The data is drawn from a wide variety of sources, including OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN OCHA field offices, the World Bank and the European Commission, and has been streamlined to form seven core datasets. These are:

1. International humanitarian response – what countries in crisis receive from international governments and private contributions

2. Official development assistance – what countries give and receive in the form of OECD-defined ‘aid’ for sectors such as governance and security, education or health

3. Financing mechanisms – what countries give and receive through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), emergency response funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHFs)

4. Funding channels – how humanitarian financing flows through the system, be it through the UN, government agencies or NGOs

5. Needs, crisis, vulnerability – what countries give and receive through the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP) and non-CAP appeals; what we know about need from the EU’s crisis and vulnerability index

6. Capacity – what resources governments have to respond to crises within their own countries; what investments have been made in risk reduction

7. Reference tables – summary tables on various indicators and indices

For the first time Google Spreadsheets have been used for GHA’s datastore, increasing the accessibility for users, who can download the data in a variety of formats, including excel and CSV files.

The data will be updated on a rolling basis, beginning in June, to include the latest data that drives our forthcoming GHA Report 2012.

Do get in touch should you have any comments or feedback on our newly restructured datastore.

Our first two updates on funding in response to the Libya emergency, which also contains some useful external links to maps and sitreps as well as basic aid data and development indicators, can be found in Libya crisis #1 and Libya crisis #2. 

The data expressed below is an extract from UN OCHA FTS and can be accessed in this Google Docs file. Both the GHA and UN OCHA teams are happy to help with any data enquiries. 

Humanitarian financing headlines, 23 September 2011:

1. US$431.1 million has been tracked in response to the crisis in Libya, US$250.5 million of which in response to the UN’s regional flash appeal (which also covers priority humanitarian needs in Egypt, Niger and Tunisia).

2. As at 23 September, 61.4% (US$250.5 million) of the  UN regional flash appeal for US$407.8 million has been funded.

3. The Top 5 government donors to UN flash appeal are: the United States (US$56.8m, or 23.1% of the total appeal funding), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$40.4m, 16.4% of the total appeal funding), Australia (US$28.2m, 11.5%), United Kingdom (US$12.1m, 4.6%) and Norway (US$9.1m, 3.7%).

4. The top 5 government contributors to the overall emergency (i.e.  UN flash appeal funding as well as other funding for humanitarian projects not listed in the appeal) are: the United States (US$81.6m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$55.1m), Australia (US$37.5m), United Kingdom (US$21.9m) and Sweden (US$19.5m).

5. So far, 61.4% of the UN’s appeal requirements have been met. The coverage of requirements ranges from 4.6% in Egypt to 80.7% regionally. 21.5% of the needs have been met within Libya itself, 55.6% in Niger and 55.7% in Tunisia.

6. The latest information on funding by cluster and by agency can be found on the UN OCHA FTS site.

Humanitarian financing headlines, 12 September 2011

1. The UN has tracked US$385.9 million in response to the crisis in Libya, US$246 million of which in response to the UN’s regional flash appeal (which also covers priority humanitarian needs in Egypt, Niger and Tunisia).

2. As at 12 September, 60.3% (US$246m) of the US$407.8m UN regional flash appeal has been funded.

3.The Top 5 government donors to UN flash appeal are: the United States (US$56.8m, or 23.1% of the total appeal funding), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$40.4m, 16.4% of the total appeal funding), Australia (US$28.2m, 11.5%), United Kingdom (US$12.1m, 4.6%) and Norway (US$9.1m, 3.7%).

4. The top 5 government contributors to the overall emergency (i.e.  UN flash appeal funding as well as other funding for humanitarian projects not listed in the appeal) are: the United States (US$81.6m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$55.1m), Australia (US$37.5m), United Kingdom (US$21.9m) and Sweden (US$19.5m).

5. So far, 60.3% of the UN’s appeal requirements have been met. The coverage of requirements ranges from 4.6% in Egypt to 80.7% regionally. 18.5% of the needs have been met within Libya itself, 55.6% in Niger and 50.6% in Tunisia.

