Key points include:

• Pledges have yet to translate into cash contributions, with the RRP just 10% funded and the SHARP 11% funded (at 6 February 2013)
• Donors within the region look set to become among the leading donors to the crisis response.

This gha-2013-briefing-funding-to-the-Syria-crisis-II collates and summarises the latest available information on financial investments in humanitarian assistance via international actors and will be updated periodically to monitor the financing response to the crisis.

The post Humanitarian financing to Syria: 6 February 2013 appeared first on Global Humanitarian Assistance.

Humanitarian aid network: who’s who?

Our new illustrative guide to humanitarian response clearly maps out who is involved and incorporates those working in the areas of financing, coordinating, delivering or reporting. The guide explains what roles the many different parties play: be they governments; the UN; NGOs; private donors; the military; the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement; as well as, importantly, affected communities. This network is represented by a ‘tube map’ or ‘subway’ and along the routes can be found a number of ‘trains’ relating to the financing and information components of the humanitarian system.

Financing

Link through our finance train and you will find all you need to know about the funding channels available for donors, who face a range of options when allocating their spend. Donors may direct their money through pooled funds, such as common humanitarian funds or emergency response funds, managed by the UN system. They may channel their money through UN agencies or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and International Committee of the Red Cross (IFRC/ICRC) for example. Alternatively, donors may implement their funds directly, through their own military or via other means. For a comprehensive account of all funding options available, including advantages and disadvantages of each, explore our interactive guide.

Completing the picture

You can read about transparency of humanitarian financing data in the information section of our new guide. You can also explore the rest of our data and guides section, including our datastore for more humanitarian financing resources.

If you have any feedback or questions for the GHA team, please get in touch.

The post Mapping and navigating the humanitarian system: an interactive guide appeared first on Global Humanitarian Assistance.

Our GHA Report 2012 published earlier this year revealed that the top three recipient countries of international humanitarian aid over the period 2001-2010 were respectively Sudan (US$9.7 billion), Palestine/OPT (US$6.5 billion), and Afghanistan (US$5.6 billion); and that the top three government donors in the same period were the United States (US$34.1 billion), EU institutions (US$14.6 billion) and the United Kingdom (US$8.5 billion). The GHA country profiles drill down into the humanitarian picture for each of these individual countries, presenting firstly the headline facts and figures before showing where each country sits in relation to others, which donors and recipients are involved, and which channels of delivery and financing mechanisms are employed. The profiles then look beyond the humanitarian sphere to other types of aid, as well as providing data on investments in risk reduction (see also our recent report on aid to disaster risk reduction).

In a world where donors are under great pressure to demonstrate value for money, and where multiple players have a stake in the effective implementation of humanitarian assistance, it is vital that we have a clear and comprehensive view of who spends what and where, through which channels and according to what priorities. We hope our new and updated country profiles, which contain downloadable data, fulfil that role for you.

We’d love to receive your feedback; we will be creating new profiles in 2013 so if there are additional countries that you would like to see profiled, please let us know.

The post New country profiles from GHA: the latest data appeared first on Global Humanitarian Assistance.

Yet this represented just 5% of the total humanitarian funding from international governments and private donors in 2011. There may yet be scope therefore for increasing the volumes of funds channelled via these mechanisms and space for innovations on the pooled fund model.

To date, pooled humanitarian funds have been a UN-led initiative, but a new pooled humanitarian fund was created in 2010 by the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA), a group of UK-based NGOs, which they are now looking to take to scale. In this article, we examine the particular features of the CBHA ERF and consider whether its global ambitions complement and enhance the existing humanitarian funding architecture.

Do we really need another pooled humanitarian fund?

Pooled humanitarian funds are generally thought to be a good thing on balance, channeling increasing volumes of humanitarian funds from a growing range of donors to both well known and some under-funded crises. In some cases pooled humanitarian funds have improved the timeliness of funding and they encourage humanitarian organisations to participate in inter-agency coordination forums.

For donors, pooled funds also have the very attractive quality of reducing transaction costs, transferring responsibility for fiduciary control and the identification of needs and suitable funding partners to the UN agencies managing the funds and the agencies or coordination bodies overseeing their allocation processes. This is particularly appealing at a time when many government donors are facing staff cuts and it also makes it easier for newer donors who have limited technical capacity and experience to assess proposals and prospective partners to participate.

But transaction costs are not necessarily reduced overall, rather in many cases they are shifted down the transaction chain. And the transaction chain itself may be lengthened and administrative costs extracted at each stage.

