Yet this represented just 5% of the total humanitarian funding from international governments and private donors in 2011. There may yet be scope therefore for increasing the volumes of funds channelled via these mechanisms and space for innovations on the pooled fund model.

To date, pooled humanitarian funds have been a UN-led initiative, but a new pooled humanitarian fund was created in 2010 by the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA), a group of UK-based NGOs, which they are now looking to take to scale. In this article, we examine the particular features of the CBHA ERF and consider whether its global ambitions complement and enhance the existing humanitarian funding architecture.

Do we really need another pooled humanitarian fund?

Pooled humanitarian funds are generally thought to be a good thing on balance, channeling increasing volumes of humanitarian funds from a growing range of donors to both well known and some under-funded crises. In some cases pooled humanitarian funds have improved the timeliness of funding and they encourage humanitarian organisations to participate in inter-agency coordination forums.

For donors, pooled funds also have the very attractive quality of reducing transaction costs, transferring responsibility for fiduciary control and the identification of needs and suitable funding partners to the UN agencies managing the funds and the agencies or coordination bodies overseeing their allocation processes. This is particularly appealing at a time when many government donors are facing staff cuts and it also makes it easier for newer donors who have limited technical capacity and experience to assess proposals and prospective partners to participate.

But transaction costs are not necessarily reduced overall, rather in many cases they are shifted down the transaction chain. And the transaction chain itself may be lengthened and administrative costs extracted at each stage.

The CERF – the largest pooled humanitarian fund with annual funding of around US$460 million – can only pass on funds directly to UN agencies who in turn pass around a quarter of all CERF funds to NGOs to implement humanitarian programmes. While release of funds to UN agencies may be rapid, the lag-time between the award of CERF rapid-response funds and receipt of funds by NGOs receiving funds via UN agencies takes an average of up to 13 weeks.

We can’t track these multiple transactions at the moment – although the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) would enable us to – so we don’t know what proportion of the original funds donated remain or how much time is lost in these multiple tiers of transactions. This is a major limitation in our ability to assess the timeliness and efficiency of pooled humanitarian funds.

But it is clear that both money and time may be lost in a system with multiple layers of transaction and implementing NGOs – including national NGOs who often struggle to access funds via pooled channels – are often at the end of the chain, last to receive funds and with limited influence over where, how and to whom funds are allocated.

The extent to which pooled humanitarian funds are a good thing currently depends to a certain extent then on who you are but also on where you are.

The CERF, reliant on channelling funds through UN agencies, can only direct funds to places where UN agencies have a footprint. Country-level pooled humanitarian funds are established in a limited number of usually protracted crises, where the UN has an established coordination presence. That potentially leaves a large number of crisis situations, where the UN does not have a substantial footprint and capacity to monitor and articulate needs, unlikely to benefit from pooled humanitarian funding. With an increasing number of small-scale emergencies associated with climate change and many ‘forgotten’ or ‘neglected’ sub-national crises, smaller crises may experience growing inequality in funding and response to needs.

In reality, when NGOs need to start-up somewhere new or scale-up fast, they can’t wait for the donor and pooled funding leviathan to crank into gear, so they do so with their own private resources. But many international NGOs have limited private resources and they may have many competing claims on these funds. Moreover, it may be extremely difficult for national NGOs to call on reserves to respond to crises.

So if a new mechanism could take the best of humanitarian pooled funds, and improve on some of the limitations, to make funds for NGOs more accessible (including national NGOs) and to channel funds to less high profile crises, then perhaps we do need one.

What is the CBHA ERF?

The CBHA was established in 2010 by 15 UK-based NGOs to strengthen the coordination and capacity of the humanitarian NGO sector. As part of this initiative a £4 million fund was established for member agencies to draw on during an emergency. The ERF provided immediate seed money for agencies to begin relief efforts before other funding became available. Programmes funded by the ERF must begin delivering aid within seven days of the start of a response and complete within 30 days.

Funding in this pilot phase of the fund was awarded based on proposal submissions which are evaluated through peer review by representatives of all the member agencies.