The information below is based on data published by UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) on 31 August – a database that is updated daily. Both the GHA team and UN OCHA teams are happy to help with any data enquiries. Data on official development assistance (ODA) is taken from OECD DAC. The data can be accessed in this Excel file or this Google Docs file.

Other useful sources of information include:

• North Africa Humanitarian Response Portal
• Libya crisis map: http://libyacrisismap.net/
• Situation reports: http://reliefweb.int/taxonomy/term/140
• Appeal documents, needs and daily data updates: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=930
• Crisis background and news: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/libya-turmoil
• For trends in development aid to the region, see Kerry Smith’s report, Arab Spring. http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Arab-Spring.pdf

Humanitarian financing headlines, 31 August 2011

1. The UN has tracked US$374.8 million in response to the crisis in Libya, US$230.9m of which in response to the UN’s regional flash appeal (which also covers priority humanitarian needs in Egypt, Niger and Tunisia).
2. As at 31 August, 60.3% (US$246m) of the US$407.8m UN regional flash appeal has been funded.

3.The Top 5 government donors to UN flash appeal are: the United States (US$56.8m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$40.4m), Australia (US$28.2m), United Kingdom (US$11.3m) and Norway (US$9.1m). Figures in the table below are US$ million.

4. The top 5 government contributors to the overall emergency (i.e.  UN flash appeal funding as well as other funding for humanitarian projects not listed in the appeal) are: the United States (US$81.6m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$55.1m), Australia (US$37.5m), United Kingdom (US$21.9m) and Sweden (US$19.5m). Figures in the table below are US$ million.

5. The best funded clusters in the UN appeal are currently logistics and camp management/coordination.

Background and development indicators

6.The political and security crisis in Libya that began in February 2011 has resulted in acute pockets of fighting (centred mainly in and around Tripoli, Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains), has reduced the capacity of public institutions to function and has led to large scale internal and cross-border displacement. In addition to the challenge of protecting civilians from the direct effects of the fighting, humanitarian efforts have focused on trying to meet food, fuel and medical needs as well as shelter. (See: UN OCHA’s latest sitrep of 26 August for a detailed situation report).

7. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), over 800, 000 people have left the country (total population of 6.5m).

8. Libya is one of six Arab countries to have experienced protests and unrest since December 2010, along with Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain (see: Arab Spring http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Arab-Spring.pdf).

9. Libya has received very little official development assistance (ODA or aid) – under 0.05% of the total allocated to over 150 countries since 2005. Indeed, as a region, ‘north of the Sahara’ (an OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) grouping that also comprises Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) has accounted for 3.6% of total ODA over the past five years.

Firstly, using Many Eyes to create a basic line chart showing the international humanitarian response since 1995 – this includes humanitarian aid provided by governments and the private contributions recorded by UN OCHA FTS.

I also published the total official humanitarian aid, official development assistance and population data in a Google Spreadsheet and created this.

… and all available, in Excel, from our Datastore..!

How much aid is spent in conflict-affected states?

Definition of conflict-affected: based on Uppsala conflict data programme’s reporting of conflict incidence plus presence of a UN mandated multilateral peacekeeping force (i.e. the number of countries receiving the aid in the graph above varies each year). 33 recipients of aid were defined as conflict-affected in 2009.

How much humanitarian aid is spent in conflict-affected states?

How much humanitarian aid is spent in fragile states (2009)?

43 of the 145 countries receiving humanitarian aid in 2009 were classified as fragile.

Each top 10 recipient of humanitarian aid in 2009, was classified as ‘fragile’.

Definition of fragile state: characterised by widespread extreme poverty, most off-track in relation to MDGs and commonly caught in or emerging from violence and conflict. Our list here is based on definitions and lists compiled by World Bank (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 2008), Brookings Institution (Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 2009) and Carleton University (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CFIP) index 2008).

What was aid spent on in 2009?

By ‘aid’ we mean official development assistance (ODA) expenditure as reported to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

‘Other’ ODA =US$55.4 billion and here includes: transport and storage; communications; business, banking and financial services; forestry, fishing and industry; core support to NGOs; refugees in donor countries; etc.

Health includes population and reproductive health. If you take this out, Health expenditure = US$8.2bn

The humanitarian aid figure quoted here is the gross disbursement as reported to the CRS.

