DAC donors disbursed US$129.4 billion (excluding debt relief) in 2011 (in nominal terms). Compared to the previous year, it represented the first decrease of ODA in more than 15 years, with volumes 2.7% lower (in real terms) than 2010. Unlike global ODA, DAC aid to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 4.0%.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Although nothing major seems to have changed in terms of importance of donors (with the US still the leading donor, providing almost US$30 billion in 2011, followed by Germany and the UK), the real news is that only 7 countries have increased their ODA in 2011.

Italy had the largest increase both in percentage terms (24.5%) and volumes (US$667.4 million in 2010 prices), while Germany is the only other G7 country to have shown an increase in 2011. Moreover, big decreases from EU countries (notably Spain and Greece) are possibly a consequence of the impact of the recession on aid budgets.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

The negative trend can be seen also when assessing performance against aid targets as a percentage of GNI. In 2005, the 15 countries that were members of the European Union by 2004 agreed provide the equivalent of 0.7% of their GNI as ODA by 2015.  Looking at the 2011 data, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark have met the target while most donors appear to be off track to meet the target by 2015.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Humanitarian aid from DAC donors totalled US$9.7 billion in 2011, representing a 2% on 2010. But, contrary to total ODA figures, 13 countries showed an increase compared to the previous year, with the biggest decrease coming from the United States (US$ 224.2 million, a 5% decrease), which remains however the largest donor of humanitarian aid followed by Japan and the UK.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

What do we learn from this new data? Many try to explain the decrease as attributable to high inflation in 2011 (which was indeed higher than 6% for DAC donors); this is partially true, even though when looking at nominal trends growth in 2011 was smaller than growth in 2010. But the most important implication is that this decrease of ODA from DAC donors (even if Country Programmable Aid (CPA) may rise by 6% in 2012, while from 2013 onwards it is expected to stagnate) might represent a further step towards the increasing importance of non-DAC donors and south-south cooperation. Although some of these “new” donors report to the DAC, the picture is still incomplete and it is therefore difficult to accurately compare their levels of development assistance with the ones of traditional donors; and after Busan, this release might represent a further push towards the restructuring of the traditional aid architecture and reporting practices. Finally, this change of course in aid levels, together with the possibility that the World Bank will not be directed for the first time by an American, also underlines that global development is now entering a new and decisive phase.

Several agencies are, however, continuing to provide assistance to Syrians that have crossed or are crossing the borders into Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, said it has registered 6,375 Syrians in Lebanon but said the actual figure there is likely to be higher as not all refugees register with the agency. Turkish officials said nearly 10,000 Syrian refugees are living in tent camps along the country’s border with Syria, and reports put the number of Syrian refugees already in Jordan at 10,000.

What does that mean for funding?

There are essentially three streams of humanitarian funding flows focusing on humanitarian activity in, on and around Syria:

1. Humanitarian activities in-country

- Some agencies have budgeted to support continued operations in and around Syria in 2012 and some donors have pledged support for humanitarian activities (e.g. the United Kingdom has pledged UK£2 million to “three established humanitarian agencies” (DFID, 17 February 2012) but in-country operations are currently restricted due to lack of access.

- The only funding reported to UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) specifically to address the crisis in Syria so far in 2012 is US$645,995 from Germany to the ICRC

- In 2011, UN OCHA FTS reported expenditure of US$11.8 million on humanitarian operations in Syria, from eight main donors. The three largest donors were: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), US$3.3 million; Australia, US$3.2 million; and Switzerland just over US$3 million. Just over half of this was provided through the ICRC and World Food Programme (WFP).

- The ICRC budget for Syria in 2012 is CHF12 million – nearly three times higher than in 2011 – some of which will focus on assisting civilians in the current crisis and some of which will assist refugee populations (see below and also ICRC overview of operations).

Due to a technical problem, tables cannot currently be displayed. We are aiming to fix this in the next couple of days. Meanwhile, you can access them by clicking straight through to this spreadsheet.