Since March 2010 the ERF has allocated £4 million to 12 humanitarian emergencies and the ERF peer review mechanism was used to disburse an additional £21 million in the context of the Pakistan 2010 floods.

What are the comparative advantages of the CBHA ERF?

The CBHA, while small in scale to date, has received some pretty convincing endorsements. The UK Department for International Development’s 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) for example, acknowledged the role of the ERF in improving the rapid response in certain disasters as a model for providing ‘greater equity in allocations, and coherence’. And two independent reviews of the ERF clearly indicate some important comparative advantages relating to timeliness, cost-effectiveness and funding in accordance with needs, particularly in less high profile crises.

Based on an independent review of the ERF after its first year of operation:

-          the ERF appears to have successfully driven up humanitarian funding to crises which did not have Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) flash appeals and therefore where the UN system and bilateral donors were not focussing much attention (Bangladesh, Myanmar, and South Kordofan)

-          the ERF provided additional resources to NGOs in contexts where the UK, at least, was otherwise only channelling its humanitarian funds through UN agencies or the CERF

-          the ERF had markedly quicker disbursement and start-up times compared to other humanitarian funding modalities

-          on average, ERF-funded projects were approved and became operational two to three times quicker than other NGO projects as a whole

-          and in avoiding multiple layers of transaction costs, ERF funds are more cost effective in that a greater proportion of donor funds remains to deliver goods and services to crisis-affected populations.

While the amounts of funding awarded are relatively small and the implementation period short, recipient agencies report that ERF funds enable them to scale-up and to leverage more funding from other sources – including in the Horn of Africa in 2011. According to an independent review conducted by DARA, “The CBHA response to the crisis in Somalia long before it became a major news story reflects one of the key advantages of such a peer-managed fund – the ability to respond to humanitarian needs even when they are not on the news”.

In addition, and perhaps most importantly, 52% of all grants awarded via the CBHA were channelled on to local partner organisations. While many donors may recognise the critical importance of supporting domestic response capacity, they usually struggle to do this in practice. The CBHA offers an alternative channel for donors to domestic actors to international financing and to build domestic response capacity.

What are the challenges to going global?

In a relatively short space of time and with a relatively small amount of funding the ERF has demonstrated impact, cost effectiveness and major comparative advantages in responding to needs fast. The CBHA have ambitions to take the ERF to scale to build something like a global CERF for NGOs. If successful, this could provide an effective complement to the existing suite of pooled humanitarian funds. But with many government donors trimming their aid budgets, they may face some formidable challenges in accessing funds, while the demand for response, particularly in relation to climate-related disasters, continues to grow.

In reality, despite the potential of pooled humanitarian funds to broaden donor participation and a record 161 official and private donors contributing to pooled funds in 2010, just ten government donors (UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Canada, Ireland, Denmark, Germany and Australia) provided 90% of the total funding to all the ERFs, CHFs and the CERF from their inception in 2006 up to 2011, with the UK alone providing 29%. There are already many competing claims on these donors’ resources.

In targeting private donors, the ERF may come up against competition with the fundraising strategies of their member agencies and they may face some difficulties in achieving consensus among members on ethical and reputation considerations around accepting funds from corporate donors. Building relationships with non-traditional government donors requires time and resources.

The ERF’s peer review model, which currently functions transparently and efficiently, may need to develop new governance models for global scale operations, where informal networks, personal relationships and experience will not be adequate to evaluate partners and their proposals, and they will need to move away from their UK brand in order to appeal to a wider constituency of donors and implementing agencies.

Based on the impressive early successes of the ERF however, there is every reason to believe that the CBHA has the creative vision and drive to meet these challenges. What remains to be seen is whether donors will rise to their challenge to provide more timely, needs-driven and cost effective humanitarian funding.

You can read more about pooled humanitarian funding in GHA Report 2012, and our special reports on  CHFs and ERFs and you can access our unique dataset on financing flows through the UN OCHA managed CERF, CHFs and ERFs here.

