Figure 1: Funding response to Horn of Africa crisis

Another food crisis has now hit the Saheldue to the failure of last year’s rains and aid agencies are calling for an early response to limit the effects. We examine the context and complicating factors that led to last year’s crisis in the Horn of Africa, and emphasise the need for increased early funding to avoid a repeat of the levels of crisis seen in 2011.

Drought

The failure of two consecutive rainy seasons (Oct-Dec 2010 and Apr-Jun 2011) resulted in low crop yields across the Horn of Africa, leading to a reduction in labour demand as well as below-average livestock prices and increased livestock mortality.

Increasing food prices

Food prices across the region subsequently started rising in late 2010. The situation was exacerbated by increases in global food prices, particularly in areas that rely on importing large proportions of their food, such asDjibouti.

The price increases spread to other markets, including fuel, pushing many moderately food-insecure households over the edge.

Security restrictions on aid delivery in Somalia

In July 2011 the UN identified a number of key operational constraints that were severely inhibiting relief efforts. Of particular note was the limited humanitarian access to affected areas of Somalia due to ongoing insecurity and restrictions imposed by armed groups. In areas of Somalia controlled by al-Shabab the group had put in place aid bans on several agencies, preventing food from entering some of the worst struck areas of famine.

In south-central Somalia armed conflict, civil unrest, crime, extremism and piracy caused further problems in terms of aid delivery and relief efforts.

The refugee crisis

A quarter of Somalia’s population was displaced due to the war, and by July 2011 humanitarian organisations in Ethiopiaand Kenyawere struggling to cope with the vast influx of refugees. An average of 1,400 Somalis sought refuge at Kenya’s Dadaab complex every day, with the camp hosting over four times its intended capacity of 90,000.

The extraordinarily high numbers of refugees arriving in camps caused an entirely new set of problems. In the Dadaab camp there was a reported increase in sexual violence against women and girls, putting them at a higher risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, due to a lack of space in the main refugee camp some 65,000 people had settled on the outskirts where access to basic services was minimal.

The Deyr rains – a blessing and a curse

Whilst the eventual onset of Somalia’s Deyr rains in October 2011 was welcomed for cattle and livestock production, the rains brought with them a host of other complicating factors, including:

• increased risk of hypothermia
• increased risk of outbreaks of water-borne and other diseases
• further displacement at camps inMogadishu, where temporary structures could not withstand the rain
• difficulties in aid distribution due to heavy rainfall
• disruptions in planting
• rising malnutrition rates in camps in and aroundMogadishu, placing further demands on already stretched relief efforts.

Funding

An inadequate early funding response from the international community meant relief efforts in the Horn of Africa were seriously restricted for the first half of 2011, with donor response only really picking up once the full extent and effects of the crisis had become all too apparent.

Crisis builds in the Sahel

As warnings mount of a crisis across theSahelthat could affect up to 15 million people, the failure of last year’s rains has already caused crop and food shortages and food prices have doubled in some areas.

Aid agencies acknowledge that the response to date has been better than was the case for previous crises and that lessons have been learnt following last year’s events in the Horn of Africa. However, there is still a long way to go before early response sufficiently meets the needs of the most vulnerable in an effective and timely way, and can prevent the levels of crisis witnessed last year. If governments and donors have really taken the lessons from 2011 on board, they need to demonstrate this by providing much greater levels of funding, and sooner rather than later.

The Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme will release its GHA Report 2012 in July. To pre-order a copy, please contact Dan Sparks: dan.sparks@devinit.org

DAC donors disbursed US$129.4 billion (excluding debt relief) in 2011 (in nominal terms). Compared to the previous year, it represented the first decrease of ODA in more than 15 years, with volumes 2.7% lower (in real terms) than 2010. Unlike global ODA, DAC aid to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 4.0%.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Although nothing major seems to have changed in terms of importance of donors (with the US still the leading donor, providing almost US$30 billion in 2011, followed by Germany and the UK), the real news is that only 7 countries have increased their ODA in 2011.