The CERF – the largest pooled humanitarian fund with annual funding of around US$460 million – can only pass on funds directly to UN agencies who in turn pass around a quarter of all CERF funds to NGOs to implement humanitarian programmes. While release of funds to UN agencies may be rapid, the lag-time between the award of CERF rapid-response funds and receipt of funds by NGOs receiving funds via UN agencies takes an average of up to 13 weeks.

We can’t track these multiple transactions at the moment – although the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) would enable us to – so we don’t know what proportion of the original funds donated remain or how much time is lost in these multiple tiers of transactions. This is a major limitation in our ability to assess the timeliness and efficiency of pooled humanitarian funds.

But it is clear that both money and time may be lost in a system with multiple layers of transaction and implementing NGOs – including national NGOs who often struggle to access funds via pooled channels – are often at the end of the chain, last to receive funds and with limited influence over where, how and to whom funds are allocated.

The extent to which pooled humanitarian funds are a good thing currently depends to a certain extent then on who you are but also on where you are.

The CERF, reliant on channelling funds through UN agencies, can only direct funds to places where UN agencies have a footprint. Country-level pooled humanitarian funds are established in a limited number of usually protracted crises, where the UN has an established coordination presence. That potentially leaves a large number of crisis situations, where the UN does not have a substantial footprint and capacity to monitor and articulate needs, unlikely to benefit from pooled humanitarian funding. With an increasing number of small-scale emergencies associated with climate change and many ‘forgotten’ or ‘neglected’ sub-national crises, smaller crises may experience growing inequality in funding and response to needs.

In reality, when NGOs need to start-up somewhere new or scale-up fast, they can’t wait for the donor and pooled funding leviathan to crank into gear, so they do so with their own private resources. But many international NGOs have limited private resources and they may have many competing claims on these funds. Moreover, it may be extremely difficult for national NGOs to call on reserves to respond to crises.

So if a new mechanism could take the best of humanitarian pooled funds, and improve on some of the limitations, to make funds for NGOs more accessible (including national NGOs) and to channel funds to less high profile crises, then perhaps we do need one.

What is the CBHA ERF?

The CBHA was established in 2010 by 15 UK-based NGOs to strengthen the coordination and capacity of the humanitarian NGO sector. As part of this initiative a £4 million fund was established for member agencies to draw on during an emergency. The ERF provided immediate seed money for agencies to begin relief efforts before other funding became available. Programmes funded by the ERF must begin delivering aid within seven days of the start of a response and complete within 30 days.

Funding in this pilot phase of the fund was awarded based on proposal submissions which are evaluated through peer review by representatives of all the member agencies.

Since March 2010 the ERF has allocated £4 million to 12 humanitarian emergencies and the ERF peer review mechanism was used to disburse an additional £21 million in the context of the Pakistan 2010 floods.

What are the comparative advantages of the CBHA ERF?

The CBHA, while small in scale to date, has received some pretty convincing endorsements. The UK Department for International Development’s 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) for example, acknowledged the role of the ERF in improving the rapid response in certain disasters as a model for providing ‘greater equity in allocations, and coherence’. And two independent reviews of the ERF clearly indicate some important comparative advantages relating to timeliness, cost-effectiveness and funding in accordance with needs, particularly in less high profile crises.

Based on an independent review of the ERF after its first year of operation:

-          the ERF appears to have successfully driven up humanitarian funding to crises which did not have Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) flash appeals and therefore where the UN system and bilateral donors were not focussing much attention (Bangladesh, Myanmar, and South Kordofan)

-          the ERF provided additional resources to NGOs in contexts where the UK, at least, was otherwise only channelling its humanitarian funds through UN agencies or the CERF

-          the ERF had markedly quicker disbursement and start-up times compared to other humanitarian funding modalities

-          on average, ERF-funded projects were approved and became operational two to three times quicker than other NGO projects as a whole

-          and in avoiding multiple layers of transaction costs, ERF funds are more cost effective in that a greater proportion of donor funds remains to deliver goods and services to crisis-affected populations.

While the amounts of funding awarded are relatively small and the implementation period short, recipient agencies report that ERF funds enable them to scale-up and to leverage more funding from other sources – including in the Horn of Africa in 2011. According to an independent review conducted by DARA, “The CBHA response to the crisis in Somalia long before it became a major news story reflects one of the key advantages of such a peer-managed fund – the ability to respond to humanitarian needs even when they are not on the news”.

In addition, and perhaps most importantly, 52% of all grants awarded via the CBHA were channelled on to local partner organisations. While many donors may recognise the critical importance of supporting domestic response capacity, they usually struggle to do this in practice. The CBHA offers an alternative channel for donors to domestic actors to international financing and to build domestic response capacity.

