Freedom at Issue

The Perilous State of Freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa

2012-02-03T11:31:26-05:00

by Vukasin Petrovic
Director for Africa Programs

Photo Credit: Nicolas Pinault/VOA News

The progress that sub-Saharan Africa has achieved in building democracy over the past generation is coming undone. After two decades of significant gains, the continent has experienced a steady decline in democracy over the last several years.

In 1972, when Freedom House began publishing Freedom in the World, the state of political and civil rights in sub-Saharan Africa was bleak. With the exception of a few bright spots, dictatorships of one stripe or another ruled the majority of citizens on the continent. Coups and countercoups were commonplace, as were leaders who proclaimed themselves “president for life.” Elections, if held at all, were often manipulated to validate an incumbent leader’s rule.

In the mid-1980s, a wave of democratization began to transform Africa. The continent experienced close to two decades of steady and, in a few cases, impressive democratic gains, arguably reaching the peak of its development in 2005. For that year, of the region’s 48 countries, 11 were rated Free by Freedom House, while 23 were rated Partly Free and 14 remained Not Free.

From 2005 until today, democratic setbacks in sub-Saharan Africa have significantly outpaced its once promising gains. Political and civil rights improved in only 10 countries, largely due to the stabilization of post-conflict situations, while 23 countries experienced overall, and often rapid, declines in democracy. In the most recent edition of Freedom in the World, covering calendar year 2011, only nine countries were rated Free, 21 were rated Partly Free, and a shocking 19 were designated Not Free.

Improvements in 2011 were evident in Niger, which held competitive and transparent elections, and Côte d’Ivoire, where Alassane Ouattara assumed the presidency following extensive fighting triggered by the refusal of the previous president, Laurent Gbagbo, to accept defeat in the December 2010 elections. In addition, Zambia achieved modest gains due to elections that led to a peaceful transfer of power to Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front, ending over two decades of rule by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy.

The most notable declines in democracy for sub-Saharan Africa in 2011 took place around elections. The Gambia was downgraded from Partly Free to Not Free in the aftermath of presidential elections that were judged neither free nor fair. The electoral environment was rendered toxic by President

Yahya Jammeh’s suppression of the political opposition, media, and civil society. In Uganda, the government of Yoweri Museveni brutally cracked down on independent journalists and employed repressive tactics against peaceful protesters. Antigovernment protests were also subjected to a violent crackdown in Djibouti, which witnessed the intimidation of opposition political parties prior to an election that resulted in a third term for President Ismail Omar Guelleh. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the flawed November elections sparked widespread violence that continues to engulf Kinshasa and threatens to become a nationwide conflict if a timely political solution is not reached.

The causes for sub-Saharan Africa’s setbacks in the period from 2005 to 2011 vary from country to country, but upon deeper analysis, a clear pattern begins to emerge—Africa has suffered a noticeable decline in all of the fundamental components of freedom that inform Freedom in the World. The sharpest declines occurred in the categories of Freedom of Expression and Belief (22 countries), Political Pluralism and Participation (20 countries), and Rule of Law (20 countries). The score for Organizational and Associational Rights declined in 18 countries, while that for Electoral Process decreased in 14 countries.

The deterioration in these areas reflects the determination of political elites to hold on to power at any cost, and particularly to hijack elections. Excluding countries that suffered armed conflicts or coups over the last two decades (and the newly formed nation of South Sudan), all of the sub-Saharan African states rated Not Free this year have been ruled by the same parties or leaders for at least 20 years, and in some cases much longer.

There is a clear link between the length of ruling parties’ tenures and the steady decline in democracy. Even sub-Saharan Africa’s powerhouses, such as Ethiopia (21 years), Kenya (10 years), Nigeria (13 years), and South Africa (18 years) have experienced an overall stagnation or decline in freedom. The poor performance of precisely these largest and most influential countries, which had previously inspired hope for democratic progress, is perhaps the most disturbing trend in the region. Kenya, despite its previously modest democratic gains, has not fully recovered since the flawed elections of 2007, following which politically motivated ethnic violence broke out. To date, impunity has largely reigned; those responsible for directing and participating in the violence have yet to be held accountable. Similarly, Nigeria’s stagnation since the disastrous elections of 2007 has included pervasive corruption; elections in 2011 that, while somewhat improved, were still marred by numerous cases of political violence and suspected vote fraud; and increasing levels of sectarian and religious violence.