Italy had the largest increase both in percentage terms (24.5%) and volumes (US$667.4 million in 2010 prices), while Germany is the only other G7 country to have shown an increase in 2011. Moreover, big decreases from EU countries (notably Spain and Greece) are possibly a consequence of the impact of the recession on aid budgets.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

The negative trend can be seen also when assessing performance against aid targets as a percentage of GNI. In 2005, the 15 countries that were members of the European Union by 2004 agreed provide the equivalent of 0.7% of their GNI as ODA by 2015.  Looking at the 2011 data, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark have met the target while most donors appear to be off track to meet the target by 2015.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Humanitarian aid from DAC donors totalled US$9.7 billion in 2011, representing a 2% on 2010. But, contrary to total ODA figures, 13 countries showed an increase compared to the previous year, with the biggest decrease coming from the United States (US$ 224.2 million, a 5% decrease), which remains however the largest donor of humanitarian aid followed by Japan and the UK.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

What do we learn from this new data? Many try to explain the decrease as attributable to high inflation in 2011 (which was indeed higher than 6% for DAC donors); this is partially true, even though when looking at nominal trends growth in 2011 was smaller than growth in 2010. But the most important implication is that this decrease of ODA from DAC donors (even if Country Programmable Aid (CPA) may rise by 6% in 2012, while from 2013 onwards it is expected to stagnate) might represent a further step towards the increasing importance of non-DAC donors and south-south cooperation. Although some of these “new” donors report to the DAC, the picture is still incomplete and it is therefore difficult to accurately compare their levels of development assistance with the ones of traditional donors; and after Busan, this release might represent a further push towards the restructuring of the traditional aid architecture and reporting practices. Finally, this change of course in aid levels, together with the possibility that the World Bank will not be directed for the first time by an American, also underlines that global development is now entering a new and decisive phase.

Aid lore is littered with tales such as that of the Mozambique Government which sought a few million dollars some twenty years ago to invest in flood management, to no avail. A few years later the same donors were responding to the humanitarian needs of flood victims with over a $100 million.

Any thought that was given to DRR in Haiti before the January 2010 earthquake was focused on the ever-present Atlantic hurricane season. As the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) observed earlier this year “the focus of preparedness in Haiti was overwhelmingly on seasonal climatic events. Rare, but catastrophic events were not contemplated. The poorest countries are the least able and willing to invest in risk reduction, including in preparedness. Considering the urgency of everyday needs faced by these countries, the onus for risk reduction and disaster preparedness should be more on the international community”.

I saw myself last week in Haiti that much still needs to be done in terms of embedding disaster risk reduction in the recovery phase but there is certainly a greater awareness of the issues when it comes to reconstruction of health facilities and schools which tumbled into rubble during the earthquake.

These are just some of the reasons why UNISDR extends a wholehearted welcome to the new report from Development Initiatives – Disaster Risk Reduction: Spending Where It Should Count – which takes on the considerable challenge of shedding light on how much donors actually do invest in disaster risk reduction.

I am not too surprised at the outcome but it’s good to have the evidence based on solid investigation of official development assistance (ODA) contributions over a ten-year period (2000-2009). If anything, the report’s authors may have erred on the generous side in calculating that 1% of all development aid to the top 40 humanitarian/emergency aid recipients is for DRR i.e. $3.7 billion out of $363 billion received in total aid by these countries.

As though to add insult to injury, the report also finds that in 2009, 68% of DRR financing came from humanitarian funds, a disturbing signal that we are still all too good at locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.

So what’s happening? Why is DRR still flying under the radar in the 40 neediest nations on the planet? After all, they accounted for 847.5 million of the 2.2 billion people affected worldwide during the decade under scrutiny and almost 600,000 of the 840,000 dead.

The only statistic where these countries fall short on the global scale of things is economic damages, mustering just $74 billion out of a worldwide total of $891 billion.

However, there can be little doubt that to consider the monetary value alone of these damages is to underestimate the impact on poor nations of the loss of key development assets such as roads, bridges, schools and health facilities. Many of these losses are recurring ones because of the lack of strong risk governance in many least developed and most exposed countries.

It is impossible to reflect in these numbers the excruciating setbacks which poor families can suffer as a result of a flood, a storm or an earthquake which destroys the family home. The loss is much more profound than simply the price of the flimsy materials used to construct it. The so-called shack or slum dwelling is often the workplace, a sanctuary for children, and the only defence against the environmental hazards which often dictate where the poor can afford to settle.

