At a time when many government donor budgets are feeling the squeeze from the economic crisis, the levels of private voluntary contributions in humanitarian donorship are showing no such signs. Nearly a quarter (24%) of the international humanitarian response for the period 2006 to 2010 came from private voluntary contributions, amounting to at least US$18 billion. Private funding as a share of the total humanitarian response grew from 17% in 2006 to 32% in 2010.

This trend has not escaped aid agencies, which are paying special attention to private donors. Regular fundraising campaigns in the media, through the post or face to face are a familiar feature in most developed countries. Moreover, the economic crisis of the past four years has prompted aid organisations to intensify their collaboration with private donors. For many organisations, private money is the answer to the dilemma of how to keep responding to the growing number of aid challenges when there are limited government resources available.

Major humanitarian crises in the past decade have prompted unprecedented amounts of private donations: the tsunami that caused widespread devastation across the Indian Ocean in December 2004 saw US$3.9 billion raised in private aid; the response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti generated at least US$1.2 billion in contributions from the general public; and US$450 million was channelled in response to the 2010 floods in Pakistan. While global private support to large-scale emergencies is relatively easy to gauge, it remains unclear how much private money is out there in any given year.

However, if private support to humanitarian aid is here to stay and the system is becoming increasingly reliant on this source of funding, it is imperative that we are able to gain as clear a picture as possible about its volume, and more importantly, its use. After all, the volume of funding is only one part of the picture. Not every dollar of humanitarian aid can be used in the same way, nor will each dollar have the same impact on the ground. Therefore, it is critical that we are able to start systematically assessing the effectiveness of private funding in responding to humanitarian needs and tackling vulnerability.

You can view, download, or print the report here. If you would like to receive a hard copy of the report please do get in touch: dan.sparks@devinit.org

 The list was compiled based on a set of qualitative criteria, which included:

• ·        innovation, understood as creativity in programming
• ·        effectiveness, measured by NGOs’ delivery against objectives
• ·        impact, looking at the NGOs’ outcomes rather than outputs and whether activities are donor-driven or needs-based
• ·        efficiency and value for money, evaluating administrative overheads and coordination in order to avoid duplications
• ·        transparency and accountability, assessing organisations’ levels of reporting and participatory planning
• ·        sustainability, defined as enduring impact and relevance
• ·        strategic and financial management, meaning consistency of funding and the use of a self-evaluation process
• ·        peer review, measured by NGO and donor perception of sector leaders.

 Despite the use of these metrics the ranking does not appear to be based on empirical evidence; “there is no science in the measuring” when it comes to selecting the best 100 NGOs, The Global Journal admits in its methodological note. Furthermore, the spectrum of organisations included in the list is quite wide. For the purpose of its study, The Global Journal defines NGOs as “operational or advocacy focused non-profit organisations organised on a local, national or international level”.  With such a broad definition – ranging from long-established organisations with clearly defined political or developmental agendas, to young information-sharing initiatives springing from universities and technological centres – it is no surprise that the reader is presented with a rather eclectic list of organisations.

 Methodological issues aside, what is particularly appealing about The Global Journal’s Top 100 Best NGOs list, is the high presence of non-Western NGOs. Within the top 10 ranking, there are already two developing country-based organisations: Bangladeshi BRAC in fourth place and Kenya-born Ushahidi in tenth.

 However, it is interesting to note that, from a geographical perspective, over half of the 100 best NGOs are based in only two countries: 37 come from the United States and 14 from the United Kingdom. Emerging countries, such as India and Brazil, contribute just over a tenth of the top non-profit organisations in the ranking while developing countries host 15 of the best NGOs.

Table 1: Comparative analysis of UN CAP appeals at launch. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

However, the new Humanitarian Appeal seeks to mobilise US$93 million less than did the mid-year review (MYR) of the 2011 CAP, which represents a 1% decline. Yet, any direct comparison between global CAP requirements at the time of launch – which takes place on the last day of November each year – and at its mid-year review point – which occurs each July – can be misleading. This is due to the fact that new consolidated appeals are added after the annual CAP is issued and flash appeals are launched in response to sudden onset emergencies that could not be foreseen in the annual CAP. Therefore a detailed analysis of individual appeals is essential in order to assess the actual variations taking place.

