A good friend of mine is a prominent Egyptian business man. As the board member of a national charity, he travels frequently to what he calls “real Egypt.” Last week in rural Asyut, his NGO distributed three hundred cows. Each time the head of a local family walked away with a cow, the women burst into howls of ululation. Their joy, he said, was visibly equal to that of guests at an Arab wedding.

“That’s the aspiration of an Egyptian villager today,” my friend told me. “The ownership of a cow is what gives them milk to drink, cheese to sell, and then money with which to buy subsidized government bread. Former president Mubarak’s reign reduced Egyptian ambitions to owning a cow.”

I have been in Egypt all week, absorbing the anxieties of a people faced with deep uncertainties as they experiment with democracy and vote for a presidential candidate from a slate of below-average choices. Whoever wins the presidential race after the run-off in June will not only have to address the pressing problems of poor housing, low-paid jobs, mismanaged healthcare, a decline in tourism, and the desperate need to boost Egypt’s GDP, but they will also be fighting battles on two other fronts.

The victory of an Islamist candidate would create deep angst in the military top brass that is only too keen to maintain control of the Egyptian economy and independence from civilian rule. And while there are secular liberals who would rightly take Islamists to task, revolutionary elements within their ranks would likely commit not to building a movement to win the next election, but to focus on removing Islamists from power by any means necessary. The personal, emotional, class, and other forms of hatred for Islamists in Egypt (among many of the liberal elite) are difficult to overestimate.

While disorganized liberals, the military, and varied Islamists contend for control of the state, foster greater uncertainty, and scare away investors and tourism, the “real Egypt” continues to struggle for survival.

My taxi driver took a wrong turn in downtown Cairo, heading down a one-way street. At the end of the street a police officer stopped us.

“By Allah, I did not know this was a one-way street,” my driver pleaded in Arabic. “Thanks for teaching me. I won’t repeat it again. By Allah, believe me.”

The officer was not impressed. He asked the driver to get out of the car and produce the necessary documents. Within moments, the driver was back, and the officer turned to me.

“Didn’t you know this was a one-way street?” he asked me in Arabic. I responded with the bookish Arabic I know, Modern Standard Arabic, and the officer walked away knowing I was not Egyptian and therefore not picking up on his intended meaning.

Meanwhile, the taxi driver had prepared a fistful of cash for the officer. Invoking God again and uttering prayers for the officer and his family, the driver shook hands with the officer. The shaking of hands was the passing over of cash.

“What do you take me for?” protested the policeman. “I am a respectable person!” That was supposed to be code for “you cannot bribe me.” The money did not come back, though. The officer’s right hand stored the cash in his pocket. The driver shook his hand again, with more cash, and said more prayers.

“Go, go,” said the policeman. “Be careful next time.” The driver then told me he had just avoided a fine of 1,200 Egyptian pounds (two hundred U.S. dollars), more than the driver would make in a month.

One year after the Egyptian revolution, the police, representatives of the Egyptian state, are seen by many to be as corrupt as ever. At the same time, police wages are pityingly low.

Corruption, a difficult economic situation, and political uncertainty in Egypt are enveloped in a broader disregard for the rule of law and democratic culture. Hardline Salafis have threatened violence and all-out rejection of the electoral results if Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s last prime minister, wins the presidential office. Less radical Islamists have promised another revolution, with some liberals supporting that sentiment. If an Islamist such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi wins then secular revolutionaries will not accept the results and the military may take to playing political games to undermine the Brotherhood’s control of the state.

As political high drama plays out, “real Egypt” suffers from poverty and corruption. Make no mistake about it: the stakes are high in Egypt. If the experiment with democracy fails here, then prospects for freedom, democratic culture, human rights, instituting the rule of law, and creating a model for other nations in the region and beyond fail with it. We cannot stand by and watch that happen. Soon, Washington, DC, and European capitals will be forced to choose between different factions in Egyptian politics. Who will we support and why?

Egypt. The country’s first presidential elections since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak will take place this Wednesday and Thursday, May 23 and 24. Candidates Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh are the current front-runners, although it is difficult to predict the results based on limited available polling data. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi fared well in early voting by Egyptians abroad.

