Having taken you through my first two games in detail (those against Barcelona and Almería), I will broaden my analysis to include a few games and discuss some general trends. In this article we will take a look at the first three matches of the Champions League campaign.

The draw set us up with AC Milan, Bordeaux and Rubin Kazan. Our most difficult match on paper was AC Milan in the San Siro, though Bordeaux would be no pushovers (despite their low reputation in the game). In theory Kazan should be the easiest, and may require us to break out the domination tactic mentioned in the previous article. In between, there should be plenty of league matches in which we can test that experimental set up.

AC Milan 1-2 Real Madrid CF

So. Milan at the San Siro. I kept faith with the tactic that had bombed at Almería, since I was convinced that away against a big club a counter attacking strategy would work well. Milan’s team lined up 4-3-3 like Barca which made me convinced that this was the right decision.

Now, considering we were down to ten men for most of the second half, we did very well. Milan did achieve more clear cut chances, but they were forced to take 50% of their 26 shots from range. Compared to our record (2 out of 12), that meant we were still getting into the box before shooting (even if none of those were “clear cut” enough for the stats). While 26 shots may seem quite a lot to concede, we only rarely looked like we were defensively in any danger – and given that Milan spent 66 minutes of the game needing a goal in their own back yard, I’m reasonably satisfied with the performance.

Our two goals came from reasonably conventional sources, but on another day we might have struggled more. The first came from a corner. Pepe was unmarked at the near post and nodded in the ball. I believe this is a similar situation that is created by the so-called “corner bug”. Annoying if this is the case, but I assure you all the attacking set pieces are on their defaults! The second goal came from Higuaín again – a lovely run from a long ball over the top (classic counter attacking) followed by a sublime cut inside on Kaladze, twisting the centre back inside out. He stroked it in from about 8 yards with his left foot. While we cannot rely on such moments of brilliance week-in-week-out, it is relieving to see that the squad (right now) is capable of it.

Real Madrid CF 0-0 FC Girondins de Bordeaux

A frustrating 0-0 draw at home that could have been so much better. Using the counter in the first half, we switched to the dominate tactic for the last 30 minutes when it became clear Bordeaux were happy to take the draw.

Frustrating though it was, we saw some positives from the draw. Once again we produced few long shots, only 5 out of our 19 coming from range (versus 8 out of their 13). However, none were clear cut, and only 5 shots actually hit the target. We had more possession, suggesting that counter was the wrong choice of tactic – you can’t counter if the opposition doesn’t first come at you – but the team kept everything tight at the back, which is definitely a positive. The dominate tactic still needs some work on it though – more of that in the next article.

Rubin Kazan 2-2 Real Madrid CF

Another night of Champions League football that had me scratching my head and questioning the desire of my team. Having come through some pretty lacklustre games in the league as well, Kazan away should have been, as the media were at great pains to point out, a pretty easy run out. It wasn’t. We were 2-0 down at one stage, clawing back a draw and were perhaps a tad unfortunate not to wrap things up.

This match proved to me once and for all, however, that the current “dominate” plan was just not working. Although we were able to compete at times during the match, we were nowhere near flexible enough to really put consistent pressure on the opposition and create the chances needed to win the match outright. Furthermore, conceding two goals is just not the Mourinho way. We outplayed them by most measures, but so many long shots (over half) and so few converted chances (2 goals from 21 shots) suggested that we needed a new plan.

A Russian epiphany

Part of the clue to the solution came later on in the match when Kazan moved to a rather strange version of the 4-2-3-1. Instead of playing the classic two lines (DM-DM; AML-AMC-AMR) they played a withdrawn central midfield (DM-DM; AML-CM-AMR). Rather effective it was too – by playing a pocket in between my midfield and my attack, Kazan were not only able to buy themselves time by holding onto the ball, they were able to use people in space to create counter attacks. Great use of wide outlets saw them score two in 20 minutes; one from a headed cross and the other from a corner.

This finding made me look a little more at the midfield in the later league games – losing out here was a definite problem.

We weren’t putting enough pressure on their deep midfielders. Couple that with a general toothlessness in front of goal, and hey presto you’ve got a formula for drawing. This was my third tie in four games. Something needed to be done…

So, the next article will highlight these problems even further by showing you where my “dominate” tactic was failing in the league. I say “failing” in the Mourinho sense. Despite still being up at the top of the table, the number of draws and petty goals conceded made me unconvinced that this was a Mourinho style of play. Next time, then, I will show the two biggest issues I faced along with some analysis; hopefully you might be able to apply this to some of your own matches.

Related posts:

1. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 4
2. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 3
3. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 2

The 4-4-2 is a not a dead formation, but the way in which the system is implemented which is the main problem and the reason why England have had so many problems. There are many teams such as Aston Villa and Fulham who have put together a 4-4-2 that has been very successfully in the previous season. The latter reaching the final of a European competition.

The formation is a system that relies too much on technical players, which is why it plays into the hands in the type of players produced in England. As a defensive option if your players are organised, the 2 bands can be difficult to break down. As anything the system needs to develop in order to have a place in modern football.

To prove that the 4-4-2 can be a good formation in Football Manager still, I will take the Capello role for South Africa 2010 and prove that it is not the 4-4-2 which is the problem, but the way in which is was implemented against most notably Germany but the other two games we failed to win. Unorganised, under-performing players who were too easily dragged out of position, Barry didn’t track his men properly and Rooney looking too work too much and not intelligently was the reason why we went down. It was difficult to see if any other formation would have really made the difference, lets face it against Algeria our players should have taken that easily.

Therefore too compete in the World Cup I will do so only using a 4-4-2 or variants of it. The ground rules to lay down are;

• Only a 4-4-2 can be used
• That means 4 defenders, 4 midfielder, 2 strikers
• 3 straight lines don’t need to be used.

Therefore, what I will look to do is develop a number of 4-4-2 tactics that are able to cope against the smaller sides, as well as strong and organised against the bigger sides. One that allows for plenty of passing options and to hold the midfield, with a striker coming from the forward line into midfield to help the midfield out number the opposition in that area. Another with 2 close bands of 4 that will make it difficult for a 4-3-3 or a 4-5-1 to break down. Looking to start from Millie’s simple 4-4-2 I will evolve a style that will both suit the players and combat the opposition.

Join the debate: is the 4-4-2 outmoded?

How would you implement a 4-4-2 with England? Would you have done anything different to Capello or was it the players failing?

Related posts:

1. Episode 1-10: FM Community: Is the scene dead?
2. World Cup 2010 Group C: Football Manager 2010 Analysis
3. How to play a simple 4-4-2

If you’ve been following these articles so far, I have set up a counter attacking tactic inspired by José Mourinho and it has beaten Barcelona at home. Not a bad start. However, beating Barcelona requires very different tools to beating Sporting Gijon. If you’ve ever wondered why one week you can beat the best teams and then fail miserably the next, this is the article for you.