We should never forget the human impact which disaster statistics represent as this can play a significant part in convincing donors that disaster risk reduction has a major contribution to make towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals and building the bulwarks against climate change.

There are many anomalies highlighted in this report. The large portion of development aid directed at countries affected in one way or another by the “War on Terror” stands out. So too does the fact that while the top 40 aid recipients regularly account for the highest proportion of deaths due to flooding, flood-related DRR funding in general goes to countries outside this top 40.

However, the stand-out fact is that less one dollar out of every hundred dollars of aid money to the top 40 humanitarian recipient countries is spent on disaster risk reduction. And significant sums of money included under DRR are actual large-scale reconstruction projects such as seismic-resistant housing in Pakistan and Gujarat.

Funding for DRR is not targeted at countries which need it most. This report has performed a valuable service by bringing this uncomfortable truth to the fore. UNISDR as the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction is ready to work with all and sundry to help correct this.

We should always bear in mind that the most significant investment in disaster risk reduction is that made by national and local governments themselves which is why one of the priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action emphasizes the creation of national budget lines for DRR.

Clear international policy and coherence on DRR spending by aid donors will help in terms of setting the direction but ultimately ODA spending on DRR will have little sustainable impact unless beneficiary countries are convinced of the value of a risk management and risk reduction approach. The funding criteria of ODA donors are particularly important in countries where there is a high degree of state budgetary dependence on ODA.

Although quantifying the total investment needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level is difficult and context-specific, the growing humanitarian caseload indicates that current DRR investment is insufficient. Global dynamics, such as climate change, urbanization and environmental degradation, are increasing society’s disaster risk, and disasters are eliminating wealth faster than it is produced (as reported in the 2011 Global Assessment Report) which shows that greater investment is needed in mainstreaming DRR within sustainable development.

Due to the increasing need for disaster relief, humanitarian donors appear to better recognize the importance of DRR, and attempt to support it as best they can through their limited funds. This approach is inadequate in the long-term. Governments and their development partners should firstly prevent as much risk as is cost efficient, mitigate or transfer what they can of the remaining risk and then, recognizing that there will always be residual risk, prepare for it. Prevention and mitigation are primarily long-term development issues, while preparedness spans both humanitarian and development concerns. Yet in many cases, due to a lack of development investment in DRR, humanitarians are trying to fill gaps across the DRR spectrum. Predictable financing for achieving long-term DRR goals needs to come from development sources.

The report highlights that the negligible part of ODA that is dedicated to DRR is rarely focused on those countries which should be given priority as determined by an assessment of risks and needs. While recognizing that donors tend to have countries and/or regions of interest for a number of reasons, and that operational settings are challenging in some high-risk countries, the humanitarian principals of impartiality and neutrality should guide ODA for DRR: human and societal risk should therefore drive prioritization. Conflict and fragile states add an additional dimension of complexity, but recent efforts to better understand and implement disaster risk management in insecure contexts are showing promise.

Preparedness for response deserves special attention as it provides an opportunity to link humanitarian and development efforts. Yet in the current world of bifurcated aid structures, this potential for linkage is actually a liability, with preparedness often falling between humanitarian and development budget lines. A broader resilience approach, as advocated by a number of leading donors and agencies, aims to reduce vulnerability to all potential shocks, even those that are highly uncertain, while at the same time fostering socioeconomic growth which in turn further increases resilience. However, unless the current systems can find a better way to work together without creating yet another budget line, support for resilience will be challenged.

Comprehensive DRR aid tracking and monitoring is critical to successful implementation, results reporting, and to avoiding overlap of efforts across sectors. A sound framework for tracking DRR financing is not yet in place. As the report indicates, the quality of data reported on disaster-related aid needs considerable improvement. A major bottleneck in quantifying the resources dedicated to DRR within humanitarian or development aid is the lack of standardized definitions for recording such investments. The Hyogo Framework for Action Mid-Term Review in fact calls for increased standard-setting and development of tools and guidelines for DRR-sensitive planning and budgeting.

This lack of standards has meant that DRR has not been identified as a core sector or crosscutting issue in most aid providers’ accounting and reporting systems, and in some cases has resulted in inaccurate reporting using multiple definitions/criteria. There is also a lack of accounting procedure for direct investments in DRR, as well as for quantifying DRR investment components in related sector projects. In order to effectively target mechanisms that address the quality and quantity of ODA and other cooperation flows, a thorough review of aid architecture from a DRR perspective is needed. GFDRR and UNISDR have already begun tackling this challenge through a disaster aid tracking initiative.