Ethiopia continued a decade-long trend of growing authoritarianism. In 2010, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi masterminded national elections that were thoroughly tainted by intimidation of opposition parties, independent media, and nongovernmental organizations. Meles has increasingly employed so-called antiterrorism laws to brazenly suppress any semblance of political opposition or independent media. South Africa, although still categorized as a Free country, has seen its democracy deteriorate as a result of political interference in the judiciary and threats from top government officials against the media.

Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 is a political minefield where in almost any election, desperate incumbents could trigger an outburst of repression, political violence, and ethnic conflict. With 18 countries scheduled to hold some form of elections in 2012, including Angola, Cameroon, Senegal, and potentially Kenya and Zimbabwe, democracy may deteriorate further if the balloting is not free, fair, and accepted by all parties.

The continent suffers from leaders who have overstayed their welcome and would in fact be replaced if elections were fair. The international community needs to engage early in electoral processes; step up the pressure to prevent political elites from cracking down on the opposition, media, and civil society in the run-up to voting; and ensure that the electoral results are respected and a transfer of power takes place. Otherwise, sub-Saharan Africa will continue to slip back toward where it started in the early 1970s.

As Russia Prepares for Protests, New Media Battle the Old

2012-02-02T09:19:36-05:00

by Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker*

Writing on the revolutions of Central Europe in the New York Review of Books two decades ago, scholar Timothy Garton Ash made the observation that “the crucial medium was television. In Europe, at the end of the twentieth century all revolutions are telerevolutions.”

Today, one could argue that all revolutions, at least in their nascent stages, are social media revolutions. However, this does not mean that television has been tossed onto the ash heap of history. In fact, in settings where the state retains dominance over television, it is in many ways functioning as a counterrevolutionary medium.

The current situation in Russia—which Freedom House has given poor marks on political rights and civil liberties, democratic development, and media freedom, but middling scores on internet freedom in particular—is a case in point. The country’s unfair and fraud-ridden parliamentary elections on December 4, 2011, brought into sharp relief the dramatically different realities portrayed by new and old media. Russia’s growing ranks of internet users collected and disseminated evidence of widespread and blatant electoral abuses, stimulating a response from a wider public that is showing less tolerance for corrupt and manipulative leadership. By contrast, the Kremlin-controlled national television networks, with only minor exceptions, have ignored both the extensive election mischief and demands that Russia’s top leadership be held accountable for it.

State dominance of the national broadcast media has long made it possible for the authorities to keep meaningful criticism off most television screens and shape the boundaries on what people are free to discuss on the air. For example, instead of genuine opposition figures, activists, and social critics, televised public-affairs shows feature a reliable set of Kremlin-approved commentators. Television can also serve as a simple loudspeaker for the leadership when it chooses to go on the offensive. Before the December 4 elections, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin used state media to denounce certain nongovernmental organizations and election monitors as foreign-funded “Judases.” State-controlled outlets are doing more of the same in advance of the March 4 presidential vote.

It is important to remember that the audience for these outlets comprises most of the population. Their extensive reach can be seen in recent polling data. A Levada Center survey conducted after the parliamentary elections (December 8–16) asked Moscow residents to list up to three sources from which they usually got their news. The results heavily favored state-controlled media: television—78 percent, internet news sites—44 percent, friends and neighbors—39 percent, radio—28 percent, newspapers—26 percent, and other internet sources—16 percent.

More to the point, 89 percent of those who supported the ruling United Russia party said they got their news from television, whereas only 38 percent of that group reported using internet news sites. Beyond Moscow, this breakdown is likely even more skewed toward television, as rural populations have less access to the internet and other independent sources of information.