One of the major criticisms I have seen on the forums over the past few years with Football Manager is that there is no “consistency of results”. The argument is that a good, solid tactic which beats one team one week can lose miserably the next. This shouldn’t be.

While I understand the frustration, hopefully my own experiences early on in my career at Real Madrid will help highlight some of these issues. I beat Barcelona in the last match. My next one against Almería resulted in a 1-0 defeat.

Unión Deportiva Almería 1-0 Real Madrid CF

On the left is the diagram from the Barcelona match. On the right is Almería. From this situation, we conceded the goal. Note how in the Barcelona match everyone is in the right position to defend the potential cross from the winger. Henry (Barca #14) has been forced back and the midfielders are being stopped from making any penetrating runs. In the Almería match, however, the situation is much worse. Playing on the counter, the opposition’s midfielders are pushed much higher. My defensive midfielder (Xabi Alonso, #5) is well out of position, leaving the Almería MC free on the edge of the box (Almería #25). Crusat, the winger (Almería #6) jumps the challenge, crosses to the MC and with the yard of space the midfielder has time to set his shot and scores.

Just look at that defensive line, though. The two centre backs (#18 and #21) are on each other’s toes, both marking the striker (Amería #11) and ignoring the goal scorer (Almería #25). All of this caused by Xabi Alonso’s frustration – his poor positioning forced him to close down the winger, pulling him out of position and leaving a massive gap in the centre to be exploited. Partly we must blame the marking system in Football Manager – but mostly this is a problem caused by my tactical system.

Once again, let’s look at the Barcelona match on the left and Almería on the right. Barcelona’s midfielders are pushed closer to our midfield line – clearly they want to get the ball more and create more attacks than Almería. In the Barca game, we have roughly three against three as our men look to run into the channels – in the Almería match we have three attackers against five defenders, and Ronaldo (#9) and Higuaín (#20) have temporarily switched positions in a vain attempt to find more space.

Were we playing a more possession oriented game this would be fine – Xabi Alonso (#5), Lassana Diarra (#10) and Marcelo (#12) would all be in perfect positions to receive a ball, lay it off and work out where to move next. But I’m not. I’m playing on the counter. So, we look to move the ball forward. A ball is lofted to Kaká (#8) to try and bypass the DMC (Almería #22) and MC (Almería #23) who would easily intercept a ground ball. Kaká misses out, so a counter is quickly launched. And look – the red arrows show the space the MCs (Almería #23 and #25) have to run into. They have the time and space to pick out the penetrating pass. The ball gets to their left winger (who has got the jump on our right back, Sergio Ramos #4) and they cross the ball. Somehow, they hit the woodwork and the ball is scrambled away.

Smaller teams require different tools

A quick analysis of the match stats shows this in sharp relief. Approaching this game in the same way as the Barcelona match caused great trouble. Almería’s stats look remarkably similar to ours from the Barca match – we were played and beaten at our own game. They had few long shots, less possession, more chances, hit the woodwork twice; in effect, they made far better use of their possession than we did. And that’s a no-no if we want to be Mourinho.

So, how do we solve this problem? Clearly a few changes need to be made. So, I have created another tactical style, again inspired by The Special One.

The tactics

I chose to call this a “dominate” tactic as opposed to the “counter” tactic I used against Barcelona, but dominate may not be the right word. Essentially, Mourinho likes to defend from the front when playing certain sides. Against AC Milan in the derby last season, he lost Sneijder early to a red card. Where most would have moved to a 4-4-1, attempting to hit Milan on the counter, he set his Internazionale side out in a 4-3-2, keeping the pressure on the ageing Milan team and forcing them to be defensively sound. They were pinned in to their own half, afraid to burst forward for fear of leaving gaps. Inter duly won the match.

Similar principles apply here – keeping a roughly similar formation, but putting more emphasis on driving the opposition back. This will require a bit more possession play and better use of the space on the pitch; but done properly it should allow the side to keep control of most matches. Once the scoreline forces the opposition to come and attack us, we can switch to our classic style and hit them on the break – hopefully allowing us to grab another goal or two.

And so, we have this. A purer 4-2-3-1, with two MCs (Lassana Diarra and Xabi Alonso) and a proper AML (Drenthe) rather than a ML. Ronaldo will be encouraged to attack more as a proper third forward to accompany Kaká and Higuaín. And the two MCs will be required to play the ball a little more – so Diarra becomes a central midfielder (albeit still with a defend duty) while Xabi Alonso moves his playmaking duties slightly further up the pitch. For now I will keep use full backs not wing backs. And I will still require the team to close down and mark the oppostion’s full backs and wingers at all times.

So for the second time, I cracked open the creator and created a tactical file with the following settings:

Team Instructions

Philosophy: Rigid
Starting Strategy: Attacking
Closing Down: Stand-off more

All other settings on default.

Player Instructions

GK: Goalkeeper, defend (First choice: Iker Casillas)
DL: Full Back, automatic (Álvaro Arbeloa)
DCl: Centre Back, defend (Pepe)
DCr: Centre Back, defend (Raúl Albiol)
DR: Full Back, automatic (Sergio Ramos)
MCl: Central Midfielder, defend (Lassana Diarra)
MCr: Deep Lying Playmaker, support (Xabi Alonso)
AML: Defensive Winger, support (Royston Drenthe)
AMC: Attacking Midfielder, attack (Kaká)
AMR: Inside Forward, attack (Cristiano Ronaldo)
FC: Poacher, attack (Gonzalo Higuaín)

Also for “defending corners” all players with the “back” instruction were changed to “man mark”.

Theory and practice

Once more, I will attempt to put sound theory into practice but it’s not always so simple. My results over the next few league games will help refine this plan and help get the team to play well in these situations. This will probably require a bit more tweaking since it will rely on a balance between attacking movement and sound defensive principals. Difficult to pull off.

In the next match, I played AC Milan at the San Siro, so this seems like a good time to dust off the “counter” tactic. The next article will cover my first three matches in the Champions League – Milan (A), Bordeaux (H), Rubin Kazan (A). A good mix of attacking and defensive strategies needed, so another excellent chance to show you why one tactic might work one week but be completely inappropriate the next.

Related posts:

1. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 2
2. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid?
3. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 3

• Spain’s best was a mediocre 4th place in 1950.
• The Netherlands have fared better in the past reaching two World Cup finals in 1974 and 1978 and a fourth place in 1998.
• It is the first World Cup final ever to have not included either Brazil, Argentina, Italy or Germany.
• Neither teams have played each other before in a major tournament.
• Wikipedia has a great round-up of teams that have made the top four throughout the history of the World Cup.

