As you know, the position of the aircraft (for display on the Map and as used by a number of systems) – is determined by the FMC (Flight Management Computer). Of course the FMC actually has no inherent ability to determine position at all – it merely looks at the positions provided by other systems and uses that information to decide where the aircraft is.

These systems include ADIRU/IRS (Inertial Reference System ), Radio Navigation Aids and of course the now ubiquitous GPS . The FMC looks as these positions and uses the most accurate one – typically GPS – to update it’s own determination of aircraft position.

This distinction is important. In the event of a GPS failure which causes the FMC to re-consider (for example) the ADIRU/IRS as the new position source, it will take some time for the FMC position to “wander” across to the IRS determined position. It’s not instantaneous – which is a good thing, given that the aircraft would take a sharp turn to head back towards track if the position reference were to change quickly.

GPS is indeed ubiquitous, as these days at any point in space it’s not unusual to be able to gain position information from between 6 and 9 satellites. This is a whole lot of redundancy and increased accuracy in position fixing. While that many satellites are unlikely to fall out of the sky any time soon (solar flare activity notwithstanding ) the weak point is of course the onboard GPS equipment. Should it fail then we revert to 1980′s navigation technology of Radio Navaids falling back on ADIRU/IRS. Today’s IRS’s are stunningly accurate – after 14 hours of flight, despite an ANP of 20 miles or more – it’s not unusual to see less than a mile’s difference between the GPS and ADIRU. But that mile discrepancy is a significant impact on terminal navigation – were it not for radio updating of the FMC position.

Isn’t it about time someone looked at the formula for determining the ANP of a current generate IRS? It sure seems like the numbers (which starts at about 4 nm/hr and ameliorates out to about 20 nm after 10 hours) seems a bit excessive when I’m scarcely seeing more than about half a mile drift on the IRS when I shut down after 14 hours).

Oh – and if you’re not clear on the difference between the ANP of an inertial position and actual IRS drift then you’d better stop reading this and head back into the FCOM.

Therefore, it’s such a pity we turn off NAV RAD updating of the FMC position by default in the FMC during Pre-Flight. There’s a reason we do this and it’s based on RNP / RNP-AR approvals, but it does leave the ignorant exposed should GPS position fixing fail.

From a training point of view – this is where the simulator frustrates me no end.

You see today’s simulator’s are totally unable to simulate IRS drift, except as a hugely obvious simulated mapshift failure. IRS drift is actually a normal event – rather than a non-normal one. At any stage of flight, pressing the EFIS POS button will show some degree of IRS drift – along with the FMC ignoring it because GPS or NAV RAD is in use. If these other more accurate sources aren’t available – you won’t see IRS drift because the FMC is following the IRS – even though the drift is there; you now have mapshift. But in the simulator – the IRS doesn’t drift and no matter how long you fly for, the IRS position is superimposed right over the GPS position – which is totally missleading.

This is where the GPS failure comes in. In preparation for RNAV RNP AR approaches – all radio nav updating in our aircraft has been disabled by default. Hence if the GPS fails, the FMC will not use radio aids to calculate position – instead it will default to the Inertial ADIRU/IRS position. Fortunately the GPS Checklist encourages the use of radio navaids as a navigation source – but it’s not exactly clear about the need for it.

Practices & Techniques : GPS Failure and Subsequent Navigation

In the event of total GPS loss to the aircraft, the QRH NNM checklist asks the crew to consider allowing the update of FMC position by radio updating “If radio updating is allowed.”

Radio Updating of the FMC position is inhibited by default, and checked in this position during pre-flight. After a GPS failure, if radio updating remains OFF, all position fixing all FMC position (and subsequent LNAV Navigation) is based on IRS positioning. On a typical 14 hour flight to LAX, this means the aircraft could be anything up to 1 nm left or right of centreline if LNAV is used to position onto a precision or non-precision approach.

Crew will need to enable radio updating and closely monitor navigation performance – typically via the EFIS POS facility.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

GPS Failure and Subsequent Navigation

FMC (Flight Management Computer) scratchpad messages are generated at the bottom of the screen built into the FMC CDU (Computer Display Unit). It is a one line display that the FMC uses in order to pass a message onto the crew. They are not (directly) a part of Boeing’s design intent for the alerting system of the aircraft – that said, some of them do come with an EICAS alert  FMC MESSAGE  – many do not though.

The scratchpad itself is the incongruous name given to the bottom line of the CDU. Any text entered in via the keyboard or line selected down from the higher lines of the CDU end up in the scratchpad. From here they can be either cleared or line selected up into one of the lines of the CDU display above. As an example, you can use the keyboard to enter the name of a waypoint “YOW” and enter it into the LEGS page to change aircraft navigation.

The scratchpad is also where the FMC places messages. These messages cover many purposes – data entry errors; a requirement for additional information; details of uplink/downlink COM status, and more. Apart from the messages themselves, the FMC CDU also has CDU Annunciator lights on the front used to communicate as well (DSPY – Display; OFST – Offset; MSG – Message; and EXEC – Execute) – do you know (exactly) what they all mean?

Scratchpad messages are classified as follows, and come with the following annunciations:

• FMS Alerting Messages (Scratchpad Message, EICAS  FMC MESSAGE  alert; CDU MSG light)
• FMC Communication Messages (Scratchpad Message, EICAS COM Message (FMC) annunciation; CDU MSG light; Aural High-Low Chime)
• FMS Advisory Messages (Scratchpad Message, CDU MSG light)
• FMS Entry Error Messages (Scratchpad Message; CDU MSG light)

The use of the same space for data entry and to communicate messages would seem to be somewhat fraught – but not when you realise that there are actually two display lines in this area, one over the other, with the scratchpad data entry line having priority over the scratchpad message line. It is this feature that allows you to retain a scratchpad message while you correct the situation that prompted it – which is in keeping with the way we are trained to deal with most error messages on the flight deck. For example …

You were/are off track (due weather) and now that you are in the clear, decide to head back towards track and return to FMC LNAV navigation. You turn the track bug and the aircraft follows. You’re pointing towards the next waypoint, and select LNAV on the MCP. At this point LNAV appears in white on the FMA indicating that LNAV mode engagement is armed; but an FMC scratchpad message annunciates “NOT ON INTERCEPT HEADING“. According to the FMC Pilots Guide “LNAV is selected on the MCP and the airplane is not within the capture criteria of the active leg, or the current heading does not intercept the active leg.”

The most common response to this is to clear the scrathpad message and adjust the track of the aircraft so that it intercepts the active leg. However if instead the message was left in the scratchpad, while you turn the aircraft to intercept the active leg, the FMC would re-evaluate the intercept and remove the message by itself – validating the action of the Pilot Flying. From a CRM/NTS/Error Management point of view – this is a far more satisfying solution.

But wait, there’s more …

I mentioned that in fact there are two scratchpads – and there are. It is possible to interact with the CDU scratchpad, either entering data via the keypad or line selecting data down from the CDU screen into the scratchpad, while retaining the scratchpad message in memory. Any use of the scratchpad by the pilot will hide the message, but retain it (if it’s not cleared first). Once you have used the scratchpad and cleared it of your entries – the scratchpad message will be displayed.

Note that although it may seem clumsy, it’s impossible line select a scratchpad message into a CDU LSK position – but still, it seems like a lot of bother, doesn’t it.

But consider the case of a runway change on departure. A new runway is selected and the FMC generates “TAKEOFF SPEEDS DELETED”. It’s telling you something important – “New performance data is entered after the VSPEEDS have been entered on the TAKEOFF REF page, a takeoff thrust selection change is entered after the VSPEEDS have been entered, or pilot-entered values do not comply with the relative takeoff speed check. The crew must reselect proper VSPEEDS.”

Normally the pilot manipulating the FMC will clear this message (hopefully with the acknowledgement of the other pilot) and then ideally deal with the missing speeds straight away. However it is entirely possible to retain this message right through a takeoff speeds entry process until the speeds are re-entered, at which point the message will self clear. Which of these two process is less prone to error – less prone to forgetting to re-enter your speeds?

In any event, our discussions did resolve one thing – we are going to introduce an SOP whereby a pilot who intends to clear a scratchpad message is required to confirm that action with the other pilot. For the most part – this should be happening anyway, but taking this action raises the visibility of a good habit – and give Check Captains something to look for as well.

Practices & Techniques : The FMC is trying to tell you something – why aren’t you listening?

The CDU scratch pad is the FMC’s prime method of trying to tell you something. Messages like “UNABLE HOLD AIRSPACE” or “TAKEOFF SPEEDS DELETED” or “ROUTE DISCONTINUITY” are the FMC’s way of communicating a problem to the crew – a problem that is valid, even if the crew don’t understand the message. It’s not uncommon to see crew clear those messages with minimal acknowledgement, a habit that unfortunately commences during simulator training.

CDU Scratchpad messages need to be dealt with like any other annunciation in the flight deck. Noticed, Called, Analysed, Acted Upon. Some of the more common(ly ignored) FMC messages are listed here.

VAI SOP Standard Calls require the CM1/CM2/PF/PM to confirm a scratchpad message with the other pilot prior to clearing a message. This requirement commences once the pre-flight initial CM2 setup / CM1 cross check is complete.

While there are scratchpad messages which are all but inconsequential to flight (STANDBY ONE or INVALID ENTRY) and there are messages which are commonly understood and occur routinely (INSUFFICIENT FUEL [during route changes]; UNABLE HOLD AIRSPACE; DRAG REQUIRED or UNABLE RTA) there are also messages which can have a significant impact of flight path and flight safety (DISCONTIUITY; INSUFFICIENT FUEL; RW/ILS FREQ/CRS ERROR; or TAKEOFF SPEEDS DELETED).