Iran. The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yukiya Amano, is visiting Tehran to attempt a deal with Iranian officials in the investigation of their nuclear program ahead of planned talks in Baghdad this week. Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs, will lead the Baghdad meetings along with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany. The IAEA is seeking access to information and sites including the Parchin facility—a major point of contention.

Lebanon. Fighting in the streets of Beirut has abated, at least temporarily, after a fierce gun battle between Sunni factions erupted early Monday. The killing at a north Lebanese checkpoint of Sunni cleric Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Wahid and another man, both affiliated with the March 14 alliance, appears to have been the immediate cause of the violence. The ongoing crisis in Syria has heightened tensions among rival Lebanese political factions and sectarian groups and incited fears of a spillover of violence from Syria. Meanwhile, Gulf countries have urged their citizens not to travel to Lebanon.

Yemen. A massive suicide bomb attack in Sanaa on Monday claimed the lives of nearly one hundred people, mostly soldiers rehearsing for a parade to be held tomorrow, on Yemen’s national day. Al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the blast. According to officials, the bomber passed through heavy security to reach the location of the attack and was dressed in military uniform.

Egypt. Egyptians living abroad—many in the Gulf, the United States, and Canada—have begun voting in the presidential elections. Turnout has been low thus far, but voters will have until May 17 to cast their ballots. The latest poll numbers from Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies have Amr Moussa maintaining a strong lead, with Ahmed Shafiq overtaking Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh for second place. The survey was conducted on May 8 and 9, however, before last week’s widely viewed debate between Moussa and Aboul Fotouh.

The Gulf. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meets in Riyadh today to discuss the possibility of creating a union of the GCC’s six member states, similar to the European Union. Liberal civil society activists have criticized the plan, citing concerns about the effect it would have on pro-democracy opposition groups. Analysts have pointed to the benefit of a union for GCC members in countering Iranian influence.

Iran. Talks between Iranian and International Atomic Energy Agency officials to be held today in Vienna will lay the groundwork for discussions next week in Baghdad. Iran’s withholding of access to the Parchin military complex will likely be a major point of contention.

Israel-Palestine. Two Palestinian prisoners have reached the seventy-seventh day of their hunger strike, and doctors are saying they are dangerously close to death. Other prisoners who are members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah—up to 1,600 of them—are also participating in the fast to protest prison conditions and extended detentions without trial. An Israeli prison service spokesperson says Egypt has brokered a deal, likely to be announced this week, that aims to end the strike. On Tuesday, Palestinians will mark Nakba Day, which commemorates Palestinian displacement following the declaration of Israel as an independent state.

Libya. Human Rights Watch (HRW) today has released a report documenting seventy-two civilian deaths it says were caused by NATO air strikes in Libya between March and October 2011. HRW has called for a “prompt, credible, and thorough” investigation into the deaths. NATO responded through its spokesperson, saying it “did everything possible to minimize risks to civilians.”

Syria. The results of last week’s parliamentary elections will be announced Tuesday. Meanwhile, violence continues to spread throughout the country, spilling into Lebanon with recent clashes in Tripoli between supporters of Bashar al-Assad and opposition members.

Egypt is set to broadcast a televised debate between two top presidential candidates, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Amr Moussa. One was once an inmate in Mubarak’s prisons, and the other Mubarak’s foreign minister.

I have met both men, and they are equally adept at the art of deflecting questions. The next president of Egypt will serve his term competing with the Egyptian military for influence—both men know this, and have bent over backward to be seen as cooperative. Neither candidate clearly represents the generation or ideas that gave birth to the Tahrir Square protests last year, but just as rumors were spreading that the elections would be cancelled and further doom was capturing the new Egyptian political space, the idea of monazarat, debates, has helped lift spirits.

The moderator, Yosri Fouda, a former al-Jazeera correspondent who now anchors a popular show on ONtv, has received hundreds of suggested questions for the candidates from Egyptians on Twitter, among them:

“What will you do to fix the relationship between the police and the people?”

“How will you encourage foreign direct investment?”