As a Football Manager fan you just can’t miss this epic FIFA World Cup final, and since it is streamed online and available on many cell phones too in case you don’t have access to a TV.

If you are going to watch it online be very careful of spammers and scams that have jumped on the World Cup fever. Don’t fill in any surveys, offers or pay any money to watch this event live online. You can watch it for free.

BBC1 will be streaming the World Cup live from its website for UK viewers. ITV will also have the 3rd place playoffs on its website.

If you are outside of the UK then you can find a library of World Cup streams on this site. An international feed for the World Cup Final should be available here.

It will be interesting to see the managing styles come to play in the Final. Spain have a very tight well organized team that has strong possession, although has lacked on goal scoring abilities, but that did not stop them against lead goal scorers Germany.

For the Netherlands, it is the chance to break the odds for underdog fame.

(via Pop Crunch)

Related posts:

1. Live & Interactive Football Manager Webinar Broadcast
2. The Biggest Reason To Play Football Manager Live

You can download the matches and watch them yourself HERE.

Against Sampdoria/4-4-2

Positives

In the first 15 minutes Zarate had two very good opportunities, coming from through balls from deep, the intelligent movement off the ball by Rocchi, who was able to open the space for his partner by dropping deep and right, dragging the opposition’s defender with him. The second chance (and the first goal of the match) was all about our tactical setup – Rocchi made spaces for Zarate, he cuts inside and latch the great through ball pass by our main playmaker.

In the whole match there was situations in which we can see the great interplay and combinations between the two strikers, which first opened the space for each other (or for the pushing on midfielders from deep) then attempt to set up each other up (or to set up the ongoing midfielder).

One of the positive things is also that the two central midfielders never pushed forward at the same time – always one of them was deep and securing the middle of the pitch.

When the opposite start slowly to attack us we have the time to reshape and cover each zone in our half – that’s why the opposition’s players don’t have much chance in front of our goal. The team formed a flat back four, covered by the sweeper and the three central players ahead of them – we defended with 8 players making us difficult to break down.

Negatives

The only real negatives was  our central midfielders don’t seem to press adequately – they rarely picked the right time to press the ball, allowing their zone to be uncovered when chasing the ball back.

Against Milan/4-3-3

Positives

If we exclude the two goals that the team conceded our defence was very stable and didn’t give away to many clear cut chances. In the last 20mins the team attacked with great flair and made some good opportunities, unfortunately we didn’t score from them.

Negatives

The first goal was due to personal mistakes of our players ; while the second was the pure evidence why the 3-5-2/5-3-2 formation has tough times against one-striker formations – our wing-back were unable to play against two players in their zones dealing with a winger and a full back, our central defenders were constantly dragged away from their position, trying to cover the wing-backs, leaving the centre zone empty and uncovered and given the fact that Milan posses great player with vision, skill and speed it was logical we conceded in that way.

Against Lech/4-4-2

Positives

In this match our counter-attacks were the pure evidence of what my tactical setup was made to do– defending deep, steal the ball then pass it via direct killer balls from deep position to one of the two strikers who goes in one-on-one situation creating clear cut chances.

Negatives

One more goal conceded by set-piece. This is strange, given the fact our defenders posses good height and skills in the air.

Against Catania/4-3-1-2

Positives

some good attacks, nothing more – either in defence or in attack.

Negatives

This was one more time when it’s clear that my defenders lacked the agility and mobility to deal with good killer pass that release a fast  and mobile striker in our final third. Our whole defence is struggling to cope with such as style of play.

The other bad thing is that when the opposition strikers constantly roams around the final third and  our defenders are unable to deal with them, due to lack of concentration and squad gelling.

Against Fiorentina/4-2-3-1 with three AMCs

Positives

Against Fiorentina we were clearly outplayed little positive came out of the game at all.

Negatives

We were totally outplayed by the front four of Fiorentina. They posses players with vision, skills and pace/mobility we couldn’t cope with them, absolutely no way my setup could cope with such a shape. We didn’t outnumber them in our half (they have 8 players, we have 6, more so that they have four attacking players lined in two lines while we have six defender lined in three lines) they just destroyed us by simply having outnumbering us in vital positions.

Next article I will look at the major problems of the tactical setup, many that can be seen already from the above matches. Going through the steps of how to counter we have discovered.

Related posts:

1. The Lazio 3-5-2/5-2-3 Sweeper
2. World Cup 2010 Group C: Football Manager 2010 Analysis
3. World Cup 2010 Group A: Football Manager 2010 analysis

In the previous article I discussed my Mourinho-style plan for the big games. Unfortunately, that big game came sooner than I would have initially liked – Barcelona at the Bernabéu. It did mean, however, that I could test my theories on Mourinho early on. Our third match of the season would be AC Milan at the San Siro – so, if I didn’t get it right pretty quickly it was doubtful how long this series of articles could continue!

Real Madrid CF 2-0 FC Barcelona

Well, first of all we won the game. As I said in the opening article, winning is more important than style. But given that I was trying to recreate the Mourinho spirit, there were a good few signs of encouragement.

First of all, let’s recap the list of expectations from the last article:

• Our possession should be around 40%-50%
• Barcelona should primarily be taking long shots
• We should create more Clear Cut Chances (CCCs)
• We should reduce Barcelona to one goal at most

All four of these came to pass with this match. We secured 48% possession, forced Barcelona into 9 long shots (out of 13 in total), created 3 CCCs to their 0 and, most satisfying of all, kept a clean sheet. On top of this, we ran less distance (which I hope was down to our low closing down and positional discipline – time will tell if this is true), got a much higher average rating, and only took 4 long shots out of a total of 13 (suggesting we got closer to goal than Barca did).

But as I’ve mentioned time and time again, statistics can be misleading. A qualitative view of the match will provide far more clues as to whether the Mourinho spirit has been captured – and whether the theory from the second article matches up to the reality.

How far does the theory match the reality?

Here we see the defensive shape during the game. The Barcelona players clearly have some roaming instructions as the number 17 in the centre of the pitch is actually the right winger. Despite this, all the players are covered; Diarra (#10) has dropped deep and is near to Ibrahimovic (Barcelona striker, #8). Without a man to mark, Marcelo (#12) has tucked inside to leave three defenders marking two Barcelona forwards (#17, #8). Arbeloa (#2) has stopped Henry going down the flank (Barcelona winger, #14), and Ronaldo (#9) is also pressuring him. Henry’s only real outlets in this scenario are to cross to the centre (where we outnumber them four to two) or use Abidal (Barcelona left back, #22). In the event, Henry crosses and the attack breaks down. We counter quickly and Higuaín gets a good shot from 6 yards out, forcing a corner.

