Both Mohsen Rezai and Ali Akbar Velayati are thought to have been involved in planning and approving 1994 attack on the Jewish community’s headquarters in Buenos Aires, an act of terror that killed 85 people. Rezai was the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard at the time of the attack and Velayati was Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is actually an Interpol warrant, a “Red Notice,” out for Rezai.

A July 20, 2009 Congressional resolution, H. Con. Res 156, notes that:

Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina, an office created by the Government of Argentina, concluded that the AMIA bombing was ‘decided and organized by the highest leaders of the former government of * * * Iran, whom, at the same time, entrusted its execution to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah’;

Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Prosecutor of Argentina concluded that the AMIA bombing had been approved in advance by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, Iran’s then-leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s then-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran’s then-Minister of Security and Intelligence Ali Fallahijan…

It’s worth adding that another leading candidate, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, has boasted of his role in the violent suppression of internal dissent:

I was the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Air Force at the time. Photographs of me are available showing me on back of a motor bike, with Hossein Khaleqi, beating them [the protestors] with wooden sticks….I was among those carrying out beatings on the street level and I am proud of that. I didn’t care I was a high ranking commander.

Then there is Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator since 2007, and whom the Washington Post describes as inflexible, ideological, and anti-American.

Those who believe that this election will lead to reforms inside Iran, or to a weakening of the regime’s nuclear weapons program or its support for terror, are substituting hope for evidence.

There are many ways to measure the success of American foreign policy, and popularity is not necessarily the best one.

But when an administration and a president start out as Mr. Obama did, in essence reviling his predecessor’ policies in the Arab world and assuring Arabs that he had a new and better way, it is striking if the product is less popularity.

And that is the case in Egypt. A new Pew poll says that while Bush’s popularity in Egypt in his last year in office, 2008, was 22 percent, today Obama’s rating has fallen even lower–to 16 percent.

The same poll contains much interesting data. For example, only 39 percent of Egyptians think things are better now than when Mubarak ruled the country; only 29 percent expect that their economy will improve in the coming year. These numbers should keep President Morsi up at night.

The numbers on democracy are somewhat cheering. As the Pew narrative notes, “Two-in-three Egyptians [66%] believe democracy is the best form of government, while just 21% think that in some circumstances a non-democratic form of government can be preferable.” Asked whether democracy or a strong leader is more important, democracy wins 60 to 36 percent. Moreover “by a slender margin, Egyptians tend to prioritize democracy over stability. About half (51%) say it is more important for Egypt to have a democratic government, even if there is some risk of political instability. Slightly fewer (43%) believe it is more important to have a stable government, even if there is some risk it will not be fully democratic. However, the percentage who prioritize stability has increased since 2011, when just 32% held this view.” I would have expected higher numbers prizing stability, given Egypt’s history in the last few years.

When asked what their highest priorities are, 83 percent of Egyptians say improved economic conditions– but 81 percent say a fair judiciary, 60 percent say uncensored media, and 51 percent say freedom of speech. Interestingly, 32 percent say freedom of religion for minorities is “very important” and an additional 49 percent say it is “somewhat important.” In a country that is only 10-15 percent Coptic (and some would say lower), those are impressive numbers. They suggest that the government could attain wide public support for defending the Copts from violence, which it has largely been unwilling to do. The very recent State Department report on religious freedom in Egypt says this: “the government generally failed to prevent, investigate, or prosecute crimes against members of religious minority groups, especially Coptic Christians, which fostered a climate of impunity. In some cases, government authorities reacted slowly or with insufficient resolve while mobs attacked Christians and their property, or encouraged Christians to leave their homes.” President Morsi could do more; the failure is one of leadership.

As the “Arab Spring” swept the fake republics of North Africa–Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt–Algeria seemed immune. Media reports dwelled on its stability (see this 2011 BBC and this 2012 Deutsche Welle story).

The question now is whether that perception is correct.

There was one burst of violence this year, the January 16 terrorist seizure of a natural gas facility that ultimately left at least 38 civilians and 29 terrorists dead after a four-day siege. But now there is more trouble: President Bouteflika appears to have had a stroke and has not been seen in public in over a month. The government claims he is recovering well, but there is no evidence to support that claim. As France 24 put it, “When he was appointed foreign minister in 1963 after Algeria won its independence from France, the 26-year-old Bouteflika cut a dashing, energetic picture as the world’s youngest foreign minister. Half-a-century later, the Algerian president is in frail health as he enters the final year of his third consecutive term in office.”

The country has long been run by the opaque group of military and intelligence officials known as “le pouvoir,” but can that system really hold? The nation is rich due to gas revenues, but the people are poor: foreign reserves are said to be $200 billion, but there is widespread rural poverty and high unemployment.

