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As the mooted presidential election in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is postponed to December 2018, South Africa’s most significant engagement in post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) since its return to African affairs in 1994 hangs in the balance. While South Africa has done a fairly decent job of supporting the DRC at various difficult intervals since the 1990s, the model it has pursued in that country appears to be falling short of the demands of strategic state and institution building. It is a model at the end of its resources.
This policy insights paper argues that these shortcomings are a result not only of South Africa’s inability to master the challenging political terrain in the DRC but also of Pretoria’s pushback from value-driven doctrines in its diplomacy. This severely impacts South Africa’s ideological and normative posture, particularly the manner in which it is inconsistently articulated in the political institution-building process in the DRC – a complex country with multi-layered issues and competing external and domestic stakeholders.
China is vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change in various ways, including through disasters such as floods, droughts and typhoons, and is therefore a key player in the global efforts to mitigate climate change.
This publication presents the findings of new research study on how gender equality, climate change and disaster risks intersect in China. The research investigates gender gaps in China’s policy framework, attitudes and gender composition of government institutions, NGOs’ roles as well men and women’s differential vulnerabilities to the adverse impacts of climate change.
The research report also outlines 15 recommendations for the next steps. The report’s data was collected through a policy review, 84 interviews and a survey of over 3400 people in eight counties of Jiangsu, Qinghai and Shaanxi provinces. The research will support evidence-based discussion on how China can integrate gender into climate change action and disaster risk reduction over the coming years.
Sustainability, traceability, and branding for final consumers have been a component of market development of coffee for two decades in Brazil, but only just started in the beef sector. Sustainability initiatives for coffee have enjoyed high price premiums and support from cooperatives to make this possible. Efforts in the cattle and beef sector are more recent and still in a pilot phase.
It is heartening, the author of this paper argues, to observe that developing countries, led by China and other BRICS members have been successful to organise alternative sources of credit flows . aiming for financial stability, growth and development. Setting a goal to avoid the IMF type of loan conditionalities and the dominance of US dollar in global finance, these new institutions provide a much needed turn in the global financial architecture, especially in the background of the on-going demands for austerity as are currently imposed on Greece by the troika of IMF, the ECB and the EU. It is rather ironic that the Western financial institutions as well as the EU are not in a mood to provide any option to Greece short of complying with the disciplinary measures as a pre-condition for Greece to continue with the Eurozone and its common currency, the Euro.
Limitations of the on-going global financial architecture at command of the IMF and its member nations in the OECD brings to the fore the need for new institutions which can provide alternative solutions. The launch of the financial institutions by the BRICS seem to chart out an alternative route which may turn out as superior in achieving a superior global financial order.
The BRICS financial institutions, along with the proposed clearing account will herald a new set of financial architecture which has the potential to be beneficial, not just for the BRICS but for global financial system at large. Since those settlements will not rely on dollar or other major currencies as unit of account, exchange rate fluctuations across such currencies will not impact the cross rates between the individual BRICS currencies as long as kept frozen with forward contracts renewed over time.
Arrangements to use the trade surpluses of individual BRICS members, by those in deficit would add to demand within the BRICS by creating new channels for intra-BRICS trade. The transfer of surpluses to meet deficits can even be treated as a loan , to be adjusted to similar other transactions of the NDB.
Moreover, trade surpluses earned by individual members (say China) will remain within the Brics as investment and will not be used as assets in US dollar , avoiding sources of vulnerability. Finally the Brics may devise ways and means to channelize the capital flows in a manner which strengthens the Brics institutions and generate real demand, say with infrastructures, rather than spurious activities of a speculative nature.
Over the last few decades, Latin American countries have experienced a boom in social protection policies. This increase has been fuelled by the expansion of fiscal space as the result of steady economic growth. While many of these countries had already had some type of social security system in place, most still lacked effective policies to reduce poverty and few had public programmes offering social assistance.
Cash transfer programmes rapidly emerged in countries all over the continent, followed by other social assistance programmes focusing on vulnerable individuals and families. The design of policies or systems varies according to the context and capacity of each country. Even within a country, there is great heterogeneity in the quality of services offered. This process has rapidly shown interested countries that even when the implementation of public policies is strongly inspired by a model existing in another country, their experience will always be unique.