Governments are ultimately responsible for the safety and well-being of their citizens. As GHA’s new report highlights, accessible information on domestic spending on DRR is generally limited. Standardization of global DRR finance tracking and budgetary definitions would naturally permeate national budgetary systems. However, we must be cognizant that in low-income countries, where national budgets are limited and resources must be distributed amongst many competing priorities, international support is needed to initiate the path of resilient growth. As a country becomes more resilient, disaster losses decrease, ensuring more domestic resources to invest in further growth and resilience.

Recent disasters such as the Pakistan floods, the Haiti earthquake and the famine in the Horn of Africa have raised substantial debate around the need for more strategic investment in disaster risk reduction within aid programmes; the impact of these disasters could arguably have been lessened and recovery quickened if risk had been reduced before the event, which could have resulted in lower requirements for assistance later on.

This new report examines the levels of donor investment in disaster risk reduction in the top 40 humanitarian recipients over the last 10 years, and compares and contrasts these totals with overall aid figures. Questions are posed about the equity of this funding, and whether it is being appropriately directed to meet needs. All this is in the context of a current model of year on year increase of humanitarian expenditure in the same countries, and a humanitarian system which is increasingly under pressure (aid from governments reached US$12.4 billion in 2010, the highest figure on record, and for the first time in five years the level of needs met fell significantly). The sustainability of this is questionable. The report argues that there is a clear need for a shift in the focus of spending. 

Some headline figures for the top 40 humanitarian recipients, 2000-2009: Only US$3.7 billion out of a total US$363 billion of official development assistance (ODA) went to reduce disaster risk; 1% of all development aid is directed at DRR. Four countries alone (Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh) accounted for 75% of all DRR funding. In 2009, 68% of DRR financing came from humanitarian funds.

At a time when humanitarian needs are at an historic high, and donors are under considerable pressure to spend less and prioritise value for money, a reassessment of spending is essential. This report reveals the critical need for a revised financing model which places greater emphasis upon the reduction of risk, based on comprehensive assessments of need and appropriate prioritisation of funding, as well as improvements in the quality of reporting.

You can view, download, or print the report here. If you would like to receive a hard copy of the report, or to speak to the report’s authors, please do get in touch: georgina.brereton@devinit.org

Table 1: Comparative analysis of UN CAP appeals at launch. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

However, the new Humanitarian Appeal seeks to mobilise US$93 million less than did the mid-year review (MYR) of the 2011 CAP, which represents a 1% decline. Yet, any direct comparison between global CAP requirements at the time of launch – which takes place on the last day of November each year – and at its mid-year review point – which occurs each July – can be misleading. This is due to the fact that new consolidated appeals are added after the annual CAP is issued and flash appeals are launched in response to sudden onset emergencies that could not be foreseen in the annual CAP. Therefore a detailed analysis of individual appeals is essential in order to assess the actual variations taking place.

Table 2: Comparative analysis of 2011 and 2012 UN CAP requirements. All figures are in US$ million. [Source: Development Indicatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Somalia is the country experiencing the single most dramatic escalation of requirements for 2012 with a staggering increase of over 500%, in the course of a single year, up to US$1.5bn, driven by the severe drought crisis in the Horn of Africa. Requirements by beneficiary also soared to US$380 per person, a 93% increase from 2011. Yet, even with recent improvements in the security situation and better humanitarian access, it remains doubtful that such a vast volume of funding can be successfully implemented in one of the most unstable and volatile countries in word.

Figure 1: Somalia consolidated appeals’ total requirements and requirements per beneficiary for 2011 and 2012. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Requirements for Kenya and Djibouti – the other two CAP countries most severely affected by the Horn of Africa crisis – also feature predominantly in the Humanitarian Appeal for 2012. Kenya’s is the third largest consolidated appeal for 2012 with a 26% increase in needs compared to six months ago and a 45% rise from the 2011 CAP levels. Funding sought for drought-affected Djibouti more than doubled, with requirements per beneficiary also rising by some 18%. 

