<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?><rss version="2.0" xml:base="https://www.eff.org/rss/updates.xml" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Deeplinks</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/rss/updates.xml</link>
    <description>EFF&#039;s Deeplinks Blog: Noteworthy news from around the internet</description>
    <language>en</language>
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    <title>Voters Reject ALPRs and Surveillance Tech at the Ballot Box</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/voters-reject-alprs-and-surveillance-tech-ballot-box</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Do &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://sls.eff.org/technologies/automated-license-plate-readers-alprs&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;automated license plate readers (ALPRs)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; have any place in our communities? That question has been a hot topic in&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/san-diego-city-council-votes-end-flock-contract-turn-off-alpr-cameras/4102682/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; city council meetings&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/science-technology-data/democracy-happening-fight-over-flock-cameras&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;community conversations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/811-license-plate-readers&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;news coverage&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; around the country for months. This past election day, a couple of U.S communities took it further: to the ballot. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And overwhelmingly, voters decided that, no, these devices should not be deployed on our streets. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/effs-policy-position-alpr-surveillance-eliminate-it-and-reduce-its-harms&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;We agree!&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In Maine, the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ballotpedia.org/York,_Maine,_Article_5,_Flock_Camera_Removal_and_Voter_Approval_for_Surveillance_Technology_Initiative_(November_2026)&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;coastal community of York voted&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to remove the town’s existing ALPR cameras and require that any future proposed installations receive voter approval before proceeding. The local initiative ended up on the ballot after constituents &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.yorkmaine.org/DocumentCenter/View/13089/November-2026-General-and-Special-Budget-Referendum-and-Citizens-Petition-Ordinance-to-Stop-ALPRs&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;gathered enough signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on a citizens’ petition for a local ordinance. On Election Day, nearly three-quarters of York voters supported the ban. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Thousands of miles away, voters in League City, Texas also voted &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.leaguecitytx.gov/2670/Elections&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;against allowing the local police department&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to continue use of ALPR cameras. That vote was formally approved on November 17, which began a 72-hour window to remove the cameras. Since the election, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.leaguecitytx.gov/m/newsflash/home/detail/6467&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;the cameras have been “bagged”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; or covered to prevent the collection of data.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;At least one city also decided to expand protections afforded to their residents when it comes to the use of surveillance technology. In Pflugerville, Texas, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pflugervilletx.gov/2026-charter-review-commission-recommendations&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Proposition B passed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, now requiring that the City Charter be amended to include “protections governing the collection, use, retention, and oversight of data, facial recognition, and surveillance technologies.” It also requires “a responsible artificial intelligence framework.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;While every municipality has different rules for how to get a local ordinance placed on the ballot, banning use and securing the removal of surveillance tools locally is a powerful way of protecting your community against devices and data collection that goes far beyond your town lines. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Surveillance is a choice, not a mandate, and our communities have the power to refuse it. EFF has supported local communities around the country over the last few years in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/procurement-power-when-cities-realized-they-can-just-say-no-2025-review&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;advocating against the procurement of surveillance technologies&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in their cities, counties, and states. These victories at the ballot box &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/local/flock-cameras-alpr-votes-san-diego-county/509-6b349113-9860-4b10-930f-68008ca13fa5&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;and&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://culvercitycrossroads.com/2026/11/17/city-council-ends-flock-surveillance-camera-contract-immediately/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;in&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2026/08/cities-terminate-flock-contracts-at-record-pace-in-august/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;city councils&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; show that when mass surveillance is presented as a policy choice, not a technical necessity, communities can and do reject it. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Do you know what surveillance tools are being used by your local police departments? Check out the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://atlasofsurveillance.org&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Atlas of Surveillance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to learn more about the tools deployed in your city, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://join.eff.org/atlas/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;sign up to volunteer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; if you want to push for more transparency across the country. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112551 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/street-level-surveillance">Street-Level Surveillance</category>
 <dc:creator>Beryl Lipton</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/vote_1.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="25107" />
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    <title>The Justice Department Wants To Give Patent Trolls More Power </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/justice-department-wants-give-patent-trolls-more-power</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/patents&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Software patents&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; are mostly vague, hard to define, and widely abused. Most tech patent lawsuits aren’t filed by companies that make real products. They’re filed by patent trolls, companies that acquire patents to extract payments through litigation and legal threats. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;A patent on one feature of a smartphone shouldn’t give the patent owner the power to threaten the existence of the entire product line. But that is exactly the leverage patent trolls want—and the current administration is helping them to get it. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In two recent patent cases, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Radian Memory Systems v. Samsung &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;and&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; Collision Communications v. Samsung, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;the Justice Department and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have asked courts to make it &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;easier&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; for patent owners to &lt;/span&gt;get&lt;span&gt; injunctions. These are judicial orders that can force companies to stop selling products or remove features from them, rather than simply pay monetary damages. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The threat of an injunction can pressure a company to pay far more than what a patent is actually worth. In 2006, NTP Inc., a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.manufacturing.net/operations/news/13088185/patent-company-ntp-settles-with-apple-google&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;patent holding company&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; with no products of its own, was able to pressure BlackBerry manufacturer Research in Motion Ltd. to pay a $612 million settlement when it was on the verge of an injunction. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;Protection Against Patent Trolls&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In May 2006, the Supreme Court rejected the practice of granting permanent injunctions almost automatically after a finding of patent infringement. In &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/388/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;eBay v. MercExchange&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, the high court held that patent owners must satisfy the same tough requirements that plaintiffs in non-patent cases must meet to get a permanent injunction. After eBay, patent owners had to show “irreparable harm,” that they can’t be adequately compensated by money, that the “balance of hardships” favors the plaintiff, and, critically, that an injunction would not harm the “public interest.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;At EFF, we &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2006/05/16&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;celebrated&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;eBay v. MercExchange&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; as a major win for internet users. More than twenty years ago, we saw that software patents were going to be a disaster—not just for small companies (which they are), but for freedom of expression online. As EFF explained in its &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ebay_v_mercexchange/eff_amicus_brief.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;brief&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The United States Patent and Trademark Office has issued patents on methods for&lt;a href=&quot;https://w2.eff.org/patent/wanted/volomedia/EFF_volomedia_prior_art.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;downloading video programs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://patents.google.com/patent/US7359963B1/en&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;publishing web pages&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, sending email messages, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/13487_Ex_Parte_reexamination_request_c.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;making&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/13487_Ex_Parte_reexamination_request_c.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;internet telephone calls&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; and even online fundraising methods. Injunctions against uses of these technologies—and many similar technologies—will inevitably affect, and may even chill, free expression on the internet. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The eBay rules make sense because the monopolies provided by patents are only justified when they serve a public purpose: promoting scientific and technological progress. Enforcing patents is not supposed to come at the cost of later innovators, free expression, or people’s access to technology. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Now, two decades after eBay, the government is urging courts to interpret those protections in ways that could give patent owners greater leverage. It’s unusual for the government to intervene in private patent disputes, but the current administration has done so repeatedly—and not on the side of the public. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;Patent Licensing Disputes Shouldn&#039;t Threaten Entire Product Lines &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In June 2025, the Justice Department and Patent Office filed a “statement of interest” in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Radian Memory Systems v. Samsung&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a dispute over patents involving solid-state drives (SSDs), the storage devices commonly used in modern computers. Radian, a patent assertion company tied to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/united-states/intellectual-property/purported-industry-cast-out-sues-samsung&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Fortress Investment Group&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, sought a preliminary injunction that would block sales of Samsung’s products even before a judge or jury had decided whether there was patent infringement. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In its &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;statement&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;, the government argued that even a patent owner whose business depends entirely on patent licensing could suffer irreparable harm, because calculating how much money it should get might be difficult. “In cases of unique assets, courts have commonly found irreparable harm when damages are difficult to calculate,” the DOJ writes in its brief. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But courts regularly resolve disagreements about patent royalty rates, a patent’s contribution, and comparable licenses. The fact that those disagreements exist does not, by itself, establish that monetary damages wouldn’t be enough to compensate the patent owner. If courts adopted the DOJ’s views here, a difficult but ordinary part of patent litigation could become a reason for finding irreparable harm, making it easier for patent owners to seek injunctions that threaten entire product lines. Pure patent-licensing businesses would love that—they would routinely start to ask for injunctions, since eBay’s most important protections would be weakened. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The government also says that “the prospect of an injunction can facilitate negotiation among the parties.” That’s exactly the problem. A company negotiating under threat of shutdown might pay massive sums to patent litigation shops in order to avoid disruption to product lines or customers. The payment is more likely to reflect the value of the threat, rather than the value of a patent. Radian ultimately withdrew its request for a preliminary injunction, but the government&#039;s arguments about when injunctions should be available remain concerning. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;A Second Attempt To Weaken eBay&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Remarkably, the government &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1429386/dl&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;returned to this argument&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in February of this year, in a case called &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Collision Communications v. Samsung&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which had already gone to trial. In this case, Collision, a patent-licensing entity &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.piplius.org/news/pipli-to-federal-circuit-no-automatic-injunctions&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;that acquired its patents from a defense contractor&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, was awarded a $445.5 million jury verdict for infringement of four patents, and then sought an injunction. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Even though the jury had awarded Collision $445.5 million in damages, the government still intervened in the case, arguing that patent owners like Collision, which do not make products, should not be denied injunctions because they rely on patent licensing. &lt;/span&gt;They also argued that the difficulty of calculating monetary damages can support an injunction.&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Although the court agreed that Collision had suffered irreparable harm and that monetary damages would be inadequate, U.S. District Court Judge Rodney Gilstrap rejected Collision’s argument that ongoing patent infringement automatically establishes irreparable harm. He ultimately denied the injunction because Collision didn’t satisfy two other requirements of the eBay test: showing that the balance of hardships favored an injunction and that an injunction would not harm the public interest. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Now Collision has appealed, and the argument is in front of the Federal Circuit, the nation’s top patent court. A &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.piplius.org/news/pipli-to-federal-circuit-no-automatic-injunctions&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;brief from the Public Interest Patent Law Institute (PIPLI)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; explains what is at stake: when a patent owner doesn’t have any products, an injunction can prevent the public from accessing critical technology altogether. Since the patents here involve how mobile phones connect to cellular networks, “the effect on the public goes far beyond what these patents claim as improvements,” PIPLI explains. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The outcome could extend well beyond these two companies. The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;eBay&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; test requires courts to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;consider&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; who a permanent injunction would hurt, and who would benefit—including the public. A patent owner’s desire for more negotiating leverage should not override the interests of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;millions of people who rely on their phones&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;Yet that’s exactly the kind of leverage the government’s arguments could make it easier for patent owners to obtain, at the expense of the public.  &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;The Government Should Protect the Public, Not Patent Owners&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Patent owners can already collect damages and royalties when their patents are infringed. But they should not get a shortcut to shutting down tech products just because calculating damages is hard work. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Justice Department should defend the eBay safeguard. Instead, this administration is helping patent owners find ways around it. Courts should reject those arguments. We shouldn’t even have to say it, but we do: making patent threats more valuable does not align with the public’s interest.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;This post is the second of a three-part series about how the current administration is using its power to give patent holders more power at the public’s expense. The final post will publish next week. See our previous post:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/why-fewer-people-are-challenging-bad-patents&quot;&gt;How the USPTO is undermining patent reviews&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 21:08:00 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112549 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/patents">Patents</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims">Patent Trolls</category>
 <dc:creator>Joe Mullin</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/patent-troll-3b.png" alt="Patent Troll line art on graph paper; troll is in a small jail cell, ready to escape." type="image/png" length="646513" />
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    <title>The Paramount-Warner Brothers Deal Could Usher in Another Age of Lost Media</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/paramount-warner-brothers-deal-could-usher-another-age-lost-media</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;There are all sorts of reasons to be against the merger of Paramount and Warner Brothers-Discovery. There&#039;s the obvious problem of increasing concentration in the already pretty-concentrated film and TV industry. People have problems with Paramount&#039;s owner Skydance interfering  with its &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/tv/articles/cbs-news-insider-responded-dan-210830467.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;news&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; coverage and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/16/opinion/stephen-colbert-late-show-cbs.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;late night comedy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. But one of the biggest is the way we are losing choice and access to information and culture. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In the context of the digital world, there are two major problems with these mega mergers. One, as we&#039;ve said in the past, is that it &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/best-big-media-merger-no-merger-all&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;further degrades&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; the already awful state of mainstream streaming services. In short, by increasing the amount of legacy content under their control, major studios don&#039;t have to invest in either new content or well-engineered services to get users. Plus, they can pool the data they have on users together in an increasing assault on consumer privacy. A monthly subscription and more information about your habits and interests? Win-win for them. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Another problem is the disappearing of content. In the digital era, there should be no more lost media. Making and storing copies of media is easier and cheaper than it ever has been. The idea of the persistence of content online has become the adage &quot;the internet never forgets.&quot; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;However, since more and more media is locked behind subscription services under the control of fewer and fewer companies—and as physical copies, or even just digital copies that are actually &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;owned&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; by consumers also vanish—access to our common culture is at risk. Incentives to take information and media offline should raise huge red flags. Unfortunately, they are multiplying.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;First, there&#039;s the impulse of merged companies to offset the cost of their merger by shelving projects and claiming them as tax write-offs. We saw this &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/batgirl-shelved-at-warner-bros-hbo-max-1235191371/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;last &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;time&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; Warner Brothers was taken over, with projects being ended in order to take advantage of a specific kind of tax benefit. It has little to do with the quality or even how much or how complete a project is—money is the driving factor and we as a culture are all poorer for it. And we all know it. That&#039;s why the outrage &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theringer.com/2026/08/27/movies/coyote-vs-acme-oral-history-shelved-warner-bros-looney-tunes&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;eventually led to Coyote vs Acme&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; being released by a much smaller studio. But not every project can count on having the perfect storm that brings a movie or show back from the dead. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Second, there&#039;s the imposition of a new owner&#039;s own goals and beliefs upon its new acquisition. Some choices might seem kind of benign, like Discovery axing a lot of&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/19/heres-why-hbo-max-is-pulling-dozens-of-films-and-tv-series-from-its-streaming-platform.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; family-friendly and kid-oriented content &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;from HBO Max. Of course, when one of the things affected is a pillar of childhood like Sesame Street, the loss of access to old episodes becomes a loss to the culture and not just a change in direction. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; Another area where we might lose access to information is in the radical shift in direction for news reporting. Reporters have resigned and more are being offered &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.thedailybeast.com/cbs-news-staff-eye-escape-from-trumpy-boss-david-ellison&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;buy-outs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; to support the change in direction. Whether this will escalate to older projects being removed from streaming services or quietly buried in the recommendation algorithm is yet to be seen, but remains a real possibility. And it&#039;s not lost on anyone that one of the outlets reporting on the chaos at CBS News was CNN, which is now owned by the same people who own CBS News. The loss of diverse sources of news, as imperfect as we may have thought they were, hurts all of us. It makes it harder to access information and diverse points of view. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Finally, media disappears as licenses expire and as studios &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/29/streaming-services-remove-movies-shows-heres-why.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;decide&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; they no longer want to pay residuals or backend deals to the creative people who made the work in the first place. Again, this looks like business decisions but if the works were exclusively available via streaming, those movies disappear forever. That both contributes to the idea that works are disposable and that paying the workers who made the art is not as important as shareholder value.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;On top of all of this, draconian copyright regimes and the anti-user product designs they create have made it nearly impossible for people to archive this material on their own—as many used to using VCRs. It’s easy to see a crisis in access to culture and information brewing, at the same time that it should be easier than ever to preserve and make available our shared digital culture. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 20:56:59 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112547 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/innovation">Creativity &amp; Innovation</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/competition">Competition</category>
 <dc:creator>Katharine Trendacosta</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/icon-2019-innovation.png" alt="Innovation" type="image/png" length="16801" />
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    <title>Privacy&#039;s Defenders Podcast: Snowden Exposes NSA’s Lies</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/privacys-defenders-podcast-snowden-exposes-nsas-lies</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;By 2013, EFF had spent seven years arguing in court that the National Security Agency was sweeping up ordinary Americans’ communications, including through &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/privacys-defenders-podcast-secret-room&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;the secret room&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; that whistleblower Mark Klein had exposed. The government would neither confirm nor deny it, and outside the courtroom the public seemed to have moved on. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Then, in early June, documentary filmmaker &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.praxisfilms.org/laura-poitras&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Laura Poitras&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and journalist &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://greenwald.substack.com/about&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Glenn Greenwald&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; mysteriously missed a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freedom.press/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Freedom of the Press Foundation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; board meeting at EFF’s offices. It turned out they were in Hong Kong, meeting an NSA contractor who had been secretly writing to Laura for months. His name was Edward Snowden, he had thousands of secret documents proving the government had in fact been spying on millions of Americans. When he subsequently revealed himself, a photo of him sitting behind his laptop – emblazoned with a big red EFF sticker – went worldwide.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Welcome to the fourth episode of “Privacy’s Defenders,” a podcast about the people – lawyers, journalists, hackers, and others – who’ve fought to secure your digital liberties since before most people even knew what the internet was.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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    &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/02/embedded-video-and-your-privacy&quot; rel=&quot;noreferrer&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Privacy info.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span&gt;This embed will serve content from &lt;em&gt;&lt;a rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; href=&quot;https://player.simplecast.com/21ba982d-0892-47e9-a638-36b5fae0e2d7?dark=true&amp;amp;color=000000&quot;&gt;simplecast.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
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&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://open.spotify.com/show/4UAplFpPDqE4hWlwsjplgt&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/spotify-podcast-badge-blk-wht-330x80.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Spotify Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;198&quot; height=&quot;48&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/effs-how-to-fix-the-internet/id1539719568&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/applebadge2.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Apple Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; height=&quot;47&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://music.amazon.ca/podcasts/bf81f00f-11e1-431f-918d-374ab6ad07cc/how-to-fix-the-internet?ref=dmm_art_us_HTFTI&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;47&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/styles/kittens_types_wysiwyg_small/public/2024/02/15/us_listenon_amazonmusic_button_charcoal.png?itok=YFXPE4Ii&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://feeds.eff.org/howtofixtheinternet&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/subscriberss.png&quot; alt=&quot;Subscribe via RSS badge&quot; width=&quot;194&quot; height=&quot;50&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(You can also find this episode on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://archive.org/details/privacys-defenders-E4-snowden-exposes-NSAs-Lies&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Internet Archive&lt;/a&gt; and on &lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/-IMuX1KkGzE?si=Er4zrk-G9Loe6-Zm&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;YouTube&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In this episode, former EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn talks with Laura Poitras about how she got to that historic moment, including her years of expertise in communicating via encrypted channels. Freedom of the Press Foundation Executive Director &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freedom.press/people/trevor-timm/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Trevor Timm&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; – a former EFF activist – shares his recollection of the day the first Snowden story broke. For EFF and its clients in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Jewel v. NSA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; Snowden’s documents were proof of what the government had spent years refusing to confirm. As Cindy puts it, “We were struggling along in the mud, and we felt like somebody gave us wings.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;It&#039;s the story of the lawyers who fought for your privacy, the government that lied about spying on you, and the whistleblower who blew it all wide open.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The “Privacy’s Defenders” podcast is a follow-up to Cindy’s book, “Privacy’s Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance,” bringing to life pivotal moments in the voices of those who fought for your rights. Sales of “Privacy’s Defender” benefit EFF, so &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://shopeff.org/products/privacys-defender-by-cindy-cohn&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;pick up your copy today&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;! &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Joanne Elgart Jennings co-produced and created this podcast.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Jarrod Sport co-produced, mixed, and mastered it.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Corinne Ruff is our story editor.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We had additional help from Rachel Estabrook and Alison Broverman.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The original music was composed and performed by Nat Keefe of Hot Buttered Rum with Ben Andrews on the fiddle.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112532 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/how-to-fix-the-internet-podcast">How to Fix the Internet: Podcast</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying">NSA Spying</category>
 <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/pd-podcast-banner.png" alt="Privacy&amp;#039;s Defender: Stories From the Fights for Digital Rights" type="image/png" length="1062415" />
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    <title>European Commission Plan to Give Frontex Trusted Flagger Status Is A Threat to Free Speech</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/european-commission-plan-give-frontex-trusted-flagger-status-threat-free-speech</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF and 27 other human rights organizations &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/civil-society-letter-frontex-powers-under-dsa&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;called&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on the European Commission today to retract a dangerous proposal granting its border agency Frontex power to request that national authorities issue takedown orders for social media content and giving Frontext “trusted flagger” status under the Digital Services Act (DSA), the EU regulation governing online platforms and content moderation in the region.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The extraordinarily improper proposal not only disregards the provisions of the DSA but also places a mechanism of enforcement overreach in the hands of a law enforcement agency that has &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/23/frontex-failing-protect-people-eu-borders&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;failed to safeguard people&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; against serious human rights violations at EU borders.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Under the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/regulation-amending-european-border-and-coast-guard-regulation_en&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;proposal&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, Frontex has the power to “monitor publicly accessible social media content, detect developments relevant to external border management, and support action against illegal online content linked to border-security risks.” Granting Frontex trusted flagger privileges on top of its existing mandate risks creating a powerful tool for over-enforcement, stifling the free expression of migrants, asylum seekers, and other marginalized groups. We warned the Commission of these risks in a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/civil-society-letter-frontex-powers-under-dsa&quot;&gt;letter&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The DSA is supposed to make online platforms more accountable and protect users’ fundamental rights, not give the EU power to sic its border police on people for exercising their right to free expression.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;EFF and other rights organizations have for years &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/02/enforcement-overreach-could-turn-out-be-real-problem-eus-digital-services-act&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;sounded alarms &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;about potential abuse under the DSA’s trusted flagger provision, which gives “Digital Services Coordinators” the ability to award entities—including law enforcement agencies—a privileged channel to alert online platforms about illegal content. We’ve taken the firm position that law enforcement cannot be trusted to properly flag illegal content. In July, we &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/eff-and-article-19-submission-european-commission-dsa-trusted-flagger-guidelines&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;told&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the Commission that giving law enforcement trusted flagger status could undermine fundamental rights and said that police agencies like Frontex should not be made trusted flaggers. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The EU proposal gives Frontex decision-making power over free expression that is not envisaged under the DSA. First, content removal orders can only be issued by relevant national authorities. The DSA does not foresee a role for entities like Frontex to request such orders. Second, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa&quot;&gt;trusted flaggers&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; notify platforms of suspected illegal content—platforms must prioritize these notices and they have sole responsibility to decide to remove content. It’s not flaggers’ role to request removal orders from national authorities. Combining these powers blur enforcement and flagging functions, which the Commission’s own &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/draft-commission-guidelines-trusted-flaggers&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;draft guidelines&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on trusted flaggers explicitly caution against. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;“The risk of Frontex utilizing its power as both a Trusted Flagger and authority that can demand removal orders, to surveil user-generated speech, and over-flag content under the guise of  ‘border security risk’ is clear. This will likely result in platforms over-censoring content and chilling the speech of already marginalized groups, particularly those from migrant and asylum-seeking communities,” the letter says. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We urge the Commission to rescind the proposal. It undermines the DSA, threatens fundamental rights of citizens and non-citizens, and is enforcement overreach that does not align with international human rights standards. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:33:26 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112546 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/eu-policy-principles">Digital Services Act</category>
 <dc:creator>Karen Gullo</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/eu-flag-11.png" alt="EU-flag-circuits" type="image/png" length="48177" />
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    <title>EFF’s AI Cybersecurity Policy Framework</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/effs-ai-cybersecurity-policy-framework</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;The news has been filled with stories recently of AI breaching the security of websites. And while it may feel like a new problem because of AI’s involvement, it turns out that there are longstanding existing cybersecurity safety best practices that these companies—some of the largest tech companies in the world—could and should have taken to prevent these breaches.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recent cybersecurity incidents have shown that some of the world’s largest tech companies have failed to take basic security precautions when testing frontier AI systems on internet-connected systems. Unfortunately, these failures resulted in breaches of numerous third-party websites, including an AI research-sharing platform called Hugging Face and the Australian healthcare system’s website. Even worse, AI developers failed to detect most of the incidents until long after they occurred due to inadequate monitoring of the AI systems during testing. Had the companies abided by basic, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/ai-cybersecurity-policy-framework&quot;&gt;common sense security protocols&lt;/a&gt;, these incidents likely would not have occurred.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the White House and some leaders of major AI companies have claimed that no action is necessary, understandably, lawmakers at all levels and of both parties are proposing legislation to create new, additional safety protocols. These incidents may warrant legislative action. However, the good news is that post-incident reports indicate &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;new&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; protocols are largely unnecessary. Following &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;existing&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; best practices would have been enough to prevent the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident and others like it. In other words, responsible AI developers can take immediate action to protect the public by implementing well-established security precautions as they develop and test their systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lawmakers should start by referencing existing legal protections, including claims like negligence, gross negligence, trespass to chattels, Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and computer trespass statutes like the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and analogous state law provisions, such as Section 502 of the California Penal Code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Policymakers can help protect the public by requiring AI developers to follow established security protocols—and creating legal liability for failing to do so. These policies would protect the public from irresponsible actions by AI developers without impeding innovation. To the extent that gaps in existing laws warrant new legislation, EFF recommends the following policy framework:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;STATUTORY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS: &lt;/strong&gt;Lawmakers should enact legislation that requires AI developers to adhere to well-established cybersecurity best practices when testing AI systems, such as strong sandboxing and network isolation, least-privilege access, effective logging and monitoring, and clear incident-response procedures&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;REGULATORY STANDARDS: &lt;/strong&gt;Congress should require an existing federal agency, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;, to adopt safety standards for pre-deployment development and testing of generative AI systems, based on the established best practices referenced above. The agency should be required to update the standards every 2 years, or earlier as needed due to reported security incidents and/or major technological advancements. These standards should be developed in consultation with academic and nonprofit AI researchers, civil liberties organizations, and commercial AI developers, and adopted through formal agency rulemaking following a notice and comment process. That consultation should include an assessment of potential adverse impacts on competition, with the goal of ensuring that regulatory standards do not effectively lock out potential competitors.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;LIABILITY: &lt;/strong&gt;The law should provide for civil liability for AI development and testing that results in unauthorized access to a third party system, if performed under conditions that do not satisfy cybersecurity standards adopted by NIST, or another federal agency responsible for adopting these regulations, unless the company proves it acted reasonably under the circumstances to prevent unauthorized access to third party system &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ENFORCEMENT: &lt;/strong&gt;Both federal and state authorities should be able to hold AI developers accountable where they have failed to meet the minimum standards adopted by the designated federal agency, such as NIST. Providing for state—in addition to federal—enforcement power reduces the risk of regulatory capture. Regulators should require independent investigations and notification of affected parties in the event of a security incident involving unauthorized access to a third party’s computer system. Finally, legislation should include an appropriately targeted private right of action.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The public shouldn’t have to worry about the risks of reckless AI development—or give up the benefits of AI just to prevent irresponsible developers from causing harm. By adopting policies that address demonstrated risks, lawmakers can provide meaningful public protection without hampering the development of useful tools.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;NIST, the NSA, and CISA have recently issued a set of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2026/10/16/Key_Practices_for_Incident_Readiness_and_Response_in_Super_Intelligence%20_Training_and_Evaluation.pdf&quot;&gt;voluntary practices&lt;/a&gt; for managing security incidents during the training and evaluation of AI agents. Those practices may inform but do not substitute for the regulatory standards that should be developed according to the public, participatory process outlined here. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:50:00 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112543 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/ai">Artificial Intelligence</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/cyber-security-legislation">Cyber Security Legislation</category>
 <dc:creator>India McKinney</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Tori Noble</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/og-governmenthacking_0.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="146862" />
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    <title>Donate Equity to Support Digital Rights: Stocks, DAFs, and Giving</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/how-donate-equity-support-digital-rights-stocks-dafs-and-charity</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Do the holidays have you thinking about how you can support your favorite nonprofit? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;For 35 years, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has been advancing our digital rights, including &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/coders&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;defending security researchers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/08/celebrating-ten-years-encrypting-web-lets-encrypt&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;encrypting the web&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;fighting illegal surveillance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. Donating equity to EFF can help support this important work.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Perhaps your family has taken advantage of the new tax law around giving by creating a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/daf&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Donor-Advised Fund&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Perhaps your employer has gone public and you now own stock. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Perhaps you’ve seen some of EFF’s recent successes and thought,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; Man, imagine what they could do with more.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;b&gt;Stocks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;A gift of equity can help your contribution go farther and offer tax savings. When you donate appreciated stock, you avoid paying capital gains tax on any increase in its value. You also receive a charitable income tax deduction for the fair market value of appreciated stock on the date it is transferred. Also, more and more companies are offering gift-matching programs that can double your impact at no additional cost.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;If you have owned the stock for less than a year, your gift will not qualify for all of these potential tax advantages. And&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;gifts of appreciated stock are fully deductible—up to a maximum of 30% of your adjusted gross income. Please check with your accountant or tax advisor regarding your particular tax status.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We have helpful information &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/other-ways-give-and-donor-support#stock&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to facilitate the transfer of securities. Please &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:ddz@eff.org?subject=Stock%20gift%20to%20EFF&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;email us&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; if you have any questions. And &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:ddz@eff.org?subject=Stock%20gift%20to%20EFF&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;let us know in advance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; if you are transferring securities. We’ll need to know the amount and type of shares that you will be donating in order to provide a tax receipt.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Donor-Advised Funds&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;As a 501(c)(3) organization, EFF can also receive distributions through your &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/other-ways-give-and-donor-support#daf&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Donor-Advised Fund&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; (DAF), including one-time gifts or recurring donations. Simply inform your DAF provider you would like to make a gift to: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Electronic Frontier Foundation &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;(EIN 04-3091431) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;815 Eddy Street &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;San Francisco, CA 94109 &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Please note that many DAF providers do not provide the donor’s name to the recipient organization. If you would like to be recognized for your gift, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:ddz@eff.org?subject=DAF%20gift%20to%20EFF&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;let us know&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; the amount of the gift and the fund name. And due to IRS regulations, we may not be able to provide a thank you gift in line with your giving level. The DAF provider is responsible for your tax receipt.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supporters.eff.org/donate/join-eff-today&quot;&gt;JOIN EFF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The rules that govern technology shape our freedom. Help us write those rules today! &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:23:12 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112541 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Hudson Hongo</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/challenge-banner-1.png" alt="Colorful figure with wings" type="image/png" length="115393" />
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  <item>
    <title>Amazon Ring’s New Indoor Surveillance Drone Is Not Compatible with Privacy  </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/amazon-rings-new-indoor-surveillance-drone-not-compatible-privacy</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Amazon Ring has finally announced their &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/24/amazon-ring-flying-security-camera-drone-announced.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;long-dreaded indoor drone&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, a small &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/amazons-ring-debuts-security-robots-drone-rcna608538&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;flying surveillance device connected to their security suite of products&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; that can fly around your house filming and recording things. The device is supposedly designed to fly preset paths across your home and will also activate if a sensor or alarm has been triggered. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Customers should think twice about purchasing these devices for a number of reasons. These devices are problematic in many of the ways &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/07/amazon-ring-cashes-techno-authoritarianism-and-mass-surveillance&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;we’ve said Ring’s stationary home surveillance products are a problem&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, plus some new ways. At a very basic level, they are essentially a window into your house that can be accessed by anyone with access to your account—which has historically included &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2023/05/rings-privacy-failures-led-spying-harassment-through-home-security-cameras&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;bad actors looking to embarrass or harass Ring users&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51048406&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;employees of the company&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;What’s worse, Ring has &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/11/ring-cameras-go-mobile-as-amazon-debuts-ai-powered-security-drone-and-robot/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;supercharged&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; the units with its ‘AI Pilot’ to map routes, model the interior of the home, and control movement. This means not only is the footage being sent to corporate servers, but the company is also making inferences about your home to carry out tasks. How much home usage data this is based on, and if it can be used to infer when certain household activities are happening, are both open questions. And presumably, to maintain the preset routes, inferred data about your home will still be held by Ring even after any stored video footage is deleted.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;6}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The risk to your privacy is only compounded once you consider Ring’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2025/09/30/ring-police-partnerships&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;renewed partnership with police&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; through the massive surveillance and taser vendor, Axon. Through this partnership, police have the ability to request camera footage from Ring users with just a few clicks on Axon’s platforms. This includes its &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfAYNCWsjKg&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Fusus platform&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, an interactive surveillance feed and map police use to manage all the surveillance devices they have access to, like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://sls.eff.org/technologies/automated-license-plate-readers-alprs/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;automated license plate readers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. It’s unclear exactly what devices police can request footage from, but if this request feature is extended to Ring’s drones, police could easily send requests for footage from inside your house. Sharing is voluntary, but once footage is submitted, it cannot be retracted. Worse still, if your footage is not sitting on Amazon’s servers fully encrypted—and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/cold-take-amazons-new-encryption-method-still-doesnt-deliver-real-privacy&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;there’s reason to believe their privacy options are not the strongest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;—police could serve a warrant straight to the company, instead of to you, to get footage from your devices.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;New problems and questions arise because the camera can fly. For instance: if police serve a warrant on Amazon, can they only get the footage from the camera, or could they also get access to control the drone? If the latter, we could be looking at the first full home search in history where police serve a warrant on a third-party tech company and not the resident. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The CEO of Ring has pitched this product’s safety benefits in several ways, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnbc.com/2026/11/10/amazons-ring-unveils-flying-drone-robot-to-patrol-homes-businesses.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;including by saying&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;: “If someone is going around your house at night, and your motion detector goes off on your Ring doorbell, imagine if you see spotlights and something flying across the window...You’re probably not going to go into that house.” But partially justifying a $250 piece of technology that invades your privacy on what an imagined burglar &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;might&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; do doesn’t sound like a foundation for safety—it sounds like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_theater&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;security theater&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and marketing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;It isn’t new for Ring to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/amazon-owned-ring-wants-report-crime-news/588394/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;prey on the fears and paranoia&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; of people and their properties. This is the latest iteration of that: a patrolling drone or rover wouldn&#039;t have been possible even in the world&#039;s top museums and art galleries a generation ago. Moving this technology into the household as a common consumer product is another example of companies &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/tech-companies-are-trying-shift-entire-concept-privacy-again&quot;&gt;attempting to lower the bar&lt;/a&gt; on surveillance being normalized.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;With previous Ring products, consumers have had to consider what cameras and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.consumerreports.org/home-garden/home-security-cameras/video-doorbell-cameras-record-audio-too-a4636115889/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;high-powered microphones&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; can learn about their home usage from the front door. Autonomous flying drones and rovers &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;inside&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; the home add a whole new layer. What can these devices learn about you and your family? And do you really trust that data sitting on a server somewhere? Consumers should consider these risks before subjecting their guests and households to the latest creepy surveillance tool.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:58:26 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112539 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/street-level-surveillance">Street-Level Surveillance</category>