2. Operations to support Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey

- UN OCHA FTS tracked just under US$1 million (US$912,974) for operations specifically relating to Syrian refugees in 2011. This was provided by three donors: Italy (direct bilateral contribution to Lebanese government); Norway (through Norwegian Refugee Council); and Switzerland to UNHCR.

- Some agencies are raising money to provide support to Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries – for example Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief.

- MSF set up a health programme for Syrian refugees in Wadi Khaled, in the north of Lebanon, in November 2011. Funding to support MSF operations such as this are not necessarily tracked within UN OCHA FTS.

[Note: Jordan is home to refugees from Syria, Iraq and Palestine. At the height of the crisis in Iraq, Jordan hosted an estimated 1.5 million Iraqis. The UN estimates that there are now half this number, though actual numbers fluctuate. This raises an interesting point about how many governments are providing support to people in crisis and how these resources are made visible, or not, in reports on international resource flows.

3. Operations in Syria to support refugees from Iraq and Palestine

Syria has the world’s third largest refugee population and is itself home to refugees from both Iraq and Palestine. The Syrian government has taken on the responsibility for providing some of the basic utility requirements – including, for example, in the camps that are home to Palestinian refugees (while UNRWA provides basic environmental health services including sewage and waste disposal and provision of safe drinking water).

- UNHCR’s 2012 budget for Syria stands at US$94.5 million, 20% less than that for 2011 due to the projected reduction in the number of registered Iraqi refugees. However, while the number of refugees is declining, their humanitarian needs are rising as their vulnerability increases. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent is UNHCR’s key operational partner.

- UNRWA provides health, education, and relief and social services to more than 496,000 Palestine refugees living in nine official and three unofficial camps in Syria.

- So far in 2012, UN OCHA FTS has tracked US$2.3 million in support of Iraqi refugees in Syria. This has come from Denmark in support of operations by Danish Red Cross and Danish Refugee Council. In 2011, US$26.2 million was provided for refugees of Palestine and Iraq inside Syria.

Download data from this spreadsheet. Tables will be shown here in the next few days.

Useful resources:

ICRC

ReliefWeb

UN data

BBC factfile

UNHCR

AlertNet

The main policy recommendations to emerge from a three-year consultation process, and clearly articulated in the report « Analyses et propositions sur l’action humanitaire dans les situations de crise et de post-crise » commissioned by Bernard Kouchner, and written by Alain Boinet (Solidarités International) and Benoit Miribel (Action Contre La Faim (ACF)), centre on adopting and promoting the EU consensus on humanitarian aid and on developing a national humanitarian policy framework.

Money-wise, the emphasis is to be on: post crisis reconstruction and preparedness (specifically, a proposal to spend EUR50 million a year on reconstruction programmes); partnerships with NGOs (target to spend EUR160 million through French NGOs by 2012); public information; bolstering France’s research/academic capacity; and engagement in the UN reform process.

I was asked to talk about: how France is currently situated in comparison with other donors in terms of financial flows (and in relation to development aid) – trends and main partners, comparisons with OECD DAC donors and other government donors; recipient countries; principal partners (NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, United Nations); trends in types of crises (DRR, post conflict). I was also asked to reflect on the ‘financial crisis’ and its implications. That was a lot to try and get through within 15 minutes … especially since I also wanted to use the time to talk about the value, impact and transparency of resources for people in crises.

The fact that France’s bilateral humanitarian contributions are ‘modest’ (a word that features in the report, p30), is not news. Since 2000, it has spent between US$15 million and US$55 million a year on bilateral humanitarian aid (i.e. specified or ‘earmarked’ funding for specific programmes or projects) with very little channelled through its own national NGOs. At US$344.7 million over the 10-year period 2001-2010 (US$310.7 million 2000-2009), that’s less than Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (US$793 million) and 16 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) governments (19th, Finland, gave US$751 million), and more than Kuwait, Russian Federation and five other DAC governments (Luxembourg, New Zealand, Austria, Portugal and Greece). It’s interesting for people to be able to place their national expenditure alongside others’ of course, but the headline numbers are too broad, too sweeping to show us the true value of contributions and activities, which might not be comparable: what was the money spent on? where? who for? how long for? through which partners? with what impact?

