Enough blogs

ICC Chief Prosecutor, Prendergast Discuss Court’s Challenges and Progress

Laura Heaton — Wed, 23 May 2012 20:49:50 +0000

As International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s tenure comes to an end in June and on the heels of developments in high-profile cases testing international justice mechanisms, it’s an opportune time to reflect on the ICC’s first decade. At a recent event hosted by the International Peace Institute in New York, it was a unique occasion that Moreno-Ocampo led the discussion of lessons learned and challenges that lie ahead.

The event focused on a fundamental impediment to the ICC’s work: the court’s inability to execute arrest warrants. Zénon Mukongo Ngay, minister counselor from Democratic Republic of Congo’s U.N. Mission, and Enough Project Co-founder John Prendergast participated in the discussion as panelists.

In his remarks, Moreno-Ocampo stressed that the challenge in moving forward with cases in the ICC’s docket lies in the discrepancy between “consensus” in principle and in practice. “We have an agreement to end impunity and to [adhere to] the Rome treaty, so we have consensus on the principle, but there is not yet the consensus required on implementation,” he said, citing three outstanding arrest warrants for current Sudanese leaders, President Bashir, Defense Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, and Southern Kordofan Governor Ahmed Haroun—all wanted for crimes allegedly committed in Darfur. As a way to illustrate why it is so difficult to gain consensus on the cases, he described the theoretical thought process of some critics of the Bashir arrest warrant, who say “Yes, we agree what you’re saying is a good idea, but not today in Darfur. We’re worried about the South of Sudan. We’ll ignore the Bashir genocide in Darfur.”

Prendergast highlighted this same discrepancy between progress on international justice in theory and practice, calling political will the “key variable and wild card” that has a major impact on the apprehension strategy for each case. In his presentation, Prendergast addressed the primary political interests undermining efforts to arrest the ICC’s three most-wanted men:

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir: Bashir is protectively situated in a powerful clique at the top of Sudan’s ruling party that has overseen a huge increase in oil production financed by Chinese, Indian, and Malaysian investment. Through that business, Bashir has carefully cultivated relationships in a number of capitals in the region and farther afield. Prendergast explained: “This isn’t Qaddafi, who at the end was friendless, so it’s a very different scenario and makes it much more complicated to talk about acting so forcefully in support of this arrest warrant.”

Congolese warlord Bosco Ntaganda: Deals struck by Congolese President Joseph Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Kagame have, by design, protected Bosco Ntaganda against apprehension. The calculation was that Ntaganda would serve a crucial function both in military campaigns and in maintaining a separate power structure running parallel to the Congolese army’s in eastern Congo that is instrumental in maintaining a hold on vast mineral wealth in the region.

Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony: Far less protected than Bashir and Ntaganda, Joseph Kony has in the past enjoyed the support of elements in the Acholi diaspora community but more prominently has been “rescued and resuscitated” from the government in Khartoum. “But this case has the least resistance in crafting a credible apprehension effort,” Prendergast said, and the recent unified action—from the regional armies, African Union, and the United States—directed at capturing Kony, while by no means flawless, is a testament to that consensus.

To see the full event, including Prendergast’s remarks about strategies for overcoming these apprehension obstacles and the intriguing Q+A session, watch the video below.

Till Papenfuss from IPI’s Global Observatory also interviewed Prendergast on the topic of bringing international wanted war criminals to justice on the sidelines of the event.

Photo: ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and John Prendergast at the International Peace Institute (Don Pollard)

Enough Project Proposes Policy Recommendations to the Great Lakes Contact Group

Annette LaRocco — Wed, 23 May 2012 19:49:57 +0000

This Thursday and Friday in The Hague, the International Contact Group on the Great Lakes Region will meet again. Since the early 2000s, the contact group, a body that consists of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the European Union, and the United Nations, has met on a quarterly basis to focus on political, diplomatic, security, and development issues in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

The Enough Project presented the contact group with several key policy recommendations in the run up to their February 2012 meeting in Washington, D.C. In advance of this week’s meeting in the Netherlands, Enough has drafted another set of proposals related to four of the contact group’s urgent subject areas: security reform and civilian protection in eastern Congo, irregularities in the Congolese political process, continued reform in the minerals sector, and armed groups and regional dynamics, particularly with regard to the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA.