 <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Bill Budington</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ring_banner.png" alt="The shadow of a police officer looms in front of a Ring device on a closed door." type="image/png" length="82172" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Tech Companies Are Trying to Shift the Entire Concept of Privacy (Again)</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/tech-companies-are-trying-shift-entire-concept-privacy-again</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Privacy, which companies were once happy to claim was all about personal choice, is now primed to affect everyone around you even more than it already did.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/think-twice-buying-or-using-metas-ray-bans&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Meta&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://9to5google.com/2026/11/12/google-intelligent-eyewear-glasses/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google’s&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; smart glasses can record anything the owner is looking at or use artificial intelligence to describe it. Apple’s* &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://support.apple.com/en-us/148354&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Audio Intelligence feature&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; turns every Apple Watch into a transcription machine that records or summarizes your day. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://bee.computer/products/frontier&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Amazon’s Bee devices&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; take that a step further and can record and transcribe everything. Dozens of other companies are introducing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbes-personal-shopper/article/best-ai-wearables/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;pendants&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://techcrunch.com/2026/09/20/voccis-ring-adds-a-new-form-factor-to-meeting-note-taking/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;rings&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;node=223193081011&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;other products&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; designed to record, transcribe, or summarize everything we say and do all day long.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Privacy has always been a team sport. The actions you take with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/communicating-others&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;communication apps&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/privacy-badger-now-fights-more-sneaky-google-tracking&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;collaborative software&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, or &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://fixitalready.eff.org/apple/#/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;your cloud backup solutions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, have long impacted everyone else you’re interacting with. But moving those choices deeper into the physical world where strangers, colleagues, family, and friends are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;all&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; now a part of your privacy choices is drastically changing the game.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tech companies want us to accept a reality where one person’s privacy choices (or lack thereof) mean you suddenly need to be an expert in consumer tech who understands the capabilities of many devices on the market, how they work, how and if they signal when they’re recording, and what platforms they do or do not connect to. They believe these ambient surveillance devices that work in the background and are designed to look as normal as possible are the future, while they also expect the owners of these devices to use them responsibly and to notify those around them of their capabilities to act within whatever laws their states may have. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This is not reasonable, nor how consent works in any practical sense.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Let’s break this down by looking at some of the biggest players currently in the game: Apple and Amazon, who have two different takes on transcribing audio throughout the day, as well as Meta and Google, who both have slapped AI and cameras onto eyeglasses. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;How to Think About the Technical Promises Companies Make&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Ask Apple about privacy concerns and they’ll &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/Audio_Intelligence_Privacy_Overview_Sep_2026.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;point to a white paper&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that explains all the technical barriers between them as a company and the data generated by the watch. Ask Meta and they’ll talk about all the ways you can &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.meta.com/ai-glasses/privacy/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;customize the privacy controls&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; or how certain details, like faces, may be blurred out when you interact with Meta AI through the glasses (but not during standard recording). &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-security/intelligent-eyewear-privacy-protections/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google does this too&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Amazon will also talk&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; about how &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/devices/amazon-personal-ai-bee-frontier-bee-eclipse&quot;&gt;you’re always in control&lt;/a&gt;, and no audio is stored (though it’ll also let you enable Amazon store integration, so your conversations can directly result in ads for products). And so on across all the companies making these products.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Some of these solutions do a better job than others at cutting out potential law enforcement or company access to this data. There will be a time to dive into these details more deeply, but the technical privacy promises these companies focus on only cover the consumer and user of the device. They ignore every bystander you interact with and their inability to actually opt out. There is no technical protection for you as a non-user of these devices, the person who finds yourself captured by them. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Still, we hope to look deeper into the technical differences between this category of devices soon.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;There Must Be Some Laws to Consider, Right?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;With something like Apple’s Audio Intelligence and Amazon’s Bee devices, it may be best to treat them similar to an always-recording microphone, even if companies try to claim there’s “technically” no audio recording. These tools still often use a microphone to capture raw audio from &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2510&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;conversations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and convert it into summaries or transcripts before discarding the audio. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google&#039;s &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-security/intelligent-eyewear-privacy-protections/&quot;&gt;blog post notes that it has&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; a whole responsible use part of their Terms of Service where users have to agree not to record others without permission or in sensitive places. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But it’s not just the question of the legality from the point of view of the user. Law enforcement will eventually try to compel access to the data that these products create (either real-time audio or the summaries and transcripts they create). And while some products, like Apple’s Audio Intelligence, are engineered to make that difficult, not every product will be. We know from history that when data exists, governments will do everything they can to access it. There’s no reason to think something would change today.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;No Tech and Legal Solutions Will Reduce Social Issues&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There is a problem humming along in the background that is impossible to address with technical or legal solutions. If secretly documenting conversations becomes the norm, it makes every private conversation less spontaneous and open. It breaks a longstanding social norm that you will not record and document every conversation with friends, family, colleagues, or strangers. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The companies that make these sorts of products like to claim they’re no different from tools we already have. You can easily record everything right now with a phone or a camera. Heck, you can do so with a camcorder or cassette recorder if you want. And you can transcribe conversations with pen and paper, too. But those are actionable steps we take that both require effort from the user, and are clear to others around us. This new wave of passive surveillance tech is designed to encourage continuous monitoring and hide its use. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Even taken at face value, none of these products can understand the complex social context we all navigate every day. We intrinsically know there are different social agreements we all make when we’re standing on a street corner, at a protest, in a bathroom, at a doctor’s office, at the gym, or in a restaurant. Taking notes in a meeting at work is completely normal. Getting a summary of a conversation with your best friend about their divorce is not. Always-on monitoring of our conversations is an unacceptable burden on our conversational privacy. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google seems to all but admit this problem in a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnn.com/2026/11/12/tech/google-glasses-privacy-concerns&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;conversation with CNN&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; when it described the company’s experiments with a notification system that would alert people’s phones when someone was recording nearby: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;“And just alerting bystanders doesn’t do much to help, [Juston Payne, senior director of product management at Google] said. “It can actually be weirdly disempowering to you in that you’re like, ‘What am I meant to do now?’” he said.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;What We Can Do About It&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s easy to buy into the tech company line that these products are inevitable, but we’ve seen so many vaporware products over the years that we should take those claims of success with a grain of salt. We’ve seen entire product categories come and go within just a few years, and if the public doesn’t want this stuff, the tech companies will have to throw in the towel. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Of course, that doesn’t mean we all just have to sit around and hope that’s what happens. For its part, Apple &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://9to5mac.com/2026/11/03/watchos-27-3-beta-adds-new-siri-recap-and-live-rewind-features-for-apple-watch/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;launched its Audio Intelligence features in beta&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; specifically to get feedback, and we think it’s worth taking the time to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.apple.com/feedback/watch/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;fill out their feedback forms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (or in the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://developer.apple.com/feedback-assistant/#feedback-assistant&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Feedback Assistant app&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; if you’re in the beta) and let them know what you think.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Products from the likes of Meta, Google, Amazon, and others might be harder to push back on, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/think-twice-buying-or-using-metas-ray-bans&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;but politely and clearly engaging&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; with those who use them in ways that make you uncomfortable is a good place to start. And if you see abusive videos on social networks where these sorts of products are used, report them. If you find these products useful for yourself, make it clear to those around you when you’re using them, and only do so with consent and in social moments where it makes sense to do so.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;*Apple is an EFF donor. EFF donors do not influence our agenda or our positions.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 21:29:31 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112537 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <dc:creator>Thorin Klosowski</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/mobile-privacy.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="23559" />
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    <title>🤕 Medicare&#039;s AI Experiment | EFFector 38.20</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/medicares-ai-experiment-effector-3820</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;When we need medical care, we expect decisions about our treatment to be made by our doctors, not a tech company&#039;s algorithm. But in January, the federal government launched a program that uses AI to &lt;span&gt;evaluate Medicare beneficiaries&#039; requests for certain procedures.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF sued for records on WISeR, seeking badly needed transparency about Medicare&#039;s AI experiment. In &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/effector/38/20&quot;&gt;our latest EFFector newsletter&lt;/a&gt;, we&#039;re talking about what happens when the government &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/new-records-obtained-eff-expose-more-problems-medicares-ai-experiment?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;outsources treatment approval to private AI companies&lt;/a&gt;—without sufficient transparency, testing, or legal limits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/effector/&quot;&gt;JOIN OUR NEWSLETTER&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;For over 35 years, &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/effector&quot;&gt;EFFector&lt;/a&gt; has been your guide to understanding the intersection of technology, civil liberties, and the law. This issue covers &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/were-asking-ninth-circuit-hold-reverse-location-warrants-categorically?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;unconstitutional digital dragnets&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/postal-service-surveilled-protest-activities-online-little-rules-oversight?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;a post office surveillance schem&lt;/a&gt;e, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/new-records-obtained-eff-expose-more-problems-medicares-ai-experiment?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;what EFF uncovered&lt;/a&gt; about Medicare&#039;s AI experiment.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prefer to listen in? EFFector is now available on all major podcast platforms. This time we&#039;re talking to EFF&#039;s Lena Cohen about WISeR records documenting improper denials, operational chaos, and lengthy delays that have left patients waiting in pain. You can find the episode and subscribe&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://effector.simplecast.com/&quot;&gt;on your podcast platform of choice&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;
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    &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/02/embedded-video-and-your-privacy&quot; rel=&quot;noreferrer&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Privacy info.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
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&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://open.spotify.com/show/6Q48ICplENdQ4ZarUIgfLZ&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/spotify-podcast-badge-blk-wht-330x80.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Spotify Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;198&quot; height=&quot;48&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/effector/id1882562931&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/applebadge2.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Apple Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; height=&quot;47&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/83be1062-f511-47b3-bd2b-fc44e831c3ad&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;47&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; src=&quot;https://eff.org/files/styles/kittens_types_wysiwyg_small/public/2024/02/15/us_listenon_amazonmusic_button_charcoal.png?itok=YFXPE4Ii&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://feeds.eff.org/effector&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/subscriberss.png&quot; alt=&quot;Subscribe via RSS badge&quot; width=&quot;194&quot; height=&quot;50&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Want to protect your right to digital privacy? Sign up for &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/effector&quot;&gt;EFF&#039;s EFFector newsletter&lt;/a&gt; for updates, ways to take action, and new merch drops. You can also fuel the fight for privacy and free speech online when you &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/join&quot;&gt;support EFF today&lt;/a&gt;!&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 18:32:37 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112531 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Hudson Hongo</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/effector-green-web.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="78242" />
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    <title>We’re Asking an Appeals Court to Require a Warrant for ALPR Searches</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/were-asking-appeals-court-require-warrant-alpr-searches</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Today&lt;span&gt;, along with the ACLU, EFF filed an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/united-states-v-sturdivant-eff-aclu-amicus-brief&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in the Sixth Circuit court of appeals in &lt;em&gt;United States v. Sturdivant&lt;/em&gt;, a case where police warrantlessly tracked a suspect’s movements using &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://sls.eff.org/technologies/automated-license-plate-readers-alprs&quot;&gt;Automated License Plate Reader&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (ALPR) data. Our brief details the vast, interconnected network of ALPRs that constantly track drivers around the country and argues that this tracking is a “search” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sturdivant&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; involves a series of robberies in and around Cleveland, Ohio. Using surveillance camera footage, police identified the make, model, and color of the robber’s car, but they did not know its license plate number. After running an open-ended search of two ALPR databases, Flock and ELSAG, officers learned a car belonging to the defendant had been tracked near sites of the robberies, eventually leading to his arrest. Faced with a motion to suppress the ALPR evidence, the district court held that Mr. Sturdivant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his license plate number because it could be observed by members of the public, and that therefore he had no Fourth Amendment interest in not having his car tracked in public places.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But ALPRs are simply not comparable to observing an individual license plate on a passing car. As we’ve explained in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://macdl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Brief-Amicus-ACLU-ACLUM-CPCS-EFF-MACDL.pdf&quot;&gt;many&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/search-through-millions-license-plates-police-should-get-warrant&quot;&gt;amicus&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclu.org/cases/schmidt-v-norfolk&quot;&gt;briefs&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and in our lawsuits directly challenging ALPR use in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/siren-v-san-jose&quot;&gt;San Jose, California&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/wisconsin-council-churches-v-milwaukee-racine-kenosha-green-bay&quot;&gt;Wisconsin&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, ALPRs give law enforcement “&lt;/span&gt;a virtual time machine to view suspects’, or anyone else’s, past movements (and much more) with just the click of a button.” Just last month, a federal district court &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/federal-court-rules-alprs-are-mass-surveillance-eff-gets-disappointing-ruling&quot;&gt;agreed&lt;/a&gt; and held that ALPRs are a “&lt;span&gt;form of indiscriminate mass surveillance” that can violate the Fourth Amendment.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We hope the Sixth Circuit will reverse the lower court in this case and hold that ALPR searches require a warrant.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-related-cases field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Related Cases:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/wisconsin-council-churches-v-milwaukee-racine-kenosha-green-bay&quot;&gt;Wisconsin Council of Churches v. Milwaukee, Racine, Kenosha &amp;amp; Green Bay&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item odd&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/siren-v-san-jose&quot;&gt;SIREN and CAIR-CA v. San Jose&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 22:09:24 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112525 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Andrew Crocker</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/siren_v._san_jose.png" alt="sinister cop and cameras loom over street grid with cars identified by license plates" type="image/png" length="224550" />
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    <title>Why Fewer People Are Challenging Bad Patents</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/why-fewer-people-are-challenging-bad-patents</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;The number of petitions being filed at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has collapsed. That’s not reason for celebration. The PTAB is an important line of defense against low-quality software patents being used in lawsuits against people and companies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;The drop didn’t happen because suddenly patents have become higher quality. It’s simply because USPTO leadership is increasingly refusing to consider good challenges to patents, for reasons unrelated to the merits. The process has become so unreliable that many would-be patent challengers aren’t even trying.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;Inter partes review (IPR) is a process that allows people to challenge patents at the Patent Office, rather than having to fight an expensive lawsuit in federal court. It’s one of the most important ways to get bad patents out of the system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;In the third quarter of 2026, July through September, only &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_stats_september2026.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;97 IPR petitions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; were filed at the PTAB, compared to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_StatsFY25_Q4.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;327 petitions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; during the same period in 2025. Similarly, only &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_stats_september2026.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;37 IPR petitions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; were filed in September 2026, compared to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_StatsFY25_Q4.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;129 petitions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; in December 2024—the last full month before the current USPTO leadership began reshaping how the Board handles patent challenges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;This dramatic decline shouldn’t just concern patent lawyers. EFF has fought bad patents because so many software and internet patents make claims to the basic tools of free expression online, like sending email, using online ads, or publishing web pages. When bad patents go unchallenged, they affect everyone who cares about the freedom to write new code and make new technology.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;That’s why EFF has defended IPR since it came on the scene more than a decade ago. It provides a faster and less expensive way to challenge patents that should never have been granted. Congress created IPRs because the Patent Office makes mistakes. District court litigation is an extraordinarily expensive way to correct them. Without a meaningful administrative review process, bad patents remain powerful weapons in the hands of patent trolls and others seeking to extract settlements from companies that often did nothing wrong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;Now, USPTO leadership is dismantling that safeguard.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;Petitions and Institution Rates Are Falling &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;Since Congress created the IPR patent challenge process in 2012, the PTAB has always had some discretion in deciding which petitions deserve review. But institution rates today are much lower than their typical historical range.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;Between fiscal years 2022 and 2024, the PTAB instituted between &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_stats_september2026.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;66% and 68% of IPR petitions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. In fiscal year 2026, which concluded in September 2026, the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_stats_september2026.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;institution rate fell to 41%&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. And institution is only the first step of an IPR—it means the PTAB has agreed to hear the challenge, not that the challenger won, and the patent will be invalidated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;That decline helps explain why fewer petitions are being filed in the first place. Preparing an IPR petition takes substantial time and money. While cheaper than federal court, it’s still a complicated administrative process. Before filing, a challenger typically needs to search for prior art, hire experts, and develop detailed technical and legal arguments about why the patent never should have been granted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;Companies were willing to pay for IPRs because, historically, they could expect a predictable process. Petitions that met the statutory standard generally had a reasonable prospect of being heard and decided on the merits. But the USPTO has made it harder to get petitions heard and is throwing them out for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the challenges. Faced with these odds, many potential challengers aren’t filing at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;Even After a Challenge Is Accepted, The USPTO Director Can Cancel It &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;When the PTAB decides to hear an IPR case, that means the petition has been “instituted”—but that has never meant that the petitioner will definitely win. It means the PTAB has determined the challenge warrants a full merits review, and the parties could expect the proceeding to continue toward a final written decision. But under the current USPTO leadership, that expectation has disappeared. The PTAB’s institution decisions are being repeatedly vacated by the Director.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;USPTO Director John Squires has vacated at least 29 decisions granting institution of IPR proceedings, and subsequently denied the petitions, terminating those proceedings before a final written decision. These include cases that PTAB judges had already agreed to hear, as well as proceedings that Squires himself had previously allowed to proceed. This level of retroactive intervention is unprecedented.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;In some cases, the parties had already invested substantial time and money litigating before the PTAB, only to have the proceeding terminated based on new reasoning by the Director’s office that arose after institution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;For example, in &lt;span class=&quot;s2&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Revvo Technologies v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, the &lt;a href=&quot;https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1557459/download-documents?artifactId=fHuLv6ePedvNLweBvXRXkGQ9Z7e5WZn5beir9Fr7GFSJNBpqM57eBS8&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;Director vacated&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; an institution decision and remanded the case to the Board. The Board then instituted review again, but the &lt;a href=&quot;https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1557459/download-documents?artifactId=H3DtzUay1Fr___vOn4BwyjbqZlNlVnLJuFfOl6-xKDNfs2e01ZlVZ8w&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;Director reversed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; that decision. Using a new approach, the Director said that the petition had inconsistencies between claim construction positions taken before the PTAB and in district court. Since then, that decision has been cited as a basis for terminating several other instituted proceedings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;The result is another layer of uncertainty for people who want to challenge bad patents. Getting through the front door of an institution decision is much harder than it used to be—and now, even getting through that door doesn’t mean the PTAB will decide your challenge. Predictability is one of the things that made IPRs work.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;Congress Created the PTAB To Avoid Costly Litigation &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;Congress created IPRs in part because challenging a questionable patent in federal court is enormously expensive and risky. Patent examiners work under serious time constraints, and some patents that shouldn’t have been granted will inevitably issue. Not every patent dispute requires years of expensive district court litigation. Congress recognized that, and created an administrative process, staffed with experts more capable of correcting those mistakes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;That system has benefited the public. Since 2012, it has helped invalidate thousands of patent claims that never should have been issued. The IPR process has protected &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/alice&quot;&gt;startups, software developers, nonprofits, and small businesses&lt;/a&gt; that otherwise would have faced crushing litigation costs simply for building products or offering services that use everyday internet technology.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;EFF supports a balanced IPR system because it should be easier to fight against bogus patents that should never have been issued. The cost of fighting a patent can be a weapon in itself, and weak patents don&#039;t just burden large technology companies. Patent trolls routinely target &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/alice&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;s1&quot;&gt;small businesses and independent developers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, and have gone after podcasters, retailers, and even coffee shops and nonprofits. These organizations have neither the resources nor the desire to spend years litigating over potentially invalid patents in federal court. IPR offers a chance to challenge those patents before litigation costs get out of control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;If we weaken the IPR system, bad patents become much harder and more expensive to challenge.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;We Shouldn&#039;t Accept This as the New Normal&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;Some defenders of the current approach argue that lower institution rates reflect more balance in the patent system. But institution rates at the PTAB have plummeted from 68% to 41% in just two years—a nearly 40% decline. IPR petition filings have reached historic lows. And even proceedings that have already been instituted can now be terminated months later, without a decision on the merits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;These developments send a troubling message to members of the public who might want to use the PTAB: don&#039;t bother. The PTAB doesn’t need to institute every petition. But it does need to provide a process that is transparent, predictable, and fair. Right now, confidence in the system is disappearing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;If companies, individuals, and nonprofits conclude that IPRs aren’t worth pursuing, the consequences won&#039;t stop at the PTAB. More weak patents that never should have been granted will survive, and patent trolls will use them. That means more defendants facing expensive district court litigation or paying settlements driven by the cost of litigation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;p1&quot;&gt;That&#039;s not &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/07/when-us-patent-office-wont-do-its-job-congress-should-step&quot;&gt;what Congress intended when it created IPRs&lt;/a&gt;. It should not become the PTAB&#039;s “new normal.”&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 21:40:14 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112522 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/patents">Patents</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims">Patent Trolls</category>
 <dc:creator>Betty Gedlu</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Joe Mullin</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/patent-troll-warning_0.png" alt="A warning sign with a picture of a troll says &amp;quot;do not feed the troll&amp;quot;" type="image/png" length="339880" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>U.S. Supreme Court Deals Final Blow to Corporate Human Rights Accountability</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/us-supreme-court-deals-final-blow-corporate-human-rights-accountability</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;For the past two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has been slowly &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/supreme-court-narrows-ability-hold-us-corporations-accountable-facilitating-human&quot;&gt;weakening the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)&lt;/a&gt;, a key human rights law that allows foreign nationals to sue persons or entities in civil court for harms resulting from violations of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justsecurity.org/46352/original-meaning-alien-tort-statute/&quot;&gt;international law&lt;/a&gt;. The court’s &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-856_kjfm.pdf&quot;&gt;recent ruling&lt;/a&gt; in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/doe-i-v-cisco&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; dealt the law a final blow, foreclosing—absent new legislation by Congress—any future ability by plaintiffs to use the law to hold technology companies accountable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses. EFF &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/us-tech-companies-must-be-accountable-us-courts-facilitating-persecution-and-torture&quot;&gt;filed multiple amicus briefs in the case&lt;/a&gt;, including most recently in the Supreme Court.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Supreme Court Rejected New Causes of Action Under the ATS&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ATS was passed by the very first Congress in 1789 and in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44947&quot;&gt;just a few words&lt;/a&gt; gives U.S. federal courts jurisdiction to hear civil claims brought by foreign nationals against defendants who violated “the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.&quot; There has been a longstanding question about what counts as a valid civil claim under “the law of nations.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6103279683071618777&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; (2004), the Supreme Court had noted three historical international law claims that the First Congress likely had in mind: violation of &lt;a href=&quot;https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e396?d=%2F10.1093%2Flaw%3Aepil%2F9780199231690%2Flaw-9780199231690-e396&amp;amp;p=emailA%2FjrmZXu%2FGx%2F6&quot;&gt;safe conducts&lt;/a&gt;, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy, collectively known as the &lt;a href=&quot;https://tlblog.org/supreme-court-closes-the-door-on-the-alien-tort-statute/&quot;&gt;Blackstone Three&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;em&gt;Sosa&lt;/em&gt; court also held that federal courts may recognize &lt;em&gt;other&lt;/em&gt; substantive causes of action under the ATS if they reflect international norms that are “specific, universal, and obligatory,” stating that this “door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, the &lt;em&gt;Sosa&lt;/em&gt; court recognized that the ATS could be used to bring claims related to historical violations of international law as well as select newer claims reflecting modern concepts of human rights.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In &lt;em&gt;Cisco&lt;/em&gt;, the Supreme Court overruled the second &lt;em&gt;Sosa &lt;/em&gt;holding. The majority held that the current case, a technology company aiding and abetting torture and other human rights abuses, was beyond the scope of the original three ATS claims and it was not for the court to create new ways of enforcing international law. The court said:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;[W]e close the door that &lt;em&gt;Sosa &lt;/em&gt;cracked to judicially created ATS liability. We do not disturb &lt;em&gt;Sosa&lt;/em&gt;’s holding that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute; nor do we revisit its assumption that causes of action are available for torts corresponding to the Blackstone three.&lt;sup&gt; &lt;/sup&gt;We conclude only that &lt;em&gt;Sosa &lt;/em&gt;was overly optimistic in its prediction that there might be a narrow class of cases in which courts may create ATS actions without infringing on the prerogatives of the political branches. In truth, this class is a null set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What result for this case? Cisco argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that aiding-and-abetting liability exists under the ATS for the torts alleged by the plaintiffs. Cisco is correct. &lt;strong&gt;Courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, so there is necessarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations. &lt;/strong&gt;Plaintiffs’ ATS claims against Cisco must be dismissed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Cisco is Off the Hook for Aiding and Abetting Horrific Human Rights Abuses&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Supreme Court’s ending of the plaintiffs’ case against Cisco is hugely disappointing given that the case has been going on since 2011 and the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/07/victory-ninth-circuit-allows-human-rights-case-move-forward-against-cisco-systems&quot;&gt;Ninth Circuit in 2023&lt;/a&gt; allowed the case to move forward in an excellent and well-reasoned opinion. The Ninth Circuit held, in part:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;We conclude that Plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as true, are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Cisco provided essential technical assistance to the &lt;em&gt;douzheng &lt;/em&gt;[&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-second-amended-complaint-0&quot;&gt;violent struggle&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;em&gt; &lt;/em&gt;of Falun Gong with &lt;strong&gt;awareness that the international law violations of torture, arbitrary detention, disappearance, and extrajudicial killing were substantially likely to take place&lt;/strong&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The plaintiffs sued Cisco for the company’s role in building and deploying the “Golden Shield,” also referred to as “The Great Firewall of China”—a vast surveillance system that Cisco began building in the late 1990s and that the company customized to enable the Chinese government to target disfavored minorities, including members of the Falun Gong religion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-second-amended-complaint-0&quot;&gt;thirteen plaintiffs&lt;/a&gt;—Falun Gong practitioners—alleged arrest, detention, and torture, including of themselves and family members, at least one of whom died by beating while being detained. The allegations were horrific: the plaintiffs were placed in forced labor camps, beaten with steel rods, shocked with electric batons, and endured sleep deprivation and violent force-feeding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Importantly, the plaintiffs also alleged that their private emails, text messages, and other information—intercepted by the Golden Shield—were shared with the torture sites, and shown to them and used as part of their torture and forced conversion sessions, which included threats to their family members and others who had communicated with them. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And now, Cisco is off the hook for all of this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Congress Must Act to Hold American Tech Companies Accountable for Aiding and Abetting Human Rights Abuses&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As we argued in our &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/2026-03-27-eff-amicus-brief-cisco-v-doe-scotus&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt; to the Supreme Court, a robust federal statute is necessary given that voluntary and informal mechanisms of corporate human rights accountability are inadequate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in 2011. The following year, in 2012, Cisco first published its Global Human Rights Policy. Since then, the company has never provided redress to the plaintiffs, despite its &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/assets/csr/pdf/Human-Rights-Policy.pdf&quot;&gt;currently operative human rights policy&lt;/a&gt; stating:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Where we have identified that we have &lt;strong&gt;caused or contributed to an adverse human rights impact&lt;/strong&gt;, we are committed to providing access to and cooperating in remediation for affected individuals, workers, and communities through legitimate processes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What’s more, the Associated Press conducted an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/dake-kang-garance-burke-byron-tau-aniruddha-ghosal-and-yael-grauer-contributor-associated&quot;&gt;extensive 2025 investigation&lt;/a&gt;, which recently won the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/dake-kang-garance-burke-byron-tau-aniruddha-ghosal-and-yael-grauer-contributor-associated&quot;&gt;Pulitzer Prize&lt;/a&gt;, further mapping Cisco’s and other American tech companies’ involvement in creating China’s surveillance state over the past three decades. When questioned by the AP reporters, the companies dismissed any notion of human rights obligations and simply “said they adhere to relevant &lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-a80904158b771a14d5a734947f28d71b&quot;&gt;export controls&lt;/a&gt;, laws and regulations where they operate.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short, Cisco’s commitment to human rights is a fiction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given that the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively read the ATS into non-existence, Congress must now step up. While there might be &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justsecurity.org/144005/justice-after-alien-tort-statute/&quot;&gt;other avenues for redress&lt;/a&gt; including under state law, there must also be a comprehensive federal human rights law allowing any plaintiff to hold American companies—especially technology companies—accountable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses, with knowledge or intent that those abuses would occur, and whether the victims suffered those abuses in the U.S. or in foreign countries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The implications of this gap in U.S. human rights law are significant. As &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justsecurity.org/136437/cisco-supreme-court/&quot;&gt;Prof. Harold Koh considered&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;[T]he Justices should ask whether affording such immunity in &lt;em&gt;Cisco &lt;/em&gt;would implicitly signal to U.S. companies that they could not be held liable for assisting the &lt;em&gt;U.S. government &lt;/em&gt;in committing gross violations. Such violations could include constructing a mass surveillance system that may be used to surveil, persecute, retaliate against, and punish real and perceived opponents and constructing systems that autonomously commit war crimes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;American companies should not have a free pass to build out surveillance states (or other technologically sophisticated systems) that not only violate personal privacy or facilitate censorship, but that can also lead to real-world physical violence and even death.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-related-cases field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Related Cases:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/doe-i-v-cisco&quot;&gt;Doe I v. Cisco&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 19:29:03 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112521 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-human-rights">Surveillance and Human Rights</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/taxonomy/term/72">Legal Analysis</category>
 <dc:creator>Sophia Cope</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/china-eye.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="23708" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Google Forcing AI on Students Is BS</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/google-forcing-ai-students-bs</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google is rightfully facing blowback for forcing K-12 schools to enable AI if they wanted to keep using Google search. The company quickly backtracked and decoupled and turned off the services by default, but made it clear search will continue to be just another AI chatbot. This mandate forces an ultimatum on educators: accept generative AI or de-google your school.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Students, teachers, and parents across the U.S. are now years into an argument about how schools should respond to the growth of AI-enabled tools. Google decided to skip this debate and take this choice from schools. In August it activated AI chatbot Gemini &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://workspaceupdates.googleblog.com/2026/08/gemini-in-google-classroom-is-expanding-to-users-of-all-ages-with-contextualized-Gemini-starter-prompts-for-students.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;for 150 million K-12 students&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on Google Classroom, leaving educators &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.edweek.org/technology/schools-caught-flat-footed-after-google-makes-gemini-chatbot-available-to-all-students/2026/09&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;scrambling to respond&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. A few months later, Google introduced a new way to turn it off — but now administrators &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/03/us/google-search-schools-restrict-ai.html?unlocked_article_code=1.NlE.VMKr.Cr-g-C6phyfH&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;would also be turning off Google search&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnbc.com/2026/11/03/google-responds-to-outrage-over-removing-search-in-schools-that-ban-ai.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;walked this back&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; somewhat, clarifying that Gemini, Gemini notebook, and Search will have their own controls and will be off by default. But because of Google’s broader approach to force AI on all search users, this change is still an example of a tech monopolist pushing unwanted changes into the classroom.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tying AI to Search&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s no secret that the biggest companies in AI  are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2026/10/30/ai-sees-a-first-shake-out-as-worries-build/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;operating at a huge loss&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, in the hope they can follow&lt;/span&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://locusmag.com/feature/cory-doctorow-no-one-is-the-enshittifier-of-their-own-story/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Uber’s enshittification playbook&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Offer a cheap convenience &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2026-07-23/alphabets-205-billion-ai-spending-plan-spooks-investors&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;at a major loss&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; until old systems atrophy, then flip the script to reduce wages and raise consumer costs—whether that’s paying with cash or with data. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This puts Google in the odd position of an incumbent, with around &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.searchengines.net/guides/search-engine-market-share-by-country/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;90% of search traffic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. It needs to not only make good on its own AI investment, but protect its dominance from new AI tools. It’s not just enough to offer its own AI mode, it needs to turn search into AI mode, while engaging in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/google-summaries-arent-about-ai-theyre-about-lock&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;clumsy self-preferencing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that is &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/ai/articles/google-just-lost-half-trillion-204412907.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;eating its own ad revenue&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The problem with this approach is the public is split on AI, to put it mildly. Some users will welcome these changes, but the rest are stuck in an all-or-nothing bargain. Anyone concerned  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.popsci.com/technology/ai-overview-inaccuracy-google/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;about the accuracy of AI overviews&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; or their &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.forbes.com/sites/terdawn-deboe/2026/05/18/google-ai-overviews-are-eating-your-website-traffic-fight-back/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;impact on click-through rates&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://gizmodo.com/ai-is-killing-wikipedias-human-traffic-2000673686&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;online communities&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/column/1017983/google-ai-search-online-publishing&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;small publishers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; can just &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=deal%20with%20it&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;deal with it&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The bet is any inconvenience in switching to an alternative is enough to keep you trapped.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google can and should offer a way to disable AI overviews. Smaller services like DuckDuckGo* and Brave search have simple and persisting AI settings which don’t require login. These services also don&#039;t mince words and make a distinction between generated AI summaries, suspected AI results, and the backend use of AI to curate links. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s not enough to point to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pcmag.com/explainers/dont-want-to-see-google-ai-overviews-cant-turn-off-but-you-can-do-this&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;opaque workarounds&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, either. Adding “-ai” to your Google search will usually remove AI Overview, but so will “-unicorn”. This trick isn’t meant to be an AI off-switch, it’s a quirk of how AI Overview was implemented and can change at any time. These tricks also don’t generalize well to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://tedium.co/2024/05/17/google-web-search-make-default/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;settings for system administrators&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Hacks might work for now, but everyone—including administrators—deserve clear set-and-forget controls for the tools they rely on.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Pushing AI on Schools&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;De-googling your life isn’t easy, and for schools it can be even more difficult. For decades Google has gone after schools to foster life-long Google users—resulting in many institutions being deeply entrenched in its ecosystem &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/google-hit-with-privacy-suit-over-data-collection-on-school-kids&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;despite data privacy concerns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. That’s because schools face major &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/facebooks-secret-war-switching-costs#:~:text=Switching%20costs%20are%20how%20economists%20refer%20to%20all%20the%20things%20you%20have%20to%20give%20up%20to%20switch%20between%20products%20or%20services&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;switching costs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; when moving to a competitor. It takes more than flipping a setting—it means a lengthy contract process, staff retraining, and a cumbersome migration of past work. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The difficulty of switching makes granular controls even more essential, particularly for a hot-button issue like generative AI. Few parents would send their kids to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.kcra.com/article/ai-driven-school-folsom-education/65359290&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;AI-driven schools&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, but they may want their kids to learn tools like search as they exist outside of the classroom. However, many parents and teachers concerned with AI disrupting learning are pushing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-09-02/lausd-student-ai-ban-policy&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;major school districts&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to implement temporary &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/09/mayor-mamdani-and-chancellor-samuels-put-students-first-with-nat&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;AI moratoriums&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for young students. These pauses are meant to make sure any introduction of AI &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.edweek.org/technology/what-is-age-appropriate-use-of-ai-4-developmental-stages-to-know-about/2024/02&quot;&gt;fits the needs of students&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;and is done in a way that actually makes sure educators are prepared. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But in either camp, this is a choice that must be made by schools, not Google. Teachers know more about what their students need than a trillion-dollar tech company, and this expertise should be respected in their own classrooms. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google’s self-preferencing and desperate attempt to eventually recoup on an AI money pit must be tempered with more fine-tune controls over generative AI. It’s in Google’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;own interest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; to stop abusing its dominance to piss off users, advertisers, and school communities. It’s also Google’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;responsibility&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; as an adjudicated monopolist.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;span&gt;*DuckDuckGo is an EFF donor. EFF donors do not influence our agenda or our positions.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 19:14:22 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112519 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/competition">Competition</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/ai">Artificial Intelligence</category>