Africans are interested in learning more about the successful experiences of countries, such as that of Brazil, which serve as a reference and guide for developing their own pathways to social protection solutions.
The partnership between the Government of Brazil and the Government of Senegal, the African Union Commission, UNDP World Centre for Sustainable Development (RIO+ Centre), UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa and the Lula Institute provided the opportunity for a high-level debate at the International Seminar
on Social Protection in Dakar. In addition to Brazil and Senegal, there were representatives from Cape Verde, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Zambia and Zimbabwe at the event.
This publication registers the inputs and results of the International Seminar in Dakar. It reveals a theoretical alignment regarding the social agenda that is necessary to both African countries and Brazil, especially in regards to social protection.
In the past 15 years, South-South development cooperation (SSDC)1 and triangular development cooperation (TrC) have been growing in prominence as a result of an increase in resources, geographical reach and
diversity of approaches to new forms of development partnerships. At the same time, demands for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are also being made by citizens, taxpayers and civil society that are engaged in SSDC
Yet, the lack of a clear and common conceptual framework makes SSDC monitoring and evaluation challenging. This problem is compounded by the evidence gaps and the low quality of data on SSDC, which is generally incomplete and unreliable, owing to weak M&E systems and overall information management in Southern partners. Development agencies among Southern partners are relatively new and still lack the seasoned M&E experience of traditional donors. Moreover, Southern partners understand SSDC in different ways, compared with a more homogeneous understanding among traditional donors. Hence, Southern partners have no comparable conceptual and methodological framework to match the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC/OECD) to guide and standardise their development cooperation M&E.
This paper provides an overview of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices from different institutions engaged in South-South development cooperation (SSDC) and triangular development cooperation (TrC) in Brazil, based on a literature and document review and semi-structured interviews with 13 Brazilian and international institutions.
The findings corroborate the initial hypothesis that there is no unified M&E system for Brazilian development cooperation but heterogeneous M&E practices. These practices are mainly focused on outputs and shaped by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency’s parameters as well as those of the executing institutions.
The challenges and pitfalls identified by domestic and international institutions involved in Brazil’s SSDC/TrC showed the growing awareness of the need to prioritize M&E. However, heterogeneous concepts of evaluation and diversified institutional contexts suggest that a broad and cross-sectorial debate could
enhance construction of a unified framework for Brazilian development cooperation, working hand in hand with general discussions on South-South cooperation and international development governance.
International organizations have played a crucial role in this process by supporting the diffusion and transfer of social protection policies. However, the role of South-South Cooperation partners cannot be underestimated. Brazil’s development trajectory in the last decade has drawn the world’s attention to the country’s social protection and food and nutritional security policies.
This paper aims to analyse how can trilateral cooperation (TrC) initiatives sharing Brazilian experiences in social protection contribute to the 2030 agenda. In the last decade, social protection has gained the spotlight in development cooperation. The boundaries of social protection has expanded from a narrow understanding of safety nets to potentially encompassing a broader set of policies aimed at increasing social justice and as a redistributive measure that reaffirms the social contract of the state with its citizens. Countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America have introduced regular cash transfers and other programmes to assist poor and vulnerable citizens, with positive impacts on a range of well-being indicators for millions of people.
As the global development landscape continues to evolve, new and emerging actors – countries transitioning from being aid recipients to aid providers – are becoming increasingly visible on the global scene. Although the approaches, interests and resources of emerging donors are far from uniform, their increasing presence in global development – particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings – could create new ways of thinking about foreign aid and contribute to more horizontal, equitable and efficient practices. The rise of these donors also poses challenges: their compliance with international standards in development assistance, the effectiveness of their aid and the inclusivity of their efforts have often been questioned.
Turkey’s presence in Somalia is an important example of emerging donor engagement in a conflict setting. Its involvement in Somalia intensified in response to the devastating 2010–2012 famine, but has since gone well beyond delivering aid and assistance to famine survivors. It has hosted international and regional conferences, mediated among various parties, engaged in capacity-building efforts, encouraged bilateral trade and delivered development assistance. Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has been remarkably multifaceted; it has included the Turkish government, religious institutions, nongovernmental organisations, the private sector and local municipalities. It is too early to accurately assess the impact of Turkey’s involvement on Somali institutions or to understand whether it has attenuated the conflict. Instead, this report draws on dozens of interviews in Turkey and Somalia to examine trends and challenges.