The white arrows show the movements that can easily be made by our players in order to mark other Barcelona men and still keep enough numbers in defence. Afellay (#22) can pick up the right back (Daniel Alves, #2); Kaká can stop dropping deep and either attack the centre midfielder (Xavi, #6) or the defensive midfielder (Touré, #24); and Ronaldo can pressure the left back (Abidal, #22).

Our attacking shape is also looking good. The white line shows the three attackers; the blue line shows the supporting midfield players; and the yellow line shows our defensive cover. As we can see, Marcelo (#12) can push on from defence if needed and support the left midfielder (Afellay, #22). In the midfield, Xabi Alonso (#5) can also push on, but his current position also allows him to cover the MC in the event of a Barca counter attack (see Barcelona’s Iniesta, #12). Diarra (#10) is also covering the other MC (Xavi, Barcelona #6), so Arbeloa has plenty of space to run at Henry and support the attack if required. Afellay (#22) can run in at the right back (Daniel Alves, #2), knowing Marcelo (#12) has the winger (Krasic, #17) covered. Finally, on the attack we can see Ronaldo (#9), Higuaín (#20) and Kaká (#8) all have the potential to attack the gaps between the Barcelona defenders and cause major problems if the right ball is threaded to them.

The Goals

Both goals came from typical counter attacking situations, which pleased me. The first was a quick sweeping move from right to left, finished by a one-on-one between Kaká and Valdés. The second came from just three players – Casillas punted a long ball up; Kaká knocked it down for Higuaín; and the striker skinned the centre back (Márquez, #4) with a similar movement to Milito in the 2010 Champions League final. He then ran in on the keeper and lifted it into the top right corner. (The yellow arrows show player movement/dribbles; the white arrows show ball movement).

Changes during the match

Continuing my plan to keep things simple and avoid endless tweaking, my changes were minimal. Once two-nil up, I dragged the AMR back to MR to concentrate mainly on covering the wings defensively. To pre-empt Barcelona attacking hard, in the final 15 minutes I also dragged the AMC back to MC. Arbeloa’s sending off came too late to make a difference, but I brought off the MC for a right back to finish the game with a deep 4-4-1. Otherwise, the only other changes I planned to make were to make sure that I kept opposition instructions selected on their AML, AMR, DL and DR.

Success?

In this match, the theory worked a treat. But there are two caveats here. First, I had planned for this specific match all the way through pre-season. Yes, the plan worked out but would it work against all of the larger sides? Time will tell. Time will also be the judge about whether this strategy will work against smaller sides. I’m convinced it won’t, and indeed it will become the most difficult part of our tactical setup – finding a way to score goals against sides who don’t attack with a club built to play on the counter. Should be interesting.

The next article will look at just this issue. How do you attack smaller sides? For all of you who complain about tactical consistency, I will show you just how you can beat Barcelona one week and then lose to nobodies the next. Strap in and enjoy Real Madrid getting humiliated in the next instalment…

Related posts:

1. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 2
2. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid?
3. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 4

Jordan Cooper: Now the match is a very important center piece of how you should be focusing your motivation, your morale, your team talks towards; but a lot of the overall sense of how your team gels as a squad comes to the day-to-day morale maintenance, and dealing with transfers, dealing with tutoring, intermixing players together, and that will basically set you up for making matches so much more effective where you don’t have to deal with a lot of major things in order to be successful on the pitch.

I know that we’ve highlighted a bunch of times that in Football Manager 2010, they still haven’t introduced the fact that you can’t really criticize or talk to your players like a real manager would like in the dressing room or on the training pitch; everything has to be done kind of through the public.  But you do highlight the fact that maybe that’s why it has such a big morale boost because when you go to the tabloids with an issue that you have with a player—either positive or negative—that obviously in real life is going to have more of an effect than if you just pull them aside on the training pitch.

Gareth Millward: Yeah, definitely.  I think this is one of the things that Matt vom Brocke or ‘The Next Diaby’ was really trying to point out when he did CPW back in 2008, and it’s something that he’s brought into CPW ‘10 as well is this idea; but doing it through the media, it’s probably one of the reasons why it has such a big effect.  If I were to go down the route where you could criticize in private and praise in public then would that send mix messages?  It certainly would make a very interesting system but it would make it far more complicated to play properly.  It’s definitely something to be interested in.

And the other thing of course is that we can criticize a player if he comes out and demands more first-team football through the press.  We can criticize him for going to the press without coming to see you first, but it doesn’t really work the other way around which is quite an interesting aside.

What you’re saying about squad management being the long-term issue in Football Manager is definitely true.  This is the thing that you do as an ongoing strategy in order to build squad gelling, in order to bring through youth players or slot in immediately into the squad, bring in players who are likely to strengthen the squad mentally as well as technically.  These are the sort of issues that you really need to be thinking about when you sign players when you’re looking to develop youths, and when you’re generally just looking to get the team to play together better.

Jordan Cooper: Commenting on a player’s form—the easiest way to superb morale.  So how easy is it?

Gareth Millward: Well, through testing, it’s actually one of those things where once you get to know your players and you get to know how the interaction system works, it’s actually very easy to use over time.  Easiest might be a good word for the tagline, perhaps most effective way to superb morale is probably the other way of looking at it because you can boost a player from a reasonably low morale to superb morale literally within 24 hours.

From the minute you make the comment to the minute it lands, the morale can boost straight up.  And if you get it right, you can pretty much constantly keep your first 11 at superb morale.  Of course if you get it wrong then you end up making them much less confident.  But definitely commenting on a player’s form is perhaps the headline thing that you can do; if you don’t do any other form of squad management other than team talks and player interaction, these are the two things you definitely should do in order to keep morale high which will have a direct bearing on match-day performance.  This is not the short to midterm effects. It’s these two—team talks and commenting on player’s morale—are the things that you really should be looking at, at least using for the major occasions if not using all the time.

Jordan Cooper: I find that commenting on a player’s form, like you should probably do as much as possible.  I think you’re absolutely right that you could boost people’s morale so fairly easily just by paying attention to their last five games and then gearing your comment towards what type of player they are; because obviously as you say in CPW, that an average performance for a super star may actually be a bad thing.  You’d want to say, “Well, I don’t think he’s on form.”  Yet for maybe a wonder kid or a very developed player or rotation player, having a 6.8, 6.9, or one 7, maybe it might be worth to say, “I really like your form,” yet for a super star that wouldn’t be the case.