Finally, a smart pilot may not choose to clear an FMC CDU Scratchpad Message – but instead retain the message in the scratchpad until the underlying cause has been corrected. The CDU is fully functional while a scratchpad message is displayed with any data entered into the scratchpad line replacing the message until that data is either line selected into the CDU or cleared, at which point the message is returned – if it’s still valid. An example of this could include “NOT ON INTERCEPT HEADING” when LNAV has been armed but the aircraft is not tracking towards an active leg – correcting the aircraft track will clear the scratchpad message.

Standard Calls : FMC Scratchpad Messages

The FMC CDU communicates with pilots through data entered and calculation results on the CDU itself, four CDU Annunciators (DSPY, OFST, MSG and EXEC) and CDU Scratchpad Messages. These messages are categorised into Alerting, Communication, Advisory and Entry Error messages.

Anytime a CDU scratchpad message is generated after the initial pre-flight CM1/CM2 data entry/cross check procedure is complete – the CM1/CM2/PM/PF is required to check awareness in the other pilot prior to clearing the message. This is required whether the EICAS FMS MESSAGE is generated or not.

PM : “FMC TAKEOFF SPEEDS DELETED”
PF : “CHECK“

For a conservative NTS operation – consideration should be given to not clearing certain scratchpad messages, but instead dealing with the underlying cause behind the messages. Once the cause has been dealt with, the scratchpad message will be removed by the system.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

FMC Scratchpad Messages

Door FWD Cargo Checklist Extract

Our current phase training includes a  DOOR FWD CARGO  unlocked indication shortly after takeoff. Apart from satisfying a matrix requirement and giving crew experience of this non-normal, the overt intent of this failure in the simulator profile is to give crew a reason to divert to the nearest suitable airport.

The  DOOR FWD CARGO  checklist itself requires that the aircraft be de-pressurised to ensure that if the door was to come off, less damage would be done than if the aircraft were fully pressurised. At this point the crew are at 8,000 ft and de-pressurised. Continuing to Los Angeles seems unlikely.

That said in a previous simulator we had two similar failures like this. The first was Door Forward Cargo indicating not locked in flight; the second was Door Forward Cargo – door comes off the fuselage out into the airflow and on it’s way down the side of the aircraft, takes out the right engine along with two hydraulic systems. As the instructor it was easy to confuse the two failures in the IOS – well, it was easy to confuse them once. Being pressurised/unpressurised never seemed to make much impact on the amount of damage that forward cargo door did as it embedded itself in the right engine – but I digress.

Anyway… I was supposed to program a Door Forward Cargo indication failure on takeoff. I did this through the gear lever so I wouldn’t have to hit the button on the failure myself. I programmed the simulator so that when the lever was selected UP, the failure became active – and sat back to watch.

At least that was my intention – so far it hasn’t been successful. The Sim Instructor Operator Station (IOS) indicated the failure was active – but there was no indication to the crew, even after the takeoff inhibit ended. Oops. As it turned out later – this failure is only written by CAE to work on the ground. We’re still trying to find out why, but even knowing that isn’t going to change the fact that the failure doesn’t work airborne.

As such I was forced to improvise on the spot – often not a great recipe for training fidelity …

Door AFT Cargo Checklist Extract

Sticking with the theme – I failed one of the other cargo doors instead. The problem now is that the simulator is VH-VPD which was our first owned aircraft, and it has the small version of the main cargo door aft of the wing. The size distinction is important in this failure. All doors on the aircraft (Cargo, Cabin, E/E Bay, etc) are plug type doors – a Boeing innovation where essentially the door is bigger than the hole it fills and therefore the higher the pressurisation differential between inside/outside the aircraft, the less likely the door will come open. Don’t ask me how a door that’s bigger than the hole opens outwards to let the passengers and cargo in – that’s just magic as far as I’m concerned.

Despite being a plug type door, when not indicating locked the Forward Cargo Door checklist requires the aircraft de-pressurise. We have always presumed this is related to the size of the door. The smaller Aft Cargo door does not require de-pressurisation and diversion – as long as the cabin is pressurising normally. Thus despite the failure the crew would assess and continue on to Los Angeles, extending the sim session from 2 hours to 14. Since I needed them to divert (no coffee or toilet in the sim) the next obvious choice was … you guessed it, pressurisation failure.

Because I knew the small door failure wouldn’t cut it, I programmed them simultaneously. Rather than the instantaneous heart-rate-raising big bang failure, I used slow de-pressurisation. Essentially the aircraft would fail to pressurise because the aforementioned small door was not only unlocked, but not properly closed. Hence the crew would assess pressurisation, realise the problem, and return. At least, that was the plan.

This statement seems pretty clear, doesn’t it?

Note: The aft lower cargo door is in a safe configuration as long as cabin pressurization is normal. Positive cabin differential pressure ensures the door stays in place.

Boeing 777 Air Synoptic

That shouldn’t be too hard to work out, should it? Pressurisation at this point is assessed via the AIR Synoptic page. Apart from showing good bleed air from the engines to the air-conditioning packs, the AIR synoptic also shows values such as Cabin Altitude and Rate of Climb, Differential Pressure and Forwad/Aft Outflow value positions.

A good crew would typically see the picture shown here during climb after takeoff. By “good”, I mean a crew who would initially see the failure, think about it, then ignore it. They’d have QRH familiarity and know that this checklist doesn’t come with memory items, but they’d also know what the most likely outcome of this checklist was. They’d follow Boeing doctrine and delay running it until the critical take off phase was over, the aircraft was clean (gear and flaps retracted) and usually wait until the aircraft had cleared any terrain issues associated with the departure airport. Thus typically the aircraft would be climbing through about 7,000 ft by the time they finished the checklist and had a look at the AIR synoptic to assess pressurisation.

A quick glance shows you – Cabin Altitude below aircraft (as it should be); Cabin Altitude Rate climbing (normal, so is the aircraft); Outflow Valves Closed; duct pressure adequate, differential pressure positive. The problem here is … the quick glance. Like me – you’re looking to confirm the normal, rather than seeking what’s abnormal and looking for indications against the normal bias – looking to confirm a problem. Now let’s look again.

• Cabin Altitude – 5,500 is quite high. The cabin altitude is controlled in part by the selected cruise altitude. High takeoff weights (and therefore lower initial crusing altitudes) combined with the high cabin differential pressure capability of the 777 (9+ PSI), initial cabin altitudes in the 3000-4000 feet range are normal. This one is at 5,500 because the door is slightly ajar and the pressurisation system is unable to maintain the required lower altitude as the aircraft is climbing. It’s doing it’s best – I’ve been seeing cabin altitudes up to 2000 ft below the aircraft in the climb with this failure – but still to high for an initial cabin altitude.
• Cabin Rate – 800 fpm is not extreme, but again given the high diff of the 777 and the typically lower initial cruise altitudes, you see less than this typically.
• Cabin Differential Pressure – a Delta P of 1.2 is way too low. In cruise it would be well over 8. The 1.2 here is because the hole in the aircraft is not quite big enough to equalise the pressure – the Bleed Air/Packs are working hard. But 1.2 is far too low for this altitude when the pressurisation is working “normally”. Speaking of holes in the aircraft …
• Outflow Valves – The basic operating premise of an aircraft pressurisation system is that air flows in at a faster rate than it flows out – but it does flow out. It is only during Non-Normal events that you see fully closed outflow valves. Closed outflow valves are an indication that the Bleed Air/Packs are unable to provide adequate airflow – a pressurisation problem.

It’s very easy as the instructor to sit at the back and judge the errors of your students in front of you. It’s slightly more difficult to divorce yourself from the insider knowledge you have as an instructor and assess realistically. In this case, the signs are subtle – but they’re there. I could certainly not state with my hand over my heart that confronted with the same situation the first time, I would have picked up on these indications. For me though, the outflow valves are definitive. The only time they’re both closed airborne is when something is wrong.

The discussion point here is the concept of assessing a system on the aircraft. With EICAS Warning/Caution/Alert messages – we are no longer used to looking at gauges and indicators and assessing the performance of a system. We are also separated from the normal operation of the aircraft by automatics and self monitoring systems and synoptics pages that were looked at during initial training, but now remain hidden away until they’re required by an unusual situation. We’ve become quite reliant on the alerting system to diagnose failures and provide clear, simple indications of what the problem is and what we have to do next.

So far most crew have missed the pressurisation problem that I programmed in concert with the door failure. Once the aircraft climbs above 10,000 ft (and the cabin above 8,000 ft) the pressurisation failure becomes clear and the crew act accordingly. For myself, serendipitously this experience has taught me to take simple checklist words such as “cabin pressurisation is normal” more carefully.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Assessing System Status/Performance

From what I can glean on the web, the 737 Max while incorporating some revolutionary technologies in the engines and airframe – is essentially a 737NG on the flight deck, and certainly several steps behind the 777 – which entered service 17+ years ago in 1995. South West being the launch customer for the 737 probably has something to do with that, as well as minimising the training for all the 737 pilots in the world – you’ve gotta love legacy equipment … but I digress.

I was recently in Singapore viewing the new Boeing Training Facility , their 777 simulator and other facilities. Purpose built, the facility was impressive and a clear sign of Boeing’s commitment to the growth of Asian airlines and their orders for lots of Boeings.