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has distinguished itself by a readiness to deploy staff in the field despite the security risks, deference to the Somali government and a push for national ownership, as well as its involvement in the security and private sectors. However, its experience has also brought to the fore critical tensions: Will its respect for sovereignty and support to security institutions clash with norms of human rights and the inclusion of other parts of society in peacebuilding? Can this multi-pronged approach to aid be channelled toward a coherent and comprehensive peacebuilding strategy? And will these nascent aid institutions be able to weather domestic pressures in Turkey? [Authors' summary]
The importance of Science and Technology (S&T) and availability of innovation driven solutions, particularly to mitigate and address sustainability challenges globally has been a central theme in all important global platforms in the recent past including the Rio+20 process that led to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD3) leading to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Climate Change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) including COP 21 and the Istanbul Plan of Action (IPoA) for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The FfD3 prioritising S&T delivery perhaps signals collective willingness to address issues of resource availability and financing of a global mechanism to facilitate and support the process.
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda documents final decision on part of world leaders to establish a Technology Facilitation Mechanism – TFM. This was officially adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. India (along with Brazil) has been enthusiastically promoting the cause for TFM under the Post 2015 Development Agenda.
This policy brief reviews the current proposals for TFM and proposes a three-tier structure that can be way forward for the TFM. It also presents possible role that India can play in steering the TFM.
India along with other countries has signed the declaration on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, comprising of seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the Sustainable Development Summit of the United Nations in September 2015. SDGs are comprehensive and focus on five Ps – people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership. On its current trajectory, India has already set for itself more ambitious targets for implementation of SDGs in several areas of economic progress, inclusion and sustainability.
As part of this major work programme on SDGs, RIS has also come out with this set of 19 papers dealing with various aspects of sustainable development goals. These papers have been prepared in collaboration with prominent experts from respective fields.
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) increasingly struggle to respond effectively to the needs of middle-income countries (MICs). This has influenced not only their potential development impact but also their own financial stability. Part of the challenge has been internal business processes that deter greater borrowing by countries, especially in the presence of other financiers with less strenuous requirements. These processes include lengthy loan approval processes, limited use of in-country management systems and sensitivities around environmental and social safeguards. There is also a need for greater responsiveness and an emphasis on the importance of knowledge services.
This policy briefing (drawing on a more in-depth discussion paper) highlights some of these challenges and offers some alternative solutions. The New Development Bank (NDB), as a new entrant to the development finance milieu, will do well to draw on the experiences of existing MDBs to improve its offerings to countries.
The deepening of China’s engagement with Africa has also prompted the broadening of its interests on the continent. This has resulted in China’s expansion into increasingly riskier territories, which means there is a greater urgency to protect its interests from the political vagaries endemic to conflict-affected African states. This evolution marks a shift away from traditional perceptions of Chinese engagement in Africa as being limited to its economic interests, towards one where China becomes a politically interested and invested actor. This trend is paralleled by a macro-level reorientation of China’s foreign policy goals, where it envisions itself playing a stronger norm-setting role in the global arena.
This policy insights paper explores the values and imperatives that motivate China’s engagement in peace and security, human rights and human security in Africa.
China’s foray into political matters is a consequence of the growing need for it to respond to attacks on its citizens and investments on the ground, but can also be traced to grander foreign policy underpinnings associated with its desire to position itself as a norms entrepreneur in the global arena. What emerges from the interplaybetween these two factors is a dynamic foreign policy that is responsive to the political contexts of African states while guarding the sanctity of state sovereignty.
To be a successful player in promoting peace, security and human rights in Africa, China has found it necessary to develop an approach that mitigates the challenges of operating in volatile environments by increasing its engagements in multilateral organisations. In doing this, China positions itself as an important alternative to established global norms, projecting its aspirations of becoming a more responsible great power in world affairs.
The Centre for Confl ict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Johannesburg-based Foundation for Human Rights (FHR) hosted two public dialogues in Cape Town, one on 11 April 2016 on “South Africa in Africa: National Interest Versus Human Rights?”, and another on 30 June 2016 on “South Africa in Southern Africa: ‘Good Governance’ Versus Regional Solidarity?” Both events were held at the Centre for the Book in Cape Town.