Gareth Millward: Well, definitely.  I wrote an article for the Football Manager Britain main site about my time as the manager of Hinkley in Football Manager ‘10.  And I found with my squad that actually quite average performances such as a 6.5, an average performance was something that I should say, “Yeah, you’re doing pretty well.  Keep it up.”  But if I’d been manager of Manchester United or managing Chelsea, one of my first team players like Frank Lampard or Wayne Rooney put in that kind of performance, I would have been absolutely really quite angry with them for performing so averagely.  It definitely depends not only on the player’s expectations, but the club’s expectations as well.

You want more from your best players, and your more professional and your more determined players want more for themselves by working out what they want and what they want to hear, and what you need them to hear.  After awhile, although you will probably make a lot of mistakes, I continue to make mistakes.  Every time I join a new club I always get quite a few of them wrong, but after a few months with pretty much commenting as much as I possibly can on their form to try and keep the morale boosted, you soon learn what you need to say to each of the players to get the most from them.

Jordan Cooper: And you also highlight that older and more matured players tend to respond a little bit more consistently to your form comments, and the younger players kind of– I always find younger players sometimes you can never be really ironed down their personality that much because from one day to the next, it seems like they’re manic depressive.

Gareth Millward: Definitely, yeah.  But that’s due to some of the hidden attributes and some of the mental attributes that they have which affect their personality.  Older players really, they tend to have made it so they tend to be a little bit more professional, a little bit more consistent.  They have more developmental traits so they’re more, in football management terms, intelligent players.  So they’ve been around a block a bit.  They know really what they should be doing and what they shouldn’t be doing; otherwise, they wouldn’t have survived in football for as long as they have.

Whereas with young players, you’re never entirely sure what’s going to happen because they haven’t fully developed a coherent personality.   They’re not as consistent because they’re younger; they’re not as professional because they’re younger.  Their mental stats aren’t as developed because they’re younger, which is another reason why tutoring is such an important part of the game because you can pass on some of those metal stats to the youngster to make them more consistent in the way they behave and the way they play, and make them more determined to play better.

I think in general you want to praise your youngsters more because they are more prone to lapses in confidence because they don’t have the experience; they don’t have the emotional maturity yet to be able to rant and rave at them just because they’ve not played as well as your well-established, 30-year-old, world-class striker.

Jordan Cooper: Now let’s say you’re in the lucky position of having an entire squad that is on superb morale.  Does that mean that commenting on form really won’t do anything or is there some type of benefit even when players are on superb morale to comment?  Because there’s no level to go from there; they can’t be overly superb.

Gareth Millward: No, you won’t be able to improve their morale; but if you comment on a couple of players, you may make them more determined for the next game because they’ll be in a better mood in terms of their PR icon.  And the reason for doing it, more important is that the more correct responses you get, the more positive responses you get from your players the more likely it is that you will become one of their favoured personnel.  And if you’re one of their more favoured personnel, then they’re more driven to play well for you because they see you as a friend, as a mentor; they have respect for you.  So they’re much more likely to play well with you; or even if you move clubs, they’re more likely to accept your approaches for them if you’ve got a very good relationship with them.

It’s always important to make sure that you don’t waste an opportunity to build a relationship particularly with your key players because if you can build a good relationship with them then they’re more likely to perform more consistently for you and they’re more likely to stick with the club rather than handing in transfer requests if a bigger team comes in for them.  And just generally, you’re going to get a higher level of squad gelling because the player is going to feel far more confident being at a club where his favorite manager is the manger.

Jordan Cooper: And a gelled squad is a happy squad and that’s what the point−

Gareth Millward: A gelled squad is a happy squad, exactly.

Jordan Cooper: –building harmony.  And you highlight here when you talk about these long-term planning strategies, that the long term really depends on whatever time period that you want.  Some people kind of look at FM Britain and go, “Oh, you guys play 25 season long careers,” but there are plenty of those out there that only play two or three seasons.  But the concepts still apply.

Gareth Millward: Oh, definitely.  Lots of people want the list of wonder kids.  So clearly some people expect to be playing the game for more than a couple of seasons; but if you want to get the best from your wonder kids, then you need to learn how to pass on the right traits to them; how to keep a gelled squad so they’re happy to stay there.  And long term really can be anything from a couple of seasons to quite a long way down the line, unless you’ve inherited a squad of complete super stars and you’re only intending to play for one, maybe two seasons with that team.  You need to be able to keep the squad gelled and have some kind of longterm goal.

You need to be able to keep the best players at the club.  You need to be able to keep those best players at the club performing at consistently high level.  So I don’t think you should ever be underestimating the long-term planning that goes into keeping a club solid and on the right track.

Jordan Cooper: Well, one of the first things that you always have to do when you take over a club or you move or you change players around is choosing a captain.  And typically, the default reaction is to basically look at whoever has the highest influence and make them the captain and obviously, you can look into determination, team work, and see if they have the hidden professionalism stats.  But is it more than just looking at 1-20 type of stats to determine who your captain is?  Does the age matter?

Gareth Millward: These are the factors that go into it.  You can just pick it on influence because the majority of times if they’ve got high influence then they’re likely to have other high stats mentally such as determination and professionalism and all these other kinds of things.   

If they’ve got a high stat influence they are likely to be of a certain age.

But there are other things to look into.  One of the factors that we mentioned is seniority which is one of these loose kinds of terms.  It is not really something you can pin down; but seniority in terms of probably a first team player or a first team regular, the kind of guy that’s going to play 30 to 40 games a season, the kind of guy that probably is going to be in his late his late 20s or early 30s or maybe even older; he’s going to be the kind of guy that’s been in the club a few years as well.  They’re the kind of guys on top of guys that have got influence that you want to make a captain because they’re likely to have friends at the club which means that people are going to respect them more; they’re likely to have other high mental attributes because they’re going to be older because they’ve been at the club awhile that are already gelled and settled which means they’re going to be performing at a consistently high level.

And if they’re performing at a consistently high level then that’s a good example to the rest of the squad.  It doesn’t really look very good if your captain is playing 4 out of 10 every week.   So you kind of want a player that’s well established at the club.  And it’s not to say that you shouldn’t just buy somebody in to become captain because plenty of teams have done that in the past and there’s nothing inherently wrong with that.  But if you’re looking for the kind of ideal archetypical captain, it’s going to be somebody with high influence, high professionalism, high determination, one of your better players at the club, somebody that plays virtually every game, and somebody that’s been at the club a few years and is likely to stay there for a few more yet.  That’s the kind of guy that you want as your captain with all things being perfect.

Jordan Cooper: And your selection policy also has a lot to do with how your players react psychologically in the game because obviously usually most players want to play.  Almost everyone on your squad wants to play first team football but some people are willing to accept the fact that they’re only going to be rotation players, or they’re only going to be reserved players.

So what factors in the selection policy should you really look into so you don’t get the situation where you have a very valuable rotation player who basically wants a transfer request because he’s not playing first team football?