Of particular interest to me are the procedural trainers that Boeing have in place. It’s easy to see how these wonderful devices can be used to supplement and replace fixed base simulator sessions in the transition syllabus. Flows can be practised and with the addition of in depth system displays that respond to panel selections and programmed systems failures – this brings a low cost alternative to the use of a very expensive full flight simulator, without the distraction of motion and visual. I should think will in the very least provide equal training value (you’re always pressure for time in a Simulator) with the potential to produce better outcomes given good instruction. Students transitioning onto the aircraft can sit with their partner and review the lessons ahead of time, maximising the potential learning benefit when they do enter the full flight simulator.

B777 Procedural Trainers

The picture on the far right is a screen short of an overhead panel segment with a live systems display that responds to switch selections and other system related events. What a fabulous addition to a training center.

While the 777 simulator was familiar, and the 777 ground trainer a pleasant surprise … I was there for a promised ride in the 787 … which we eventually got.

B787 Sim Ride

There’s no end of detailed reviews and videos on the 787 on the web (including a few on Flight). I wasn’t in the sim long enough to compete with those, and having not done any training on the aircraft - we didn’t even see a non-normal – I wouldn’t even try. This is just a touch and feel write up.

I suspect we were all looking forward to the 787 sim. I’ve done quite a bit of reading about the aircraft, and have several friends who are either flying it already or are instructors/test/delivery pilots on the aircraft. Jetstar and Qantas are getting them this year (we saw some JSQ pilots in Singapore on conversion courses for the 787) and there’s a remote possibility my own airline may eschew the A350 and order B787′s as well (although I’m not holding out much hope personally).

B777 Procedural Trainers

The flight deck was pretty much as I’d expected to see, with the exception of the HUD ( Heads Up Display ) – I’d completely forgotten about it. A friend that had accompanied me on the trip had flown and trained on the HUD before but I haven’t encountered one. To be honest I approached it with trepidation and in fact kept putting it away. I was focussed on getting the most of the 787 as a 777 pilot – seeing what came of those skills thrown into the 787 as it were. I wasn’t disappointed but used the HUD for my last circuit.

The Displays

As a 777 pilot – the displays were simply a joy to behold. Pure Boeing with nothing of that half-finished look Airbus screens all seem to inherit. The central EICAS screen has gone and been replaced by two large PFD/ND screens in front of the pilots. Half of the ND is taken by the pilot who has the EICAS display up – nominally the PF although I suspect this will come down to an airline determination for the most part. As the PF I wanted EICAS over on the PM side so I had that enormous Nav Display – until I was asked to look for something on it, at which point I could see the benefit of the PF not having to stretch across to look.

B787 Display

For the Boeing pilot – the screens are purely evolutionary here – a clear, thoughtful developmental process onwards from the 777 displays. Some of the features were a joy to behold, such as the RNP envelope indication on the ND and the vertical profile display. Our 777′s don’t have this (even as our 737′s on the domestic fleets do, for the most part) and the vertical situational awareness benefits it brings are immediately apparent.

Handling

I can’t speak much to the handling, I just didn’t see enough of the envelope. Being only Boeing’s second fly by wire commercial aircraft (?) (unless you count the 777 several times – 100, 200A, 200B, 300, 300ER, 200LR, 200LRF, etc) I would not have expected much variation from the 777 and didn’t find any. Ground handling (as much as it can be in a sim) was conventional. Acceleration on the runway was impressive (as it always in in an empty aircraft) and I managed the first rotation without to much “staging”. Everything after that was entirely conventional and once again, like slipping on the 777 glove. As always I’m sure there were hundreds (thousands!) of little bits of software code working away to make the flight easy – and it was. Paul or Stu thought it was a bit touchy in pitch – I can’t speak to that. It was lovely to fly.

The HUD

I flew my first circuit without the display. I just wanted to enjoy basic flight without the gadgets (Ha! No gadgets in a 787 – Sure!) However downwind I lowered it into place and started exploring. As someone who flies with glasses on, I initially found the HUD something of a challenge. Apart from focussing issues (which were mostly in my mind, in retrospect), I had difficulty in obtaining the exact seating position that revealed the entire HUD. I kept finding that either the FMA at the top or part of the compass rose at the bottom went missing. On one of the videos below, I moved the camera around to give you an idea of what I was initially experiencing. As an instructor who has “debriefed” a vast number of pilots for seating position in the 777 over the last 10 years , the irony was not lost on me.

Ken at the B787 Controls

Eventually I found my spot. Should I ever end up instructing in the 787, I’m clearly never going to have to discuss seating position with the pilots I train. If they can see the HUD, they’re in the right position. If they can’t – they’re going to have to get into the right position, and that’s the end of it.

Paul, another colleague that had accompanied me, flew his entire first circuit (radar vectored ILS) on HUD alone and did not find it challenging. By all means we would get more from it having done a HUD training package first – I was still finding additional prompts and information highlights in the HUD late on final. I was fortunate enough to be given some time in the e-Jet sim last year and there were thrust and speed assistance mechanisms on the e-Jet PFD that are strongly reminiscent in the HUD. It’s a great bit of kit – my last approach was in Cat 2 weather with a manual landing at the bottom and the HUD certainly comes into it’s own in this environment.

I took a couple of videos of the HUD during Paul and Stu’s flight. If you’re interested – there are far better videos on YouTube and I suggest you go look at those.

Unfortunately there wasn’t time for much more than that – we’d spent too much time (as far as I was concerned!) reviewing the Boeing facilities – the reason we were there! – but I’m certainly looking forward to my next encounter with the 787.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

The Boeing 787 – Evolutionary and Revolutionary

There are several reasons why Decision Making Models are in use. The popular notion is that there are some pilots who can’t make decisions, and need a model; just as there is a popular notion that some pilots are natural “decision makers” and no matter how complex the decision, they never need a model; the truth is perhaps somewhere in the middle.

Modern aircraft are both very complex and highly simplified. Information presentation systems, coupled with alerting and electronic checklists take what could be a very complex system and reduce it to essences that pilots can pretty easily deal with. There are a couple of problems with this though.

One of these is the Non Technical Skills requirement. Even after the Captain (or First/Second/Relief Officer) has reached a good decision based on complex information after risk analysis and implementation review – this has to be communicated to (and agreed to by) everyone else – this is better achieved when everyone is along for the ride, rather than told when you’ve reached the destination. Or at least, ideally it should. Some of the natural decision makers out there who aren’t necessarily thinking these things through methodically (consciously) but still coming up time and time again with the right decision – may not be the greatest of communicators.

Finally – there’s the QF32 factor. Where the problem is really bad and the information is so complex, so changing and so overwhelming, that a reasoned decision taking all factors into account allow the situation to develop fully to avoid impulsively rushing in – may not be possible. It’s get the aircraft on the ground time.

In any event – with a few models on the table (in the Group) – we’ve been trying to reach a consensus …

F O R – D E C

Facts

• What is the full extent of the problem?
• Gather all relevant Facts.
• A problem which has been well defined at best usually suggests its own solution and at worst prevents the crew from going down the wrong path.
• It is important to stay focused on defining and understanding the problem rather than rush to the solution.
• There will often be more than just the one problem requiring a solution and they will all need to be carefully considered and then dealt with in order of priority.

Options

• What options are available?
• Define the different options you have, considering that there may be several possible options to facilitate a safe outcome.
• Time can be considered as; critical, available and required. There are very few problems that require immediate action. In the vast majority of cases a considered and well developed plan is going to lead to a safe optimised resolution.
• The use of open questions can assist in staying problem centred. “What do you think … ?”

Risk/Benefit

• What are the risks and benefits associated with each option?
• With the given situation, what are the assessed risks in pursuing a course of action weighted against the perceived benefit?
• With the given situation, do we return for an immediate landing overweight or do we take up the hold and jettison fuel?
• With the given problem, do we land on the longer runway with a crosswind or the shorter runway with a headwind?

Decision

• Which option have you decided on?
• After spending an appropriate amount of time on the first three steps, the commander must eventually make a decision.
• This is the step that many people instinctively leap to, however correct application of a management model will lead to a process driven solution that will have initially focused on accurately defining the problem, analysing the options before finally deciding on the solution.

Execute

• Execute the selected option. Once the decision has been made, the plan must be put into action

Communicate

• Communicate your intentions.
• Once the plan has been executed, the commander must ensure that his intentions are communicated to all interested parties.
• This will include the cabin crew and passengers within the aircraft, along with relevant agencies on the ground.

Irrelevantly, one special moment in all this has been finding out the various models that are around and in use. It’s been fascinating – here’s a sample. All models have their good and bad elements. Many share common ideals and drivers – since the problems all the models are trying to address are substantially similar.

DODAR (British Airways)

D – Diagnose
O – Options
D – Decide
A – Assign
R – Review

DECIDE (US FAA)

D – Detect
E – Estimate
C – Choose
I – Identify
D – Do
E – Evaluate

NMATE (Boeing)

N – Navigate
M – Manage
A – Alternatives
T – Take Action
E – Evaluate

SAFE

S – State the Problem
A -Analyse the Problem
F – Fix the Problem
E – Evaluate the Result

GRADE

G – Gather Information
R – Review the Information
A – Analyse the (you guessed it) Information
D – Decide
E – Evaluate the Course of Action

FATE

F – Fly the Aircraft
A – Analyse the Alternatives
T – Take Action
E – Evaluate

RAISE

R – Review the problem
A – Analyse
I – Identify solutions
S – Select an Option
E – Evaluate

ADFP

A – Aircraft (Consider the Problem)
D – Destination (Appropriate)
F – Fuel (Sufficient)
P – People, Pax, ATC, Company etc.