We should also consider the extent of France’s contributions to humanitarian activities through its funding of the EU budget. The graphs in the slides and Excel clearly show the extent of this funding, together with multilateral ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. Some 25%-30% of France’s official development assistance (ODA) is provided in the form of ‘multilateral’ (i.e. totally unspecified) contributions to EU institutions each year. (It provides the second largest contribution after Germany.) And I learned at the conference that the EU spends 23% of its budget through French NGOs! With these multilateral elements taken into account, France is propelled to 9th largest donor over 10 years.

To meet the many demands placed on humanitarian delivery, which is pulled in so many directions, we need to be able to see all the resources available to address the needs – not just those in the ‘emergency response’ envelopes of OECD DAC governments (which happen to be the only ones we can get consistent and comparable data on). To meet the demands effectively, we need to put all resources available on the table so that we can make informed choices based on comparative advantage.

Humanitarian aid financing is but one resource that can be applied to promoting resilience to risk and addressing the consequences of poverty. It can work alongside local private and government resources; other aid and aid-like flows from a variety of government donors; private sector investments and donations; foreign security and peacekeeping investments. In order to harness the potential of all of these contributions, we need to be able to see them; and a precondition for that is transparency. Our generation is ideally placed to make the most of convergence in information, communications and technology to make that happen.

If you read French, you might want to take a look at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website or this article by Jean-Jacques Louarn and Jérôme Larché at Grotius International.

Meantime, here are some additional slides. I’ve put the data in this Google Doc. The graphs didn’t convert from the Excel version of the file, so I’ve saved that here in our datastore.

Technical annex:

The Republic of Korea has shown impressive economic progress over the last 50 years with gross national income (GNI) rising from US$2.98 billion in 1962 to US$966.6 billion in 2009, ranking it the 13^th largest economy in the world (World Development Indicators). In November 2009 the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oh Joon said, “Half a century ago, Korea was one of the poorest nations in the world, endeavouring to emerge from the ashes of the Korean War to rebuild itself” (OECD DAC).  Korea’s development and transition from aid recipient to aid donor has taken place in a relatively short period of time, and its economic growth has enabled its aid budget to increase from US$100.3 million in 1995 to US$816 million in 2009.

Source: Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/nov/02/g20-summit-cannes-interactive

On 1 January 2010, Korea became the 24th member of the Organisaton for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistant Committee (DAC).  During a special session in November 2009 the OECD DAC unanimously appointed Korea as a member on the grounds that it has successfully transformed from “an emerging donor to an advanced donor”, with increased official development assistance (ODA) volumes, coherent aid strategies, and an aid system developed in line with OECD DAC principles. In 2008 the OECD DAC conducted a Special Review of the Republic of Korea’s Development Cooperation citing recommendations for future aid policy, systems and coordination.

History of assistance

In the aftermath of the 1950 Korean War three quarters of Korea’s imports were financed by foreign aid and by 1962 the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan was implemented with foreign aid playing a key role in Korea’s social and economic development. From 1945 to the 1990s Korea received a total of just under US$13 billion in overseas assistance. However, Korea has regarded itself as a donor since the 1960s, when it provided training to technical staff from developing countries with the support of USAID. Independent assistance from Korea began in the 1980s, when it designed a development programme in support of South-South cooperation (Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)). By 1995 Korea was no longer on the World Bank’s list of recipient lending.

Aid architecture

Four key actors are responsible for Korea’s development assistance. Korea’s concessional loan policy is implemented by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), under the supervision of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), and its bilateral grant aid policy is implemented by the KOICA, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT).

EDCF promotes economic cooperation through concessional loans for development projects to developing country governments. KOICA is a key driver in the implementation of Korea’s ODA and is responsible for grant aid and technical cooperation programmes – promoting sustainable development, strengthening partnerships with developing partners and enhancing the local ownership of beneficiaries.