In its first year, The Republic of South Sudan has taken place in the UN CAP for the second time. The country’s first consolidated appeal was launched at the time of the 2011 CAP MYR last July and represented the separation of humanitarian plans and the associated financial requirements for South Sudan from those of Sudan. In 2012, both Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan see their requirements per beneficiaries grow well beyond 100% when compared the previous year, despite a more moderate increase in net appeal requirements: collectively needs increased from US$1.7bn in 2011 to US$1.8bn for 2012. Looking at each country, the Republic of South Sudan sees the funding sought increase by a quarter while Sudan’s requirements decline marginally by 4%.

Figure 2: Sudan 2011 CAP and consecutive separated South Sudan and Sudan consolidated appeal requirements. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Many traditional consolidated appeals begin 2012 with declining funding requirements: Afghanistan, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) all see their funding diminished. In the case of Afghanistan and CAR, this is happening despite an increase in the number of beneficiaries (32% and 18% respectively), while Chad sees those considerably reduced. Such apparent contradiction reinforces the perception that there is little connection between the identification of humanitarian needs and the level of funding requirements in the Humanitarian Appeal.

Figure 3: CAP requirements for Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad and occupied Palestinian territory (2011-2012). [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

The CAP 2012 document states that “coordinated needs assessments are more systemically practised, and this is likely to be fine-tuning the identification of people in need and of the scope of their needs. Also, information management innovations are likely playing a part in reducing funding requests (…)”. Nevertheless, this is at best a tenuous explanation of the widely varying scenarios presented by the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal: while Afghanistan is experiencing drought and intensified conflict, leading to an increase in the number of vulnerable people, its funding requirements are being slashed by a quarter; on the other hand, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has lost 31% of its beneficiaries and yet funding requirements remain unchanged from those of the previous year.

With regards to the countries included in the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal, they are few highlights, apart from the disappearance of the West Africa regional appeal which has been part of the CAP for the past 11 years. The West Africa appeal used to encompass some 15 countries, many of which experience small-scale but persistent humanitarian crisis and high vulnerability. Traditionally it has been a rather small appeal, with average requirements comprising only 4.4% of the CAP. However, if the level of funding requested has usually been low, so has been the response too: the West Africa appeal received on average just 4.1% of all CAP funding and was the worst funded consolidated appeal in 2011.

Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Niger frequently participate in the CAP process with individual appeals as these countries face larger-scale emergencies that demand targeted response. Indeed, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire are part of the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal and Liberia is expected to come on board by the beginning of 2012. However, at least another five countries in the region – Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea and Burkina Faso – are currently experiencing cholera outbreaks. Leaving them outside of the CAP is not likely to raise donor awareness of their needs, nor help to provide adequate assistance to affected populations.

In the Philippines, the population of Mindanao continues to face the triple effects of insecurity, natural hazards and poverty. During 2011 heavy rains and severe weather caused repeated flooding in central and southern Mindanao, the last flash floods happening only a few days ago.

Finally, the 2012 UN Humanitarian Appeal suggests that a more strategic identification of objectives exists now than it did previously, with clearer boundaries being set between humanitarian needs and secondary aims. This could account for the marked decline in funding requirements for some humanitarian contexts, as demonstrated below.

• The oPt CAP for 2012 seeks 22% less money than it did in 2011 placing requirements at their lowest level for the last five years. Although the appeal acknowledges that “the humanitarian needs in the oPt have not fundamentally changed”, this CAP opts for a narrower scope than was seen in previous years.
• Nearly two years after the devastating 2010 earthquake, Haiti is in a transitional phase and CAP requirements have gone down by 40% compared to those from the CAP MYR., However, when compared to funding requirements from 12 months ago, this decrease reaches 75%. According to the appeal document this is not a transition appeal but one which focuses on critical humanitarian needs only, leaving reconstruction and development work to other funding mechanisms.
• In Zimbabwe, the humanitarian community has revised funding requirements for 2012 downwards by 45%, as only priority humanitarian needs will be covered under the 2012 CAP, while recovery work will be addressed by other initiatives such as the Zimbabwe UN Development Assistance Framework.

This new, more targeted approach of the UN CAP is a welcome development as it helps to keep the appeal process more firmly grounded in key humanitarian objectives. It should also help to bridge the gap between humanitarian requirements and humanitarian funding. On average, a third of humanitarian needs have gone unmet in the last five years with provisional levels for 2011 being the highest ever, at 41%. However, meeting needs can only be achieved if humanitarian donors maintain current levels of funding despite the squeeze on their budgets and do not reduce the size of their country envelopes in line with decreased appeal requirements. 