The new report, “At the Hague: Great Lakes Contact Group Discusses Justice and Accountability” by Enough’s Associate Director of Research Aaron Hall and Policy Analyst Ashley Benner, reflects on significant changes in the region since the group’s last meeting and proposes key steps for the contact group to adopt to promote peace, development, security, and accountability in the Great Lakes.

Enough’s policy recommendations for the contact group are as follows:

Security in Eastern Congo

Support and pressure the government of Congo to arrest Bosco Ntaganda and his top commanders.
Press the government of Rwanda to support the arrest of Ntaganda and to refuse him and his fellow rebels safe haven.
Use diplomatic and economic leverage to push Rwanda and Congo to a durable peace, including eliminating Rwandan-linked military structures in eastern Congo, resolution of refugee right of return issues, and the dismantling of the Hutu-based FDLR rebel group.
Pressure the Congolese government to implement security sector reform.
Assert to the governments of Congo and Rwanda that Bosco Ntaganda is bad for a stable and legitimate minerals business.

Continued Electoral Irregularities and Provincial Elections

Immediately call for the resignation and reconstitution of the Congolese National Electoral Commission, or CENI, into a more equitable and representative body.
Enact strong consequences and accountability measure for electoral fraud and manipulation by the current government, including but not limited to aid reconfiguration, security assistance, individual sanctions, and travel restrictions.
Coordinate statements that strongly and publicly condemn all state-led efforts to suppress citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms.

Conflict Minerals

Work with the U.S. government to use the burgeoning Public Private Alliance, or PPA, to begin a multilateral process for developing an internationally agreed upon certification scheme for Congo’s minerals.
Support the establishment of a regional monitoring mechanism to verify whether mines and traders are conflict-free.

Armed Groups and Regional Dynamics, including the LRA

Engage with governments in and outside the region as well as the African Union to quickly secure a sufficient number of capable troops for the pursuit of the LRA and protection of civilians.
Provide enhanced intelligence and transport capabilities vital to enabling the troops to locate key LRA commanders, analyze LRA activity, identify threats to civilians, and act quickly on information.
Maximize opportunities to encourage LRA commanders and rank-and-file fighters to leave the group, in conjunction with ongoing military operations.

Photo: Voters check names on a registration list in Congo's election last November (Enough / Sarah Zingg Wimmer)

WATCH: Darfur United – Kicking Off

Laura Heaton — Tue, 22 May 2012 22:49:52 +0000

The underdog is often the team to watch at international sports tournaments. Having risen above challenges and shown up the naysayers, triumphs are sweeter, even when the victory is just having made it so far. The VIVA World Cup, a tournament for teams not represented in the official soccer world—from Northern Cyprus, to Western Sahara, to Tibet—features perhaps more inspiring stories of overcoming adversity than most. But this year, Darfur United will no doubt stand out as a team that truly beat the odds.

The team of 15 players, ranging in age from 18 to 28, has been training in the Darfuri refugee camps in eastern Chad in preparation for the tournament, which will be held in Iraqi Kurdistan in June. All of the Darfuri players were children when they escaped Sudan amid the government-sponsored violence that left villages burned to the ground and family and friends dead and displaced. They now live in 12 different refugee camps scattered near the border, but they will represent all Darfuris when they compete for the Nelson Mandela trophy next month.

i-ACT, an Enough Project and Darfur Dream Team partner, has worked to build Darfur United and is traveling to eastern Chad this week for the final preparations before the tournament. They shared this video about Darfur United:

Last month, Enough featured a guest blog post by Brian Cleveland, a middle school social studies teacher in Seymour, Connecticut, who recently returned from eastern Chad where he worked as a coach for Darfur United and helped select the top 15 players from across the refugee camps to join the team. Seymour Middle School, where Cleveland also coaches basketball and soccer, has raised more than $1,300 this year for its sister school, Choula A primary school in Goz Amer refugee camp.

“Many of our players exclaimed about how this was the first time refugees from each of the 12 camps were brought together," Cleveland wrote about the visit. "Darfuri people have something to root for and be proud of, our players said—an opportunity for the world to hear a positive story of Darfur. The team and I hope that, through the beautiful game of soccer, Darfur United can fulfill its name and give Darfuris a chance to tell their story on an international level.”

Follow the team and learn more about the Darfur United players at DarfurUnited.com and on Facebook and Twitter.