What are the challenges to going global?

In a relatively short space of time and with a relatively small amount of funding the ERF has demonstrated impact, cost effectiveness and major comparative advantages in responding to needs fast. The CBHA have ambitions to take the ERF to scale to build something like a global CERF for NGOs. If successful, this could provide an effective complement to the existing suite of pooled humanitarian funds. But with many government donors trimming their aid budgets, they may face some formidable challenges in accessing funds, while the demand for response, particularly in relation to climate-related disasters, continues to grow.

In reality, despite the potential of pooled humanitarian funds to broaden donor participation and a record 161 official and private donors contributing to pooled funds in 2010, just ten government donors (UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Canada, Ireland, Denmark, Germany and Australia) provided 90% of the total funding to all the ERFs, CHFs and the CERF from their inception in 2006 up to 2011, with the UK alone providing 29%. There are already many competing claims on these donors’ resources.

In targeting private donors, the ERF may come up against competition with the fundraising strategies of their member agencies and they may face some difficulties in achieving consensus among members on ethical and reputation considerations around accepting funds from corporate donors. Building relationships with non-traditional government donors requires time and resources.

The ERF’s peer review model, which currently functions transparently and efficiently, may need to develop new governance models for global scale operations, where informal networks, personal relationships and experience will not be adequate to evaluate partners and their proposals, and they will need to move away from their UK brand in order to appeal to a wider constituency of donors and implementing agencies.

Based on the impressive early successes of the ERF however, there is every reason to believe that the CBHA has the creative vision and drive to meet these challenges. What remains to be seen is whether donors will rise to their challenge to provide more timely, needs-driven and cost effective humanitarian funding.

You can read more about pooled humanitarian funding in GHA Report 2012, and our special reports on  CHFs and ERFs and you can access our unique dataset on financing flows through the UN OCHA managed CERF, CHFs and ERFs here.

The post The CBHA Early Response Fund (ERF) appeared first on Global Humanitarian Assistance.

The good news is that the number of people affected by humanitarian crises and the number of people in need of assistance both went down in 2011. Humanitarian funding also reduced in 2011, but remained above 2009 levels, at US$17.1 billion.

But while the major proximate causes of disasters appear to have abated somewhat in 2011 (there were fewer natural disasters and the incidence of conflict has been on a downward trend for almost a decade), the major global vulnerabilities of climate change and economic volatility remained a present threat, with food and energy prices remaining high and subject to volatility into 2012. And in reality, we still know very little about the real number of people affected by crises or in need of assistance.

The international financing response to the crises considered of the highest priority for international response in the UN’s consolidated appeals process (CAP) fell 38% short of the financing requirements in 2011, despite a substantial reduction in the amount of funds requested. This is part of a longer-term downward trend, and in 2011, the unmet financing needs were at their widest for a decade.

In addition to the financing response falling further short of needs, the international response to the major crises of the last two years have also exhibited some concerning tendencies in the proportional allocation of funding in accordance with assessed needs, and in the timeliness of response.

The distribution of humanitarian funding has been relatively stable for a number of years. Sudan was the leading recipient for five consecutive years between 2005 and 2009. But all that changed in 2010 when Haiti and Pakistan received large volumes of funds which had far reaching effects on the distribution of funds among other recipients. Funding for these emergencies does not appear to have been entirely additional.

The data suggests that the major emergencies of 2010 attracted funding at the expense of smaller scale, less high profile emergencies. The top three recipients typically receive around 30% of the total funds to recipient countries but in 2010, this jumped to 49%. All other recipients saw not only their shares of the total, but the collective volumes they received also fell. Consolidated appeals, which represent the needs of chronic complex crises, saw an 11% drop in their proportion of funding requirements met in 2010, and many appeals reported having greater difficulties attracting funding in the first half of the year, which in some cases meant programming ambitions were scaled back.

In 2011 we saw another worrying example of the limits of international response in responding to meet humanitarian financing needs, when donors showed a lack of willingness to respond to an assessment of needs that focused on risk and likely outcomes rather than manifest humanitarian needs, at great human and financial cost. Clear evidence that a crisis was building in the Horn of Africa and calls for donor support were not responded to until the crisis had already escalated to huge proportions. By June 2011, only 28% of the financing requirements in the UN consolidated appeal for Somalia were met. A few weeks later, famine was declared and funding began to flow quickly to the appeal.