3P’s

P – Perceive
P – Process
P – Perform

OODA

O – Observation
O – Orientation
D – Decision
A – Action

CLEAR

C – Clarify the problem
L – Look for data and share information
E – Evaluate different solutions
A – Act on your decisions
R – Review performance

PILOT

(this has to be the best one, surely?)
P – Pool the facts
I – Identify the problem
L – Look for Solutions
O – Operate
T – Take Stock
(perhaps not)

SADIE (Emirates in the 90′s)

S – Share Information
A – Analyse Information
D – Develop the Best Solution
I – Implement your decision
E – Evaluate the Outcome

RCCSDAD

R – Recognise
C – Control the aircraft
C – Contain the emergency
S – Safe Flight
D – Decide
A – Act
D – Divert?

SOCS

S – Situation, define
O – Options
C – Consequences of actions
S – Select (an Action)

DESIDE

D – Detect
E – Estimate
S – Set Safety Objectives
I – Identify
D – Do
E – Evaluate

During the discussion the following models were advanced by the “managers” I work with. I must admit, I got at least halfway down them until I realised they were pulling my chain. Some of these require inside knowledge… so, for you VA folk, next time you have Paul or Stu on the other end of a Beer, ask them.

APPLE

A ssess the problem
P erform the correct memory item
P erform the correct checklist
L et ATC know what you are up to
E xecute the diversion

IPAD

I nterrogate
P robe
A ssess
D ecide

BESTPRACTICE

B elt sign ON
E xamine the problem
S ound the alarm
T ell the cabin
P riorities
R isk assessment
A ction plan
C hecklist complete
T hreat and error management
I ndicate intent
C onsider the options
E xecute the plan

KENSCHAIR

K now the problem
E xecute the diversion
N otify ATC
S ecure the aircraft
C hecklist complete
H old if required
A irport for diversion
I nform passengers
R eview the risk

What model does your airline use?

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Decision Making Models in Aviation

Image Credit: http://www.wikipiedia.org

At that time, the initial training for the 777 Type Rating was provided in our own 777 Flight Simulator by Alteon , which is now a Boeing Company. While the contract required that our in house developed SOPs (based primarily on Boeing FCOM/FCTM documentation) were to be taught to our transitioning pilots – we encountered a number of stumbling blocks. One of these was Missed Approach Acceleration.

Note : This post has been updated to include some analysis on turn radius and potentially compromising the calculated splay by accelerating prior to MAA/MSA.

Background

At the bottom of an instrument approach, if visual reference is not established the crew are required to execute the Go-Around procedure and commence a Missed Approach. Initially configured for landing – the undercarriage is raised and some of the landing flap is retracted in the go-around procedure as the aircraft transitions from the descent to a climb.

This is the beginning of the Missed Approach Procedure. While the procedure may involve lateral manoeuvring (turns) – what I’m primarily concerned with here is the vertical component.

From an initial climb speed of essentially the final approach speed, at some point the aircraft will need to accelerate, retract flap and reduce thrust from the go around (typically maximum) thrust setting to something like Climb/Max Continuous and establish level flight at a safe altitude. The bone of contention is when that acceleration phase commences. When I arrived, our students we being taught to accelerate at 1000 ft AAL in the missed approach, in common with the take off profile.

However a missed approach often does not follow the same departure track as a take off, and while intermediate acceleration for engine out departure profiles is assessed – this is not the case for engine out missed approach climb.

Boeing References

There area number of Boeing FCOM and FCTM references in this area.

FCOM NP 21.40 “Go-Around and Missed Approach Procedure”

The FCOM normal procedures reference specifies acceleration at “acceleration height”. This term is not defined elsewhere in the FCOM or FCTM.

FCTM 5.64 “Go-Around and Missed Approach – All Approaches”

The go-around profile diagram in the FCTM again refers to “Acceleration height” without further defining this term.

FCTM 5.58 “Go-Around and Missed Approach – All Engines Operating”

This section covers in detail the acceleration and flap retraction segment of the missed approach in more detail.

Go-Around and Missed Approach – All Engines Operating

The minimum altitude for flap retraction during a normal takeoff is not normally applicable to a missed approach procedure. However, obstacles in the missed approach flight path must be taken into consideration. During training, use 1,000 feet AGL to initiate acceleration for flap retraction, as during the takeoff procedure.

If initial manoeuvring is required during the missed approach, do the missed approach procedure through gear up before initiating the turn. Delay further flap retraction until initial manoeuvring is complete and a safe altitude and appropriate speed are attained.

Command speed should not be increased until a safe altitude and acceleration height is attained. Accelerate to flap retraction speed by repositioning the command speed to the manoeuvre speed for the desired flap setting. Retract flaps on the normal flap/speed schedule. When the flaps are retracted to the desired position and the airspeed approaches manoeuvre speed, select FLCH or VNAV and ensure CLB thrust is set. Verify the airplane levels off at selected altitude and proper speed is maintained.

Acceleration subsequent to a Go-Around should not be commenced until:

• Initial manoeuvring is complete.
• A safe altitude (or flap retraction altitude) and appropriate speed have been obtained.
• Obstacles in the missed approach flight path must be taken into consideration.
• During Training, 1000 ft AGL may be used to initial acceleration for flap retracting, based on the procedure used during Take Off.

FCTM 5.60 “Go-Around and Missed Approach – One Engine Inoperative”

The FCTM does not differentiate the acceleration and flap retraction stage of a go‑around for engine out operation. In fact the recommendation is that the same procedure is to be used.

Go-Around and Missed Approach – One Engine Inoperative

The missed approach with an engine inoperative should be accomplished in the same manner as a normal missed approach except use flaps 5 for the go-around flap setting for a flaps 20 approach or use flaps 20 as the go-around flap setting for a flaps 25 or 30 approach. After TO/GA is engaged, the AFDS commands a speed that is normally between command speed and command speed + 15 knots. The rudder is automatically positioned by the TAC to compensate for differential thrust with minimal input required from the pilot. Select maximum continuous thrust when flaps are retracted to the desired flap setting.

This implies that acceleration and flap retraction during an engine out go-around:

• Should not be commenced until the same criteria has been met as for a normal go-around;
• That the same procedure is advisable for both All Engine and Engine Out manoeuvres;
• That 1000 ft AGL should be used during Training.

The Problem – Missed Approach Acceleration at 1000 ft AAL

This is the crux of our problem. Owing to the references in the FCTM to acceleration at 1000 ft AAL “During Training” – Boeing/Alteon teach their/our students that Missed Approach Acceleration (both All Engine and Engine Out) requires acceleration to be commenced at 1000 ft in the missed approach. This is actioned by increasing the speed on the MCP – and it’s wrong.

As we’ll see below – ICAO PANS OPS has no concept of acceleration and clean up in the middle of a missed approach. While it’s true that there is a concept of initial, intermediate and final missed approach segments, these refer to climb profile (initial missed approach finishes as the aircraft reaches positive climb in the missed approach manoeuvre) and terrain clearance – there’s an increased terrain clearance requirement in the final missed approach segment.

The primary reference document here for us is the ICAO document 8168-OPS/611 (volumes 1 and 2).

PANS OPS Missed Approach Procedure Acceleration

An instrument approach requires a maximum nominal gradient of 2.5% from the commencement of the intermediate missed approach segment, to the completion of the final missed approach segment.

Terrain at certain airports may require gradients in excess of this in which case this is documented on the relevant approach plate.

The missed approach path is segmented into Initial, Intermediate and Final – with associated limiting speeds (Cat D aircraft) of Intermediate 345 kph (186 knots) and Final 490 kph (264 Knots). The delimiter between the intermediate and final missed approach segments is the obstacle clearance achievable.

As such, while the speed limit associated with the missed approach construction should allow acceleration to Vref 30+80 after a go-around, the missed approach path construction itself does not include any allowance for an acceleration segment. This does not mean intermediate acceleration cannot be undertaken – but no terrain clearance allowance is made. The aircraft must clear 2.5% from the MAP (Missed Approach Point) to the MAA (Missed Approach Altitude).

As primarily a JAR-OPS airline, a detailed examination of the FAA United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) documentation has not been completed for this issue. However it is know that an intermediate acceleration segment is not part of the American regulations, and minimum gradients of anywhere from 2.1% to 3.3% are in use, terrain notwithstanding.

Procedural Commonality – All Engine vs Engine Out

Because of the excess thrust available during a two engine missed approach, an intermediate acceleration segment could potentially be scheduled during a two engine missed approach and still allow the aircraft to remain clear of terrain. However this would mean documenting, training and relying on the recall of two different procedures for the missed approach, depending on whether this is flown with one engine inoperative or not. Most airlines reach the conclusion that this carries an unacceptable safety risk against an acceptable loss of potential engine wear and tear and extra fuel usage for the relatively few two engine go-arounds that are encountered in normal line operations.

Many crew have enough difficulty scheduling a 1000 ft acceleration during an all engine missed approach, without having to remember not to do it during an engine out missed approach.

Engine Thrust Limits

Extending the missed approach segment to the MAA has the potential to infringe on the 5 minute limit on engine thrust in excess of Maximum Continuous Thrust (all engine) or the 10 minute limit on engine out thrust in excess of CON thrust.

However the risk of an exceedence of the 5 minute all engine limit is low, owing to the excess thrust available when two engines are operational. In any case, during a normal all engine missed approach a setting significantly less than TOGA thrust is scheduled (enough for 2000 fpm) unless required by the performance of the aircraft – in which case it’s … required.