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Amidst calls for a scale up of aid and warnings of funding shortfalls following poor “Gu” rains in Somalia, the threat of a severe food crisis in the Sahel looms. We examine the cost and efficiency of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest social protection programme outside South Africa, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). We also compare the PSNP’s response to the recent Horn of Africa food crisis with the more traditional humanitarian response.

The Productive Safety Net Programme

The PSNP was created in 2005 and provides regular, predictable cash and/or food transfers to 7–8 million rural and food-insecure households (approximately 10% of the population) in roughly half of Ethiopia’s c. 600 woredas. It operates for six months in a year, bridging a period of predictable food needs. 85% of beneficiaries take part in public works in exchange for the support, while the remaining 15%, who are unable to work, receive free direct support.

The PSNP has two main aims:

• to provide households with enough income (in cash or food) to meet their food gap, thereby protecting assets from depletion and enabling recipients to be lifted out of long-term food insecurity
• to build community assets.

Cost

In its first year (2005) the PSNP cost US$225 million. It supported 4.83 million people, with a cost per beneficiary of US$46.6. The budget has since increased to include scaling-up mechanisms for times of increased need (see below), and to support greater numbers of people. The 2010 budget is estimated to have been US$347 million. That same year, the programme supported 7.4 million people, with a cost per beneficiary of US$47.

Crisis response

1)      PSNP

The PSNP has inbuilt mechanisms enabling it to scale up its response in times of increased acute food needs through a contingency budget and a Risk Financing Mechanism (RFM). In August 2011, as the extent of the Horn of Africa food crisis became apparent, the RFM was triggered. This allowed the PSNP to extend the duration of its support to 6.5 million of its regular recipients, as well as to provide three months of support to an additional 3.1 million people, bridging the food gap until the November 2011 harvest. With a total of 9.6 million beneficiaries throughout the 2011 food crisis, the PSNP’s response to the crisis came to an estimated US$53 per beneficiary (including extra costs associated with the RFM).

2)      Emergency humanitarian response

Areas not covered by the PSNP have relied on traditional humanitarian actors, including UN agencies and NGOs, to meet emergency food needs. The emergency humanitarian assistance provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) and Joint Emergency Operation Plan (JEOP) in response to the 2011 food crisis benefitted a combined maximum total of 2.5 million beneficiaries. This was at an estimated cost of US$422 million (based on the 2011 Humanitarian Requirements Document’s funding summary), giving an estimated cost per beneficiary of US$169.

An even clearer picture of the PSNP’s cost-effectiveness emerges if we consider the as yet uncalculated value of the public works carried out by 85% of recipients, as well as the lives and livelihoods saved by beneficiaries’ long-term participation in the programme. This is particularly the case when compared with the cost of a more traditional emergency humanitarian response.

Further benefits of the PSNP

In areas not covered by the PSNP, the time lag between identifying and assessing the 2011 crisis, mobilising funding and responding to humanitarian needs was up to eight months. Moreover, not all of the funding required for the humanitarian food aid response was forthcoming, and agencies had to distribute half-rations in some distribution rounds. In contrast, where the PSNP RFM was activated, the response time was reduced to as little as two months in some areas.

As an established programme with predictable requirements, the PSNP can benefit from the best deals when procuring commodities; it also uses established distribution networks, and is therefore more cost-effective.

Shock protection

A recent report by the Institute of Development Studies investigates the degree to which the PSNP has been successful at protecting beneficiaries from recent shocks such as the 2011 food crisis.

Key findings include the following.

• The PSNP has a positive impact on the food security and wellbeing of beneficiary households, irrespective of whether or not they have been affected by shocks. However, PSNP recipients exposed to shocks have lower food security and wellbeing indexes than PSNP recipients who were not exposed to shock.
• Whilst the PSNP does contribute to protecting households against the level of impact caused by a shock, the positive effects are not sufficiently robust to shield recipient households completely (a finding which is supported by another recent evaluation of the PSNP).