Photo courtesy of Flickr.com/brewingluminous

Nepal has undoubtedly experienced its fair share of natural hazards over the last century, some of which recur year on year such as floods and landslides and others which have struck less frequently but have the potential to cause more devastation, as is the case with earthquakes. This makes the country one of the 20 most disaster-prone countries in the world.[1]

The risk of exposure to natural hazards has been exacerbated by the fact that the country has only recently emerged from ten years of intrastate conflict. It is still vulnerable and has a long way to go in terms of development. Lack of government capacity, weak infrastructure (roads, buildings) and over-population in urban areas, makes it difficult to reduce the risk. There is a high need for preparedness approaches and disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies that take account of the country’s vulnerability.

Despite the risk that Nepal faces, levels of funding to preparedness between 2007 and 2009 have accounted for only 6% of total humanitarian funding. However, actual amounts have increased over the same period and will hopefully continue to do so with the introduction of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC).  Funding for DRR is more difficult to track as currently there is no code within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) to which donors can report their funding.

Figure 1: Funding reported to prevention and preparedness code, 2007-2009 (US$ million). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD CRS data

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was launched by the Government of Nepal in May 2009 and is supported by a number of international institutions including the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) along with several United Nations’ (UN) agencies and donors such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and the World Bank among others. Building on the successful risk reduction of other countries such as Bangladesh and Mozambique, the Consortium aims to generate funding for, and improve the coordination of, disaster preparedness and risk reduction in Nepal. It is not however a pooled fund (Nepal does already have one small pooled fund for emergency response). It attempts to build on the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) and to help support the Government of Nepal develop a DRR Action Plan. The NRRC is built around the assumption that a coordinated approach between different organisations engaged with DRR issues needs to be adopted, drawing on the experience and strengths of different institutions.

The Nepal Consortium is still in its infancy, yet it has shown that a properly articulated country plan can assist in attracting both interest and funding. It bridges the humanitarian and development divide, bringing together actors from both sides within an overall funding and coordinating umbrella. However, to date, not all donors have bought into the Consortium, with the absence of evidence demonstrating value for money (such as cost benefit analyses and impact assessments) cited as a key factor – a general characteristic of the global debate on preparedness. It is therefore perhaps too early to decide whether the Consortium is a model to be replicated in other countries, or a one off. Only time will tell.

For more information please see a special case study on Nepal that was carried out as part of a wider study on tracking funding for preparedness for the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

For the second consecutive year, floods in Pakistan (in late August) have emphasised the country’s vulnerability and lack of capacity to prepare effectively for events of this scale. The floods have had a devastating impact on infrastructure, public assets, livelihoods and the country’s economy. The World Food Programme reports that 5.4 million people were affected this time, 73% of the harvest was destroyed, and 36% of livestock killed in the flooded areas. In June of this year, the Federal Finance Minister announced that the cost of reconstruction, after the July 2010 floods, would be in the region of US$43 billion, and the latest disaster will put further strain on national budgets (Oxfam: Pakistan’s resistance to disasters one year on from the floods). The floods in Pakistan demonstrate the need for the government and donors to increase investments in activities to reduce risk, such as effective early warning systems, flood control, resilient housing and better planning.

Pakistan was the eighth largest recipient of humanitarian aid in the last ten years, receiving a total of US$2.4 billion between 2000-2009. The requirement for aid will increase following the recent floods. While levels of humanitarian and development aid have been high, funding for disaster preparedness and DRR appear to be nominal.

Quantifying overall DRR investments in Pakistan within the existing data is challenging. The figures extracted for this tracking exercise do not include funding from national governments, civil society and the private sector, nor do they include contributions from many potentially influential donors to Pakistan, such as India. As is stands, methods of donor DRR reporting are often inconsistent with other reported activities.

Currently financial support to DRR and preparedness in Pakistan can be examined using publicly available data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s database. While DRR predominately falls within the remit of development departments, in many cases programmes are financed from humanitarian budgets and coordinated by humanitarian aid departments, and are tied to response and early recovery programmes. Thus, investments in DRR can be extracted from preparedness funding within humanitarian financing.