Official development assistance (ODA)

Korea’s ODA contributions have grown from US$100.3 million in 1995 to US$816 million in 2009, and preliminary figures estimate that its aid could reach over US$1 billion in 2010. However, even with this potential growth in aid in 2010 it would still only rank Korea 18^th compared to other OECD DAC donors’ aid volumes.

Humanitarian contributions between 1995 and 2009 totalled US$156.9 million and unsurprisingly Korea’s humanitarian aid as a proportion of ODA since 1995 averaged at only 2.7%.  In 2009 Korea gave US$19.4 million in humanitarian aid ranking it fairly low (28^th) compared to other government donors such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 12^th, Saudi Arabia, 20^th and Greece, 23^rd.

ODA and humanitarian aid from Korea, 1995 – 2010. Data for 2010 is prelimanry and ODA is inclusive of debt relief, 1995-2009 ODA excludes debt relief.

ODA and HA 1995-2010″ src=”http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ODA-and-HA-1995-2010.png” alt=”" width=”600″ height=”371″ />

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Key committments

• Korea has committed to 0.15% ODA/gross national income (GNI) by 2012 and 0.15% by 2015.
• It has also committed to untie 75% of ODA by 2015.
• Korea aims to double ODA to Africa to US$214 million by 2012.
• Within the health sector it has pledged US$6 million to The Global Fund 2011-2013 and US$1 million to GAVI.

Source: ONE, Data Report 2011

Humanitarian aid engagement

Korea does not currently have a specific humanitarian policy, but disaster relief and reconstruction is one of KOICA’s aid themes and emergency relief and reconstruction has become a core programme. In October 2006 it joined the United Nations’ (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Donors Support Group (ODSG) and co-convened the ODSG Partnership Meeting in June 2007, in Seoul. Korea also joined the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group (HLWG) in July 2007 (which focused on assistance to specific crises and countries), the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams since 2003 and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) since 1999 (chairing it in 2000). Since Korea specialises in search and rescue efforts, it has also participated in the OCHA-administered Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Partnership (APHP) since its establishment in 2004. In July 2009 Korea signed up to the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)initiative, becoming the 36^th member.

Recipient allocation

Korea’s aid shows allocation based on regional proximity. Between 2000 and 2009 a significant proportion of Korea’s aid, over half (US$2.3 billion), was concentrated in Asia, with 30% of total contributions going to the Far East (US$1.3 billion).  Sub-Saharan Africa has received just under 18% (US$756 million) in this period.

Korea’s regional allocation of aid, 2000-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Korea’s top recipients are similar year on year with Viet Nam and Iraq featuring regularly – six and five times respectively. The other recipients that featured in Korea’s top ten in 2009 included Angola (US$28.7 million), Afghanistan (US$27.9 million), Laos (US$26.3 million), Turkey (US$25.1 million), Philippines (US$22.3 million), Nepal (US$21.5 million) and Bangladesh (US$19.9 million).

Korea’s top three aid recipients (US$m), 2000-2009

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1	Viet Nam	Viet Nam	China	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Viet Nam	Viet Nam
	21.8	53.8	31.8	42.7	70.8	130.4	46.4	41.7	56.5	71.4
2	Uzbekistan	Indonesia	Viet Nam	Indonesia	Viet Nam	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mongolia
	20.6	29.2	31.3	33.7	36.5	39.5	25.7	29.6	33.7	33.7
3	China	China	Cambodia	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Angola	Indonesia
	19.4	23.0	27.8	24.2	28.6	32.4	29.6	28.9	23.8	31.7

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Recipients of Korea’s humanitarian aid are concentrated in Asia and the Middle East.  However, recipient allocation is less concentrated than that for ODA – Iraq and Indonesia appear in the top three only three times each.