The main focus of the public dialogue “South Africa in Africa: National Interest Versus Human Rights?” was to discuss South Africa’s obligations to the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) generally, and its specific obligations towards arresting Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted for war crimes by the ICC. Following the adoption by the United Nations (UN) Security Council of resolution 1593 in March 2005, several investigations resulted in two warrants being issued by the ICC for the arrest of al-Bashir in March 2009 for war crimes, and, in July 2010, relating to charges of genocide, both committed in Sudan’s Darfur region.
The following four key recommendations emerged from the two public dialogues:
South Africa faces a series of macroeconomic challenges in the coming months that will strain its ability to address its most pressing need – more jobs. The macroeconomic policy approach taken in the recent time period largely adheres to mainstream tenets, emphasising low inflation and fiscal restraint. Since the Great Recession of 2008, however, those tenets have come under scrutiny, even by organisations such as the IMF.
High global levels of unemployment persist seven years after the onset of the crisis, underscoring the relevance of an alternative macroeconomic framework for both developed and developing countries in which the jobs deficit is the utmost priority. Among policymakers and scholars, the urgent need to stimulate employment coupled with multiple additional macro-level challenges has resuscitated attention to the importance of identifying a wider array of macroeconomic tools beyond the standard ones used in the past 25 years.
This policy brief discusses the recent macroeconomic approaches employed by the South African government with an emphasis on examination of the monetary policies adopted by the South African Reserve Bank. Their impact on the goals of employment creation and growth will be discussed. This will be followed by a review of alternative strategies potentially available to the South African government to address these challenges.
Development cooperation is an integral part of India’s foreign policy and India has been extending cooperation to its fellow developing countries even before its independence in 1947. In present times, India’s development cooperation is manifested through its 'development compact' comprising five components, namely, capacity building and skill transfer, technology and related partnerships, development finance (which includes concessional loans and lines of credit), grants, and trade and investment. Off late, Indian extension of Lines of Credit (LoCs) through EXIM Bank of India have also become a prominent modality of Development Cooperation. However, in many a cases it has been seen that the projects faced a number of challenges for effective delivery.
This discussion paper explores these challenges and other issues related to quality and timely delivery of the projects. It also explains evolution of the scheme IDEAS and discusses new guidelines by EXIM Bank.
In 2003, Zimbabwe formally announced the Look East Policy (LEP) in the face of economic sanctions by the West. This, coupled with the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) of 2000, has strengthened trade and bilateral investments between Zimbabwe and China. China is increasingly involved in Zimbabwe's agriculture, mining, construction and tourism industries. There is also an influx of Chinese entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe's retail industry. The repercussions of the LEP have been mixed. In this policy brief, the authors critically engage with three sectors: agriculture, mining and the informal sector; in order to provide an overview of the effects that LEP has had on Zimbabwe focusing on the period 2010-2016. They also propound some recommendations for more positive outcomes in the future.
It is likely that Zimbabwe will continue its strong relationship with China. This is notwithstanding, the fact that it is China that stands to benefit more from interaction with Zimbabwe in terms of natural resource wealth extraction and trade, as compared to the little financial aid being poured into Zimbabwe by Beijing. The evolvement of Sino-Zimbabwe relations will however, remain a matter of strategic interests at play. In this regard, it is noteworthy to highlight that the Chinese government has of late been reluctant to commit to financial investment given the political climate in the country. The recent introduction of the Indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe has also negatively affected Chinese companies particularly in the mining industry.
Rising powers such as Brazil, India and China have achieved major advances in supporting economic and social development in their less-developed regions and in creating health and social protection systems in response to the rapid changes they are undergoing. However, there are gaps in the evidence on this, and understanding these experiences better could ensure that the right lessons from these advances are incorporated into international processes of mutual learning.
Mutual learning is emerging as a new way of talking about the 'how' of development cooperation, particularly in contexts of rapid change, with countries increasingly recognising that they have much to learn from each other's experience. Achieving the promise of universal development within the ambitious and complex framework of the Global Goals agreed in 2015 will require much more systematic and strategic efforts to learn from and share the development policy innovations of rising powers such as China and Brazil. This should include exploring opportunities for other countries to engage with the rising powers' experiences through more structured processes of mutual learning.
What can be done to accelerate mutual learning informed by the important development experiences of rising power countries?