A persuasive analysis just published by the Atlantic Council is entitled “Algeria: A Powder Keg Ready To Explode?” Karim Mezran, the author and a senior fellow at the Council, says this:

Algeria may be teetering on the brink of a crisis, with the three pillars of the regime’s stability—its powerful military, abundant revenues from hydrocarbons, and the façade of a democratic political system—beginning to crumble.

First, the terrorist and security challenge is greater than it has been in years, as Algeria’s border with Mali reminds us. Second, “From a socioeconomic point of view, despite Algeria’s enormous wealth in oil and gas, the population suffers from poverty, unemployment, and citizen discontent.” Then comes “a political crisis at the top of the state apparatus. The illness of Abdulaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria since 1999, makes it highly unlikely that he will be able to run for another term with upcoming presidential elections in 2014. No clear procedure exists for the appointment of his successor, which leaves a vacuum at the pinnacle of political authority.”

As Mezran notes, “It is hard to predict the outcome of the myriad of tensions that are boiling in the country. It is possible that the Algerian people, still fatigued from the bloody civil war of the 1990′s and conscious of the repressive power of the state choose not to confront the regime in any sustained or systematic way.” Right–perhaps. As we’ve seen across the region, things are often far less stable than they appear. A recent Carnegie study notes this:

At first glance, Algeria gives the impression of a country that has succeeded in bypassing the turmoil of the Arab Awakening that has rocked the Middle East over the last two years. Social unrest appears to be largely under control. The country is enjoying a large current account surplus, a limited budget deficit, and very low external debt. Recent parliamentary elections were conducted without interruption and were officially open to participation by all political parties. But despite this reassuring veneer, many of the social, economic, and political challenges that triggered uprisings in neighboring North African countries fester just beneath the surface in Algeria.

The author, Lahcen Achy, concludes starkly that:

The clock is ticking. If the regime does not start down the road of managed political and economic reform soon, while it retains the cushion of high hydrocarbon rents, it will quickly become too late. Algeria is faced with a stark choice: reform now or collapse later.

But Le Pouvoir has never been inclined toward such reforms, especially not at a moment of political uncertainty–Bouteflika apparently quite sick, and an election next year without him on the ballot for the first time since 1999. So Algeria is worth more attention than it is getting. Its immunity to change may be wearing thin.

This is strange kind of “moderation,” for Rafsanjani’s presidency (1989-1997) includes the following acts of terror:

1. 1992 Israeli embassy bombing in Argentina, 29 killed and 242 injured
2. 1994 bombing of the AMIA, the Jewish community center building in Buenos Aires, 85 killed and approximately 300 injured. In 1996, an Argentine issued an arrest warrant for Rafsanjani due to his personal role in approving this attack.
3. 1992 assassination of 4 Kurdish dissidents in a restaurant Berlin, which German prosecutors said Rafsanjani has personally approved.

That’s a partial list of acts of international terrorism, and Rafsanjani’s personal role has been noted by prosecutors and courts.

At home, Rafsanjani was president for most of the so-called “chain murders” or “serial murders” of 80 Iranian intellectuals and dissidents from 1988 to 1998. (See a full list here.) As president, Rafsanjani kept in office the officials committing these crimes. Indeed, the fact that some were removed by his successor, Mohammed Khatami, shows once again that Rafsanjani could have acted to stop the terror–but instead acted to enlarge it.

So, the media are adopting a definition of pragmatism and moderation that is indefensible. When he was president of Iran Rafsanjani presided over some of the worst acts of terror ever committed by the Islamic Republic.

Much has been written about whether the instability in Iraq, the warfare in Syria and the crises this causes for Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, the Kurdish drive for autonomy (at least) in Iraq and Turkey, will at some point combine to unravel the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and England in 1916. Put another way, the question is whether the borders established in the context of the First World War will stick.

Here is one answer: they are effectively gone already, whether as a legal matter they disappear or remain. After all, when Iran can send any amount of arms through Syria and Iraq to its allies and proxies in Lebanon–ignoring the Lebanese government and Lebanese border–what is left of borders? Iran has in effect an open space running from the Afghan border to the Mediterranean, where it can place arms and soldiers almost at will. We know that Iranian IRGC forces are in Syria, and we know that Hezbollah forces from Lebanon are fighting there too. We know that just as jihadis from all over the world crossed from Syria into Iraq, ignoring that border to fight the Americans, today they are arriving across borders into Syria, now to fight the Assad regime.

Other examples can be cited. The border between Gaza and Egyptian Sinai is breached and mocked by hundreds of smuggling tunnels. The huge flow of Syrian refugees, now probably 1.5 million, moves across borders to seek safety. In fact it seems the only real, stable borders still existing are those of Israel. And that is in good part because Israel has built elaborate security barriers north, east, and most recently south, to demarcate and defend them. Israel’s borders exist on the ground, and the great irony is of course that they are the only boundaries in the region that do not exist on maps and are viewed as temporary until a peace agreement with Syria and with the Palestinians is achieved.