“What do you plan to do about corruption?”

“How will you guarantee an independent judiciary?”

This debate is vitally important. If it goes ahead as scheduled (very few things are certain in today’s Egypt), it will help realize the dreams of young Egyptians who have sacrificed blood, time, and treasure to create a new democratic Egypt. Second, allowing the debate to occur is a reassuring sign from the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that it is not considering canceling or postponing elections. Third, holding a presidential debate sets a precedent that future candidates for public office will go through similar public scrutiny, thereby ensuring greater transparency and accountability in the emerging political system. Fourth, the debate is a strong message from the Arab world’s most populous country to its regional neighbors that Egypt’s presidents will answer to the people.

Finally, something to watch for: Aboul Fotouh, the current underdog, has had years of experience addressing large crowds of protesters at the Muslim Brotherhood rallies he led. Many outside Cairo are yet to recognize Aboul Fotouh as a serious contender. In this debate, Moussa has everything to lose, and Aboul Fotouh everything to gain.

You can watch the debate here tomorrow at 1:30 p.m. EST or 7:30 p.m. Cairo time.

Algeria. Elections for Algeria’s parliament, scheduled for May 10, are being met with cynicism by many Algerians seeking reform. In a country whose leaders are under pressure but have thus far managed to avoid the fate of their regional neighbors, the elections are being heavily promoted by the government as a step in the right direction. While the elections are expected to be free and fair in comparison with decades of rigged polls, voter skepticism and apathy may result in low turnout.

Egypt. The committee overseeing the Egyptian presidential election has invited presidential candidates to a meeting this week to explain voting procedure and discuss points of contention ahead of the elections on May 23 and 24. The latest poll from Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies shows presidential candidate Amr Moussa leading with 39 percent of participants’ votes. Former Muslim Brotherhood member Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh follows with 24.5 percent, then Ahmed Shafiq, the former prime minister, with 17.2 percent. In fourth place is Mohamed Morsy with 7 percent, followed by Hamdeen Sabahi with 6.7 percent. Compared with previous polling data, Morsy and Shafiq appear to be gaining popularity among potential Egyptian voters.

Israel-Palestine. An appeal on behalf of two Palestinian prisoners on hunger strike was rejected by Israel’s high court today. The prisoners, Bilal Diab and Tha’er Halahlah, are under administrative detention and have been on hunger strike for seventy days. The appeal requesting their release was denied on the basis that the two men are a security risk to Israel. The prisoners are in a “life-threatening condition” according to the Israeli organization Physicians for Human Rights.

Syria. Parliamentary elections today in Syria are being touted by the government as evidence it is open to reform, but the outcome is unlikely to have an effect on the ongoing internal crisis. Opposition leaders have criticized the elections as a sham and an “insult to democracy.”

When I was invited to visit Bahrain by members of the royal family, I hesitated. They had crushed peaceful protesters last year, and their police had used tear gas against human rights activists. Like everybody else, including some of the Bahraini policemen I later spoke with, I was appalled at the violence and thought the monarchy had blood on its hands. But I felt that declining the offer was irresponsible. I wanted to know the monarchy’s side of the story. So I accepted the invitation—on the condition that I was free to meet Bahrain’s opposition.

Bahrain is a tiny island nation of six hundred thousand citizens, with a Parliament of only forty members, and it cannot be understood if looked at in isolation. For one thing, it stands at the forefront of a regional cold war. Saudi Arabia lies to the west, connected by a twenty-five kilometer causeway built jointly by the Saudis and Bahrainis. To the east, across the waters of the Gulf, lies Iran. Both Tehran and Riyadh have major stakes in Bahrain.

En route to Bahrain, I stopped by in Riyadh and had many conversations with top government officials, journalists, and academics. Their views were clear: Saudi Arabia would not stand by and see Bahrain’s ruling al-Khalifa family fall from power. The Saudis sent in soldiers to help the al-Khalifas regain control of Bahrain in March 2011 and are prepared to do so again.

If King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa abdicates, they asked, then who would be next among Arab kings? What consequences would the ensuing chaos have on global energy supplies? If power falls into the hands of the main Shiite opposition group, Bahrain could join Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon under the Iranian sphere of influence in the Middle East.