Governance and security accounted for 12.5% of aid expenditure in 2009

Governance and security = US$16.6bn, includes: conflict, peace and security (US$3.6 billion) and government and civil society (US$13 billion)

‘Other’ ODA =US$55.4 billion

Health includes population and reproductive health (half the overall US$16bn).

Top 10 recipients of governance, security and humanitarian aid in 2009

Governance and security includes: conflict prevention and government and civil society.

All these statements can be made!:

When debt relief is excluded, seven of the top 10 recipients of total ODA are also top 10 recipients of ODA for government and civil society and conflict resolution combined: Afghanistan; Palestine/OPT; Tanzania; Pakistan; Iraq; Sudan; and DRC.

Six top 10 recipients of humanitarian ODA are also top 10 recipients of ODA for government and civil society and conflict resolution combined:  Sudan; Palestine/OPT; Afghanistan; Pakistan; DRC; and Iraq.

Seven of the top 10 recipients of ODA for government and civil society and conflict resolution combined are also top 10 recipients of total ODA excluding debt relief: Afghanistan; Iraq; Palestine/OPT; Sudan; Pakistan; DRC; and Tanzania.

Six of the top 10 recipients of ODA for government and civil society and conflict resolution combined are also top 10 recipients of humanitarian ODA: Afghanistan; Iraq; Palestine/OPT; Sudan; Pakistan; and DRC.

Afghanistan received over US$1.3 billion in government/civil society aid in 2009 …

… and was the largest recipient of aid expenditure on conflict prevention …

… and six of the top 10 governance and security recipients were also top humanitarian priorities

Six top 10 recipients of humanitarian ODA are also top 10 recipients of ODA for government and civil society and conflict resolution combined:  Sudan; Palestine/OPT; Afghanistan; Pakistan; DRC; and Iraq.

Aid expenditure on governance and security is growing

‘Other’ ODA =US$55.4 billion

Health includes population and reproductive health. If you take this out, Health expenditure = US$8.2bn

The humanitarian aid figure quoted here is the gross disbursement as reported to the CRS.

What does ‘government and civil society’ aid include?

What does aid spent on ‘conflict, peace and security’ include?

But official development assistance (ODA) is only part of the picture

Between 2002 and 2010, the United States has appropriated US$52 billion in ‘Reconstruction assistance’ for Afghanistan – not all of this counts as official development assistance (ODA). US$19 billion has gone through state and USAID, of which some goes to security activities that are non-ODA eligible.

US$33 billion has been spent through the US Department of Defense (DoD), of which US$28 billion on training for Afghan security forces and counter-narcotics operations.

[Note:

ODA cannot be used to fund military equipment, services or debt relief. It cannot

fund security expenditure related to paramilitary functions or anti terrorism. It

cannot fund mine clearance if the objective is not developmental.

If the military are used to deliver humanitarian aid, limited additional costs can

be counted as ODA. To be additional, costs must be incurred over and above the

costs of keeping personnel on base in the donor country and take account of any

compensation received from the UN for the use of military services.

Within UN approved peace operations some activities in the post confl ict

phase can count as ODA. These include human rights, election monitoring,

rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers, advice on economic stabilisation,

demobilisation of soldiers and weapons disposal. Within these activities funding

must not go to the armed forces or for military capacity building. It has to be used

to increase democratic control or for civil society engagement.]

What is global expenditure on UN department of peacekeeping missions?

Source: GHA Report 2010, Development Initiatives, based on SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database

Many are asking about the consequences of the ongoing financial crisis, which first made its impact felt on the markets and the pockets of people in many developed countries in 2008. The above patterns in overall humanitarian expenditure for 2009 do not appear to be out of the ordinary. Humanitarian aid fluctuates each year. At US$52 million, the decrease is relatively minor. And many of the 2009 disbursements will have been budgeted for/made prior to the crisis breaking. For the moment at least, the humanitarian expenditure trend remains upwards.

But the headline figure does mask some variations in individual donor expenditure. While some donors reported substantial increases in their humanitarian aid in 2009 – the United Kingdom, for example, by just under US$150 million – others reduced theirs. Some of them considerably so. The 2009 data shows that EU institutions and the Netherlands reduced their humanitarian expenditure by US$350 million and just under US$107 million respectively for example. We are interested in trying to understand the reasons behind significant changes and will be following up with individual donors in the New Year.