Insights from Kenya

Since 2005, the Kenyan government has invested heavily in a range of social protection schemes, including safety nets, as a key part of its poverty reduction strategy. Prior to 2005, the main form of safety net support offered to poor and vulnerable populations was traditional humanitarian relief, usually in the form of food aid, mobilised by the government and the international community in response to crises such as drought and floods. However, between 2005 and 2010 spending on social protection programmes in Kenya rose by almost 75%, and spending on safety nets doubled.

A recent review of Kenya’s Social Protection Sector highlights the importance of a system-wide approach to social protection, emphasising the complementary nature of different social protection schemes such as safety nets, social security and health insurance. The report states that, “combining safety net support with investments in livelihoods and employment can move households rapidly out of poverty”. Further studies associated with Ethiopia’s PSNP have found that households accessing other packages of agricultural support in addition to the PSNP were more likely to be food secure than those which did not, reinforcing the idea that social protection schemes should not be viewed in isolation.

The PSNP’s response to the Horn of Africa crisis clearly demonstrates that more effective alternatives to the traditional humanitarian response to a food crisis do exist. Yet for a social protection scheme to fulfill its potential, both political and financial support are essential. Where a full range of social protection interventions are not available, cash transfers and voucher-based programmes appear to provide better protection against crises than commodity distribution. However, whilst the use of cash programmes is steadily increasing, they remain under-used, primarily due to concerns amongst donors about the associated risks. These include the potential for the diversion of funds to terrorist or militant groups in conflict-affected areas and the possibility that a large influx of cash into local markets may lead to inflation. Recent experiences in the Horn of Africa, however, suggest that such fears are relatively unfounded. More importantly, for cash transfer programmes to be fully effective in a crisis situation, the necessary financial support must be readily available at the point of need (as is the case with the PSNP’s RFM).

GHA Report 2012

An evaluation of Ethiopia’s PSNP and its ability to respond to the 2011 crisis is provided in GHA Report 2012, which was launched last month. To order a copy, please contact Dan Sparks: dan.sparks@devinit.org

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The domestic initiative has especially grown with the expansion of the private sector, which has sustained Uganda’s economic growth at an average of 6% per annum for a period of nearly 20 years. Many companies have as a result tended to identify with their customers through robust Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies and have contributed to many emergency responses in Uganda. Ugandans in safer parts of the country have also shown solidarity with their counterparts in emergency hit areas, sending them relief in the form of cash and physical items.

These efforts however have largely been frantic, undocumented and uncoordinated, rendering it difficult to determine scale, trends and the impact on wider humanitarian architecture.

In 2010, DRT, with support from the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme undertook a study to assess how domestic response has contributed to the overall humanitarian effort in Uganda over a ten year period. This was done by mapping the domestic response resource flows, assessing the impact and benefits of each resource flow, determining how the resources are targeted, mapping how actors claim resources and assessing both the data and the utility of the method used in capturing and analysing the data. The study was carried out in Katawi and Pader districts which have suffered protracted and recurring disasters in the last ten years including conflict, flooding and drought. It was also carried out at the height of the humanitarian crisis caused by the March 2010 Bududa mudslides, which killed hundreds and displaced thousands of people.

Eighteen months have passed since the study and in the same period the country has sadly witnessed several other humanitarian crises of varying degrees. Heavy rains have caused a lot of destruction since June 2011, killing scores of people and destroying homes and crops. In a district called Bulambuli, around the Bududa area in the Mount Elgon ranges, mudslides struck again on 28 August, killing over 40 people and rendering thousands homeless. In what one newspaper dubbed “The curse around Mt Elgon”, huge stones and a mass of hanging soil in a game reserve were washed downhill burying several houses, an incident wildlife officials blamed on deforestation of the mountain slopes. In perhaps the most gripping and unexpected disaster, lightning strikes killed over 30 people across the country in the months of June and July. These disasters once again tested the ability of the national and local government and other domestic actors in responding to emergencies.

