In an op-ed piece entitled “Going Directly to Israelis and Palestinians,” Shlomo Ben-Ami, Thomas Schelling, Jerome Segal, and Javier Solana suggest “a new approach” that isn’t new at all. The heart of it is this:

“The U.N. Security Council…will establish a special committee composed of distinguished international figures acting in their own capacity. Possibly it would be headed by a former American statesman or senator.” Their “first task would be to determine if there is any possible peace agreement that would be acceptable to a majority of both the Israeli and Palestinian people.” To determine this, the panel would “go to the region where, over a period of several months, it would conduct a transparent inquiry into the possibility of genuine peace.”  It would hold televised hearings and “conduct public opinion research and study the record of past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations — in particular, the Clinton Parameters and the progress made at Taba and in the Olmert-Abbas round.” Then, and this is the key, the panel “would…develop a draft treaty” which the UN Security Council would approve in a resolution, calling for negotiations based upon it as a starting point. If Israel or the Palestinians object, “the process should go forward even if one government, or both, fails to embrace it.” If the parties fail, the Security Council should “pass a resolution which embodies the…plan and calls on Israel and the Palestinians to announce their acceptance.”

The four authors are optimistic: “Agreement may not be immediate. However, an end-of-conflict plan that emerges from this process will have the staying power of historic resolutions such as 181 and 242. Supported by majorities on both sides, it will be an offer that political leaders cannot indefinitely refuse.”

What’s above is the plan as the authors describe it. Here’s my description.

The four men are tired of the fact that neither Israelis nor Palestinians accept peace terms that they, in their wisdom, are sure are right. The fact that Israel is a democracy with an elected government is an inconvenience to be brushed aside; “public opinion research” is much more reliable than elections, I guess.  So much for democracy in the year of the “Arab Spring.” The fact that Israel has twice made offers to the Palestinians–Prime Minister Barak in 2000 and Prime Minister Olmert in 2008–that were very generous in the view of the United States is irrelevant. The fact that those offers were withdrawn precisely because Israel did not want to allow the Palestinians to pocket them and start negotiations from those points is also irrelevant; the panel will start by swallowing them and jumping off from there, studying them “in particular.”

The confidence of these four authors in getting “majorities on both sides” to support such a plan is bizarre. It has been tried. The “Geneva Initiative” of 2003, a lengthy, detailed peace plan developed by Israelis and Palestinians who know a lot more about the issues than these four gentlemen, went nowhere. The “People’s Voice Initiative” sponsored by one Israeli and one Palestinian leader, who offered some central principles for a peace deal and asked citizens on both sides to sign up, got 400,000 signatures in a combined population of 11.5 million. To be a bit more specific about the issues, do they think they will get Palestinians to agree to abandon the so-called “right of return,” or Israelis to give up Jerusalem? Will they have security proposals that cope with the Hamas control of Gaza, or ways to handle every territorial dispute? Do they think no dedicated, intelligent American, Palestinian, or Israeli officials have ever addressed these issues and earnestly sought solutions?

Then of course there is the personnel question. Who might the “distinguished international figures” turn out to be? Why, with luck they might be as distinguished as the four authors; maybe three of them (excluding Ben-Ami, an Israeli and former foreign minister) might even comprise three of the four! For other ideas as to who are “distinguished international figures,” look at the group that named itself “The Elders” and even has a web site: http://www.theelders.org/. Consisting of Kofi Annan, Ela Bhatt, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Brundtland, Fernando H. Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Mary Robinson, Desmond Tutu, they have decided to solve the world’s problems and on the Middle East they proclaim that “After decades of peace process, there is still no peace. The Elders are supporting civil society action for an end to the conflict and lasting peace.” Apparently they should knock that civil society nonsense off and simply write up a final status agreement, and mail it in to the UN. What are the Elders up to? In their own words, “The Elders represent an independent voice, not bound by the interests of any nation, government or institution. They are committed to promoting the shared interests of humanity.” (Emphasis in the original, by the way.)

Which brings us back to the four authors of this new, old, proposal. They too are sure they represent the “shared interests of humanity.” They will not only not be “bound by the interests of any nation, government, or institution” but are certain they themselves and people like the Elders are much better than messy things like democracy and elected governments.

I don’t know if the current Israeli leadership and the current PLO leadership can make peace; their predecessors obviously could not. But I do know that only Israelis and Palestinians can make peace. Not the UN, not the Elders, and certainly not another “special committee composed of distinguished international figures.”