Korea’s top three humanitarian aid recipients (US$m), 2000-2009

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1	Serbia	Serbia	Afghanistan	China	Afghanistan	Sri Lanka	Indonesia	Iraq	China	Palestine/OPT
	0.2	0.3	2.3	0.3	11.8	7.2	9.8	5.4	5.9	3.1
2	Pakistan	Guinea	Timor-Leste	Iran	Thailand	Iraq	Iraq	Lebanon	Iraq	Sri Lanka
	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	5.7	7.0	1.7	3.0	2.1
3	Ethiopia	Tanzania	Ethiopia	Algeria	Indonesia	Indonesia	Philippines	Bangladesh	Myanmar	Indonesia
	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	4.0	1.0	1.1	2.6	1.6

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is absent from Korea’s list of aid recipients as these flows are not formally reported to the OECD DAC and cannot officially be classed as ODA. For Korea, the DPRK is not classified as a separate country but is regarded as the northern part of the peninsula – “politically, both North and South claim sovereignty over each other’s territory. Article 3 of the South’s constitution specifies the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands as its territory. Therefore, such flow (aid, trade) between the two is considered as a domestic one” (Soyeun Kim, 2011). In 2007 it was estimated that that around US$558 million could be classed as ODA from the South to the North (OECD DAC).

 Types of aid

Between 2006 and 2009 95% of Korea’s aid was sector allocable. Humanitarian aid only made up 4% in this period of which reconstruction and relief was the largest sub-sector (US$30.4 million) followed by emergency relief (US$19 million).

Korea’s types of aid, 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Of Korea’s sector allocable aid the majority (53%) is spent on social infrastructure and services.

Breakdown of Korea’s sector allocable aid, 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

A breakdown of social infrastructure and services shows that education receives the largest proportion, US$266.3 million (30%), followed by government and civil society, US$231.1 million (26%) and health, US$217.6 million (25%).

Breakdown of Korea’s social infrastructure and services aid, 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Channels of delivery and financing mechanisms

Korea channels the majority of its aid through the public sector, however a higher proportion of aid was channelled through multilateral organisations in 2008 and 2009.

Korea’s aid, channels of delivery (US$m), 2006-2009

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Public sector	97%	95%	89%	89%
NGOs and CSOs	1%	1%	2%	2%
Public-Private Partnerships	0%	0%	1%	1%
Multilateral organisations	1%	3%	8%	8%

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

Multilateral funding

Korea financially supports a wide range of multilateral institutions. Since 2007 it has channelled a large amount of aid, US$194.6 million through the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank. It has also maintained annual contributions of approximately US$27 million to the Asian Development Fund since 2006.

Korea’s multilateral funding, (US$m), 2006-2009

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

An increasing proportion of Korea’s humanitarian aid is being channelled through multilateral organisations as opposed to the public sector. A recommendation from the OECD DAC’s Special Review of Korea’s Development Co-operation was that more of Korea’s humanitarian aid be channelled through multilateral and pooled funding mechanisms rather than bilateral systems.

Korea’s humanitarian aid, channels of delivery (US$m), 2005-2009

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Public sector	93%	75%	75%	33%
NGOs and CSOs	0%	0%	0%	0%
Red Cross Movement	0%	1%	1%	4%
Multilateral organisations	7%	24%	24%	63%

Source:Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2009 prices.

To download this article as a pdf please click here

The tables below show (1) donors to the appeal (2) all humanitarian funding (i.e. appeal plus other contributions) reported by donors in response to the Libya emergency this year. The data is an extract from UN OCHA FTS and can be accessed in this Google Docs file.

Both the GHA and UN OCHA teams are happy to help with any data enquiries.

All humanitarian funding reported by donors for Libya, 2011

Our first two updates on funding in response to the Libya emergency, which also contains some useful external links to maps and sitreps as well as basic aid data and development indicators, can be found in Libya crisis #1 and Libya crisis #2. 

The data expressed below is an extract from UN OCHA FTS and can be accessed in this Google Docs file. Both the GHA and UN OCHA teams are happy to help with any data enquiries. 

Humanitarian financing headlines, 23 September 2011:

1. US$431.1 million has been tracked in response to the crisis in Libya, US$250.5 million of which in response to the UN’s regional flash appeal (which also covers priority humanitarian needs in Egypt, Niger and Tunisia).

