter-attack mounted by bombing advocates (and apologists) combined with the predictable quick denunciations and denials from official sources helped generate a significant public reaction. The Pentagon reaction to the Salisbury articles touched off a new round of editorial comment about the credibility gap. Polls at the start of the year reflected the public’s growing cynicism about public statements. One Harris poll indicated that the public of January 1967 was just as likely to blame the United States for truce violations (despite public announcements to the contrary) as the enemy. Two years earlier this had not been so. Salisbury happened to be in North Vietnam when Hanoi was first bombed — whether by accident or design is uncertain. Consequently, his dispatches carried added sting — he was reporting on the less appealing aspects of a major escalation in the bombing campaign which would have attracted headlines on its own merits. His “in depth” of such an important benchmarks added markedly to its public impact. So great was the cry that President Johnson felt impelled to express “deep regret” over civilian casualties on both sides.

To Walter Lippman, the New Year meant “there is hope ONLY in a negotiated compromise” (emphasis added), but to others optimism was the keynote. Ambassador Lodge, in his New Year’s statement, predicted that “allied forces will make sensational military gains in 1967″ and “the war would end in an eventual fadeout one the allied pacification effort made enough progress to convince Hanoi that the jig was up.”  The New York Daily News informed 15 million New Yorkers that the “U.S. Expects to Crush Main Red Force in ’67.”

Johnson’s troop commitments generated an interesting quote from future President Gerald Ford on page three of this volume: “This event generated a storm of criticism especially from Congressman Gerald Ford who attacked the Administration for expanding operations into the Delta without advising Congress.” Ironic he would serve Nixon as VP (beginning in 1971) and had to confront Nixon’s secret war in Cambodia dating back to 1969.
Even the The Washington Starquoted North Vietnam’s Premier Phan Van Dong as being convinced that American public opinion “would eventually force the US to leave South Vietnam. He confirmed the often expressed fears of US officials who prophesied great danger of a wider and bloodier war if North Vietnam misread the peace marches and opposition to the war, interpreting it as lack of US determination.”

One of the interesting sections in this Volume is Section 4 “The Domestic Debate Continues: Polarization at Home.” Both members of Congress and citizens at home were protesting the war in Vietnam.  This was noted in February 1966, yet the war would continue and more Americans would die for another 10 years.  Another hot issue was inconsistent reporting from the military with reporters:

Pentagon Papers:  Part IV. C6b: Evolution of the War.
Extracted pages 90-100
In early February the Pentagon acknowledged that it had lost 1800 aircraft in Vietnam as opposed to the 622 “combat planes” which it had quoted earlier. R. W. Appel wrote in the New York Times questioning COMUSMACV infiltration figures.

 The public and the press alike were becoming increasingly wary of the statistics coming out of Washington. Even the Chicago Tribune in early March surmised that either the figures coming out of MACV were wrong or those coming out of the Pentagon were misleading. The paper cited a recent joint press conference held by McNamara and Rusk in which they announced that communist military forces in Vietnam had suffered tremendous casualties in the past four months, quantitatively an increase of 40-50%, thus reducing their effectiveness significantly, but in the next sentence announcing that serious communist military activity in Vietnam had “increased substantially.”

By mid-March editorial commentary was focusing on the theme that generally there would be more and wider war. American casualties announced on 10 March were higher than those for any other week of the war: 232 KIA, 1381 WIA, 4 MIA for a total of 1617.  Four days later the U. S. conducted the heaviest attacks of the 1967 air war on North Vietnam (128 missions flown by approximately 450 aircraft). Not only was there a feeling that the war would be longer and more intense, bur the public was becoming increasingly aware of its costs. In mid-March the House Appropriations Committee approved a $12 billion supplemental appropriations bill and a week later the Senate overwhelmingly approved a $20.8 billion military procurement program. The ease of which the appropriations bills were being passed was not truly indicative of the mood of Congress which was becoming increasingly divided about the war. The Stennis Subcommittee (Preparedness) was carrying the military’s fight for more troops. In late March Stennis charged that “American commanders in Vietnam are not getting all the troops they want and the bombing of the north is overly restricted.” The Pentagon reply to this was that “there had been no reduction in any program of troop deployments previously approved by the Department of Defense.” Senator Symington was publicly urging wider air raids of North Vietnam to include attack of the MIG airfields. By late March, Stennis’ charges were coming in drum-fire fashion focusing on charges that future troop deployments to Vietnam would fall below approved levels; that urgent military appeals for the bombing of more meaningful targets in North Vietnam were being arbitrarily denied and that the Pentagon was responsible for a gross shortage of ships in Vietnam. Prior to General Westmoreland’s return to the U.S. in late April, General Abrams had been named as his Deputy Commander and it appears that indeed, despite Westmoreland’s promises of victory, it would be a long war. For early that week the infiltration/casualty figures for the first quarter of 1967 were released, and they indicated that despite huge Red losses of nearly 25,000 men in the first 12 weeks of that year, nearly 4,000 more than that amount had infiltrated during the same period and were now active in enemy units in the South.