Table 2: Comparative analysis of 2011 and 2012 UN CAP requirements. All figures are in US$ million. [Source: Development Indicatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Somalia is the country experiencing the single most dramatic escalation of requirements for 2012 with a staggering increase of over 500%, in the course of a single year, up to US$1.5bn, driven by the severe drought crisis in the Horn of Africa. Requirements by beneficiary also soared to US$380 per person, a 93% increase from 2011. Yet, even with recent improvements in the security situation and better humanitarian access, it remains doubtful that such a vast volume of funding can be successfully implemented in one of the most unstable and volatile countries in word.

Figure 1: Somalia consolidated appeals’ total requirements and requirements per beneficiary for 2011 and 2012. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Requirements for Kenya and Djibouti – the other two CAP countries most severely affected by the Horn of Africa crisis – also feature predominantly in the Humanitarian Appeal for 2012. Kenya’s is the third largest consolidated appeal for 2012 with a 26% increase in needs compared to six months ago and a 45% rise from the 2011 CAP levels. Funding sought for drought-affected Djibouti more than doubled, with requirements per beneficiary also rising by some 18%. 

In its first year, The Republic of South Sudan has taken place in the UN CAP for the second time. The country’s first consolidated appeal was launched at the time of the 2011 CAP MYR last July and represented the separation of humanitarian plans and the associated financial requirements for South Sudan from those of Sudan. In 2012, both Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan see their requirements per beneficiaries grow well beyond 100% when compared the previous year, despite a more moderate increase in net appeal requirements: collectively needs increased from US$1.7bn in 2011 to US$1.8bn for 2012. Looking at each country, the Republic of South Sudan sees the funding sought increase by a quarter while Sudan’s requirements decline marginally by 4%.

Figure 2: Sudan 2011 CAP and consecutive separated South Sudan and Sudan consolidated appeal requirements. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Many traditional consolidated appeals begin 2012 with declining funding requirements: Afghanistan, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) all see their funding diminished. In the case of Afghanistan and CAR, this is happening despite an increase in the number of beneficiaries (32% and 18% respectively), while Chad sees those considerably reduced. Such apparent contradiction reinforces the perception that there is little connection between the identification of humanitarian needs and the level of funding requirements in the Humanitarian Appeal.

Figure 3: CAP requirements for Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad and occupied Palestinian territory (2011-2012). [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

The CAP 2012 document states that “coordinated needs assessments are more systemically practised, and this is likely to be fine-tuning the identification of people in need and of the scope of their needs. Also, information management innovations are likely playing a part in reducing funding requests (…)”. Nevertheless, this is at best a tenuous explanation of the widely varying scenarios presented by the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal: while Afghanistan is experiencing drought and intensified conflict, leading to an increase in the number of vulnerable people, its funding requirements are being slashed by a quarter; on the other hand, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has lost 31% of its beneficiaries and yet funding requirements remain unchanged from those of the previous year.

With regards to the countries included in the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal, they are few highlights, apart from the disappearance of the West Africa regional appeal which has been part of the CAP for the past 11 years. The West Africa appeal used to encompass some 15 countries, many of which experience small-scale but persistent humanitarian crisis and high vulnerability. Traditionally it has been a rather small appeal, with average requirements comprising only 4.4% of the CAP. However, if the level of funding requested has usually been low, so has been the response too: the West Africa appeal received on average just 4.1% of all CAP funding and was the worst funded consolidated appeal in 2011.

Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Niger frequently participate in the CAP process with individual appeals as these countries face larger-scale emergencies that demand targeted response. Indeed, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire are part of the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal and Liberia is expected to come on board by the beginning of 2012. However, at least another five countries in the region – Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea and Burkina Faso – are currently experiencing cholera outbreaks. Leaving them outside of the CAP is not likely to raise donor awareness of their needs, nor help to provide adequate assistance to affected populations.

