E-Discovery can sometimes be thought of as an ailment that requires a quick remedy in the form of software or services.  We continue to be reminded, however, that e-discovery is much more than a fleeting malady; it is an ongoing business problem that must be treated with the same diligence and meticulous execution as regulatory compliance or data security.

So where should the prudent practitioner begin?

Every good IT project manager I have ever worked with always had the same mantra when it came to solving a problem with technology – make sure the business problem has been well defined and establish detailed requirements before venturing into the marketplace.  So, why are so many companies sending out form RFPs containing canned text expecting to find a miracle “end-to-end” e-discovery solution in a relatively short period of time?  The answer, I believe, lies both in the abundance and availability of generic information about e-discovery and the fact that most companies looking to bring e-discovery in-house are already feeling the pain of rising costs and demands on existing staff.  They are, in short, trying to conquer their e-discovery problem in a day.  To truly conquer the problem, it should be attacked from the areas causing the greatest pain and expense first, and those areas should be thoroughly examined using proven project management techniques.

If e-discovery is indeed a significant business process, then companies must address that problem using the same proven methods that they have been using for years to solve other business problems.  For example, every company today, believe it or not, has an e-discovery solution in place.  If the company was sued tomorrow, and there was a significant e-discovery component to the matter, the company would likely react in a certain way based on a number of factors – hire outside consultants, work with a litigation support provider, rely on their outside counsel to coordinate e-discovery, etc.  So why not predict that reaction, analyze it, and determine where the greatest expense and pain lies in that process?  From that data, the company can decide which portions of the e-discovery workflow, if any, should be brought in-house, and it can seek out best-of-breed solutions rather than settling on the first end-to-end vendor that comes knocking.  The next step is to rely on those time-honored project management edicts – define the business problem and establish concrete requirements.  Then the company will be armed with the most powerful weapon in the marketplace – the power to distinguish.

The burning question, then, is how does the company decide which portions of the e-discovery workflow to bring in-house?  The answer is relatively simple: you follow the money (right out of the front door in many cases).  Where is the company spending most of its e-discovery budget, and are those portions of the workflow good candidates to bring in-house?  Typically, processing data and review are the most expensive phases of any e-discovery project.  The logic here is simple: if you send 100GB of ESI to outside counsel to review, it will be more expensive and time-consuming than sending only 20GB.  Thus, processing, analysis, and first-pass review are great candidates to be brought in-house from an ROI perspective, and bringing these phases in-house could facilitate a form of early case assessment given the right solution.

Now, suppose a company decides to bring processing, analysis, and first-pass review in-house, also leveraging their chosen technology solution for early case assessment.  Now what?  The process can simply be repeated.  Given the solution implemented, what happens if we get sued tomorrow?  What other portions of the e-discovery workflow will need to be outsourced and how will we do that?  What will that cost?  Is there a better way?  The company can continue this process until it determines that either all portions of its e-discovery workflow have been successfully brought in house or the ROI of bringing additional portions of the workflow in house does not justify additional projects at that time.  This analysis should then be repeated on a regular basis to ensure the current solution is still meeting the needs of the organization and that market or industry shifts have not created additional opportunities for cost savings.

Although an effective and defensible in-house e-discovery solution likely cannot be built in a day, a carefully crafted plan of attack and a thorough understanding of the organization’s particular needs can strategically position it for long term success.

The survey does a good job of teeing up the issue:

The world contains an unimaginably vast amount of digital information which is getting ever vaster ever more rapidly. This makes it possible to do many things that previously could not be done: spot business trends, prevent diseases, combat crime and so on. Managed well, the data can be used to unlock new sources of economic value, provide fresh insights into science and hold governments to account.

It goes on to talk about how companies like Walmart, which has 2.5 petabytes of point-of-sale transaction data, is using business intelligence software to analyze the 1 million transactions it does every hour. By doing so, Walmart is able to improve the efficiency of its supply chain and the effectiveness of its marketing. The article also describes how companies like Amazon and Google use web analytics software on click stream data to improve their services.