Our crew are trained to be aware of these limitations and in the event of a 5 minute or 10 minute exceedence, manual selection of CON thrust is available to the crew through the CLB/CON switch on the MCP, terrain clearance permitting.

It should be noted that the 5 or 10 minute limit exceedence is likely only when a high MAA is involved. A high MAA is almost certainly the result of significant terrain in the missed approach path, which is exactly the situation where an intermediate acceleration and flap retraction would most put the aircraft at risk.

Acceleration : Airspeed, Turn Radius – and Splay

One point commonly made in defence of delaying acceleration is that by increasing speed, you increase your turn radius, and therefore potentially compromise the calculated splay. This has some validity to a point, but not as much as you might think. Engine out flight paths are calculated based on a maximum of 15 degrees angle of bank until the aircraft has begun accelerating. Once airspeed increases – this limit is thrown out the window both by certification and the autopilot/flight director system. At clean speed the aircraft should schedule at least a 25 degree angle of bank turn.

Based on the 777=300ER – the potential range of initial missed approach speeds ranges from a light weight 130kts out to Max Landing Weight Vref Flap 20 (Engine Out) of about 169 knots. In either case the aircraft would clean up to Up Speed (Min Clean, or Green Dot speed on the Airbus) of about 229 knots. So – making the numbers simple:

• Turn radius assuming no acceleration would be based on a speed range of 130 … 170 kts; turn radius calculated using 15 degrees AOB.
• If acceleration is commenced early – a maximum speed of 230 kts and a maximum bank of not less than 25 degrees.

Therefore you can compare the calculated 15 degree turn radius of the non-accelerating aircraft at 170 kts with the accelerated (up to 230 kts) aircraft at 25 degrees angle of bank. The result looks something like this:

And in graphical form …

What this tells us is that essentially the accelerated aircraft turning at 25 degrees bank will have a smaller turn radius than the maximum speed unaccelerated aircraft, out to almost (but not quite) the clean speed of the aircraft. It’s really only in a very small corner of the envelope that your terrain clearance is at risk – from the point of view of turn radius.

In Summary : SOP Missed Approach – All Engine & Engine Out

We train our crew using the standard Boeing FCOM NP’s, with an additional document (SOP Guide : NPs) to clarify interpretation and any procedural differences.

Both All Engine and Engine Out missed approaches are flown to the Missed Approach Altitude, without acceleration. PF/Capt may elect to accelerate early if above MSA and confident of remaining so to the completion of the Missed Approach flight path.

Crew are training in this procedure through documentation, in the simulator and during line training. Boeing/Alteon notwithstanding.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Missed Approach Acceleration

This failure has something of a history in 777 simulator training. As candidates (and instructors) encounter the failure after the first instance, there’s a tendency to “over think” and become somewhat inventive in how it’s handled. Let me explain.

In the simulator this failure is typically given at high altitude to add the complication of the requirement for an engine out drift down. Thus the PF needs to decide between running the checklist, or commencing a drift down in anticipation of the thrust loss – or both. The determining factor is usually the margin above minimum manoeuvring speed – it’s a judgement call by the PF/Captain.

Boeing 777 Engine Oil Press L,R Checklist Extract

Alternatively it’s given during climb with high thrust set on both engines. This reduces significantly the time before the onset of engine failure indications including further limit exceedences, engine/airframe vibration and more severe damage. You can’t run an engine for very long without oil pressure and the more thrust you ask of it, the shorter that time period is. It should be noted that in this circumstance one of the Engine Failure checklists (along with the associated memory items) is usually a more appropriate response to the failure than the annunciated  ENG OIL PRESS  checklist.

In the simulator, the time between the EICAS (Engine Indicating Crew Alerting System) message and the onset of engine damage is pretty dependent on thrust on the engine and is essentially formulaic – driven by simulator programming. If the failure occurs in the climb and climb thrust remains set – engine failure with the potential for engine damage comes soon(er). Once the engine indicates the conditions for Limit/Surge/Stall or Severe Damage/Separation, the PF (Pilot Flying) should commence an Analysis (P&T 7.13 Engine Failure Analysis) and commence any applicable memory items. Don’t forget to Fly The Plane.

It’s not unusual for the crew when first given this failure to be slow in actioning the checklist, and the engine fails with associated limit exceedence / damage indications. The crew’s reaction to this experience, combined with some (perhaps) inappropriate debriefing by the instructor leads to some inventive responses from both trainees and instructors alike during follow up encounters. This usually takes the form of:

• Calling for the  Engine Limit/Surge/Stall  checklist memory items in response the low oil pressure indication. Since low engine oil pressure shows a limit exceedence, this would seem a logical response. Having run the memory items – the appropriate follow on would be the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall checklist rather than the annunciated Oil Pressure checklist (although attempting a re-start of the engine may not be advisable.) Note however that these memory items only reduce thrust on the engine and it’s the checklist that actually shuts it down precluding further damage. Thus the memory items will only delay the onset of engine damage. Therefore a follow action often seen in the simulator is …

• Calling by memory for the Fuel Control Switch … Cutoff. Some instructors will frown upon this action, but it’s a legitimate call by the Captain of the day to make. This combination of Engine Limit/Surge/Stall and Fuel Control Switch secures the engine and prevents (further) engine damage when for some reason responding directly to the  ENG OIL PRESS  is not possible (why not?).

The above is however a fairly complex response to a simple loss of oil pressure. It’s hopefully fair enough to say that the simplest response is probably to (a) fly the aircraft; and (b) run the checklist. If the aircraft is in a high thrust situation this can often be relieved quickly by the PF through levelling off and slowing down – without the need for running checklist memory items or checklist items by memory. Levelling off and slowing down (where possible) usually achieves the aim of reducing thrust on the affected engine enough to give you time to complete the  ENG OIL PRESS  checklist (at least to Fuel Control Switch … Cutoff) prior to engine damage.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

ENG OIL PRESS – A Simulator Scenario

First, some background.

Delaying Final FMC Performance Data Entry

Our SOP’s are pretty much based on Boeing’s for the 777. Initially the FMC is (almost) completely programmed by the First Officer while the Captain does the walk around outside during the pre-flight phase. I say almost, because the crucial takeoff performance figures are left out deliberately at this stage.

The Captain will verify the FMC entries made by the First Officer against the flight plan and other sources once back on the flight deck. Once again critical Aircraft Weight, Take off Thrust / Configuration / Speed and other take off related performance information is left blank.

There are good reasons behind delayed entry of this data. The first is the changing nature of this information during pre-flight – between initial data entry and pushing back for departure a number of the variables upon which performance information is based can and does change. Aircraft weight, departure runway, airport weather, configuration – and several more – are all subject to change. If the FMC were completed initially, each change on one of the variables would require an update to the FMC.

There is also the likelihood that a single change in a variable can produce several settings changes in the FMC. All this multiplies and complicates the process of achieving accurate, cross checked performance information into the FMC.

Thus we wait until we have the final weight of the aircraft known and updated airfield weather data available. Then if necessary a re-calculation of takeoff performance data is done and the final figures entered into the FMC shortly before pushback.

The cross check for the initial FMC setup is one pilot entering information into the FMC; later on a second pilot independently verifies the data entered.

Final FMC Performance Data Entry

Once the load sheet is received and a final run of laptop calculated take off performance is done – the Final FMC Performance Entry Procedure results in (hopefully) the accurate entry and cross check of the required data. The importance of the accurate calculation and entry of this information cannot be over emphasised.

While the procedure certainly looks complicated (as shown here on the right), a lot of the complexity here comes from the detailed scripting of who does what in terms of the source of the information and who has it; the entry of information and who does it; and the cross checking. In practice it’s a lot easier than it reads.

This procedure is learned and practised on the ground using a computer training aid and then a flight simulator until it becomes fluid from recall. A competent crew with procedural repoire aren’t at all challenged by the correct completion of this procedure – omissions and errors stand out clearly to an observer familiar with the flow it.

That said …

Reading through the procedure the roles of the two pilots involved are clear.

- First Officer has the take off performance data (laptop) and provides the figure to the CA.
- Captain has the Load Sheet (aircraft weight and center of gravity) and enters the numbers provided by the First Officer.
- First Officer cross checks that the numbers provided to and verbalised by the Captain are actually entered correctly into the FMC.

This is where the current issue comes in … Who should be doing What?

The cross check here is two pilots working together using a tightly defined, scripted procedure to enter data across several pages of the FMC. Omissions by one pilot should be picked up by the other. Though it ties up both pilots at once and is subject to an elevated risk due any interruptions; this procedure is considered industry best practice.

Who Flies?

There has been a number of research projects, based on data collected from airline flight operations, examining the rates of error production – and more importantly the rate of error detection - when comparing a procedure done by the Captain and monitored by the First Officer, versus reversed roles. Our procedures (above) are clearly designed based on the Captain – being the more experienced and therefore more likely to correctly action a procedure – as the protagonist in our script physically entering the data.

However there is data now (actually it’s been around for a while) to suggest that while an increased error rate may occur if the junior less experienced crew member is performing a procedure, the error capture rate (as enforced by the Captain) is significantly higher, achieving an overall better result.

As such, the procedure I was taught and have been using for 15 years; the procedure we’re now passing on, would seem to be ass-about. The First Officer should be entering critical performance data while the Captain provides, monitors/cross checks.

Let’s look at some of the documentation.

ATSB AR2009-052 Takeoff Performance Calculation and Entry Errors : A Global Perspective

The impetus of this report was the Emirates A340 Tail Strike incident in Melbourne, March 2009 – an investigation which interestingly is still ongoing. While prompted by this incident, AR2009/52 doesn’t dwell on the Emirates event in Melbourne, instead selectively reviewing related incidents from Australia and Overseas.