In the Philippines, the population of Mindanao continues to face the triple effects of insecurity, natural hazards and poverty. During 2011 heavy rains and severe weather caused repeated flooding in central and southern Mindanao, the last flash floods happening only a few days ago.

Finally, the 2012 UN Humanitarian Appeal suggests that a more strategic identification of objectives exists now than it did previously, with clearer boundaries being set between humanitarian needs and secondary aims. This could account for the marked decline in funding requirements for some humanitarian contexts, as demonstrated below.

• The oPt CAP for 2012 seeks 22% less money than it did in 2011 placing requirements at their lowest level for the last five years. Although the appeal acknowledges that “the humanitarian needs in the oPt have not fundamentally changed”, this CAP opts for a narrower scope than was seen in previous years.
• Nearly two years after the devastating 2010 earthquake, Haiti is in a transitional phase and CAP requirements have gone down by 40% compared to those from the CAP MYR., However, when compared to funding requirements from 12 months ago, this decrease reaches 75%. According to the appeal document this is not a transition appeal but one which focuses on critical humanitarian needs only, leaving reconstruction and development work to other funding mechanisms.
• In Zimbabwe, the humanitarian community has revised funding requirements for 2012 downwards by 45%, as only priority humanitarian needs will be covered under the 2012 CAP, while recovery work will be addressed by other initiatives such as the Zimbabwe UN Development Assistance Framework.

This new, more targeted approach of the UN CAP is a welcome development as it helps to keep the appeal process more firmly grounded in key humanitarian objectives. It should also help to bridge the gap between humanitarian requirements and humanitarian funding. On average, a third of humanitarian needs have gone unmet in the last five years with provisional levels for 2011 being the highest ever, at 41%. However, meeting needs can only be achieved if humanitarian donors maintain current levels of funding despite the squeeze on their budgets and do not reduce the size of their country envelopes in line with decreased appeal requirements. 

Three multi-country epidemics are ongoing, according to UNICEF, each with separate strains: the Lake Chad Basin, affecting Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger; the West Congo Basin, with impacts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR); and Lake Tanganyika – which encompasses DRC and Burundi. In Chad and Nigeria, the epidemic had already started in 2010 and is the worst in Chad’s history, with 16,000 cases and 433 deaths largely driven by the country’s vast territory and large-scale population movements. The table below summarises existing reports on numbers of cholera cases and related deaths as reported by the leading humanitarian organisations and affected countries:

Figure 1: Cholera incidence statistics per affected country for 2011. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UNICEF, WHO, OCHA and IRIN sources]

In DRC, the outbreak was reported in March 2011 and in only three months a total of 3,896 cases, including 265 deaths have been reported, with an overall CFR of 7%; these numbers have continued to grow over the past months. In north-eastern Nigeria containing the disease has been hampered by high population density and sporadic conflict, while in CAR health authorities declared an outbreak just two weeks ago. Smaller cholera epidemics in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Togo are being contained. 

Following its late 2010 cross-border epidemiological study of the Lake Chad Basin, which looked to identify the key cholera hotspots and how the infection was spreading across borders, UNICEF now calls for cross-border coordination to be enhanced at all levels. The study is currently in its second phase, analysing how better to act on the findings from last year’s work.

A review of the current funding status of cholera-related projects in existing United Nations (UN) consolidated appeals integrated in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) presents a rather bleak panorama due to considerable underfunding. This seems to indicate the likelihood of a launch of a dedicated UN common appeal for the regional cholera outbreak. Currently, 12 countries are covered by a consolidated appeal and all appeals but one include cholera prevention and response projects. However, with the exception of Chad, levels of funding are worryingly low, just two and a half months before the end of the year and the appeal period.

Figure 2: Funding status for cholera-related projects in existing UN CAP appeals for countries affected by the 2011 epidemic as of end of October 2011. [Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS data]

Note: The DRC consolidated appeal doesn’t present requirements for each specific project but only on a cluster level.