Most of the lines Sykes and Picot marked on maps still remain, but they have less and less reality. Changing national borders formally, with the approval of all parties and the United Nations as well, seems nearly impossible. But ignoring them, breaching them, and erasing them on the ground, where actual human beings live, seek refuge, make war, survive, or die–well, that has already happened to a very striking degree.

The newest polls tells us that President Mohamed Morsi’s popularity continues to decline. Today 47 percent of Egyptians say they are dissatisfied with his performance while 46 percent approve of it. Only 30 percent would today vote for him for president.

Meanwhile, Tom Carothers of Carnegie has written a persuasive essay reminding us to take a second look at the “dismal opposition.” As Carothers wrote,

Overly harsh views of the Egyptian opposition—combined with a lack of recognition that many once-weak opposition actors in countries emerging from authoritarian rule have gone on to win elections—fuel the unhelpful idea that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only political force likely to hold power in Egypt for the foreseeable future. And that idea in turn encourages the problematic belief evident in U.S. policy in the past year that no alternative to the Brotherhood is likely to be viable for many years and the resultant tendency to downplay the Brotherhood’s significant political flaws.

Carothers rightly says we should not be supporting the opposition, but we should be supporting democracy and human rights in Egypt far more actively than we have been. Permanent Muslim Brotherhood control of Egypt and a steady decline in respect for civil liberties are not inevitable, but we help make them so if we abandon our role in supporting the principles of liberal democracy.

On April 17 Mr. Kerry testified on the Department’s FY 2014 budget and was asked about these vacancies. He acknowledged the problem but blamed the White House personnel office. This was the story in Foreign Policy:

The White House vetting process is to blame for all the senior-level vacancies around the State Department, but nominations for some of those positions should be coming soon, Secretary of State John Kerry said Wednesday.

Now it is nearly a month later and there has been no real progress. Critical jobs like Assistant Secretary for Europe, for Africa, for the Near East–and the list is quite long–sit vacant. Nor can Kerry blame the Senate for a slow confirmation process, for there are no nominees. His own web site proudly states that he has logged 41 travel days and now he is off to Stockholm.

Secretary Kerry will travel to Stockholm, Sweden, on May 14, where he will meet with Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Bildt to discuss the Arctic Council, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, and other issues of global importance. Secretary Kerry will then travel to Kiruna, Sweden, where he will attend the Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting on May 15.

Does this seem essential, compared with filling those vacant jobs? My (unsolicited) advice: stay home and go to the White House. See the National Security Advisor, the Chief of Staff, the Vice President, and the President, and tell them you cannot function without filling those vacant positions. A month ago Kerry said nominations would be coming “soon” but they have not come. It’s time for him to make this–not a discussion of Syria with the Swedes–his top priority.

In an interview with Radio Free Europe, Osanlu revealed that he had fled into Turkey three months ago. He explains that the human rights situation in Iran is getting worse “day by day,” and that his life was threatened.

We were trying to bring unity among various workers groups in order to reach a solidarity society or a workers federation, I had become very active in this since last year and It didn’t remain secret from [authorities] who would send me all kinds of messages and threats,” Osanlu said. “They had told my two bailsmen who had secured my release from prison in 2011 that I should present myself at the prosecutor’s office or at the prison. All of these events in addition to the information I received that there were discussions to kill me, hit me with a car, or do some similar to the chain killings [of intellectuals] — I was also told by friends that it wasn’t right for me to stay in Iran — made me reach the conclusion [that I had to leave].

With elections around the corner in June, repression in Iran has been increasing. That Lech Walesa was able to stay in Poland (like Havel in Czechoslovakia) but Osanlu must flee to save his life is a measure of that repression. The concentration on nuclear negotiations with Iran sometimes obscures that the real problem is not the weapons but the regime itself, and any negotiated deal that makes that regime more secure and extends its life would contribute to repression in Iran and instability in the entire region. In the end Iran’s aggressive support for violence and terror in the Middle East, and indeed well beyond it, will end when the Islamic Republic itself is replaced by a democratic government in Iran.

Russia and the US have agreed to work towards convening an international conference to find a political solution to the conflict in Syria. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of State John Kerry announced it would follow on from an Action Group for Syria meeting in Geneva last June. Mr Kerry said they would try to “bring both sides to the table”.