What’s missing is an equally intelligent analysis of the legal and regulatory implications of all this data. The move from paper to ESI (email and files) has created a user-generated, written record of everything that happens in a company. That’s incredibly helpful when, after the fact, questions or disputes arise. Rather than relying on incomplete recollections, courts and regulators can now consult a written record – one where every document is time-stamped and very often attached to a person’s name via email. That enables judges and regulators to get better information which, in turn, leads to better decisions. It’s hard to quantify the value of that, but there’s no doubt it’s substantial.

There is, however, a catch. Because the volume of ESI is so great, it’s really expensive to gather, sift through, and then produce information. Add the requirement that the process needs to be defensible (i.e., easily explained in court), and the whole thing gets really expensive really fast. Hence the need for electronic discovery software: it’s the only cost-effective way for companies to manage their ESI from a legal and regulatory perspective.

That’s why I believe e-discovery software will be as big a category as web analytics software or business intelligence software – it’s a different side to the same coin. Or, more specifically, a different dimension to managing digital information stores which, as The Economist points out, are growing tenfold every five years.

Update: Nick Patience at The 451 Group has also posted on this topic, at almost exactly the same time as me.

Pension Committee of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan, et al., v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, et al. (“Pension Committee”) is generating a lot of buzz and reminds me of the Yogi Berra quote: “this is like déjà vu all over again” … particularly when thinking back to her landmark Zubulake decisions.  In this opinion, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York pens another potential electronic discovery classic, while simultaneously paying homage to her past opus.

Before we get into the “how” and “what” of the 85 page opinion, it’s probably reasonable to posit the “why” question, particularly when Judge Scheindlin and her team spent 300 hours on the mammoth undertaking.

“I, together with two of my law clerks, have spent an inordinate amount of time on this motion. We estimate that collectively we have spent close to three hundred hours resolving this motion. I note, in passing, that our blended hourly rate is approximately thirty dollars per hour (!) well below that of the most inexperienced paralegal, let alone lawyer, appearing in this case. My point is only that sanctions motions, and the behavior that caused them to be made, divert court time from other important duties-namely deciding cases on the merits.”

So, why was this fact pattern worthy of the inordinate amount of briefing time (regardless of the inconceivably low $9,000 fee)?  A skeptic might postulate that Judge Scheindlin has been out of the limelight lately, often being eclipsed by Judges Peck and Grimm.  It’s also been a year since her Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp., opinion and it’s likely that she wanted to hearken back to the good ole Zubulake days, where she had the ear of the entire electronic discovery world.  Her tribute is less than subtle, as she even subtitles Pension Committee: “Zubulake Revisited: Six Years Later.”

Less skeptically, however, she likely sees a host of matters rife with electronic data discovery disputes caused by the bar’s lack of e-discovery savvy.  It seems plausible that Pension Committee is a way for her to coalesce leanings from Zubulake (and beyond) into one, clear expression of legal duties.

Given the length of her opus, we won’t dissect the entire opinion as Ralph Losey did (chockablock with flying gerbils), but will instead focus in on the enduring and potentially controversial sections.  As way of background, the dispute at hand focused on claims by a group of investors who brought an action to recover losses of 550 million dollars stemming from the liquidation of two British Virgin Islands based hedge funds.  Unlike many typical e-discovery disputes, this instant action focused on the conduct of the plaintiffs as they attempted to deal with the often murky landscape of ESI preservation, collection and production.  Fortunately, Judge Scheindlin provided much needed foreshadowing to both readers and bloggers alike in her opening comments:

“Because this is a long and complicated opinion, it may be helpful to provide a brief summary up front. I begin with a discussion of how to define negligence, gross negligence, and willfulness in the discovery context and what conduct falls in each of these categories. I then review the law governing the imposition of sanctions for a party’s failure to produce relevant information during discovery. This is followed by factual summaries regarding the discovery efforts–or lack thereof–undertaken by each of the thirteen plaintiffs against whom sanctions are sought, and then by an application of the law to those facts. Based on my review of the evidence, I conclude that all of these plaintiffs were either negligent or grossly negligent in meeting their discovery obligations. As a result, sanctions are required.”