Hijacking the Congo Conflict Minerals Narrative

John Bagwell — Tue, 22 May 2012 20:01:13 +0000

In a post last week, we covered a recent Congressional hearing on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act’s section 1502 held by the House Financial Services Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade. Tom Murphy, a blogger on international development issues respected by many of us here at the Enough Project for his thoughtful and balanced criticism of some human rights advocacy initiatives, featured a response on his blog, A View From the Cave. In the post, Murphy criticizes the narrative of “Profits vs. People” (the title of Enough’s post) as dismissive of the legitimate debate about the positive and negative impacts that the conflict minerals provision is having on the mining sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Murphy takes particular issue with our description of two of the witnesses who testified at the hearing. He wrote:

Academic Laura Seay and activist Mvemba Dizolele also testified during the hearing. The Enough blog posts [sic] puts them into the 'profits' side of the argument saying that they sided with House Tea Party Caucus member and Chairman of the Subcommittee Rep. Gary Miller (R-CA), as well as with industry lobby groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers by testifying against 1502.

Such a connection is unfair to Dizolele and Seay. By taking a stance that someone is either on one side or the other, the Enough Project is dismissing genuine concerns about the implementation of 1502.

It’s important to note that Enough wasn’t involved with this event; indeed, we didn’t have a witness on the panel. But several members of our team attended the hearing and were alarmed to see how the conflict minerals provision is increasingly being employed in the fierce anti-regulatory debate in Congress today. By design, the hearing, entitled “The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502,” set up this “cost vs. impact” dichotomy, as several members of Congress recognized in their opening remarks and questions to the witnesses. For one example, Rep. Gwen Moore (D-WI), who said in her remarks:

I want to make sure we focus on the correct frame when we’re discussing the ‘costs’ of conflict minerals, not just being dollars and cents and extra paperwork and extra compliance officers among our manufacturers. … We’re talking about some of the most wretched and vile mass abuses of humans documented today …

We welcome reasonable debate about section 1502 and have participated in numerous panels and forums alongside critics of both the provision itself and Enough’s approach on the issue. There is no doubt that Dizolele and Seay’s intentions are, like our own, aimed at helping the people of Congo and not on the side of industry in this “profits vs. people” narrative. However, the fact remains that their testimony was used to bolster the bottom line message delivered by Congressman Miller in his closing comments: “And let's hope that the [DRC] government and the region does something about this problem, deals with the human rights. I hate to see the burden placed on the back of American businesses. It's not Congress paying, it's American business paying.” By accepting to appear as Republican witnesses at the hearing, it’s difficult to imagine Seay and Dizolele were naïve to the fact that their testimonies would be used to support this side of the debate.

Section 1502, which attained strong bi-partisan support in its previous life as stand-alone legislation as well as during conference committee hearings, unfortunately seems to be becoming a political football for some in Congress who seek to make it a poster child for anti-regulatory agendas. Both the positive and negative impacts of 1502 should continue to be researched and debated, but our hope is that the conversation occurs in a way that does not contribute to a narrative that dismisses the positive role and responsibility that both the U.S. government and corporate actors have to play in helping to address the crisis in eastern Congo.

I agree with Murphy that, when attempting to address complex foreign policy issues, simply “doing something is not sufficient.” But neither is letting complexities and the pursuit of perfection lead to inaction and the abdication of global responsibility we all have in helping to seek solutions.

If this “costs” approach—focused primarily on whether conflict minerals regulations are too burdensome for corporations but thinly veiled as a debate over whether 1502 is doing more harm than good for civilians in eastern Congo—continues to progress and leads to attempts at a repeal of Section 1502, it will set back years of work and political will generated for action—not just pertaining to Congo, but for any issue that seeks to address corporate responsibility and transparency as an entry point for tackling challenging human rights issues across the globe.

Photo: Members of a mining cooperative in Walikale, with copies of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank bill (Enough / Laura Heaton)

Enough 101: The Lord’s Resistance Army in Darfur

Mollie Zapata — Tue, 22 May 2012 15:06:53 +0000

Editor’s Note: As part of the series Enough 101, this post is intended to provide a contextual background for understanding the complex issues that the Enough Project works on. To learn more about the LRA, read “The Lord’s Resistance Army: Who Are They?”

Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, originated in northern Uganda, spread to eastern Congo, Central African Republic, and South Sudan, and is now suspected to have moved even further north to operate in the historically conflict-ridden Darfur region of Sudan. The LRA’s status as a regional threat and U.S. designated terrorist organization has garnered international attention and focused the efforts of the U.S., affected governments, and African Union on arresting Joseph Kony and bringing an end to the LRA’s deadly regional operations.