In 2015, China's People's Congress revised and ratified a controversial foreign non-governmental organisation (NGO) management law that is set to take effect in 2017. According to reports, the new law will directly affect approximately 7,000 foreign NGOs operating within the country's borders as well as local NGOs who receive financial support from overseas donors. These groups include foundations, social groups, NGOs and think tanks. Strict government control toward these groups will likely manifest from the law. Whilst the Chinese government may have their own reasoning for the new regulations (concerns about foreign NGOs harming national security), at a time when environmental problems are only increasing in the country and around the world (often with Chinese involvement), this law can only do more harm than good. Globally and in China, often it is international environmental NGOs that do most of the work in trying to address vast environmental challenges.
The ‘Rise of the South’* and the role of ‘emerging powers’ in global development has animated much of the political and economic discourse of the past decade. There is, however, little empirical evidence on the contribution that emerging Southern partners make to sustainable development, due to the lack of common measurement systems for South–South cooperation (SSC).
This case study utilises the analytical framework developed by the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST) to assess the range, extent and quality of South Africa’s peace, governance and economic support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The study reveals that South Africa, in absolute financial terms, is a significant development partner in the DRC, and even exceeds the traditional donors when its aid is measured in proportion to gross national income.
The qualitative field research highlights that South Africa’s approach to development co-operation to a large extent reflects the core values of SSC, although with a mixed bag of successes and failures in terms of the results of co-operation activities. This pilot study of the South Africa–DRC development partnership is one of the first in which the NeST conceptual and methodological framework has been tested for the purpose of further refining tools and indicators for SSC analysis, so as to assist the future monitoring and evaluation endeavours of South Africa and other emerging development partners.
Emerging economies such as India have their own philosophy underlying development cooperation. The norms and mechanisms of such cooperation are different from OECD norms or norms followed by international financial institutions.
There is a need for engagement and dialogue among all the stakeholders involved in development cooperation – the traditional donors, the emerging Southern providers, the development partners in developing countries and international and regional financial institutions. A broad international consensus on international development cooperation in a transformed world would be worth pursuing especially in the context of the very ambitious goals adopted under Agenda 2030 by the United Nations, involving 17 Sustainable Development Goals with 169 targets to be achieved.
It is against this background that the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) organised the Conference on South-South Cooperation in New Delhi on 10 and 11 March 2016 in collaboration with the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; United Nations; Network of Southern Think Tanks (NesT); and the Forum of Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC). The large number of participants, representing all the major stakeholders in SSC – policymakers, academics, civil society organisations, traditional donors, private enterprises and development practitioners – majority of them being from the global South, deliberated at length on major emerging issues facing South-South Cooperation and other forms of development cooperation.
This Report on the proceedings of the Conference, brought out by RIS will serve as a reference for deepening the South-South development cooperation, expanding North-South and Trilateral Development Cooperation, particularly in the context of the recent UN agenda of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
How close is the Tanzanian-Chinese partnership today? Bi-lateral trade and Chinese economic activity in Tanzania today is far more significant than in the 1970s; China’s “no strings attached” policy is still attractive and political solidarities and military co-operation have remained relatively strong. However, this bi-lateral relationship does not have the importance, nor the exclusiveness it enjoyed in the heydays of socialism. Today, China must compete economically, politically and culturally with the activism and soft power of a larger group of countries, particularly the United States. Although both in Dar es Salaam and in Beijing this relationship is still presented as “special”, it has lost the structural role that it had until the late 1970s in shaping Sino-African relations. Growing Sino-American and Sino-Western competition in Africa has increased Tanzania’s option and helped it, to some extent, to better defend its own interests.
This paper examines Tanzanian-Chinese relations over the past half century and more particularly since 2005, highlighting how global political, strategic and economic shifts have affected and on the whole reduced, in relative terms, the importance of this bi-lateral relationship.
The engagement of BASIC in the climate regime is crucial for the maintenance and strengthening of the multilateral system achieved so far. We believe that the regime and the climate change agenda must be subject to a robust foreign policy initiative that may guarantee Brazil’s position of leadership in the field. In this sense, we present the following recommendations:
South Africa is ranked among the world’s top 12 largest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitters, largely due to dependence on plentiful coal for electricity generation and an energy-intensive industrial and mining sector. Under the Copenhagen Accord, South Africa committed to cut emissions by 34% from business as usual (BAU) by 2020, and by 42% by 2025. These targets represented a relative, not absolute, decline in emissions and are conditional on international support. They follow a “peak, plateau, decline” (PPD) trajectory, where GHG emissions should peak by 2020, plateau until 2030 and begin to decline after 2030.