Not only do we need more comprehensive, comparable and timely information on humanitarian needs, we also need a shift in mindset towards incorporating risk and probability of disaster into our assessment of crises and the need for response if we are to respond effectively, proportionately and in a timely fashion to slow-building complex disasters, which look to be increasingly likely to occur in areas such as the Sahel and Horn of Africa.

The emphasis on where we place our financing investments to deal with humanitarian crises similarly requires a major rethink. Building greater resilience to crises is the most efficient and cost-effective way of preventing suffering and protecting livelihoods, yet we currently still only spend 4% of humanitarian aid on disaster prevention and preparedness and less than 1% of development aid between 2006 and 2010.

GHA Report 2012 presents transparent and reliable analysis of how the international response has measured up to the scale of global humanitarian crises, and is an essential resource for all those working to address humanitarian crisis and vulnerability.

You can view, download, or print the report and its data, or get in touch if you would like to receive a hard copy.

The post GHA Report 2012 is launched today exposing a humanitarian aid system struggling to adapt to the changing face of crisis appeared first on Global Humanitarian Assistance.

The Australian National University’s Development Policy Centre estimates that total ODA (excluding debt relief) in 2012 will amount to approximately US$114 billion, or 0.28% of total OECD gross domestic product (GDP) – its lowest level since 2008. Our survey of announcements includes:

Aid budgets for the world’s top 20 ODA donors in 2012

Announced or expected cuts in aid budgets:

• US: Expected to be down by US$3.5 billion from 2011
• Japan: Set to decrease by 2% to US$7.2 billion
• Netherlands: 2012 budget cut by 17.8%, or €958 million (US$1.3 billion), to €4.34 billion
• Canada: Announced 2012 budget is US$1 billion less than expected, heading for a fall in ODA from the projected 0.33% of GDP to 0.27% in 2015
• Italy: Predicted to be down from €3,050 million in 2011 (0.19% gross national income (GNI)) to €1,880 million (0.12% GNI) in 2012
• Spain: Expected to decline from €3,067 million (0.29% GNI) in 2011 to €1,740 million (0.16% GNI) in 2012.

Announced or expected increases in aid budgets:

• Germany: €6.4 billion; €164 million more than 2011
• UK: Up by UK£0.2 billion, but still UK£380 million less than originally intended and UK£1.2 billion less over next three years
• Sweden: SEK35.8 billion, up by 2% from 2011; humanitarian aid also up at SEK5 billion
• Australia: AU$5.1 billion, up from AU$4.8 billion in 2011-2012, but at 0.35% of GDP, still less than the originally planned 0.38%; disaster aid increased by AU$50 million
• Switzerland: Increase of US$140 million; ODA set to exceed $2 billion in 2012 and reach 0.5% of GNI by 2015
• Belgium: Increase from €2,014 million in 2011 (0.53% of GNI) to €2,172 (0.56% of GNI) in 2012
• Finland: Increased to €1,201 million from €1,074 in 2011
• South Korea: Committed to ODA at 0.15% of GNI by 2012 and 0.25% by 2015
• Austria: Increased from €796 million in 2011 to €1,469 million (0.27% to 0.47% of GNI) in 2012.

Little or no change:

• Denmark: To be maintained at 2010 level of DKK15.2 billion until 2013
• France: 1% increase in 2012 with a 3% decrease to follow in 2013
• European Union (EU) institutions: The EU’s 2012 Development Cooperation Instrument budget has been reduced by €70.7 million; however, the EU as a Global Player budget area is up by 7.4% from 2011 at €9.4 billion, with humanitarian aid spending up by 2.9%
• Norway: Aid budget of NOK27.8 billion represents a slight increase from NOK27.6 billion in 2011; however, this represents an actual reduction in US$. Funding for emergency relief, humanitarian assistance and human rights is up by NOK246 million ($41.5 million or €32.3 million).

Unknown:

• Turkey: No information available.

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DAC donors disbursed US$129.4 billion (excluding debt relief) in 2011 (in nominal terms). Compared to the previous year, it represented the first decrease of ODA in more than 15 years, with volumes 2.7% lower (in real terms) than 2010. Unlike global ODA, DAC aid to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 4.0%.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Although nothing major seems to have changed in terms of importance of donors (with the US still the leading donor, providing almost US$30 billion in 2011, followed by Germany and the UK), the real news is that only 7 countries have increased their ODA in 2011.