In Bahrain, I was a guest of the king’s son, Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, who, in the context of the country’s current political climate, is a liberal’s liberal. Educated in Washington and Cambridge, England, the forty-two year-old prince spoke about Britain’s constitutional monarchy, the dire need for political reform in his country, and his yearning for a political settlement with the opposition.

He appeared genuinely contrite about the excesses of the government in Bahrain, but also convinced that the opposition has no vision of how to improve matters. “The path to hell is paved with good intentions,” he said. Constantly, he referred to the need for “evolution” rather than “revolution.”

Within the ruling family, he led the charge for reform last year, but was abandoned by al-Wefaq, the main opposition party, midway through discussions. The party kept changing its demands and the leaders were divided over what they wanted. This strengthened the hand of the more conservative wing of the royal family, led by the conservative, long-serving prime minister, Prince Khalifa bin Sulman al-Khalifa.

The opposition wants the prime minister to resign, but neither the king nor the crown prince can dare ask a family elder to depart in ignominy.

Just as there are divisions within the royal family, there are serious splits in Bahrain’s Shiite political scene. Not all the Shiites in Bahrain want to topple the monarchy. Nor is the opposition composed only of democrats who simply want to oust a monarchy.

Again and again, in villages and in meetings with Shiite opposition figures, one name kept coming up: Ayatollah Issa Qassim, spiritual leader of al-Wefaq, whose writ runs large across the Shiite opposition movement. Educated in Iran, his sermons are generally anti-American, anti-democracy and vehemently pro-Iran. When Iran’s green movement challenged the mullahs in Tehran, Ayatollah Qassim accused the West of “trying to divide an otherwise peaceful country” and of “hatred toward Islam.”

He is also intolerant of Shiites with divergent views back home. Three Shiite members of Bahrain’s Parliament explained to me the consequences of daring to challenge Ayatollah Qassim. When they decided not to honor al-Wefaq’s call to boycott elections last October, al-Wefaq-controlled mosques called on people to attack them; firebombs were thrown at their homes and their children were harassed on the streets. They live in fear for their lives, and they are not alone.

Ayatollah Qassim’s supporters not only undermined the crown prince’s efforts at reconciliation, but in recent weeks have taken to rioting in villages across Bahrain. In Sitra, one such village outside Manama, I spoke in Arabic with a police official, a Shiite, who said: “I am Bahraini before I am Shiite. We must live as Bahrainis and do what’s right for our country, and not be controlled by Iran’s clerics.”

Like Bahraini Sunnis, the official felt the monarchy was not giving him the means to respond to the rioters. They have no guns, he complained, which left them at the mercy of rioters with home-made arrows and Molotov cocktails. “Last year, my colleagues in the army and interrogation units were wrong to torture protesters,” he said. “But what about the attacks on us now? How are we do defend ourselves?”

Ayatollah Qassim has not called on his supporters to cease violence against the police, government and dissenting Shiite leaders. Instead, he has demanded that Jawad Hussain, one of the legislators I spoke with, and other dissenting Shiite political leaders and clerics come to the ayatollah’s mosque during Friday services and publicly repent for betraying “the community.”

Ayatollah Qassim’s message does not justify the torture and human rights violations exercised by the government of Bahrain. The demands of the opposition for an end to discrimination in government jobs and for greater political freedoms are valid. But calls for greater human rights must not be selective. Last year the opposition blocked bills that gave women equality and freedom in Bahrain because the ayatollahs opposed it, while the monarchy and Sunni parties supported it.

Bahrain is an important nation because it is a focal point of what is happening in the Middle East today—the battle to find a balance between preserving the best values of the Islamic tradition while the region eases its way into the modern world.

It is crucial that Western nations help the country achieve this balance, and that they not provide diplomatic cover for rioters and clerics in the name of human rights and democracy.

Instead, they should be using every pressure point to strengthen the reformist strands within the monarchy in support of political change, equal rights for women and an end to the language of Shiite sectarianism in Bahrain. Negotiations around the political table are the only way forward in Bahrain.