South Africa faces many challenges: the economy is largely energy inefficient and resource-intensive, human development indices remain low, and inequality and unemployment are high. Energy- and other resource use patterns need to be addressed in order to move towards a sustainable, low-carbon and equitable country in a resource-constrained future.
This paper aims to identify opportunities for urban emissions reduction in South Africa. The key findings illustrate cities’ important role in reducing emissions in South Africa, including:
Brazil has taken the lead in climate policy design and implementation in Latin America with the adoption of the National Plan on Climate Change (PNMC) in 2008 and its climate change law, the National Policy on Climate Change, in 2009.
This paper investigates climate policy integration and coherence in land use policies in Brazil. Unlike other policy analyses a key aim is to assess ‘internal policy coherence’ in the climate change domain, or the extent to which positive and negative interactions between mitigation and adaptation are taken into account in policy formulation. The paper is based on a systematic content analysis of major federal level climate change and land use policies. The results indicate a stronger focus on climate change mitigation compared to adaptation in all land uses. Integrated approaches that consider mutually supportive mitigation and adaptation actions are called for in key climate change policies, but so far such linkages remain largely unexplored in sectoral policies. While some progress in this regard occurred in the agricultural sector, this has not translated into actual policy actions that are of use to small-scale producers. In the forest domain the focus remains almost exclusively on climate change mitigation.
Three main recommendations are drawn.
Within the energy and climate debate perhaps no issue is more contentious than the degree to which emerging economies should rely only on non-fossil fuel resources and energy efficiency to meet their growing energy demand. Perhaps the greatest example of this debate can be illustrated by the degree to which India confronts the dilemma of committing to a low-carbon economy while at the same time steadfastly developing a robust energy sector through which it plans to bring electricity access to all its citizens, including 300 million people currently lacking access even to one electric light bulb.
This paper pays a great deal of attention to the Indian power sector where past policies have led to such a deterioration, especially in the transmission and distribution networks, that it will take years and investments in excess of $2 trillion to get India to the point where large volumes of intermittent renewables can be integrated into the grid.
The paper also examines the institutional, social and economic bottlenecks laguing the entire energy sector from inadequate billings and collection systems, bribery of meter readers in various forms, rival bureaucracies at the state and federal levels, power theft, lack of market-based pricing and nonpayment of bills by wealthy industrialists, agricultural landlords, government agencies and the military that will hinder meaningful reform throughout the energy economy.
Finally, the paper addresses the strong arm tactics that the government of India (GoI) has used in seizing land reserved for forest preserves and tribal peoples and opening it up for coal and other industrial activities.
Through analysis of the Indian energy sector, the paper will illustrate the chief issues that will form the cornerstone of this national discussion:
China’s new-found willingness to integrate its national climate policies into international climate negotiations is arguably the single most momentous development in international climate politics in recent times. It removes one of the major stumbling
blocks of past climate negotiations.
There are strong reasons to believe that China will make good on its promises. China’s climate change strategy is connected to the objectives of the current economic restructuring. The link between climate change goals and China’s economic interests lends credibility to its international commitments. But will this link hold? Will the alignment of climate change objectives and economic goals survive under the new conditions of economic slowdown and corresponding political pressures?