For the most part our procedures are highly compliant with the observations and recommendations of this report. That said, I did see 9 ways in which we could improve safety with respect to our operation – inside and outside the flight deck – and provided the summary to Flight Operations Management.

In particular, this table from AR2009/052 caught my eye. It took a while, but I was able to track down one of the authors, Dr Matthew Thomas and obtain his report and some additional data. I’m still working through this in detail at the moment as I formulate a report for our Standards Committee to look at altering our procedure.

Behind the data and the statistics is essentially the axiom that while a First Officer may make more mistakes (statistically) than a Captain; a Captain is much better at detecting – and correcting – the mistakes of the other pilot that a First Officer is.

From my personal perspective, I’ve been training and checking pilots here since pretty much the first pilot arrived 8 months before our first aircraft did. During training and occasionally during checking, this specific procedure has at times not been without error and as such the cause of a number of debriefing discussions. In essence I’ve been watching Captains making mistakes in the data entry/checking of this procedure on and off for two years now – albeit usually minor, low/no direct impact mistakes.

During the subsequent debrief discussion, the procedural error would be clarified – but also discussed was the lack of cross check from the First Officer. Only rarely do I encounter a lack of procedural knowledge on the part of the FO – just a hesitancy to correct the Captain over what was perceived as a relatively minor procedural error – particularly in the check/training environment. This is classic flight deck authority gradient stuff.

Captain/First Officer Authority Gradient

If you think about it – both our Captain and First Officer are trained (at least in terms of the aircraft/operation itself) to a pretty similar standard; in our airline both hold a command aircraft type endorsement/command instrument rating on the aircraft; both are trained initially and recurrently according to the same lesson content. From the training point of view, there’s no reason to expect that our First Officers make more mistakes than our Captains. Add on top of this the fact that as a new start airline – most of our First Officers came to this airline with significant experience levels; the competency gradient between the Left and Right hand seat is pretty flat at times.

Cockpit Authority Gradient

In addition to the style adopted by the Captain, the interaction between the flight-deck members will define the authority gradient between the two. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot, and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. The optimum gradient, which may differ between individuals and national cultures, encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge, while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. Most airlines encourage a flat cockpit authority gradient, since there are a number of nationalities, levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds in the pilot group. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by a shallow authority gradient.

Based on this fairly equivalent capability (at least in terms of aircraft knowledge and procedural familiarity) one would think that the CRM concept of Authority Gradient would be pretty flat in our airline as well. But in terms of this procedure – it would appear this is not the case.

That’s the beauty of reversing the procedure so that the First Officer enters the data and the Captain cross checks - challenges - the accuracy : Authority Gradient works for the final result. The solution would seem simple – reverse the procedure so that the First Officer enters the data and the Captain monitors and cross checks. Simple enough.

Risk Analysis and Change Management

Any proposed change to SOPs undergoes a review of a fleet management committee to evaluate the need for and impact of the change. A change like this however is going to be something else again. I all likelihood we’ll involve personnel from the Flight Safety Department to evaluate the risks and benefits of the procedural change. Assuming the benefits are considered worth the risks, then the risks need to be managed – including managing the risks of the change process itself.

The concept of the First Officer flying with the Captain monitoring as a safety paradigm is not new. While it’s application to an operation as a whole is unlikely to find favour – I’m hoping it’s application to this little corner of our SOPs will improve the safety of our operation.

References (Apologies for my poor referencing skills …)

• An Exploratory Study of Error Detection Processes During Normal Line Operations, Thomas/Petrilli/Dawson.
• Eliminating “Cockpit Caused” Accidents; Captain Steve Last.
• Calculating Errors, Linda Werfelman, Aerosafetyworld.
• Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective, ATSB AR2009052.
• Use of erroneous parameters at takeoff, Anthropologie Appliquee.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

So, Who should Fly?

The flight was essentially a chartered service (on an ‘experimental’ aircraft) with none of the entanglements encountered during regular scheduled services. You can read about the ‘enhanced’ passenger experience here.

The flight offered unprecedented access to the cockpit in flight, cabin, crew and staff. What follows is my very general early impressions and understanding of the Boeing 787 from a slightly more technical point of view. No doubt we’ll be able to offer more in-depth information in the future.

The Cockpit

Any 777 pilot visiting the Boeing 787 for the first time will immediately feel at home in their new office. Despite the differences, the familiarity is overwhelming. The overhead panel, displays, operational philosophy, ergonomics and system integration up the front, while different, is almost identical to that of the 777 with regard to presentation.

Boeing 777 Pilots will feel at Home

The similarities are such that the Australian regulator will issue a Boeing 787 ‘type rating’ on the basis of a 777 endorsement. In the USA, a 5-day conversion course is mandated for converting pilots, and it’s expected that a similar program will be implemented in Australia should the program ever be necessary. Not unlike the Airbus approach to rationality in types, the 787 effectively provides for cross-type currency. While flying two types, only a recurrent simulator assessment in one should be necessary to include required currency on the other similar type. The freedom and cost savings gained from this are no different to an operator that routinely schedules pilots between various 737 types.

The cockpit is clean and uncluttered thanks to the absence of the large circuit breaker panels that we’re used to in traditional types. Almost all circuit breakers are ‘virtual’ and are accessed via the forward Multi-Functional Display (MFD). In keeping with Boeing philosophy, breakers should only be reset when called by a checklist or in the interest of safety. The very few old style ‘thermal’ breakers shouldn’t normally be touched. The cumbersome engineering panel on the starboard side of the cockpit (near observer seat 2) in the 777 is gone and it’s now integrated into the forward displays (although flight crew use is inhibited airborne below 10,000 feet).

The CDU’s, or Control Display Units (the pilot interface to the Flight Management Systems/Computers) are virtual – essentially meaning that the clunky push-key interface is almost a thing of the past. The digital presentation offers numerous advantages with the most notable being that the actual pilot interface can be modified with a Block Point update to add increased functionality and ‘buttons’ (not unlike the software that updates on your smart phone). A Boeing engineering executive told me that they couldn’t re-invent the pilot interface overnight and deprive the crew of all familiarity, so we can expect incremental improvements over time to drag the FMC out of the 1970′s. The current look and feel would be familiar to any Boeing pilot.

The forward screens are large and exceptional. The PFD (Primary Flight Display) is large and familiar. The ND (or Navigation Display) is now essentially more of an MFD that incorporates the functionally formerly offered by the Upper Display. The MFD can be split into two halves with the ability to display virtually any information from any other panel. When showing traditional ND information it occupies full screen with projected track and radar information to 1280 miles (as opposed to the 640 miles in the 777).

Moving the airport diagram from the EFB (Electronic Flight Box) onto the MFD will be a treat on unfamiliar taxiways. The integrated EFB itself is very similar in size and functionality to a tablet device… and all the pinching and swiping gestures apply. Sadly, the integrated airport information on the MFD via the EFB is only available when a full Flight Bag kit is installed (the Boeing technical guru was unsure of how much information was derived from the FMS – he’s getting back to me).

The PFD itself is split on the left side to display information in digital form. Gone are the digitally-controlled analogue timers from the 777; they’re now replaced by electronic displays. The same panel also displays information such as callsign (for short-haul folk, you’ll no longer have to wind it into the altitude alert on your control yoke), active radio frequencies, transponder codes, SELCAL and UTC time/date and registration.

Facts from a B787 Pilot in Training:

• Loss of the Attitude and Heading Reference units (AHRU’s) and reversion to standby instruments – displayed on the normal PFD’s.

• Loss of the inertial reference units defaults to GPS positioning. The IRS’s can be aligned airborne from the GPS (if available).
• The APU shuts down automatically in the event of an APU fire – airborne or on the ground. Cargo Fire also results in automatic fire extinguisher discharge.
• Like the 777 – a nitrogen gas generation system pressurises the fuel tanks to displace fumes and provide full time flammable protection.
• CPDLC is installed in overdrive. Uplinked speed, heading, altitude display on a second line on the MCP and can be transferred into the actual speed, heading and altitude control. Even conditional clearances can be uplinked, accepted and action by the pilot and FMC.
• There’s an auto drag feature that operates when the aircraft is high on approach and landing flaps have been selected. Ailerons and the two most outboard spoilers are extended, while maintaining airspeed, to assist in glide path capture from above (not unlike the Direct Lift Control (DLC) on the Lockheed L-100 TriStar).
• Flaps, Ailerons, Flaperons and Spoilers are symmetrically moved in cruise based on airspeed, weight and altitude to optimise cruise performance to alter camber to reduce drag.
• Fuel Jettison is installed but an automatic Fuel Balancing system is also installed. No more opening crossfeed valves – or forgetting to close them.
• The aircraft is approved for ILS using GPS and a ground based augmentation system (GBAS) with conventional Cat 1 minima. HUD approaches will allow lower minimums augmenting vision at approved airports with runway centerline guidance from either ILS or GPS.

Cockpit noise was comparable with the 777 although the cabin was very quiet and comfortable.

Electrical System Architecture

Many systems that traditionally had a reliance on the pneumatic system have been transitioned to the electrical architecture. They include engine start, API start, wing ice protection, hydraulic pumps and cabin pressurisation. The only remaining bleed system on the 787 is the anti-ice system for the engine inlets. In fact, Boeing claims that the move to electrical systems has reduced the load on engines (from pneumatic hungry systems) by up to 35 percent (not unlike today’s electrically power flight simulators that use 20% of the electricity consumed by the older hydraulically actuated flight sims).