International conference…Geneva…Middle East…Russia…it all brought back memories. Once upon a time, the Carter Administration had the same idea. In 1978 it decided this was the way to move forward in the Middle East. So opposed to this idea were Egypt under Sadat and Israel under Begin that they worked together to thwart it; this was a central factor in Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem to address the Knesset. In particular Sadat feared that Syria, backed by the Russians, would have undue influence at any such conference.

Today’s situation is different in very many ways, yet there is a thread that ties these two efforts together: the foolish American view that the Russians really mean to help. Sadat and Begin doubted it, and they were right. It is difficult to understand why Secretary Kerry thinks Vladimir Putin and we have common interests, because Putin has been arming and supporting the Assad regime. Nor does Syria’s humanitarian crisis appear to move him. And as for the fate of Jordan, a key American strategic interest, Putin no doubt thinks it would be just fine to see Jordan unstable.

This time around, there will be no Begin and Sadat to rescue us from a foolish American diplomatic effort. But the Syrians fighting to overthrow the regime, and the Israeli determination to prevent the current crisis from strengthening Hezbollah, seem likely to have a greater impact on events in Syria than words spoken by American and Russian diplomats. The American position so far appears to be to evade action, using words, red lines, visits to Russia, and next an international conference to provide justifications for doing too little to protect our interests.

And all of this comes in the aftermath of President Obama’s apparent bluff and the disappearing red line. Last January, months before the President made that great error, former Secretary of State George P. Shultz spoke here at the Council on Foreign Relations and had something to say about the subject. Words of wisdom:

When I was in the Marine Corps boot camp, sergeant hands me my rifle. He says, take good care of this rifle; this is your best friend. And remember one thing: never point this rifle at anybody unless you’re willing to pull the trigger. No empty threats.

Now, I told this to President Reagan once. He kind of blanked on it, and I said, Mr. President, we need to be very careful in what we say. Because if we say something is unacceptable, that means there have got to be consequences if it happens. You say something is unacceptable, and it happens and you don’t do anything, nobody pays attention to you anymore.

Vladimir Putin made the American Secretary of State cool his heels for three hours before seeing him. Perhaps there is a connection here.

But the background makes this insult less startling. Kerry was in Moscow to plead for Russian help in sorting out the administration’s terrible dilemma in Syria. President Obama does not wish to intervene but the humanitarian toll–75,000 killed since he said in the summer of 2011 that Assad must go–and the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria make that position increasingly indefensible. We may not want some sort of proxy war in Syria but Iran and Hezbollah do. And their presence has helped attract some 6,000 Sunni jihadis, whose presence destabilizes not only Syria today but potentially several other countries tomorrow.

Faced with this challenge what did Mr. Obama and Mr. Kerry do? They asked Putin for help. This is astonishing in itself, for the last four years offer proof that Putin is an enemy of the United States and seeks to weaken us, not to help us. The notion that we have common interests in Syria beggars belief.

There are messages Mr. Kerry might theoretically have delivered that might have elicited a different reaction from Putin. Try this one: “We will not permit a Hezbollah and Iranian victory in Syria and we will not accept Assad’s continuation in power. Nor will we accept a never-ending civil war there that produces a million refugees, whose presence may destabilize Jordan. So we will destroy Assad’s air power and he will lose the war, unless you get him out of there.” That might wake Putin up and maybe he would see American representatives without the humiliating three-hour wait. Today, we look weak and irresolute and he treats us accordingly.

In fact there are roughly 550,000 refugees in Jordan and the number grows by 60,000 a month. Are we prepared to see Jordan destabilized? Are we prepared to see Iranian and Hezbollah expeditionary forces changing the outcome of a conflict in the Middle East?

Perhaps. Nothing we have yet done in Syria really answers that question, although the unwillingness to act suggests that we are, and that the worst outcome the White House can contemplate is action–not defeat.

But defeat is possible. Should Assad stay in power due to Russian and Iranian and Hezbollah support, and should Hezbollah’s domination of Lebanon thereby be solidified, and should our long-time ally Jordan be destabilized by the presence of three-quarters of a million or a million Syrian refugees, we will have been defeated and our position in the Middle East dealt an historic setback. Any hope of a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis would be gone. The alliance system we have built up in the Gulf would be shredded because our own credibility would be gone.

This is what is at stake in Syria. The picture of an American secretary of state hanging around for three hours, desperate to see Putin and seek his help, is pathetic–and suggests a profound misjudgment of Putin (who has nothing but contempt for weakness) and of Russian policy. There is little room for pity in the international politics of the Middle East: the strong prevail and the weak suffer. Our allies have believed we were the strong party, but must now doubt our will. The Israelis know that there is no substitute for power and the will to use it, so they are giving demonstrations in Syria of their own policy–in the absence of any American determination to prevail.

This is a situation fraught with danger for American allies and American national interests. Appealing to Russia for help is the true measure of this administration’s failures.