But now what? Can it be that even this mass killing willl have no impact beyond a bit of weekend hand-wringing? The Annan plan, and his “mediation” efforts as a whole, are a facade behind which Assad hides while killing civilians, and behind which the United States government and EU leaders hide to justify doing nothing very useful. Assad is not afraid of Kofi Annan.

We will know in a few days whether Annan goes doggedly, indeed blindly, forward or salvages his own reputation by declaring his efforts at an end and demanding international action against Assad. Were he to do so, action might actually follow; it would be difficult for governments to turn away and dismiss his conclusions.

So this week is a test for the former Secretary-General. He may be remembered for this sorry turn in Syria–or for demanding that governments face the truth and help the people of Syria put an end to the murderous Assad regime.

This shocking event is no surprise, for the Syrian government has been killing civilians for 14 months and the death toll is now above 12,000. The disgrace is ours, for letting it go on, month after month.

I have previously referred to Secretary Clinton’s very unfortunate February remark that “world opinion is not going to stand idly by.” Three months later, it is, and so is she. American leadership on Syria is absent, and in its place have come all sorts of excuses and explanations of why we can’t “do more” in Syria.

In this context the President’s announcement of a new “Atrocities Prevention Board” a little over a month ago defies parody when he is in fact watching atrocities occur. The President said this:

We must tell our children about how this evil was allowed to happen — because so many people succumbed to their darkest instincts, and because so many others stood silent….”never again” is a challenge to nations.  It’s a bitter truth — too often, the world has failed to prevent the killing of innocents on a massive scale.  And we are haunted by the atrocities that we did not stop and the lives we did not save…. Elie [Wiesel] alluded to what we feel as we see the Syrian people subjected to unspeakable violence, simply for demanding their universal rights.  And we have to do everything we can.  And as we do, we have to remember that despite all the tanks and all the snipers, all the torture and brutality unleashed against them, the Syrian people still brave the streets.  They still demand to be heard.  They still seek their dignity.  The Syrian people have not given up, which is why we cannot give up.

Those words should be a source of shame today. We “cannot give up” but in fact are doing next to nothing to help the Syrian people defend themselves, seeking instead excuses for inaction. Those who believed the Gulf Arabs or the Turks would act effectively without American leadership may be forgiven for the error–but error it was, more and more clearly with each passing day and the deaths each day brings in Syria. We have no more excuses.

On the White House web site, we are told that the President’s words that day came “after an introduction by Professor Elie Wiesel.” This is misleading, for Wiesel not only introduced the President but took him to task. It’s not surprising that the White House does not show us what Wiesel said, about the Holocaust and about Syria today:

It could have been prevented. The greatest tragedy in history could have been prevented had the civilized world spoken up, taken measures in 1939, ‘40, ‘41, ‘42. Each time, in Berlin, Goebbels and the others always wanted to see what would be the reaction in Washington and London and Rome, and there was no reaction so they felt they could continue. So in this place we may ask: Have we learned anything from it? If so, how is it that Assad is still in power?

How indeed? In large part because President Obama has provided no leadership, apparently preferring to watch these massacres to taking the risks of acting. He is, to use Clinton’s phrase, standing idly by, making speeches from time to time but denying the opposition the assistance they need. If the killing goes on at these levels of brutality he may be forced to act, but that will not eliminate the stain on his record that these 14 months will leave. An “Atrocities Prevention Board” is a nice thing to have; I’m for it. But I’d trade it in an instant for a president determined to prevent atrocities.

In the Weekly Standard I commented recently on the account former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert has given of the peace negotiations he led near the end of his term in office.  Here are some excerpts; the article is found here.

Here is Olmert, describing his negotiations with PLO chairman and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas:

I was within touching distance of a peace agreement. The Palestinians never rejected my offers.  And even if on the thousandth time there are people who are going to try to say that they rejected my offers, the reality was otherwise. They didn’t accept them, and there’s a difference. They didn’t accept them because the negotiations weren’t concluded; they were on the verge of conclusion….The gaps were very small, we had already reached the very last final stretch.

This announcement is interesting and potentially significant, but not in obvious ways.

First, it was brokered by the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. This is a significant display of the continued vigor of that organization and its influence on the Palestinian parties.

Second, it shows a continuing determination on the part of the Fatah old liners and Hamas leaders to sideline PA prime minister Salam Fayyad. In fact this is just about the only goal upon which they agree. Hamas does not want an effective PA government because they wish to rule, themselves; Fatah wants Fayyad out of the way so that Fatah big shots can get more jobs and end Fayyad’s long fight against corruption.