The finding of sanctions aside, Judge Scheindlin goes out of her way to crystallize duties and identify the type of conduct can cause an e-discovery breach.  Despite significant caveats about the fact intensive nature of each discovery dispute, she nevertheless proffers the following synthesis, which has caused no shortage of consternation amongst electronic discovery practitioners and commentators:

“After a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to contemporary standards can be considered gross negligence. Thus, after the final relevant Zubulake opinion in July, 2004, the following failures support a finding of gross negligence, when the duty to preserve has attached:

• to issue a written litigation hold;
• to identify all of the key players and to ensure that their electronic and paper records are preserved;
• to cease the deletion of email or to preserve the records of former employees that are in a party’s possession, custody, or control;
• and to preserve backup tapes when they are the sole source of relevant information or when they relate to key players, if the relevant information maintained by those players is not obtainable from readily accessible sources.

[bullets added]

Assuming Pension Committee is followed beyond the bounds of the Southern District of New York, which is still speculative at this stage, it certainly means sleepless nights for corporate legal departments with litigation hold and preservation processes that are less than “contemporary.” While it’s hard to argue with the theoretical appropriateness of the above items, it’s questionable how practical these steps are, particularly for large enterprises that may have dozens (or hundreds) of litigation holds in place at any one point in time.  Multiply the numbers of holds times the disparate types of ESI and the complexities of the IT infrastructures and Judge Scheindlin’s seemly innocuous mandate can quickly become a tactical minefield, rife with sanctions possibilities.  Unfortunately, with the rapid proliferation of social media usage and cloud computing, this already complex paradigm is only going to become more vexing in the near term.

Given that the number of struggling enterprises is legion, it does certainly beg the question whether more folks than not can live up to this new “reasonableness” standard.  If not, this articulation may materially raise the bar and result in a demonstrable increase in spoliation motions, if that were possible.  Already, spoliation charges are often referred to as a “case within the case” by many, something which Judge Scheindlin reluctantly acknowledges.

“Finally, I note the risk that sanctions motions, which are very, very time consuming, distracting, and expensive for the parties and the court, will be increasingly sought by litigants. This, too, is not a good thing. For this reason alone, the most careful consideration should be given before a court finds that a party has violated its duty to comply with discovery obligations and deserves to be sanctioned. Likewise, parties need to anticipate and undertake document preservation with the most serious and thorough care, if for no other reason than to avoid the detour of sanctions.”

[Footnotes omitted]

Perhaps ratcheting up of the e-discovery standard of care can be rationalized as aspiration in nature.  Yet, it is hard to see how it reflects the actual business practices of many in corporate legal departments, particularly when the actions/inactions occurred (as in this case) several years ago when nascent notions about best practices were still evolving.

“The age of this case requires a dual analysis of culpability–plaintiffs’ conduct before and after 2005. The Citco Defendants contend that plaintiffs acted willfully or with reckless disregard, such that the sanction of dismissal is warranted.  Plaintiffs admit that they failed to institute written litigation holds until 2007 when they returned their attention to discovery after a four year hiatus. Plaintiffs should have done so no later than 2005, when the action was transferred to this District. This requirement was clearly established in this District by mid2004, after the last relevant Zubulake opinion was issued. Thus, the failure to do so as of that date was, at a minimum, grossly negligent.”

[Footnotes omitted]

Perhaps my biggest issue with this decision is that it (perhaps myopically) places an inordinate level of importance and awareness of the Zubulake decisions, particularly for those outside Judge Scheindlin’s district.  This lawsuit was initially brought in Florida and “[w]hile a duty to preserve existed in the Southern District of Florida at the time this action was filed, no court in the Eleventh Circuit articulated a ‘litigation hold’ requirement until 2007.”  In my mind, it hardly seems fair to retroactively imbue the Plaintiffs with this type of comprehension and duty.

At the end of the day, and despite quibbling with the equities involved, Judge Scheindlin has largely succeeded in moving the e-discovery ball forward.  The opinion will likely be one of the most widely read cases in 2010 and deservedly so since it describes with precision and clarity the burdens and penalties in the evolving area of ESI spoliation.  The main question will be to what extent will other jurisdictions adopt the same culpability framework and extend the reach of Pension Committee just as happened with the Zubulake line of cases.