There are three scenarios of China‘s climate policy presented in the brief:
Short-term measures threaten climate targets:
• the economic slowdown will not automatically lead to declining CO2 emissions in China. The trajectory of CO2 emissions crucially depends on how remaining growth is being generated
• as maintaining growth and preventing unemployment becomes the priority, long-term structural changes are likely to be postponed. Short-term stimulus through infrastructure and construction threatens China’s climate targets
Implications for European decision-makers:
• a full climate backslide is unlikely. But the changing economic context in China raises questions about the validity of China’s climate change commitments. The temptation to create short-term growth at the expense of long-term climate goals will rise
• under economic pressure, China’s government becomes more likely to revert on recent trends and again prioritise domestic flexibility over international commitments. Agreements need to be reached and fixed quickly before the window of opportunity closes
• EU-China mechanisms of climate change cooperation support a long-term, structural transition. But the emerging challenge is of a different nature. European actors should shift focus towards ways to confront the short-term need for growth and employment without derailing China’s climate change efforts
U.S.-China relations have evolved and grown enormously since the Nixon visit to Beijing in 1972. But despite this progress, underlying mutual distrust over long-term intentions has grown and can over time make mutual antagonism a self-fulfilling prophecy. U.S.-China relations should now advance to a new stage that has the two countries consult and cooperate to address the most critical global issues of the 21st century. Climate change and clean energy, along with the global economic crisis, offer turning points. Cooperation on climate change can help move U.S.-China relations to a new stage; failure to cooperate can introduce significant new tensions.
This report recommends ways to overcome obstacles to cooperation between the United States and China on climate change. The report is intended for senior leadership in each country, with the goal of helping them:
• understand relevant conditions in the other country
• appreciate the priorities and constraints of counterparts across the Pacific
• take action to control greenhouse gas emissions at home
• develop specific avenues of bilateral cooperation
• facilitate agreement in multilateral negotiations on these topics
India and Africa's partnership has entered a new era. Close political relationships are being invigorated by a flourishing trade
and investment relationship. This new trade and investment relationship could be crucial in the struggle to lift millions out of
Africa-India trade has followed the upward trend in South-South trade and investments over the last decade. Bilateral trade has
grown at a robust 31.8% annually between 2005 and 2011, through the economic crisis. There has been a surge in Indian
private investment in Africa with 'big ticket' investments in the telecommunications, IT, energy, and automobiles sectors.
The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Export Import Bank of India (EXIM Bank) initiatives through the India-Africa Conclave and other Government of India initiatives are spurring on the burgeoning trade and investment relationship. In addition to more traditional development approaches, such as through Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation, the business oriented 'development compact' pioneered by CII and the EXIM Bank seems to be positively impacting directly on bilateral trade.
To understand the dynamics of this vibrant relationship, CII surveyed some 60 key Indian and African companies and business associations - a survey undertaken in collaboration with the WTO. Results highlight a number of factors getting in the way of expanded business and investment ties. Access to Indian buyers and trade finance emerges as major concerns for African traders. Transport and logistics costs and poor business environments are cited as major difficulties by Indian traders - a factor also cited as holding back further investment.
This joint CII-WTO report concludes with a series of recommendation on how development assistance and investments in tandem could help smooth out potential bottleneck towards a more sustainable investment-led trade growth relationship.
The nature of India’s relationship with Africa is clearly evolving into a wider, deeper engagement that, while clearly in India’s advantage, also offers significant potential benefits to its African counterparts. This overview of Indian/African economic collaboration is a joint piece of work from KPMG and the Confederation of Indian Industry. It specifically looks at:
An important caveat pertaining to India’s economic relations with Africa, is that they are not confined to the BRICS and India’s reach in Africa extends beyond the alliance. The surge into Africa is driven mainly by the Indian government, but the private sector has not been lagging and significant economic linkages have arisen due to the interventions of the private sector from India.
The overall conclusion is that Indian-African trade and economic relations are likely to continue to grow, even in the wake of massive increases over a relatively short period of time with no current indication that the relationships are likely to cool anytime soon. While global conditions dictate events, the fact that Indian-African trade and economic relations continued to grow even through periods of some economic crisis suggests potential that has yet to be fully exploited.
This report evaluates the disclosure practices of 100 major emerging market multinationals headquartered in 15 countries and active in 185 countries. The report is part of a series on corporate reporting published by Transparency International since 2008. Initially focused on
the world’s top multinationals, the series was expanded to include a first report on emerging market multinationals in 2013.
To enhance comparability, the company sample for this report is primarily based on the 2013 edition of the Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing Emerging Market Multinationals report. This report assesses the public disclosure practices of emerging market multinationals based on three dimensions: first, the reporting of key elements of their anti-corruption programmes; second, the disclosure of their company structures and holdings; and, third, the disclosure of key financial information on a country-b-ycountry basis. This information was gathered from corporate websites and other publicly available sources by a team of Transparency International researchers.
Despite some scattered signs of improvement since 2013, the overall results of the assessed companies remain weak, a clear indication that emerging market multinationals still practise low standards of transparency.