Uganda (which has been pursuing the LRA for more than 20 years) and Sudan have a history as rivals, often providing safe haven to each other’s rebel groups. Uganda supported the rebelling Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, in Sudan’s Second Civil War, and Sudan backed Uganda’s nemesis, the LRA. In 1994, the LRA began receiving support—in the form of weapons, ammunition, military training, and use of military bases in what was then the southern part of Sudan, now the independent Republic of South Sudan—from the Sudanese government.

Additionally, the government of Sudan in Khartoum tends to support proxy armies to fight its battles (as seen in Sudan’s support of the marauding Janjaweed in Darfur and various militias in South Sudan). In the early 2000s the LRA fought as such a proxy on the side of the Sudanese government against the SPLA.

Though Khartoum claims to have cut off all support to the LRA in 2002, it is very likely that Kony and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (both wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity) continued this mutually beneficial relationship until 2005, when Omar al-Bashir’s government in Khartoum signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the South Sudan rebels, which led to South Sudan’s independence in July 2011.

After such a long history of collusion between Kony and Bashir, it is no surprise that the LRA eventually made its way north to perpetrate attacks in the Darfur region of Sudan. The U.N. Group of Experts reported that in July 2009, Kony ordered the LRA to move into eastern Central African Republic “with the intention of proceeding to Darfur.” The LRA was first confirmed in Darfur, which abuts South Sudan’s northernmost border, by the Enough Project in March 2010 at the same time Khartoum was intensifying its own attacks in Darfur. In an oped for Foreign Policy at the time, then Enough Project Executive Director John Norris wrote:

The evidence clearly suggests that advance LRA scouts coordinated with Sudanese armed forces well in advance of the LRA's arrival in Darfur, and it seems implausible that local Sudanese armed forces commanders would welcome the group in Darfur without seeking approval from Khartoum, including Bashir. There are also suggestions that the LRA has received direct logistical support from the Sudanese army since arriving in Darfur.

This development was even more problematic because Ugandan forces did not have permission to cross into Sudan to pursue the LRA.

According to two eyewitnesses, in October 2010 a mission led by Kony’s chief body guard met with a Sudanese intelligence officer and the armed forces commander of the western region of Sudan to request assistance and asylum for Kony. As a result, the Sudanese provided the LRA with satellite phone numbers “to facilitate future contacts with Kony.”

Between January and March 2011, the LRA staged attacks in Raga County, South Sudan, which borders Darfur, potentially signaling renewed efforts to move north and reconnect with Khartoum to seek financial or material support. Fears that the LRA would become involved in a renewal of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict upon South Sudan’s secession in July 2011 did not come to fruition, and it wasn’t until a year later that the LRA was again allegedly spotted near Darfur.

In April 2012, a Darfuri rebel group said that Kony and the LRA were in Darfur, and a week later a Ugandan army spokesman agreed, claiming that they had intelligence locating the LRA in Sudan and linking the Khartoum government to the LRA. However, this information is not confirmed, and considering Uganda and Sudan’s long history of conflict and trading accusations, may not be credible. Sudan denied all allegations of supporting the LRA, while Ugandan President Museveni threatened to defeat Sudan if the allegations proved to be true.

If the allegations are true, the regional armies pursuing the LRA would likely find themselves unable to operate in Sudan, and the LRA could find safe haven there. This would be a major obstacle to success for the U.S. military advisors deployed in the region and the new African Union initiative to end the LRA.

UPDATE: Tracking Compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2046 on Sudan and South Sudan

Jenn Christian — Tue, 22 May 2012 09:46:13 +0000

In the wake of U.N. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios’ briefing to the U.N. Security Council on May 16 concerning Sudan and South Sudan’s compliance with Resolution 2046, Khartoum remains, in many respects, defiant. In particular, Sudan continues to resist a return to negotiations with South Sudan, asserting that security issues must first be addressed. Notably, Resolution 2046 explicitly provides that the two sides must return “unconditionally” to negotiations. In light of the impasse, President Thabo Mbeki, head of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, or AUHIP, met with President Bashir over the weekend. The meeting did not, however, yield immediate assurances from Khartoum that it will return to negotiations anytime soon.