At recipient country level, 9 of the 10 largest recipients remained the same in 2009. Myanmar ceded its place in the top 10 to Pakistan, which received the second highest increase (an additional US$370 million). Humanitarian aid to Palestine/OPT shot up to US$1.2 billion and now almost reaches that of the highest recipient, Sudan (US$1.3 billion). Some such changes are to be expected each year.

It is important not to discount the potential impact of the global financial crisis on humanitarian aid – not least because humanitarian aid is a financial flow that underwrites basic service provision in many countries that other official development assistance (ODA), trade, remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI), commercial lending and other financial flows do not/cannot reach. However, the 2009 figures may not be the best indicator of evidence.

Changes in individual donors’ humanitarian expenditure may or may not be symptomatic of financial crisis. They could indicate administrative or wider policy changes. We need to ask the question as the 2009 figures by themselves cannot answer. We will keep an eye on budget announcements (the newly launched budget4change.org is good for that) and the figures for 2010.

Some charts and tables based on the latest DAC release follow…

Top 10 donors of total humanitarian aid 2009

The 10 donors of humanitarian aid in 2009 were (in order): the United States; EU institutions (DG ECHO and others); the United Kingdom; Germany; Spain; Sweden; Netherlands; Norway; Canada and France. A slight change in order from 2008, with Italy ceding its top 10 place to Canada.

Top 10 donors of total humanitarian aid 2009 per citizen

When worked out on a ‘per citizen basis’ (i.e. dividing humanitarian aid expenditure by the total population), Luxembourg emerges as a very generous donor (with each citizen contributing just over US$126 to humanitarian aid expenditure), followed by Norway and Sweden. Also interesting to observe is that the United Arab Emirates is seventh on the list.

Biggest increases in humanitarian aid expenditure, 2009

The United Kingdom increased its humanitarian aid expenditure substantially in 2009 – up by US$149.4 million. Sweden, Australia, Turkey and Spain all increased theirs by over US$20 million. Smaller increases were also made by Canada, Finland, Hungary and Luxembourg.

Largest decreases in humanitarian aid expenditure in 2009

We are investigating the EU’s decline in humanitarian aid expenditure – when you look at changes by recipient country, they make sense in context of situation and trends … but given the extent of the apparent cut (US$350 million), we have asked the EU to comment. According to its own reports, DG ECHO’s funding remained relatively static.

Other notable changes came from Netherlands and Ireland.

Top 10 recipients of total humanitarian aid 2009

Sudan remains the top recipient of humanitarian aid for the sixth consecutive year. But its humanitarian aid volume went down slightly (by US$67 million). Humanitarian aid to Sudan has, since 2004, been between US$300 million and US$600 million higher than the next nearest recipient each year. This ‘margin’ has now dropped to around US$100 million.

Going up … biggest increases in volume of total humanitarian aid 2009

Palestine/OPT’s humanitarian aid rose dramatically in 2009. At US$1.2billion, it has almost reached the same levels as Sudan, which, as a top recipient since 2004, has always had between US$300 million and US$600 million more than the next largest recipient.

The United States increased its humanitarian aid expenditure to Palestine/OPT from US$22 million in 2008 to US$304 million in 2009. Detailed Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data shows numerous lines of project expenditure, including a large contribution to UNRWA’s General Fund, 2009 Emergency Appeal for the West Bank & Gaza. The European Institutions also increased their directly administered expenditure to the country fairly considerably (by some US$35 million), with contributions to UNRWA for emergency distress relief and reconstruction, and also to NGOs for food aid. The United Kingdom increased its expenditure to the country by a similar amount. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) doubled its expenditure there too (from US$5 million to US$9.4 million).

Humanitarian aid to Pakistan also increased considerably.

This emphasis on Palestine/OPT only changes the concentration of humanitarian aid expenditure on the top 3 or top 10 donors slightly however.