One of the findings of the 2010 domestic response study was the fact that victims of disasters consider the domestic effort to be prompt and immediate, and largely free from the procedural and bureaucratic practices of international agencies – clearly positive traits. However, the domestic effort, led by government and supplemented by private companies and local agencies, is also notorious for being frantic and uncoordinated.

Some critics believed the Government’s handling of the Bulambuli disaster was a disaster in its own right, due to the Government’s late entry into the response effort, and the differing numbers of the dead provided to companies giving out similar relief items. Yet the Government insists that it has responded to disasters in the best way possible, given the circumstances, pushing back against critics, and stressing that even countries with some of the most sophisticated technologies and expertise to predict, warn and respond to disasters struggle “when nature decides to act in a certain way”.

The Bulambuli tragedy however revealed that anticipation of disasters is not yet a key part of the Government’s disaster preparedness strategy, which was a principal finding of the domestic response study. Nonetheless, there have been several positive developments since the study was conducted, including the relocation by the Government of the over 5000 people displaced by the Bududa landslides to a camp in Kiryandongo district (with plans underway to do the same for Bulambuli victims), the approval of the Disaster Policy by Cabinet and the activation of National Emergency Operations and Coordination Centre.

Yet, as the study established, the primary problem has not been about lack of disaster response policy frameworks, but rather the implementation of such policies. Disaster management desk officers exist within key sector ministries, disaster management committees at district, sub-county and village levels, and a full Ministry of Disaster Preparedness exists as a coordinating body. Under it are Directorates of Relief, Disaster Prevention and Refugees. Most of these structures are active during emergencies but go into near oblivion once the event passes.

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The Movement has a complex resource architecture that includes bilateral (direct funding between two elements of the Movement such as between National Societies) and multilateral pathways (when funds are channelled via a third party such as through IFRC) with resources mobilised from various sources – governments, multilateral organisations, private contributions and commercial enterprises amongst others.  Currently, the volumes and trends of resources within the whole Movement are not being captured as data on funding flows within the different pathways are not compiled into a single analysis.

Data on multilateral funds, produced by IFRC, as well as information from ICRC, has fed into previous Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) reports, yet this gives only a partial picture.  For example, in 2009 IFRC estimated that multilateral funding was only 30% of the total income to the Movement.  Although some National Societies detail financial statements in their annual reports, using these statements for analysis is extremely challenging as the data is not comparable.  IFRC is establishing a Federation-wide reporting system for National Societies and the Secretariat that includes total income and total expenditure as indicators.  In the long term, the IFRC is hoping to capture greater detail such as sources of income and patterns of expenditure.

The Global Humanitarian Assistance programme wants to add to the understanding of financing volumes and trends Movement-wide. We, therefore, contacted 12 Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies and asked them to complete a template detailing their income and expenditure in 2010 and 2009.  Seven National Societies replied – Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All seven provided income data for 2009 whereas five provided it for 2010.  Four provided expenditure data for 2010 and five provided it for 2009.   National Societies vary in their strategies and funding patterns and, therefore, the data portrayed here cannot be extrapolated across other Societies, especially given the small sample size.  Despite this, the study does highlight the wider income and expenditure for seven National Societies as well as the complexities around how National Societies perceive their mandate and their expenditure behaviour.

Income

Combined data on the humanitarian income for 2009 and 2010 shows that private donations from individuals to the National Society in their country of residence made up the largest share of income (41%) while income generating activities (contracted and commercial services) made up the second largest share (24%).

Figure 1. Top three sources of humanitarian income in 2009 and 2010 combined

In comparison, the combined data on total income (development and humanitarian) for 2010 and 2009 shows that income-generation contribute the largest amount (36%), while governments make the second largest (26%) and individuals contributing to their own National Society the third largest (25%).

Figure 2. Top three sources of total income in 2009 and 2010 combined

Comparatively, other sources of humanitarian income represent a significantly smaller proportion of the overall funding.  The National Societies appear to receive only marginal volumes of money from other delivery agencies, for example from UN agencies or other multilateral organisations such as the World Bank or regional development banks. Funding passed from the UN system on to the seven National Societies only amounted to 2.1% of the total (see table below).