Gareth Millward: Well this is one of the things that you need to get right and I think that the selection policy is one thing that you do need to make sure.  If you are going to play a heavy rotation policy, you need professional players that are willing to accept that they’re not going to play every week; and at the same time, if you’re going to play a heavy rotation policy, you don’t want to be giving 15 players in your squad key player status because you’ve given them key player status because it’s the only way you could offer them enough wages to come to the club.  I think we’ve all run into that mistake in the past or at least I have.

One of the things you really need to do is to make sure that you build a squad for the purpose.  The easiest way to get a squad gelled, playing well and playing your tactics the way that you want them to play is to make sure that you keep a settled first 11.  Keeping a more settled first 11 with a number of key substitutes is the best way to keeping a gelled squad.  But obviously, it’s not the best way to making sure that you’ve got a fit squad every single game for a 50 game season.  So you need a good mixture between rotating a lot and keeping a settled enough squad so that the entire team gets together and learns to gel.

It is a difficult balancing act and we do go through it in the guide; but in general, if I’m with a small team in the lower divisions, I will tend to have a smaller squad and try and play my best 11 out of that smaller squad as much as possible, than I would with Barcelona or Manchester Untied where I have the luxury of being able to rest my best players in the run up to major games; or just in general, being able to kind of rotate players in and out, make four or five changes every game.

Consistency is rewarded in the game in terms of the way that your squad gelled together but obviously it can be a problem in that you can end up playing players who are out of form or worst, injured or with low condition.

Jordan Cooper: You highlight a very important factor that people don’t understand as far as tactics are concerned, and I’m not saying that this is the wrong approach to take but a lot of people do play Football Manager 2010 as a fantasy game.  As you know, their favorite club is X and they’re going to bring in all of their favorite players.  But the downside to that is you may have the best players in the world, but they don’t know how to play together.

Gelling your squad together takes time and throughout that, you will be able to get them to play the best on the pitch with your tactics.

Gareth Millward: That’s definitely a way of doing it and quite a lot of people make the kind of mistake in order to get players to gel, you need to play the same formation every game.  And that’s not actually the case in Football Manager that there’s no in-game penalty for changing tactics or for changing formation from game to game.  That’s not really the issue but there is a lot to be said in terms of squad gelling for keeping a settled first 11 and keeping those settled first 11 playing in the same kind of roles so that they’re playing in their natural positions.

Now, in effect that means that you tend to be playing the same formation but there’s no real penalty to changing tactics.  The penalty really is in a high turnover of players.  So, although it may be good to buy the five best strikers for your Real Madrid side or for your Manchester City side, the problem is that you’re never going to get all five of those players gelled into the squad before at least two of them want to leave the first team football.

It is about balancing.  There’s nothing to say that building a team very, very quickly of super stars is wrong; it’s just about carries inherent risks in the same way that there’s no way to say that building a squad slowly is the right way to do it, but obviously you’re bored and your fans are going to get agitated if it takes you five or six years to get success of the major club.  In fact, you’re probably more likely to get the sack before you even get the chance to build that.

You just need to be aware of risk and reward and that’s really what football managing is about and what CPW is about.  It’s about identifying where the risks are and where the rewards are and letting people go, “Okay, this is the way I want to do it.”

Jordan Cooper: And the more that your squad is gelled, pretty much the more options you have to go with that because I believe that if you’re bringing in a lot of players in the beginning of a season that you kind of maybe keep things very basic.  Kind of like, “Let’s set up a standard 4-4-2,” or whatever formation that you see fit and then working your way towards playing that free flowing attacking style and making all these changes because once the squad is gelled, I think that they are communicating with each other much better.  So you could get away with doing a lot of really interesting cool things but when they’re not gelled, trying to force very advanced “things in their direction,” they really don’t communicate well enough in order to pull it off.

Gareth Millward: Yeah, that’s the major issue.  When you’re starting off a club or you’ve got an un-gelled squad then you want to be functional.  Your ultimate aim is to make sure that you get the points.  And if the best way of getting those points is to grind out draws and wins, then so be it.  But once the team gets more gelled and they understand each other, they know where their teammates are going to be so that their passes are more accurate; they’re better anticipating the runs of their own players; and they can play more intricate football.  It gives you the opportunities to bring more players in the next summer because you know that even if you are bringing in three or four difference players, it’s not going to completely set the club back to having no gelling whatsoever.  You’ve got the time to be able to bring them in.

That’s really the kind of crux of it with an un-gelled squad—you want to be functional.  But the quicker you can get the club gelled, the quicker you can go on to do the cool things as you put it; the kinds of things that people are always like, “Oh, I want to play like Barcelona” or “I want these players to play together.  I want to play this formation.  I want to do this.  I want to do that.”

That’s far, far easier to work out how to do if your players know each other than if you’re trying to get a group of guys who have never even seen each other before to play something quite intricate.

Jordan Cooper: For those that like to have a very active transfer policy, to put it lightly, I’ve seen some people that pretty much offload their entire team and bring in a new one. What are the potential pitfalls and things that you should take into consideration when you buy and sell players and bring players in?  How does that affect your harmony?  How does that affect the morale of the other players on your squad?

Gareth Millward: Bringing in too many players in too short space of time obviously means that you’ve got a load of players at your club that aren’t gelled, and it’s going to take time for them to learn how to play particularly if you’ve brought them in from abroad and they don’t know the language and they come from a completely different football culture.  It’s going to take them a long time to get used to the tempo of the game.  It’s going to take them a long time to get used to the language so that they can understand what the players are saying to them.  Particularly if you haven’t got a particularly high reputation, it’s going to take awhile for them to fully respect what you have to say to them.

Like I said, there’s nothing inherently wrong with bringing in loads of players from elsewhere in order to build a squad, but there are potential pitfalls.  There are certain things that you can do to try to avoid that.  If you can keep the core of the team together; five or six players who you try and keep for as long as you possibly can; who act as the settled players in the team that can bring other players and to keep at least some gelling and harmony in the squad.

If you can keep a few of the older guys who have got a lot of motivation, a lot of professionalism, a lot of determination, they’re the kind of guys that can pass onto these wonder kids that you’ve brought in or the new youth system that you’re trying to set up.  They can pass on a lot of good information and experience to those players.  And they can come into the first 11 for a dozen games a season just to add a bit of steel to the side, a little bit of emotional maturity to the team.  There are all sorts of ways you can do it.

To completely wholesale, gutting out the team and bringing in a new one carries massive, massive risks.  So we do cover that in the guide in terms of the potential pitfalls but also the potential benefit.

Jordan Cooper: So when you do bring in players, getting people that fit the personality of your squad is probably very important because you want to have the same type of players; if they’re professional, they’re determined, you want them together.  You want to bring those types of players in.  