This article originally appeared in the New York Times here.

Egypt. Bowing to continued pressure from the Islamist-dominated Egyptian parliament, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has agreed to reshuffle Egypt’s cabinet. Although the reshuffle is less than parliament leaders had previously demanded—dismissal of the entire cabinet—parliament speaker Saad el-Katatni has accepted the outcome as a step in the right direction. Meanwhile, following protests calling for the Saudi government to release Egyptian human rights lawyer Ahmed al-Gizawy and the subsequent closure of the Saudi embassy in Cairo as well as consulates in Suez and Alexandria, King Abdullah has assured SCAF it will consider reopening the Saudi embassy in the coming days.

Syria. Dozens more UN monitors are slated to arrive in Syria this week, but will likely be welcomed by further violence as the mid-April truce has almost completely broken down. A number of alleged suicide attacks over the past several days in addition to continued gunfire and shelling from the Syrian army have threatened to make UN-Arab League special envoy Kofi Annan’s six-point plan obsolete.

Lebanon. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman will visit Beirut this week to meet with Lebanese officials and March 14 leaders. The reported purpose of his trip is to encourage authorities and opposition leaders to commit to hold the upcoming parliamentary elections on schedule despite political challenges, as well as to discuss the effects of the Syria crisis on Lebanon.

The dominant narrative in the West, that Bahrain’s opposition figures are somehow deserving of unconditional support because they are opposing an unelected monarchy, deserves scrutiny—the situation on the ground is more complicated than many recognize. In an interview with CFR today, I explain some of the complications and the geopolitical implications of empowering the Bahraini opposition without them first rejecting sectarianism, embracing women’s rights, abandoning violence, distancing themselves from Iran, and returning to the negotiating table.

Most importantly, it is necessary for democracy activists to be democrats, not theocrats.

When I was in Bahrain earlier this month, Ayatollah Isa Qassem was a name that kept being repeated by opposition members. Qassem is the philosophical and spiritual head of the al-Wefaq opposition party in Bahrain. I ask you to read the evidence below and decide for yourself if he is a peaceful democrat. These quotes are taken from Qassem’s sermons. The original Arabic appears below the English translation of each quote.

From a sermon on June 7, 2002:

[Khomeini is] one of the heroes of Islam and Islamic unity…and when we speak of Islamic unity we have to salute Khomeini’s jihad and dedication to the cause—to salute his establishment of Islamic unity week and his passion for the issues of the Islamic ummah with Palestine at the forefront of his attention. He will remain a champion fighting for the oppressed across the world.

… بطل من أبطال الإسلام والوحدة الإسلامية…ويفرض علينا الحديث عن الوحدة الإسلامية أن نحيي جهاد الإمام الخميني قدس سره في هذا السبيل، وتأسيسه لأسبوع الوحدة الإسلامية وذوبناه في قضايا الأمة، وفي طليعتها القضية الفلسطينية، وحتى غدا لسعة أفقه ينتصر لكل المستضعفين في العالم

June 6, 2003:

[The Iranian Revolution is] the call that never dies and will not die. It is not right for the nation to weaken and waver in its support for it and without pledging its full alliance in thought, sentiment, and practice, and refusing to submit to the arrogant American administration.

إنها الصرخة التي لا تموت ولن تموت ولا يصح للأمة أن تهن أو تتهاون دون الالتفاف بها وإعطائها الولاء الكامل فكراً وشعوراً وعملا بلا استكانة أمام الإرادة الأمريكية المتغطرسة، ولا ذوبان في الطرح الأمريكي، ولا مغادرة عن الصراط الإسلامي القويم

February 13, 2004:

A few words on the occasion of the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran:

A revolution that was ignited by one of the heroes of faith, knowledge and determination; a lover of the lovers of Mohammed’s lineage and his blessed sons, peace be upon them.

[The Iranian Revolution is] a blessed revolution that toppled one of the Islamic world’s despots–the despot most supportive of the Great Devil, the United States, as the great Imam al-Khomeini named it.