 <dc:creator>Rory Mir</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/student-privacy-og.jpg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="57309" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Presenting &#039;Desire Lines: Encoding Queer Digital Futures&#039;</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/presenting-desire-lines-encoding-queer-digital-futures</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;What does the digital future look like? Who gets to imagine it, shape it, and make it real?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Building a freer, more inclusive digital age requires not only challenging systems of surveillance and control, but also making space for creativity, community, and radical imagination. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That&#039;s why earlier this year with the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://desirelines.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;queer arts collective&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, we put out a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/call-submissions-digital-pride&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;call for submissions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; inviting people to explore the intersections of technology, identity, and digital liberation—whether that involved pointing the lens towards an underrepresented issue in digital justice efforts; sharing personal accounts of joy, pleasure, or sorrow under surveillance; or painting wide imaginations for our communities using technology for good instead of carcerality and doom.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And we’re excited to share that the project is now live! &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/11/05/desire_lines.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Desire Lines: Encoding Queer Digital Futures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; explores a digital world that dreams wilder and exists louder. Seven artists share their visions of digital liberation, spanning from early internet-coded yearning to escapist steamy chat rooms and seed-laced battle suits for revolution. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These essays and stories remind us that digital rights aren&#039;t just about the existence of technology and its deployment as existing in a vacuum, but instead about how tech tools are a way for people to express themselves freely, find communities, explore identities, and build spaces to exist and seek joy without fear. Too often, conversations about technology focus on innovation, efficiency, and the next big thing while overlooking the people and communities most affected by the systems being built. This project was an effort to break containment and make space for something different: a chance to imagine digital futures rooted in queer creativity, resistance, and possibility.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Together with the queer arts collective, we were excited to launch the magazine and celebrate the artists and ideas that brought it to life through our session at Mozilla Festival last week, ‘&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://events.mozillafoundation.org/e/mozilla-festival-2026/page/schedule?sessionId=440542&amp;amp;pastSession=true&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Privacy x Queer Desire&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,’ where we started out by co-curating a community privacy plan grounded in digital fairness before launching the magazine. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If the stories in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/desire-lines-encoding-queer-digital-futures&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Encoding Queer Digital Futures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; teach us one thing, it’s that we don&#039;t have to accept the digital future handed to us by oppressive governments and tech companies. We already have pre-Big Tech internet experiences encoded in our fondest memories that can inform our dreams for something better, and together we can build a new reality.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Read Desire Lines: Encoding Queer Digital Futures &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/11/05/desire_lines.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 18:21:41 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112512 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <dc:creator>Paige Collings</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/neon-unicorn-final-banner.jpg" alt="image depicts a neon unicorn jumping out a laptop on a purple background" type="image/jpeg" length="845536" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>EFF Submission to OHCHR Consultation on Child Rights and Safety in the Digital Environment</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/eff-submission-ohchr-consultation-child-rights-and-safety-digital-environment</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;“&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;The safety of young people in the digital environment cannot be assessed without also considering the safety of young people in offline environments. For millions of young people around the world, the digital environment is their safe place, their haven from an unsafe physical environment, community, or family situation. The digital environment may be the best, perhaps only, place for them to find critical safety information and community, to explore ideas that are controversial in their families and larger physical environments, and to otherwise nourish their personal autonomy.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;“For these young people, regulatory efforts that limit their access to online services or to certain features they find valuable, make their lives, in total, less safe, even if there has been some marginal safety benefit to their digital environment.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;“The OHCHR must thus consider the whole of young persons&#039; lives in any recommendations that come out of this process and not treat ‘safety, physical or mental health, and rights in the digital environment’ as disconnected from safety, physical or mental health, and rights elsewhere.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So begins &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/11/06/eff_submission_to_ohchr_consultation_on_child_safety_.pdf&quot;&gt;EFF’s submission&lt;/a&gt; to the global Call for Inputs on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2026/call-inputs-child-rights-and-safety-digital-environment&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Child Rights and Safety in the Digital Environment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; conducted by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. The OHCHR is preparing a report on the issue to be presented to the UN Human Rights Council at its 64th session in the first quarter of 2027. The Human Rights Council requested the OHCHR to solicit input from a wide range of stakeholders, including child and youth perspectives, and convene five regional consultations to assess the risks to the safety of the child in the digital environment and best practices to address these risks in different geographical areas, bearing in mind current and emerging business models. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The OHCHR acknowledges that young people today navigate a digital environment with both “unprecedented opportunities” and “serious and evolving risks,” and sets out a rights-based framing whereby “Children&#039;s &#039;safety&#039; is therefore addressed through the full framework of their rights — with freedom from violence (Art. 19) and protection from exploitation and abuse (Arts. 34–36) as clearly defined obligations, situated alongside privacy (Art. 16), access to information (Arts. 13 and 17), expression (Art. 13), participation (Art. 12), and development (Art. 6). Protection and the full range of children&#039;s rights are understood as reinforcing rather than competing imperatives, and measures taken in the name of safety must not be used to restrict the enjoyment of other rights, such as the right to privacy and the right to participate.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In light of this, EFF’s &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/11/06/eff_submission_to_ohchr_consultation_on_child_safety_.pdf&quot;&gt;submission&lt;/a&gt; focused on the current general disregard for young people&#039;s speech and privacy rights by regulators around the world, all of whom seem far more interested in empowering parents rather than young people themselves, or meaningfully involving young people in the regulatory process. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;We emphasized the human rights-centered uses young people make of social media that were not specifically set out in the concept note. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;We also explained that too often, policy proposals aiming to remedy the issues of online safety for young people introduce limitations on access to online services and content rather than tackling the specific problems that people experience. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span mce-data-marked=&quot;1&quot;&gt;More specifically, our submission looks at:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;the most significant risks to young people’s safety in the digital environment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;how digital product design and business models drive risks to children&#039;s rights online, including in AI-mediated services&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;the inclusion of young people’s views in the design, governance, and regulation of digital environments &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;how equality and non-discrimination in access and protection can be ensured&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;the promotion of digital literacy, skills, and empowerment for young people &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;the impact of legislative and regulatory measures from the United States to Indonesia and Australia &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;importance of broader, more systemic interventions that can address address online harms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;how global instruments and processes can protect young people online. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The internet is where young people learn, find community, explore their identities, access important information, and express themselves. Curtailing these opportunities doesn&#039;t make them safer. And requiring everyone to hand over sensitive personal information just to access online spaces creates privacy risks for all users.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As the OHCHR has acknowledged, the solution to the issue of online safety should not require a choice between protecting young people from danger or protecting their rights. Instead of restricting access, governments should focus on the systems that create these risks in the first place; tech companies must be accountable for their design choices, data practices, and surveillance-driven business models; and young people need to be included in the decisions that affect them. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Read our full submission &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/11/06/eff_submission_to_ohchr_consultation_on_child_safety_.pdf&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 15:55:49 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112518 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <dc:creator>Paige Collings</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>David Greene</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ageverification-banner2-3a.png" alt="two kids on a huge laptop, spied on by an eye in magnifying glass" type="image/png" length="1249014" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>When the Watchdogs Are Silenced: India&#039;s Crackdown on Those Documenting Online Censorship </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/when-watchdogs-are-silenced-indias-crackdown-those-documenting-online-censorship</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;On November 3, our colleagues at the Software Freedom Law Center, India (SFLC.in) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ifex.org/india-ifex-expresses-solidarity-with-sflc-in-and-other-digital-organisations-documenting-violations-of-free-expression-and-information-following-attempted-censorship/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;received notifications&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; from X that the Delhi Police had issued takedown requests targeting 42 URLs. Among the accounts and posts targeted were those belonging to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://sflc.in/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;SFLC.in&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://internetfreedom.in/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Internet Freedom Foundation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; (IFF), and X account @geoblockedindia, as well as posts documenting legal notices and instances of online censorship.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Takedown requests targeting SFLC.in and other digital rights groups threaten not only their work, but the public’s ability to know when and how online speech is being restricted.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The requests cite grounds including hate speech, alleged defamation of the Hindu nationalist organization &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rashtriya_Swayamsevak_Sangh&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; (RSS), and concerns relating to safety and security. But the context in which these requests have emerged is particularly troubling: they target organizations and individuals whose work involves documenting restrictions on online expression and making those restrictions visible to the public.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In other words, the organizations being targeted are among those trying to tell the public when and how its speech is being censored.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;SFLC.in is one of India&#039;s most important digital rights organizations and promotes innovation and open access to knowledge by helping developers make great free and open-source software, protects privacy and civil liberties for Indians by educating and providing free legal advice, and helps policymakers make informed and just decisions about use of technology. In 2025, we recognized their work with an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/08/eff-awards-spotlight-software-freedom-law-center-india&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;EFF Award&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; for Defending Digital Freedoms.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://internetfreedom.in/dont-ask-people-to-give-up-a-fundamental-right-within-seven-days/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;IFF&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; (the Internet Freedom Foundation) is another of EFF&#039;s close allies in India. Like EFF, IFF combines advocacy campaigns and strategic litigation to advance digital rights. They write frequently about internet shutdowns and have filed several lawsuits contesting them.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Among SFLC.in&#039;s initiatives is its&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freespeech.sflc.in/&quot;&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Free Speech Tracker&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, which documents instances of online censorship, content restrictions, and account takedowns in India. In a country where government orders to restrict online content are often opaque, this work is absolutely essential.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Recent legal notices object to the tracker itself, as well as the organization’s documentation of restricted content and geo-blocked material. The allegations against SFLC.in include claims that it is &quot;continuously opposing government directions&quot; and publicly circulating information about restricted content, thereby undermining measures taken in the name of national security and public order.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;But documenting government censorship is not the same as undermining public safety. Reporting that content has been restricted is not an endorsement of that content, nor does it constitute an attempt to circumvent the law. It is an exercise in transparency and accountability, and one that allows journalists, researchers, civil society organizations, and the public to understand how governments exercise their power over the information landscape.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Censorship thrives in the absence of transparency&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The use of legal complaints and platform takedown mechanisms against organizations documenting censorship creates a particularly troubling dynamic. When those who monitor restrictions on expression are threatened with having their accounts or reporting removed, the result is a chilling effect that extends far beyond the immediate targets. Other organizations or journalists may think twice before documenting controversial takedowns or challenging government orders, and the public loses access to an independent record of decisions that affect its ability to speak and access information online.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;There is also an important role here for platforms like X. Platforms &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://santaclaraprinciples.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;must be transparent&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; about the requests they receive, provide meaningful notice to affected users, and ensure that any restrictions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and avenues for appeal. When governments seek to restrict speech, platforms have a responsibility to avoid becoming opaque intermediaries through which censorship is quietly carried out.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;These developments are part of a broader pattern of pressure on independent civil society organizations working to defend freedom of expression and access to information in India. Digital rights groups play an indispensable role in documenting the effects of government policies, identifying patterns of censorship, and challenging restrictions that undermine fundamental rights. Their ability to do so independently is not a peripheral concern; it is a cornerstone of a healthy democratic society.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The right to freedom of expression includes the right to scrutinize the exercise of government power. That includes the right to document censorship, question the reasons given for it, and make that information available to the public. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;EFF stands in solidarity with SFLC.in, the Internet Freedom Foundation, @geoblockedindia, and all those working to document and challenge restrictions on online expression in India. We urge the authorities in India to respect the rights of digital rights organizations to conduct their work without intimidation or retaliation, and to ensure that any restrictions on online expression comply with international human rights standards.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 09:30:42 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112517 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
 <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/issue-icon-2026-freespeech.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="26366" />
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  <item>
    <title>Reflecting on Digital Rights Wins and Losses in Sacramento</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/reflecting-digital-rights-wins-and-losses-sacramento</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;California’s 2026 legislative session has officially adjourned and it’s time to reflect on the wins and losses that have shaped Californians’ digital rights landscape this year. This was the second year of a two-year legislative session, which meant several bills &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/trends-watch-california-legislature&quot;&gt;resumed their legislative paths from 2025&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF monitored nearly 100 bills in the state over the two-year session. These included proposed regulations on 3D printers, access to social media platforms, police, commercial, and workplace surveillance practices, AI, and other privacy concerns. While we saw some victories, alarming developments also raised serious concerns about the future of privacy protection in the state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Celebrating Wins&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Use of automated decision-making and surveillance in the workplace&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Governor Newsom signed vital protections on the use of automated decision-making in the workplace and workplace surveillance tools, specifically &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/yes-californias-no-robo-bosses-act&quot;&gt;No Robo Bosses&lt;/a&gt; (&lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB947&quot;&gt;SB 947&lt;/a&gt;) and &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1883&quot;&gt;AB 1883&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Championed by our &lt;a href=&quot;https://calaborfed.org/press-releases/governor-gavin-newsom-signs-california-federation-of-labor-unions-sponsored-bills-regulating-ai-in-the-workplace/&quot;&gt;labor partners&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB947&quot;&gt;SB 947&lt;/a&gt; limits how employers can use automated decision-making to fire or discipline workers, including provisions that ensure workers get vital information about automated decisions that affect them, and that an algorithm is not the only authority for these consequential decisions. Alongside it, &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1883&quot;&gt;AB 1883&lt;/a&gt; prohibits the use of workplace surveillance to predict emotions or collect neural data. This stops employers from using potentially biased, invasive, and exploitative forms of AI surveillance at the workplace, marking an important step toward creating workplaces that respect the privacy and autonomy of workers. We look forward to continuing to ensure that technology in California’s workplaces is deployed fairly, thoughtfully, and with respect for all workers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Protecting against federal overreach&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF was also grateful to see Governor Newsom sign &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB747&quot;&gt;SB 747&lt;/a&gt;, which allows damages lawsuits against federal officials &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/02/protecting-our-right-sue-federal-agents-who-violate-constitution&quot;&gt;who violate the U.S. Constitution&lt;/a&gt;. Victims of constitutional violations deserve a complete remedy and this law also helps deter constitutional violations in the first place. Gaps in current law often make it difficult to seek a damages remedy against federal officials who violate the U.S. Constitution. This bill makes it easier to bring such litigation. Federal law enforcement officials have violated our&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/you-have-first-amendment-right-record-police&quot;&gt; First Amendment right to record on-duty police&lt;/a&gt; and other newsworthy subjects, and also sometimes violate our Fourth Amendment right to be &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/eff-fourth-circuit-electronic-device-searches-border-require-warrant&quot;&gt;free from unreasonable searches of our phones and laptops&lt;/a&gt;. When this happens, the people who suffer these violations should be able to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/02/protecting-our-right-sue-federal-agents-who-violate-constitution&quot;&gt;sue these officials for damages&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, EFF supported two bills (which are now state law) that clarify and extend California’s shield laws to protect patients, healthcare providers, and others involved in reproductive healthcare and gender-affirming care that is legal in California. After the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/effs-statement-dobbs-abortion-ruling&quot;&gt;overturn of Roe v. Wade&lt;/a&gt;, California &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/09/eff-california-governor-protect-abortion-data-privacy&quot;&gt;enacted&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/09/california-leads-reproductive-and-trans-health-data-privacy&quot;&gt;numerous shield laws&lt;/a&gt; to protect people who provide, receive, or help others obtain healthcare that is legal in California. These laws prohibit California agencies and certain companies from helping other states enforce laws that punish this care. Yet the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.kff.org/lgbtq/overview-of-president-trumps-executive-actions-impacting-lgbtq-health/&quot;&gt;federal government&lt;/a&gt; and coordinated efforts in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down&quot;&gt;other states&lt;/a&gt; still &lt;a href=&quot;https://reproductiverights.org/resources/emerging-threats-state-laws-abortion-access/#states-increasing-penalties-for-medication-abortion&quot;&gt;threaten access&lt;/a&gt; to these legally protected healthcare services. &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1854&quot;&gt;AB 1854&lt;/a&gt; addresses these threats by expanding coverage to more California businesses and individuals who receive legal demands, creating a notification process so the Attorney General can intervene to stop improper disclosures, and clarifying that law enforcement cannot arrest someone if the Governor refuses an extradition request. These protections serve as a necessary response to real and escalating tactics outside the state targeting lawful reproductive healthcare.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF also supported &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1930&quot;&gt;AB 1930&lt;/a&gt; to protect confidential medical records from politically motivated investigations into lawful healthcare, empowering the California Attorney General’s office to meaningfully intervene and respond to out-of-state subpoenas or requests for data regarding protected care.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Young people online&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF is dedicated to protecting the rights of young people online. We supported a handful of bills on &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/governor-newsom-signs-student-backed-digital-literacy-bills-alongside-misguided&quot;&gt;digital literacy and cybersecurity education&lt;/a&gt; that were signed into law, such as &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB2071&quot;&gt;AB 2071&lt;/a&gt; on digital wellness instruction and &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB2298&quot;&gt;AB 2298&lt;/a&gt; on cybersecurity in educational standards. Unlike &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification&quot;&gt;blanket bans&lt;/a&gt;, these bills address online safety through education rather than prohibition. Young people rely on the internet not just for entertainment, but for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/meta-settlement-yet-another-example-online-youth-organizing-under-threat&quot;&gt;civic engagement&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1jy512r19ro&quot;&gt;education&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.advocatesforyouth.org/siecus-and-advocates-for-youth-oppose-the-kids-online-safety-act-kosa/&quot;&gt;self-expression&lt;/a&gt;, and&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.thetrevorproject.org/research-briefs/online-experiences-and-mental-health-of-lgbtq-young-people/&quot;&gt; community&lt;/a&gt;—especially vulnerable youth who may &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.teenvogue.com/story/kids-online-safety-act-homeschooled-kids&quot;&gt;lack support&lt;/a&gt; in their physical surroundings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Real digital safety comes from preparation, not isolation. Research consistently shows that &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/positively-media/202305/why-proposed-social-media-bans-wont-keep-your-kids-safe&quot;&gt;open, honest conversations&lt;/a&gt; about digital literacy and privacy with trusted adults are &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2026/06/26/nx-s1-5843233/a-psychologist-makes-the-case-against-social-media-bans-for-kids&quot;&gt;far more effective&lt;/a&gt; at protecting youth than restrictive censorship laws. Young people themselves recognize this need; in fact, &lt;a href=&quot;https://edsource.org/2026/social-media-ai-mental-health/755990&quot;&gt;AB 2071 was co-authored by a group of students&lt;/a&gt; actively seeking better resources to navigate their digital lives safely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF and our allies were also able to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/california-steps-back-dangerous-expansion-its-age-gating-law&quot;&gt;stop the expansion of California’s dangerous age gating law&lt;/a&gt; from operating systems to browsers. The California legislature &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-cas-ab-1856-exempts-open-source-expands-age-gating&quot;&gt;stepped back from their plan&lt;/a&gt; to expand the 2025 age-gating law and ultimately removed language from &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1856&quot;&gt;AB 1856&lt;/a&gt; that could have compounded serious threats to users’ speech, privacy, and security just to browse the internet, and positively, removed the burdens on open-source operating systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;Real digital safety comes from preparation, not isolation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While EFF still believes the underlying law that AB 1856 amends, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/ab-1043s-internet-age-gates-hurt-everyone&quot;&gt;AB 1043, is unconstitutional&lt;/a&gt;, we appreciate that the legislature did not &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-cas-ab-1856-exempts-open-source-expands-age-gating&quot;&gt;expand this problematic age-gating framework&lt;/a&gt; to browsers. We were also pleased that an earlier amendment to AB 1856 &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-cas-ab-1856-exempts-open-source-expands-age-gating&quot;&gt;reduced the threat to the open-source community&lt;/a&gt; by exempting open-source operating systems. Given these changes, EFF &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/eff-letter-re-ab-1856-removal-opposition-amended-july-1&quot;&gt;removed its opposition&lt;/a&gt; to AB 1856, and thanks the author for listening to concerns from advocates and developers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mourning Losses&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Updating California’s Information Practices Act (IPA)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF was &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/californias-cities-and-counties-must-step-their-privacy-game-ab-1337-can-do&quot;&gt;proud to co-sponsor&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1337&quot;&gt;AB 1337&lt;/a&gt; this session alongside our friends at Oakland Privacy and Assemblymember Chris Ward, who is also the chair of the legislative LGBTQ Caucus. The bill unfortunately failed to cross the finish line after stalling in the Senate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1337&quot;&gt;AB 1337&lt;/a&gt; would have updated California&#039;s foundational &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ftb.ca.gov/your-rights/privacy/information-practices-act-of-1977.html&quot;&gt;Information Practices Act of 1977&lt;/a&gt; and extended its vital privacy safeguards present at the state agency level to counties and cities. Today, city and county governments collect vast amounts of sensitive personal data (from public health records such as vaccinations, to welfare assistance details, to license plate reader data) and administer programs that were likely not contemplated back in 1977. Yet the law has simply not kept up with modern data practices, and California still has no state law governing how local governments handle this information. While we could not build enough political progress to pass the bill this session, closing this local privacy gap remains an urgent need for California.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Social media ban&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another major setback was the passage (and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/we-all-deserve-better-internet-not-smaller-one&quot;&gt;subsequent signing&lt;/a&gt;) of a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/how-and-why-fight-back-against-social-media-bans&quot;&gt;social media ban&lt;/a&gt; for youth under the age of 16 (&lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1709&quot;&gt;AB 1709&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Technology and the laws that regulate it should support and empower young people, but AB 1709 falls far short of this goal. Using technology is how we learn and build community in today’s world, but laws &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/amending-ab-1709-doesnt-fix-it-californias-social-media-ban-still-threatens-free&quot;&gt;such as AB 1709&lt;/a&gt; cut young people off from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.youthrights.org/the-harms-of-social-media-restrictions-and-bans-for-minors/&quot;&gt;essential information and experiences&lt;/a&gt;. They also particularly harm those already facing increased challenges who find safety in supportive online communities that they cannot always access in the physical world.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;Technology and the laws that regulate it should support and empower young people&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Denying minors access to digital forums or stripping out basic tools needed to navigate them will not make young people safer or healthier in the AI age. Research shows &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/10/16/1146834/kids-are-outsmarting-social-media-bans-thats-not-a-problem-we-need-to-solve/&quot;&gt;social media bans are ineffectual&lt;/a&gt; while denying young people opportunities to develop their own voices, share their art, practice religion, or engage in politics. These laws also hurt all of us. Age-gating requirements &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/age-verification-systems-are-surveillance-systems#main-content&quot;&gt;force everyone to give up more personal information&lt;/a&gt;. To verify who can pass through online gates, companies will collect even more data, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/age-gates-are-windfall-big-tech-and-death-sentence-smaller-platforms#main-content&quot;&gt;concentrating power&lt;/a&gt; in corporate hands rather than protecting people. AB 1709 is also inconsistent with &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/02/eff-ninth-circuit-young-people-have-first-amendment-right-use-social-media-and-all&quot;&gt;rights to free expression&lt;/a&gt;, meaning California will spend resources &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/world/us/google-meta-tiktok-sue-block-california-youth-social-media-law-2026-11-05/&quot;&gt;defending a law that will likely get tied up in court&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gutting California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CIPA was originally intended to protect personal privacy against surveillance and included a private right of action so consumers could hold corporations accountable in court. This is why EFF and allied organizations spent the two-year session strongly opposing &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB690&quot;&gt;SB 690&lt;/a&gt;—a bill we dubbed the &quot;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/californias-corporate-cover-act-privacy-nightmare&quot;&gt;Corporate Cover-Up Act&lt;/a&gt;&quot; for its attempt to weaken consumer protections in CIPA. Although SB 690 &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/governor-newsom-signs-sb-690-california-2266338/&quot;&gt;was narrowed from its original draft&lt;/a&gt;, we asked Governor Newsom to veto it because it strips away the law&#039;s private right of action—a vital tool for individuals fighting back against unlawful metadata surveillance. People deserve the right to decide whether to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/you-should-have-right-sue-companies-violate-your-privacy&quot;&gt;bring a lawsuit&lt;/a&gt;, which remains one of the most effective ways to deter corporate abuse. Unfortunately, the Governor signed the bill and even urged the legislature &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/SIGN-msg-SB-690.pdf&quot;&gt;to go further next year.&lt;/a&gt; It&#039;s especially alarming to see this disregard for accountability as the federal government and law enforcement agencies seek data from businesses or data brokers to target people based on political beliefs, religious affiliations, or health decisions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We expect to see further attacks on CIPA next legislative session, as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/SIGN-msg-SB-690.pdf&quot;&gt;Governor Newsom’s signing statement&lt;/a&gt; called for “additional work in this area” and urged the legislature to “take this on next year to ensure a fair balance between protecting private information and preventing rapacious litigation.&quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Banning the sale of sensitive personal information&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;California also missed the opportunity to join other states in restricting the sale of sensitive data. We are deeply disappointed that Governor Newsom vetoed &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1542&quot;&gt;AB 1542&lt;/a&gt;, which would have ensured sensitive personal information stays private by banning its sale outright. There&#039;s a &lt;a href=&quot;https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/consumer-reports-backs-california-bill-banning-the-sale-of-sensitive-consumer-data/&quot;&gt;nationwide movement&lt;/a&gt; to protect consumers by making intimate details off-limits for businesses to sell or share. From &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/privacy-map-part-2-progress-pitfalls-and-fight-enforceable-location-data&quot;&gt;precise geolocation&lt;/a&gt; and genetic data to private messages, health records, sexual orientation, and immigration status, sensitive data reveals the most private aspects of our lives. Monetizing this information fuels financial scams, predatory pricing, and warrant-free government surveillance. By &lt;a href=&quot;https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/california-governor-vetoes-bill-banning-the-sale-of-sensitive-consumer-data/&quot;&gt;vetoing this bill&lt;/a&gt;, California not only fails to lead but falls behind other states, by missing a critical opportunity to protect our most vulnerable communities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3D printing &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The California legislature unfortunately also passed &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB2047&quot;&gt;AB 2047&lt;/a&gt;, which aimed to make every 3D printer come &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/dangers-californias-legislation-censor-3d-printing&quot;&gt;pre-loaded with censorship software&lt;/a&gt;. It&#039;s a law that is trying to prevent an act that &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB2156&quot;&gt;is already illegal in the state&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/print-blocking-wont-work-permission-print-part-2&quot;&gt;just won&#039;t work&lt;/a&gt;. It was part of a recent sweep of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/stop-new-yorks-attack-3d-printing&quot;&gt;misguided state bills&lt;/a&gt; which purport to go after &quot;ghost guns,&quot; but actually &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/print-blocking-anti-consumer-permission-print-part-1&quot;&gt;“enshittify” 3D printers&lt;/a&gt; by introducing privacy risks and a new way to restrict or upcharge users. Lawmakers even considered including misdemeanor charges that would have impacted people using alternative open-source programs. Fortunately an outpouring of opposition from makers and civil liberties advocates resulted in a bill so limited that, despite having passed and been signed into law, will not affect makers until ASTM International publishes a standard — something the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.astm.org/news/press-releases/astm-additive-manufacturing-policy-initiatives-role&quot;&gt;organization had not been considering doing&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Where California Missed the Mark&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Consumer privacy&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;California lawmakers also missed key opportunities to curb commercial surveillance. EFF supported &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB2564&quot;&gt;AB 2564&lt;/a&gt;, which prohibits retailers from engaging in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/californias-bill-ban-surveillance-pricing&quot;&gt;surveillance pricing&lt;/a&gt;, the invasive practice that allows corporations to offer the same product to two different people at two different prices based on scrutiny of their personal data. Unfortunately, the bill stalled on the last day of session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legislature also failed to move &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB322&quot;&gt;AB 322&lt;/a&gt;, which would have safeguarded the privacy of Californians by placing restrictions on the collection, use, and sale of location data. Last year, EFF &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/04/privacy-map-how-states-are-fighting-location-surveillance&quot;&gt;published a rubric for comprehensive location privacy laws&lt;/a&gt;, outlining baseline standards states should meet to shield individuals from pervasive location surveillance. Since then, states like Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, and Virginia have &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/privacy-map-part-2-progress-pitfalls-and-fight-enforceable-location-data&quot;&gt;enacted new consumer privacy restraints on geolocation data&lt;/a&gt;. Yet, even as these states move the ball forward, most of their laws leave significant gaps that still must be filled. California failed to make that change and protect residents from location surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Automatic license plate readers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;California lawmakers have lagged in &lt;a href=&quot;https://calmatters.org/economy/technology/2026/09/california-kills-flock-camera-regulation-again/&quot;&gt;enacting meaningful limits&lt;/a&gt; on automated license plate readers with all proposed ALPR regulation bills failing to pass since 2022. &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB1013&quot;&gt;SB 1013&lt;/a&gt; initially appeared on track to pass with broad support, but ultimately stalled in the final days of the session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF maintains &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/effs-state-legislative-agenda-end-alpr-mass-surveillance&quot;&gt;high standards for ALPR legislation&lt;/a&gt;, favoring &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/effs-policy-position-alpr-surveillance-eliminate-it-and-reduce-its-harms&quot;&gt;full bans or, at minimum&lt;/a&gt;, strict warrant requirements and brief data retention limits. While we remained neutral on earlier versions of SB 1013, EFF and our partners &lt;a href=&quot;https://cdt.org/insights/cdt-and-partners-post-floor-alert-opposing-ca-sb-1013-automated-license-plate-readers-bill/&quot;&gt;ultimately opposed the bill&lt;/a&gt; after late amendments compromised key privacy protections. The final draft would have doubled the current data retention period and allowed agencies to archive rather than delete data unrelated to active investigations—effectively shifting away from data minimization toward indefinite retention. (We saw &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/while-country-rejects-alpr-mass-surveillance-sf-settles-weak-safeguards&quot;&gt;San Francisco adopt a similar proposal this year&lt;/a&gt;). We encourage California lawmakers to draw from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/effs-state-legislative-agenda-end-alpr-mass-surveillance&quot;&gt;our ALPR legislative agenda&lt;/a&gt; to enact robust safeguards or ban ALPR mass surveillance altogether.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Looking Ahead&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Next session, we expect ALPR legislation to be top of mind as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.multistate.us/insider/2026/9/23/automatic-license-plate-readers-face-growing-state-restrictions-in-2026&quot;&gt;states across the country&lt;/a&gt; reckon with the harms the technology has caused. We will also be monitoring the results and action following the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports-coming-soon/2026-134/&quot;&gt;state’s audit into California’s fusion centers&lt;/a&gt;. Following calls from advocates to address privacy abuses and a lack of transparency, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee &lt;a href=&quot;https://sd31.senate.ca.gov/news/cervantes-requests-state-audit-ensure-greater-accountability-fusion-centers-safeguard-rights&quot;&gt;approved Senator Sabrina Cervantes’ audit request&lt;/a&gt; in March 2026. This builds on our past experiences working with JLAC audits to expose law enforcement overreach—such as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/02/california-auditor-releases-damning-report-about-law-enforcements-use-automated&quot;&gt;the state auditor&#039;s damning 2020 report on law enforcement’s use of automated license plate readers&lt;/a&gt; and our &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/demand-california-fix-calgang-its-deeply-flawed-gang-database&quot;&gt;2016 push to fix the deeply flawed CalGang database&lt;/a&gt;. The audit will examine the legal authority, governance, and funding of the centers, map out state and private data systems accessed by personnel, and review protocols for handling data breaches and unauthorized surveillance. This audit will mark the first comprehensive review of these facilities in 13 years and should be released by Summer 2027. We hope lawmakers use the findings to rein in these centers and their unauthorized surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Other “zombie bills” are also expected to return next year, including legislation regarding the use of copyrighted material to train AI systems. Throughout the two-year session, EFF raised serious concerns about &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB412&quot;&gt;AB 412&lt;/a&gt;, a bill that would require AI developers to identify and disclose copyrighted works used in generative AI training. We argued that complying with such a mandate is &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/californias-ab-412-still-demands-developers-do-impossible&quot;&gt;practically impossible&lt;/a&gt;, as it demands information that often does not exist and cannot realistically be obtained. While we are glad the legislature paused to consider the best approach rather than rushing this policy forward, we expect legislation targeting fair use and AI training to return next session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;More broadly on AI, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/computer-security-about-get-lot-worse-heres-what-you-can-do&quot;&gt;vulnerabilities&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/&quot;&gt;security issues&lt;/a&gt; have dominated recent news cycles, and everyday Californians feel real anxiety about the risks of AI. We expect to see numerous bills addressing issues like &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/eff-statement-california-governors-executive-order-ai&quot;&gt;existential risk and kill switches&lt;/a&gt;, as &lt;a href=&quot;https://apcp.assembly.ca.gov/hearings/2025-26-informationaloversight-hearings&quot;&gt;Assembly&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://spdtcp.senate.ca.gov/system/files/2026-10/10.21-agenda_final_1.pdf&quot;&gt;Senate&lt;/a&gt; privacy committees in California have held informational hearings on these topics over the last month.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We hope to work with legislators to address the threats of AI and ensure that technology supports rights, justice, freedom, and innovation for all people. Laws should always ensure that technology empowers rather than oppresses.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 23:33:19 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112514 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Rindala Alajaji</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/california-bear2023.png" alt="Bear hugging CA state, with lightning bolts on plum bg" type="image/png" length="110576" />
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    <title>Join EFF to Celebrate the Life of Aaron Swartz</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/join-eff-celebrate-life-aaron-swartz</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Join us to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/event/aaron-swartz-international-hackathon-2026&quot;&gt;celebrate the legacy of Aaron Swartz&lt;/a&gt; on Nov. 8, 2026. With the organizers of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aaronswartzday.org/&quot;&gt;Aaron Swartz Day&lt;/a&gt;, we’re honoring his life with an in-person and remote hackathon. This event is supported by several organizations that carry on his work, including the Internet Archive—which is hosting the in-person event—the &lt;a href=&quot;https://freedom.press/&quot;&gt;Freedom of the Press Foundation&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://creativecommons.org/&quot;&gt;Creative Commons&lt;/a&gt; and the &lt;a href=&quot;https://free.law/&quot;&gt;Free Law Project&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aaron Swartz was a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/farewell-aaron-swartz&quot;&gt;digital rights champion&lt;/a&gt; who believed in the need for an open internet. His life was cut short in 2013, after federal prosecutors charged him under the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa&quot;&gt;Computer Fraud and Abuse Act&lt;/a&gt; (CFAA) for systematically downloading academic journal articles from the online database JSTOR. Facing the prospect of a long and unjust sentence, Aaron died by suicide at the age of 26.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF was proud to call Aaron a friend and ally. We continue to stand with programmers and developers engaged in cutting-edge exploration of technology through our &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/coders&quot;&gt;Coders&#039; Rights Project&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hackathon participants can contribute code, documentation, and design to several open-source and public-interest projects. These include &lt;a href=&quot;https://securedrop.org/&quot;&gt;Secure Drop&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://openlibrary.org/&quot;&gt;Open Library&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://cdss.berkeley.edu/project/quantifying-commons&quot;&gt;Quantifying the Commons&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://onionpress.org/onionhome/&quot;&gt;Onion Press&lt;/a&gt;, and our own &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.atlasofsurveillance.org/&quot;&gt;Atlas of Surveillance&lt;/a&gt;.  EFF Director of State Affairs Hayley Tsukayama will also join hackathon participants at the Internet Archive at 11 a.m. for an Atlas of Surveillance on-boarding session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Contributors across experience levels are welcome. The Aaron Swartz Day organizers are also open to adding new projects and workshops, so please contact them at &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:aaronswartzday@gmail.com&quot;&gt;aaronswartzday@gmail.com&lt;/a&gt; if you’d like to suggest a workshop or project—particularly open-source projects on Github that participants can continue to work on after the event. For more details on how to participate in-person or remotely, please visit the Aaron Swartz Day and International Hackathon page at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.aaronswartzday.org/&quot;&gt;www.aaronswartzday.org&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Event Details&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Date:&lt;/strong&gt; Sunday, November 8, 2026&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Time:&lt;/strong&gt; 10:00 AM – 5:00 PM PST&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Social Lunch:&lt;/strong&gt; 1:00 PM – 3:00 PM PST&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In-person Location:&lt;/strong&gt; Internet Archive Headquarters, 300 Funston Ave, San Francisco, CA 94118&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Admission:&lt;/strong&gt; Free, but please &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eventbrite.com/e/aaron-swartz-international-hackathon-2026-tickets-2002921172143&quot;&gt;RSVP here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 23:21:45 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112515 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Hayley Tsukayama</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/og-aaronswartz-credit.jpg" alt="Aaron Swartz at a Boston Wiki Meetup in 2009 photo by Sage Ross via Wikipedia" type="image/jpeg" length="268127" />
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    <title>We’re Asking the Ninth Circuit to Hold Reverse Location Warrants Categorically Unconstitutional</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/were-asking-ninth-circuit-hold-reverse-location-warrants-categorically</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yesterday, along with the ACLU, EFF filed an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/united-states-v-spurlock-eff-aclu-amicus-brief&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt; in the Ninth Circuit court of appeals in &lt;em&gt;United States v. Spurlock&lt;/em&gt;, a case involving a “tower dump” warrant. These overbroad warrants require cellular providers to turn over location data about every phone in a given area at a given time. This is the first such case to be heard by a federal appeals court since the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/victory-supreme-court-says-constitution-protects-peoples-location-data&quot;&gt;US Supreme Court ruled this summer&lt;/a&gt; that highly similar “geofence” warrants are searches under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Spurlock &lt;/em&gt;involves an investigation into two murder victims discovered on the side of a rural California highway. Police also found a car belonging to one of the victims several miles away on the same highway. They quickly sought a tower dump warrant for an area covering this stretch of road, which eventually revealed location data on nearly 1,700 unique phones. Faced with a motion to suppress, the district court relied on a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/08/federal-appeals-court-finds-geofence-warrants-are-categorically-unconstitutional&quot;&gt;Fifth Circuit court of appeals decision&lt;/a&gt; about geofence warrants to hold that tower dumps are similarly categorically unconstitutional “general warrants” that violate the Fourth Amendment. However, the court refused to suppress evidence on the basis of the “good faith doctrine.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our amicus brief on appeal makes several key arguments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, we point out that the Supreme Court’s decision in the geofence case &lt;em&gt;Chatrie v. United States &lt;/em&gt;this summer only strengthens the arguments that tower dumps are unconstitutional general warrants. Tower dumps are a somewhat older technique than geofence warrants, but they are both “reverse location searches,” in which police “tap into an all-encompassing database, allowing them to undertake nearly perfect, retrospective surveillance of countless persons and places.” This is the sort of untargeted “general warrant” the framers of the Fourth Amendment wanted to prevent. As we write in the brief, “Searching all people in an area without probable cause to believe they were all involved in the criminal activity under investigation reproduces the evils of general warrants and is not constitutionally permitted.” It’s this rule of law that prevents police from searching the houses of a hundred, or even a thousand people in the vicinity of a crime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, we note that even if high courts continue to allow tower dump and geofence warrants in any cases, core Fourth Amendment law requires strict limits to protect the privacy of innocent bystanders, including limits on the scope and duration of the warrants, as well notice to affected individuals and after-the-fact deletion and minimization of irrelevant data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, we argue that the Fourth Amendment requires the court to set aside the good faith doctrine in cases like these and actually decide the constitutional issue. Too often courts pass the buck in cases involving novel surveillance techniques, leading to situations where police can continue using the technique for years or even decades without a definitive ruling.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 20:26:48 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112511 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/cell-tracking">Cell Tracking</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/location-privacy">Locational Privacy</category>
 <dc:creator>Andrew Crocker</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/locationdata_v2.mov1_.gif" alt="An animated image showing location pins dropping onto a street map from above, tracing several paths" type="image/gif" length="2071190" />
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    <title>Google Summaries Aren&#039;t About AI, They&#039;re About Lock-In </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/google-summaries-arent-about-ai-theyre-about-lock</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Whether they call it AI summaries, knowledge panels, or AMP, Google takes actions that are less about functionality and more about locking you into its own ecosystem. Knowing that makes it possible for all of us to choose better services than Google&#039;s, defeating their anticompetitive goal. In this case, as it is so often, knowledge is power. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In the old days, when dinosaurs roamed the earth and getting online involved your computer making eldritch shrieking, Google was a website that took whatever you typed in and gave you a list of links that best matched what you were searching for. As it&#039;s grown beyond that, however, the core function of Google Search has moved from giving you the best answer to your query to a number of other things, most of them about making money for Google.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;This is obviously not a new observation. It&#039;s at the core of what EFF Special Advisor Cory Doctorow named &quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/podcast-episode-fighting-enshittification&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;enshittification&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;.&quot; But it&#039;s important to remember that whatever shiny new name or technology is wrapped around these tools, it&#039;s not about the wrapping, it&#039;s about the monetization.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In the case of Google Search, the company has a history of rolling out new &quot;features&quot; that are less helpful to the searcher and more designed to keep you and your data within the Google ecosystem. One easy example of enshittification is putting sponsored links and ads at the top of search results, forcing you to scroll down past a bunch of not relevant links to get to your answers. Or, in some cases, accidentally clicking on sponsored links that might be designed to give you the opposite information of what you&#039;re looking for or for a competitor to the product you intended to buy. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The other clumsy version of this is Google&#039;s self-preferencing, where Google&#039;s own services—say YouTube if you&#039;re looking for a video—are weighted so that they appear at the top of a search over a competitor&#039;s. Similar to this was Google&#039;s push for websites, particularly news ones, to be made available via what it called &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/07/googles-amp-canonical-web-and-importance-web-standards-0&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;&quot;Accelerated Mobile Pages&quot; or AMP&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, which in theory stripped out features that might make loading a page on mobile too slow, but also handed over control of how webpages looked on mobile to Google and turned mobile links, often by default, into Google links. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;But the other way that Google has historically kept your—and your valuable eyeballs—on its website has been to just obviate the need to even click on a link and leave Google at all. The first version of this was what Google calls &quot;knowledge panels.&quot; These are snippets of information shown on the results page of a search that purport to answer your question. Knowledge panels predate the AI push and haven&#039;t always been what you could call &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://gizmodo.com/googles-algorithm-is-lying-to-you-about-onions-and-blam-1793057789&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;accurate&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Remember that it is Google&#039;s monetary incentives that drive the decisions and not necessarily the tech itself.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Knowledge panels are extremely similar to the AI summaries we now see at the top of Google Search results, except that instead of pulling quotes from specific linked sources, it&#039;s the AI doing the summarizing, though also sometimes with links. They are basically the same thing, mostly changed only in branding, because AI is now the cool kid on the block. The goal is essentially the same—it&#039;s less about providing you with the best answer to your query and more about making you think it&#039;s unnecessary to click a link and leave Google&#039;s ecosystem. And, more importantly, it keeps you on Google&#039;s pages longer to read the content. More time on the page is more time exposed to ads and sponsored links and more money for Google. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;200}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The biggest irony here is that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;it didn’t even work&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. People choosing to use “AI mode”—and possibly made accustomed to getting information as text instead of links through the knowledge panels and the AI summaries at the top—has caused &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ft.com/content/eb386156-5bf9-4edd-80f2-803fdee1e33d?syn-25a6b1a6=1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“lower monetization”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; via ads. Ads, remember, are Google’s main source of revenue. Like newspapers before them, Google is finding that counting on a monopoly on ad space maybe isn’t the most sound strategy in a shifting technological landscape. And to get out of the hole it has made for itself, it is lighting cash on fire to try to get back on top. Perhaps they should consider pivoting to video. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Every time you see a feature like this, no matter what it is called or what &quot;new&quot; technology they claim fuels it, remember that it is Google&#039;s monetary incentives that drive the decisions and not necessarily the tech itself. And you can always choose to ignore it, scroll past, disable it, or even &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/i-want-opt-out-software-made-big-tech&quot;&gt;go to another service entirely&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 20:05:03 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112505 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/innovation">Creativity &amp; Innovation</category>