The overall average score for the 100 companies assessed in this report is 3.4 out of 10, a slightly weaker performance than in 2013 but almost on a par with the 3.8 overall score obtained in our 2014 report assessing
the world’s 124 largest multinationals. It is disconcerting to observe that emerging market multinationals, with an average score of 48 per cent, have barely registered improvement in the disclosure of their anti-corruption programmes since 2013, when their average score was 46 per cent. Once again, they trail behind the top global publicly listed companies assessed in 2014.
Overall index result:
Both India and China have been promoting Public Private Partnership in delivering infrastructure in various sectors. This paper examines their current infrastructure condition both in terms of quality and investment and therefore understands the driving factors of them using PPP. It compares and contrasts the characters of PPPs in India and China. India prioritizes in transport and energy while China puts its emphasis in public services. SOEs have a bigger presence in PPPs in China while foreign investors have more space in India.
The main reason for India using PPP is the gap between government fiscal capacity and the increasing infrastructure demand; while in China, the key is innovation, in the sense that private sector has better technology and management skills in tackling sophisticated issues such as water treatment and elderly care. China takes a top-down approach in the promotion of PPP while India, in the national level, also takes a top-down approach but has to take a bottom-up approach in the state level.
The paper also discusses some of the major challenges for both countries including human resources, regulatory and legal framework and financing gap. The author is cautiously optimistic about the future of PPPs in both countries given the fact that both governments having been taking actions to address the challenges although these challenges are quite daunting.
The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) is set to issue its first loans in the second quarter of 2016. The bank, the latest addition to the global development finance landscape, was initiated due to a number of factors in emerging economies. One of the key issues that emerging economies, including the BRICS group, struggle with is the slow pace of reform in existing global financial institutions to better reflect the current political and economic realities (which in some cases deviate significantly from when these organisations were created in the post-Second World War era).
Emerging economies also suffer from serious infrastructure funding deficits, which can be addressed by drawing on the significant domestic savings across developing countries. The NDB was thus born partly as a result of these factors. Since its conception in 2011 the bank has begun taking form, including finalising legal arrangements, assigning different roles and responsibilities among the five founding BRICS members, and setting up an office. Ahead of the extension of its first loans, some details have emerged on the bank’s operations.
This paper tracks the historical development of the NDB, investigates modalities around its operations, and looks towards the likely impact it will have in the development finance milieu.
The NDB has managed to go from being a concept to becoming a reality and extending loans within five years, which is a significant achievement. The set-up of the bank was driven by a number of factors, including the BRICS’s dissatisfaction with the pace of
reforms in existing IFIs and domestic economic factors, such as the need for infrastructure financing combined with the significant domestic savings that could be applied to meet this need.
As the bank is gearing up to extend its first loans in the second quarter of 2016, it has become clear that a number of characteristics will define the bank’s approach. These include a focus on renewable energy infrastructure (at least in the first round of loans); on bringing new and innovative ideas to the fore; on speeding up operations; and on co-operating rather than competing with existing DFIs.
While the NDB’s likely impact on infrastructure financing is difficult to assess at this early stage, it is clear that both challenges and opportunities exist for the bank. For example, while its capitalisation limits its scope, the infrastructure financing deficit is so enormous
that any additional funding would assist in decreasing the gap. And while it is unclear at this point what innovative methods the bank will look to introduce, there is certainly scope to influence other DFIs.
India and Myanmar are geographically proximate countries with strong historical, cultural and economic linkages. With recent economic dynamism and changes in their respective political regimes, the overall bilateral relations between India and Myanmar are poised to be taken up to its next higher level.
This study has tried to address the question as to why the situation fails to improve despite the knowledge of the issues. It finds that the ambiguity at the conceptual level, a lack of information trickle-down at the operational level and narrow interests at the stakeholders’ level are primarily responsible for such a
With India’s unilateral Duty Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) Scheme and ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITGA) now in place, the bilateral trade and economic relations face a new reality, especially with important changes in the policy framework relating to Border Trade Agreement.
It is in this context that India-Myanmar border trade assumes a new meaning and significance. It may be emphasised that the issues relating to border trade would have to be situated in a policy framework which is much broader in its canvas so that relevant policy and practical implementation measures could be identified.