Putin’s marathon call-in show performance on December 15 was emblematic of the way that the Kremlin has dominated political discussion in the media over the last decade. All key outlets broadcast the choreographed event, which allows the Russian leader to communicate an unchallenged message directly to his core constituency. Meanwhile, Putin has said he is “too busy” to participate in debates with his fellow (relatively friendly) presidential candidates, demonstrating his aversion to any unscripted television exposure.

Given this background, it was all the more remarkable that Russia’s three main state-controlled television channels reported on the December 10 rally against election fraud in Moscow, though the gathering, unlike previous protests, may have simply been too large to ignore. Since the end of the holidays, the state media have gone back to their old ways, devoting extensive positive coverage to Putin and disparaging the opposition as unfit to govern. Opposition figures Vladimir Ryzhkov and Boris Nemtsov were recently granted rare appearances on late-night talk shows, but both programs were prerecorded and edited, and Ryzhkov was berated and called a “traitor” on air by Sergei Kurginyan, a Kremlin apologist, for meeting with newly arrived U.S. ambassador Michael McFaul.

The regime’s control over broadcast media served it well during the past decade, but as Russia’s governance and economy have deteriorated, the Kremlin-friendly version of reality on television may be drifting too far from ordinary Russians’ daily experiences and understanding of their country. A similar dynamic took hold in the dying days of the Soviet Union, when it became impossible for ordinary citizens to stomach the government-issued fantasy any longer.

If such a rupture is now under way—and it is still an open question—the internet will have played a key role in bringing it about. Putin’s apparent failure to fully appreciate the threat posed by new media is consistent with his general reliance on old tricks, such as stoking anti-Americanism, in a rapidly shifting landscape. Indeed, as he prepares for another six years in office, he has made clear that he has no intention of changing the way he governs the country.

The future of Russian media is therefore bound up with the outcome of the larger political battle. The coming days and weeks will tell whether a critical mass of Russians have seen enough of the status quo.

* Robert Orttung is assistant director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Christopher Walker is vice president for strategy and analysis at Freedom House. Walker can be followed on Twitter @Walker_CT.

Fact Sheet: Freedom House in Egypt

2012-01-31T17:48:02-05:00

by Sarah Trister
Manager of Congressional Affairs

The offices of Freedom House, along with those of 10 other organizations, were raided and closed by Egyptian police on December 29^th. Since then, the assault on Egyptian civil society has intensified, and pressure on U.S. democracy organizations in Egypt has grown. In an attempt to justify its actions, the Egyptian government has engaged in an aggressive campaign of misinformation about what is taking place. In response, we offer the following fact sheet:

As part of a broad campaign against free civil society in the country, the Egyptian government last December 29 raided the offices of three U.S.-based organizations whose activities in Egypt are funded by the U.S. government— Freedom House, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute. Each of these groups had shared extensive information about their activities with Egyptian authorities and had attempted to undergo the registration process. The offices of seven other organizations were also raided.

“Investigations” are reportedly underway into more than 400 civil society organizations within Egypt, including Freedom House, IRI, and NDI. As a part of these “investigations,” staff from Freedom House have been subject to hours of interrogations, with clearly political motivations forming the basis of the allegations.

Egyptian authorities have blocked American staff who work for NDI and IRI in Egypt from leaving the country.

Freedom House supports activities that encourage civic engagement, free expression, free association, and free assembly—freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Egypt is a signatory.

Freedom House and similar organizations work around the world on a variety of democracy, election, and human rights issues. Work can be done from local field offices, or through the Washington, D.C. office. When working in a foreign country, Freedom House operates in a transparent manner with the safety of partners and staff foremost in mind.

Freedom House does not choose sides. We do not get involved in any country's politics or partisan competitions and we don't push for specific political outcomes. Participation in Freedom House activities is open and available to people of all political persuasions, faiths, and ideologies who want to work in support of human rights and an open political process.

Language in the annual State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill states that U.S. democracy and human rights programming “shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country.”