The waring signs were ringing again.  Yet the lack of honesty in the military and the White House contributed to a protest movement that required another two years to become simply unavoidable for Johnson.  But it was all at such a terrible cost.

I feel that more reports documenting a losing effort will continue to surface as I make my way through all 7,000+ pages of the study.

On the surface it should shock Americans today to read the reports and both military and diplomatic cables that show President Johnson, General Westmoreland & their aides planed how to deal with losing the war in Vietnam in mid 1965.

Regrettably if you read previous volumes of the Pentagon Papers its very clear America had absolutely no reason to back Diem and the South in its war against the communist North….other than the domino theory that was gripping global politics.  They knew well before ’65 that South Vietnam would fall to the communists.
US involvement in Vietnam and to a greater extent South East Asia began during the late stages of World War II.  During the 1961 Presidential transition we learned President Eisenhower briefed incoming President elect Kennedy that Americans would again be drawn into war in Laos — not Vietnam.  The Johnson White House clearly understood the history of failed efforts by the US to aid South Vietnam in it’s long protracted war against the communist North.

While it was Watergate that would later gave us the catch phrase “What did the President know and when did he know it” clearly Volume IV-C5 reveals Johnson and his White House advisers knew between March and July of 1965 that South Vietnam could not win their war.  Mid 1965 — its already understood we cannot turn the tide against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong?

These memorandums appear on roughly page 1,780 in Volume IV-C5 and just five months before the battle of the Ia Drang valley.  Today some will recognize this battle by the critically acclaimed book We Were Soldiers Once… And Young. Many remember the 2002 movie starring Mel Gibson.  305 Americans died in this battle. And while winning at LZ X-Ray, horrifically American soldiers marched to LZ X-Albany where the stung enemy ambushed and killed an additional 155 Americans.  So even before waging this battle the White House knew it was a losing effort.  Again, just stunning to read these cables and reports by key members of the White House and armed forces outlining how to bring US soldiers into Vietnam in a formal landing while working on a strategy to salvage face (against the Soviets and Chinese) while understanding their efforts were inevitability a lost cause.

Volume IV C5 reveals the deep ties of four consecutive Presidential Administrations regarding Southeast Asia, Laos and Vietnam.  Beginning with Truman in 1945 to Eisenhower, then Kennedy and at the time of the writing – Johnson with Richard Nixon to take over and expand the War after 1968.  Despite an initial deployment of 44 US battalions (~57,200 troops) to Vietnam to help fight the war all reports by military and civilian analysts, well…now we can read for the first time – 40 years later….it was all just bullshit from before our troops even landed at Da Nang.

Pentagon Papers:  Part IV. C5: Evolution of the War.
Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Forces: March – July 1965
Section: N:  The U.S. Moved to Take Over the Land War — The Search and Destroy Strategy and the 44 Battalion Debate
Subsection: D:  Search and Destroy as a Strategy and 44 Battalions as a Force
Key participants:  President Johnson, General Westmoreland, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, US Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, Under Secretary of State George Ball & Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton
Extracted Text: Pages 104 – 116:

Page 104:
Section D: Search and Destroy as a Strategy and 44 Battalions as a Force
—
Page 114:
This message was extremely important, for in it COMUSMACV [Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] spelled out the concept of keeping U.S. forces away from the people. The search and destroy strategy for U.S. and Third Country forces which continues to this day and the primary focus of RVNAF on pacification both stem from that concept.  In addition, Westmoreland made a big pitch in this cable for a free hand to maneuver the troops around inside the country. That is the prerogative of a major field commander — there is good indication that at this stage Westmoreland saw himself in that light rather than as advisor and assister to the Vietnamese armed forces.