Now, we’re talking about things like that but obviously, there are players like the Joey Barton’s—the players that may have enough skill—that you almost have to deal with the fact that they’re disruptive. Is there any reason to bring in people that aren’t professional and determined or does it just come down to “They’re just too talented to not take them in?”

Gareth Millward: In certain cases, you might not have a choice.  You may have to bring in somebody who hasn’t got the best mentality in the world because they’re the only person available because you’re a smaller squad and they’re the only people you can get on your budget.  You might decide that it is worth the risk taking on a person who is obviously very talented even though they might be flaky; they might not perform particularly well all the time; or they might not get up for the big matches; they might not be particularly professional, but you might decide with the position that you’re in that it’s worth the risk.

And exactly the same way that you might thing, well this player has had five long-term injuries over the past six or seven years but he’s so good.  I think it might be worth the risk bringing him in and seeing if we can keep him fit.  There is always that kind of considerations to make.

I would suggest that if you’re trying to build a dynasty at the club that’s trying to win lots of trophies at the high end of the game; that bringing in a player with a disruptive personality should really be on the proviso that you can get rid off them pretty sharpish if it ends up back firing.  And certainly, you don’t want that kind of guy to be passing on those kinds of traits to your youngsters.

There are always reasons why you might go against the perfect personality type and bring in other types of people but it should always be with the knowledge no matter how good a player is technically, if they don’t apply themselves then a player with a CA of 190 who only performs at 50% of his ability is still basically a player with a CA of 95.  You have to be aware of those kinds of issues whenever you’re assigning anybody who your scouts or your coaches identify as perhaps not necessarily being a perfect personality type.

You can download Communication and Psychological Warfare, the ultimate guide to squad management HERE. Including the audio 2.5 hours of audio and transcripts.

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1. 3 Squad Management Techniques We Can Learn From Manuel Pellegrini
2. FML Extra: Episode 23 – Jordan Cooper
3. Tactical Bible 08: Squad Management V: Discipline

In the first article I discussed the nuts and bolts of the tactical plan I had set up. Essentially it is a 4-2-3-1 with the left winger withdrawn slightly. It is designed to prevent the opposition from using their possession to any effect, and then when we finally regain the ball we will be in a good position to launch effective attacks through the gaps. This is the sort of play Mourinho devised for Inter Milan in their big matches last season against sides who were likely to come at him and try to beat him. So, let’s look at my settings in a little more detail and explore why I made the choices I did.

The Tactical Plan

First of all, the team instructions. I chose to close down less, because this is a good way of keeping team shape. The point of the tactic on the defence is to mark the opposition’s forwards and prevent them from receiving any decent balls. As the passing stats from the 2010 Champions League final show, nearly the whole Bayern side completed more passes than Inter; but as Fernando Duarte pointed out, most of those passes were sideways. If you can’t penetrate, it doesn’t matter whether you have 40% of possession or 80%. I then chose the counter strategy so that the team would withdraw slightly but attack hard once they got hold of the football. Finally, the rigid philosophy will keep the team playing in definite bands across the pitch, to keep their shape on the defence and to allow a progressive placement of players from the defenders through to the attackers.

The player instructions are designed to get the following movement from the players; Higuaín as a poacher will stay high up the field to be available as an option for the counter-attack. Kaká can put pressure on the opposition midfield, but can also sprint forward to join Higuaín when we regain the ball. With Ronaldo able to push hard up the line and slightly inside, and Drenthe stepping beyond the halfway line, the formation will take a sort of 4-2-4 shape on the attack. Xabi Alonso will move slightly further forward to offer another passing option in the centre, while Diarra, Pepe and Albiol can remain in position in case we lose the ball unexpectedly. This just leaves the full backs who can push on to assist the forwards, but must always be aware of their defensive duties.

In at the deep end

As first games go, it could have been much easier; but Barcelona at home will at least give us the opportunity to try our style against a very good team who like to play possession football. If we can make Barcelona toothless then things will look good for the rest of the season.

A couple of small points on our own team for this game. Injuries and suspensions have ruled out Sergio Ramos, Drenthe and Pepe. In order to strengthen the squad I have signed Juliano Belletti from Chelsea as cover for a number of defensive positions and Ibrahim Afellay from PSV Eindhoven. He can play through the middle as well as covering on the two wings.

I also made sure that I used opposition instructions on their DL, DR, AML and AMR. I chose to always close down and always tight mark. The reasoning was two-fold. First, defence in FM10 is much more stable when you put pressure on the opposition’s wide players because the marking system is far from perfect in this area of the pitch. Second, tactically it will force my wingers to track back in their defensive duties if for nothing else than to track any wing back that decides to burst forward out of defence. Between the two of them, my full back and winger on either flank should be able to work together to stop anyone driving deep down the wing to put in a cross.

The Game Plan

The following two diagrams show how my initial tactical plan should work against Barcelona’s 4-3-3. Their starting lineup for this match had a conventional back four (Márquez and Piqué in the centre, Daniel Alves and Abidal as wing backs), a defensive midfielder (Touré), two central midfielders (Xavi and Iniesta), two wingers (Henry and Krasic) and finally a lone striker (Ibrahimovic).

The first diagram shows the defensive shape of the team. Our full backs will be required to stay goal-side of their wingers, with our two centre backs keeping a watchful eye on Ibrahimovic. Our DMCs will match up with their MCs. Afellay will aim to track back fully and keep goal-side of Daniel Alves. Ronaldo, however, will keep an eye on Abidal but will not come as deep. He should be able to break away into the space on the right wing when we get the ball to launch a counter. Similarly, Kaká will monitor but not stick too tightly to Touré to allow him to break forward. Higuaín will sit on the shoulder of a centre back, ready to receive the ball in space.

The second diagram shows our shape on the attack. Kaká moves to support Higuaín, with Ronaldo also bursting forward, creating a line of three players in attack. Afellay supports this by moving into the final third and dropping in slightly behind the front three. In the gap between Alves and Xavi, he can play between the lines as well as getting back easily into positions should we lose possession. Note that Abidal’s position on Barcelona’s attack and on his defence is quite drastic. Either Abidal will be forced to stay in the right back position, or Ronaldo will exploit the space in behind him. Xabi Alonso is able to move into the space between Barca’s midfield and attack, offering a great outlet for a sideways pass. Finally, the full backs will watch the opposition wingers and not commit themselves too much to the attack.