The United States does not distinguish between registered and unregistered organizations when making democracy and human rights assistance programming decisions. Many countries, including Egypt, utilize registration as a way to stymie and control civil society organizations, particularly those that work on democracy, governance, and human rights.

In order for a foreign group to legally operate within the United States, it must simply fill out the proper tax forms. Civil society organizations within the United States do not have to report their activities to or receive approval from the United States government.

Almost $300 million in U.S. taxpayer dollars goes directly to the Egyptian government annually for economic and social assistance, including some democracy and human rights funding. The ministry that receives this funding, the Ministry for Planning and International Cooperation, is headed by a Mubarak holdover who has been directing the assault against civil society.

Per the FY 2012 State and Foreign Operations Bill, before the Administration can release the $1.3 billion in military aid for Egypt, it must certify that the government of Egypt is “supporting the transition to civilian government including holding free and fair elections; implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.” At this point, it is clear these conditions are not being met.

An Ambiguous Anniversary in Egypt

2012-01-26T16:14:03-05:00

by Charles Dunne
Director for Middle East and North Africa Programs

To mark the first anniversary of Egypt’s January 25 revolution—which resulted in the fall of long-time president Hosni Mubarak just 18 days later—a coalition of more than 80 revolutionary groups issued
a statement underscoring just how unfinished the revolution really is.

“In light of a full year of failure,” the statement by the Revolutionary Youth declared, “it is clear that the junta has not achieved the goals of the revolution.” Amid the demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of people in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and other cities across the country, both celebrating the anniversary and calling for an end to military rule, that statement struck a sobering note. Hundreds have been killed since last January 25 by Egyptian security forces; thousands of others wounded in clashes; and over 12,000 civilians have been put on trial in military courts for a range of crimes, most of them political in nature and in any case a violation of guarantees of due process. Meanwhile, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) faces spiraling economic problems, with a budget crisis and a sharp depreciation of the Egyptian pound potentially in the offing. The hoped-for democratic transition seems to be in serious jeopardy.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the SCAF’s attempt to eviscerate Egyptian civil society and handcuff its international partners through a campaign of legal intimidation and media sensationalism that began in the summer of 2011. What has been portrayed by the Egyptian government as strictly a matter of law—the need to investigate NGOs to ensure they are in compliance with Egyptian law governing their registration and ability to move funds into the country—has been given the lie by the manner in which the investigation has been carried out. Freedom House, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, along with 14 other organizations (many of them Egyptian), were all raided on December 29 by armed security police. Our offices were searched, equipment and records seized, cash on hand confiscated, and the premises closed and sealed. Freedom House’s local staff has been repeatedly interrogated by the investigating judges. International staff of some of these organizations has been prevented from leaving the country. The media vilification campaign continues unabated, and some organizations, including ours, have been falsely accused (though not formally charged) with attempting to foment instability and “chaos” in the country. All this has taken place despite the fact that Freedom House and its sister organizations made every attempt to comply with Egyptian law by being transparent about our activities, submitting applications for legal registration, and cooperating with the investigation.

The raids are only the latest episode in a broader war on Egyptian civil society. Over 400 Egyptian organizations are likewise under investigation, and some of their offices have been closed as well. Their employees too remain under investigation. It is no coincidence that the Egyptian government’s actions focus almost exclusively on organizations involved in human rights, democracy building and governmental oversight. These activities pose a challenge to long-entrenched interests in Egypt.

The SCAF’s motivations seem clear. Pulling a page from Mubarak’s playbook, the military wants to ensure that it is seen as the only authority in Egypt that can control the rising power of the Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood (whose Freedom and Justice Party won 46 percent of the votes in the new parliament) and its more radical counterparts, the Salafis. By intimidating or eliminating the ability of civil society as well as liberal politicians and parties to offer alternatives, the army can justify its continued grip on the levers of power. This is an especially effective message in some Washington corridors of power.