The goal of this new effort is supposedly elections, which are long overdue. But neither Fatah nor Hamas wants elections any more than they want real national unity; they just want to appear to support that goal, which is popular among Palestinians, and they want Fayyad out. Logically, then, they may announce an agreement, though it will be a very costly one: many donors, Western and Arab, will hold back on delivering funds once Fayyad is gone. But what they will not do is hold parliamentary or presidential elections, which neither Hamas nor Fatah leaders think are in their interest right now.

There’s a good chance that the May 27 talks will not reach a deal, given the hatreds that separate Hamas and Fatah, and a better chance that a deal will be reached and Fayyad replaced. If the latter happens, that “unity deal” will break down after a few months–and before elections are held. This will get the Palestinians through 2012, which is the larger goal of the leadership right now. The benefits of all this maneuvering to the Palestinian people are, of course, non-existent.

Asharq Alawsat, the London Arabic-language newspaper, reports on this issue today in a story entitled “FSA: Hezbollah fighters in Syria, carrying out raids.” According to the FSA, the Free Syrian Army, there are also Iranian elements present. What are they doing? According to the newspaper’s sources, the Iranian are providing technical advice and assistance: “there are also Iranian specialists present in the northern areas [of Syria] close to the Turkish borders who have set-up operation rooms…in order to intercept the telephone calls of activists and FSA members…the Iranian specialists’ tasks include training, communication operations and uncovering activists.” But the Hezbollah men are operational: they are snipers.

I have had the same report from official sources in the region, and believe it. Given the importance of Syria to Iran and Hezbollah, it is not surprising that they are willing to fight to preserve the Assad regime. As we debate whether to offer non-lethal and lethal aid to the opposition, the intervention of Iran and Hezbollah on the Assad side and against the people of Syria ought to weigh heavily. A failure to offer adequate assistance is tantamount to saying that a victory for Iran and Hezbollah in Syria is acceptable to us, and a lesson to dictators everywhere to keep on killing. That would be a disastrous policy for the United States to adopt.

Radio Free Asia reports that “Chinese authorities have closed two Tibetan private schools in the Gansu and Qinghai provinces and detained at least five staff as authorities moved to restrict assertions of national identity in Tibetan-populated areas of western China.”

The most recent closure is of an orphanage school in Gansu province, and “The reasons given were the school’s focus on teaching Tibetan language, speech, and culture, as well as the composition by the head of the school of a song containing ‘separatist’ contents.” The latter phrase, “separatist contents,” typically means something nice was said about the Dalai Lama. The former head of the school disappeared in early 2011 after being questioned by Chinese authorities, and the two teachers left running the school were detained by the police early this month.

Such actions by Chinese authorities do not make headlines, but they are part of an effort under way since the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1959 to eradicate Tibetan culture. That disappearances and detentions still occur in 2012 suggests how determined Communist Party leaders are to crush that culture, but equally how resilient it remains and how great is the loyalty of Tibetans to the Dalai Lama–more than half a century after he escaped into exile.

Today the former French prime minister Michel Rocard is in Tehran meeting with top officials including the foreign minister and the nuclear negotiator. As this trip comes only days after Hollande’s victory, and as Rocard is like Hollande from the Socialist Party, it is hard to believe there was zero coordination or that Rocard would have gone if Hollande had asked him not to. If that is indeed the case, let us hope M. Hollande says so, and fast.

It is difficult to exaggerate how significant a softening of France’s hard line would be. France has been tougher than Russia and China of course, but has also stiffened the position of the “EU 3″ by being tougher than Germany and the UK. More important, it has at many junctures been tougher than the United States, sharply asking the difficult questions, highlighting logical deficiencies in arguments, and slicing through wishful thinking. If France is now to abandon this stance and simply agree with the UK, Germany, and the United States, the negotiations with Iran are more likely than ever to produce an unsatisfactory result that will be labelled adequate by its proponents.

Perhaps M. Hollande will clarify that Rocard was asked not to go and carried no message with him. If not, the defeat of President Sarkozy will be seen to have an immediate and harmful effect on France’s hitherto tough line on the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

The November 2011 report of the Bahrain International Commission of Inquiry (or BICI) was seen, at the time, as a turning point. King Hamad accepted the report though BICI was quite critical of the government and found many human rights violations. This was the moment when moderates could take back leadership and end the period of drift, violence, and alienation. That did not happen. Beyond arguing over what portion of the BICI recommendations the government has actually implemented or will implement, there is a deeper problem. The BICI report was about human rights issues, not about the structural political questions that Bahraini society must address. Those issues were beyond the BICI’s jurisdiction, so it rightly did not reach them. Still, the day the BICI report was accepted personally by the king looked like an excellent chance to get the ball rolling on serious and moderate political reform that could bring stability back to the country.