For its part, South Sudan has called in recent days for the imposition of sanctions on Sudan for its failure to implement certain aspects of Resolution 2046. "They [Sudan] have violated all aspects of the resolution of the Security Council. So it is time the global community extends their support to the decision of the UNSC and imposes steep sanctions [...] against Khartoum," said South Sudan’s Minister of Information Barnaba Marial Benjamin.

In an effort to track these and other developments, the Enough Project has updated its timeline and chart that track Sudan, South Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North’s compliance with Resolution 2046. As developments continue to unfold, the Enough Project will update its timeline and chart accordingly.

View timeline infographic full-screen.

To track the actors’ compliance with those conditions on which the resolution does not attach a corresponding deadline, the Enough Project has produced a new table. The table identifies the conditions from Resolution 2046 with which deadlines are not associated and then lists indicators of actors’ compliance, or lack thereof, with each of those conditions.

	Conditions in UNSC Resolution 2046 without Corresponding Deadlines		Indicators of Implementation or Lack Thereof
	Unconditional withdrawal of Sudanese and South Sudanese armed forces to their respective sides of the border (Operative Para. 1(ii))		None to date.
	Sudan and South Sudan cease the harboring of and providing support to rebel groups in the other state (Operative Para. 1(iv))		4 May 2012: President Bashir accuses the leader of the SPLM-N rebellion in South Kordofan, Abdel-Aziz Al-Hilu, of being “a mere façade of the foreign powers” that fund the SPLM-N’s activities, an implicit reference to South Sudan’s suspected support of SPLM-N forces. 10 May 2012: President Bashir proclaims, “"If they [South Sudan] want to change the regime in Khartoum, we will work to change the regime in Juba. If they want to attrite us, we will attrite them. And if they want to support our rebels, we will support theirs."
	Sudan and South Sudan activate an ad hoc committee under the JPSM to receive and investigate complaints and allegations made by one party against the other (Operative Para. 1(v))		None to date.
	Sudan and South Sudan must immediately cease all hostile propaganda and inflammatory statements (Operative Para. 1(vi))		9 May 2012: Chairperson of the Security Committee of South Sudan’s National Legislative Assembly announces that South Sudan will again attack Heglig if SAF forces continue to attack South Sudanese territory. 11 May 2012: President Bashir proclaims "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" policy in any future attacks by South Sudan against Sudan. President Bashir went on to say, "We have fertilized the soil with their [South Sudan’s] dead," and SAF forces "will defend the country and chop off any hand stretching to take it."
	Immediate cessation of attacks against property or religious and cultural symbols belonging to nationals of the other state (Operative Para. 1(vi))		None to date.
	Sudan and South Sudan extend full protection of nationals of the other state in line with international principles and consistent with the Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters initialed in March 2012 (Operative Para. 1(vi))		14 May 2012: Humanitarian airlifts begin to evacuate an estimated 12,000 South Sudanese previously stranded in Kosti, Sudan to Juba, via Khartoum. The airlifts are organized by the International Organization for Migration, or IOM, and supported by the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. 18 May 2012: The International Organization of Migration, or IOM, continues airlifts of stranded South Sudanese out of Sudan. Flights have been increased from two to four a day and IOM plans to further expand the number of flights to six per day.
	GoS and SPLM-N extend full cooperation with the AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD to reach a negotiated settlement (Operative Para. 3)		8 May 2012: The SPLM-N calls for “a comprehensive peaceful settlement” to conflict in Sudan. 9 May 2012: The leadership council of the NCP, chaired by President Bashir, states that it does not agree to elements of UNSC resolution 2046 regarding negotiations with the SPLM-N. 10 May 2012: Commander in chief of SRF forces and SPLM-N chairman, Abdel-Aziz Adam El Hilu, says that "the root cause of conflict in Sudan can never be addressed through selective dialogue. It is requires comprehensive understanding and settlement." 14 May 2012: Sudan’s parliament rejects negotiations with the SPLM-N.
	GoS and SPLM-N acceptance of the tripartite agreement for humanitarian access to Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Operative Para. 4)		8 May 2012: SPLM-N reiterates its acceptance of the Tripartite Proposal and expresses its willingness to initiate a “humanitarian cessation of hostilities” to allow for the Proposal’s implementation. 14 May 2012: Sudan’s parliament rejects the Tripartite Proposal.
	Protection and promotion of human rights in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law by all parties (Operative Para. 7)		11 May 2012: Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, condemns Sudan’s "indiscriminate" aerial bombings of South Sudan, saying, "I am saddened and outraged to learn that such attacks which place civilians at great risk - and have already killed and injured some and caused many thousands of others to flee - have been taking place again in recent days." Pillay further declares, "Deliberate or reckless attacks on civilian areas can, depending on the circumstances, amount to an international crime."