Table 1.  Sources of humanitarian income in 2010 and 2009 combined

If we assume that only contributions from individuals, trusts/foundations and corporate giving is classed as private income, then at least 44% of the income to the seven National Societies came from private sources. However, if the money raised through income generating activities, such as the sale of promotional items, first aid training, gaming and lottery and income from investments, is taken into account this share could reach 68%. In comparative terms, our previous research on implementing organisations has shown that the main non-governmental organisations (NGOs) receive on average 58% of their income from private sources.

Figure 3: Average private and institutional income for humanitarian aid for seven National Societies in 2009 and 2010 combined

However, the volume of private income, defined in wider terms for the purposes of our research as funding coming from individuals, corporations, trust/foundations and income generating activities varies extensively across National Societies. For example, this only made up 18% of the total income of Belgian Red Cross in 2010 and 2009 combined, whereas for the same period it was 84% of the total income of the British Red Cross. Similarly, income generation provides 2% of the total income to the Danish Red Cross in 2009 whereas it was 72% of the income of the French Red Cross in the same year.

Expenditure

Figure 4: Total expenditure of National Societies, 2009-2010

The majority of funds from our sample data were spent on long term services and development programmes – 52% in 2010 and 59% in 2009 – whereas disaster response and early recovery made up the second largest share, 35% in 2010 and 30% in 2009.  Furthermore, the majority of funds were spent domestically, 61% in 2010 and 58% in 2009.  The whole of Colombia’s expenditure is spent domestically, which is perhaps not surprising given it is a recipient National Society, but when the Colombia Red Cross is omitted from the sample, the domestic expenditure is still 60% in 2010 and 57% in 2009, which is more surprising given the other National Societies are from high-income countries.  Examples from the British Red Cross data show that domestic expenditure included event first aid and first aid training, fire and emergency support services, refugee services and care in the community.

In terms of international expenditure, more funds were spent multilaterally than bilaterally. In 2010, 27% of funds were spent multilaterally and 9% were spent bilaterally, whereas in 2009 17% of funds were spent multilaterally and 14% were spent bilaterally. While these shares are not in line with previous findings from IFRC that over two-thirds of the Movement expenditure is bilateral, our limited sample size does not necessarily mean that this difference in the results is significant.

Figure 5: Channel of expenditure of National Societies, 2009-2010

The table below illustrates the differences between how National Societies perceive their mandate.  For example, the British Red Cross states that all their activities are humanitarian even though it spends more on long term services and development programmes than disaster response and early recovery, and on disaster preparedness and risk reduction combined, and despite having a greater domestic (66%) expenditure than international (34%).  By contrast the Danish Red Cross reports that 93% of its income is development funding while 78% of its expenditure is on long term services and programmes and 59% is spent domestically.  The Colombia Red Cross spends all its funds domestically, 77% of which is on disaster response and early recovery.

Table 2: Trends across four National Societies 2010 and 2009

This analysis, however insufficiently representative to be extrapolated across all National Societies, provides an interesting insight into their financial structure. In terms of humanitarian income, it portrays an overall prevalence of private funding over governmental and other sources of income. More specifically, income generating activities appear to be a considerable source of financing for National Societies and an income strategy that clearly differentiates them from most other NGOs and civil society organisations. In terms of expenditure, the study shows that domestic activities outweigh the international aid programmes for all National Societies participating in the research. This finding, while not unexpected for the Colombian Red Cross, may be regarded with surprise for the other National Societies that are based in high-income countries.

Although this exercise gives an insight into the funding patterns of only seven National Societies, when replicated on a larger scale it could provide valuable information on volume and trends within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. While the global reach of the Movement – based on its worldwide presence and its network of volunteers – is well understood, a more complete funding picture will enable a better assessment of the full financial scale and weight of the Movement within the delivery system, thus emphasising its influence. It could also lead to improved coordination across the Movement, enabling better programmatical decisions and more effective assistance for those in need.