A revolution that made America kneel in Iran, and cut the hand that tried to defile Islam and its values in that country and stopped it from looting and plundering the wealth of the good Muslim Iranian people in such a provocative manner.

. كلمات سريعة في مناسبة انتصار الثورة الإسلامية في إيران

ثورة فجّرها بطلٌ من أبطال الإيمان والعلم والعزيمة والصمود، وعاشقٌ من عشَّاق خط أجداده الكرام محمدٍ وعليٍ وأبنائه الهداة عليهم السلام

ثورة مباركةٌ أطاحت بواحدٍ من أشدِّ طواغيت عالمنا الإسلامي، وأكثرهم دعماً من الشيطان الأكبر أمريكا كما سمّاها السيد الإمام الخميني العظيم

ثورةٌ ركّعت أمريكا في إيران، وقطعت يدها الجانية عن العبث بمقدّرات الإسلام وقيمه الغالية في ذلك البلد وعن نهب خيرات الشعب الإيراني المسلم الكريم وثرواته الهائلة بصورةٍ استفزازية بشعة

June 4, 2004:

The day of the departure of Imam Khomeini was a catastrophic day that this nation had to live through. He was a Quranic leader, a mujahid in the name of God, stubborn on the path of truth, a seeker of the afterlife, a teacher of the nation putting generations on the track of struggle, and establishing a school of guidance…

يوم الذكرى للرحيل السعيد للسيد الإمام الخميني (ره) يوم فاجعة عاشتها الأمة الواعية، وواعيةٍ قاسيةٍ. كان قائداً قرآنياً مجاهداً في الله، عنيداً في الحقّ، طالباً للآخرة، معلّم أمة، ومخرّجاً لأجيال على طريق الكفاح، ومدرسة هادية للحياة

June 8, 2007:

A man of mercy, a revolution of mercy, a state of mercy that is not exclusive to this nation but for the people at large. The man is Imam Khomeini, the revolution is his, and the state is his, and the secret lies in the mercy of his Islam, the Islamic revolution, and the Islamic state…If all Islamists, regardless of their sects, gathered around this man, this revolution, this state and the peoples of this nation followed them, Islam would have been on a fast track to total victory.

رجلُ رحمة، وثورةُ رحمة، ودولةُ رحمة، رحمةٍ ليست خاصة بالأمة، وإنما أستطيع القول أن كل ذلك فيه رحمة للناس. الرجل هو الإمام الخميني، والثورة ثورته، والدولة دولته، السر في كون هذا رحمة إسلامُ الرجل، إسلام ثورته، إسلام دولته
.والإسلام ضرورة لإنسانية الإنسان، للحياة الدنيا، للآخرة
وأقول لو التفّ الإسلاميون كلّهم بكل مذاهبهم، بالرجل، بالثورة، بالدولة، والتفّت بذلك شعوب الأمة لأسرع الإسلام الخطى على طريق النصر الكاسح، ولعمّت النعمة الأمّة والإنسانية بصورة أظهر وأوضح

February 8, 2008:

The revolution happened in Iran setting in place an Islamic Republic, so they gathered against it in animosity. The East, the West, and their agents in the Islamic world. They belittled it, and belittled those who are in charge of it…If you look within the Islamic nation for a political system that is not connected to the West, to the axis of evil, and does not prostrate before either West or East, you will only find one political system: [Iran]

حدثت الثورة، وأقام الإسلام نظاما إسلاميا جمهوريا في إيران، فاجتمعوا على عداوته والكيد به، اجتمع الغرب والشرق والعملاء الداخليون في البلاد الإسلامية على عداوته والكيد به. قلّلوا من شأن وشأن القائمين عليه …  لو بحثت في إطار الأمّة كلّها عن نظام سياسي لا يرتبط بمحور الغرب ولا بمحور الشر، ولا يسجد على أعتاب الغرب ولا الشرق لما وجدت غير نظام واحد

February 15, 2008:

…and Hezbollah is a treasure enriched by mujahideen, heroes, revolutionaries, and pillars of faith— there is no need to worry about [its future]