With discussions underway around the need for a dedicated regional plan to combat the epidemic, we may look at other major cholera crises for reference regarding donor response to needs. At the end of 2005, West and Central Africa faced another cholera epidemic which spread to ten countries where a total of 51,976 cases and 814 deaths were registered over a period of three months leading up to the launch of the UN flash appeal. The West and Central Africa Region 2005 Flash Appeal requested US$3.2 million to support UNICEF, WHO and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) activities in response to the outbreak, and to support the preparation of affected countries ahead of the forthcoming cholera season. Of the 47 projects listed under the appeal, only one was funded, together with a contribution of US$1.2 million of overall funding for UNICEF, pending allocation to specific projects. On the whole, only 44% of the needs identified within the 2005 regional appeal were met.

Figure 3: Unmet requirements and funding received for the 2005 West and Central Africa regional cholera appeal. [Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS data]

More recently, in October of 2010 and only ten months after the earthquake that devastated the country, Haiti experienced its first case of cholera since records of the disease exist (WHO keeps a registry on existing cholera cases since 1949). 507,398 cases were recorded in just three months with case fatalities reaching 2.2% and causing 5,286 deaths, as reported by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).  In terms of financial support for the emergency, an analysis of the funding status of cholera-related projects within the 2011 Haiti consolidated appeal indicates that 80% of the needs are currently met. By comparison, only 59% of the overall appeal needs were met in the same period.  Moreover, data gathered by the Office of the UN special envoy for Haiti tells us that 97.3% of pledges made by donors for the cholera emergency were met, as of September of this year.

Figure 4: Pledges and contributions – both disbursement and confirmed commitments – for the Haiti cholera and earthquake crisis. [Source: Development Initiatives based on data published by the Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti]

Such inequity between funding for past and present cholera epidemics in West and Central Africa and the cholera outbreak in Haiti makes you wonder whether the geographical location of the crisis may carry more weight than the nature of the emergency.

The Movement has a complex resource architecture that includes bilateral (direct funding between two elements of the Movement such as between National Societies) and multilateral pathways (when funds are channelled via a third party such as through IFRC) with resources mobilised from various sources – governments, multilateral organisations, private contributions and commercial enterprises amongst others.  Currently, the volumes and trends of resources within the whole Movement are not being captured as data on funding flows within the different pathways are not compiled into a single analysis.

Data on multilateral funds, produced by IFRC, as well as information from ICRC, has fed into previous Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) reports, yet this gives only a partial picture.  For example, in 2009 IFRC estimated that multilateral funding was only 30% of the total income to the Movement.  Although some National Societies detail financial statements in their annual reports, using these statements for analysis is extremely challenging as the data is not comparable.  IFRC is establishing a Federation-wide reporting system for National Societies and the Secretariat that includes total income and total expenditure as indicators.  In the long term, the IFRC is hoping to capture greater detail such as sources of income and patterns of expenditure.

The Global Humanitarian Assistance programme wants to add to the understanding of financing volumes and trends Movement-wide. We, therefore, contacted 12 Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies and asked them to complete a template detailing their income and expenditure in 2010 and 2009.  Seven National Societies replied – Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All seven provided income data for 2009 whereas five provided it for 2010.  Four provided expenditure data for 2010 and five provided it for 2009.   National Societies vary in their strategies and funding patterns and, therefore, the data portrayed here cannot be extrapolated across other Societies, especially given the small sample size.  Despite this, the study does highlight the wider income and expenditure for seven National Societies as well as the complexities around how National Societies perceive their mandate and their expenditure behaviour.

Income

Combined data on the humanitarian income for 2009 and 2010 shows that private donations from individuals to the National Society in their country of residence made up the largest share of income (41%) while income generating activities (contracted and commercial services) made up the second largest share (24%).

Figure 1. Top three sources of humanitarian income in 2009 and 2010 combined

In comparison, the combined data on total income (development and humanitarian) for 2010 and 2009 shows that income-generation contribute the largest amount (36%), while governments make the second largest (26%) and individuals contributing to their own National Society the third largest (25%).