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We sincerely welcome your input to make this information as up-to-date and accurate as possible, so if you have any additions or changes please email Georgina.Brereton@devinit.org.

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The study was carried out in February 2011 and set out to map the sources and volumes of funding as well as the scope of the various resource flows.  In addition to this, the wider contribution of the KRCS to the country’s overall humanitarian response was explored, which included consideration of the Society’s auxiliary role to the Government, the extent of its autonomy, its role within the humanitarian system and its relationship with key stakeholders.

The report can be found here.

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Out of the list of 187 national society annual reports covering the period 2007-2010 provided to us by the IFRC in November 2010, it was possible to access 131.  Of these, 68 showed data on income (covering 46 countries) and 62 showed data on expenditure (covering 44 countries).

The categories into which we grouped the income and expenditure data were not preset prior to the exercise, but evolved out of the ways in which the various national societies reported the data – there was no standardisation of reporting across national societies.  As such, the same income source or the same outflow could be categorised differently for the various national societies, according to the descriptions used.  This is particularly applicable for expenditure data which is reported less comprehensively than income data.  For example, bilateral spending to national societies may be described as ‘RC national societies’ in one report but as a ‘project sector’ in another report.

Income

Our findings show that income raised domestically decreases as the country-level income decreases (see figure 1).  National societies from high income countries raised 77% of their income domestically, whereas national societies from low income countries raised 11% of their income domestically.  National societies from low income countries were more dependent upon funds from within the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement (18%) whereas national societies from high income countries did not receive any funds from within the movement.

Figure 1. Sources of income for Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies, 2007-2010, according to country income levels

Expenditure

The largest proportion of funds spent by national societies from high income countries went towards blood/first aid/ambulance services (41%), (see Figure 2).  The largest proportion of funds (44%) spent by national societies from low income countries was on disaster preparedness and risk reduction (DPRR) whereas national societies from lower-middle income countries spent most of their funds on projects/appeals (54%).   However, as mentioned previously, reporting of expenditure data is relatively weak which poses limitations for data analysis.

Figure 2. Expenditure by Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies, 2007-2010, according to country income levels

Annual reports are used by some national societies as a way of reporting their financial information, however not every national society provides a financial statement in their annual report and those that do vary in the detail they give.  The lack of standardised reporting also means that data which is disaggregated by source or sector is not comparable across societies.  Nonetheless, with some improvements annual reports could be a good tool for Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies to provide transparent financial data.

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• 40 of the 94 countries surveyed release no meaningful budget information.
• Mongolia and Uganda, while still not meeting best practices, have improved over time.
• There are also some geographic patterns: the United States and the countries of Western Europe tend to be more transparent while the Middle East and Africa tend to be less so.
• South Africa is the top performing country while India, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine all perform relatively well.
• Afghanistan scored 21 points higher than Iraq.

The findings of the Open Budget Index echo some of our experiences trying to obtain data for a number of governments on how much they spend on disasters.  Data is hard to come by.  We’ve been asked to attend meetings to justify why we want data and to write formal letters requesting data.  Trying to find the right person to ask is a large hurdle to overcome, and should you find them emails invariably remain unanswered and phone calls ignored.  Yet if an international organisation is having difficulty, imagine how impossible it is for the citizens of that country, let alone the poor and vulnerable.

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I’ve already posted some of my thoughts on the conference here.  In addition to these, other interesting topics included the development of partnerships beyond the humanitarian system. Guidelines have been developed for foreign militaries operating in disaster affected countries during times of crises, through the Asia Pacific Conference on Military Assistance in Disaster Related Operations. A coming together of the humanitarian and private sectors was highlighted in the combined work of Mercy Malaysia and Pricewaterhouse Cooper (PWC) one that builds on the strength of each organisation to enable a more effective response.   PWC helps Mercy Malaysia to improve their organisational systems and develop their strategy, while Mercy Malaysia is helping PWC decide how to assist after a disaster and develop their Corporate Social Responsibility.  The next steps following the conference are here.

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