Going down .. biggest decreases in volumes of total humanitarian aid in 2009

Humanitarian aid expenditure in Afghanistan went down.. while overall official development assistance (ODA) to the country went up. Humanitarian aid to Myanmar had increased considerably in 2008 (following Cyclone Nargis) and declined again in 2009. Humanitarian aid to Ethiopia had also experienced an increase in 2008 (driven largely by the United States’ response to the food crisis).

Notes

1.       The data on which this report is based is available from the data store:

- for analysis by donor, 1990-2009

-  analysis by recipient should be made available soon (there’s a technical hitch in uploading the file! Sorry!)

2.       Our figures will differ from the DAC’s because:

-          we add in HA/ODA from core contributions to UN agencies

-           we do not include Korea as a DAC donor until the next DAC data release (April 2011, which will provide preliminary data on 2010 flows)

-          in 2009 we have included UAE’s reported HA contribution from Table 2a (as individual donor, as non-DAC donor and in total HA from all donors figure)

- we include the EC as a a donor.

3.       The figures quoted in the above text about the EC and United Kingdom’s contributions to Palestine do not take into account their totally unearmarked core contributions to multilateral agencies.

4.       Our figures relate to official development assistance (ODA or ‘aid’) expenditure as reported to the OECD DAC aggregate tables. The figures reported here exclude debt relief.

5. In 2009, total ODA increased by just over 4% to US$139.8 billion (excluding debt relief). Total humanitarian expenditure reached US$11.7 billion – an 8.4% share of total ODA.

6.       All data is expressed in constant 2008 prices.

Firstly not all actors are included in the data reported. There are far too many gaps, and significant ones.
Some governments, especially those outside of what is classed as the humanitarian system, do not report to the main databases we have at our disposal; if they do report it is often haphazard and not comparable with other data. The national governments response to humanitarian crises is incredibly difficult to track; these countries are one step removed from donors, and their contributions, whether financial or through their role in logistics and coordination, are rarely fully understood, and hardly ever counted.
The contributions from individuals are also missing. Firstly the private voluntary contributions made by individuals around the world are often not reported properly by the implementing agencies that receive their funds, especially, once again, for those countries outside of the humanitarian system as we know it. But beyond that the work done by communities, families and individuals remains uncounted and unaccounted for.
In fact in a rather perverse irony of humanitarian (and development) aid the closer you get to the beneficiaries the less you know about the value of the money given.
The data reported itself meanwhile is not as useful as we need it to be. The two main databases we have, the DAC CRS and the OCHA FTS have issues. The DAC is much more rigorous as it demands all countries to use it the same way, the same codes and to report all aid funding. It is also far too late in reporting, includes the funding from only the 22 members of the DAC and the codes it uses for humanitarian are nothing like that used within the humanitarian system. The FTS meanwhile, though a part of the system and set up to monitor appeals, cluster funding etc is flawed because it is a voluntary system; it relies on individual donors and organisations to report, and that reporting when it is made is far too variable and open to question.
Finally, the missing link perhaps, is impact. Even given these caveats I would like to say we understand reasonably well what is happening in terms of inputs. But of the exact group of beneficiaries for these inputs. And the outputs that money produced? And beyond that to outcomes? That is something much, much harder to gauge. And yet of course this is the thing that surely is most important. How is it possible that we still don’t have an easy way to measure what happens to US$100 million of humanitarian aid to a country, of what impact it has on the population’s life and welfare?
In essence in my role as programme leader for GHA I am, together with the programme colleagues and our various partners, to work through these issues, to fill in the blanks, interpret the variables, discounting those we judge are wrongly reported, mix and match sources of data as best we can, investigate those areas of humanitarian financing that others do not. We try our best.
For humanitarian aid then what do we need? Simply, a systematic, easy-to-use and real-time detailed data set that goes down to the level of what is done exactly where with whom. If we had all the data in forms that we could compare and contrast we could tell a much clearer picture of humanitarian aid, and, we think, enable those in positions of policy and implementation to make much better decisions, and for those paying the aid bills or receiving the assistance, to better hold the system and its actors to account.
There would be still the need for the GHA programme, and other people and organisations who want to examine humanitarian financing to do exactly that. We would just wouldn’t be spending all our time trying to work out whether or not we had good enough data and from then what it was trying to tell us.
Until then we’ll continue the work.