Go here for the most recent Compliance Tracker Updates.

Photo: Rubkona market in South Sudan's Unity state smolders after an aerial bombardment in late April (AP)

Petna Ndaliko in Eastern Congo: "The Party Goes On"

Chloe Christman — Mon, 21 May 2012 21:20:36 +0000

Editor’s Note: On May 1, the Raise Hope for Congo campaign launched “I Am Congo,” a new video series highlighting voices from the ground. The series profiles five inspiring Congolese individuals—Fidel Bafilemba, Amani Matabaro, Denise Siwatula, Petna Ndaliko, and Dominique Bikaba—who are making a difference in their communities. Enough Said will be highlighting each video profile over the coming weeks.

As we entered the Yole!Africa compound in Goma, passing through a guarded gate that separated the center from the chaotic city streets, we felt as though we had stepped into an oasis. The four of us—our team travelling to collect the stories of five individuals for I Am Congo—had just finished our first attempt to film the streets of Goma. Our shoot was cut short with the arrival of members of the Congolese army who, to put it lightly, did not want to be on camera despite the official film permits we had in hand.

Young men were scattered around the Yole! compound preparing for the upcoming music and film festival—two were rapping to a heavy beat, others were practicing their dance moves, and others sat still watching the performances, their backs against the building’s walls painted with images conveying freedom and peace. It was a stark contrast to the blaring horns and armed men we had just been surrounded by.

Petna and other Yole! staff took us on a tour of the facilities and introduced us to some of the youth gathered for the day. Many of them were wearing t-shirts from the previous years’ festival with the silhouetted face of Patrice Lumumba (much like the iconic Barack Obama “Hope” image), representing the hope for political change and the pursuit of something better. The center is a rare place in eastern Congo where youth come together to do something different, where they can escape the chaos of Goma’s busy streets and relax in an atmosphere that feels like an alternate reality compared to what surrounds the concrete, barb-wired walls. Yole! provides not just a space and encouragement to explore, but also equipment—including microphones, speakers, laptops, and video cameras—and training for film editing, music, and other arts. Yole’s annual SKIFF Festival brings together an estimated 14,000 people for 10 days of movie screenings, performances, and exhibitions, creating community through art. A filmmaker himself, Petna created a space where youth can keep “building and not destroying.”

Petna faces many challenges in his work, and that day he told us about how local authorities had entered the compound the previous day and arrested some of the youth who were practicing without providing any reason. He also told us about the difficulties in obtaining a permit to build the stage for the 2011 SKIFF Festival, then just a couple days away. But the challenges do not stop there. Yole! has been robbed three times in the past year resulting in the loss of 15 laptops, two professional cameras, seven additional video cameras, two still cameras, and three external hard drives. In the case of the most recent robbery, which took place on April 24, five armed robbers, three of whom wore local police uniforms, took among their loot two external hard drives with footage of the recent controversial presidential and legislative elections. They also severely injured the center’s security guard.

Petna has created a space that fosters community, values freedom and expression, and provides youth an alternative to violence. He teaches them to speak up to challenge the status quo of oppression and instability through art therapy and peaceful expression, but this approach, like any other attempt to bring out change, makes Yole! a target. Despite all this, Petna refuses to stop. As he says cheerfully in the video, “The party goes on.”

At the center, we asked Petna what motivates him to continue in the face of these challenges. We could not have anticipated the answer: He recounted an experience when he visited HEAL Africa, a local hospital and organization providing services to communities and survivors of sexual violence, to project a film. In the audience was a woman who had not spoken at all since she had been raped. Moved by the film, she finally opened up. The four of us capturing and hearing this story stood frozen in place—the din of the nearby rap rehearsal seemed to lessen in the moment—as he recounted this story. We knew in that instant we had captured the core of what Petna does and why he does it.

For information on how you can support Yole!Africa in the wake of the most recent robbery, visit their Facebook page or donate here.

Share Petna's story and view the other "I Am Congo" video profiles.