But in recent months and indeed in the last few days things have gotten worse. Talks between the government and the opposition were ended and a crackdown of some sort seems imminent. The top spokesman for the government, Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, said “Because of the escalation in violence, we are looking into the perpetrators and people who use print, broadcast and social media to encourage illegal protest and violence around the country. If applying the law means tougher action, then so be it.”

What went wrong? There is so much blame to go around that everyone gets apportioned some: police and soldiers, high-ranking security officials, the king, the royal family, Shia extremists, violent youth…the list is long. Bahraini officials bridle at Western accounts casting them as evil and all Shia activists as heroes, and this is no doubt understandable: there are extremists in the Shia community, people who say seditious things, seek to overthrow the government, and engage in violence as a means of creating additional tension. But if there are more of them today than there were on the day demonstrations began in February 2011, the explanation is largely to be found in the royal court—or courts, for the Saudis too played a role here in preventing reform. No one denies that they leaned on the Bahraini royal family to crack down, and of course they sent troops to Bahrain last year.

The underlying problem is simple to understand: the people ruling Bahrain in the al-Khalifa family do not wish to lose power and fear that moves toward democracy—a powerful elected parliament and a civilian rather than a royal prime minister, for example—will result in neutering the monarchy and giving the Shias and Iran too much power. The royal family has struggled over this, with the crown prince apparently favoring reform but more powerful figures—the prime minister, minister of the Royal Court, and the Commander in Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force (all of course al Khalifas)—deciding that repression is the better long term bet. The king, who could overrule them all, has either sided firmly with the hard-liners or has been ineffectual and inactive. Since the day last November when he accepted the BICI report he has provided no leadership.

What is to be done? Is it hopeless? Certainly one can come away from meetings with Bahrainis with that feeling, as month after month goes by and things get worse. Time is not on the side of moderates; as in Syria, time and violence are leading to deeper and deeper divisions within the population. And as in Syria, extremists of several varieties, some domestic and many foreign, will sooner or later make their presence known. Still, most Shia appear to favor a compromise solution that moves by stages toward a greater role for the populace in decisions making, and some in the government and royal family acknowledge that force cannot be the long-term solution. Indeed some well-informed people tell me that the Saudis and Emiratis realize this, want things in Bahrain to quiet down, and are now advising the al-Khalifa to find a solution. For the Saudis, the realization may have dawned that while democracy in Bahrain might give ideas to the many Shia in their own Eastern Province, Saudi collusion in endless violence and repression of the Shia in Bahrain might produce an even more unsettling result.

What is missing above all is leadership. Since his acceptance of the BICI report the king has provided almost none, but neither have we—the United States. We are an old friend and ally of Bahrain and seek calm there for many reasons, one of which is the presence there of the Fifth Fleet headquarters. A radicalized or violent Bahrain would be an impossible host for the Fifth Fleet, and would possibly come under greater and greater Iranian influence. Thus far Iran does not seem to be doing much meddling beyond inflammatory broadcasting, but that can always change; terrorism and subversion are among the Islamic Republic’s specialties.

So what have we done thus far? A fair assessment is, nothing. In his UN General Assembly speech last September President Obama said these nice words:

In Bahrain, steps have been taken toward reform and accountability. We’re pleased with that, but more is required. America is a close friend of Bahrain, and we will continue to call on the government and the main opposition bloc — the Wifaq — to pursue a meaningful dialogue that brings peaceful change that is responsive to the people. We believe the patriotism that binds Bahrainis together must be more powerful than the sectarian forces that would tear them apart. It will be hard, but it is possible.

This week, on May 9, Secretary Clinton met with Bahrain’s Crown Prince Salman and the State Department had similar nice words say:

Secretary Clinton affirmed the long-standing commitment of the United States to a strong partnership with both the people and the Government of Bahrain. They discussed the full range of regional and bilateral issues, including the Bahraini Government’s ongoing efforts to implement the recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). Secretary Clinton noted the steps already taken to implement the recommendations, but expressed that much work remains to fully address ongoing human rights issues, including individual cases. She encouraged the Bahraini Government to champion a clear process – in both word and action – that leads to meaningful institutional and political reforms that take into account the interests and aspirations of all Bahrainis.