Ambassador Taylor returned to Vietnam from Washington shortly after the battle at Dong Xoai, just as the new Thieu-Ky government was being installed. His first report confirmed the ‘seriousness of the military situation as reported by General Westmoreland and also pointed up the very tenuous hold the new government had on the country.  This report apparently helped to remove the last obstacles to consideration of all of the forces mentioned in Westmoreland’s request of 7 June. On 22 June, the Chairman of the JCS cabled Westmoreland and CINCPAC to inform them that the ante had gone up from 35 to 44 battalions, counting all forces planned and programmed and including the 173rd. Westmoreland was asked if 44 battalions would be enough to convince the VC/DRV that they could not win. General Westmoreland replied that there was no evidence the VC DRV would alter their plans regardless of what the U.S. did in the next six months. The 44 battalion force should, however, establish a favorable balance of power by the end of the year. If the U.S. was to seize the initiative from the enemy, then further forces would be required into 1966 and beyond.

On the 26th of June, as has already been noted, General Westmoreland was given the authority to commit U.S. forces to battle in support of RVNAF “in any situation ..”when, in COMUSMACV’s judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces.”  This was about as close to a free hand in managing the forces as General Westmoreland was likely to get. The enclave strategy was finished, and the debate from then on centered on how much force and to what end. There were some attempts to snatch the chestnuts from the fire, however.

Westmoreland’s opposition, while far from presenting a united front, had its day in court during late June and early July 1965. The Embassy in Saigon, “‘while recognizing the seriousness of the situation in South Vietnam, was less than sanguine about the prospects for success if large numbers of foreign troops were brought in. Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson told Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton on 25 June that the U.S. should not bring in more troops. The situation,
according to Johnson, was in many ways no more serious than the previous
—
Page 115:
year. Even if it were more serious, he went on, massive input of U.S. troops was unlikely to make much difference. The best they could do would be to hold a few enclaves. Johnson pointed out that the Vietnamese were afraid they would lose authority if more U.S. troops were brought in. He advised that the U.S. allow the forces already in the country to settle. After some experimentation with them, the way would be much clearer. Once in, troops could not, without difficulty, be-taken out again.

The views expressed by Johnson to McNaughton parallel those of Ambassador Taylor throughout the build-up debate. Both men were very much concerned with the effect of the proposed build-up on the Vietnamese; They were not directly opposed to the use of U.S. forces to help the GVN; they merely wanted to go very slowly to insure against loss of control.

At the opposite end of the spectrum from General Westmoreland was Under Secretary of State George Ball. Convinced that the U.S. was pouring it’s resources down the drain in the wrong place, Ball placed himself in direct opposition to the build-up. In a draft memorandum he circulated on the 28th of June, Ball stated that Westmoreland’s intention was to go to Phase III combat (Phase III of the 8 May Concept of Operations which called for US/Allied forays inland to secure bases and areas for further operations). In Ball’s view there was absolutely no assurance that the U.S. could with the provision of more ground forces achieve its political objectives in Vietnam. Instead, the U.S. risked involving itself in a costly and indeterminate struggle. To further complicate matters,· it would be equally impossible to achieve political objectives by expanding the bombing of the North — the risks of involving the USSR and the CPR. There too great, besides which such action would alienate friends. No combination of the two actions offered any better’ prospect for success. Since the costs to achieve its objectives if the U.S. embarked on an expanding program were indeterminate, the U.S. should, in Ball’s view, not elect to follow such a course of action.   It should instead “cut its losses” by restricting itself to the programmed 15 battalions and 72,000 men made public at a press conference in mid-June by the Secretary of Defense.  By holding those forces to a very conservative Phase II strategy of base defense and reserve in support of RVNAF, U.S. combat losses could be held to a minimum while the stage was being set for withdrawal.

Ball was cold-blooded in his analysis. He recognized that the U.S. would not be able to avoid losing face before its Asian allies if it staged some form of conference leading to withdrawal of U. S. forces.  The loss would only be of short term duration, however, and the U.S. could emerge from this period of travail as a ”a wiser and more mature nation.” On 1 July, Ball sent to the President a memorandum entitled “A Compromise Solution for South Vietnam.” In that memorandum, Ball presented his case for cutting losses essentially as it is described above.
—
Page 116:
Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, like so many others, found himself in between Westmoreland and Ball.  The U. S. needed to avoid the ultimatum aspects of the 44 battalions and also the Ball withdrawal proposal, both of which were undesirable in Bundy’s estimation. On 1 July, Bundy suggested to the President that the U.S. should adopt a policy in which you could allow it to hold on without risking disasters of scale if the war were lost despite deployment of the full 44 battalions. For the moment, according to Bundy, the U.S. should complete planned deployments to bring in-country forces to 18 maneuver battalions and 85,000 men. The Airmobile Division and the remainder of the 1st Division should be brought to a high state of readiness, but the decision as to their deployment should be deferred. By so acting the U.S. would gain time in which to work diplomatically to realign Southeast Asia and thereby salvage its honor and credibility. The forces in Vietnam, which Bundy assumed would be enough to prevent collapse, would be restricted to reserve reaction in support of RVNAF. This would allow for some experimentation without taking over the war effort — a familiar theme. Bundy felt, as did Ambassador Taylor, that there remained considerable uncertainty as to how ‘well U.S. troops would perform in the Vietnam environment. We needed to find out before going big.