 وحزب الله حزبٌ كنزٌ يثرى بالمجاهدين، بالغيارى، بالأبطال، بقممٍ إيمانية واعية فلا يُخاف عليه، وإنه لحزب منجب، وإن الأمة التي منها هذا الحزب لأمة منجبة

June 12, 2009:

…and his revolution, his victory, his state created many revolutionaries on the path of God…you rightfully and honestly say that Khomeini’s revolution, his victory, and his state created a new widespread jihadist line that transcended the borders of the revolutionary country…

وقد صنعت ثورته وانتصاره ودولته ثائرين كثراً على طريق الله

تستطيع أن تقول محقّاً صادقاً بأن الإمام الخميني (قده) قد نسَلَت ثورته وانتصاره ودولته تيّاراً ثوريّاً جهاديّاً رساليّاً واسعاً داخل الأمَّة متجاوزاً في سعته حدود بلد الثور

June 19, 2009:

…Hezbollah is an exemplary Islamic group…

…حزب الله مثال اسلامي

June 26, 2009:

The western reaction to [the Iranian elections] in such an exaggerated manner ignites strife, perpetuates struggle, and creates a division in an otherwise peaceful country. Hatred here is a hatred toward Islam, and the Islamic mode of governance and the effectiveness of that mode in solidifying the nation and its dignity, ensuring its progress and superiority, and preserving its interests and independence. Behind that hatred is a fear of a wider reversion to Islam and what that means in terms of turning over the scales of powers on Earth and changing the equation to the benefit of the Islamic nation and those who are oppressed…

الحدث الداخلي في إيران يمكن أن يحدث في كل مكان ويأخذ حجمه الطبيعي وينتهي إلى ما ينتهي إليه من غير انحياز من قوى الشر في الأرض لطرف معيّن على حساب آخر بهذه الصورة المبالغ فيها، ومن غير هذا الدفع والتحريض الشديدين على إلهاب الفتنة، وإشعال النار، وتعميق الصراع، وإيجاد محرقة شاملة في بلد آمن. البغضاء هنا بغضاء للإسلام، والصيغة الإسلامية للحكم، وفاعلية هذه الصيغة في تثبيت أصالة الأمَّة، وعزّتها وكرامتها، وتحقيق تقدّمها وتفوّقها، والحفاظ على استقلالها ومصالحها
ووراء هذا الحقد خوف من عودة أوسع للإسلام الحق من قبل الأمة، وما تعنيه العودة للإسلام من انقلاب موازين القوى في الأرض، وتغيّر المعادلة الفعلية لصالح الأمة الإسلامية والمستضعفين

For al-Wefaq’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Isa Qassem, to enter the Arab uprisings without nullifying his previous remarks on democracy as Western and evil makes a farce of what the Arab Spring was all about. Policymakers in Washington should be well aware of the forces that are opposing the monarchy, and the ideational links to Hezbollah and Iran. Yes, the monarchy must reform—but so must the opposition. The sentiments expressed above are not those of a democrat.

During my visit to Saudi Arabia last week, Saudi friends from various sectors of Saudi life were candid in expressing their sentiments toward government, society, and reforms. I do not wish to divulge their identities, and think that the quotes below from many conversations are self-explanatory about Saudi approaches to issues of domestic concern. While this is not a representative sample, the sentiments being expressed are reflective of one strand of sensitivities on the ground in Riyadh. I know from my own Saudi family members in Jeddah and Medina that their and their neighbors’ views are different from most of what appears below. Nevertheless, most of the quotes below are from English-speaking Saudi men who are educated at Western universities:

“I want a job, a house, a family, and good healthcare—I don’t care about the details of government and politics.”

“We Saudis want three things: an end to corruption, end of high unemployment, and creation of better housing.”

“I will never allow my wife, sister, or daughter to work in the same room as a male colleague.”

“Why should our youth rebel? The best of them, nearly 130,000, are studying at universities around the world—almost 60,000 of that number are in the United States. The King pays for their fees, travel, accommodation, cars, holidays, and medical insurance.”

“The government conducted a private survey of ordinary Saudis. Overwhelmingly, the respondents said that ‘democracy’ meant welfare benefits from the government to the people.”