2. As at 23 September, 61.4% (US$250.5 million) of the  UN regional flash appeal for US$407.8 million has been funded.

3. The Top 5 government donors to UN flash appeal are: the United States (US$56.8m, or 23.1% of the total appeal funding), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$40.4m, 16.4% of the total appeal funding), Australia (US$28.2m, 11.5%), United Kingdom (US$12.1m, 4.6%) and Norway (US$9.1m, 3.7%).

4. The top 5 government contributors to the overall emergency (i.e.  UN flash appeal funding as well as other funding for humanitarian projects not listed in the appeal) are: the United States (US$81.6m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$55.1m), Australia (US$37.5m), United Kingdom (US$21.9m) and Sweden (US$19.5m).

5. So far, 61.4% of the UN’s appeal requirements have been met. The coverage of requirements ranges from 4.6% in Egypt to 80.7% regionally. 21.5% of the needs have been met within Libya itself, 55.6% in Niger and 55.7% in Tunisia.

6. The latest information on funding by cluster and by agency can be found on the UN OCHA FTS site.

Humanitarian financing headlines, 12 September 2011

1. The UN has tracked US$385.9 million in response to the crisis in Libya, US$246 million of which in response to the UN’s regional flash appeal (which also covers priority humanitarian needs in Egypt, Niger and Tunisia).

2. As at 12 September, 60.3% (US$246m) of the US$407.8m UN regional flash appeal has been funded.

3.The Top 5 government donors to UN flash appeal are: the United States (US$56.8m, or 23.1% of the total appeal funding), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$40.4m, 16.4% of the total appeal funding), Australia (US$28.2m, 11.5%), United Kingdom (US$12.1m, 4.6%) and Norway (US$9.1m, 3.7%).

4. The top 5 government contributors to the overall emergency (i.e.  UN flash appeal funding as well as other funding for humanitarian projects not listed in the appeal) are: the United States (US$81.6m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$55.1m), Australia (US$37.5m), United Kingdom (US$21.9m) and Sweden (US$19.5m).

5. So far, 60.3% of the UN’s appeal requirements have been met. The coverage of requirements ranges from 4.6% in Egypt to 80.7% regionally. 18.5% of the needs have been met within Libya itself, 55.6% in Niger and 50.6% in Tunisia.

The information below is based on data published by UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) on 31 August – a database that is updated daily. Both the GHA team and UN OCHA teams are happy to help with any data enquiries. Data on official development assistance (ODA) is taken from OECD DAC. The data can be accessed in this Excel file or this Google Docs file.

Other useful sources of information include:

• North Africa Humanitarian Response Portal
• Libya crisis map: http://libyacrisismap.net/
• Situation reports: http://reliefweb.int/taxonomy/term/140
• Appeal documents, needs and daily data updates: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=930
• Crisis background and news: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/libya-turmoil
• For trends in development aid to the region, see Kerry Smith’s report, Arab Spring. http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Arab-Spring.pdf

Humanitarian financing headlines, 31 August 2011

1. The UN has tracked US$374.8 million in response to the crisis in Libya, US$230.9m of which in response to the UN’s regional flash appeal (which also covers priority humanitarian needs in Egypt, Niger and Tunisia).
2. As at 31 August, 60.3% (US$246m) of the US$407.8m UN regional flash appeal has been funded.

3.The Top 5 government donors to UN flash appeal are: the United States (US$56.8m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$40.4m), Australia (US$28.2m), United Kingdom (US$11.3m) and Norway (US$9.1m). Figures in the table below are US$ million.

4. The top 5 government contributors to the overall emergency (i.e.  UN flash appeal funding as well as other funding for humanitarian projects not listed in the appeal) are: the United States (US$81.6m), European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO, US$55.1m), Australia (US$37.5m), United Kingdom (US$21.9m) and Sweden (US$19.5m). Figures in the table below are US$ million.