New Amendment Bars Non-Humanitarian U.S. Aid to Countries Hosting Sudan’s Bashir

Annie Callaway — Mon, 21 May 2012 16:01:33 +0000

Despite being wanted by the International Criminal Court for genocide and crimes against humanity, Omar al-Bashir remains comfortably in power as the president of Sudan. In an effort to boost international pressure to have him arrested, the House Appropriations Committee recently adopted an amendment which would cut off all non-humanitarian aid to countries that allow Bashir to travel within their borders. The amendment was offered by Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) who has a longstanding history of championing Sudanese issues on the Hill.

“In a time when the foreign affairs budget is being squeezed, I believe our assistance should be a direct reflection of American values and priorities,” Wolf stated in support of the amendment. By threatening to cut off potentially huge amounts of financial assistance, the U.S. is warning countries that have a history of welcoming Bashir that this behavior is unacceptable and will now warrant consequences. The amendment allows the secretary of state to make an exception if he or she determines that the country in question is furthering the peace process between Sudan and South Sudan.

Bashir’s crimes span the spectrum of inhumanity. From Darfur to the Nuba Mountains and Abyei, he has an ongoing history of orchestrating and bankrolling violence against his own people. Despite South Sudan’s independence last year, the Khartoum government continues to terrorize South Sudanese civilians as well through indiscriminate aerial bombardments.

Rep. Wolf emphasized that apprehending Bashir would also be beneficial for American security interests, noting that “Bashir’s government gave safe haven to Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s, and Khartoum was a revolving door for Hamas and other designated terrorist groups.”

The amendment is timely, as the African Union has invited Bashir to attend a summit in Malawi this June. Malawi also hosted Bashir at a trade summit last year—a move that prompted Representative Wolf and others to call on the Millennium Challenge Corporation, or MCC, to discontinue its program in Malawi in light of allowing a wanted war criminal to travel freely within its borders. The MCC has since suspended its compact with Malawi and cited Bashir’s visit as one of the reasons behind this decision. The recently adopted House amendment will hopefully inspire similar action by the African Union, bolstering Malawi’s calls for Bashir’s invitation to the July summit to be rescinded.

The U.S. has significant economic influence globally, leverage that can be used to support bringing Bashir—and other wanted criminals—to justice. The humanitarian, economic, and political situation in Sudan is rapidly deteriorating and will continue to do so as long as its head of state enjoys impunity from crimes he has committed against the very people he is meant to serve and protect. Wolf’s amendment is an important component of a comprehensive strategy to address the complex situation in Sudan. Help make sure the U.S. makes this a priority by asking your representative to support the Sudan Peace, Security, and Accountability Act of 2012.

Photo: Congressman Frank Wolf (Roll Call)

U.N. Security Council Should Remain Vigilant in the Face of Sudan’s Mounting Defiance of Resolution 2046

Annette LaRocco and Jenn Christian — Fri, 18 May 2012 14:50:45 +0000

On Wednesday, the U.N. Security Council received its first briefing regarding Sudan and South Sudan’s compliance with Security Council Resolution 2046. In the closed meeting, the U.N. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, briefed the council on the events in Sudan and South Sudan since the passage of the resolution. As mandated, Menkerios’ presentation was the first of what will be biweekly reports regarding the situation in the two Sudans and the compliance of Sudan, South Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, or SPLM-N, or lack thereof, with the terms of Resolution 2046.

U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice characterized Special Envoy Menkerios’ report as a “mixed assessment…on the compliance with the various provisions of Resolution 2046.” The Enough Project’s Compliance Tracker has been monitoring the implementation of the resolution’s deadlines and provisions.

To that end, the government of Sudan has failed to meet several deadlines enumerated in the resolution, including:

Continued aerial bombardments of Unity state, South Sudan after the 48-hour deadline for cessation of hostilities.
Failure to redeploy SAF troops out of the Abyei area within the two-week deadline, despite South Sudan’s withdrawal of its police force from the area.
Indications of reluctance to unconditionally return to North-South negotiations within the two-week deadline, despite the South’s willingness to do the same.

Moreover, the government of Sudan has violated several provisions of the resolutions, including:

Continuation of the use of inflammatory statements and rhetoric, such as Bashir’s statement that, "We have fertilized the soil with [South Sudan’s] dead."
Rejection of negotiations with the SPLM-N.
Refusal to agree to the Tripartite Agreement, which would allow for humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

For its part, South Sudan has expressed its willingness to comply with the resolution, in particular, through its recent redeployment of South Sudan police out of the Abyei area and its commitment to return to negotiations.