Apart from the cost savings gained by an electrical aircraft, the weight savings themselves by eliminating redundant system components are also quite significant. Over 60-miles of copper wiring was eliminated by modern design.

Ken describes the 787 as “17 computer servers packaged in a Kevlar frame”. The central brain of the aircraft is the Common Core System (CCS). Two Common Computing Resources (CCRs) coordinate the communications of all the computer systems, isolating faults and covering failed systems with working systems. When battery power is first applied to the airplane in the morning, it takes about 50 seconds for the left CCR to boot up. After the CCR’s work their magic, the APU can be started.

The 787 has four times the potential electric generation of the 777 – 1.45 megawatts. The generators (four at 250 kVA, two per engine, and two at 225 kVA on on API) produce 235 VAC for the large users on the bus – otherwise the traditional 115 VAC and 28 VDC are operational. Seventeen Remote Power Distribution Units (RPDU) power about 900 loads through the aircraft. The power distribution system is in the aft belly along with the Power Electronics Cooling System (PECS). It’s liquid cooling for the large motors, along with an Integrated Cooling System (ICS) for use by the galley carts, cabin air and IFE.

The APU itself does a good job of illustrating the enhanced electrical architecture. A more traditional function of the APU is to drive a large pneumatic load compressor. Replacing the pneumatic load compressor with starter generators results in significantly improved start reliability and power availability. The 787 APU is projected to offer a 400% increase in reliability over aircraft with a pneumatic load compressor.

The 787 has done away with constant speed generator drives (Integrated Generator Drives, or the IDG) and has replaced them with use of a variable frequency electronic power; with the engine generator and started functions integrated into a single unit. Not unlike the 737NG, starting the APU without pneumatics increases the average time between failures to 30,000 hours – making it three times more reliable than, say, a 767 with a traditional pneumatic starter.

If 3 of the 4 engine drive generators fail in flight, the APU will start automatically. Two APU generators can be operated to the certified ceiling of 43,000 feet. If all four generator fail in flight, the Ram Air Turbine will deploy (RAT) will deploy and power only essential buses and, if necessary, hydraulic power to the flight controls (should the RAT itself fail, standby power will ensure continued use of the autopilot, captain’s flight director and instruments, FMC, 2 IRSs and VHF radios in addition to some other essential instruments).

The use of electric brakes on the Boeing 787 (moving away from a hydraulically actuated system) again illustrates the innovative architecture. Apart from reducing the mechanical complexity and elimination of hydraulic related failures (leaking brake hydraulic fluid, leaking valves etc), it provides its own fault detection, analysis and health monitoring system. The system will apply pressure as necessary (even when parked) to ensure that only enough pressure is applied as the system cools.

The braking system includes four independent brake actuators per wheel and it will be permissible to dispatch the aircraft with one inoperative with far fewer braking penalties applied when compared to its archaic hydraulic stable mates. Because the brakes are electric, the 28 volt anti-skid and braking system will be available on standby power (after a loss or primary electrical systems).

Flight Controls

Flight Controls are hydraulic with only a few exceptions. Engine drive and Electric pumps operate at 5,000 PSI (3000 PSI standard) to allow for weight-saving smaller tubing and actuators. With the loss of all three systems, two spoiler panels on each wing (and the stabilizer trim) are electrically powered (flaps are unavailable). The loss of Hydraulics and Electrics result in power from the advanced Permanent Magnetic Generators (PMG’s) which produce power even if the engine is wind milling. If the PMG’s fail, flight controls are powered by the 28-volt standby bus.

The 787 features a revolutionary computer-controlled turbulence dampening system that symmetrically deflects the flaperons, ailerons and elevators to smooth the ride in turbulence. Control surfaces will respond to lateral and longitudinal movements in flight to ‘dampen the ride’. A lateral component is enacted through the rudder on approach in response to gusts and turbulence. Boeing predicts an eightfold reduction in the number of passengers who will experience motion sickness.

Air Conditioning (and Pressurization)

The two air-conditioning packs control two electric cabin air compressors (CAC). The four CAC’s share two inlets under the aircraft. If a Pack controller fails, the remaining pack controller takes over all four CACs.

Boeing has managed to reduce the cabin altitude to 6,000 (with a pressure differential of 9.4 PSI) while cruising at 43,000 feet. The lower cabin altitude means that the body will absorb 8% more blood resulting in fewer headaches, eye irritations, caught, colds, dizziness, fatigue and – in extreme circumstances – Deep Vein Thrombosis.

As well as the lower cabin (and humidification), the air inside the cabin is filtered via two means. The outside air passes through an ozone removal abater (similar to a catalytic converter) before mixing with cabin air that has passed through a hospital grade HEPA (High-Efficiency Particulate Arresting) filter and gaseous filter. The resulting concoction then conditions the cabin.

In the Cabin

Mechanical ‘sliding’ window shades are replaced with electro-chromatic dimmable windows that can be dimmed ‘electrically’ from transparent to black in five shades. They can be controlled by each passenger individually or managed from the cabin console (to integrate with the mood lighting) so the entire cabin can be dimmed or brightened progressively with the touch of a button. The shades have a projected life of over 20 years or 70,000 cycles.

Not unlike the 777, the 787 features mood lighting to progressively and artificially introduce the mind and body of travellers to longitudinal travel. The new LED lighting lasts up to twenty times longer than traditional incandescent lights and will not emit heat, and uses less power.

More Cabin Pics Available on our Facebook Page

Life-Cycle Cost Design Philosophy

The life-cycle approach looks at how technology, maintenance, training and all design options impact upon an aircrafts’ cost over an entire lifetime. Traditionally, the cost considerations included drag, weight, noise, development and build costs and scheduled reliability. Boeing have added maintenance cost and airplane availability to the matrix which translates to an aircraft that is simply more productive, efficient, safer and requires less time in maintenance.

The aircraft simply represents the future of air travel.

Boeing have been in contact with us and have provided some interesting opportunities in the future. Make sure you subscribe to our mailing list and ‘like’ us on Facebook so we can keep you up-to-date.

Thanks to Boeing, Qantas and Jetstar for the invitation to attend the event.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Boeing 787: A Pilots Perspective

In this article I’ll try and articulate my impressions as a passenger and convey my early opinions relating to the 787 customer experience.

I arrived at Qantas HQ wondering how they would manage a few hundred people on the doorstop of their Sydney office. As it turned out, I was fortunate enough to be selected by Boeing as one of the 28 media representatives to experience a flight most people would kill for. Hosted by both Qantas and Boeing, the day included an informal return trip to Brisbane for lunch with various media opportunities scattered throughout the day. In attendance was the Qantas CEO, Alan Joyce, Jetstar New Zealand CEO, David Hall, Boeing VP of Marketing, Randy Tinseth and a small army of Boeing staffers that provided logistical, maintenance and customer support.

Pics from the Early Press Conference

I avoid using words like stunning… but on this occasion I feel that I have to – there’s no word that more aptly describes the Dreamliner’s ramp presence. A gentleman I was talking to said that he was there because his television network “made him” (poor guy). “I’ve never been much of an aviation or travel fan”, he said, “… but being here now, and for the first time ever, I’m looking at an aircraft and the only word I can use to describe it is beautiful”. Such is the evolution of Boeing’s design philosophy. Gone are the days of reengineered 1960′s technology and those box-kite designs that we’d sadly come to expect from manufacturers. Not unlike a bird, the 787 exhibits a naturally organic yet futuristic presence on the ramp… and it exhumes a very obvious hypnotic and feminine charm that can’t be ignored. For many, the experience on the 787 will be the first time they’ve actually had an emotional connection with an airframe.

I’m usually a very level person with an unwavering temperament that thinks of aircraft in the same way a handyman does of his hammer. However, on this occasion, getting up extremely close and personal with the machine I found myself reaching up and touching it expecting some sort of cosmic implosion. I though back to a moment in a Star Trek movie where Commander Data (a sentinent Android) queries Captain Picard as to why he felt the need to touch the Phoenix when visiting a historic warp ship for the first time.

Data: Sir, does tactile contact alter your perception of the Phoenix?
Picard: Oh, yes! For humans, touch can connect you to an object in a very personal way, make it seem more real.
[Data also puts his hand on The Phoenix]
Data: I am detecting imperfections in the titanium casing… temperature variations in the fuel manifold… it is no more “real” to me now than it was a moment ago.

Many pilots – again, referencing Star Trek – form a Borg nation. We love aircraft and flying for reason that passengers and enthusiasts can’t and don’t relate to. We’re assimilated into a world of SOP’s, repetition, checklists and procedures, and there’s always a clear disconnect from the passenger experience (we’re more focused on the passenger comfort of that experience). Although we’re acutely aware of what passengers want, it usually rates rather low on our aircraft wish-list. We have a very utilitarian attitude; the aircraft is a tool of trade and we treat it as such.

The Boeing 787's Scupltured Ramp Presence

It didn’t take me long to realize why the 787 made such an immediate emotional impression on me – Boeing have reinvented air travel. What I was experiencing on the inside and outside of the aircraft was so new it was like I was touching an aircraft for the first time all over again. Boeing had stepped back far enough from the internal systemic bureaucracy that I can only assume plagues their organization to identify with the need to overhaul their thinking… and they did an incredible job. The result is a thing of beauty.

Inside the 787

Entry was made into the aircraft via the 2L door while parked in the Qantas hangar. Not unlike the 777, business passengers will appreciate the separate 1L door that can be used exclusively for the pointy end of the aircraft. Premium guests shouldn’t have to deal with those awful and underdressed commoners staring at them as they board.