 <dc:creator>Katharine Trendacosta</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ai_news.jpg" alt="Robot hand reaching toward a typewriter" type="image/jpeg" length="209889" />
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    <title>Postal Service Surveilled Protest Activities Online With Little Rules, Oversight</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/postal-service-surveilled-protest-activities-online-little-rules-oversight</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;The U.S. Postal Service used social media surveillance to monitor and report on protests across the political spectrum, government records show.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/projects/225910-icop-foia-eff-v-usps-no-21-cv-2024/&quot;&gt;records&lt;/a&gt;, disclosed to EFF and other requesters suing the postal service under the Freedom of Information Act, show that the agency’s internet Covert Operations Program, or iCOP, routinely sifted through social media posts organizing and discussing protests with little records of any oversight or legal justification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF filed &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/eff-v-usps-social-media-monitoring-icop&quot;&gt;suit in 2021&lt;/a&gt; after &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.yahoo.com/news/the-postal-service-is-running-a-running-a-covert-operations-program-that-monitors-americans-social-media-posts-160022919.html&quot;&gt;Yahoo News&lt;/a&gt; disclosed the program’s existence and how the agency used it to monitor First Amendment protected activities. After years of delays and technical failures that led the agency to lose access to a trove of emails discussing the program, the postal service disclosed records to EFF and several other requesters this year.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Postal Service used iCOP to surveil First Amendment activities&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The disclosures include a series of bulletins created from iCOP, which show that the postal service used the program in 2020 and 2021 to monitor and circulate information about a wide range of planned protests. They included a planned “&lt;a href=&quot;//www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834349-bulletins-reports-final/#document/p4&quot;&gt;Million MAGA March&lt;/a&gt;,” a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834349-bulletins-reports-final/#document/p25&quot;&gt;guns rights advocacy&lt;/a&gt; event and counter-protest in Virginia, a nationwide &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834349-bulletins-reports-final/#document/p67&quot;&gt;Save the Post Office Saturday protest&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834349-bulletins-reports-final/#document/p55&quot;&gt;planned protests&lt;/a&gt; in front of then-Postmaster General Louis DeJoy’s home in Washington, D.C.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many of the bulletins provide dry descriptions of the events being planned and reference public discussions or events on major social media services. Others seem to imply or anticipate that the protests would turn violent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, in discussing planned national and international protests &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834349-bulletins-reports-final/#document/p47&quot;&gt;scheduled for March 20, 2021&lt;/a&gt;, the bulletin references potential violence in light of “online inflammatory material.” Yet the bulletin acknowledges that the agency has “no intelligence to suggest specific threats.” This bulletin was described by Yahoo News when it disclosed iCOP’s existence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another bulletin discussing an ongoing Black Lives Matter protests in response to police shooting and killing people styles itself as a “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834349-bulletins-reports-final/#document/p68&quot;&gt;National Civil Unrest Update.&lt;/a&gt;” The bulletins also recount and monitor threats sent to then-Postmaster DeJoy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Postal Service also disclosed three email chains to EFF that, while heavily redacted, show how the agency queried iCOP and disseminated what it found (Read the emails &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834357-sensitive-fw-redacted-20190625-redacted/&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834355-sensitive-fwd-address-lookup-redacted/&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834352-texas-dl-photo-request-sensitive-redacted/&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;). The government agreed to release the email messages as part of settling EFF’s FOIA suit this fall. To EFF’s knowledge, they are the only existing materials that reflect how the agency queried iCOP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Postal Service renames iCOP and loses access to records about it&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to the agency, after Yahoo News disclosed the program in 2021, the postal service &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834364-55-3-hodge-declaration/&quot;&gt;renamed it and publicly said that it had stopped issuing bulletins&lt;/a&gt;. But the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834350-seven-final/&quot;&gt;documents do not say&lt;/a&gt; that the agency’s social media surveillance stopped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the same time, EFF and several other FOIA requesters sought records detailing how the agency used iCOP and what rules the postal service had for using the program and distributing information it gained from surveilling social media. EFF spent years pushing the agency to disclose email communications about the program, which the agency had stored on an external hard drive. Amid these negotiations, someone dropped the hard drive, rendering it inoperable, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834364-55-3-hodge-declaration/&quot;&gt;agency officials said&lt;/a&gt;. By the time that happened, the agency had already deleted the underlying email messages pursuant to the agency’s retention schedule.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Minimal records disclosed about internal limits on surveillance programs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF’s FOIA request sought internal rules, guidance, and training that would show what safeguard the Postal Service imposed to protect First Amendment rights. The agency disclosed very few documents in response to this part of EFF’s request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, a series of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834353-2021-fpis-00338-redacted/&quot;&gt;slides&lt;/a&gt; give an overview of the program, but do not explain how officials used iCOP. The closest thing to internal guideline that the agency disclosed were &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834350-seven-final/&quot;&gt;talking points&lt;/a&gt; the Chief Postal Inspector authored in response to questions about iCOP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The inspector wrote that, “In reviewing social media postings to gather information we did not single out any particular group and did not base what was reviewed on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, immigration status, or a person’s exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” The statement echoes language in the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28834349-bulletins-reports-final/#document/p27&quot;&gt;bulletin&lt;/a&gt; stating that its purpose is not to infringe on First Amendment rights; Other parts of the talking points characterize the surveillance as providing officials with situational awareness.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The postal inspector’s talking points go on to say that “the recent attention on iCOP has highlighted opportunities for improvement, including enhanced executive oversight. We have stopped the distribution of the bulletins like the one you have seen in the media reports.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Setting aside that it’s unclear whether internal oversight occurred or resulted in any changes, the claim that iCOP did not infringe on First Amendment rights rings hollow. As the records disclosed show, surveilling and reporting on social media users’ efforts to organize rallies and protests was a feature of iCOP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But more fundamentally, the claims by Postal Service officials fail to recognize that &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/our-lawsuit-against-trump-administrations-social-media-surveillance-moves-forward&quot;&gt;surveillance&lt;/a&gt; directly chills First Amendment rights. Further, the government can misuse the information it obtained as part of its social media surveillance to harass or retaliate against those exercising their constitutional rights.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although EFF’s case seeking records about iCOP has ended, we will continue to bring more transparency to the government’s use of social media surveillance and look for ways to challenge the practice, especially when people are caught in the dragnet for exercising the First Amendment rights.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-related-cases field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Related Cases:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/eff-v-usps-social-media-monitoring-icop&quot;&gt;EFF v. USPS - Social media monitoring (iCOP)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 21:45:46 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112507 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/social-media-surveilance">Social Media Surveillance</category>
 <dc:creator>Aaron Mackey</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/social-media-surveillance-2026.jpg" alt="Security camera screens display logos for Facebook, YouTube, X, TikTok, and Reddit " type="image/jpeg" length="142559" />
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    <title>Privacy&#039;s Defenders Podcast: The Secret Room</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/privacys-defenders-podcast-secret-room</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The government’s surveillance powers grew rapidly after Sept. 11, 2001, some in public view and some in secret. EFF suspected but couldn’t prove that the National Security Agency was spying on Americans&#039; communications. The New York Times sat on a story about it for over a year, finally publishing it in December 2005. Then, in January 2006, a retired AT&amp;amp;T technician named &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/memoriam-mark-klein-att-whistleblower-about-nsa-mass-spying&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Mark Klein&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; walked into EFF&#039;s office with a manila folder of documents that blew the story wide open.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Welcome to the third episode of “Privacy’s Defenders,” a podcast about the people – lawyers, journalists, hackers, and others – who’ve fought to secure your digital liberties since before most people even knew what the internet was.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;mytube&quot; style=&quot;width: 100%px;&quot;&gt;
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    &lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/sites/all/modules/custom/mytube/play.png&quot; class=&quot;mytubeplay&quot; alt=&quot;play&quot; style=&quot;top: -4px; left: 20px;&quot; /&gt;
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    &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/02/embedded-video-and-your-privacy&quot; rel=&quot;noreferrer&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Privacy info.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span&gt;This embed will serve content from &lt;em&gt;&lt;a rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; href=&quot;https://player.simplecast.com/e7dd937c-3319-4a9a-9245-f9ed34b9419d?dark=true&amp;amp;color=000000&quot;&gt;simplecast.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://open.spotify.com/show/4UAplFpPDqE4hWlwsjplgt&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/spotify-podcast-badge-blk-wht-330x80.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Spotify Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;198&quot; height=&quot;48&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/effs-how-to-fix-the-internet/id1539719568&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/applebadge2.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Apple Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; height=&quot;47&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://music.amazon.ca/podcasts/bf81f00f-11e1-431f-918d-374ab6ad07cc/how-to-fix-the-internet?ref=dmm_art_us_HTFTI&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;47&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/styles/kittens_types_wysiwyg_small/public/2024/02/15/us_listenon_amazonmusic_button_charcoal.png?itok=YFXPE4Ii&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://feeds.eff.org/howtofixtheinternet&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/subscriberss.png&quot; alt=&quot;Subscribe via RSS badge&quot; width=&quot;194&quot; height=&quot;50&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(You can also find this episode on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://archive.org/details/privacys-defenders-E32-the-secret-room&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Internet Archive&lt;/a&gt; and on &lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/EvzMt1ap9sU?si=RPrmwx4HIYykbiNi&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;YouTube&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In this episode, former EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn talks with former EFF lawyer &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kevin_Bankston&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Kevin Bankston&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, who was at his desk drafting a lawsuit against AT&amp;amp;T when Klein showed up. Less than two weeks later, EFF sued the phone company on behalf of its own customers in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/hepting&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Hepting v. AT&amp;amp;T&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. Cindy speaks again with now-retired Justice Department lawyer Tony Coppolino, who asked for the opportunity to defend the case. He called EFF with a warning after Klein’s documents were filed in court: If they were classified, EFF would be in big trouble. You’ll also hear from Klein himself, and from Carolyn Jewel, a romance novelist and AT&amp;amp;T customer who became the lead plaintiff in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;EFF&#039;s related case against the NSA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;It&#039;s the story of a secret room in a San Francisco phone company building, a heroic whistleblower, and the people who refused to let mass surveillance stay hidden.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The “Privacy’s Defenders” podcast is a follow-up to Cindy’s book, “Privacy’s Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance,” bringing to life pivotal moments in the voices of those who fought for your rights. Sales of “Privacy’s Defender” benefit EFF, so &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://shopeff.org/products/privacys-defender-by-cindy-cohn&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;pick up your copy today&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;! &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Joanne Elgart Jennings co-produced and created this podcast.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Jarrod Sport co-produced, mixed, and mastered it.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Corinne Ruff is our story editor.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We had additional help from Rachel Estabrook and Alison Broverman.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The original music was composed and performed by Nat Keefe of Hot Buttered Rum with Ben Andrews on the fiddle.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:00:01 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112494 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/how-to-fix-the-internet-podcast">How to Fix the Internet: Podcast</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying">NSA Spying</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/pd-podcast-banner.png" alt="Privacy&amp;#039;s Defender: Stories From the Fights for Digital Rights" type="image/png" length="1062415" />
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    <title>Independent Digital Media Is Not a Privilege Governments Can Revoke: The Fight to Save Egypt’s Mada Masr </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/11/independent-digital-media-not-privilege-governments-can-revoke-fight-save-egypts</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;On November 11, Lina Attalah, founder and editor-in-chief of the independent Egyptian news outlet &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/en/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Mada Masr&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, will face trial for the second time in just two weeks. This time, she faces charges of spreading false news, an accusation that has become one of the Egyptian government&#039;s most frequently used tools for prosecuting journalists.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The trial follows a conviction on October 27, when Attalah was &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/en/2026/10/27/news/u/lina-attalah-in-custody-after-court-issues-le3-mn-fine-orders-mada-masrs-closure/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;found guilty&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; of managing an unlicensed news website. The Mada Masr team had repeatedly applied for a license, but their attempts went unacknowledged. The proceedings took place in a single hearing, which Mada Masr &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.instagram.com/p/DfM44U5m32q/?mdxt=MXI2aWJiaTE5YzJ5bg==&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;states&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; included serious violations of her right to a fair trial. She was sentenced to the maximum fine of 3 million Egyptian pounds (approximately 55,000 USD), forcibly removed from the courtroom, and held for seven hours until the fine was paid. The court also ordered Mada Masr&#039;s closure and the confiscation of all equipment belonging to the organization.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The current wave of repression has also targeted &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://matsda2sh.com/en&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Matsada2sh&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, a fact-checking and open-source intelligence initiative. Its entire six-person newsroom was &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/04/egyptian-journalist-faces-terrorism-charges-entire-newsroom-detained-matsadaash-press-freedom&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;violently arrested&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, illegally detained, and interrogated under torture before being charged with terrorism-related offenses and spreading false news. The team remains in pretrial detention.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;According to CPJ, at least &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cpj.org/data/imprisoned/currently-imprisoned/?status=Imprisoned&amp;amp;cc_fips[]=EG&amp;amp;group_by=location&amp;amp;currently-imprisoned=1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;25 other journalists&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; are currently incarcerated in Egypt.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Governments seeking to control the flow of information increasingly rely on a combination of legal harassment, financial pressure, criminal prosecution, and restrictions on the infrastructure that makes independent publishing possible. Egypt&#039;s media licensing regime is a particularly troubling example. Requiring news organizations to obtain government authorization to operate creates an obvious mechanism for restricting who gets to publish and whose voices are allowed to reach the public. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The charge of spreading false news is similarly dangerous. Governments around the world have increasingly invoked the language of misinformation to justify restrictions on speech, often without meaningful safeguards against political abuse, as we laid out in our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/effs-submission-un-ohchr-protection-human-rights-defenders-digital-age&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;recent submission&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Governments should never be the arbiters of which reporting is permissible, particularly when that reporting concerns their own conduct.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Why Mada Masr matters&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;80}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Founded in 2013, Mada Masr has spent more than a decade doing the kind of journalism that authoritarian governments find most threatening: documenting abuses, amplifying marginalized voices, and reporting on issues that powerful institutions would prefer remain hidden.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Its reporting has given torture survivors and the families of political prisoners a platform. It has opened space for debate about reproductive rights. It has brought frontline reporting from Sudan and Gaza, and stood alongside refugees facing xenophobic attacks and security crackdowns.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Emerging as a digital-first publication, in a media environment where traditional outlets were increasingly constrained, being purely digital allowed Mada Masr’s founders to build an independent publication outside the structures of legacy media. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;At a time when &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/84996.aspx&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;only 43% of Egyptians had access to the internet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, going fully digital meant taking a big risk, but it was one that has been rewarding: Despite being blocked by the Egyptian government since 2017, Mada Masr has continued to reach Egyptian and global audiences, and Attalah has received numerous accolades, including the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.icfj.org/news/fareed-zakaria-and-two-international-digital-news-pioneers-receive-prestigious-journalism&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Knight International Journalism Award&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordre_des_Arts_et_des_Lettres&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Ordre des Arts et des Lettres&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, and a spot in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://time.com/collections/100-most-influential-people-2020/5888226/lina-attalah/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;TIME Magazine’s 100 most influential people&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; (2020).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Mada Masr has also consistently engaged with technology and advocated for a free and independent internet for the global majority. It has covered dozens of hot-button tech stories in recent years, from &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/en/2018/04/16/feature/politics/cybercrime-bill-nears-committee-approval-with-harsher-penalties-for-site-admins-protection-for-bona-fides/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Egypt’s Cybercrime Bill&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/2024/04/05/news/u/%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%82/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Israel’s use of AI weaponry in Gaza&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, to stories about the “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/en/2026/08/12/feature/society/privacy-chaos-from-fraudulent-sim-registration-to-biometric-data-collection/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;privacy chaos&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;” caused by biometrics to more &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/2019/09/06/opinion/u/%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A9%D9%8B-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8E-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A2%D8%AA%D9%8D-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;personal essays&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; about the importance of the internet and tech. In August, they launched an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/en/2026/08/09/feature/society/open-call-for-proposals-and-reporting-practices-on-artificial-intelligence/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;open call for proposals&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; on original critical reporting on artificial intelligence.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Mada Masr may be thoroughly Egyptian, but it doesn’t belong just to Egypt. Its team has made into a publication that represents the kind of independent, local, grounded journalism that international audiences need, particularly at a time when international reporting on state repression is lacking. They built on-the-ground networks to center local voices in Sudan (publishing in both &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/en/topic/2023-sudan-war/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;English&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.madamasr.com/topic/%d9%86%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%86/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Arabic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; on the conflict) and Gaza out of a sense of cross-border responsibility and solidarity.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;This is precisely why its potential closure should concern everyone who cares about a free press. The ability to publish independently, investigate powerful institutions, and to share information without government interference is fundamental to the exercise of free expression. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;From solidarity to action&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;80}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The international community has repeatedly expressed concern about restrictions on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://rsf.org/en/country/egypt&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;press&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-net/2022&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;internet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; freedom in Egypt. More than 100 organizations have now joined &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://timep.org/2026/10/23/urgent-global-call-following-the-referral-of-mada-masr-editor-in-chief-lina-attalah-to-trial/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;statements&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://timep.org/2026/10/28/organizations-condemn-mada-masr-shutdown-stand-with-editor-in-chief-lina-attalah/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;solidarity&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; with Mada Masr, and with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://timep.org/2026/09/30/global-call-for-the-release-of-entire-newsroom-at-egyptian-investigative-journalism-platform-matsadaash/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Matsada2sh&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;These expressions of support matter, particularly when journalists are increasingly isolated and under threat—but solidarity must also translate into sustained political and institutional pressure.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The international governments and institutions that maintain relationships with Egypt—including those in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—should make clear that the prosecution of journalists and the forced closure of independent media outlets are unacceptable. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The cases against Lina Attalah, Mada Masr, and Matsada2sh must be dropped. The journalists who remain in detention must be released. And Egypt&#039;s licensing regime, with its profound chilling effects on access to information and independent knowledge production, must be brought to an end.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;There is a particular urgency to defending independent media at a moment when governments are finding ever more ways to restrict the circulation of information. Whether through internet shutdowns, platform restrictions, surveillance, or the criminalization of reporting, the result is often the same: fewer opportunities for people to understand what is happening around them, to challenge official narratives, and to hold power accountable.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We cannot allow the closure of one of Egypt&#039;s most important independent newsrooms and the prosecution of its editor-in-chief to become another routine episode in the global erosion of press freedom. Nor should we wait until the last independent journalists have been silenced before recognizing what has been lost.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;To learn more about Lina Attalah in her own reads, you can read our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/speaking-freely-lina-attalah&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Speaking Freely interview&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; from January 2026.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 15:10:22 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112504 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
 <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/offline-general.png" alt="Offline General" type="image/png" length="18239" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Rewriting Copyright Law for Generative AI Would Hurt Everyone</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/rewriting-copyright-law-generative-ai-would-hurt-everyone</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;In courts across the country, publishers and creators are suing large AI companies for training generative AI models on copyrighted works. It’s easy to see these cases as a David-and-Goliath showdown between authors and publishers fighting for a cut of Big Tech company profits. But this fight is actually much larger. It affects billions of people who aren’t represented in the case at all, including researchers, artists, activists, journalists, people with disabilities, and anyone who accesses and shares content online.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That’s why EFF is stepping in to defend the &lt;em&gt;public’s&lt;/em&gt; rights in these cases. Today, EFF filed an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/re-openai-eff-amicus-brief&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt; in &lt;em&gt;In re OpenAI,&lt;/em&gt; explaining how the court’s ruling on fair use could impact people worldwide. If fair use gets narrowed, it will impede work that benefits the public, like medical research and investigative journalism, and even limit access to privacy protection tools.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let’s be clear: creators and workers deserve support as AI changes their fields, and Big Tech companies must be held accountable for the harms they cause. But giving copyright holders more control over the web won’t accomplish either of these goals. If the plaintiffs prevail in these cases, courts would have to rewrite copyright law in ways that hurt everyone except powerful media and tech companies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 class=&quot;subhead&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Rewriting Fair Use Makes Everyone Worse Off&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copyright exists for one reason: to stimulate creativity and innovation in service of the greater public good. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in this lawsuit are arguing to limit everyone’s fair use rights, in ways that would thwart the basic purpose of copyright. The harms of shrinking fair use will go far beyond generative AI, impacting everyone.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initial speculation that AI models would be infringement machines, churning out works highly similar to those on which they were trained, &lt;a href=&quot;https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.12649&quot;&gt;has proven unfounded&lt;/a&gt;. And courts have already found fair use in cases where copyrighted works were used to train generative AI models, recognizing that training uses those works for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/two-courts-rule-generative-ai-and-fair-use-one-gets-it-right&quot;&gt;a fundamentally different purpose&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Plaintiffs in these cases argue that, even if the use is transformative, using their works to train AI is still unfair, because the AI models could generate new, non-infringing works that might compete with plaintiffs’ own works. They also argue that scraping or downloading the data without permission—or in some cases, from websites containing infringing copies—was independently infringing and/or rendered any subsequent uses of that data unfair.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These arguments would put beneficial research and reporting at risk. First, if copying without permission rules out fair use, the law will never protect transformative uses that benefit us all. Researchers, journalists, and other watchdog groups gather information the same way AI companies do—but they do it to serve the public interest, and often to hold Big Tech itself accountable. For example, journalists and nonprofit researchers have used “crawling” or “scraping” &lt;a href=&quot;https://themarkup.org/amazons-advantage/2021/10/14/amazon-puts-its-own-brands-first-above-better-rated-products&quot;&gt;to investigate potentially anticompetitive practices by tech companies&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.counterharm.com/research/toxic-twitter&quot;&gt;research misinformation and hateful content posted on X&lt;/a&gt;. Their data acquisition techniques are virtually identical to those used by AI giants—but they lack those companies’ deep pockets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Requiring users to show that copyrighted material was lawfully obtained would also threaten everyday internet use. As EFF’s brief explained, that requirement would “cast legal doubt on the billions of copies we collectively make every day through routine online activities like opening emails, clicking on an embedded link, visiting websites, sharing pictures, streaming music, and watching videos. All of this activity requires intermediate copying.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fair use is what lets us all use the internet without being compelled to track the source of every image, video, and article that we click on, and make sure the rights are all cleared.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, while rightsholders are understandably concerned about competition from AI generated works, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/eff-courts-dont-rewrite-copyright-over-ai-hype&quot;&gt;copyright law exists to &lt;em&gt;promote new creation&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, not protect authors who published first. Under the plaintiffs’ theory, no one could stand upon the shoulders of giants. Copyright could prevent people from writing new books inspired by themes in a favorite novel or genre, or prevent academic researchers from publishing literature reviews that distill insights from prior research—simply because readers might prefer those new publications over those that came first.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, general-purpose AI models are neither designed nor usually used to create works targeted at any particular market. These models have been used to generate new insights and tools for medicine, science, journalism, art, and accessibility. For instance, an AI-powered tool called &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bemyeyes.com/blog/introducing-be-my-ai/&quot;&gt;Be My AI&lt;/a&gt; uses Open AI’s GPT models to provide visual descriptions for people who are blind or have low vision. Generative tools have also &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06792-0&quot;&gt;accelerated scientific research&lt;/a&gt;, and researchers have used these tools to develop &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20260309-ai-is-finding-treatments-for-incurable-diseases&quot;&gt;new medical treatments and medications&lt;/a&gt; for conditions previously thought to be incurable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mandatory Licensing Would Entrench Big Tech &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Some creators and publishers argue that AI developers should just get a license. But requiring permission for every work used would give the largest companies massive advantages over small competitors and impede academic research. As Professor Lawrence Lessig recently noted:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;If all training requires a license, then none but a handful of tech giants will be able to afford the costs of training. That’s not because authors are greedy but because the copyright system is the least efficient property system known to man.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moreover, creators are unlikely to benefit from these licensing arrangements in many cases. Media and entertainment giants have exploited the imbalance between themselves and underpaid working artists for decades. Trying to help creators by giving them more rights under copyright is, as Cory Doctorow has written, like trying to help a bullied kid by giving them more lunch money for the bully to take. Artists aren’t getting good deals from record labels or publishers now; there’s no reason to think these companies, which already own the copyrights, will treat artists more fairly once they control the data that powers AI.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 class=&quot;subhead&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Future of AI Is Too Important to Leave to Big Content or Big Tech&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AI technologies will affect all of us, and copyright law is ill-equipped to address many of these consequences. The rules governing these technologies should be rules that serve the public—not just the small number of companies that can afford to litigate copyright battles for decades, or settle for billions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 23:42:45 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112503 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property">Fair Use</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/ai">Artificial Intelligence</category>
 <dc:creator>Corynne McSherry</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Tori Noble</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ai-scraping-v6-crt.jpg" alt="A robot studying a data stream" type="image/jpeg" length="213535" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Why VPNs Are Worth Defending</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/why-vpns-are-worth-defending</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Developers of &lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/choosing-vpn-thats-right-you&quot;&gt;virtual private network (VPN)&lt;/a&gt; apps are &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/09/24/russia-crackdown-on-bypassing-online-censorship&quot;&gt;reporting&lt;/a&gt; that their products are again being pulled from Apple’s App Store in Russia. This is an unacceptable crackdown on a vital tool to protect privacy and speech online.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why? VPNs give people a way to control their own online activities. When you visit a website through a VPN, that website only sees the VPN server&#039;s location (well, IP address) rather than your actual location. It&#039;s like sending a letter through a P.O. box so the recipient doesn&#039;t know where you really live. It can also disguise where you’re accessing information from, &lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/understanding-and-circumventing-network-censorship&quot;&gt;which can make it possible&lt;/a&gt; to access information banned by your government.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;This is an unacceptable crackdown on a vital tool to protect privacy and speech online.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Going after tools that give people the space to communicate and access information freely is a common tactic from the totalitarian playbook. This latest demand comes after several steps the Russian government’s taken to surveil speech specifically on Apple products. In 2024, the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/07/04/russia-forces-apple-to-remove-vpns-from-app-store-a85608&quot;&gt;Moscow Times&lt;/a&gt; reported that Russia’s state media watchdog, Roskomnadzor, went after VPN apps on the Apple App Store, after banning access to Western social media platforms and blacklisting opposition media sites. Russia then &lt;a href=&quot;https://appleinsider.com/articles/25/12/04/russia-shutters-facetime-as-it-tightens-control-over-apps-communication&quot;&gt;blocked Apple’s FaceTime software&lt;/a&gt; in 2025, according to Apple Insider.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-28/russia-adds-apple-and-microsoft-to-state-surveillance-registry&quot;&gt;Bloomberg also recently reported&lt;/a&gt; that the Russian government has added Apple and Microsoft to its state surveillance registry. This gives Roskomnadzor access to local users’ correspondence, &lt;a href=&quot;https://appleinsider.com/articles/26/10/29/russia-orders-apple-to-surrender-users-messages-on-demand&quot;&gt;Apple Insider reported&lt;/a&gt;, and puts both companies in a position to turn over customer information to the country’s security services as required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With government control encroaching on their devices and less access to tools that give them alternate methods, people in Russia are left with shrinking options to communicate online or find information that isn’t state-sanctioned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While Russia’s actions offer a more extreme vision of what happens when the government tries to enforce speech rules by attacking vital privacy tools, it is far from the only government doing so. Several &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/lawmakers-want-ban-vpns-and-they-have-no-idea-what-theyre-doing&quot;&gt;states in the U.S.,&lt;/a&gt; bent on making it difficult to circumvent invasive age-gating laws, have suggested banning VPNs—either to access certain content or in some cases to simply ban them outright. EFF has &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/court-agrees-eff-utahs-vpn-law-demands-technical-impossibility&quot;&gt;publicly (and loudly) criticized&lt;/a&gt; these proposals, because going after VPNs is a dangerous step down the road of censorship.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attacks on speech and privacy online are deeply troubling, no matter where they happen. What those in power may see as a “loophole” in their invasive laws is actually an expression of user control. We’ll continue to speak out when we see governments going after them to take that control away.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 20:55:24 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112500 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/anonymity">Anonymity</category>
 <dc:creator>Hayley Tsukayama</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/vpn-highway-tunnel-banner.jpg" alt="A highway sign shows the upcoming turns for different IP addresses, as cars pass a circuit tree lined road and drive into a tunnel." type="image/jpeg" length="284672" />
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  <item>
    <title>Tech Tips for Parents this Digital Parenting Week</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/tech-tips-parents-digital-parenting-week</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In today’s digital world, the internet is an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/thousands-young-people-told-us-why-kids-online-safety-act-will-be-harmful-minors&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;essential resource&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for young people to access information, explore community, and find themselves. But we know that this often comes alongside fears of experiencing online harms like doxxing, grooming, or bullying.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Trying to protect your family from everything all the time is impractical and exhausting, but some thoughtful planning can help families devise a workable plan that meets their needs and addresses their concerns.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That’s why this Digital Parent Week, we’re sharing easy tips on how parents and their children can work together to co-curate a digital safety plan that helps all members of the family enjoy the benefits of technology while protecting their online privacy and safety. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;Start with Open Conversations&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Online safety begins with communication, not just restrictions. Talk with a young person about how they use the internet: their favourite apps, games, and social media platforms for example. Creating a supportive environment helps young people feel comfortable asking for help if something goes wrong online.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Together, you can think about:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;What do we want to protect? &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;e.g., I want to protect a young person’s privacy and mental health when they’re playing Roblox. They love Roblox and use it to communicate and hang out with their best friend, so we’d like to find a way to make it as safe as possible.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Who do we want to protect it from?&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; e.g., messages from strangers, staying up too late playing, wasting money on pointless digital junk in games.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;How bad are the consequences if we fail? &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;e.g, losing some money on a scam or having creepy conversations with strangers that could escalate into something more nefarious or dangerous.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;How likely is it that we will need to protect it? &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;e.g., I don’t know the likelihood of a stranger messaging you on Roblox because I’m not sure how communication works on the platform, but I’ve heard from their friends that strangers message them all the time in some games.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;How much trouble are we willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences? &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;e.g., I’m willing to learn from my child how the game works, play the game with my child, and learn how to work the parental controls. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Who are our allies?&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; e.g., my partner, our parents, as well as a young person’s best friends and their parents.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It&#039;s easy to think of a young person&#039;s experience on the internet as being totally disconnected and different from your own. But now is a great time to also interrogate your own internet habits, like the sorts of sites you engage with, tools you use, and privacy settings you&#039;ve set. These questions are as valuable to help you as a parent as they are just an internet user.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Sometimes even just figuring out what conversations are worth having can take some effort, we&#039;ve put together some ideas to get you started in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/online-privacy-for-parents-and-youth#example-how-to-have-a-conversation-about-online-privacy&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;our guide&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;Make Privacy a Family Priority&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Digital security training can feel overwhelming but this is why a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/02/building-community-privacy-plan&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;community-oriented approach&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; helps. In speaking with your family and friends, you can build out digital security practices that work for you. This makes it more likely that your privacy practices will become second nature to you and your loved ones.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Use secure messaging services for every communication:&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; Choosing a secure service ensures that your privacy is protected from government and corporate surveillance. If you can convince your family to get on board, options like Signal provide the most extensive privacy protections out of the box through its use of end-to-end encryption and limited data collection. But we understand that sometimes it&#039;s easier to stick with whatever the family already uses for a group chat, like WhatsApp, Apple&#039;s iMessage, or Google Messages, so take the time to familiarize yourself with the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-use-whatsapp&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;limits of WhatsApp&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/victory-end-end-encrypted-rcs-comes-apple-and-android-chats&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;RCS encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Consider the content posted online: &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;It&#039;s easy to accidentally share personal information through photos, messages, and other content.&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span&gt;Children and adults may unknowingly share personal information through photos, messages, location settings and app permissions. Take time together to review privacy settings, check which apps can access the camera or location, and discuss why personal details should be shared carefully. Make sure you have family agreement about when and where to post photos of each other or your home.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Create incident response plans: &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Developing a plan for if or when something bad happens is a good practice for anyone, but especially with younger people. It’s important to strategize with your family around what to do in the event of such things happening, and doing so before an incident occurs is much easier than when you’re presently facing a crisis.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Alongside this, simple steps like using strong and unique passwords on all devices, including those that are shared in the family, can make a real difference. Regardless of age, there’s no time like the present to get started on good security hygiene, and for many that starts with a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/choosing-the-password-manager-that-s-right-for-you&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;password manager&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-enable-two-factor-authentication&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;two-factor authentication&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;How to Think About Parental Controls&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Many sites permit parents to control features such as personalization, algorithmic feed, autoplay, endless scroll, reactions, notifications, and time limits. Talk as a family about which features are important and useful and which are problematic. The conversations above around boundaries and digital literacy are a more effective way to prepare youth for accessing the internet. To develop true autonomy, young people need the privacy to discover the world for themselves without their parents monitoring the contents of every conversation they have.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Explore new apps together and revisit family rules as they grow. These decision points where you’re exploring with a young person what you’re both comfortable with can be good moments to “find your way to a yes” for whatever feature or tool or game they’re asking about. The questions they ask, along with your responses, provide a road map for what to look for in privacy controls that can get you to a place where everyone is comfortable engaging with that technology. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;Small Steps = Big Difference&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There is no one size fits all to the tech questions and concerns a parent will face, and keeping young people safe online is not about removing every risk and monitoring every click. This Digital Parenting Week, you can start to focus on what’s important for your family and how to best achieve those goals. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you&#039;re still not sure where to start, installing EFF’s Privacy Badger on every computer in your household is a great starting point to protecting everyone&#039;s privacy.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;For more detailed information on all these tips and more, visit &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/online-privacy-for-parents-and-youth&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF’s Online Privacy Guide&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for Parents and Youth.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 17:00:05 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112495 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification">Age Verification and Age Gating: Resource Hub</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <dc:creator>Paige Collings</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ageverification-banner2-1a.png" alt="A concerned parent and child stand on a large laptop keyboard, while a shadowy hand reaches out from the screen with social media icons and a magnifying glass to scan them." type="image/png" length="1146559" />
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    <title>Victory! You Can Now Exclude Apps from Siri AI</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-you-can-now-exclude-apps-siri-ai</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the most recent update to Apple’s devices, iOS 27.2, the company has introduced a new setting to “Exclude Apps” from Siri AI, fulfilling one of our asks from &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://encryptitalready.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;our Encrypt It Already campaign earlier this year&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;One of our main concerns with new AI features on devices is how those features interact with end-to-end encrypted content, particularly with secure messaging apps. Many AI features require cloud processing, and despite &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/secure-messaging-and-ai-remain-conflict-despite-promise-tees&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;privacy protections engineered into these systems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, the content of secure messaging apps may leave a user’s device without their knowledge. That changes the privacy concerns around using those tools. In a perfect world, users would be able to put a barrier up to ensure data from certain apps doesn’t leave the device. Here was our initial ask:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;You should be able to tell the operating system’s AI to not access an app, even if that comes at the “cost” of missing out on some features. The setting should be straightforward and easy to understand in ways the Gemini and Apple Intelligence controls currently are not.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;At launch, we found the settings to control Siri AI’s app access &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/how-limit-what-apples-new-siri-ai-can-access-ios-27&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;behavior pretty confusing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. You had to toggle several options to block Siri AI off from accessing an app, or disable Siri AI entirely. Turning off Siri AI and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/how-limit-what-apples-new-siri-ai-can-access-ios-27#classicsiri&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;reverting to Siri Classic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; is, for now, still a good option if you’d prefer to use the older version.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The most recent update is far more clear and does more to protect your data. And, just as expected, it comes at the cost of some features. That’s a good thing, actually. The features not working shows that the new setting is effective. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Here’s how to add apps to the exclusion list, once you’ve updated to 27.2:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Open &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Settings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Siri&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Excluded Apps&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tap “Add Apps” and select any apps you’d like to add to the exclusion list&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/28/siri_ai_excluded.png&quot; width=&quot;2048&quot; height=&quot;2048&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Now Siri AI cannot access the contents of the app. Excluding an app also means you may lose some features. For example, if you exclude the Apple Messages app, you will no longer be able to have Siri AI read or respond to messages for you. Even the “onscreen awareness” feature, where you invoke Siri and ask it for information about what you’re currently looking at, will not work anymore. For example, if you exclude Signal, you cannot invoke Siri and ask it to discern any information in the Signal app. You’ll just get these messages:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/28/siri_ai_x_signal.png&quot; width=&quot;2048&quot; height=&quot;1993&quot; alt=&quot;screenshot of apple phone with screenshots of siri interface over the signal app&quot; title=&quot;screenshot of apple phone with screenshots of siri interface over the signal app&quot; /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;What’s the State of This on Android?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This update from Apple is also a good excuse to check in on the process on Android. It has improved a little, but is &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://support.google.com/gemini/answer/13594961?hl=en#screen_automation&amp;amp;zippy=%2Cwhat-happens-with-my-data-when-gemini-uses-screen-automation-to-help-me-get-tasks-done-in-android-apps%2Cwhat-happens-to-my-data-when-i-use-geminis-agentic-calling-capability&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;not as straightforward&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; as Apple’s new settings, and lacks the ability to set the screen context feature per-app. But you do have some control over what Gemini can access: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Open up the Gemini app&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tap your user photo, then &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Settings &amp;gt; Personal Intelligence&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Connected Apps&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Revoke access to any apps you do not want Gemini to have access to&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This process seems to work well enough for some data and we like that it’s opt in, but it’s not exactly intuitive. For example, Signal doesn’t appear there because Signal doesn’t support Gemini’s app access feature at all. That means Gemini can’t access the content of Signal directly, which is good. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But Gemini can read notifications if you’ve enabled the “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://support.google.com/gemini/answer/15235441&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Device Assistance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” Connected App (which you likely have, since that also enables basic features, like setting a timer—check under &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Settings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Personal Intelligence&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Connected Apps&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;), and it can use screen context unless you’ve disabled the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Device controls&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Screen context&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; “Use screen and app data” option in the Gemini Settings. These two features may access the contents of the Signal app or notifications, if you choose to use them. We’d prefer a more hard-lined approach that reduces the chances of user error here: Google should give users the ability to turn these features off per app.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Apple clearly understands that some users want stronger controls over what Siri AI can and cannot access. But we think they should go further and offer the option to only use “on device” AI features, similar to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wired.com/story/limit-galaxy-ai-to-on-device-processing-or-turn-it-off/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;what Samsung offered with its Galaxy AI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. We’re happy to see this change and think all operating systems need to consider similar controls moving forward.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 20:04:21 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112491 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/end-end-encryption">End-to-End Encryption</category>