Italy had the largest increase both in percentage terms (24.5%) and volumes (US$667.4 million in 2010 prices), while Germany is the only other G7 country to have shown an increase in 2011. Moreover, big decreases from EU countries (notably Spain and Greece) are possibly a consequence of the impact of the recession on aid budgets.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

The negative trend can be seen also when assessing performance against aid targets as a percentage of GNI. In 2005, the 15 countries that were members of the European Union by 2004 agreed provide the equivalent of 0.7% of their GNI as ODA by 2015.  Looking at the 2011 data, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark have met the target while most donors appear to be off track to meet the target by 2015.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Humanitarian aid from DAC donors totalled US$9.7 billion in 2011, representing a 2% on 2010. But, contrary to total ODA figures, 13 countries showed an increase compared to the previous year, with the biggest decrease coming from the United States (US$ 224.2 million, a 5% decrease), which remains however the largest donor of humanitarian aid followed by Japan and the UK.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

What do we learn from this new data? Many try to explain the decrease as attributable to high inflation in 2011 (which was indeed higher than 6% for DAC donors); this is partially true, even though when looking at nominal trends growth in 2011 was smaller than growth in 2010. But the most important implication is that this decrease of ODA from DAC donors (even if Country Programmable Aid (CPA) may rise by 6% in 2012, while from 2013 onwards it is expected to stagnate) might represent a further step towards the increasing importance of non-DAC donors and south-south cooperation. Although some of these “new” donors report to the DAC, the picture is still incomplete and it is therefore difficult to accurately compare their levels of development assistance with the ones of traditional donors; and after Busan, this release might represent a further push towards the restructuring of the traditional aid architecture and reporting practices. Finally, this change of course in aid levels, together with the possibility that the World Bank will not be directed for the first time by an American, also underlines that global development is now entering a new and decisive phase.

The post The 2011 decrease in aid from DAC donors: a new era? appeared first on Global Humanitarian Assistance.

Several agencies are, however, continuing to provide assistance to Syrians that have crossed or are crossing the borders into Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, said it has registered 6,375 Syrians in Lebanon but said the actual figure there is likely to be higher as not all refugees register with the agency. Turkish officials said nearly 10,000 Syrian refugees are living in tent camps along the country’s border with Syria, and reports put the number of Syrian refugees already in Jordan at 10,000.

What does that mean for funding?

There are essentially three streams of humanitarian funding flows focusing on humanitarian activity in, on and around Syria:

1. Humanitarian activities in-country

- Some agencies have budgeted to support continued operations in and around Syria in 2012 and some donors have pledged support for humanitarian activities (e.g. the United Kingdom has pledged UK£2 million to “three established humanitarian agencies” (DFID, 17 February 2012) but in-country operations are currently restricted due to lack of access.

- The only funding reported to UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) specifically to address the crisis in Syria so far in 2012 is US$645,995 from Germany to the ICRC

- In 2011, UN OCHA FTS reported expenditure of US$11.8 million on humanitarian operations in Syria, from eight main donors. The three largest donors were: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), US$3.3 million; Australia, US$3.2 million; and Switzerland just over US$3 million. Just over half of this was provided through the ICRC and World Food Programme (WFP).

- The ICRC budget for Syria in 2012 is CHF12 million – nearly three times higher than in 2011 – some of which will focus on assisting civilians in the current crisis and some of which will assist refugee populations (see below and also ICRC overview of operations).

Due to a technical problem, tables cannot currently be displayed. We are aiming to fix this in the next couple of days. Meanwhile, you can access them by clicking straight through to this spreadsheet.

2. Operations to support Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey

- UN OCHA FTS tracked just under US$1 million (US$912,974) for operations specifically relating to Syrian refugees in 2011. This was provided by three donors: Italy (direct bilateral contribution to Lebanese government); Norway (through Norwegian Refugee Council); and Switzerland to UNHCR.

- Some agencies are raising money to provide support to Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries – for example Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief.

- MSF set up a health programme for Syrian refugees in Wadi Khaled, in the north of Lebanon, in November 2011. Funding to support MSF operations such as this are not necessarily tracked within UN OCHA FTS.

[Note: Jordan is home to refugees from Syria, Iraq and Palestine. At the height of the crisis in Iraq, Jordan hosted an estimated 1.5 million Iraqis. The UN estimates that there are now half this number, though actual numbers fluctuate. This raises an interesting point about how many governments are providing support to people in crisis and how these resources are made visible, or not, in reports on international resource flows.

3. Operations in Syria to support refugees from Iraq and Palestine

Syria has the world’s third largest refugee population and is itself home to refugees from both Iraq and Palestine. The Syrian government has taken on the responsibility for providing some of the basic utility requirements – including, for example, in the camps that are home to Palestinian refugees (while UNRWA provides basic environmental health services including sewage and waste disposal and provision of safe drinking water).