I’m not quite sure the configuration of our aircraft was in any way, shape or form ‘typical’. We had a business section towards the front and two zones of economy class seating. The forward zone represented a realistic cattle class while the rear section provided business legroom in premium seating. Zone four was completely empty making it ideal for break dancing. In our case, the dance floor was used for television crews and journalists to conduct business… and it was heavily utilized as a place for groups of people to simply socialize in cruise. Just forward of the 2L entry door was a bar area and large LCD TV screen playing promotional Boeing videos. We were seated in a 3-3-2 arrangement in the rear zone with with business style leg room. When the aircraft enters into service we’ll likely see a high density 3-3-3 economy arrangement with legroom comparable to the 737.

Boeing 787 Seating Arrangements

The first impression is one of space. Unlike other aircraft – from both Boeing and Airbus – the minimimalistic yet private partitioning between classes wasn’t noticeable. The overhead storage bins seemed to be integrated into the aircraft architecture and recessed further up than we’re used to seeing yet they opened up to just above eye level with enough room for four standard (61cm x 30cm x 25cm) suitcases. Most importantly, and similar in concept to Boeing’s Sky Interior, their cambered flow into the ceiling gave the impression of invisibility.

The Boeing 787's Overhead Storage Bins

Taxiing to the Runway

The air-conditioning in a traditional Boeing steals air from the engine during start, with pilots normally turning the (cabin) bleed air system off until both engines are running. Most frequent flyers are very familiar with the sounds of silence just before pushback. I didn’t hear this, obviously, because the system is now a function of the electrical system. In fact, I barely heard the engines start at all. Boeing says that engine noise can easily be contained within an airport perimeter and this was a clear indication of such. The cabin remained quiet.

We taxied for runway 34L at Sydney and passed herds of plane spotters and photographers lining the eastern airport perimeter fence. If this is the reaction the aircraft is getting now, I can only imagine that passengers will flock to it in droves once it’s in service.

Takeoff

Under most circumstances, an aircraft will fly a reduced thrust takeoff to ensure that only enough thrust is used as is necessary. This is accomplished in one of two ways: a thrust derate simply commands a defined thurst reduction; while a temperature derate tricks the engine into thinking it’s hotter outside that it actually is. It’s an exact science that requires at least a few minutes of careful performance calculations before every takeoff. Most jet takeoffs use a combination of a thurst reduction and temperature derate determined by aircraft weight, runway conditions, climb gradient restrictions and environmental conditions – the effect being a longer life on engines, less noise and reduced fuel burn. On this occasion, however, we were told that that we would have a full-rated thrust takeoff. A full thrust takeoff in a gutted 787 with barely 30 passengers and minimal fuel! The angle of climb was unlike anything I’ve ever experienced before in a jet and it’s something I may never see again. Despite that, cabin noise was minimal. Even during the takeoff roll I could comfortably talk to my neighbor at a soft volume. The engine noise wasn’t the “roar and buzz” I’m used to. Instead, it was like a progressive hum.

The advanced pivot trailing flaps means that the track fairings (installed in the pods on the underside of the wings) are smaller than on traditional aircraft – and they move a smaller distance with smaller motors. As such, flap retraction was extremely quiet and smooth.

Passenger Features

The cabin windows are integral to the passenger experience. Once in cruise it was more obvious than ever how the windows opened up the cabin in such a way that it integrated with the environment outside the aircraft. Gone are those little windows that are better suited to submarines; the 787’s windows are 30% larger than those of the A380 and significantly larger than traditional twin-aisle types.

Window Comparisons

The aircraft doesn’t have traditional window shades. The shading is controlled by an electrochromic dimming system that allows passengers to incrementally change the tint of the window from fully transparent to black. This also gives cabin crew the ability to centrally control cabin window tints based on the phase or mood of flight. As such, the windows form an integral means in which to artificially emulate timezones in cross-latitudinal flight. As a bonus, the tints can be applied on the ground to keep the aircraft cool on hot days. The low cost of maintenance and replacement of cracked plastic and Perspex contributes towards the lower overall operating cost (resulting in lower airfares).

We were warned of turbulence under 5,000 feet prior to departure yet we barely felt any bumps at all in the early climb. The 787 has a revolutionary computer-controlled turbulence dampening system that symmetrically deflect the flaperons, ailerons and elevators to smooth the ride in turbulence. There’s a lateral component as well, enacted through the rudder on approach in response to gusts and turbulence. It was very smooth despite conditions that would have upset any other aircraft. Boeing predicts an eightfold reduction in the number of passengers who experience motion sickness.

The Boeing 787 is Very Stable and Quiet in Cruise

The 50% carbon-fibre composite materials in the airframe makes the overall aircraft stronger (and cheaper). The stronger fuselage means that the pressure differential – or the difference in pressure outside the aircraft compared to inside – can be greater than is currently the case. When Boeing were testing for an ideal cabin pressure, they cycled well over 600 brave participants through a compression chamber where they were subjected to various altitudes for up to 24 hours. 6,000 feet seemed to be an altitude that most people were comfortable with, so this was the figure engineers worked with. It’s not uncommon for some types to have a cabin pressure of over 8,000 feet but Boeing have managed to reduce this to under 6,000 feet in the 787 (pressure differential of 9.4 PSI at 6,000 ft cabin altitude while cruising at 43,000 feet). This kind of cabin altitude isn’t an option in aluminium aircraft because of a reduced aircraft life (due structural fatigue) and weight restrictions (yes, pressurised air has a weight degradation).

The lower cabin altitude means that the body will absorb 8% more blood resulting in fewer headaches, eye irritations, caught, colds, dizziness, fatigue and – in extreme circumstances – Deep Vein Thrombosis (or DVT). Boeing claims that one in four travellers experience some form of ‘respiratory distress’(another term to politely describe the onset of hypoxia)… yet this reduces to barely one in twenty passengers on the Dreamliner.

The lower cabin is good news for most of us…. but unwelcome news for drunks. It’s going to take you longer to get the high you’re looking for.

Cabin and cockpit air humidity is automatic. Humidification introduces a moisture element to the air that will be a welcome feature from those that get dry skin or cracked lips.

As well as the lower cabin and humidification, the air inside the cabin is filtered via two means. The outside air passes through an ozone removal abater (similar to a catalytic converter) before mixing with cabin air that has passed through a hospital grade HEPA (High-Efficiency Particulate Arresting) filter and gaseous filter. The resulting concoction then conditions the cabin. Many frequent flyers would be aware of the smell of fumes when they’re parked behind another aircraft getting ready for takeoff. These offensive odors are (hopefully) a thing of the past. We can only hope that the advanced filtration systems will quickly eradicate the ‘biological’ waste that is sadly one of the less sobering side-effects of altitude. I refrained from testing that part out.

The 787 air was clean, fresh and comfortable although I’d like to see (or at least hear about) how the cabin deals with a couple of hundred stinky cattle class Bali passengers in high density seating.

The well balanced soft LED lighting is integral to the mood lighting of the aircraft. It is cycled through various shades, colors and brightness to emulate a feel that best conditions the human mind and body to changing time zones. Boeing claims that the LED lighting lasts up to twenty times longer than traditional incandescent lights amd will not emit heat and uses less power.

Boeing has admirably chosen Google’s Android operating system to power their in-flight entertainment systems. Customers of the 787 must choose between pre-approved Panasonic and Thales Android systems with screen sizes ranging from 7 to 17 inches. Most are touch screen although the integrated-seat solution in business class means that the units are out of reach. Various gesture based devices have completed beta runs and will soon be available as a default business offer. Personally, I’m a fan of having business IFE systems retractable into my own seat so I can adjust the screen based on seating position. It’s unknown if Jetstar will offer any kind of integrated IFE solution in their aircraft or continue operating with pay-per-use iPads (since the ‘plug-and-play’ IFE system is listed as a standard option).

Various power ports and USB connectivity options are available as options.

What Does the 787 Represent?

The Boeing 787 represents an evolutionary approach to aircraft workflow and life-cycle cost management. It’s a projected approach that looks at available technology and the cost of maintaining it over the course of the aircraft’s entire lifetime. Boeing have designed the aircraft with a focus on the performance measures of maintenance costs and aircraft reliability mixed in with the more traditional design matrix to construct an aircraft that is more efficient, safer and requires less time in maintenance.

Qantas 787 Dreamtour posts to follow:

Boeing 787. A Pilot’s Perspective
Various Video and audio interviews. David Hall, Alan Joyce, Randy Tinseth and others.

Randy Tinseth, Boeing VP of Marketing, sat down with Flight and gave us the ‘elevator pitch’ (audio and video interview to come). The aircraft has acoustically treated engine inlets, chevrons and other special treatments applied to the engines and engine casings that decrease engine noise. In fact, sounds exceeding 85 decibels never leave airport boundaries. There’s a 20% reduction in fuel burn, 30% reduction in maintenance costs (the first heavy check isn’t required until after 12 years), a direct 10% lower cash operating cost and the aircraft will be more reliable – meaning better on time performance and less network disruptions. Most of all, the aircraft represents a passenger experience that simply isn’t available on any other aircraft type.

Qantas has struggled to regain consumer confidence in their brand after a turbulent twelve months of cutbacks, industrial issues and other bad press. For a company living in a fish bowl the 787′s visit to Australia is a welcome reminder of what they’re looking to achieve in the future. David Hall, Jetstar NZ CEO, told Flight that “… the 787 was a game changing aircraft for the airline”. After having flown on it, I can only agree.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Boeing 787 Review: The Passenger Experience