 <dc:creator>Thorin Klosowski</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/encrypt_banner-animated-loop.gif" alt="animated image of the text &amp;quot;encrypt it already&amp;quot; turning from text into circles" type="image/gif" length="127662" />
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    <title>Court Should Curb Abuse of Grand Jury Subpoenas Targeting Social Media Users </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/court-should-curb-abuse-grand-jury-subpoenas-targeting-social-media-users</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;A federal appeals court should curb the government’s abuse of grand jury subpoenas to unmask social media users who criticize lawless immigration enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the message from the ACLU, EFF, and other civil liberties and trade groups who filed &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/28/gj_subpoena_amicus_brief_dc_cir61.pdf&quot;&gt;a friend-of-the-court brief&lt;/a&gt; in a sealed case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/3W9H-5ETL&quot;&gt;The case involves&lt;/a&gt; the government’s investigation of an anonymous Reddit user who commented on a post about an immigration officer in Minnesota. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) first issued an administrative subpoena to Reddit to unmask the user. When the user challenged the subpoena in court on free speech and statutory grounds (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/list-ice-subpoenas-tech-companies&quot;&gt;as many others have&lt;/a&gt;), DHS withdrew it. But then the government obtained a separate grand jury subpoena—a subpoena issued by a prosecutor to gather evidence to present to a grand jury before any criminal charges are filed—for much of the same information. The user then challenged the grand jury subpoena too, and the case is currently being appealed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The right to speak anonymously is essential. It preserves privacy and shields critics from government retaliation. In the past year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has issued grand jury subpoenas to social media companies for their users’ personal data. This is frequently done for improper purposes and without really showing that social media users have committed any crime. These subpoenas have the effect of intimidating and chilling critics, as immigration authorities have engaged in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/rights-organizations-demand-halt-mobile-fortify-ices-handheld-face-recognition&quot;&gt;invasive&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclusocal.org/press-releases/governments-own-records-reveal-racial-profiling-in-federal-immigration-stops/&quot;&gt;unconstitutional&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/08/us/immigration-agent-shootings-vehicles.html&quot;&gt;sometimes violent conduct&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As the amicus brief makes clear, courts should not defer to the government’s claims regarding the legitimacy of using grand jury subpoenas to unmask internet users. Instead, the subpoenas must receive proper First Amendment scrutiny. Like many other types of legal processes, grand jury subpoenas are issued by federal officials without prior court approval. And they too can be abused to harass or retaliate against people critical of the government.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The amicus brief was filed in early September and recently unsealed. The brief was signed by the American Civil Liberties Union of DC, EFF, the Center for Individual Rights, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, the Cato Institute, and NetChoice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is notable that NetChoice signed the amicus brief. It is a trade group that represents many companies who have received similar subpoenas including Reddit, Google, Meta, PayPal, among others. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/02/open-letter-tech-companies-protect-your-users-lawless-dhs-subpoenas&quot;&gt;EFF has called on these companies&lt;/a&gt; to do more to defend their users’ speech and privacy rights in the face of these subpoenas.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 19:48:20 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112492 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Mario Trujillo</dc:creator>
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    <title>💾 Fighting DOGE&#039;s Data Grab | EFFector 38.19</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/fighting-doges-data-grab-effector-3819</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;When we give our private information to the government to pay taxes, apply for a job, or vote, we should be able to trust that our data won&#039;t later be used against us. But in a betrayal of that trust, the federal government has been pooling the information it has about us on an unprecedented scale—and using it for purposes we never agreed to.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF and other groups are fighting back. In &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/effector/38/19&quot;&gt;our latest EFFector newsletter&lt;/a&gt;, we&#039;re talking about a recent victory in our lawsuit against the government for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-court-rules-opms-disclosure-personal-records-doge-unlawful?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;sharing federal workers&#039; confidential personnel files with DOGE&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/effector/&quot;&gt;JOIN OUR NEWSLETTER&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;For over 35 years, &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/effector&quot;&gt;EFFector&lt;/a&gt; has been your guide to understanding the intersection of technology, civil liberties, and the law. This issue covers &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/announcing-privacy-badger-safari-macos?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;our free tracker blocker&lt;/a&gt; coming to Safari, a call to action for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.acteff.org/campaign/169499/?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;net neutrality in California&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-court-rules-opms-disclosure-personal-records-doge-unlawful?utm_source=effector&quot;&gt;a big win&lt;/a&gt; in our lawsuit against the DOGE data grab.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prefer to listen in? EFFector is now available on all major podcast platforms. This time we&#039;re talking to EFF&#039;s F. Mario Trujillo about the dangers of government data grabs—and what defenders of privacy are doing to stop it. You can find the episode and subscribe&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://effector.simplecast.com/&quot;&gt;on your podcast platform of choice&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Want to protect your right to digital privacy? Sign up for &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/effector&quot;&gt;EFF&#039;s EFFector newsletter&lt;/a&gt; for updates, ways to take action, and new merch drops. You can also fuel the fight for privacy and free speech online when you &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/join&quot;&gt;support EFF today&lt;/a&gt;!&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 15:21:42 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112490 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Hudson Hongo</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/effector-green-web.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="78242" />
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    <title>Social Media When Elections Are Close: Doing the Impossible Better</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/social-media-when-elections-are-close-doing-impossible-better</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Everyone knows, or should, that perfect (balanced, targeted, transparent, swift and swiftly appealable) content moderation at scale is impossible. That doesn’t mean powerful social platforms don’t have to try to get at least reasonably close, especially when access to good information can have a profound effect on political participation and speech.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That’s why so many people, including the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.oversightboard.com/news/oversight-board-statement-on-protecting-election-integrity-on-metas-platforms/&quot;&gt;Meta Oversight Board&lt;/a&gt;, criticized Meta for suspending a major &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/18/no-kings-instagram-account-suspended-during-protests&quot;&gt;political Instagram account&lt;/a&gt; for hours during a huge early voting push on October 17; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/21/battle-meta-alleged-bolsonaro-bias-intensifies-days-before-brazil-presidential-runoff&quot;&gt;for allegedly&lt;/a&gt; boosting one candidate in Brazil’s recent presidential election. Meta denies deliberate interference in either instance, blaming &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/18/no-kings-instagram-account-suspended-during-protests&quot;&gt;“mistakes”&lt;/a&gt; in its automated content moderation systems (including AI tools that can’t tell the difference between enthusiastic follower engagement and a bot attack).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mistakes or not, with early voting in the U.S. midterms already underway, these events serve as a stark reminder that all major social media platforms need to have stronger systems in place to ensure that they serve, rather than impede, democratic communication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;Access to good information can have a profound effect on political participation and speech.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is not inherently an “AI” problem: automated systems can process content at a scale that humans never could, potentially enabling better moderation at scale and alleviating the psychological load on ill-paid moderators whose jobs require them to view incredibly disturbing content. But automated systems also reproduce existing biases, struggle to understand context, and often make mistakes that disproportionately affect journalists, activists, artists, and other vulnerable and marginalized communities. And moderation errors are even more likely when the language is spoken principally by the global majority. In 2020, leaked documents showed that Meta’s algorithms incorrectly &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.politico.eu/article/facebook-content-moderation-posts-wars-afghanistan-middle-east-arabic/&quot;&gt;deleted nonviolent Arabic-language content&lt;/a&gt; 77 percent of the time, while &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.isdglobal.org/media-mentions/the-facebook-papers-hate-speech-filters-through-in-middle-east-thanks-to-lack-of-arabic-language-monitoring-and-faulty-ai-tech/&quot;&gt;failing to detect hate speech&lt;/a&gt; under the company’s own policies in many instances. Where these systems are faltering in Arabic, they’re positively failing in less-resourced languages. As a &lt;a href=&quot;https://cdt.org/insights/content-moderation-in-the-global-south-a-comparative-study-of-four-low-resource-languages/&quot;&gt;2025 report&lt;/a&gt; from the Center for Democracy and Technology found, labeled datasets in certain languages and dialects such as Maghrebi Arabic and Kiswahili contain inconsistencies, bias, and inaccuracies due to the limited hiring of annotators who actually speak the languages as well as shifts in the languages themselves. An &lt;a href=&quot;https://restofworld.org/2023/chatgpt-problems-global-language-testing/&quot;&gt;investigation&lt;/a&gt; into ChatGPT’s outputs in several low-resource languages demonstrates the depth of problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But language disparities are just one of several concerns as automated moderation becomes more widespread. From the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and&quot;&gt;systemic suppression of content from Palestine&lt;/a&gt; to the repeated &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/how-lgbtq-content-censored-under-guise-sexually-explicit&quot;&gt;misclassification of LGBTQ+ content as adult or explicit material&lt;/a&gt;, these varied examples demonstrate the risks of overreliance on automated moderation—and the need for stronger safeguards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fortunately, there is a great deal companies, policymakers, and civil society can do to help ensure that highly automated systems operate in ways that respect human rights, minimize predictable harms, and provide meaningful accountability when they fail. If companies are going to continue relying on automation to moderate users’ speech—and there is little reason to believe they won’t—then accountability must evolve alongside these technologies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That work should start with publicly committing to the &lt;a href=&quot;https://santaclaraprinciples.org/&quot;&gt;Santa Clara Principles 2.0&lt;/a&gt;. Specifically:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Automated technologies should help, not replace, human moderators. For example, automated systems can help flag and prioritize content for review, while humans can interpret context, handle sensitive cases, and refine system performance. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/joint-submission-euelections&quot;&gt;This investment is particularly important during the weeks immediately before and after an election&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Companies must be transparent about when and how automation is used in content decisions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Companies must regularly audit their automated systems for bias, with particular attention to low-resource languages, vulnerable and marginalized communities, and conflict zones.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Companies should &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/eff-and-allies-brazils-elections-privacy-protections-are-crucial-electoral&quot;&gt;strengthen personal data protection&lt;/a&gt; guarantees and policies. Automated content moderation often relies on personal data and profiling, so companies should think carefully about what data these systems use, what&#039;s necessary and proportionate and how their systems shape moderation outcomes.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Users must have the ability to appeal, and to provide context when they believe human or automated moderation decisions have wrongfully removed their content. Appeals should be promptly evaluated and decided by human moderators.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Companies should regularly assess the human rights impact of their moderation decisions, and issue public statements of the results&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If they rely on third-party vendors, companies should carefully (and regularly) audit those vendors for compliance with these same principles&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Lawmakers should avoid promoting and passing legislation that effectively or explicitly mandates automated moderation systems&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Policymakers should also refrain from attempting to dictate platforms technical and design choices to favor or disfavor particular expression.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Policymakers should work to educate the public about how their personal data may be collected and used in electoral contexts.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These recommendations understand that automated content moderation isn’t just a technical problem for clever engineers and product teams to solve. Because content moderation shapes public discourse and fundamental rights, its design and oversight must respond to the concerns of policymakers, civil society, independent researchers, and the communities most affected by these systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One other distinct and enduring problem makes transparency, checks, and accountability all the more urgent: too few companies have far too much power over our political communication and organizing. Social media gave people the ability to wrest some control over political messaging away from media oligopolies. But we’ve met the new boss and while it’s not the same as the old boss, the song is pretty familiar. The real promise of the web to democratize communication is not likely to be met by social media oligarchs, no matter how sophisticated their content moderation practice.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 21:20:30 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112486 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/content-blocking">Content Blocking</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <dc:creator>Corynne McSherry</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/icon-2019-freespeech.png" alt="A multi-colored bullhorn icon surrounded by grey-blue hexagons" type="image/png" length="14323" />
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    <title>New Records Obtained by EFF Expose More Problems with Medicare’s AI Experiment</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/new-records-obtained-eff-expose-more-problems-medicares-ai-experiment</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;New records obtained by EFF expose additional issues with Medicare’s AI-driven prior authorization program and show why we need stronger legal limits around government use of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/algorithmic-decision-making&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;automated decision-making&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-sues-answers-about-medicares-ai-experiment&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;sued&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the government back in March for information about the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cms.gov/priorities/innovation/innovation-models/wiser&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Wasteful and Inappropriate Service Reduction (WISeR) model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a new Medicare program that uses AI to evaluate prior authorization requests for certain medical services. We &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/new-records-reveal-problems-medicares-ai-prior-authorization-experiment&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;previously released records&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; showing that WISeR has resulted in delays and denials of care, operational chaos, and reports of patient harm. Today, we’re publishing over 800 new pages of records, including:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Requests for information (RFIs) or requests for corrective action plans (CAPs) sent from the Centers for Medicare &amp;amp; Medicaid Services (CMS) to four of the six WISeR vendors, along with the vendors’ responses.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Applications of 66 companies to the WISeR model, including those of the 6 selected companies. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Task orders and contracts for the evaluation, implementation, and monitoring of the WISeR model.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Documents obtained through EFF’s lawsuit are available &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/eff-v-cms&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These newly released documents show that the WISeR rollout was rushed and rocky from the start, highlighting the dangers that arise when governments &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/department-defense-wants-less-proof-its-software-works&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;treat AI like a silver bullet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for complex problems. The documents also highlight the need for more transparency about safeguards against inappropriate, AI-driven denials. The public still lacks the information needed to assess whether clinician review is providing meaningful oversight of AI systems and whether appropriate data is being used to evaluate prior authorization requests. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF has &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/algorithmic-decision-making&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;long argued&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that AI has no place in consequential government decisions about peoples’ rights or access to benefits, such as &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/eff-140-other-organizations-call-end-ai-use-immigration-decisions&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;immigration enforcement&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/11/ai-criminal-justice-trend-attorneys-need-know-about&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;policing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; decisions. That’s because using automated decision-making in these contexts risks decisions that violate people’s rights or deprive them of benefits they’re entitled to based on biased or inappropriate considerations and without proper due process or accountability if there is an error. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;By outsourcing decision-making to private AI companies without sufficient transparency, testing, or legal limits, WISeR jeopardizes seniors’ access to medical care. Congress should step in to place greater legal limits on the use of automated decision-making in Medicare. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;WISeR’s Rollout Was Rushed and Rocky &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;CMS launched the WISeR program just six months after &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-launches-new-model-target-wasteful-inappropriate-services-original-medicare&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;announcing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; it, ignoring calls from &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aha.org/lettercomment/2025-10-23-aha-comments-cms-wiser-model&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;medical providers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to delay its rollout. In records previously released by EFF, CMS acknowledged this “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28608769-combined-records-2nd-interim-release/#document/p33&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;extremely condensed timeline&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;New records suggest that WISeR’s unusually rapid rollout contributed to widespread problems in the first few months of the program. CMS did not disclose the extent of these issues to the public, even as agency employees privately contacted vendors about potential noncompliance with program requirements. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the first three months of the program, CMS sent RFIs or requests for CAPs to at least four of the six WISeR vendors. These requests, which describe delays, technical failures, and a lack of communication with providers, suggest that widespread problems during the program’s rollout were not limited to one vendor or state. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These letters underscore the severity of the problems with the program. For example, CMS requested information from one vendor, Virtix, about numerous reported issues, including “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p20&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;determination turnaround times that exceed established guidelines&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p20&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;denials that appear inaccurate or inconsistent with applicable criteria&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” and “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p20&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;inadequate customer service&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” CMS’s RFI to Zyter–a vendor that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p125&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;uses Palantir software infrastructure&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;–observed that the agency had received reports that “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p59&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Zyter is not issuing determination letters in a timely manner&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” and communications indicating that it “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p59&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;may lack adequate processes for responding to and escalating provider/supplier concerns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” The vendor Innovaccer received two CAP requests and a “Performance Notice of Non-Compliance” over its failure to implement a fully functional portal for WISeR providers and suppliers.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;Excerpts from CMS’ letters to vendors describe problems during WISeR’s rollout:&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/26/virtix_rfi_0.png&quot; width=&quot;1468&quot; height=&quot;366&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;em&gt;Excerpt from the &lt;a class=&quot;theme markdown__link&quot; href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p20&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;RFI for Virtix&lt;/a&gt;, March 17, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/26/zyter_rfi.png&quot; width=&quot;1466&quot; height=&quot;476&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;Excerpt from the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p59&quot;&gt;RFI for Zyter&lt;/a&gt;, February 27, 2026&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/26/innovaccer_performance_notice.png&quot; width=&quot;1456&quot; height=&quot;732&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;Excerpt from the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p37&quot;&gt;Performance Notice of Non-Compliance for Innovaccer&lt;/a&gt;, February 20, 2026&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Vendors’ responses to CMS provide further evidence that WISeR’s rushed rollout contributed to its problems. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p13&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Innovaccer claimed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; it warned CMS months in advance that it might not be ready to provide full portal functionality by the launch date, even before signing a Participation Agreement. Another vendor claimed that “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p63&quot;&gt;technical and workflow stabilization challenges were encountered due to the compressed implementation timeframe&lt;/a&gt;” it faced after joining the WISeR program a month after the other vendors. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/26/innovaccer_cap.png&quot; width=&quot;1362&quot; height=&quot;402&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Excerpt from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p13&quot;&gt;Innovaccer’s Proposed CAP&lt;/a&gt;, January 16, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The issues reflected in CMS’s letters to vendors, and the vendors’ responses, illustrate the risks of deploying automated decision-making systems without proper testing or safeguards. While &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p16&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;vendors’&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p23&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;responses&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p42&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;describe&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p62&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;fixes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for the problems CMS identified, after-the-fact remedies cannot undo the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.risehealth.org/insights-articles/article/new-report-medicare-wiser-prior-authorization-pilot-program-causing-care-delays/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;harms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that patients and providers already experienced during WISeR’s rushed rollout. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;More Transparency Needed About AI Safeguards&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The public still knows far too little about any safeguards that WISeR vendors may have adopted—in part because the government chose to conceal some of this information. Transparency about these safeguards is critical to protecting patients, especially because WISeR’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/new-records-reveal-problems-medicares-ai-prior-authorization-experiment&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;payment structure&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; gives vendors, as the government put it, “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28608769-combined-records-2nd-interim-release/#document/p45&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;an incentive to deny as many claims as possible&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/26/safeguards_redaction.png&quot; width=&quot;1834&quot; height=&quot;1548&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt; Information provided by a vendor about safeguards that it says &quot;ensure the responsible and clinically appropriate application of automation” appears to have been redacted from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833805-additional-applications-and-contracts/#document/p474&quot;&gt;records released to EFF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The public has limited means to evaluate the effectiveness of even the safeguards that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;weren’t&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; redacted from records released to EFF. For example, one vendor’s application touts safeguards like “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p98&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Human-in-the-loop (HITL) workflows&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p98&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Continuous model monitoring&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” and “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p98&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Transparent audit trails&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” Yet it remains unclear whether these measures effectively prevent improper prior authorization denials. Some evidence suggests they may not: the company &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/new-records-reveal-problems-medicares-ai-prior-authorization-experiment&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;denied more requests than it approved&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in the first few months of the program, and CMS inquired about “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p20&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;denials that appear inaccurate or inconsistent with applicable criteria&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Ultimately, the records obtained by EFF raise more questions than they answer about the safeguards used by WISeR vendors. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Having a Human in the Loop Is Probably Not Enough&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;CMS has emphasized having a human in the loop as a key safeguard against inappropriate, AI-driven denials. The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cms.gov/priorities/innovation/files/document/wiser-model-frequently-asked-questions&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;WISeR FAQ page&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on the CMS website states that “Non-affirmations will require the review of a human clinician and cannot be performed solely by technology.” But whether human review provides any meaningful protection depends on the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-026-02971-1&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;details of its implementation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, such as whether human reviewers have enough time to evaluate requests and practical authority to override AI recommendations. We still lack many of those details for WISeR vendors. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;A &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s41235-023-00529-3&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;growing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/6.2004-6313&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;body&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-025-02422-7&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;scholarship&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; points to the substantial limitations of “human in the loop” policies as guardrails for AI systems. AI-generated recommendations can unduly influence human decisions, leading reviewers to over-rely on automated judgements and rubber stamp them as correct. Even worse, at least one health insurance company actively &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.statnews.com/2023/11/14/unitedhealth-class-action-lawsuit-algorithm-medicare-advantage&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;pressured clinical reviewers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to accept its AI systems’ recommendations. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.propublica.org/article/cigna-pxdx-medical-health-insurance-rejection-claims&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Another company&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; built a system that allowed clinical reviewers to reject claims without opening patient files; clinical reviewers using this system spent an average of just 1.2 seconds on each case.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Is the Right Kind of Data Informing Companies’ Decisions?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Some WISeR vendors’ applications offer general descriptions of the types of data informing their decisions. But far more details are needed to allow medical professionals to assess whether the data inputs to these AI systems are appropriate for evaluating prior authorization requests. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Inappropriate training data or input data can lead to biased, unfair, or inaccurate decisions. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cms.gov/files/document/hpms-memo-faq-coverage-criteria-and-utilization-management-020604pdf.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;CMS guidance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for Medicare Advantage organizations using AI to make coverage decisions emphasizes the importance of basing decisions on individual patients’ circumstances. It cautions against using “an algorithm that determines coverage based on a larger data set instead of the individual patient&#039;s medical history, the physician’s recommendations, or clinical notes.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;WISeR vendors’ applications reference data sources like “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p129&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;provider behavior&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p110&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;patient demographics&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p111&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;utilization management datasets&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p111&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;provider and payer performance metrics&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,” and “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28833804-rfis-caps-and-applications/#document/p82&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;historical claims data&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” Whether these sources could introduce bias or give too much weight to population-level patterns depends on how vendors use them to inform individual decisions. But we don’t yet have these important details about vendors’ data and algorithms. By outsourcing decision-making to private companies’ AI systems, the government has made it harder for the public to evaluate whether decisions are being made fairly.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Next Steps&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As the government expands its use of automated decision-making, the potential for consequential mistakes increases rapidly. The records we’ve obtained so far raise questions about the rushed rollout and lack of guardrails for automated decision-making by the U.S. government. EFF urges transparency, oversight, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/strengthen-colorados-ai-act&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;legal limits&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to protect people from the harms of automated decision-making in high risk systems.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-related-cases field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Related Cases:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/eff-v-cms&quot;&gt;EFF v. CMS&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:05:42 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112484 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/ai">Artificial Intelligence</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency">Transparency</category>
 <dc:creator>Lena Cohen</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/adm-bureaucratic-final-1200x600.jpg" alt="A robot oversees a factory conveyor belt. Its finger hovers over the reject button, as a red light scans a woman and her baby." type="image/jpeg" length="186891" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>French Court’s Site-Blocking Orders Drive Quad9 Out Of France</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/french-courts-site-blocking-orders-drive-quad9-out-france</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;A nonprofit service that protects internet users’ privacy is leaving France. Quad9, a free DNS resolver, has said &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://quad9.net/news/blog/au-revoir-france/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;it will reluctantly stop serving users in France&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on November 24. This follows a French court order that Quad9 must block access to websites that are accused of infringing the copyrights of a sports broadcaster. Forcing a responsible privacy service out of an important market is a predictable result of trying to force infrastructure providers to be copyright police.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;When you visit a website, a DNS resolver reads the domain name you type in—like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://eff.org&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;eff.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;— and translates it into a numerical IP address that’s used to direct data across the internet. A DNS resolver can see the names of websites you connect to, so its privacy policies are important. Quad9 is an NGO that’s incorporated in Switzerland, in part to protect its users from data demands. The company also helps protect users from malware and phishing by blocking domains that are known to be malicious. Services like Quad9 offer an alternative to the DNS resolvers of local internet service providers and wireless carriers, which are vulnerable to demands from law enforcement, censorship, and commercial surveillance.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In a blog post explaining its decision, Quad9 explains that the French court’s order forces it to make a decision that, either way, is bad for users. It could either “extend French law to the whole world (blocking globally)” or try to identify and block users only in France—something that it can’t do reliably, and a move that could leave the company facing massive fines if it fails to block websites perfectly within France. Quad9 says it is facing about 20 other lawsuits in France seeking similar blocking orders. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Rather than accept these demands, Quad9 has decided to withdraw its service from France. That is a real loss for French users who rely on the service to protect their privacy and security. It is also the right thing to do, when faced with the alternative: making promises it can’t keep, or abandoning users’ rights worldwide. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Quad9’s decision will not remove any allegedly infringing material from the internet. The organization doesn’t host websites. Users looking for particular websites can  easily &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-and-why-to-change-your-dns-server&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;switch&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to another DNS resolver. So the material targeted by copyright holders will remain online and accessible, even while they drive a privacy-protecting service out of France. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These events matter beyond the borders of France, and U.S. lawmakers should pay attention. Congress is considering multiple &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/site-blocking-will-not-defend-ip-no-matter-bills-name&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;site-blocking proposals&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which would require ISPs and other intermediaries, including DNS resolvers, to block access to websites in the name of protecting copyright. These bills threaten speech and our ability to access information online, and they are invitations to abuse. The Quad9 withdrawal shows another cost: if internet services get forced into being copyright cops, users can lose services that they rely on for privacy and security. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Worse still, if neutral services like Quad9 are forced to build site-blocking systems for the benefit of copyright holders, it becomes far easier for other powerful interests, including repressive governments, to demand the same systems be used to censor speech they dislike, globally. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Congress should reject site-blocking bills. They’re a threat to the open internet, and don’t help creators or creativity. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 16:19:49 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112481 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/content-blocking">Content Blocking</category>
 <dc:creator>Joe Mullin</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/copyright-digital.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="6654" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Lessons Learned From &#039;AdFection&#039; and What To Do Next</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/lessons-learned-adfection</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Last week, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;researchers at Citizen Lab revealed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; a horrifying new malware campaign, dubbed “AdFection.” It used an ad network to distribute spyware to journalist’s devices to infect them without the target ever needing to click anything. This sort of attack on journalists is dangerous and incredibly concerning, especially since it’s built on the backbone of a technology we already object to: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/ban-online-behavioral-advertising&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;behavioral advertising&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Although this type of attack has only been described targeting journalists, you can take a few steps we outline in the next section to mitigate the risk no matter who you are.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;A few factors combined to make this attack a noteworthy first-of-its-kind. First, it utilized the surveillance ad-tech ecosystem to specially target the malicious code. Second, the spyware it delivered was so-called “zero-click,” meaning it required no interaction from the user to be infected: all that is required is for the ad to be delivered and code bundled along with it to be run, which happens automatically. Neither &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malvertising&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;malvertising&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; nor &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cyber.nj.gov/Home/Components/News/News/1315/214&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;zero-click attacks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; are new on their own. What’s novel about the AdFection attack is combining them, creating a highly targeted, extremely dangerous attack which is difficult to defend against and even harder to detect.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Let’s take a deeper look from the perspective of one of the Windows devices supplied to the researchers from Al Jazeera. Here’s how the report describes the infection happening: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Someone browsing the web or using an app on that machine is served an ad created by Discover-Tech, a company exposed in the report as “purporting to be a legitimate advertising company, [but] appears to be a front for large-scale ad espionage abuse.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;The ad contains a small snippet of JavaScript code which is automatically executed when rendered in the app or website. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;This code reaches back out to a Discover-Tech server, referred to as their “NOAS server,” with detailed information about the machine rendering it: its cookie-set advertising ID, IP address, and more.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So far, nothing particularly unusual has happened. Ads that contain JavaScript code and reach back out to their servers with lots of information on your device—and by extension you—are commonplace. It’s all part of the data-driven advertising ecosystem. What happens next is more interesting:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;The NOAS server uses this detailed information to determine it is an Al Jazeera machine requesting the ad. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Instead of returning an empty response (as it does most of the time), it responds with a malicious, zero-click spyware &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/security/glossary/malicious-payload/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;payload&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. That payload was created by Discover-Tech’s partner Candiru/Integrity Labs, a company &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://citizenlab.ca/research/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;previously&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sekoia.com/blog/predators-for-hire-a-global-overview-of-commercial-surveillance-vendors&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;exposed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for involvement in sophisticated malware attacks. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;The payload is then executed and infects the targeted machine.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Companies targeting zero-click malware attacks against journalists might seem like the plot of a blockbuster spy thriller. But this attack was enabled by the everyday practices of ad-tech companies, which unfortunately have extreme latitude in the collection of users’ data. By leveraging the tracking identifiers and data collected on devices for the purpose of delivering targeted ads to specific individuals, mercenary spyware companies can repurpose this data in order to fine-tune who they infect—and hide that they’re doing it from everyone else. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Most ads are not delivered directly by the ad creators, but rather by intermediaries that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/online-behavioral-ads-fuel-surveillance-industry-heres-how&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;facilitate Real-Time Bidding auctions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Nonetheless, winning bidders are given the ability to execute JavaScript code in the browser of the person who receives the targeted ad. This allows for interactive ads to be displayed, but also (as we’ve seen) for the compromise of a device just by delivery of malicious code.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;While the different components in this &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.csoonline.com/article/571799/exploit-chains-explained-how-and-why-attackers-target-multiple-vulnerabilities.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;attack chain&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; are not novel on their own, the exposure of this combined attack is significant because it reveals a technique to hyper-target individuals and organizations for infection. Luckily, there are steps you can take to protect yourself from the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/targeted-advertising-gives-your-location-government-just-ask-cbp&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;myriad&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.404media.co/inside-global-phone-spy-tool-patternz-nuviad-real-time-bidding/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;of&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/03/09/catholics-gay-priests-grindr-data-bishops/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;dangers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2023196mobilewallacomplaint.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;presented&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/pentagon-says-us-military-personnel-are-reportedly-being-targeted-using-location-2026-05-28/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;by&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the ad-tracking industry. Here’s how.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;What You Can Do About It&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As we work towards fundamental fixes to the ad ecosystem and banning online behavioral ads altogether, the onus is on all of us to protect ourselves. This is especially important for higher risk individuals or journalists working in states with heavy surveillance. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Citizen Lab outlines&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; several steps, depending on your threat model, to take to help protect yourself:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Take some simple steps to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/11/creators-police-location-tracking-tool-arent-vetting-buyers-heres-how-protect&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;lock down your devices&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; right now.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Establish &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module-categories/basics&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;strong security fundamentals&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Sites like our own &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Surveillance Self-Defense&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://securityplanner.consumerreports.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Consumer Reports’ Security Planner&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; can help get you started.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Use a browser extension to reduce tracking. Our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Privacy Badger extension&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; is an excellent start. Network-wide ad blocking services are also worth considering if you’re comfortable handling the set up process.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;On mobile phones, disable or reset your AD ID. Here are directions to do so for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-get-to-know-android-privacy-and-security-settings#disable-ad-tracking&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Android&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-get-to-know-iphone-privacy-and-security-settings#disable-ad-tracking&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;iPhone&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Consider using &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/i-want-opt-out-software-made-big-tech#main-content&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;more privacy protective browsers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These steps can be very helpful in protecting yourself, but there is only so much you can do as an individual. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/ban-online-behavioral-advertising&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Banning behavioral ads&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; like this would be a good place to start. Behavioral ads aren’t just a privacy nightmare as designed. They are the perfect vehicle for malvertising and similar threats, just as we see here.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 17:28:02 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112474 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/online-behavioral-tracking">Online Behavioral Tracking</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/state-sponsored-malware">State-Sponsored Malware</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/taxonomy/term/77">Technical Analysis</category>
 <dc:creator>Bill Budington</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Thorin Klosowski</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/malware-shark.png" alt="malware-shark" type="image/png" length="8301" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Anti-Circumvention Laws Raise the Cost of Knowledge</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/anti-circumvention-laws-raise-cost-knowledge</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;The vast amount of information on the open web requires researchers and journalists to adapt with new tools to make sense of it all. Checking facts, gauging public opinion, and other lines of inquiry depend on being able to analyze the overwhelming amount of material posted online every day. Unfortunately, responding to the AI industry’s voracious appetite for data, companies stewarding this public data are looking to cash in and block access to the open web. This makes the web harder to navigate, and threatens all kinds of important research.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reddit’s &lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2026/07/reddit-keeps-weird-dmca-lawsuit-against-web-scraper-alive-despite-googles-loss/&quot;&gt;lawsuit&lt;/a&gt; against SerpAPI[1] and Perplexity threatens to do exactly that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reddit was once a very open platform, fostering a community of alternative apps and extensions putting users in control of their experience. Since the rise of AI however, it changed tack. Over the last three years Reddit has &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/06/what-reddit-got-wrong&quot;&gt;closed APIs to users&lt;/a&gt;, limited &lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2026/09/reddit-will-block-old-reddit-com-from-people-who-havent-used-it-in-6-months/&quot;&gt;UI features&lt;/a&gt;, and otherwise restrained access &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnet.com/news/social-media/reddit-prompting-some-mobile-web-users-to-download-the-app/&quot;&gt;without login&lt;/a&gt;. By making the voices on the platform harder to access, the company has positioned itself as a gatekeeper, and has since struck a lucrative data-sharing arrangement with Google.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SerpAPI, in contrast, is a tool which offers automated access to Google’s search engine results pages. It’s used by Perplexity, an AI-based search tool. Reddit sued to stop SerpAPI and Perplexity from bypassing Reddit’s own arrangement with Google. (Google brought a similar suit, which was dismissed by another court.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It comes as little surprise that the legal weapon Reddit employed in this case is Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the same “anti-circumvention” law that has caused so much trouble for artists, innovators, and researchers over the years—and that EFF has fought against from the beginning. Reddit’s suit claimed that SerpAPI’s use of widely used techniques to access Google search results amounted to “circumventing” access controls on copyrighted works. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are major problems with this argument. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, Reddit doesn’t own the copyright in its users’ posts—the users do, and they grant Reddit the right to distribute the posted content freely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, there’s no meaningful copyright infringement going on here. Perplexity functions like a search engine, responding to users’ queries with relevant links and optionally an AI-generated summary. Crawling and indexing the web to create a search engine was long ago ruled a fair use under copyright law.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And third, Google’s efforts to put rate limits on search queries and block some kinds of automated querying aren’t the sort of “access controls” that Section 1201 was written for. The law was passed in 1998 and targeted things like breaking the encryption on DVDs and other digital media. In contrast to physical or paywalled media, Reddit posts are visible to everyone, without a paywall and generally without a login. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, a federal district judge &lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2026/07/reddit-keeps-weird-dmca-lawsuit-against-web-scraper-alive-despite-googles-loss/&quot;&gt;ruled&lt;/a&gt; in July that the suit could proceed, concluding that Section 1201 applied. That’s a dangerous ruling, because it casts a cloud of legal uncertainty over lots of important research, including efforts to study public sentiment through social media and to preserve records of historical events. Without tools that can look at the web at scale, many kinds of research are simply impossible today. But if employing those tools risks Section 1201 liability, only the wealthiest institutions will be able to use them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We cannot let the internet be rebuilt such that information is divided up among a handful of gatekeepers and sold back to us like cable subscription packages. If our knowledge of the online world comes only through wealthy institutions, the cost of knowledge will only increase and access to unbiased answers diminishes. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[1] SerpAPI is an EFF donor. EFF donors do not influence our agenda or our positions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 17:20:40 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112480 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/dmca-rulemaking">DMCA Rulemaking</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/open-access">Open Access</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/taxonomy/term/70">Commentary</category>