While our America’s leaders (and their advisers) knew the writing was on the wall — they nevertheless marched America into that darkness.

And we needed to find out before going big?  Really?  58,195 American lives and 350,000+ casualties.
Think that was big enough?

The study is a 47 volume, 7,000+ page report regarding the US involvement in Vietnam’s long civil war.  This is a long deeply engaging read of organizational failure at the highest levels of the military and government.  So many American lives were lost for a policy that was doomed from the beginning.  This book will painfully show that the brightest and smartest RAND analysts knew it, senior military and policy advisors knew it and so did the White House.

The study was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967.  And for “newly released” material (in 2011) it provides the most horrific, fascinating and astounding read of our policy and warfare strategy under a total of four Presidents: Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. However the war continued through both Johnson and Nixon administrations finally ending under President Gerald Ford in 1975.

The Vietnam War was the longest 20th century war in American history.  The study covers a 25-year military engagement in Vietnam while US political interests and efforts actually developed before the end of World War II and continued until the fall of Saigon in 1975.  Take a step back and realize it was a 30 year losing commitment.

Even today in 2012 its amazing to learn multiple volumes of this 1967 study remained classified for exactly 40 years until released (fully redacted) by the National Archives in June 2011.

As important as this study is for understanding our role in the world over a generation, it will regrettably open old wounds. We finally have full access to read the carelessness of our decision makers (both military and Presidential) that cost the lives of over 53,000 American soldiers.  How horrific would these numbers be viewed today?

So why isn’t this “book” listed with any 2011 best sellers?  It was sure greeted with much fanfare and press coverage the day the US National Archives released the study. 

IMHO today’s twitter-focused society cannot read a 7,000+ page study. Sorry to be so blunt. American culture today — we are a nation of ‘skimmers’ due to the vast amounts of data available and our busy lifestyle, we simply do not have the time to read such lengthly books.  We only seek to quickly skim headlines in print, online and while mobile.

And regarding war, I’m afraid here (yet again) is where the lessons of history are lost.

40 years also makes another amazing difference – my ability to hold all 47 volumes on an iPad. As of January I’m just past page 3,500.

My highest compliments to an amazingly professional effort to move the Papers, printed over 40 years ago into an easily copy/paste format for educators, students and historians.

May I suggest photoshopping the faded lines of text in attached memorandums?

By simply modifying the brightness level of the image’s histogram (using the Levels tool in Photoshop) it would benefit many readers who like me, find focusing and recognizing faded text somewhat difficult to read.

The example here took less than one minute to produce a deeper, darker text that makes character recognition much easier to comprehend.

BTW: Its wonderful to color hilight sections of any volume of the study on an iPad.  And carrying around this entire 7,000+ page, 47 volume study is just remarkable.

As Part IV-C.4. reveals research, studies & politics all concluded that South Vietnamese armed forces were on the brink of collapse against the Viet Cong.  The document provides the data that should have not only questioned the decision to deploy US forces but the questioned the role of the US in Vietnam vs Laos.

It was just one terrible decision by the White House after 20 years of continued support for the South Vietnamese.  The “no surprise at the time of deployment” was an existing 20,000 American force of military and policy advisers supporting the South Vietnamese air force and government.

An emerging mistake in the previous part “[Part IV. C. 3.] Evolution of the War. Rolling Thunder Program Begins: January – June 1965″ is the “automatic reliance” on superior air power to defeat the NVA and Viet Cong.  I believe Nixon proved this wrong at the very end of the war.

Looking back — One should not help but evaluate these hard lessons from David Halberstam’s The Best and The Brightest published in 1972 (my review here)  Kennedy seemed to have the top researchers and policy advisors like McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow continue policies established by Presidents Truman and Eisnenhower regarding Southeast Asia, Laos and Vietnam.   Halberstam looked at the promise of the young Kennedy think-tank and drew upon his own lessons while reporting from Vietnam.  Halberstam was awarded a 1964 Pulitzer prize for International Reporting on the war in Vietnam  and the overthrow of the Diem regime.