The plan is very much designed to maximise our use of possession while allowing Barcelona to continue to pass the ball to nowhere. Despite being the home side, therefore, I would expect (and hope) to find the following:

• Low possession percentage is fine, but only if Barca are toothless in attack. Anything higher would either suggest we are not attacking quickly enough (and are therefore passing the ball around without penetration ourselves) or that we a completely dominating a poor Barcelona side.
• Barcelona should primarily be taking long shots. I hope that their shooting is from range as they get frustrated by our defensive set up. This should, in turn result in the following…
• We should create more Clear Cut Chances (CCCs). This is also related to the previous point – we shouldn’t be taking too many long shots. We should be able to attack swiftly and decisively and get a number of shots from inside the penalty area.
• We should reduce Barcelona to one goal at most. That might sound a little ridiculous as a statement. But if we have constructed an organised, Mourinho-style defensive system then even the fire power of Barcelona shouldn’t penetrate our goal more than once. It shouldn’t…

Nothing left to do but kick off…

Fingers and toes crossed, we go to the game. In the next article I will take you through the game and show you how the match worked in practice. If the theory works, then we should win this match. If not then it is important to understand why. There are a number of people who argue that the game does not show you why you lost and that there is inconsistency in results. The next article (and later articles in this series) will show you how I analyse a game and how you can show why you won and why you lost. This sort of information will definitely help you to understand why your team might be performing inconsistently.

Related posts:

1. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 3
2. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid Part 4
3. How will José Mourinho manage at Real Madrid?

Serbia’s system was built on organisation. A typical 4-4-2 shape, they played in quite a traditional style, with two wingers, two full backs and a split midfield and attack. Zigic dropped deep, almost to an AMC position while the rest of the side held their shape and built behind them. This allowed the Serbs to play to their major strength; height and size.

Ghana on the other hand played a much quicker 4-3-3 strategy, looking to move the ball through the lines quickly on the counter attack. The forwards were able to move in and out of each other, although their movement was not always efficient. The quick movement allowed the wing players and Gyan to receive the ball, but they didn’t always have an outlet. The MCs closed down the opposition quickly and looked to launch the counter, while the defence, like the Serbians, were able to use their size to keep the opposition at bay.

Player Instructions – Serbia

Team Instructions

Player Instructions – Ghana

Team Instructions

Germany v Australia

What could have been an intriguing game turned into a complete mismatch. Germany played effectively a 4-2-3-1, quite a departure from their traditional shape. The wingers were able to offer a lot of support down the flanks while Klose roamed for space in the centre. Supporting this structure was the “number 10″ play maker, Oezil, who was able to drop deep and wide to pick up the ball and lay it off for the forward players. Further back, the defensive midfield players worked alongside the back four to block off attacks by the Australians. It was certainly a more free-flowing and energetic German side that we are perhaps used to, but it was made to look far more than the sum of its parts by a lacklustre Australian side.

Australia were forced into two game plans. The first was a tenacious 4-4-2 system built on two holding midfielders and two forwards who were encouraged to drop deep to support the midfield. Unfortunately, it was completely overrun by the German attack which was able to overload nearly every position on the pitch. Its asymmetry was also a major weakness as Germany were equally equipped to attack down the left, the right and through the middle.

This led to “plan B”; Cahill was to play up front on his own, while the midfield was restructured into a deep-lying 4-2-3-1. The central midfielders were pulled back to cover the defence, and the wingers were pushed a little wider and further up. Did it work? We may never know. Cahill was harshly sent off for what might be termed an “orange card” tackle, and the whole plan had to be revised again. By this point, however, the game was well and truly lost, and damage limitation was the name of the game.

Player Instructions – Australia

Team Instructions

Player Instructions – Germany

Team Instructions

Follow and discuss the progression of Group D Here in our forums

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2. World Cup 2010 Group B: Football Manager 2010 analysis
3. World Cup 2010 Group A: Football Manager 2010 analysis

The game billed by the Americans as if they were the massive underdogs, one billed by the UK press with ignorance of USA sport. But neither could have  been more wrong as both sides were equally matched, the strong US team were never going to be any push over’s and tactically could have called the game a success, the New York Post declaring it a 1-1 victory for the Team USA.

In truth a poor start by England but it had it’s positives. Heskey came to the front and showed early on in the game why Capello likes to have him in the squad. The target man was looked for throughout the game to give the pass to, strong in possession and holding the ball up while the talents of Rooney, Gerrard and Lampard came from deep being fed by good simple passes opening up space for them. Shown brilliantly early in the game as such a move made the goal for Gerrard.

England fielded a team looking to attack the USA, but instead found themselves without balance in the squad without a supporting play player such as Barry finding themselves poor in possession, against a strong US side looking to deal with the England using two defensive midfielders to reduce space for England, which they did well after the first 10 minutes. .

Alot could be praise should go to the USA wingers who looked dangerous, this forced Ashley Cole, up against Landon Donavan, to be pinned back to deal with him and unable to join England further up the field, something that could have proved the difference for England if he was allowed to.  This may also have meant that out of position Milner or Wright-Phillips who were playing the new found popular inverted winger role wouldn’t have looked so bad and allowed to drift further into the middle. England was largely the better side, but USA stifled England well and prevented the dominance to amount to good chances. The demonstrated that it is not always dominance of a game that counts, something that holds true in FM.

Player Instructions – England

Team Instructions

Player Instructions – USA

Team Instructions

Slovenia vs. Algeria

Two teams with little technical ability and defensive minded cancelled each other out and made for rather dull watching. Slovenia showed a good lesson on keeping what to do when you have little technical ability in your squad and got lucky to win the game.

Algeria looked to want by put more pressure on Slovenia, with very direct play. They would win the ball in midfield, shipping it out to the wingers where you either had attacking wingback Belhadj who enjoyed running with the ball and joining attacks or the wingers who looked to play long direct balls straight to Djebbour, floating crosses from deep, the pace of these players getting them forward quickly and proving the difference in the two sides in the game. But with Slovenia unwilling to commit themselves forward and looking organised at the back the pacey players just found themselves running into opposition players and the direct play was in the end a poor use of the possession. Algeria looked most dangerous down the left hand side where they could use the attacking tendancy of Belhadj with his pace to act as a winger to run with the ball and get crosses in combined also with the speed of Ziani.

Slovenia looked comfortable at the back making themselves hard to break down each player man marking another so not allowing Algeria much space to operate. They defended most of the game dealing with Algeria’s crossing by having men marked tightly, so that Slovenia were positioned well to challenge in the air. It wasn’t until Algeria had Ghezzal sent off that Slovenia attacked a little more and a wonderful strike from Koren proving the difference in a tight uneventful game.

Player Instructions – Slovenia

Team Instructions

Player Instructions – Algeria

Team Instructions

Follow and discussion the progression of GROUP C tactics HERE at our forums

Related posts:

1. World Cup 2010 Group D: Football Manager 2010 analysis
2. World Cup 2010 Group B: Football Manager 2010 analysis
3. World Cup 2010 Group A: Football Manager 2010 analysis