In addition, the military wants to ensure that its plans for shaping the political transition now underway are not disrupted by political forces opposed to its control. At stake is the military’s ability to avoid civilian oversight of its budget and activities, and to retain control over its web of economic interests (by some estimates military or military-controlled industries account for around 40 percent of the Egyptian economy.) The SCAF also fears it will be held accountable for past crimes and human rights abuses—as the Revolutionary Youth’s statement demanded—if more democratic alternatives arise to successfully challenge the state.

Despite an energetic campaign by the U.S. Administration and Congress, the SCAF so far appears to have calculated that it can carry out its campaign against civil society without paying a significant cost to
its relationship with Washington. So far they have been proven correct.

Why should this matter to the United States? For more than 30 years, America has invested in Egypt as a cornerstone of regional stability, based on its commitment to peace with Israel, counterterrorism cooperation, and quiet facilitation of US military movement in and out of regional theaters of war. Cairo remains the third largest recipient of US military assistance ($1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually) and the fourth largest aid recipient overall. But with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, military needs are fewer. And the sweeping political changes in the region over the last year have transformed the very meaning of regional stability. Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country, has been a leader in both war and peace; it must now become a partner on political transformation, where its example, positive or negative, will have a major and perhaps transformative impact elsewhere.

Most important, the stability of this major country depends on completing the transition to democracy. The alternative—reversion to authoritarianism and resurgent radicalism—poses a serious threat of deepening political turmoil and increased economic stress, with potential regional repercussions. This is in no one’s interest. But it is more likely if civil society cannot operate freely. Without effective advocates for political freedoms, transparent electoral processes, civil liberties and representative government, Egypt’s press, political parties and citizens will more vulnerable to government repression and investors will keep their money off the table. All this has serious implications for the country’s future.

Re-opening our offices and returning equipment and documents would be a welcome first step by the Egyptian government to begin addressing the problems it has created.

But that’s only a start. Will Freedom House and its Egyptian partners be allowed to operate freely? That is where the larger and more important fight lies.

The U.S. government has considerable leverage available to influence Egypt’s course. The State Department and Foreign Operations bill, signed into law by President Obama late last year, requires that before military aid to Egypt can be released, the Administration must certify that the Egyptian military is assisting the transition to civilian government and the implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, religion, and due process of law. Used properly, this certification requirement gives the Administration an opportunity for a powerful diplomatic conversation that it should use not just to roll back the current crisis manufactured by the Egyptian government, but also to enlarge the political space in which civil society can operate.

The U.S. should insist on replacement of the current repressive Mubarak-era law governing the operations of NGOs (Law 84 of 2002), which has long been used to restrict activities of civil society organizations. Moreover, the United States should make clear it considers the protection of human rights and the advancement of democracy a vital interest in Egypt and elsewhere in the region, much as President Obama did in his speech on the Arab Spring last May.

Whether the United States can succeed in effecting such an important policy shift in Egypt is unclear; whether it will even wish to take on such a task is too. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: the longer the crisis inflicted on civil society in Egypt drags on, the likelier the rollback of democratic transition will become.

Assessing Egypt in ‘Freedom in the World’

2012-01-25T15:57:54-05:00

by Vanessa Tucker
Project Director, Countries at the Crossroads

Last week, Freedom House released the 2012 edition of Freedom in the World, its annual survey of political rights and civil liberties. According to the report, Egypt remains in the Not Free category, but with a number of score improvements and an upward trend arrow to reflect progress since the ouster of long-standing president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Some might argue that this assessment does not give sufficient credit to the achievements of the uprising, while others will insist that the improvements registered in the report are not justified in light of ongoing repression.

A closer look at Egypt’s performance on the various indicators used in the Freedom in the World scoring system should help explain the country’s overall position in this year’s survey, which covers the 2011 calendar year.

The most obvious area of progress was in the growth of political pluralism, particularly when compared with the preceding years’ staggering crackdowns on political opposition, as the Mubarak regime prepared for what many expected to be a hereditary succession. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which took power after Mubarak’s ouster, enacted a number of important reforms, including the restoration of judicial supervision over elections, the lifting of severe restrictions on political parties, key improvements to the voter registry, and other changes, reluctantly agreed to, regarding a proportional-representation voting system.