Certainly, it could be “déjà vu all over again.”

In their letter to customers announcing the deal, Ramana Venkata (President of Iron Mountain Digital) and TM Ravi (CEO of Mimosa) point to two main benefits from combining the companies. On the archiving side, Iron Mountain can now offer Mimosa as an on-premise solution in addition to its existing hosted service. If it can integrate the two, then it can offer “location-independent” archiving which “will help you transparently and seamlessly move data between the on-premises data center and the cloud.” One additional benefit to Iron Mountain, which is not mentioned in the letter, is that it could even leverage Mimosa’s technology for its hosted offering, and replace Mimecast who it currently pays to provide this service.

On the e-discovery front, Iron Mountain now has a suite of 2 products and 1 service: Mimosa NearPoint for collection and preservation; the Stratify eVantage appliance for ECA (Early Case Assessment); and, Stratify Legal Discovery Services for review and production. This makes Iron Mountain a competitor to Autonomy, Clearwell, EMC/Kazeon, and everyone else listed in Gartner’s recent MarketScope covering e-discovery software companies. I’m sure the hope is that there’s synergy between the different products so that, for example, Mimosa’s experience in on-premise software will help Iron Mountain drive adoption of its new Stratify eVantage appliance behind the firewall.

Will the combination work? As Barry Murphy (a former Mimosa employee) points out in his excellent post on this topic, a lot depends on execution. But there are at least 2 reasons to be doubtful. First, the competition is far ahead, and will be hard to catch. As Barry, points out: “Iron Mountain will have a tough road ahead to compete with the likes of Autonomy, which bought successful archiving company Zantaz and has now had almost two years of development time for its hybrid on-premise/SaaS archiving offering.” The same is true on the e-discovery side, where companies like Clearwell have hundreds of corporate customers for on-premise ECA and review.

The second reason to doubt why the combined company will be any more successful than either were before the acquisition is that Mimosa and Iron Mountain Digital serve very different markets. Most of Mimosa’s customers are small to medium sized companies; most of Iron Mountain Digital (ie., Stratify)’s revenue comes from law firms. So it’s not obvious that by combining them you create a company well-suited to serving large corporations, which is the sweet spot for e-discovery and archiving.

It will be interesting to watch events unfold.

From an industry perspective, there are two interesting questions about this deal, and I’ll cover the first of them in this post: what does the price suggest about the valuation of archiving/e-discovery companies?

To answer that question, you have to consider Mimosa’s history and financial performance. The company was founded in December 2003, and proceeded to raise $51.5 million in venture funding over 5 years from Clearstone Venture Partners, August Capital, JAFCO, Mayfield, and few others. Initially, it had great traction in the market and, at various industry events around Silicon Valley, I would often hear about how well it was doing. But then, as often happens with startup companies, Mimosa lost its way, and the growth slowed. I don’t know exactly why that happened; it could have been the recession, competition from Microsoft Exchange 2010’s new archiving features, or something completely different. But the signs were unmistakable: there were layoffs, pay cuts for the remaining staff, and (according to Venture Source) a series of 4 small debt financings totaling $10.4 million between May 2009 and January 2010.

The deal documents, which were sent out to all shareholders to approve the acquisition, reveal the financials. In 2009, Mimosa generated $20.6 million in revenue and $32.7 million in expenses, meaning it was burning about $1 million dollars every month.

So, to answer the question that many in the archiving / e-discovery community are asking, that means Iron Mountain Digital paid 6 times trailing revenue to acquire Mimosa. That’s about the same multiple it paid for Stratify in October 2007, about the same multiple Dell paid for MessageOne, and a lower multiple than EMC recently paid for Kazeon. It is reasonable to expect that the revenue multiple would have been much higher if Mimosa had been profitable, or growing more quickly.

Overall, I think this is a great outcome for Mimosa’s shareholders who must be delighted. My congratulations to them, and to the entire Mimosa team.