Is the same to be said of humanitarian aid? Does everyone look at the other for their transparency? Or perhaps something else drives people to be less transparent about aid than they should: the imperative to save lives. Does it inhibit people’s ability to be transparent? Perhaps operational agencies are too busy saving and protecting life, in providing the basics of human dignity for distressed population to think about the transparency of what they’re doing.

If we take that to be true, what arguments can we use for humanitarian aid that is transparent from initial donation through implementing agencies to the impact in beneficiary communities?

In its simplest form the argument goes like this: humanitarian aid transparency will save lives now.

Greenland: Ethereal Iceberg, by Denni Schnapp

The reasons for aid transparency in general become even more important because of the urgency of the need. More transparency would mean a more efficient coordination of activities and the avoidance of duplication, presumably the reduction of administrative costs for all involved and thus an increase of the overall value to the beneficiary. It would increase the need for accountability for the delivery of humanitarian services and products and lead to an increased stake in this delivery by both government and communities. And finally, surely only by understanding fully what is happening on the ground in humanitarian crises can we begin to see what needs to be fixed in the system, so all the research and all the consideration about what to do, issues of humanitarian space and the role of national government, of better and faster delivery, all this actually needs aid transparency.

In fact perhaps humanitarian reform, despite the relative successes of pooled finances and the cluster coordination system and slightly less successful moves towards better humanitarian leadership, actually has the wrong focus. Isn’t it is an attempt to fix the system without understanding the full nature of what the system is doing? In the aftermath of a crisis or in a protracted complex emergency we still don’t know the basics: what is delivered.

That said then what exactly do we mean by the transparency of humanitarian aid?

For me there is one overall need with two overall goals. The need is to have real-time information on all aspects of humanitarian provision: who is spending what money through which actors in which parts of the affected country on what sectors, targeting which beneficiary groups. And this information would have to include what national governments and civil society groups, and what communities and even families are doing to respond to humanitarian need. The detail is absolutely essential. It should at the very least tell us about the outputs, and later, one hopes, the outcomes too.  If we had this information then perhaps we would reach our two goals. Firstly we would have an aid system where we know what is happening right then and there and not three or six months later with evaluations and reviews; with up to the minute aid information we should be able to know what is happening when and where and be able to make the right decisions, prioritise some sectors and areas of the country, move resources around to make better use of them, make better appeals, request specific funds from donors to meet the identified need.

Secondly by having information on exactly what is supposed to happen collected together we would for the first time enable beneficiaries, whether the government or its people, to understand exactly what they should have received, from whom and when. We would drive accountability from a complete picture of what was promised by whom, rather than this rather piecemeal system that is reliant on those implementing agencies that actually do give opportunities for communities to give feedback, views that rarely affect what is delivered anyway.

In a sense then transparency is only part of the goal. Having tons of undigested raw information is unlikely to help many people. However if that information is properly understood and correctly packaged, it can help people make right decisions and help all stakeholders hold others to account.

But this is all fine, at least to me. What next? How do we deliver this? What do we need to do and who should be in charge? Who will drive this process, will it be top down, with the system demanding a uniform reporting system in detail for all actors, or will it come from the bottom, through the increased use of technology at community level, monitoring the implementation of promised work. Both of these perhaps. And how can we build into the delivery of humanitarian aid the fact that the full and ‘digested’ transparency of that assistance is a part of the work and not an additional, somehow external element?

Ushahidi, a well known crowd sourcing platform, was set up to report and map violence during the post election period in Kenya in 2008 and has since gone on to gather information for various projects globally. The purpose of the platform is to aggregate information from the public, in the simplest way possible, so that it can be used effectively in a crisis situation. Most recently, Ushahidi created a crowd sourcing platform in Haiti which enabled local people to report their needs via SMS and assisted humanitarian response teams in locating affected people using street maps.

At GHA we encourage the use of visual and communication tools that facilitate better evidence to identify the needs of people affected by natural disaster and crisis. Whilst crowd sourcing is still evolving, it appears it has the potential to transform how humanitarian needs are identified and reported by creating a direct and immediate link between crisis affected people and assistance providers. However, much more evidence is needed to demonstrate how it will actually work when crisis strikes.