Khartoum’s delayed implementation of certain aspects of the resolution, and patent refusal to implement others, should come as no surprise to the U.S. and other U.N. Security Council members. Such behavior conforms to the Khartoum regime’s consistent pattern of either delaying implementation of certain agreements to the point of abrogation or vociferously refusing to implement some or all aspects of other agreements or international obligations. Members of the Security Council must keep this demonstrated patterns of behavior in mind in the coming weeks and months as they monitor all parties compliance with the resolution and weigh when, if at all, the imposition of sanctions may be warranted.

Despite the government of Sudan’s measured defiance to the U.N.’s actions, Ambassador Rice credited Resolution 2046 with helping establish a situation “somewhat better that it was two weeks ago when the resolution was passed.”

However, the current calm along the North-South border is not sustainable without the initiation of mechanisms designed to address holistically center-periphery issues within Sudan as well as outstanding North-South issues. To this end, the international community must resist Khartoum’s demands to separate resolution of its conflict with the SPLM-N and other opposition groups in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Darfur, and other marginalized areas within Sudan with the negotiation process between Sudan and South Sudan.

As Ambassador Rice stated earlier this week:

The reality is that, as we all agree in there, it is impossible to separate what is happening from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile from the larger conflict between North and South. And the North would be wise to return to the table with the SPLM-North, to allow humanitarian access, which was discussed in there as a matter of enormous urgency given the onslaught of the rainy season. And the North needs to know—and the SPLM-North needs to know—that they have obligations in this regard under the resolution.

Other members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as the greater international community, should heed Ambassador Rice’s statements in this regard. The government of Sudan should not be permitted to undermine Resolution 2046 and continue its policy of creating divisions between the various conflicts in which it is engaged. Whether its South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Darfur, Abyei, South Sudan, or Beja, the international community must no longer allow the government of Sudan to utilize a divide and conquer policy in an effort to play regions within and around Sudan off of one another in a bid to stay politically and diplomatically viable.

Photo: U.N. Security Council (AP)

5 Stories You Might Have Missed This Week

Laura Heaton — Fri, 18 May 2012 13:16:05 +0000

Here at Enough, we often swap emails with interesting articles and feature stories that we come across in our favorite publications and on our favorite websites. We wanted to share some of these stories with you as part of our effort to keep you up to date on what you need to know in the world of anti-genocide and crimes against humanity work.

Reporting from the South Sudan side of the front line, a team from the Associated Press examined the impetus for the recent flare-up with Sudan. Reporter Jason Straziuso considers the immediate, if not lasting, impact of the rainy season on the border clashes, and photographer Pete Muller captures images of life as a soldier and a civilian on this contentious swath of land.

Indispensible Congo blogger Jason Stearns provides an update on the ever-evolving Bosco mutiny, offering estimates of the number of fighters currently following Sultani Makenga, commander of the CNDP-offshoot M23, a description of their staging area, and insights on talks between Congolese and Rwandan officials about a variety of common issues but, conspicuously, not the fate of the mutineers.

The Ugandan army was eager to have reporters speak to the recently captured LRA commander Caesar Acellam and highlight his role as a “big fish” in the rebel group. But analysts Simon Jennings of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting spoke to were more measured about the development, saying it offered little concrete insight into the strides made by the UPDF. “If Acellam did give himself up voluntarily, analysts say the arrest tells us little about how close the pursuit force is to catching Kony and the other commanders,” Jennings writes.

“Little Mogadishu”—also known as the Singo Training School in Kakola, Uganda—is a thousand miles away from the real thing and situated beside a cow pasture, but it’s the “heart of the Obama administration’s strategy for fighting al-Qaeda militants in Somalia," writes The Washington Post’s Craig Whitlock. American defense contractors hired by the U.S. State Department, many with combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, will train about three-fourths of the African Union force deploying to Somalia, offering expertise in homemade explosives in particular.

Drawing from U.N. officials, human rights advocates, and a leaked U.N. report, Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch examines what’s motivating the dramatic decline in reporting about human rights violations in Darfur. The detailed piece highlights UNAMID’s compromised reporting on atrocities, as witnessed firsthand by members of the U.N. experts panel, that was “consistent with a pattern of bias ... which tended to ignore government abuses while highlighting those carried out by the rebels.”