 <dc:creator>Mitch Stoltz</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/competition_reddit_robot.png" alt="Large robot hand taking tool from alarmed person" type="image/png" length="166219" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>The Vulnerability Apocalypse and Why We Should Fund Open Source</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/vulnerability-apocalypse-and-why-we-should-fund-open-source</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;If you use the internet at all, you may have noticed that a large percentage of sites suddenly went down earlier this week&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;and all your nerdiest friends were talking about &quot;The Vulnerability Apocalypse” and this thing called PHP that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/pl-php&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;powers nearly 70% of the websites on the internet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. You may find yourself wondering: what is PHP, what just happened, what is the vulnerability apocalypse, and what do I need to do? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;To find out what you can personally do read the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/computer-security-about-get-lot-worse-heres-what-you-can-do&quot;&gt;first blog post&lt;/a&gt; in this series! &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;What Is PHP? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;299}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;PHP is a programming language used mainly to create interactive websites. Facebook, Wordpress, Wikipedia, Etsy, and other major sites all use or were originally built on PHP. It is a long-established mainstay of web development. But because it is open-source, maintenance of these critical systems depends on a small number of volunteers working on this in their free time. The disaster scenario that happened this past week is the perfect example of why we need more money and people supporting open-source projects. Corporations should be contributing both.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;What Is the Vulnerability Apocalypse? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;120}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are the way that security professionals file reports about vulnerabilities in software. The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://nvd.nist.gov/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;National Vulnerability Database&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; (NVD), run by NIST, is the official national database of CVEs. In other words, CVE reports managed by NIST are the closest thing we have to a canonical database of security vulnerabilities in software. The NVD currently has around 400,000 CVEs that have been filed and accepted since 1988. In just the month of October, 13,000 new CVEs have been submitted. This means that 3% of critical software security bugs that have ever been officially logged were found in the last month alone. And it&#039;s likely that by the end of the year over a quarter of the software vulnerabilities that have ever been found will be from 2026. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/23/screenshot_2026-10-23_at_10.54.42_am.png&quot; width=&quot;2048&quot; height=&quot;1154&quot; alt=&quot;a graph showing the number of computer vulnerabilities by week since 1990, increasing exponentially in the last couple months.&quot; title=&quot;a graph showing the number of computer vulnerabilities by week since 1990, increasing exponentially in the last couple months.&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;Computer vulnerabilities reported are rising exponentially. Source: CVE Tracker&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;This research is being driven almost entirely by the cybersecurity capabilities of major AI models from companies like Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Historically it has been popularly assumed by cybersecurity experts that finding unknown (zero-day) exploits in any specific project and turning them into exploits was expensive. The knowledge to discover them was not widespread, and it was a hard task even for those initiated into the arcane ways of vulnerability hunting. Google even dedicated &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://projectzero.google/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;an entire team to it&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;But now thanks to major AI models, vulnerabilities are cheap, and anyone of moderate technical skill with a few dollars and access to a frontier AI model can find vulnerabilities in a few minutes. For example, recent vulnerabilities in PHP were found with a prompt to an AI model that literally said &quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7518756994284077056/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;find bad vulnerabilities in PHP&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;.&quot; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;What Happened This Week?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In 2024, a potentially severe vulnerability in PHP was &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://thephp.foundation/blog/2026/10/21/todays-php-security-release-and-how-were-strengthening-php-security/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;discovered during an external security audit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. PHP’s maintainers couldn’t agree on a solution, but more importantly, they couldn’t find a way to exploit the vulnerability. Because it didn’t seem like an active threat, they ended up deprioritizing a fix in favor of working on more urgent security issues. Then, in August 2026, security researchers working with the latest models from OpenAI and Anthropic independently discovered the vulnerability again, and another one&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;and now, with a way to exploit them. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We now know that the vulnerabilities &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;were so severe that they would have allowed even moderately inventive hackers to take over any website that uses PHP and then steal customer data, launch further malware attacks, spy on users, take websites offline, or launch a massive denial of service attack.&lt;sup&gt;[&lt;a href=&quot;#footnote1&quot;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Because of the severity of these vulnerabilities, several of the involved researchers got together with the makers of PHP to patch the vulnerabilities and disclose them in a coordinated manner. The idea was that hopefully everyone would get a chance to quietly release and then apply fixes for the vulnerabilities before the whole world found out about it.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;But news already started to leak on October 20th. There was a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://web.archive.org/web/20261021192245/https:/news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50167754&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;post on a widely read forum&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; “Hacker News” and other posts elsewhere. One of the researchers accidentally published a video early. Companies reported seeing active exploitation of the vulnerabilities going back as far as October 17th. On October 21st, six hours before the planned press embargo, one company, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://thephp.foundation/blog/2026/10/21/todays-php-security-release-and-how-were-strengthening-php-security/#leak-and-disrupted-disclosure&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Chainguard, jumped the gun and released a patch early,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; essentially giving anyone instructions about exactly where to find the vulnerabilities and how to weaponize them. This sent system administrators everywhere scrambling to patch their systems before they were taken over by hackers. And it’s going to take a long time to patch all these systems. At the time of this writing over 33 million websites are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://php2shell.censys.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;still running on vulnerable versions of PHP&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The internet is run largely on open-source software, mostly maintained by a small handful of skilled volunteers occasionally getting a small stipend, not by major corporations and highly paid engineers. These are projects you have perhaps never heard of, like PHP, OpenSSL, and SQLite, but these programs run on nearly every computer in the world and are maintained by teams as small as one person. When a vulnerability is found in these projects, it can be devastating. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;PHP isn’t the only critical open-source software with a high severity vulnerability this week either. Other widespread open-source projects like Node.js and GitLab also had severe security bugs reported. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The small number of already overworked open-source maintainers are now facing a deluge of vulnerability reports, some of which are false, but many of which are very real. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://opensourcepledge.com/blog/burnout-in-open-source-a-structural-problem-we-can-fix-together/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Burnout in open source has never been higher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;We Need Stronger Support for Open Source Projects&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Much of the foundation for the modern multibillion-dollar internet industry is built on open-source products that were created and still maintained&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;for free&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;by dedicated volunteers in their spare time. It’s an imperfect system, and it can lead to errors. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;One of those critical, under resourced open-source products is PHP. And while vulnerabilities in PHP were privately found years ago, they were left unfixed because they didn’t seem as impactful as other bugs at the time. These same vulnerabilities were recently rediscovered and proved to be trivially exploitable by security researchers using advanced AI models. While in the middle of the widespread, global effort to correct this mistake and deploy fixes, the problem was leaked by some of the security researchers who had gotten early access to the fixes. Unfortunately, this left millions of websites, ranging from personal blogs to government sites, vulnerable to hacking that could result in data theft, malware distribution, and worse. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Open-source projects like PHP and others are the backbone of the entire internet. If they don’t get the resources they need, they and the internet they power, are at risk of falling apart. Corporations (whose products would not exist without these products) should be actively contributing to their maintenance.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;sup&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;&lt;a id=&quot;footnote1&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;1. A technical analysis of the vulnerabilities is out of scope for this post and has already been &lt;a href=&quot;https://calif.io/php2shell/&quot;&gt;written by the original researchers&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 22:36:46 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112476 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/ai">Artificial Intelligence</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/security">Security</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/taxonomy/term/77">Technical Analysis</category>
 <dc:creator>Cooper Quintin</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/OG-GovernmentHacking-Playpen.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="124026" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Computer Security Is About to Get a Lot Worse, Here’s What You Can Do</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/computer-security-about-get-lot-worse-heres-what-you-can-do</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;It is a commonly held truth among computer geeks that there is no such thing as bug-free software, or a secure computer. Any piece of software that anyone actually uses &lt;a href=&quot;https://hackaday.com/2026/04/15/doom-on-a-fancy-smart-toaster/&quot;&gt;will have a security vulnerability somewhere in the code&lt;/a&gt;. The more complex that software is, the more likely there will be a vulnerability. Fortunately for everyone, finding severe vulnerabilities was generally considered an expensive and difficult task requiring years of training and deep knowledge of how computers and software worked. Until recently there was a steady background hum of vulnerabilities being found and patched, with major vulnerabilities that could cripple the entire internet only happening every few years. Now that is no longer the case. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;You may have noticed your nerdiest friends freaking out about the “Vulnerability Apocalypse” this week and waving their arms in panic about something called PHP. You may have also noticed that some of your favorite websites were down for a bit. In the last two weeks of October alone, there have been multiple, potentially internet-breaking vulnerabilities reported and patched. Many of those vulnerabilities were in the open-source software that is the foundation of the vast majority of the internet. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;For more detailed information on what happened, and why supporting open-source projects matters, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/vulnerability-apocalypse-and-why-we-should-fund-open-source&quot;&gt;check out our other blog&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;This is all because frontier AI models, such as those created by OpenAI, Anthropic, and others, have made it incredibly cheap and easy to find previously unknown vulnerabilities (zero-days) in open- and closed-source code. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Three percent of all software vulnerabilities ever found in history were found just in the month of October. This year alone researchers have found nearly a quarter of all software security issues which have ever been discovered.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;If exploiting critical software is now cheaper and easier than ever, what does that mean for us as individuals and what does that mean for society as a whole? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;TL; DR&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;: It’s going to get worse before it gets better. But you can protect yourself with basic digital security hygiene that is now more important than ever. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;What Do I Need to Do?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;299}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;There absolutely needs to be a bigger conversation about how we got here and how to fix the systemic issues involved, including how corporations that depend on open-source code should contribute to their upkeep, and how big tech should be regulated. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;But for now, this news is a compelling reason to tighten up your digital hygiene. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;A lot of computers are going to get hacked a lot more often, and unfortunately, it isn’t going to get better any time soon. &lt;/span&gt;Thankfully, EFF has compiled a comprehensive set of security advice in &lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/&quot;&gt;our Surveillance Self-Defense guides&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;To start&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;we recommend making sure your browser and all applications are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/keeping-your-data-safe#create-a-secure-device&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;always up to date&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; with the latest patches.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;You should also consider installing a tracker blocking tool, like EFF’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;Privacy Badger&lt;/a&gt; (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/announcing-privacy-badger-safari-macos&quot;&gt;now on Safari&lt;/a&gt;),&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and remain vigilant for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-avoid-phishing-attacks&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;phishing attempts&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. Additionally, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/choosing-the-password-manager-that-s-right-for-you&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;install a password manager&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/creating-strong-passwords&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;use unique passwords&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; for each website, so that if one site is compromised, the rest of your passwords are safe. You should also be aware that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/breachies-2025-worst-weirdest-most-impactful-data-breaches-year&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;data breaches&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; may now be more likely, and the websites you visit may experience more attacks than usual, which means that some services may be disrupted. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;If you host a blog or other website, make sure that either you or your hosting provider has &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;patched&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; this particular issue. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;For additional tips on protecting yourself and others, head over to our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Surveillance Self-Defense site&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. Additionally, if you’d like to support any of EFF’s open-source projects like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Privacy Badger&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/meet-rayhunter-new-open-source-tool-eff-detect-cellular-spying&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Rayhunter&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://certbot.eff.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Certbot&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, visit our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supporters.eff.org/donate/join-eff-4&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;donate page&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 22:36:29 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112475 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/ai">Artificial Intelligence</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/security">Security</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/taxonomy/term/69">Call To Action</category>
 <dc:creator>Cooper Quintin</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>India McKinney</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/OG-GovernmentHacking-Playpen.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="124026" />
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  <item>
    <title>Two States Can Now Restrict Social Media Access—Here’s What To Do Next </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/two-states-can-now-restrict-social-media-access-heres-what-do-next</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Last week, two federal appeals courts &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/2026-10-14_opinion_dckt_94_0.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;issued&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/10.15.26_netchoice_v._carr_opinion.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;opinions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that will allow Florida and Georgia to start enforcing laws that will age-gate and block young people from accessing social media. The laws do not adequately respect minors’ rights to play, speak, and learn online. More fundamentally, these laws don’t help young people stay safe online—a goal that lawmakers should pursue.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Age-Gated? Email EFF at &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:agegates@eff.org&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;agegates@eff.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Because of the new laws, some young people will lose their ability to access lawful information, find their online communities, and even engage with school board members. Others will need parental permission to stay online. And adults will face increased demands to prove their age, which will put their privacy at increased risk simply to continue to use the services they already use. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;opposed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; these laws because they threaten the free expression and privacy of both minors and adults.  Even though these lawsuits are not over, the injunctions that paused enforcement have been lifted, and the states of Florida and Georgia will now be able to enforce broad restrictions on social media use. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The restrictions that these states will start enforcing are a setback for the rights of all internet users, but they are not written in stone. That’s why EFF is encouraging internet users - and particularly young people – to start keeping a record of how they are affected. If you are a teenager who loses access to an online discussion, can’t participate in a political campaign, or stop seeking information because you don’t want to upload personal information, document what happened. The same is true for adults who may be mistakenly blocked by age checks, and parents who may encounter obstacles to authorizing their children&#039;s use of online services. These experiences matter. They can help us show courts, policymakers, and the public what government restrictions on online expression actually cost the people who live under them. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Hopefully, with enough proof of the expressive harms these laws cause, we can push lawmakers to rescind them. That’s why we’re encouraging folks to reach out to EFF once they’ve documented these harms. You can write to us about this issue at the email address &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:agegates@eff.org&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;agegates@eff.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;The Decisions&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These two opinions, issued by the same panel from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, allow Florida and Georgia to enforce restrictions on social media accounts for people under 16 years old. The requirements differ by state. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;In &lt;/b&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/2026-10-14_opinion_dckt_94_0.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;Florida&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;,&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; the judges allowed that state’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.flsenate.gov/session/bill/2024/3&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;H.B. 3&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to move forward, which requires covered platforms to ban anyone under 14 from opening or keeping accounts—even with parental permission. Teenagers who are 14 or 15 can have accounts only with parental consent. To be covered, a platform has to use algorithms, allow content uploads or the viewing of other peoples’ content, and have at least one feature on a list of features the state considers bad, including livestreaming, engagement metrics, autoplay, infinite scrolling, or push notifications. These requirements effectively apply to every major social media service that young people use.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;To the extent there is a silver lining in the ruling on Florida’s law, it’s that the panel recognized that H.B. 3 targets expression protected by the First Amendment. The problem is that the ruling uncritically accepts the idea that a social media service is addictive in a clinical sense, even if just 10% of users under 16 are using the platform for two or more hours per day (the standard set in H.B. 3). The court simply accepts that time spent online is a proxy for harm. The bill doesn’t distinguish doomscrolling or compulsive use from organizing a campaign, making art, or talking with friends. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;In &lt;/b&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/10.15.26_netchoice_v._carr_opinion.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;Georgia&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://legiscan.com/GA/text/SB351/id/2973892&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;S.B. 351&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; can now be enforced. That law requires parental consent for anyone under 16 to hold an account on social media platforms. It also requires platforms to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to check users’ ages, which creates a hurdle for adults as well as under-16s. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The ruling acknowledges that S.B. 351 “overwhelmingly applies to platforms that overwhelmingly host protected speech.” But the ruling faults the plaintiffs for not being able to show that “invalid applications substantially outweigh the valid ones.” That asks the groups challenging the law to meet a virtually impossible standard—to make their case, they would have to measure and evaluate the content hosted by all online services affected by the law. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Both of these cases may be further appealed, and are likely to continue in the lower courts. But people in Georgia and Florida can no longer count on court injunctions to protect their access to the web. What the effects will be going forward depends on how platforms implement these new restrictions, including how they check ages and parental consent, as well as state officials’ views on these efforts. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you hit an age-gate while online, check out our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/01/so-youve-hit-age-gate-what-now&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;blog post about how you might want to proceed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;age-gating resource hub&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. If you want to speak out about your experience, you can talk to us at agegates@eff.org.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;What is Lost&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Some youth who lose their social media accounts will lose contact with friends. Others will lose access to a support group, the ability to speak out on current issues, or an audience for their artwork. More young people will be shut out of discussions about what’s going on in their school and their community. U.S. law has long recognized that people under 18 have their own rights to speak and receive information. These new laws interfere with those rights. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Florida opinion suggests that young people can browse the internet without an account, or use a parent’s account. But that doesn’t help those who might participate in a private group, send a personal message, or speak to an audience they have built up. Nor does it recognize the reality that in many households, young people may not have the ability to use a parent’s device, or even have healthy relationships with their parents. For parents of children under 14, the Florida law also overrides parental autonomy—even if parents wanted to allow their child on these services, they cannot do so by law. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These laws won’t just harm younger kids. Adults and older teens will bear the cost of the new rules. In order to figure out who is young enough to not be able to join, or who needs parental consent to join, services will have to check users’ ages. That likely means asking people to submit ID or other sensitive information. Some people will be mis-classified as too young; others will decide that they’d simply rather stop participating instead of handing over even more personal data. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;Keep A Record&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Between the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/09/10/meta_settlement_one_pager.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;recent Meta settlement&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and these 11th Circuit decisions, despite widespread opposition, age-gating is becoming a reality for the American internet. As these laws are enforced, we need to understand what they mean for the people who have to deal with them. And we need to create a record of their effects on everyone’s speech so we can push to repeal them.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you encounter a restriction due to these laws that affects you, keep a record, ideally while the details are still fresh in your mind. Screenshots, along with notes about the date and time, the service involved, and the task you were trying to accomplish, will all be helpful. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Did you lose an account or can’t participate?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; Describe what you lost. Were you using a group to organize a club, volunteer in your community, or keep in touch with friends? Did losing your account cut you off from people you wouldn’t otherwise be able to be in touch with? Even if you just used the account to access local news or follow your favorite content creator, that’s still a significant loss of your right to access information online.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Record problems with age checks and parental consent.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; What information did the service request from you? Were you able to provide it? Did it reject your age proof, or classify you incorrectly? If you’re a parent, were you able to give permission, and what did you have to provide? What promises did the service make about what it did with the data it collected from you? Save explanations given by the platforms or any services they employ to age gate, including any law they cite. If you are to appeal a result and choose to, keep track of those attempts as well. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;You can also document choosing to drop out.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; If you abandon an account or service because you’re unwilling to provide ID or other personal data, write down what you gave up, and why. You don’t need to submit sensitive information to show that you are burdened by new rules. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;You Can E-Mail agegates@eff.org &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If these restrictions affect you, we encourage you to reach out to EFF by emailing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:agegates@eff.org&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;agegated@eff.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and telling us more about what happened. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF will continue to oppose laws that prevent adults and minors from expressing themselves online, or that push people to give up their privacy to participate in the digital world. These recent court decisions are setbacks, but they don’t settle the debate. By keeping track of people who lose access, age-check failures, and the online conversations that can no longer happen, we’ll be in a better position to challenge the worst of these restrictions, in both legislatures and courts. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And in the meantime, EFF will keep fighting for laws that actually make us safer online—like stopping social media companies’  harmful surveillance of all internet users. We’ll continue to push for laws that empower parents, children, and all internet users to have meaningful choice and control over their online services. Those goals can make everyone safer online, while preserving our ability to speak and access information. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Further Action &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Email EFF about your experience at &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:agegates@eff.org&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;agegates@eff.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; . &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Further Reading&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/10.15.26_netchoice_v._carr_opinion.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;11th Circuit Opinion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in Netchoice v. Carr (Georgia)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/2026-10-14_opinion_dckt_94_0.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;11th Circuit Opinion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in CCIA, NetChoice v. Uthmeier (Florida) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/042_corrected_aclu_eff_amicus_brief-1.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF amicus brief&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in Florida case&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2026/10/21/10.15.26_netchoice_v._carr_opinion.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF amicus brief&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in Georgia case&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Age Verification Hub&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;


&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 18:19:34 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112470 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification">Age Verification and Age Gating: Resource Hub</category>
 <dc:creator>Joe Mullin</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ageverificationbanner-2.png" alt="A hand holding a cellphone showing a verification screen and ACCESS DENIED in the background." type="image/png" length="549220" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Canadians Are Running Out Of Time To Oppose The Dangerous C-22 Surveillance Bill</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/canadians-are-running-out-time-oppose-dangerous-c-22-surveillance-bill</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Canada’s Parliament is debating a massive expansion of surveillance powers that will threaten the privacy and security of millions of people. Bill C-22, also called the Lawful Access Act, has already passed the House of Commons, and is now before the Canadian Senate. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Canadians still have an opportunity to speak out and stop this dangerous legislation. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) is &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ccla.org/take-action/civil-liberties-alerts/bill-c-22-lawful-access-threatens-your-privacy-and-security/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;urging all Canadians&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://action.ccla.org/page/199880/petition/1?ea.url.id=10034277&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;sign its petition&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; opposing the bill. (The petition on CCLA’s website is governed by CCLA’s privacy policy.) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://action.ccla.org/page/199880/petition/1?ea.url.id=10034277&quot;&gt;Take action&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.acteff.org/campaign/167270/&quot;&gt;Tell the canadian senate to stop C-22&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As we &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/canadas-bill-c-22-repackaged-version-last-years-surveillance-nightmare&quot;&gt;wrote earlier this year&lt;/a&gt;, Bill C-22 gives the government new powers to force digital services—including telecom companies, messaging apps, and more—to help with government surveillance. Worse, it allows Canada’s Minister of Public Safety to order companies to create a backdoor to their services for law enforcement, as long as it doesn’t lead to a “systemic vulnerability.” That’s a clear recipe for weakening the encryption we all rely on. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It also requires services to retain metadata for up to a year, which reveals who people communicate with, where they go, and what services they use, even when they are not suspected of any crime. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Researchers at CCLA and Citizen Lab published a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ccla.org/privacy/ccla-and-citizen-lab-researchers-release-detailed-analysis-of-bill-c-22s-many-flaws/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;detailed analysis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of C-22 and its serious constitutional and cybersecurity problems. The analysis points out that the bill needs more than cosmetic changes—it calls for entirely withdrawing Part 2 of Bill C-22, the section that establishes the surveillance and data retention regime. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Bill C-22 could also expand the sharing of Canadians’ personal data with foreign law enforcement, including the United States. Canada has been negotiating a cross-border data-sharing agreement with the U.S. that would allow American police to get information about Canadian internet users with limited safeguards and oversight. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Some Canadian senators have already &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/chamber/451/debates/092db_2026-10-08-e#53&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;expressed concerns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; about the bill, and rightly suggested, as CCLA and Citizen Lab have, that it may not be compatible with privacy protections in the Canadian constitution. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you’re in Canada, read and sign CCLA’s petition opposing Bill C-22 today. Don’t let the Senate allow this dangerous expansion of government surveillance to become Canada’s new reality. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://action.ccla.org/page/199880/petition/1?ea.url.id=10034277&quot;&gt;Take action&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;Canadians: defend your privacy and security&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Further reading:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.parl.ca/documentviewer/en/45-1/bill/C-22/third-reading&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Full text of C-22&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;April: &lt;a href=&quot;https://ccla.org/privacy/coalition-to-mps-scrap-unprecedented-surveillance-measures/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Canadian Civil Liberties Association statement and letter&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June: &lt;a href=&quot;https://ccla.org/privacy/ccla-and-citizen-lab-researchers-release-detailed-analysis-of-bill-c-22s-many-flaws/&quot;&gt;CCLA and Citizen Lab researchers release detailed analysis of Bill C-22’s many flaws&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://openmedia.org/press/item/ottawa-repackages-its-surveillance-backdoor-in-bill-c-22&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Open Media blog on C-22&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/07/canadas-bill-c-2-opens-floodgates-us-surveillance&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF’s analysis of bill C-2&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 22:10:21 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112469 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/cross-border-access">Cross Border Access</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/end-end-encryption">End-to-End Encryption</category>
 <dc:creator>Joe Mullin</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/OG-Encryption-DefendEncryption.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="35296" />
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  <item>
    <title>Introducing Our New Surveillance Self-Defense Guide: Online Privacy for Parents and Youth</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/introducing-our-new-surveillance-self-defense-guide-online-privacy-parents-and</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The internet is a vast and confusing place no matter your age. Trying to help youth engage with it safely and privately is a complicated topic that touches on many different skillsets and ideas. But just because it’s complicated doesn’t mean it’s impossible. We’ve launched our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/online-privacy-for-parents-and-youth&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Online Privacy for Parents and Youth&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; Surveillance Self-Defense guide in hopes to provide a framework for finding solutions that work for you. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF rolls out this crucial resource as state and local governments consider &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;ill-advised laws&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that cut young people off from essential information and experiences. This particularly harms vulnerable youth and marginalized groups who often find safety in supportive online communities they can&#039;t access offline. Such laws also entail age gating, which compromises the privacy of all internet users and stifles young users’ ability to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/lawmakers-must-listen-young-people-regulating-their-internet-access-2025-review&quot;&gt;learn, grow&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/eff-court-young-people-have-first-amendment-rights&quot;&gt;express themselves&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Young people have unique needs and those needs change over time. Trying to protect from everything all the time is an exhausting process, but the security community has long had a solution for this: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/your-security-plan&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;security planning&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (also called threat modeling). The idea is to provide a series of questions designed to help you focus on what’s truly important. When it comes to online privacy, this is as applicable for youth and parents as it is for anyone else. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We used a security plan as our foundation for this guide because deciding what is and isn’t important is the first step we should all take when assessing our privacy risks. But this isn’t a place for quick fixes, and every young person has their unique needs and considerations. There is no single tool or technology fix that can substitute for spending time learning, and then teaching a young person, how the internet works, how to use it, what sorts of harms exist, and how to navigate those harms.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Solutions are rarely about the tools or software you use. It’s about understanding the threats and concerns you have, and then determining what steps you can take to mitigate those risks. We hope our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/online-privacy-for-parents-and-youth&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Online Privacy for Parents and Youth&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; guide can help provide the outline to get the conversation started.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supporters.eff.org/donate/support-surveillance-self-defense&quot;&gt;Donate Today!&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:07:38 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112468 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/security-education">Security Education</category>
 <dc:creator>Thorin Klosowski</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/og-ssd-logo.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="37977" />
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  <item>
    <title>Interoperability vs. Security: Why not both?</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/interoperability-vs-security-why-not-both</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;An open internet where people can freely build, share, and remix each other&#039;s work is a powerful engine of grassroots innovation we’ve all benefited from. In recent decades, however, corporations have taken control of an increasing share of this work, giving them a greater ability to stifle challengers and limit our choices. When regulators address this by mandating that  tech giants play fair by requiring interoperability, the gatekeepers respond with a tired refrain: Playing fair puts users’ security at risk.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Unfortunately for these trillion-dollar companies, this &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dict.org/bin/Dict?Form=Dict2&amp;amp;Database=*&amp;amp;Query=gotcha&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;gotcha&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; isn’t the end of the conversation. Regulators can ensure that meaningful choice &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;and&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; security thrive.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Lawmakers have been catching up, recognizing that the best way to rein in big tech is to require these &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oligopoly&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;oligopolies&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to open up their platforms to independent developers. As we &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/interoperability-and-privacy?language=en&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;explained six years ago&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, mandating interoperability helps prevent the misuse of people’s data and enables more privacy-respecting alternatives. Tech giants, in contrast, have been arguing that our data is safer when they have exclusive control.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tech Giants Claim Interoperability Means Insecurity&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The European Union’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/adoption-dsadma-notre-analyse&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Digital Markets Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (DMA) put interoperability into law under Article 6(7): “gatekeeper shall allow providers of services and providers of hardware, free of charge, effective interoperability with” a designated &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers-portal_en&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Core Platform Service&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; they operate. The language describes an unambiguous requirement to remediate vendor lockouts and anti-competitive behavior of the major service operators—it is not optional.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Apple &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://developer.apple.com/security/complying-with-the-dma.pdf?track_code=3eb23490-7b93-4003-8c81-e85b5c2b132a&amp;amp;element=BODY&amp;amp;productLocationId=BODY&amp;amp;position=null&amp;amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.apple.com%2Fsecurity%2Fcomplying-with-the-dma.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;claimed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that enforcing this obligation in mobile app stores would put their customers at risk and do irreparable harm to trust in their brand. It’s an argument reminiscent of Apple’s fight against the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/2024/2/9/24067957/apple-right-to-repair-oregon-bill-parts-pairing-ban&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;right to repair&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and in both instances the company is fighting to maintain its restrictive ecosystem to stop people from finding better deals elsewhere. Apple has long cultivated a more corporate-controlled experience with the iPhone, but this argument is now also being used for the relatively-more-open Android devices from Google.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the same year Apple argued against the DMA, Epic Games &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/epic-games-v-google&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;sued Google&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for its restrictive terms of service and extractive policies for revenue generated in apps. Google predictably &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25A354/375834/20250924190329491_Google%20SCOTUS%20Stay%20Application%209-24-25%20-%20Final.pdf&quot;&gt;alleged&lt;/a&gt; that opening up its platform to other app stores it couldn’t vet would allow harmful apps to be installed. The case was ultimately decided this year in the U.S. federal appeals court for the Ninth Circuit, with the court rejecting this argument, dealing a blow to  Google’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/12/feudal_sec.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;feudal security&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; arrangement, and paving the way for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/challengers-approach-third-party-app-stores-arrive-google-play&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;third-party app stores to be delivered as apps via the Google Play Store&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Interoperating Secure Systems Can (and Should) Exist&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Policymakers cannot take tech giants’ claims at face value. Companies have every incentive to resist interoperability requirements, because interoperability lowers practical barriers and reduces &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/facebooks-secret-war-switching-costs#:~:text=Switching%20costs%20are%20how%20economists%20refer%20to%20all%20the%20things%20you%20have%20to%20give%20up%20to%20switch%20between%20products%20or%20services&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;switching costs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for consumers adopting competing services. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Even where companies offer credible claims from internal technical and security experts, independent experts rarely have the access and information they need to test those claims. Companies have &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.04538&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;selectively made arguments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that security is harmed by interoperability, often in contexts which are to their advantage. These companies are happy to let a general misconception flourish which frames security as &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;inherently opposed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; to interoperability.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This narrative is wrong. We’ve seen that when interoperability and information security are both set as essential and non-negotiable criteria, secure interoperable systems result—systems that don’t sacrifice the rich features we’ve come to expect of the services we rely on. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The cross-platform rollout of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rich_Communication_Services&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Rich Communication Services&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (RCS), and now &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Message Layer Security&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (MLS) on top of it is a perfect example of this, creating end-to-end secure messaging by default between Android and iOS. For RCS and MLS, Google was conveniently on the other side of the interoperability argument, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://techcrunch.com/2022/08/09/google-new-campaign-pressure-apple-adopting-rcs/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;campaigning Apple to adopt the standard&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to overcome the diminished “green bubble” experience iPhone users had when texting non-iPhone users. Once &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.webpronews.com/google-releases-ad-celebrating-apples-adoption-of-rcs/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Apple finally agreed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to interoperate by implementing common standards, all users benefited from improved messaging security. In cases where legitimate security concerns are raised, these can be assessed and remedied on a case-by-case basis, without sacrificing user agency.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Striking the Right Balance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Retrofitting interoperability into already secure closed systems shouldn’t be done carelessly: it requires regulators strike the right balance of pressure and leniency to allow the time and precision necessary to make these renovations. Any components developed with the assumption of privileged access by trusted parties (e.g. your &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://trustedfuture.org/when-interoperability-mandates-weaken-security-jit-happens/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;browser engine&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;) are particularly vulnerable to serious security risks when opened up to unaccountable third parties.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;By adapting interoperability and information security as essential design principles, we can expect more safety, but also more freedom.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;With regard to the DMA, when security concerns are legitimate, we urge the European Commission to work with companies and outside experts to offer guidance in technical implementation and provide clarity on regulatory compliance. This approach paves a path forward that balances the interest of legal oversight and the needs of the companies alike. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Policymakers wishing to uproot these unfair platforms of control must do so with care and limit the impact this disruption can have. But security concerns must not act as a lever to indefinitely delay compliance. Closed systems should be impartially evaluated, and if concerns are valid, regulators can allow more time and guidance to be given to companies implementing these changes. One possibility is a tiered approach: offering leniency during an initial period where systems need to be retrofitted to abide by new requirements, followed by a subsequent and ongoing stricter observance of fair play.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Once interoperability and information security are adopted as essential design principles, further development with these rights-enhancing principles in mind will more easily follow. The result will be an internet the world deserves—where we can expect more safety, but also more freedom.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 22:39:34 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112467 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/competition">Competition</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/security">Security</category>
 <dc:creator>Bill Budington</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Rory Mir</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/decentralization-banner.png" alt="Personified mushrooms communicating from underground homes" type="image/png" length="594967" />
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    <title>EFF to Brazil’s ANPD: Data Privacy and Free Expression Must Underpin Platform Regulations </title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/eff-brazils-anpd-data-privacy-and-free-expression-must-underpin-platform</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The Brazilian National Data Protection Agency (ANPD) plays a pivotal role in the regulation of digital platforms according to new legislation approved in Brazil. Throughout this year, EFF has presented comments, filed submissions, and met with the agency to emphasize crucial guardrails that the enforcement of new regulations should ensure.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;ANPD is responsible for detailing and applying obligations set in Law n. 15.211/2025, which established rules for the protection of children and adolescents in the digital space. While some provisions establish important privacy safeguards, like prohibiting advertising based on profiling of underage users, the law created mandatory age assurance mechanisms for accessing digital products and services.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We have &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification&quot;&gt;raised alarms&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; on the privacy and free expression issues around age-gating the internet. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Age verification technology is often &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/face-scans-estimate-our-age-creepy-af-and-harmful&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;inaccurate&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/hack-age-verification-company-shows-privacy-danger-social-media-laws&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;privacy-invasive&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.blocked.org.uk/reported-sites&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Examples also show&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; how it’s prone to enforcement overreach, resulting in sites blocked beyond legal requirements. In the UK, providers disproportionately restricted &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.blocked.org.uk/reported-sites?category=Counselling,+Support,+and+Mental+Health&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;several&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; counseling, support and mental health sites under the Online Safety Act. Current age assurance methods risk wrongly walling off adults with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/when-no-id-means-no-internet-age-verification-and-right-access-information&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;no valid IDs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wired.com/story/when-face-recognition-doesnt-know-your-face-is-a-face/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;facial differences&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://arxiv.org/html/2604.28166v1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;physical disabilities&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, among others.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We highlighted these concerns in our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/comentarios-da-electronic-frontier-foundation-regulamentacao-da-lei-152112025&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;comments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/contribuicao-da-eff-tomada-de-subsidios-da-anpd-sobre-o-guia-orientativo-mecanismos-de&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;submissions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;underscoring that ANPD should avoid a blanket approach to age assurance obligations. Following the legislation, restrictions should apply only to products and services that are inadequate or prohibited to children and adolescents according to categories already set in regulation, with robust protections against subjective and overbroad interpretations. Guarantees such as access to information, freedom to participate in society and meaningful access to technologies also compound what constitutes the best interests of the child. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Moreover, we stressed that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/07/zero-knowledge-proofs-alone-are-not-digital-id-solution-protecting-user-privacy&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;zero knowledge proofs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; alone fail to ensure strong user privacy, including safeguards that the law itself sought to secure. Our submission explains why other requirements, such as &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/statements/statement-12025-age-assurance_en&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;unlinkability, selective disclosure, batch issuance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and processing on device, are crucial for achieving greater levels of protection and mitigating privacy harms. Minimum information being shared to the verifier and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/w3c/credential-considerations/blob/main/credentials-considerations.md#no-phoning-home&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;no “phoning home”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; to the issuer of a user’s accepted credentials are conditions that prevent actions like collusion and data sharing about the user.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We also shared &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/comentarios-da-eff-ao-guia-orientativo-da-anpd-sobre-escopo-do-eca-digital&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;inputs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; about the scope of the law, asking more clarity on which providers are covered by its obligations and the importance of treating differently non-dominant players like federated networks and free software applications. Without that clarity, this could negatively impact beyond gaming and major platforms that are the main target of these regulations. We elaborated on the agency’s regulation of prevention duties, the relevance of modulating them according to the type and structure of providers, and alerted them that their interpretation should not result in general monitoring obligations.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;On another but related front, we sent &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/comentarios-da-eff-tomada-de-subsidios-sobre-o-marco-civil-da-internet&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;comments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; regarding Brazil’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/intermediary-liability-brazil-intricate-path-ahead&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;new internet intermediary rules&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. Here too, ANPD has a critical regulatory role after a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/major-setback-intermediary-liability-brazil-risks-and-blind-spots&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Supreme Court’s decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and presidential decrees changed the liability regime initially set in the law known as “Marco Civil.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;With the turn to notice and takedown mechanisms and duty of care obligations, we emphasized measures to prevent censorship of protected content. These involve ensuring solid means for appeals of restricted posts, avoiding overreliance on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/part-1-automated-moderation-here-stay&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;AI-based content moderation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, strictly tailoring the application of concepts like duty of care and systemic failure, and not normalizing the blocking of platforms and websites. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We raised concerns about a trend reflected in the new regulation requiring platforms to proactively report user to authorities with unclear guarantees. Finally, we urged the agency to advance essential transparency and accountability measures for enabling greater public oversight over the application of the new regime.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;As we &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/intermediary-liability-brazil-intricate-path-ahead&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;said&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; before, platform accountability under the new rules ultimately hinges on how accountable its enforcement will be by platforms and state institutions. Rigorous commitment to fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, privacy and data protection, is required so that intended protections don’t instead lead to harms. ANPD must uphold this commitment and make sure that new regulations don’t backfire.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;276}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 22:11:43 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112466 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/age-verification">Age Verification and Age Gating: Resource Hub</category>