As a result of these reforms, a range of new or previously banned parties were allowed to participate openly in the political system. In perhaps the most notable outcome, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was able to campaign for and ultimately win a large number of parliamentary seats, whereas before Mubarak’s fall, the Muslim Brotherhood was formally banned. While it did contest past elections through candidates running as independents, their success in a thoroughly rigged system was essentially a function of executive whim.

Indeed, the 2011 parliamentary elections, which began in November and ended earlier this month, were by all accounts much more open and competitive than the sham exercises conducted in 2010. Despite some irregularities, a severe lack of organization, and deficiencies in the Supreme Electoral Commission (SEC), it was clear that fraud, violence, and intimidation were dramatically less common than in previous elections. Egypt’s scores in Freedom in the World would have been even higher if the elections had been completed and the parliament seated before the end of the reporting period.

It is easy to forget when recounting these striking successes that there were no elected executive or legislative officials in place from the time of Mubarak’s fall until just this week, when the new parliament formally convened. During the intervening months, all state power rested with the unelected SCAF, which gave numerous indications that it was not genuinely committed to a transition to civilian rule. Instead it attempted to carve out special privileges and prerogatives that it hoped to retain under any new constitution. The SCAF also renewed and expanded the widely reviled Emergency Law, effectively criminalizing strikes, the spreading of false news and information, and the obstruction of traffic—a provision used to thwart street protests. (The SCAF partially lifted the emergency law yesterday, with the important caveat that it can still be used in cases of “thuggery.” It is unclear whether this change will prove significant in practice.)

The SCAF’s behavior over the past year represented in many ways a continuation or an attempted reestablishment of Mubarak-era institutions and practices, and this is reflected in many of the Freedom House scores. For example, the initial flourishing of independent media after the uprising in early 2011, including the proliferation of political debate on the airwaves, in blogs, and to a lesser extent in print, has increasingly come under threat. The SCAF has restricted free expression through direct censorship and intimidation, raids on news organizations, bans on discussing military affairs, arbitrary detention of bloggers and journalists, and editorial interference at state media, which played out most egregiously during attacks on mostly Christian protesters in front of the state television building in October.

Intimidation and violence against people who express dissenting views are incompatible with the development of a civilian-led democracy, but this has not stopped the SCAF, like the Mubarak regime before it, from brutally cracking down on protests and their organizers. The problem drew fresh international attention in December, when security forces were filmed stripping and beating a female protester in the street. The enduring structures of repression also continue to operate behind closed doors, where the authorities have engaged in systematic torture and the extensive use of military trials for civilians.

Finally, the SCAF has perpetuated the Mubarak-era pattern of hostility toward domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that work on human rights and democracy issues. Even as it assails such NGOs for subverting Egyptian sovereignty with foreign funding, the SCAF
demands clear confirmation from the United States that the military’s $1.3 billion in annual aid is not in jeopardy.

Photo Credit: Timothy Kaldas

It would be unreasonable to expect the full transformation of Egypt’s political system less than a year after Mubarak’s departure, particularly when some of the institutional reforms that need to occur—the creation of strong anticorruption frameworks, the development of a truly independent judicial system, and a thorough overhaul of the police and security forces, among others—typically take many years to achieve. Even if a new constitution is drafted openly and inclusively this year, with protections for women and minorities, and the subsequent presidential election is free and fair, these longer-term reform challenges mean that Egypt is unlikely to be rated Free in Freedom in the World for some time to come.

It is reasonable, however, to expect the SCAF to abandon the repressive tactics on which the Mubarak regime relied for decades. As the past year has vividly demonstrated, these tactics are not nearly as effective as once assumed. A central lesson of the uprising is that when a government treats its citizens as adversaries rather than political actors with legitimate demands and interests, it cuts off all possibility of a substantive policy debate. Such debates are unpredictable and often messy, but the only alternative to a clash of ideas—in the halls of parliament, among civil society organizations, and in independent courts and media—is a far more dangerous confrontation in the streets.