- UNHCR’s 2012 budget for Syria stands at US$94.5 million, 20% less than that for 2011 due to the projected reduction in the number of registered Iraqi refugees. However, while the number of refugees is declining, their humanitarian needs are rising as their vulnerability increases. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent is UNHCR’s key operational partner.

- UNRWA provides health, education, and relief and social services to more than 496,000 Palestine refugees living in nine official and three unofficial camps in Syria.

- So far in 2012, UN OCHA FTS has tracked US$2.3 million in support of Iraqi refugees in Syria. This has come from Denmark in support of operations by Danish Red Cross and Danish Refugee Council. In 2011, US$26.2 million was provided for refugees of Palestine and Iraq inside Syria.

Download data from this spreadsheet. Tables will be shown here in the next few days.

Useful resources:

ICRC

ReliefWeb

UN data

BBC factfile

UNHCR

AlertNet

The post Humanitarian funding for Syria #1 appeared first on Global Humanitarian Assistance.

The main policy recommendations to emerge from a three-year consultation process, and clearly articulated in the report « Analyses et propositions sur l’action humanitaire dans les situations de crise et de post-crise » commissioned by Bernard Kouchner, and written by Alain Boinet (Solidarités International) and Benoit Miribel (Action Contre La Faim (ACF)), centre on adopting and promoting the EU consensus on humanitarian aid and on developing a national humanitarian policy framework.

Money-wise, the emphasis is to be on: post crisis reconstruction and preparedness (specifically, a proposal to spend EUR50 million a year on reconstruction programmes); partnerships with NGOs (target to spend EUR160 million through French NGOs by 2012); public information; bolstering France’s research/academic capacity; and engagement in the UN reform process.

I was asked to talk about: how France is currently situated in comparison with other donors in terms of financial flows (and in relation to development aid) – trends and main partners, comparisons with OECD DAC donors and other government donors; recipient countries; principal partners (NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, United Nations); trends in types of crises (DRR, post conflict). I was also asked to reflect on the ‘financial crisis’ and its implications. That was a lot to try and get through within 15 minutes … especially since I also wanted to use the time to talk about the value, impact and transparency of resources for people in crises.

The fact that France’s bilateral humanitarian contributions are ‘modest’ (a word that features in the report, p30), is not news. Since 2000, it has spent between US$15 million and US$55 million a year on bilateral humanitarian aid (i.e. specified or ‘earmarked’ funding for specific programmes or projects) with very little channelled through its own national NGOs. At US$344.7 million over the 10-year period 2001-2010 (US$310.7 million 2000-2009), that’s less than Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (US$793 million) and 16 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) governments (19th, Finland, gave US$751 million), and more than Kuwait, Russian Federation and five other DAC governments (Luxembourg, New Zealand, Austria, Portugal and Greece). It’s interesting for people to be able to place their national expenditure alongside others’ of course, but the headline numbers are too broad, too sweeping to show us the true value of contributions and activities, which might not be comparable: what was the money spent on? where? who for? how long for? through which partners? with what impact?

We should also consider the extent of France’s contributions to humanitarian activities through its funding of the EU budget. The graphs in the slides and Excel clearly show the extent of this funding, together with multilateral ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. Some 25%-30% of France’s official development assistance (ODA) is provided in the form of ‘multilateral’ (i.e. totally unspecified) contributions to EU institutions each year. (It provides the second largest contribution after Germany.) And I learned at the conference that the EU spends 23% of its budget through French NGOs! With these multilateral elements taken into account, France is propelled to 9th largest donor over 10 years.

To meet the many demands placed on humanitarian delivery, which is pulled in so many directions, we need to be able to see all the resources available to address the needs – not just those in the ‘emergency response’ envelopes of OECD DAC governments (which happen to be the only ones we can get consistent and comparable data on). To meet the demands effectively, we need to put all resources available on the table so that we can make informed choices based on comparative advantage.

Humanitarian aid financing is but one resource that can be applied to promoting resilience to risk and addressing the consequences of poverty. It can work alongside local private and government resources; other aid and aid-like flows from a variety of government donors; private sector investments and donations; foreign security and peacekeeping investments. In order to harness the potential of all of these contributions, we need to be able to see them; and a precondition for that is transparency. Our generation is ideally placed to make the most of convergence in information, communications and technology to make that happen.

If you read French, you might want to take a look at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website or this article by Jean-Jacques Louarn and Jérôme Larché at Grotius International.

Meantime, here are some additional slides. I’ve put the data in this Google Doc. The graphs didn’t convert from the Excel version of the file, so I’ve saved that here in our datastore.