So, we are for all good things: human rights, reform, accountability, friendship, dialogue, and a process leading to meaningful institutional and political reform. But we also know, fifteen months after the protests began and with the situation deteriorating, that such words are not helping much. They are a substitute for action. There is no American leadership. This will come as no surprise: we “led from behind” in Libya and in Syria our inaction, our determined refusal to lead, is becoming increasingly shocking as the death toll mounts literally each day. A Washington Post editorial rightly described Obama policy toward Syria as “militant passivity.” Considering that even the stakes in Syria have not moved the Obama administration to act, the failure to do more than issue the occasional statement on Bahrain is predictable.

It is also dangerous and foolish. What is needed is far more, and at high levels: a real effort to bring the sides together, of the sort we have repeatedly made in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or undertook in the Balkans. Bring key Bahraini leaders to Washington and have the president and secretary or a high-level designee work with them day after day until something is hammered out; send a top-level empowered emissary to Manama for the same purpose, and have him or her stay for weeks; organize a conference, with the Emiratis and Saudis and Brits (or some other useful combination), where real efforts could be made to hammer out a deal. Has the president discussed this seriously with key officials like the Saudi king or foreign minister, or the Emirati crown prince? Has he pushed them, pressured them, cajoled them? Has he leaned forcefully on the King of Bahrain, or is he too “cool” to engage in that way?

There are many ways to try in Bahrain, but we are not trying. We are wringing our hands from time to time. In Syria thousands have been killed so we wring them more often and more publicly, and at the highest levels. In Bahrain the level of violence is much lower, so the occasional statement is handed out.

If this goes on, in one year or two or five we will wonder why we were foolish enough to do nothing back in 2011 and 2012 when a solution might have been feasible to build. We’ll look at the level of violence, the growing support for radicalism and extremism, the Iranian interference, and the growing complaints about the presence of the Fifth Fleet, and ask why we did not try much harder to help back when it seemed possible. What’s missing in Bahrain is leadership, from the king to be sure, and from the United States as well. We’ll all come to regret it, just as we’ll regret the astonishing refusal to act in Syria as the situation there spiraled downward day after day. The Obama administration’s “militant passivity” is threatening important American interests in the Middle East.

Thus the Vice President of the United States explaining international politics. As I think back to the relationships between President Bush and, to take a few examples, Japanese prime minister Koizumi, Australian prime minister Howard, German chancellor Merkel, British prime minister Blair, King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah II of Jordan, in every case closer than the relationships established with them or their successors by President Obama…well, if we were isolated it was hard to see it.  The “we were the problem” trope is also somewhat undermined by data showing that American popularity in the Arab world is now lower than it was when President Bush left office, a fact that somehow the talkative VP managed to overlook.

Then there are the inconvenient UN Security Council resolutions–inconvenient for the Biden narrative. Resolution 1696 was passed unanimously (except for Qatar) in July 2006, and demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Resolution 1737 was adopted unanimously in December 2006, banned the supply of nuclear-related materials to Iran, and froze the assets of certain individuals and companies related to Iran’s nuclear program. Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously in March 2007 and again tightened sanctions on arms sales and supply to Iran and on Iranian banks, and targeted Iran’s missile program as well. Resolution 1803 was adopted in March 2008 with only Indonesia abstaining, and imposed an arms embargo on Iran and froze additional Iranian assets. It asked states to watch Bank Melli and Bank Saderat in particular.

It’s worth mentioning these resolutions now only because they make it clear that the United States had already achieved a substantial international consensus, and P5+1 unity, against Iran before Mr. Biden left the Senate to ascend to his august post. He seems to be ignorant of these facts or he could not say something as foolish as “we were the problem” and “we were diplomatically isolated.” Policy toward Iran ought to be bipartisan and largely has been until now, and fair credit has been given to the Obama administration for working to get new UN resolutions that tighten the sanctions a good deal. Mr. Biden’s effort to rewrite the history is unworthy, if unsurprising. He owes an apology to the many American officials who worked long and hard, and successfully, to construct the international consensus on which more recent officials have built. History did not start on January 20, 2009.

UPDATE: My former NSC colleague Will Tobey has added the following facts:

In January 2009 Iran was enriching uranium with about 4,000 centrifuges; now it has more than 8,000 in operation. Enriched uranium stocks are up five fold in the same period. Two years ago Iran began enrichment to 20 percent. Whatever the VP might think about administration policy, it’s not slowing Iran.