The data supports the case that investments in DRR have been sparse and expenditure on disaster preparedness has not been a priority for Pakistan. Between 2005 and 2009 US$15.6 million for disaster preparedness was reported through the DAC, accounting for just 1% of Pakistan’s total official humanitarian assistance. While this indicates the relatively low priority given to DRR, it only accounts for preparedness funding within humanitarian aid.

In order to calculate the total amount spent on DRR in Pakistan, activities hidden within wider development programmes and projects must be considered, including those relating to food security, health systems and environmental management. Widening the lens and examining funding reported towards wider development programmes reveals further funding for DRR in Pakistan.

Pakistan has received nearly US$800 million over five years for DRR, 71% of which was allocated in 2006. The majority of this funding went towards cross-sector World Bank development programmes tied in with reconstruction efforts after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake (US$530 million in 2006 and US$202 million in 2007). With the exception of 2006 (23%) and 2007 (9%) investments in DRR have accounted for less than 0.5% of total official aid. Very little of this money appears to have been spent on either early warning systems or flood prevention and control.

Through NGOs and global initiatives such as the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), DRR has gained increasing international prominence and recognition for being a vital means of reducing the impact of natural disasters, preventing humanitarian crisis and ensuring long-term sustainable development. Many government donors now acknowledge the need for a comprehensive and strategic approach which encompasses preparedness and prevention strategies and have developed strategies for implementing and financing DRR within their aid programmes. More and more governments are recognising the need to create and invest in effective disaster management frameworks and institutions. At the national level there have been a number of positive examples of joint efforts to generate funding for, and improve the coordination of, disaster preparedness and risk reduction through consortiums, such as those successfully underway in Indonesia  and Nepal.

However, for countries like Pakistan, investments in DRR from donors have so far been minimal. While there have been some positive moves to improve disaster management in Pakistan the catastrophic consequences of the recent flooding suggests that much more needs to be done, and done quickly.

It is widely agreed that there is a need for better investment in DRR to reduce the impact of events such as the devastating floods in Pakistan in the last two years.  There is also an evident need to improve the current reporting of DRR if there is to be clarity around  what resources are available, which is essential for effective planning and allocation, and monitoring of investments.

Afghanistan has been a major humanitarian aid recipient for the last decade, but its relationship with humanitarian aid has been complex, controversial and often unpredictable.

Humanitarian aid to Afghanistan increased dramatically in the year following the US-led invasion before falling sharply again the next year. Development aid continued to grow steadily throughout the decade, while humanitarian aid remained at relatively low levels until a major escalation in humanitarian needs in 2008 put humanitarian needs in Afghanistan back on the international agenda.

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Afghanistan has participated very sporadically in the UN Consolidated Appeals process. Afghanistan has only participated in the UN consolidated appeal process (CAP) just three times between 2000 and 2010 and only began to prepare a humanitarian work-plan from 2009, with the establishment of a UN OCHA office in Kabul.

There have however been five ‘non-CAP appeals’ in this period. Non-CAP appeals are by definition lower priority and typically receive a poorer donor response. The use of non-CAP appeals is illustrative of the low priority given to humanitarian needs in the post invasion period when many of the major donors prioritised state-building and stabilisation agendas.

The donor financing response to these various UN funding appeals has been extremely variable.

While the analysis and articulation of the scale and severity of humanitarian needs and humanitarian financing in Afghanistan has improved latterly with reinforced humanitarian leadership in Kabul, this latest statement of increased financing requirements happens at a time of unpredictability in donor financing responses. We commented elsewhere on the disappointing donor response to the UN CAP appeal up to the mid-year point, and noted recently the very disappointing response to the Pakistan flash appeal to date. In this climate of uncertainty, it is apposite that the revised Afghanistan appeal calls for an increased emphasis in responses on ‘more sustainable, longer term, disaster risk reduction interventions, by government and development partners over the next years.’

We will monitor donor responses to the Afghanistan appeal through this blog. You can access the data referred to in this blog here and we plan to update our report on resource flows to Afghanistan early next year.