 <dc:creator>Veridiana Alimonti</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/brazil-platform-2.png" alt="One person holds a megaphone for another, with Brazil flag" type="image/png" length="46142" />
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    <title>EFF’s State Legislative Agenda to End ALPR Mass Surveillance</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/effs-state-legislative-agenda-end-alpr-mass-surveillance</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/node/112478&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2026/10/26/effs_state_leg_agenda.png&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; width=&quot;223&quot; height=&quot;300&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Police agencies across the U.S. have deployed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) to capture images of passing vehicles along with time, date, and GPS coordinates. While the technology itself isn’t new (ALPRs have existed in various forms for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.anpr-international.com/history-of-anpr/&quot;&gt;more than 50 years&lt;/a&gt;, and in &lt;a href=&quot;https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/c623f29a9eb8599abec842570558e453/view&quot;&gt;the U.S. since 1998&lt;/a&gt;), the surveillance landscape has shifted dramatically. Rapid advances in artificial intelligence and national data sharing have transformed police ALPRs into an interconnected, nationwide tracking network. It is pitched to city councils by law enforcement and private vendors like Flock Safety, Motorola Solutions (Vigilant), and Axon as an essential tool for solving violent crime.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In reality, it is an inherently dangerous infrastructure of mass surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Since &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/alpr&quot;&gt;2012&lt;/a&gt;, EFF has worked with others to expose the severe digital rights harms of ALPR systems. For example, we’ve recently documented how these camera networks allow law enforcement to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/are-your-local-police-using-flock-safety-alprs-scan-immigrants&quot;&gt;search for immigrants&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/how-cops-are-using-flock-safetys-alpr-network-surveil-protesters-and-activists&quot;&gt;track peaceful protesters&lt;/a&gt;, target &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/license-plate-surveillance-logs-reveal-racist-policing-against-romani-people&quot;&gt;Romani communities&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flock-safety-and-texas-sheriff-claimed-license-plate-search-was-missing-person-it&quot;&gt;track women seeking reproductive healthcare&lt;/a&gt;. Police also routinely use ALPRs for low-level matters like enforcing &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/more-license-plate-reader-mission-creep-school-residency-verification-background&quot;&gt;school residency requirements or investigating noise complaints&lt;/a&gt;. Many officers also use ALPR databases to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/08/02/how-police-officers-used-vast-network-cameras-spy-their-exes/&quot;&gt;stalk past romantic partners&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/high-crime-lmao-how-cops-are-treating-mass-surveillance-joke&quot;&gt;Recent EFF analysis&lt;/a&gt; revealed officers using the system without legitimate justification—logging search reasons like &quot;LOL&quot; and &quot;LMAO.&quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Understandably, the public backlash to police ALPR technology is accelerating, and state lawmakers across the country are taking action.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;New Hampshire enacted the &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/legislation/2007/sb0041.html&quot;&gt;nation’s first state law&lt;/a&gt; on ALPR use in 2007, but technological advances and misconduct have driven even more recent legislative action. In 2026 alone, six states enacted laws that limit police use of ALPRs: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/acts/26RS/documents/0071.pdf&quot;&gt;Kentucky&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2026/AL26/4_.PDF&quot;&gt;New Jersey&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/26%20Regular/final/SB0040.pdf&quot;&gt;New Mexico&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1516/Enrolled&quot;&gt;Oregon&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This is a good start, but far more is needed. This blog presents a framework for state legislators who want to stop ALPR mass police surveillance:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;Just ban it. It is incompatible with a free society and cannot be fixed.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;In the absence of a flat ban, reduce its harms. Most importantly: limit police use of ALPRs to real-time comparison of passing plates to hotlists; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/require-police-get-warrant-search-alpr-data&quot;&gt;require a warrant&lt;/a&gt; to place a plate on a hotlist; impose strict limits on the creation and use of those hotlists; and prohibit the storage of ALPR data (and thus prevent the subsequent search and disclosure of that data).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;In the absence of a prohibition on storing ALPR data, reduce its harms. Most importantly, place strict limits on police storage, search, and disclosure of ALPR data.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ban three especially dangerous police practices: placement of ALPRs near sensitive locations like hospitals; purchase of ALPR data; and use of ALPR data to try to predict crime.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Require transparency about ALPR mass surveillance, including: a 30-day public notice before a city procures police ALPRs; a statewide registry of all police ALPRs; and regular, public audits and statistical reports about police usage.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ensure effective enforcement of all new ALPR restraints, including by means of a private right of action and the exclusionary rule.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;These policy battles often unfold locally, so state legislators must ensure that state law is a regulatory floor, never a ceiling.&lt;/strong&gt; State preemption should never force unwanted camera networks onto communities that have chosen to reject them. Local government must retain authority to enact full bans, deny funding, reject contracts, and decommission existing camera networks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h3&gt;Table of Contents&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;ul style=&quot;font-family: Montserrat; list-style-type: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395407&quot;&gt;The Gold Standard: Statewide Bans on ALPR Mass Surveillance&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395407&quot;&gt;Strict Limits on Real-time Use of ALPRs &lt;/a&gt;&lt;ul style=&quot;font-family: Montserrat; list-style-type: none; margin-bottom: 0;&quot;&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395409&quot;&gt;Limits on creating hotlists&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395410&quot;&gt;Limits on using hotlists&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395411&quot;&gt;Strict Limits on Storage, Search, and Disclosure of ALPR Data&lt;/a&gt;&lt;ul style=&quot;font-family: Montserrat; list-style-type: none; margin-bottom: 0;&quot;&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395412&quot;&gt;Storage limits &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395413&quot;&gt;Search limits &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395414&quot;&gt;Disclosure limits &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395415&quot;&gt;Transparency &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395416&quot;&gt;Additional Restrictions&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395417&quot;&gt;Enforcement &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_Toc243395418&quot;&gt;Conclusion&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;border: 2px solid gray; font-family: &#039;Montserrat&#039;; margin: 2rem; padding: 2rem;&quot;&gt;&lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A Note on Scope&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;p&gt;As in our previous post on &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/effs-policy-position-alpr-surveillance-eliminate-it-and-reduce-its-harms&quot;&gt;ALPR policy&lt;/a&gt;, our focus here is ALPR mass surveillance: the continuous dragnet collection and retention of location data on innocent drivers. Different issues are raised by automated traffic enforcement (ATE) systems, such as standalone red-light or speed cameras that solely photograph and ticket specific traffic violations, without building a searchable network about uninvolved drivers. As such, state laws against ALPR mass surveillance should not cover ATE. This is the approach in at least six states: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/PDF/BySection/Chapter_20/GS_20-183.30.pdf&quot;&gt;North Carolina&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1516/Enrolled&quot;&gt;Oregon&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt;. The most common approach is to exclude ATE from the law’s definition of “ALPR.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Of course, ATE carries risks and demands legal restrictions too. This includes tight limits on data collection, retention, usage, and disclosure—all of which should be addressed in a different statute. Lawmakers must also actively guard against vendor efforts to piggyback mass surveillance tools onto ATE contracts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395407&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395407&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;The Gold Standard: Statewide Bans on ALPR Mass Surveillance&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;Statutory limits cannot make ALPR mass surveillance safe. Because the technology relies on the indiscriminate recording of every driver’s movements, the risks are baked into the system itself. Also, innocent motorists will be &lt;a href=&quot;https://ij.org/dozens-of-innocent-motorists-have-been-pulled-over-detained-at-gunpoint-or-jailed-due-to-ai-license-plate-camera-errors/&quot;&gt;menaced by police due to false matches&lt;/a&gt;, bad actors &lt;a href=&quot;https://ij.org/the-ij-database-of-alpr-abuse/&quot;&gt;will misuse location data&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/we-demand-more-information-how-marin-cops-illegally-shared-flock-alpr-data&quot;&gt;sensitive personal movements&lt;/a&gt; will be exposed to broad government overreach. Promising harsher penalties for officer misuse cannot fix an inherently flawed architecture. Thus, state lawmakers should pursue a complete, statewide ban on ALPR mass surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First,&lt;/strong&gt; lawmakers should prohibit all state-level law enforcement agencies from acquiring, retaining, accessing, or using ALPRs or any data derived from them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second,&lt;/strong&gt; they must impose the same prohibition on county, municipal, and other local law enforcement agencies.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These prohibitions should require any agency ending an ALPR program (both state and local) to fully decommission the programs within a strict timeframe. This includes requiring agencies to: physically remove all camera hardware; revoke all user, network, and database access credentials; permanently delete all stored location data; and require vendor certification of compliance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third,&lt;/strong&gt; ban the use of state funds for state or local agencies to acquire, maintain, or access ALPR systems. This must include direct appropriations, law enforcement grants, pass-through funds, and state-administered federal funds. In August 2026, Texas Governor Greg Abbott &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.texastribune.org/2026/08/28/texas-greg-abbott-flock-cameras-order-state-money/&quot;&gt;banned state agencies&lt;/a&gt; from spending public funds on Flock cameras.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fourth,&lt;/strong&gt; ban state and local agencies from installing or operating ALPRs on state-owned highways, roadways, or public properties. In August 2026, Florida’s Department of Transportation  &lt;a href=&quot;https://fdotwww.blob.core.windows.net/sitefinity/docs/default-source/design/bulletins/eom26-01.pdf&quot;&gt;ordered the removal&lt;/a&gt; of all ALPRs from the right-of-way on state highways within 30 days. The order revokes all previously approved permits to install ALPRs, and bars future permits.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An outright prohibition is the only effective way to eliminate this mass surveillance. This &lt;a href=&quot;https://irontontribune.com/2026/08/31/ironton-bans-use-of-license-plate-reading-cameras/&quot;&gt;follows the lead&lt;/a&gt; of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/local/idaho/carey-becomes-first-idaho-city-ban-automated-license-plate-readers/277-797ea715-7ddd-4587-a4a1-e7823c4702e5&quot;&gt;municipalities&lt;/a&gt; across &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.4029tv.com/article/fayetteville-flock-cameras/74062836&quot;&gt;the country&lt;/a&gt; that have &lt;a href=&quot;https://portcitydaily.com/local-news/government/2026/10/05/pender-town-becomes-first-in-the-state-to-ban-alpr-surveillance-cameras/&quot;&gt;already enacted bans&lt;/a&gt;. However, where there’s political resistance, state lawmakers might consider a moratorium that prevents further expansion of ALPR networks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395408&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395408&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Strict Limits on Real-time Use of ALPRs&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the absence of a ban on police ALPR mass surveillance, state legislators must restrict ALPRs to real-time comparison of passing plates to hotlists. ALPR data is simply too dangerous for police to safely store, search, and disclose. An effective way to do this, as in &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXI/261/261-75-b.htm&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt;, is to require deletion of ALPR data within three minutes after collection. That means no ALPR data is stored after comparison to a hotlist, and thus that no ALPR data about unmatched cars can be searched or disclosed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A state legislature must also reduce the harms of police use of real-time ALPRs by strictly limiting the creation and use of law enforcement hotlists.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395409&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395409&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Limits on creating hotlists&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;Roughly speaking, there are two kinds of police &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.axon.com/help/fleet-3/cameras-and-sensors/fleet/3/alpr/alpr-hotlists.htm&quot;&gt;hotlists&lt;/a&gt;. An agency might link its ALPRs to external hotlists created by another agency, such as the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or a state’s department of motor vehicles. Also, a police agency might link its ALPRs to its own internal hotlist, created by its own officers, of people under investigation. State legislators must strictly limit both.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, limit the kinds of external hotlists that police agencies may link to. For example, ban police agencies from linking to the NCIC’s “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/are-your-local-police-using-flock-safety-alprs-scan-immigrants&quot;&gt;immigration violator&lt;/a&gt;” hotlist, which ICE uses to hunt immigrants with the ALPRs operated by police agencies across the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, if a police agency links to external hotlists, require the agency to update that link every day. Otherwise, drivers may be detained even though they have been removed from the list. This is required by &lt;a href=&quot;https://mca.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0050/part_0010/section_0170/0460-0050-0010-0170.html&quot;&gt;Montana&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=60-3204&quot;&gt;Nebraska&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByArticle/Chapter_20/Article_3D.html&quot;&gt;North Carolina&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third&lt;/strong&gt;, forbid officers from adding a plate on a hotlist, absent a warrant from a judge based on probable cause and particularity. Without this judicial check on police power, an officer &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.404media.co/footage-shows-cop-stalking-woman-he-met-on-a-tv-set-after-surveilling-her-with-a-license-plate-reader/&quot;&gt;stalked a potential romantic partner&lt;/a&gt; by placing her plate on a hotlist.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As with other laws requiring a warrant (such as the federal &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2518&quot;&gt;Wiretap Act&lt;/a&gt;), there should be an exception where: (1) there is an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to a person; (2) there is no time to acquire a warrant; and (3) there are grounds upon which a warrant could be granted. This exception might apply, for example, when police have probable cause to believe a child has just been abducted. In such cases, the statute must require police to seek a warrant within 48 hours, and if it is denied, to immediately remove the plate from the hotlist.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt; requires a warrant or an emergency to use ALPRs “to monitor or track an individual who is the subject of an active criminal investigation.” In &lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/29-A/title29-Asec2117-A.html&quot;&gt;Maine&lt;/a&gt;, an ALPR system may use only information based on reasonable suspicion.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fourth&lt;/strong&gt;, forbid officers from adding a plate to a hotlist, except in connection with a serious violent crime. This would include investigation of a murder but not pursuit of a traffic scofflaw.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fifth&lt;/strong&gt;, forbid officers from adding a plate on a hotlist based, in whole or in part, on: a person’s race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, immigration status, disability, sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation; their political beliefs, associations, or participation in First Amendment-protected activity; or their pursuit of reproductive, gender-affirming, or other health care. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt; forbid use of ALPR systems on these grounds, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt; forbids tracking a person based on their protected speech.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sixth&lt;/strong&gt;, require officers to log their entry of a plate into a hotlist. This must include the officer’s name and agency, the date of the entry, a narrative description of the reasons for the entry, any case numbers, and an upload of the warrant authorizing the entry. &lt;a href=&quot;https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1516/Enrolled&quot;&gt;Oregon&lt;/a&gt; requires an officer to log “the specific law enforcement purpose of the entry,” and the officer’s name.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395410&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395410&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Limits on using hotlists&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, if the plate of a passing car does not match a hotlist, laws must require immediate deletion of all ALPR data about that car. &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXI/261/261-75-b.htm&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt; state law requires deletion within three minutes. This is the most effective way to limit ALPRs to real-time identification of vehicles and drivers of interest to police, as opposed to amassing a dangerous database of the comings and goings of the entire driving public, available later for retrospective search by police.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, if the plate of a passing car does match a hotlist, then limit storage, search, and disclosure of its ALPR data to what is strictly necessary to the investigation that placed the car on the hotlist.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third&lt;/strong&gt;, require police officers, before stopping a car because of an apparent real-time match, to visually and independently confirm that the car’s plate number, plate issuing state, and other vehicle characteristics in fact do match the car on the hotlist. Many innocent motorists have been &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/11/human-toll-alpr-errors&quot;&gt;detained and menaced&lt;/a&gt; by police because of ALPR false positives. Confirmation is required by &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=57500&quot;&gt;Kentucky&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://mca.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0050/part_0010/section_0170/0460-0050-0010-0170.html&quot;&gt;Montana&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXI/261/261-75-b.htm&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1516/Enrolled&quot;&gt;Oregon&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395411&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395411&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Strict Limits on Storage, Search, and Disclosure of ALPR Data&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;Again, state legislatures should simply ban police use of ALPRs, or at least police storage of ALPR data. Third best is harm reduction through strict limits on storage, search, and disclosure of ALPR data.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395412&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395412&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Storage limits&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, limit the storage period for ALPR data to days, not months, and then require deletion. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/what-we-learned&quot;&gt;More than 99%&lt;/a&gt; of the drivers who pass an ALPR are not on a hotlist. Tracking their movements anyway, just in case they are later relevant to a police investigation, is criminalization of the entire driving population. Thus, four states already require deletion after 21 days: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/29-A/title29-Asec2117-A.html&quot;&gt;Maine&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt;. Even Flock has reduced its default retention period to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-guardrails-address-lpr-privacy-concerns-and-police-transparency&quot;&gt;seven days&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By “delete,” we mean permanently erase it, so it is impossible for anybody to access it again. It is not enough to merely store it in a way that makes it harder to access, such as archiving it, or &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/while-country-rejects-alpr-mass-surveillance-sf-settles-weak-safeguards&quot;&gt;transferring it&lt;/a&gt; from one database to another. In the words of the &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt; statute: “System data shall be purged … in such a manner that such data is destroyed and not recoverable.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, limit the types of ALPR data that can be stored: just a photo of the plate, the AI-based read of the plate number, the date and time, and the location. Conversely, ban retention of photos of people in the car, and of features of the car beyond the plate as well as AI-based reads of those photos (respectively, “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/10/resisting-menace-face-recognition&quot;&gt;facial recognition&lt;/a&gt;” and “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.police1.com/police-products/police-technology/publicsafetysoftware/flock-safety-launches-new-ai-powered-tools-to-accelerate-police-investigations&quot;&gt;vehicle fingerprints&lt;/a&gt;”).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many states have enacted such rules. &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXI/261/261-75-b.htm&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt; bans ALPRs from “photographing or recording or producing images of the occupants of a motor vehicle.” &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2026/eo18&quot;&gt;Missouri&lt;/a&gt; bans integration of facial recognition into ALPR systems. &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXI/261/261-75-b.htm&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://mca.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0050/part_0010/section_0170/0460-0050-0010-0170.html&quot;&gt;Montana&lt;/a&gt; limit ALPRs to “the sole purpose of recording and checking license plates.” &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt; provides that “data collected by an [ALPR] must be limited to” plate numbers; date, time, and location; and pictures of plate, vehicle, and surrounding area.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395413&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395413&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Search limits&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, laws should ban “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-supreme-court-shut-down-unconstitutional-geofence-searches&quot;&gt;geofence&lt;/a&gt;” searches, which are searches in which police use ALPRs to identify all of the drivers present at a particular time and place, based on police claims that one of them might be the suspect they are looking for. Even a warrant cannot justify such general searches, because the Fourth Amendment requires warrants to “&lt;a href=&quot;https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-4/&quot;&gt;particularly&lt;/a&gt;” describe the person or car being investigated. These dragnet searches of stored ALPR data are the modern-day equivalent of the colonial-era “&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Writ_of_assistance&quot;&gt;writs of assistance&lt;/a&gt;,” against which our founders &lt;a href=&quot;https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/historic-document-library/detail/james-otis-against-writs-of-assistance-february-24-1761&quot;&gt;fought a revolution&lt;/a&gt; to end.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, laws should forbid officers from searching stored ALPR data, unless they first &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/require-police-get-warrant-search-alpr-data&quot;&gt;acquire a warrant&lt;/a&gt; from a judge based on probable cause and particularity. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/license-plate-surveillance-logs-reveal-racist-policing-against-romani-people&quot;&gt;The&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/how-cops-are-using-flock-safetys-alpr-network-surveil-protesters-and-activists&quot;&gt;constant&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down&quot;&gt;revelations&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/are-your-local-police-using-flock-safety-alprs-scan-immigrants&quot;&gt;of&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://reason.com/2026/09/02/wisconsin-cops-used-flock-over-100-times-to-track-a-navy-veteran-after-he-lawfully-recorded-a-traffic-stop/&quot;&gt;bad&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/traffic-violation-license-plate-reader-mission-creep-already-here&quot;&gt;police&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/more-license-plate-reader-mission-creep-school-residency-verification-background&quot;&gt;searches&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/no-cost-license-plate-readers-are-turning-texas-police-mobile-debt-collectors-and&quot;&gt;of&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/high-crime-lmao-how-cops-are-treating-mass-surveillance-joke&quot;&gt;ALPR&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://ij.org/the-ij-database-of-alpr-abuse/&quot;&gt;data&lt;/a&gt; demonstrate the need for—&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/require-police-get-warrant-search-alpr-data&quot;&gt;at the very least&lt;/a&gt;—judicial control over this dangerous surveillance technology. A federal judge in Oklahoma recently held that &lt;a href=&quot;https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.oknd.76981/gov.uscourts.oknd.76981.62.0.pdf?ref=404media.co&quot;&gt;the constitution requires&lt;/a&gt; this judicial control, because ALPR mass surveillance invades reasonable expectations of privacy. EFF has filed lawsuits making this demand in California and Wisconsin, along with local ACLU affiliates: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/siren-v-san-jose&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;SIREN and CAIR-CA v. San Jose&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/wisconsin-council-churches-v-milwaukee-racine-kenosha-green-bay&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Wisconsin Council of Churches v. Milwaukee, Racine, Kenosha, and Green Bay&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Three states (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/23/015/01607&quot;&gt;Vermont&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;) require reasonable suspicion of a crime before searching ALPR data, and a fourth state (&lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=VEH&amp;amp;sectionNum=2413.&quot;&gt;California&lt;/a&gt;) requires this from its highway patrol. This is a step in the right direction, but not enough: the decider must be a judge, and the test must be probable cause.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third&lt;/strong&gt;, officers should be prohibited from searching stored ALPR data, unless they are investigating a serious violent crime. On the flip side, ban searches for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/are-your-local-police-using-flock-safety-alprs-scan-immigrants&quot;&gt;immigrants&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/how-cops-are-using-flock-safetys-alpr-network-surveil-protesters-and-activists&quot;&gt;protesters&lt;/a&gt;, or &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/traffic-violation-license-plate-reader-mission-creep-already-here&quot;&gt;traffic scofflaws&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some states have moved in this direction. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2026/eo18&quot;&gt;Missouri&lt;/a&gt; limits use of ALPR data “criminal justice” and “lifesaving efforts.” &lt;a href=&quot;https://ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByArticle/Chapter_20/Article_3D.html&quot;&gt;North Carolina&lt;/a&gt; bans its use for traffic enforcement. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; bans its use based on race and other protected classes, to identify First Amendment activity, for immigration enforcement, or because of access to reproductive or gender-affirming health care. &lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title49/t49ch14/sect49-1432/&quot;&gt;Idaho&lt;/a&gt; bans its use for political activity.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fourth&lt;/strong&gt;, police officers must be required to log their searches of stored ALPR data concerning a particular car. This must include the officer’s name and agency, the date and time of search, a narrative description of the reasons for search, any case numbers, and an upload of the warrant authorizing the search. The officer must write the narrative in their own words. A drop-down menu of reasons is no substitute, because it is too easy for officers to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/high-crime-lmao-how-cops-are-treating-mass-surveillance-joke&quot;&gt;dodge an explanation&lt;/a&gt; of the actual reasons by clicking a pre-written “reason.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many states require officers to log their searches of ALPR data, including &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&amp;amp;division=3.&amp;amp;title=1.81.23.&amp;amp;part=4.&amp;amp;chapter=&amp;amp;article=&quot;&gt;California&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title49/t49ch14/sect49-1432/&quot;&gt;Idaho&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N64374FD074D411EF8A03D3D48BF95FFA?viewType=FullText&amp;amp;originationContext=documenttoc&amp;amp;transitionType=CategoryPageItem&amp;amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&quot;&gt;Maryland&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2026/eo18&quot;&gt;Missouri&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://mca.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0050/part_0010/section_0170/0460-0050-0010-0170.html&quot;&gt;Montana&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXI/261/261-75-b.htm&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1516/Enrolled&quot;&gt;Oregon&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;. In &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;, this must include an officer’s documentation of both their “specific purpose” to search, and the “associated call for service or case number.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395414&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395414&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Disclosure limits&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;The “disclosure” limits below must broadly address sharing from an agency that collected ALPR data to another entity. This includes an agency opening its database to access and search by another entity. It also includes an agency transferring data from its database to another entity’s database.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, ban disclosure of ALPR data to any federal or out-of-state agency. Federal and out-of-state agencies often lack the necessary protections of the driving public. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; forbids disclosures to the federal government or agencies in 46 states, unless they have a warrant. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/victory-california-department-justice-declares-out-state-sharing-license-plate&quot;&gt;California&lt;/a&gt; forbids disclosures, unless otherwise permitted by law.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, ban disclosure of ALPR data to another agency, unless it follows all of the rules above for an agency’s search of its own data (that is, the ban on geofence searches, the requirement of a warrant, the limitation to investigation of serious violent crimes, and the requirement of an audit trail).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some states have taken steps in this direction. &lt;a href=&quot;https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title41/Chapter6A/41-6a-S2005.html?v=C41-6a-S2005_2023050320230503&quot;&gt;Utah&lt;/a&gt; requires, as a condition of disclosure to a government entity or a defendant in a criminal case, a court order finding reasonable suspicion of crime. &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt; forbids disclosure “except as required in a judicial proceeding.” &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt; require the disclosing agency to find reasonable suspicion. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; forbid disclosure unless the receiving agency follows the rules applicable to the disclosing agency.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third&lt;/strong&gt;, place strict limits on participation in a multi-agency disclosure network, such as Flock or Vigilant. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; forbids participation “in a system or network that shares” ALPR data, unless it requires all participants to affirm in writing that they will not use or re-disclose that state’s data except in compliance with that state’s laws. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; also forbids “bulk” data disclosure, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N64374FD074D411EF8A03D3D48BF95FFA?viewType=FullText&amp;amp;originationContext=documenttoc&amp;amp;transitionType=CategoryPageItem&amp;amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&quot;&gt;Maryland&lt;/a&gt; forbids data “upload” to another agency.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fourth&lt;/strong&gt;, ban disclosure of ALPR data for purposes of investigating acts and statuses that are lawful in-state. Three states (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/062500050K2-130.htm&quot;&gt;Illinois&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2026/AL26/4_.PDF&quot;&gt;New Jersey&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/item/4367/index.do#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc237945475/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYBmAdgE4ALAFYBPIQEoANMmylCEAIqJCuAJ7QA5BskRCYXAiUr1WnXoMgAynlIAhdQCUAogBknANQCCAOQDCTyVIwACNoUnZxcSA&quot;&gt;New Mexico&lt;/a&gt;) forbid disclosure to investigate immigration status. Two states (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/062500050K2-130.htm&quot;&gt;Illinois&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/item/4367/index.do#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc237945475/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYBmAdgE4ALAFYBPIQEoANMmylCEAIqJCuAJ7QA5BskRCYXAiUr1WnXoMgAynlIAhdQCUAogBknANQCCAOQDCTyVIwACNoUnZxcSA&quot;&gt;New Mexico&lt;/a&gt;) forbid disclosure in investigate healthcare that is lawful in-state. One state (&lt;a href=&quot;https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/item/4367/index.do#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc237945475/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYBmAdgE4ALAFYBPIQEoANMmylCEAIqJCuAJ7QA5BskRCYXAiUr1WnXoMgAynlIAhdQCUAogBknANQCCAOQDCTyVIwACNoUnZxcSA&quot;&gt;New Mexico&lt;/a&gt;) forbids disclosure to investigate protected assembly, petition, and speech.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fifth&lt;/strong&gt;, ban any sale of ALPR data. Six states do this: &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/title-12/subtitle-2/chapter-12/subchapter-18/section-12-12-1804/&quot;&gt;Arkansas&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N64374FD074D411EF8A03D3D48BF95FFA?viewType=FullText&amp;amp;originationContext=documenttoc&amp;amp;transitionType=CategoryPageItem&amp;amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&quot;&gt;Maryland&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.justia.com/codes/oklahoma/title-47/section-47-7-606-1/&quot;&gt;Oklahoma&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title41/Chapter6A/41-6a-S2004.html?v=C41-6a-S2004_2023050320230503&quot;&gt;Utah&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;a href=&quot;https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=VEH&amp;amp;sectionNum=2413.&quot;&gt;California&lt;/a&gt; forbids its highway patrol from doing so. &lt;a href=&quot;https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/item/4367/index.do#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc237945475/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYBmAdgE4ALAFYBPIQEoANMmylCEAIqJCuAJ7QA5BskRCYXAiUr1WnXoMgAynlIAhdQCUAogBknANQCCAOQDCTyVIwACNoUnZxcSA&quot;&gt;New Mexico&lt;/a&gt; forbids any disclosure to a private entity (or indeed to any non-law enforcement agency). &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/08/data-brokers-are-ignoring-privacy-law-we-deserve-better&quot;&gt;Data&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/location-data-brokers&quot;&gt;brokers&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/why-are-hundreds-data-brokers-not-registering-states&quot;&gt;are&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/ban-online-behavioral-advertising&quot;&gt;a&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/what-you-need-know-about-californias-drop-tool&quot;&gt;menace&lt;/a&gt; to privacy and other human rights.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395415&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395415&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Transparency&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;State lawmakers must ensure that the public has access to ample information about the ALPR mass surveillance in their communities. Many people will use this information to resist ALPRs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, state laws should require local governments to provide at least 30 days of public notice before spending funds, accepting grants or private donations, or entering into any contract or pilot program for ALPR technology. All proposed vendor contracts and funding sources must be publicly disclosed prior to approval. This helps local officials to exercise their &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/procurement-power-when-cities-realized-they-can-just-say-no-2025-review&quot;&gt;procurement&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/local-communities-are-winning-against-alpr-surveillance-heres-how-2025-review&quot;&gt;power&lt;/a&gt; to reject ALPRs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, laws should mandate the creation of a centralized, public-facing state registry of all police agencies using ALPRs, and the specific locations of all police ALPRs. Sources like &lt;a href=&quot;https://√&quot;&gt;DeFlock&lt;/a&gt; and EFF’s &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.atlasofsurveillance.org/&quot;&gt;Atlas of Surveillance&lt;/a&gt; include crowd-sourced maps of ALPR technologies, but they are not exhaustive. This was one of the provisions in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota Minn. Stat. § 13.824,&lt;/a&gt; which in part, requires police agencies to notify the state within 10 days of installing any ALPR, and requires a state agency to aggregate this information and publish a master list of the locations of all ALPRs (unless a judge determines that disclosure of a particular ALPR’s location poses a genuine security risk).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third&lt;/strong&gt;, mandate regular, independent, public audits of agency ALPR use, access logs, and query justifications to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and policies. Five states (&lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title49/t49ch14/sect49-1432/&quot;&gt;Idaho&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://mca.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0050/part_0010/section_0170/0460-0050-0010-0170.html&quot;&gt;Montana&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt;) require regular audits, ranging in frequency from monthly to biennial. Three states (&lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title49/t49ch14/sect49-1432/&quot;&gt;Idaho&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N64374FD074D411EF8A03D3D48BF95FFA?viewType=FullText&amp;amp;originationContext=documenttoc&amp;amp;transitionType=CategoryPageItem&amp;amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&quot;&gt;Maryland&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt;) require audits of access logs. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/13.824&quot;&gt;Minnesota&lt;/a&gt; requires an independent auditor and public access to the results.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fourth&lt;/strong&gt;, laws must require each agency operating an ALPR system to publish regular reports on its website detailing key operational metrics. Six states require such reports annually: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N64374FD074D411EF8A03D3D48BF95FFA?viewType=FullText&amp;amp;originationContext=documenttoc&amp;amp;transitionType=CategoryPageItem&amp;amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&quot;&gt;Maryland&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N64374FD074D411EF8A03D3D48BF95FFA?viewType=FullText&amp;amp;originationContext=documenttoc&amp;amp;transitionType=CategoryPageItem&amp;amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N64374FD074D411EF8A03D3D48BF95FFA?viewType=FullText&amp;amp;originationContext=documenttoc&amp;amp;transitionType=CategoryPageItem&amp;amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&quot;&gt;New Mexico&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/23/015/01607&quot;&gt;Vermont&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/title-12/subtitle-2/chapter-12/subchapter-18/section-12-12-1805/&quot;&gt;Arkansas&lt;/a&gt; requires them twice per year, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1516/Enrolled&quot;&gt;Oregon&lt;/a&gt; requires them monthly. These states variously require reporting of: the number of ALPRs, and a list of the locations of fixed ALPRs; the number of hotlists used, and a list of them; the number of plates scanned; the number of apparent matches to hotlists, and how many were actual matches; the number plate reads stored; and the number of searches of stored data, broken down by the purpose and agency of search.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Finally&lt;/strong&gt;, any new ALPR legislation must &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/open-records-laws-reveal-alprs-sprawling-surveillance-now-states-want-block-what&quot;&gt;maintain a proper balance&lt;/a&gt; between transparency and privacy in the use of public record acts (PRAs) to obtain ALPR information. Public records and public scrutiny of ALPR programs have shown that people are harmed by these systems. So lawmakers should not cut off access to public records that document these abuses. For example, the public should have access to operational policies, audit logs, vendor communications, and aggregate statistics. EFF opposes blanket exemptions from PRAs that block public oversight of APRs—such as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/open-records-laws-reveal-alprs-sprawling-surveillance-now-states-want-block-what&quot;&gt;recent bills in states&lt;/a&gt; like &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/83862&quot;&gt;Arizona&lt;/a&gt;. The better approach to protecting individual location privacy is a flexible, case-by-case balancing test already provided by many PRAs. Also, when a document contains both exempt and non-exempt information—like an audit log that contains both motorists’ plate numbers and officers’ search reasons—open records laws should require disclosure of the latter while withholding of the former.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395416&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395416&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Additional Restrictions&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;State lawmakers should adopt three additional bans to curtail the footprint of police ALPR surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, ban the placement of ALPRs or the collection of ALPR data near healthcare facilities, immigration services, schools, places of worship, courthouses, food banks, and other sensitive locations. &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; do this.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, ban police from purchasing ALPR data. &lt;a href=&quot;https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title41/Chapter6A/41-6a-S2005.html?v=C41-6a-S2005_2023050320230503&quot;&gt;Utah&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt; do so. Also, prohibit police from acquiring ALPR data from a private entity, except by means of a warrant. &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt; does so. &lt;a href=&quot;https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title41/Chapter6A/41-6a-S2005.html?v=C41-6a-S2005_2023050320230503&quot;&gt;Utah&lt;/a&gt; took a step in this direction, requiring a court order based on reasonable suspicion. Absent this type of rule, police evade limits on seizing data from third parties by simply purchasing it &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/location-data-brokers&quot;&gt;from brokers&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third&lt;/strong&gt;, ban police and their vendors from using ALPRs or stored ALPR data to power predictive policing technology. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/technology-cant-predict-crime-it-can-only-weaponize-proximity-policing&quot;&gt;EFF opposes such technology and urges state legislatures to ban it.&lt;/a&gt; ALPR companies have been &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2025/border-patrol-is-monitoring-us-drivers-and-detaining-those-with-suspicious-travel-patterns/&quot;&gt;providing&lt;/a&gt; law enforcement clients with an “&lt;a href=&quot;https://platesmart.com/7-emerging-trends-vehicle-recognition-alpr/#:~:text=How%20analytics%20is,and%20operational%20efficiency.&quot;&gt;analytics&lt;/a&gt;” feature, which ingests data from across police agencies, and produces a report of alleged crime trends, hotspots, and corridors. State legislators should prohibit this dangerous use of ALPR systems and data.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395417&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395417&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Enforcement&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;A law without strong enforcement is just a piece of paper. EFF recommends three kinds of enforcement measures, all of which appear in existing ALPR statutes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First&lt;/strong&gt;, all privacy laws need a “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/you-should-have-right-sue-companies-violate-your-privacy&quot;&gt;private right of action&lt;/a&gt;,” meaning ordinary people can sue a police department that breaks the law. An excellent model appears in the federal &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2520&quot;&gt;Wiretap Act&lt;/a&gt;. It expressly authorizes a lawsuit by “any person” whose personal information is processed “in violation of” this law. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/privacy-harm-harm&quot;&gt;Privacy harm is harm&lt;/a&gt;, and so a person should have their day in court, even if they cannot prove a collateral harm, such as physical injury or economic loss. Moreover, the Wiretap Act provides a full arsenal of remedies to a successful plaintiff, including injunctive and declaratory relief, liquidated and actual damages, and attorney fees.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At least three states enforce their ALPR statute with some version of a private right of action. These are good first steps but need improvement. &lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt; comes closest: it allows suit to enforce all ALPR rules and provides all remedies. Unfortunately, the plaintiff must prove “injury,” which may shut the courthouse doors to some people whose data is unlawfully processed. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; allows suit by a person “aggrieved” by violation of some ALPR rules. But a person should be able to enforce all rules, and should not have to prove they were aggrieved. &lt;a href=&quot;https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1516/Enrolled&quot;&gt;Oregon&lt;/a&gt; allows suit against a police vendor that “intentionally or with gross negligence” uses or discloses ALPR data in an unlawful manner. But this does not allow any suit against police, or even against a vendor that systematically violates the rules through ordinary negligence.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second&lt;/strong&gt;, privacy laws applicable to the police commonly ensure enforcement through the “&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusionary_rule&quot;&gt;exclusionary rule&lt;/a&gt;.” This means that if evidence is gathered in violation a privacy law, it must be excluded from court proceedings. This is sometimes called “suppression” or “inadmissibility.” The federal &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2515&quot;&gt;Wiretap Act&lt;/a&gt; has a strong version of this rule, clearly excluding evidence derived from violations of all rules. The so-called “good faith” exception &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/1c9b940d-8fd8-463c-87f4-8ddcb550af96/resisting-the-good-faith-exception.pdf&quot;&gt;has&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship/411/&quot;&gt;weakened&lt;/a&gt; many exclusionary rules, so ALPR statutes should expressly reject this exception (though &lt;a href=&quot;https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/478/704/473180/&quot;&gt;some courts&lt;/a&gt; have interpreted some statutory exclusionary rules to have no good faith exception).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At least three states enforce their ALPR statute with some version of the exclusionary rule. Again, these are good first steps but need improvement:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter55.6/section2.2-5517/&quot;&gt;Virginia&lt;/a&gt; comes closest: “Any evidence obtained as a result of a violation” of some of the ALPR rules “is not admissible.” A better rule would apply to all ALPR rules.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt; provides that ALPR data “may be admissible … provided such data was collected or otherwise acquired or held or stored in accordance with the provisions of this section” (or obtained pursuant to warrant). A more clear exclusionary rule would “exclude evidence unlawfully processed,” as opposed to “admit evidence lawfully processed.” The exclusionary rule should also extend to data unlawfully used or disclosed (and not just to data unlawfully collected or stored).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6002-S.SL.pdf?q=20261001161514&quot;&gt;Washington&lt;/a&gt; provides that information obtained from “a knowing violation” of some of the statute’s rules is “inadmissible.” But the exclusionary rule should apply to all substantive limits (not just some), and to all violations (not just knowing ones).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third&lt;/strong&gt;, police agencies and their private contractors that recurringly violate ALPR rules should be forbidden from using ALPRs at all. In &lt;a href=&quot;https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXI/261/261-75-b.htm&quot;&gt;New Hampshire&lt;/a&gt;, if an agency “repeated[ly]” violates the ALPR statute, the state department of justice may “seek an injunction banning [its] use” of ALPRs. In &lt;a href=&quot;https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/item/4367/index.do#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc237945478/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYBmAdgE4ALAFYBPABwBKADTJspQhACKiQrgCe0AOSapEQmFwJlqjdt37DIAMp5SAIQ0AlAKIAZZwDUAggDkAws5SpGAARtCk7BISQA&quot;&gt;New Mexico&lt;/a&gt;, if a vendor “fails to comply with” that state’s ALPR law, it “may be subject to … suspension of authorization or termination of access.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some states impose workplace discipline or criminal penalties on officers who violate ALPR laws, including &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00014-R00SB-00397-PA.PDF&quot;&gt;Connecticut&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title49/t49ch14/sect49-1432/&quot;&gt;Idaho&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2026/eo18&quot;&gt;Missouri&lt;/a&gt;. This is no substitute for the three types of strong enforcement measures above. ALPRs are a systemic problem requiring institution-wide enforcement of legal constraints, and not just episodic sanctions against individual officers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_Toc243395418&quot; id=&quot;_Toc243395418&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Conclusion&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;Mass surveillance ALPRs fundamentally threaten digital rights, making an outright statewide ban on police ALPRs the only effective way to fully protect privacy and safety.  The next best thing a legislature can do is limit ALPRs to real-time comparison of passing cars to hotlists, by banning storage of ALPR data beyond a few minutes. If a legislature allows storage, it must impose a tight deletion deadline (days and not months), and strict limits on search and disclosure. A legislature must also ensure transparency and enforcement. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For convenience &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/summary-list-effs-state-legislative-agenda-end-alpr-mass-surveillance&quot;&gt;here is a concise list of EFF’s ALPR state legislative goals&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 17:52:16 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112460 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Adam Schwartz</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Rindala Alajaji</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/flock-vector-1b.png" alt="A flock camera with spying eye, silhouetted against a dark purple ground." type="image/png" length="9712" />