If there is a way to get there — I would make the trip in a ping.

As I approach page 3,500 and reading about actions 40 years ago, I cannot convey how sad this is for America.  The loss of life in a war against communism (today we can realize) was doomed from the beginning. Consistently ignored by Washington and every President from FDR to Nixon lied through their teeth to protect US interests during the Cold War.

Interesting to look at the title “US – Vietnam relations 1945 – 1967″ clearly the early volumes indicate before the end of World War II the US sent money and arms to the Viet Minh — yes the Viet Minh.

In 1960 the Viet Minh changed their name to the National Liberation Front (NLF) aka Viet Cong.   So FDR and the US gave money and arms to Ho Chí Minh for one year…however we reversed course, backed the South Vietnamese and welcomed the quagmire that cost 53,000 American lives.  I hope to be done in January 2012.

To my utter amazement Dr. Meehan was not at the World Trade Center or even in New York City on 9/11.  She watched events unfold from South Orange New Jersey, 15 miles away from The World Trade Center while working at Seton Hall University.

Dr. Meehan: An attempt to share your “compelling, first-hand experience” is an embarrassment for you and Alverno College.

Your address could have described how seemingly within seconds of Flight UA #175 impacting the South Tower, a human leg fell onto Liberty street in-front of the Deutsche Bank Building.  But you could not hear the screams from those standing near the severed limb from Seton Hall.  Your address could have described segments of UA#175 that were on the grounds on the WTC Complex.  But you could not see those from Seton Hall.  And you could have shared how the impact of UA #175 shook all that way down to the entrance of the Deutsche Bank Building.  But you could not feel that from Seton Hall.

If only you were standing in-front of the Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty Street adjacent to the South Tower when flight UA#175 struck at 9:03am.

Because in all that horror Dr. Meehan — regrettably — you would have stood next to my wife.

Proving that ‘tigers eat their young’ those same pundits are already calling Google+….the next GoogleWave.

Wave? Oh, how quickly did you forget about Google’s last B-L-U-N-D-E-R in social media?  Feels like yesterday Google was so slowly handing out Wave invites that it actually killed user adoption by the time they got around to “launching” the product.

Wave was so over-hyped by those same pundits who were also on twitter begging for a Wave invite.  I recall them wishing they could be part of the Wave hype….until the exact moment they logged into Wave they found out how complex the UI was presented. Boy did Google deserve one hard shot right to the groin for that social train wreck.

So those who consider themselves social media leaders (or innovators) are actually voicing their displeasure with Google+ after its been public for just 30 days?  Oh the irony.  I cannot help but relish that quote from earlier this year that puts all those social media so called leaders or innovators into context:

“99.5 Percent Of Social Media Experts Are Clowns”
-Gary Vayerchuk interview

I attended a social media briefing two weeks ago where the guest ‘innovator’ actually stated Google+ would “totally wipe out LinkedIn” but not kill Twitter.  Interesting since LinkedIn plays to the business hiring community. And with a mid-May IPO valuation of $4.3 billion (yes that’s B — as in Billion) I somehow think the hype got the better of them yet again.

Expectations regarding Google and social media are simply out of control.  It will never be what any of those pundits want. With today’s accepted fast user-adoption model it might be time to re-evaluate a “3 strikes and your out” policy.  Will it be strike-two and your out for Google?

I hope not especially since they have been upfront to keep business away for the moment from embracing Google+ as a replacement for corporate Facebook.  It helps when you generate AdSense revenue of $2.04 billion.

Here is one sales method Google successfully employed in the UK to secure Wave penetration into the Higher Education community: Tie Wave accounts to every University student, faculty, staff and alumni when the institution migrates costly legacy email services to Google Apps for Education.  Wave made inroads in UK Universities using that exact strategy.  If Google truly wants Plus to establish a social media juggernaut, then make Plus a standard component of the Google Apps for Education strategy.  And throw in Google Voice for good measure too.

If Wave was killed due to languishing in beta Plus has a chance. Today Google can scale more efficiently than it could just four years ago (Google server infographic) However even with their infrastructure in place they have stumbled a bit out of the gate regarding Plus.

But its not a killer after just 30 days people!

Remember – in the end its all about managing expectations.  Unfortunately social media pundits expect Google to scale Plus into the stratosphere where Facebook sits.  Even with all of Google’s servers they are still not engineered to take advantage of this type of roll-out strategy…..yet.