Technical annex:

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The Republic of Korea has shown impressive economic progress over the last 50 years with gross national income (GNI) rising from US$2.98 billion in 1962 to US$966.6 billion in 2009, ranking it the 13^th largest economy in the world (World Development Indicators). In November 2009 the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oh Joon said, “Half a century ago, Korea was one of the poorest nations in the world, endeavouring to emerge from the ashes of the Korean War to rebuild itself” (OECD DAC).  Korea’s development and transition from aid recipient to aid donor has taken place in a relatively short period of time, and its economic growth has enabled its aid budget to increase from US$100.3 million in 1995 to US$816 million in 2009.

Source: Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/nov/02/g20-summit-cannes-interactive

On 1 January 2010, Korea became the 24th member of the Organisaton for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistant Committee (DAC).  During a special session in November 2009 the OECD DAC unanimously appointed Korea as a member on the grounds that it has successfully transformed from “an emerging donor to an advanced donor”, with increased official development assistance (ODA) volumes, coherent aid strategies, and an aid system developed in line with OECD DAC principles. In 2008 the OECD DAC conducted a Special Review of the Republic of Korea’s Development Cooperation citing recommendations for future aid policy, systems and coordination.

History of assistance

In the aftermath of the 1950 Korean War three quarters of Korea’s imports were financed by foreign aid and by 1962 the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan was implemented with foreign aid playing a key role in Korea’s social and economic development. From 1945 to the 1990s Korea received a total of just under US$13 billion in overseas assistance. However, Korea has regarded itself as a donor since the 1960s, when it provided training to technical staff from developing countries with the support of USAID. Independent assistance from Korea began in the 1980s, when it designed a development programme in support of South-South cooperation (Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)). By 1995 Korea was no longer on the World Bank’s list of recipient lending.

Aid architecture

Four key actors are responsible for Korea’s development assistance. Korea’s concessional loan policy is implemented by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), under the supervision of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), and its bilateral grant aid policy is implemented by the KOICA, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT).

EDCF promotes economic cooperation through concessional loans for development projects to developing country governments. KOICA is a key driver in the implementation of Korea’s ODA and is responsible for grant aid and technical cooperation programmes – promoting sustainable development, strengthening partnerships with developing partners and enhancing the local ownership of beneficiaries.

Official development assistance (ODA)

Korea’s ODA contributions have grown from US$100.3 million in 1995 to US$816 million in 2009, and preliminary figures estimate that its aid could reach over US$1 billion in 2010. However, even with this potential growth in aid in 2010 it would still only rank Korea 18^th compared to other OECD DAC donors’ aid volumes.

Humanitarian contributions between 1995 and 2009 totalled US$156.9 million and unsurprisingly Korea’s humanitarian aid as a proportion of ODA since 1995 averaged at only 2.7%.  In 2009 Korea gave US$19.4 million in humanitarian aid ranking it fairly low (28^th) compared to other government donors such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 12^th, Saudi Arabia, 20^th and Greece, 23^rd.

ODA and humanitarian aid from Korea, 1995 – 2010. Data for 2010 is prelimanry and ODA is inclusive of debt relief, 1995-2009 ODA excludes debt relief.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Key committments

• Korea has committed to 0.15% ODA/gross national income (GNI) by 2012 and 0.15% by 2015.
• It has also committed to untie 75% of ODA by 2015.
• Korea aims to double ODA to Africa to US$214 million by 2012.
• Within the health sector it has pledged US$6 million to The Global Fund 2011-2013 and US$1 million to GAVI.

Source: ONE, Data Report 2011

Humanitarian aid engagement

Korea does not currently have a specific humanitarian policy, but disaster relief and reconstruction is one of KOICA’s aid themes and emergency relief and reconstruction has become a core programme. In October 2006 it joined the United Nations’ (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Donors Support Group (ODSG) and co-convened the ODSG Partnership Meeting in June 2007, in Seoul. Korea also joined the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group (HLWG) in July 2007 (which focused on assistance to specific crises and countries), the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams since 2003 and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) since 1999 (chairing it in 2000). Since Korea specialises in search and rescue efforts, it has also participated in the OCHA-administered Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Partnership (APHP) since its establishment in 2004. In July 2009 Korea signed up to the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)initiative, becoming the 36^th member.

Recipient allocation

Korea’s aid shows allocation based on regional proximity. Between 2000 and 2009 a significant proportion of Korea’s aid, over half (US$2.3 billion), was concentrated in Asia, with 30% of total contributions going to the Far East (US$1.3 billion).  Sub-Saharan Africa has received just under 18% (US$756 million) in this period.