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    <title>EFF Launches Guide to Help Parents and Youth Protect Privacy Online</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-launches-guide-help-parents-and-youth-protect-privacy-online</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-pr-subhead field--type-text field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;Guide Includes Easy, Quick Ways To Identify and Protect Against Online Threats &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;SAN FRANCISCO – The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has published “&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/online-privacy-for-parents-and-youth&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Online Privacy for Parents and Youth&lt;/a&gt;,” a new guide to help families protect themselves online.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&quot;Parents don’t need to be technology experts to help their children navigate the digital world safely” said EFF Public Interest Technology Director Babette Ngene. “At EFF, we believe in empowering families with the knowledge and confidence to make informed decisions about their digital lives. It’s about meeting families where they are and giving parents the guidance they need to have meaningful conversations with their children about digital safety, based on what works best for their families.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;EFF launches this crucial resource as state and local governments consider enacting well-meaning but ill-advised laws that cut young people off from essential information and experiences, particularly harming vulnerable youth and marginalized groups who often find safety in supportive online communities they can&#039;t access offline. Such laws also entail age gating, which compromises the privacy of all internet users and stifles young users’ ability to learn, grow, and express themselves.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;“Deciding how to help your young people use the internet—including engaging with video games, social media, web search, and everything else—is a complicated topic that touches on many different skillsets and ideas,” said EFF Senior Security and Privacy Activist Thorin Klosowski. “But ultimately it&#039;s up to families – not governments – to decide when and how to engage with these sorts of questions.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Each young person has unique needs, and, just like their wardrobe, that changes as they age. Parents can engage in thoughtful planning to find the best, most efficient solutions that evolve along with their children. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;EFF’s guide is about helping parents explore their concerns and identify the threats their children face – like trusting AI chatbots or sharing personal information with strangers – and then determine steps they and their children can take to mitigate those risks while still using the games, educational materials, and communication platforms that help them grow.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The guide also compiles links to parental control setup documentation for a variety of popular devices and platforms, and advises parents on quick, easy tasks they can perform to advance their children’s online privacy.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;For the guide: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/online-privacy-for-parents-and-youth&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;https://ssd.eff.org/module/online-privacy-for-parents-and-youth&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-contact field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Contact:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;div  class=&quot;ds-1col node node--profile view-mode-node_embed node--node-embed node--profile--node-embed clearfix&quot;&gt;

  
  &lt;div class=&quot;&quot;&gt;
    &lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-profile-first-name field--type-text field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;Thorin&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-profile-last-name field--type-text field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;Klosowski&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-profile-title field--type-text field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;Senior Security and Privacy Activist&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-profile-email field--type-email field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:thorin@eff.org&quot;&gt;thorin@eff.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 16:19:59 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112457 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
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    <title>Victory! Court Rules OPM Data Disclosure to DOGE Is Unlawful</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-court-rules-opms-disclosure-personal-records-doge-unlawful</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a victory for data privacy, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/afge-v-opm-opinion-and-order-0&quot;&gt;a federal court in New York definitively ruled&lt;/a&gt; that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) violated the law when it disclosed millions of federal employee records to DOGE agents. In a summary judgment ruling issued on October 20, 2026, the court found that OPM violated two provisions of the Privacy Act—one restricting disclosure of personal records between agencies and another requiring agencies to protect the security and confidentiality of records.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the case was filed, many DOGE agents have left the government and OPM has rescinded their database access. However, OPM should still clean up the cybersecurity mess it created. The court will decide the remedy at a later date.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&quot;By virtue of the Court’s summary judgment ruling, OPM’s decision to grant DOGE Agents broad access to its systems of recordings containing [personally identifiable information (PII)] has been held unlawful,&quot; Judge Denise Cote wrote.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&quot;The record also provides no support for a finding that it was the pursuit of a modernization agenda that prompted OPM to grant sweeping and expedited access to a score of DOGE Agents to its systems of records containing PII,&quot; she added.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OPM maintains databases of highly sensitive personal information about tens of millions of federal employees, retirees, and job applicants. Starting in January 2025, OPM disclosed data to the U.S. DOGE Service, initially led by Elon Musk. This disclosure violates the federal Privacy Act of 1974, a watershed anti-surveillance statute that prevents the federal government from abusing our personal information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF sued OPM and DOGE because this data disclosure violates the Privacy Act. We represent unions of federal employees – the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.afge.org/&quot;&gt;American Federation of Government Employees&lt;/a&gt; and the &lt;a href=&quot;https://aalj.org/&quot;&gt;Association of Administrative Law Judges&lt;/a&gt; – and individual employees. We seek injunctive and declaratory relief. We filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our co-counsel are &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.lex-lumina.com/&quot;&gt;Lex Lumina LLP&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://statedemocracydefenders.org/fund/&quot;&gt;State Democracy Defenders Fund&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.chandralaw.com/&quot;&gt;The Chandra Law Firm LLC&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supporters.eff.org/donate/join-4--dovd&quot;&gt;Donate to EFF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;Support Privacy &amp;amp; Government Accountability&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-related-cases field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Related Cases:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/american-federation-government-employees-v-us-office-personnel-management&quot;&gt;American Federation of Government Employees v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 21:46:42 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112459 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Mario Trujillo</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/opm-eye-3b.jpg" alt="An eye with the OPM logo in the iris, green digital background" type="image/jpeg" length="149733" />
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  <item>
    <title>Require Police to Get a Warrant to Search ALPR Data</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/require-police-get-warrant-search-alpr-data</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This post was co-written by &lt;/em&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/about/staff/andi-cao&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Andi Cao&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;, an EFF legal intern.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) are mass surveillance. They photograph every passing car and log where and when it was captured, building a searchable record of where nearly everyone drives. &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/effs-policy-position-alpr-surveillance-eliminate-it-and-reduce-its-harms&quot;&gt;Cities should not buy them&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and cities that already have them should shut them down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Where these systems still operate, courts and state legislatures must reduce their harms by (among other things) requiring police to get a warrant before searching stored ALPR data. A warrant requirement would not make mass surveillance acceptable, but it would require police to justify a search to a judge before accessing records of people’s movements. Without this independent judicial check on police power, officers have been searching this data for improper reasons (many exposed by EFF) that violate our fundamental rights.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A warrant requires a judge to find probable cause and specificity—many warrantless police searches of ALPR data lack both. Officers have searched this data to profile Romani people, monitor protesters, investigate an abortion, find immigrants for deportation, track a man who complained about a deputy, stalk romantic partners, and even for no stated reason beyond “LMAO.” A warrant requirement would force law enforcement to justify these searches &lt;em&gt;before&lt;/em&gt; accessing sensitive location records, not leave the people they target to discover and challenge the abuse after the harm is done.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;What a Warrant Requires&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Warrants are a check on police power. Before officers can search a person or their property, the &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-4/?__cf_chl_tk=06MwmsZ4hwhJdfEgJDCYFrc5gIStWwUNfvXZ_eSVWH4-1791427948-1.0.1.1-EOwZ6.n8_mmIcbDjvjXHu.fx9a7CD6hf8LWNM5BjgOM&quot;&gt;Fourth Amendment&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; requires them to convince a neutral judge, under oath, that probable cause exists, meaning a fair probability the search will turn up evidence of a crime. The warrant must also describe with particularity what will be searched, so police cannot go on a fishing expedition. Critically, the officer who wants to search is not the person who decides whether the search is justified.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is why warrants are required for so many kinds of police surveillance. For example, police generally need a warrant to &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/2518.html&quot;&gt;wiretap phone calls&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, to &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/373/&quot;&gt;search the contents of a cell phone&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and to &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/585/16-402/&quot;&gt;obtain historical cell phone location records&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Stored ALPR data reveals sensitive information about the private details of our lives: where we go, when, and with whom. That’s why we believe police searches of stored ALPR data should also require a warrant. Earlier this month, a federal judge in Oklahoma &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.oknd.76981/gov.uscourts.oknd.76981.62.0.pdf&quot;&gt;agreed&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;What Goes Wrong Without a Warrant: San Jose, California&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;San Jose demonstrates the harmful consequences of letting law enforcement search stored ALPR data without a warrant. EFF and the ACLU of Northern California represent SIREN and CAIR-California in a &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/siren-v-san-jose-filed-complaint&quot;&gt;lawsuit&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; challenging this practice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first problem is the sheer number of times that SJPD officers search stored ALPR data: &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.muckrock.com/foi/san-jose-336/automated-license-plate-reader-alpr-records-request-san-jose-police-department-187612/#file-1295345&quot;&gt;261,711 times&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; between June 5, 2024, and June 17, 2025, about 692 searches a day. That scale is the result of having no warrant requirement, which would greatly reduce this kind of casual police surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Inevitably, officers abuse this unchecked power. In September, San Jose’s police chief &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.mercurynews.com/2026/09/11/san-jose-police-officer-fired-for-abusing-flock-license-plate-reader-database-chief-says/&quot;&gt;disclosed&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; an example from five months earlier: the department had fired an officer who used its ALPR system to track a woman who had accused his cousin of domestic violence, and then shared her location information with his cousin. The abusive search of stored ALPR data &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.mercurynews.com/2026/09/23/san-jose-pushes-tighter-controls-on-flock-camera-database-after-officer-abuse/&quot;&gt;came to light&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; only after the woman told police that her alleged assailant had implied he was tracking her.  A warrant requirement would have prevented this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of course, similar problems appear nationwide. For each example below, consider how things could have turned out differently if the officer had to put the reason for the search in a sworn warrant application and handed it to a judge.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;Racial profiling of Romani people&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;More than 80 law enforcement agencies &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/license-plate-surveillance-logs-reveal-racist-policing-against-romani-people&quot;&gt;searched the Flock network&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; using terms that unfairly stereotype Romani people, often without mentioning any crime. For example, the Grand Prairie (Texas) Police Department searched for “g*psy” six times using a Flock feature that identifies vehicles traveling together, in effect targeting a whole community without naming a crime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No judge should sign that warrant. Ethnicity is not evidence of a crime, and a search aimed at an entire ethnic group is the opposite of particular: it targets people for &lt;em&gt;who&lt;/em&gt; they are, not evidence that they committed a crime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;Surveillance of protesters&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EFF found that more than 50 agencies &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/how-cops-are-using-flock-safetys-alpr-network-surveil-protesters-and-activists&quot;&gt;ran hundreds of protest-related searches&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of ALPR data in 2025. For example, the Tempe (Arizona) Police Department ran three searches tied to the No Kings protest across 425 networks, with no identified crime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This lacks probable cause and targets activity that is protected by the First Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;Investigating an abortion&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 2025, a Texas sheriff’s office &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down&quot;&gt;searched more than 83,000 Flock cameras&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, including cameras in Washington and Illinois, where abortion is legal, listing the reason as “had an abortion, search for female.” &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flock-safety-and-texas-sheriff-claimed-license-plate-search-was-missing-person-it&quot;&gt;Records later obtained by EFF&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; show deputies had opened a “death investigation” after the woman’s partner, who was later charged in connection with assaulting her, reported her self-managed abortion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a state where abortion is legal, a judge would not grant a warrant for a search like this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;Finding immigrants for deportation&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;San Francisco police let out-of-state agencies search the city’s ALPR data (which itself violates &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/victory-california-department-justice-declares-out-state-sharing-license-plate&quot;&gt;California law&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;), and &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/eff-aclu-sfpd-stop-illegally-sharing-data-ice-and-anti-abortion-states&quot;&gt;at least 19 of those searches&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; were marked as related to ICE (though San Francisco is a &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sf.gov/information--sanctuary-city-ordinance&quot;&gt;sanctuary city&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;). This problem is widespread. One investigation found &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/02/op-ed-san-jose-can-protect-immigrants-ending-flock-surveillance-system&quot;&gt;more than 4,000 cases&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; in which police departments around the country searched stored ALPR data on behalf of federal law enforcement, including for immigration investigations. Some agencies even connect their ALPR systems to an &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/are-your-local-police-using-flock-safety-alprs-scan-immigrants&quot;&gt;“Immigration Violator” hotlist&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; populated by ICE, which includes plates tied to administrative warrants issued by ICE agents without any judge involved.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here too, a judge in a state where police may not help enforce immigration law would not issue a warrant for these searches.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;Retaliation against a critic&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In May 2025, Navy veteran Napoleon Jones &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/right-record&quot;&gt;lawfully recorded&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; a police traffic stop of another person in Sussex, Wisconsin. Jones alleges that a Waukesha County deputy retaliated by stopping and arresting him. He was released five hours later without citations or charges, and the deputy’s supervisor concluded the stop was illegal. Jones filed a complaint against the deputy the next day.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the weeks that followed, officers reportedly ran &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://reason.com/2026/09/02/wisconsin-cops-used-flock-over-100-times-to-track-a-navy-veteran-after-he-lawfully-recorded-a-traffic-stop/&quot;&gt;more than 100 Flock searches&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; against Jones, including some run by the deputy he had complained about. Deputies testified that a lieutenant ordered the searches in connection with Jones’s complaint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No judge should authorize tracking a man for criticizing the police.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;Stalking romantic partners&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Institute for Justice (IJ) has &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ij.org/police-have-reportedly-used-license-plate-readers-to-stalk-romantic-interests-at-least-14-times-in-recent-years/&quot;&gt;documented dozens of cases&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; in which officers allegedly used ALPRs to track current, potential, and former romantic partners. For example, a Lufkin, Texas, officer was indicted on 100 felony counts after allegedly searching for his ex-girlfriend and people she knew more than 10,000 times. Likewise, a Milwaukee officer allegedly tracked a woman he was dating and her ex nearly 180 times over two months. IJ found that most of these cases surfaced only after victims reported the officer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We hope that no officer would write “tracking the location of my ex-girlfriend” on a warrant application, and even if they did so, a judge would not authorize such a search.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;Searches for “LMAO”&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sometimes officers do not even provide a real reason to search stored ALPR data. EFF found officers &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/high-crime-lmao-how-cops-are-treating-mass-surveillance-joke&quot;&gt;logging search reasons&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; such as “LOL,” “LMAO,” “idk,” and random keyboard mashing. These entries are supposed to document why a search complies with an agency’s own use policies. A Goshen (Indiana) Police Department officer searched 6,474 networks, representing data from 82,413 cameras, with “idk” as the reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An officer who asked a judge for a warrant to track someone for “LMAO” would be laughed out of the courtroom.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;The Solution&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The best way to eliminate these abusive searches is to end ALPR mass surveillance. Where these systems remain, however, courts and state legislatures must require police to get a warrant before searching stored ALPR data. Warrants are the time-tested way to put an independent judicial check on police use of a dangerous surveillance technology. Officers must establish probable cause and specifically describe the proposed search before accessing the data, while existing exceptions for genuine emergencies still apply.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These protections must also cover real-time tracking. An ALPR “hotlist” is a list of license plates that trigger an alert when a camera spots a matching plate. Officers can stalk potential romantic partners by putting them on a hotlist, as a Florida deputy &lt;a href=&quot;https://404media.co/footage-shows-cop-stalking-woman-he-met-on-a-tv-set-after-surveilling-her-with-a-license-plate-reader&quot;&gt;allegedly did&lt;/a&gt; with a woman he met on the set of a TV show. Thus, state legislators should require officers to get a warrant before putting a person on an ALPR hotlist (as well as a warrant to search stored ALPR data).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-related-cases field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Related Cases:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/siren-v-san-jose&quot;&gt;SIREN and CAIR-CA v. San Jose&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 23:28:38 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112456 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <dc:creator>Adam Schwartz</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/siren_v._san_jose.png" alt="sinister cop and cameras loom over street grid with cars identified by license plates" type="image/png" length="224550" />
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    <title>Announcing Privacy Badger for Safari on macOS</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/announcing-privacy-badger-safari-macos</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Exciting news for Safari users: Privacy Badger is now available on Safari for macOS! You’ll need Safari version 26.5 or higher to use it.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Whether you want to protect yourself from data brokers or just don’t want Big Tech profiting off your browsing data, Privacy Badger is here to help. More than 4 million people already use EFF’s free tracker-blocking extension to take a stand against online surveillance. Safari users can now join them and EFF in the fight for a better web. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Install Privacy Badger&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/safariblog&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Support the Fight Against Online Tracking&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Safari support has been one of Privacy Badger’s most &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/EFForg/privacybadger/issues/549&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;requested&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; features for years. Thanks to recent improvements in Safari&#039;s extension support, we’ve finally made it happen for Safari version 26.5 and higher. Privacy Badger is now available on all major desktop browsers. And before you ask, yes, we will look into supporting &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/EFForg/privacybadger/issues/549#issuecomment-5849549636&quot;&gt;Safari for iOS&lt;/a&gt; once we&#039;ve ironed out any issues on macOS.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Why Install Privacy Badger on Safari?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;80}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/03/11/google-is-tracking-you-on-86-of-the-top-50000-websites-on-the-planet/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Most websites&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; contain invisible tracking code that lets companies collect, share, and profit from your personal data. Some of those companies are data brokers that sell your information to anyone willing to pay. Creepy ads are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the harms of online tracking: Once your information enters the data broker ecosystem, it’s nearly impossible to know &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/targeted-advertising-gives-your-location-government-just-ask-cbp&quot;&gt;who buys it&lt;/a&gt; or what they’re doing with it. Privacy Badger blocks online trackers to prevent your browsing data from being used against you. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Privacy Badger goes beyond Safari’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://webkit.org/blog/15697/private-browsing-2-0/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;built-in privacy features&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to provide additional protection against online tracking. In its default browsing mode, Safari limits the information that trackers can access but still allows them to load. Privacy Badger blocks trackers from loading in the first place, preventing them from tracking you using &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/after-cookies-ad-tech-wants-use-your-email-track-you-everywhere&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;techniques&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; that bypass Safari’s protections.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Privacy Badger works well by itself, and will continue to enhance your privacy when installed along side an ad blocker or with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://support.apple.com/en-mz/guide/safari/ibrw1075/27.0/mac/27&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Safari’s Advanced settings&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://webkit.org/blog/15697/private-browsing-2-0/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;block trackers in all windows&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. Since Privacy Badger &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/privacy-badger-learns-block-ever-more-trackers&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;automatically learns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to block trackers, Privacy Badger will block trackers that other tools don’t know about or &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3433210.3437536&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;choose not to block&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;For example, Privacy Badger blocks &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/01/privacy-badger-puts-you-control-widgets&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;tracking from widgets&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; like embedded tweets, comments sections, and video players. These widgets can share your data even if you never click on them. Privacy Badger prevents these trackers from loading and replaces them with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/01/privacy-badger-puts-you-control-widgets&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;click-to-activate placeholders&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Beyond tracker blocking, Privacy Badger automatically sends the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/gpc-privacy-badger&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Global Privacy Control (GPC) signal&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to tell websites not to sell or share your personal information. The GPC signal is already legally binding in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://captaincompliance.com/education/global-privacy-control/#is-global-privacy-control-legally-binding&quot;&gt;a growing number of states&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, including California, Colorado, New Jersey, and Connecticut. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;All these features (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/online-tracking-out-control-privacy-badger-can-help-you-fight-back&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;and more&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;) work together to help keep your browsing activity private on Safari.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Try It Out and Spread the Word&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;80}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;If you use Safari on macOS, give Privacy Badger a try. You’ll install Privacy Badger through the App Store on your macOS device. Installing extensions is a little more complicated on Safari than other browsers, so follow Apple’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://support.apple.com/en-us/102343&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;directions here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; if you’re having trouble. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;This is our first release of Privacy Badger for Safari, and we will keep improving it based on your feedback. If you run into any problems, let us know by emailing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:extension-devs@eff.org&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;extension-devs@eff.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, or by opening an issue on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/EFForg/privacybadger/issues&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;GitHub&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. And if blocking harmful trackers causes issues on a website you visit, you can &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/#I-found-a-bug%21-What-do-I-do-now&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;disable Privacy Badger for that specific site&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; while keeping it enabled and protecting you everywhere else. You can also let us know about broken sites by using the “Report broken site” button found next to the “Disable for this site” button in Privacy Badger’s popup window.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;When you use Privacy Badger, you join EFF and millions of other users in the fight for a better web. Help spread the word by telling your friends and family who use Safari that they can use Privacy Badger too! &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Install Privacy Badger&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/safariblog&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Support the Fight Against Online Tracking&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 17:59:22 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112449 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/online-behavioral-tracking">Online Behavioral Tracking</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
 <dc:creator>Lena Cohen</dc:creator>
 <dc:creator>Alexei Miagkov</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/badger-safari-3.png" alt="Privacy Badger logo with Tada emoji and Safari logo" type="image/png" length="81329" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>EFF Launches Privacy Badger for Safari on macOS</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-launches-privacy-badger-safari-macos</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-pr-subhead field--type-text field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;Free Tracker Blocker Used by Millions Will Protect Even More Users&amp;#039; Privacy&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;SAN FRANCISCO—Privacy Badger, the &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2025/12/17/presenting-2025-firefox-extension-developer-award-recipients/&quot;&gt;award-winning&lt;/a&gt; tracker blocker made by the member-supported digital rights nonprofit &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/&quot;&gt;Electronic Frontier Foundation&lt;/a&gt; (EFF), is now available for Safari on macOS.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Safari users can &lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;download the free browser extension&lt;/a&gt; today and join the more than 4 million people using Privacy Badger to take a stand against data brokers and online surveillance. Users will need Safari version 26.5 or higher to use it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ranked as one of the best ad tracker blockers by &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/reviews/our-favorite-ad-blockers-and-browser-extensions-to-protect-privacy/&quot;&gt;The Wirecutter&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.consumerreports.org/electronics/digital-security/to-protect-against-websites-that-spy-on-you-get-an-adblocker-a1003441908/&quot;&gt;Consumer Reports&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pcmag.com/picks/best-ad-blockers&quot;&gt;PC Mag&lt;/a&gt; and more, Privacy Badger is different from other blocking extensions. Created by EFF to stop companies from spying on you online, Privacy Badger &lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/#How-is-Privacy-Badger-different-from-Disconnect%2c-Adblock-Plus%2c-Ghostery%2c-and-other-blocking-extensions&quot;&gt;automatically learns&lt;/a&gt; to block hidden trackers on the web, along with additional privacy-protecting features. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&quot;Most websites contain invisible tracking code that lets companies collect, share, and profit from your personal data,&quot; said Lena Cohen, Staff Technologist at EFF. &quot;Creepy ads are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the harms of online tracking: Once your information &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/online-tracking-out-control-privacy-badger-can-help-you-fight-back&quot;&gt;enters the data broker ecosystem&lt;/a&gt;, it’s nearly impossible to know who buys it or what they’re doing with it. Safari support has long been one of Privacy Badger’s most requested features and EFF is excited to be able to make this important tool available to Safari users to fight back for a better web.&quot; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On Safari, Privacy Badger goes beyond the browser’s &lt;a href=&quot;https://webkit.org/blog/15697/private-browsing-2-0/&quot;&gt;built-in privacy features&lt;/a&gt; to provide additional protection against online tracking. In its default browsing mode, Safari limits the information that trackers can access, but it still allows them to load. Privacy Badger blocks online trackers from loading in the first place, preventing them from tracking you using &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/after-cookies-ad-tech-wants-use-your-email-track-you-everywhere&quot;&gt;techniques&lt;/a&gt; that bypass Safari’s protections. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With today&#039;s launch, Privacy Badger &lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;is now available&lt;/a&gt; on all major desktop browsers. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As the leading nonprofit defending online civil liberties, EFF is committed to fighting mass surveillance in the courts, through activism, and by making free, privacy-protecting tools like Privacy Badger. Now, even more people can join the movement against online tracking, by installing Privacy Badger themselves, telling their friends and family who use Safari about it, or &lt;a href=&quot;https://supporters.eff.org/donate/support-privacy-badger&quot;&gt;by supporting Privacy Badger today&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;For more on Privacy Badger for Safari on macOS:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/announcing-privacy-badger-safari-macos&quot;&gt;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/announcing-privacy-badger-safari-macos&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;For more on the dangers of online tracking:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/online-tracking-out-control-privacy-badger-can-help-you-fight-back&quot;&gt;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/online-tracking-out-control-privacy-badger-can-help-you-fight-back&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;For more on how Privacy Badger works:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;https://privacybadger.org/&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Contact:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:press@eff.org&quot;&gt;press@eff.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-tags field--type-taxonomy-term-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Tags:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/tags/privacy-badger&quot;&gt;Privacy Badger&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item odd&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/tags/ad-trackers&quot;&gt;Ad trackers&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/tags/surveillance-advertising&quot;&gt;Surveillance Advertising&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 16:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112452 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Hudson Hongo</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/badger-safari-3.png" alt="Privacy Badger logo with Tada emoji and Safari logo" type="image/png" length="81329" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>In Memoriam: Barry Steinhardt</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/memoriam-barry-steinhardt</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Barry Steinhardt, a lifelong privacy champion and an early leader in the battle for digital civil liberties who served as EFF’s president in 1998-99, died last week at age 73.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt;A Connecticut native, Steinhardt led the Vermont and Pennsylvania affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union before becoming associate director of the national ACLU. There, he helped spearhead the fight to overturn much of the Communications Decency Act, resulting in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-511&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Reno v. ACLU&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;ruling in 1997.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;When the internet was still young, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Steinhardt &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;became one of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;the first &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;attorneys to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;specialize in the intersection of technology and privacy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In early 1998 he took a leave of absence from the ACLU to become EFF’s president, and then returned to the ACLU in 1999.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In 2002 he founded the ACLU’s Program on Technology and Liberty. After retiring from the ACLU, he continued on as a senior advisor to London-based &lt;a href=&quot;https://privacyinternational.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Privacy International&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Steinhardt chaired the 2003 Computer Freedom and Privacy Conference and served on a wide variety of significant panels and boards, including the Department of Transportation’s Negotiated Rule Making on national driver’s license standards, the Advisory Committee to the US Census, and the Blue Ribbon Panel on Genetics of the National Conference of State Legislatures. He also was selected to be a member of the US delegation to the G-8 Government and Private Sector Tokyo conference on Cyber Crime and served as an advisor to the Czech Helsinki Committee. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“Barry led many critical technology and civil liberties fights and was an important mentor to me and others in the field,” said EFF Executive Director Nicole Ozer. “Barry’s influential work across strategy to defend and advance privacy rights and safeguard people against surveillance has made its mark on the law and policy of our digital world and protected the rights and safety of people across the United States and around the world.”  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 00:07:22 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112451 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
 <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/barry-steinhardt2b.jpg" alt="Barry Steinhardt" type="image/jpeg" length="174809" />
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Our Lawsuit Against the Trump Administration’s Social Media Surveillance Moves Forward. Here’s What the Court Said.</title>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/our-lawsuit-against-trump-administrations-social-media-surveillance-moves-forward</link>
    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;No one should have to choose between speaking freely and protecting their immigration status. Yet that’s precisely the choice the Trump administration’s mass surveillance of online speech forces on noncitizens living in the U.S. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Last fall, we &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/labor-unions-eff-sue-trump-administration-stop-surveillance-free-speech-online&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;sued&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; on behalf of three major labor unions to stop this surveillance program. And just this month, we won our first major ruling: A federal district court &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/uaw-v-dos-opinion-order-denying-motion-dismiss&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;denied&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; the government’s motion to dismiss our lawsuit. This means the case can move forward—a win for free speech and a critical step in protecting our First Amendment rights online. We’ve already explained why this is a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/victory-court-rejects-government-effort-dismiss-social-media-surveillance-lawsuit&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;big deal&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; for our clients, so let&#039;s take a closer look at the court’s reasoning.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Our Lawsuit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; Since taking power, the Trump administration has used AI and other automated tools to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/04/trump-administrations-targeting-international-students-jeopardizes-free-speech-and&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;broadly surveil&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; the social media and online speech of visa and green card holders, with the goal of identifying and punishing people who express views it opposes. The government is targeting a broad range of views, including &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://theintercept.com/2025/02/11/ice-immigration-social-media-surveillance/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;criticism of the&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/19/trump-musk-french-scientist-detained&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Trump administration&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.axios.com/2025/03/06/state-department-ai-revoke-foreign-student-visas-hamas&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;support for Palestine&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; or &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/18/us/politics/us-visa-revocations-israel.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;criticism of Israel&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/trump-charlie-kirk-visas-revoked-455f43467c0c50e84d3857c1e9c81458&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“rationalizing or making light of”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; Charlie Kirk’s murder; and anything nebulously &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-02009.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“hostile”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to American culture, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/exclusive-trump-admin-spies-on-social&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;founding principles&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/how-nspm-7-seeks-to-use-domestic-terrorism-to-target-nonprofits-and-activists&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“traditional American views,”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; or &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.facebook.com/uscis/posts/everyone-should-be-on-notice-if-youre-a-guest-in-our-country-act-like-it-our-rob/1099451788894614&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“our way of life.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;It has paired that surveillance with a public intimidation campaign. High-ranking officials have explicitly &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://x.com/StephenM/status/1950362892210934097&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;threatened&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to punish noncitizens for their online speech, then followed through with a series of terrifying viewpoint-driven enforcement actions. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;This has led to a significant chilling effect on speech, not just for noncitizens, but also for their families, coworkers, and friends.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In response, three major labor unions—the United Auto Workers (UAW), the Communications Workers of America (CWA), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/united-auto-workers-v-us-department-state&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;sued&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; the Departments of State and Homeland Security alleging that this viewpoint-based surveillance program violates the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The unions are represented by EFF, Muslim Advocates (MA), and the Media Freedom &amp;amp; Information Access Clinic (MFIA).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The government moved to dismiss our lawsuit, arguing first that federal immigration law prevents federal district courts from hearing the case, and second, that the unions don’t have “standing” to sue. Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York rejected both arguments and allowed the case to proceed. At this stage in the litigation, the court accepted all of the facts in our complaint as true and analyzed the law based on those facts. We will now prove these facts as the case proceeds.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Federal Immigration Law Doesn’t Block Our Lawsuit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; The government first argued that the court had no power to hear our case at all. It pointed to three provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that restrict when federal courts can review immigration matters. The district court disagreed and rejected each provision in turn.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;The first provision, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1252&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, is often called the “zipper clause.” It bars federal courts from hearing challenges that arise from efforts to deport someone, except through review of an individual’s final removal order. The government &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/uaw-v-dos-memorandum-iso-motion-dismiss-amended-complaint&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;claimed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; the zipper clause applies here because our lawsuit is really an effort to stop it from initiating adverse immigration actions.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; The district court wholly rejected this argument. Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1019/25-1019-2025-05-07.html&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Ozturk v. Hyde&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, it held that the zipper clause bars only challenges to a particular individual’s removal proceedings, not a lawsuit like ours that challenges the constitutionality of the surveillance program itself. That the surveillance program might affect someone’s immigration proceeding down the line doesn’t turn our lawsuit into a removal challenge.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; The court similarly rejected the government’s argument that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1252&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;§ 1252(g)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1252&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;§ 1252(f)(1)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; prevent federal courts from hearing this case. Our suit, the court explained, “challenges the constitutionality of a government policy that is collateral to any active removal proceedings,” so § 1252(g) doesn’t apply. And § 1252(f)(1) only limits what kind of relief a court can give. So while the court may not be able to stop a particular person’s removal proceedings, it can still block “an unlawful surveillance program that suppresses free speech.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The Unions Have Standing to Sue&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show that it has “standing” to bring its claims. This requires a plaintiff to show an “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/504/555/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;injury in fact&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” that is, among other things, “concrete.” That’s often a high bar in surveillance cases, where plaintiffs can’t easily see what the government is doing behind the scenes. And the Supreme Court &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/408/1/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;has&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/568/398/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;held&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; that a person’s mere subjective fear of surveillance is too speculative to confer standing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Even so, our plaintiffs cleared the bar. The court held that the unions alleged concrete injuries, including a chill on members’ speech that is objectively reasonable, not just subjectively felt. It found that the unions had established standing in two ways: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;“organizational standing,” based on the unions’ own injuries, and “associational standing,” based on injuries the unions’ members have suffered.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Organizational Standing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The court first held that our plaintiffs had successfully alleged an injury to the unions themselves (injury was the only aspect of organizational standing the government disputed). The surveillance program has harmed the unions’ ability to carry out their core responsibilities, including “organizing their members and advocating for the unions’ goals.” The court made two key points:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h5&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Unions Are Injured When Members Go Silent &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;As we explained in our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/uaw-v-dos-amended-complaint&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;complaint&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, the surveillance program has caused members to step back from union leadership roles; stop participating in union activities online and in person; remove their names from union webpages; and avoid filling out bargaining surveys. Members who might otherwise spread the unions’ message and raise awareness of union issues are staying quiet, hampering the unions’ ability to organize. The court said this amounts to a concrete injury for purposes of standing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h5&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;2. Surveillance Doesn’t Need to Target Pro-Union Speech &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; The court also rejected the government’s claim that members’ retreat from union activities was “essentially an overreaction,” because the surveillance doesn&#039;t target pro-union views. The court said this misunderstands the issue: “the question is whether the Government’s conduct would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected activity, not whether the specific expression a member forgoes is itself among the viewpoints the Government disfavors.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;Here, the surveillance program monitors noncitizens’ online activity indiscriminately, and members “cannot reliably predict which of their activities will be captured” and attributed to a disfavored viewpoint. What’s more, the court noted, the unions’ organizing often happens alongside the very advocacy the government is alleged to target, “including pro-Palestine and anti-ICE activism on college campuses.” That makes members’ retreat from union activity a foreseeable consequence of the program.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Associational Standing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; The court also held that the unions established associational standing to sue on behalf of their members. Of the three requirements for associational standing, the government challenged only two. It argued that members lacked sufficiently concrete injuries to sue in their own right, and that the claims aren’t “germane” to the unions’ purpose.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;The court disagreed and found associational standing for every claim but one: members’ right to receive information. That claim survives anyway, because the unions’ organizational standing covers it. Along the way, the court made several important rulings.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h5&gt;&lt;strong&gt; 1. The Ongoing Surveillance Is a Present Injury &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; As a threshold matter, the government argued that our case is a “pre-enforcement challenge,” meaning we sued before the government actually punished anyone. That would trigger a different test, and the government argued we failed it because we hadn’t alleged a sufficiently imminent threat of prosecution.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;The court disagreed, explaining that “Plaintiffs’ allegations are of an ongoing surveillance program that is actively chilling the speech of their members and otherwise causing harm.” That chilling effect is a First Amendment injury even if there isn’t a direct prohibition on speech. And when government conduct is actively chilling speech right now, a challenge to it isn’t pre-enforcement.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h5&gt;&lt;strong&gt; 2. Surveillance + Public Threats Reasonably Chills Speech &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; The court rejected the government’s argument that we alleged only a generalized, subjective, speculative fear of surveillance, explaining that “the chilling effect” of the program can “itself be an injury when the plaintiffs are surveilled.” Here, plaintiffs have alleged that their members are under active surveillance, which has had objective chilling effects on their speech. And the government is targeting certain disfavored viewpoints, making it “viewpoint discrimination” that is “presumptively unconstitutional.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;The chill is also objectively reasonable, the court held, because the government has extensively publicized the surveillance program through public statements and social media posts, making clear that noncitizens who post disfavored views will be targeted for removal. Notably, the court agreed with us that the “threat of adverse immigration consequences, under a government whose harsh immigration crackdowns has been heavily publicized and reported on, is certainly enough to deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;This is a concrete injury sufficient for standing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h5&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;3. &lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Demanding Social Media Handles Also Causes Harm&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Under the surveillance program, applicants for certain immigration benefits must &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/07/you-shouldnt-have-make-your-social-media-public-get-visa&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;disclose&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; all social media handles they have used during the preceding five years and, in some instances, maintain &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/07/you-shouldnt-have-make-your-social-media-public-get-visa&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;public social media accounts&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. The district court held that this too amounts to a First Amendment injury, undermining the rights to anonymity and freedom of association. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The judge pointed to one CWA member we identified, a lawful permanent resident with a pending naturalization application who is subject to the five-year disclosure requirement. The member has deleted one social media account, set another to private, and removed past posts expressing disfavored views. These allegations, the court said, show an actual and objectively reasonable injury due to the government’s surveillance program.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h5&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;4. General, Public Threats Can Still Be Coercive&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We also argued that the Trump administration is waging a campaign of coercive threats to suppress disfavored speech, which the First Amendment prohibits. The court agreed that this campaign can be an actionable injury of its own.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Notably, the court held that it didn’t matter that the government’s statements were not specifically targeted at certain individuals, and were instead made on social media or to the public. In this case, the court explained, “the number, severity, and high-profile examples of action upon those threats are such that a reasonable person would perceive the communication as coercive.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;That means it’s reasonable that the unions’ members “would, and did, limit their public speech on disfavored viewpoints” in response. That the threats were made to the general public “does not diminish this injury,” as the very purpose of the challenged surveillance program is to intimidate noncitizens into silence.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h5&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;5. Free Speech is Central to Union Functioning&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The court also found that the unions met the second prong of associational standing. It held that the unions’ interests in protecting their members’ rights to speak freely, organize, and advocate, are “germane” to the unions’ missions. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;The court put it plainly: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt;The freedom of Plaintiffs’ members to speak, associate, and appear publicly is not incidental to union work, but rather is the mechanism through which unions recruit, organize, communicate, and bargain. A program alleged to silence members and drive them from the unions’ rolls therefore strikes at the unions’ representational function itself.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Next Steps&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;When the government surveils what people post online and threatens to punish them for their viewpoints, the result is exactly what our clients have experienced. Members have deleted their accounts, scrubbed posts, and withdrawn from union activities. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The government must now answer our complaint and we will move forward with the discovery process, in which we anticipate getting more information from the government about its surveillance program. We look forward to continuing to prove our case.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;240}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
     <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 20:08:58 +0000</pubDate>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">112450 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/social-media-surveilance">Social Media Surveillance</category>
 <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
 <dc:creator>Lisa Femia</dc:creator>
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