“We need time. The pace of reform must be slow and respond to the ability of the people to absorb change, we believe in evolution, not revolution. Seven years ago, there were seven universities in the Kingdom—now there are twenty-nine. With education comes awareness and reforms.”

“Over a billion Muslims turn toward our country to pray five times a day. We have a responsibility to be sensitive to them and their expectations of the Kingdom’s adherence to Islam.”

“We will never see universities in Saudi Arabia where male and female students study together in the same classroom. Never.”

Three countries were on top of the agenda for the many Saudis I met with in Riyadh last week. Again and again, and in passionate terms, Saudi political leaders were keen to stress the importance of arming Syrian opposition players, bombing Iran’s alleged nuclear facilities, and unflinchingly supporting the al-Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain. In their minds, these are not political options, but rather realities on the ground that they worry Washington does not understand.

Car bumper stickers in Riyadh called for arming the Free Syrian Army. Such an open display of support for military intervention in another country cannot be expressed in Saudi Arabia without government and broader public backing. The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, is on record calling for the arming of Syrian fighters. At meeting after meeting, the U.S. government position was heavily criticized by our Saudi friends. I was struck by two points: First, when asked what would happen after Assad fled or was removed, most Saudis I spoke with fell silent. Much like the Syrian opposition, their Saudi supporters have yet to put in place a concrete, viable plan to help Syrians rebuild after the fall of this deeply entrenched Baathist state. Second, no consideration has been given to what might happen if Saudi citizens were to rise in protest against the House of Saud. Does a military intervention in Syria not set a direct precedent for Saudi protesters in the Eastern Province? If those protesters were to be armed by outside powers, would Saudi Arabia’s government accept U.S. support for anti-government Saudis?

To most Saudis, though, the Syrian conflict is not just about Syria. It is also about Saudi Arabia’s sworn enemy: Iran. While it is disputable whether Iran’s nuclear program is for weapons-development purposes, most Saudi officials I spoke with, much like the American public, are convinced that Iran is headed toward developing weapons. Tellingly, Saudi concern was not about an attack on Israel, but on Saudi Arabia itself. At the highest levels of government, there was genuine fear that Iran intends to attack Saudi Arabia, and that the United States simply does not grasp the depth of the Iranian threat to the Kingdom, and beyond.

If I found myself disagreeing with Saudi friends on Syria, and still thinking about Iran, I was impressed by Saudi resolve and clarity on Bahrain. They cited Iranian support for the Shia cleric Ayatollah Isa Qassim, who had been in exile in Qom before returning to Bahrain in 2001. The fall of the al-Khalifa family in Bahrain would result in Qassim’s political party, al-Wefaq, taking control of the country’s institutions. With pro-Iranian clerics at the helm, Shia control of Bahrain would have unprecedented consequences, encouraging agitation among Saudi Arabia’s Shia population, but also resulting in a pro-Iran government in the GCC with access to Saudi Arabia’s joint oil fields with Bahrain. During my time in Bahrain, I met with the main opposition party and other political forces—on the basis of the evidence I saw, including claims by Shia opposition members of being verbally and physically attacked by supporters of Ayatollah Isa Qassim, I found myself in agreement with Saudi analysis. I will be writing in greater detail about Bahrain separately.

While Saudi concerns about Iran are not new, Iran’s direct meddling in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan give our Saudi allies every right to worry anew about Iranian imperialist influences. In the name of creating a democracy, the West helped hand over Iraq to the Iranian sphere of influence in the modern Middle East. That mistake cannot be repeated in Bahrain—and it won’t be for as long as the Saudis are standing.

I disagree with our Saudi friends on Syria and I am unsure on Iran, but I know they are right about the risks in Bahrain and the consequences of not supporting the al-Khalifa monarchy as it introduces reforms. The U.S. government is right to station its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.

As the appetite for greater involvement in the Middle East dissipates in Washington, it is worth remembering the famous saying attributed to Leon Trotsky: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” The cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is real. Bahrain is on the front line of that war.

(My next post will address Saudi domestic concerns.)