Korea’s regional allocation of aid, 2000-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Korea’s top recipients are similar year on year with Viet Nam and Iraq featuring regularly – six and five times respectively. The other recipients that featured in Korea’s top ten in 2009 included Angola (US$28.7 million), Afghanistan (US$27.9 million), Laos (US$26.3 million), Turkey (US$25.1 million), Philippines (US$22.3 million), Nepal (US$21.5 million) and Bangladesh (US$19.9 million).

Korea’s top three aid recipients (US$m), 2000-2009

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1	Viet Nam	Viet Nam	China	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Viet Nam	Viet Nam
	21.8	53.8	31.8	42.7	70.8	130.4	46.4	41.7	56.5	71.4
2	Uzbekistan	Indonesia	Viet Nam	Indonesia	Viet Nam	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mongolia
	20.6	29.2	31.3	33.7	36.5	39.5	25.7	29.6	33.7	33.7
3	China	China	Cambodia	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Angola	Indonesia
	19.4	23.0	27.8	24.2	28.6	32.4	29.6	28.9	23.8	31.7

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Recipients of Korea’s humanitarian aid are concentrated in Asia and the Middle East.  However, recipient allocation is less concentrated than that for ODA – Iraq and Indonesia appear in the top three only three times each.

Korea’s top three humanitarian aid recipients (US$m), 2000-2009

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1	Serbia	Serbia	Afghanistan	China	Afghanistan	Sri Lanka	Indonesia	Iraq	China	Palestine/OPT
	0.2	0.3	2.3	0.3	11.8	7.2	9.8	5.4	5.9	3.1
2	Pakistan	Guinea	Timor-Leste	Iran	Thailand	Iraq	Iraq	Lebanon	Iraq	Sri Lanka
	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	5.7	7.0	1.7	3.0	2.1
3	Ethiopia	Tanzania	Ethiopia	Algeria	Indonesia	Indonesia	Philippines	Bangladesh	Myanmar	Indonesia
	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	4.0	1.0	1.1	2.6	1.6

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is absent from Korea’s list of aid recipients as these flows are not formally reported to the OECD DAC and cannot officially be classed as ODA. For Korea, the DPRK is not classified as a separate country but is regarded as the northern part of the peninsula – “politically, both North and South claim sovereignty over each other’s territory. Article 3 of the South’s constitution specifies the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands as its territory. Therefore, such flow (aid, trade) between the two is considered as a domestic one” (Soyeun Kim, 2011). In 2007 it was estimated that that around US$558 million could be classed as ODA from the South to the North (OECD DAC).

 Types of aid

Between 2006 and 2009 95% of Korea’s aid was sector allocable. Humanitarian aid only made up 4% in this period of which reconstruction and relief was the largest sub-sector (US$30.4 million) followed by emergency relief (US$19 million).

Korea’s types of aid, 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Of Korea’s sector allocable aid the majority (53%) is spent on social infrastructure and services.

Breakdown of Korea’s sector allocable aid, 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

A breakdown of social infrastructure and services shows that education receives the largest proportion, US$266.3 million (30%), followed by government and civil society, US$231.1 million (26%) and health, US$217.6 million (25%).

Breakdown of Korea’s social infrastructure and services aid, 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Channels of delivery and financing mechanisms

Korea channels the majority of its aid through the public sector, however a higher proportion of aid was channelled through multilateral organisations in 2008 and 2009.

Korea’s aid, channels of delivery (US$m), 2006-2009

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Public sector	97%	95%	89%	89%
NGOs and CSOs	1%	1%	2%	2%
Public-Private Partnerships	0%	0%	1%	1%
Multilateral organisations	1%	3%	8%	8%

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Multilateral funding

Korea financially supports a wide range of multilateral institutions. Since 2007 it has channelled a large amount of aid, US$194.6 million through the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank. It has also maintained annual contributions of approximately US$27 million to the Asian Development Fund since 2006.

Korea’s multilateral funding, (US$m), 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

An increasing proportion of Korea’s humanitarian aid is being channelled through multilateral organisations as opposed to the public sector. A recommendation from the OECD DAC’s Special Review of Korea’s Development Co-operation was that more of Korea’s humanitarian aid be channelled through multilateral and pooled funding mechanisms rather than bilateral systems.

Korea’s humanitarian aid, channels of delivery (US$m), 2005-2009

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Public sector	93%	75%	75%	33%
NGOs and CSOs	0%	0%	0%	0%
Red Cross Movement	0%	1%	1%	4%
Multilateral organisations	7%	24%	24%	63%

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

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