5. The best funded clusters in the UN appeal are currently logistics and camp management/coordination.

Background and development indicators

6.The political and security crisis in Libya that began in February 2011 has resulted in acute pockets of fighting (centred mainly in and around Tripoli, Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains), has reduced the capacity of public institutions to function and has led to large scale internal and cross-border displacement. In addition to the challenge of protecting civilians from the direct effects of the fighting, humanitarian efforts have focused on trying to meet food, fuel and medical needs as well as shelter. (See: UN OCHA’s latest sitrep of 26 August for a detailed situation report).

7. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), over 800, 000 people have left the country (total population of 6.5m).

8. Libya is one of six Arab countries to have experienced protests and unrest since December 2010, along with Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain (see: Arab Spring http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Arab-Spring.pdf).

9. Libya has received very little official development assistance (ODA or aid) – under 0.05% of the total allocated to over 150 countries since 2005. Indeed, as a region, ‘north of the Sahara’ (an OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) grouping that also comprises Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) has accounted for 3.6% of total ODA over the past five years.

We were recently asked to calculate how much EU citizens give per capita, and you can see this information in a visualisation.

In doing these calculations however, we could see very clearly just how much some countries channel via the EU institutions. We calculated that the average humanitarian contribution for citizens of EU member states in 2009 was US$10.39 – but of that, US$3.22 was spent via the EU institutions.

Humanitarian giving per citizen, EU member states reporting to the OECD DAC in 2009

[Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and World Bank data]

If we didn’t impute that money and attribute the respective shares to member governments, their apparent levels of humanitarian funding would in many cases be significantly lower.  In some cases dramatically lower – the graph below shows the proportion of EU member states’ (the ones reporting to the OECD DAC) humanitarian budgets which are channelled via the EU Institutions.

Shares of total official humanitarian aid expenditure channelled via the EU Institutions in 2009

[Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data]

We hope this helps to illustrate why it is important to build a comprehensive picture of humanitarian aid – including the less visible parts.

We have attempted to put some numbers together, which you can see in this visualisation:

The data which drives this and our calculations can be found in the data store section of the website. We know this is not perfect so please help us out if you can think of a better way!

Here’s what we did:

1. Downloaded data from OCHA FTS on 10^th August 2011 at 1500 GMT. The download includes funding from all donors to five ‘crises’ Djibouti 2011, Ethiopia 2011, Kenya 2011, Somalia 2011 and Horn of Africa – July 2011.
2. We then separated out funding within the three existing UN appeals for Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia (omitting funding which was outside of the UN appeals).
3. We added to this funding attributed to the ‘emergency type’ ‘Horn of Africa – July 2011’. This is not a UN appeal but a place for the FTS to report contributions which are not yet attributable to a specific recipient country, but which are identifiably for this crisis.
4. We then added ALL funding to Ethiopia. The appeal in Ethiopia is not part of the UN consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as such, it is not currently possible to differentiate funding to Ethiopia which is specifically for the drought response with the FTS data.

This means that our bilateral funding figures are an over estimate because we included all  funding to Ethiopia.

Next we attempted to impute back to government donors some of their contributions via multilateral funds and agencies like this:

1. We took from the CERF website the total funds allocated to those four countries in 2011.  We then took the contributions of each donor to the global CERF fund in 2011 and applied their percentage share to the volume of funds allocated to the crisis affected countries.
2. For ERFs and CHFs we took the donor contributions to the funds reported to the OCHA FTS and applied their proportions of the total to the total funds committed/contributed to the crisis by the ERFs in Kenya and Ethiopia and the CHF in Somalia.
3. We then took the amount committed/contributed by the EU Institutions to the crisis and applied to this, the share that each EU member state provided in multilateral ODA to the EU Institutions in 2010. This figure can be considered at best an estimate, but we think its worthwhile to illustrate a more comprehensive picture of what some EU member states are giving.

As you can see from this complex process, tracking funding to this crisis is not easy. If you can think of a better way of doing this, please comment or email me lydia.poole@devinit.org