This can be seen in the aid profiles of many countries but in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular. This is unsurprising given that both countries were invaded by the US and allies as a direct result of those events in New York in September 2001. Back in 2000 both of these countries were very low priority for official development assistance (ODA)[1]. Iraq was ranked as 83^rd in volume, receiving US$163.8 million and Afghanistan was ranked 73^rd, receiving US$220 million and most of that money for both countries was humanitarian (86% for Iraq and 75% for Afghanistan). These amounts still guaranteed a top ten ranking in terms of volume of humanitarian assistance, however, with Afghanistan placed 5^th and Iraq 9^th.

Table 1: Top ten humanitarian recipient countries, 2000 and 2009; (Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC.)

An examination of these top ten recipients a decade apart reveals much. Firstly it highlights how countries in the top ten have changed. In 2000 the last major war in ex-Yugoslavia (the conflict over Kosovo) made Serbia a major recipient of humanitarian aid, more than double the next highest. Other conflicts leading to significant humanitarian need were Mozambique, Angola and Timor Leste. None of these countries are in the top ten in 2009. Indeed the 2009 ranking is dominated by countries that are arguably very much connected to the Global War on Terror. This includes aid not only Iraq and Afghanistan, but also Afghanistan’s fragile neighbour Pakistan, Somalia and its neighbours Kenya and Ethiopia, Osama’s old country of residence Sudan and also OPT/Palestine, often a focus of tension between Muslim countries and its neighbours. Secondly volumes of humanitarian assistance have increased significantly. Only the top placed country in 2000 (Serbia) would make it into the top ten in 2009. Volumes of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and Iraq in 2000 would have placed only down at the bottom of the top 20 in 2009. Taken as a whole the top ten recipients of humanitarian assistance in 2009 received nearly three times the amount of those ten years earlier.

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During the decade humanitarian assistance to both countries follow a reasonably similar trend. There is an initial jump in aid in the year of invasion and the one after, followed by dropping amounts over several years and then an increase again. The increase is particularly evident in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009 where a UN appeal helped push up funding to close to US$800 and US$600 million respectively.

The most dramatic impact Afghanistan and Iraq have had on aid flows over the decade can be seen in total ODA rather than the humanitarian subset.

Table 2: Largest recipients of ODA, 2000 and 2009; (source: OECD DAC)

As mentioned, back in 2000 neither country was in the top ten of ODA, both registering less than US$250 million. By the end of the decade Afghanistan had accounted for US$28.8 billion of aid and Iraq US$33.6 billion, more than 9.3% of the total aid allocated by country over the entire decade. The two peak years for both countries were 2005 for Iraq (US$8.9 billion) and 2009  Afghanistan (US$6.2 billion)  – both are the two highest figures for any recipient country in a single year.

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Figure 3: ODA to Afghanistan and Iraq 2000-2009, (Source: OECD DAC)

The aid trends are considerably different over the decade. ODA to Afghanistan has risen slowly but steadily from invasion-year amounts of US$0.2 billion to the huge US$6.2 billion in 2009 community. Iraq’s trend on the other hand has been very different, with a huge rise over three years from almost nothing during the oil-for-food period to more than US$8.9 billion in 2005, the year in which the Iraqi insurgency was at its peak. Volumes of aid have then fallen just as dramatically though the US$2.8 billion in 2009 means that Iraq is still ranked 6^th for total ODA.

The presence of oil, or in the case of Afghanistan the absence of it, surely has a part to play in the trend over the decade. Iraq’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 was US$65.2 billion, largely driven by oil income, and was more than 23 times the volume of ODA received. Afghanistan’s GDP was in comparison only US$12.5 billion, only just twice as much as the ODA it received in the same year. Both countries have very similar population levels, with Afghanistan just under 30 million people in 2009 and Iraq just more than 31 million. The GDP disparity is therefore particular evident when analysed per person; in Iraq it was US$219 in 2009 whilst in Afghanistan it was US$40.

Clearly Iraq has considerably more money available for long-term reconstruction. Aid to Afghanistan appears likely to stay at these remarkably high levels whilst with the international community having realised that turning the country into a stable state is going to need continual and substantial support for a number of years. Some of the major donors have suggested even more funds to the country in the future.

Ten years from now Iraq will likely slip down the rankings of volume of ODA. Afghanistan will remain at the top, joined in the very least by Libya.

[1] The data in this article is taken from the OECD DAC and in particular ‘all donors reporting to the DAC’.