Figure 2. Top three sources of total income in 2009 and 2010 combined

Comparatively, other sources of humanitarian income represent a significantly smaller proportion of the overall funding.  The National Societies appear to receive only marginal volumes of money from other delivery agencies, for example from UN agencies or other multilateral organisations such as the World Bank or regional development banks. Funding passed from the UN system on to the seven National Societies only amounted to 2.1% of the total (see table below).

Table 1.  Sources of humanitarian income in 2010 and 2009 combined

If we assume that only contributions from individuals, trusts/foundations and corporate giving is classed as private income, then at least 44% of the income to the seven National Societies came from private sources. However, if the money raised through income generating activities, such as the sale of promotional items, first aid training, gaming and lottery and income from investments, is taken into account this share could reach 68%. In comparative terms, our previous research on implementing organisations has shown that the main non-governmental organisations (NGOs) receive on average 58% of their income from private sources.

Figure 3: Average private and institutional income for humanitarian aid for seven National Societies in 2009 and 2010 combined

However, the volume of private income, defined in wider terms for the purposes of our research as funding coming from individuals, corporations, trust/foundations and income generating activities varies extensively across National Societies. For example, this only made up 18% of the total income of Belgian Red Cross in 2010 and 2009 combined, whereas for the same period it was 84% of the total income of the British Red Cross. Similarly, income generation provides 2% of the total income to the Danish Red Cross in 2009 whereas it was 72% of the income of the French Red Cross in the same year.

Expenditure

Figure 4: Total expenditure of National Societies, 2009-2010

The majority of funds from our sample data were spent on long term services and development programmes – 52% in 2010 and 59% in 2009 – whereas disaster response and early recovery made up the second largest share, 35% in 2010 and 30% in 2009.  Furthermore, the majority of funds were spent domestically, 61% in 2010 and 58% in 2009.  The whole of Colombia’s expenditure is spent domestically, which is perhaps not surprising given it is a recipient National Society, but when the Colombia Red Cross is omitted from the sample, the domestic expenditure is still 60% in 2010 and 57% in 2009, which is more surprising given the other National Societies are from high-income countries.  Examples from the British Red Cross data show that domestic expenditure included event first aid and first aid training, fire and emergency support services, refugee services and care in the community.

In terms of international expenditure, more funds were spent multilaterally than bilaterally. In 2010, 27% of funds were spent multilaterally and 9% were spent bilaterally, whereas in 2009 17% of funds were spent multilaterally and 14% were spent bilaterally. While these shares are not in line with previous findings from IFRC that over two-thirds of the Movement expenditure is bilateral, our limited sample size does not necessarily mean that this difference in the results is significant.

Figure 5: Channel of expenditure of National Societies, 2009-2010

The table below illustrates the differences between how National Societies perceive their mandate.  For example, the British Red Cross states that all their activities are humanitarian even though it spends more on long term services and development programmes than disaster response and early recovery, and on disaster preparedness and risk reduction combined, and despite having a greater domestic (66%) expenditure than international (34%).  By contrast the Danish Red Cross reports that 93% of its income is development funding while 78% of its expenditure is on long term services and programmes and 59% is spent domestically.  The Colombia Red Cross spends all its funds domestically, 77% of which is on disaster response and early recovery.

Table 2: Trends across four National Societies 2010 and 2009

This analysis, however insufficiently representative to be extrapolated across all National Societies, provides an interesting insight into their financial structure. In terms of humanitarian income, it portrays an overall prevalence of private funding over governmental and other sources of income. More specifically, income generating activities appear to be a considerable source of financing for National Societies and an income strategy that clearly differentiates them from most other NGOs and civil society organisations. In terms of expenditure, the study shows that domestic activities outweigh the international aid programmes for all National Societies participating in the research. This finding, while not unexpected for the Colombian Red Cross, may be regarded with surprise for the other National Societies that are based in high-income countries.

Although this exercise gives an insight into the funding patterns of only seven National Societies, when replicated on a larger scale it could provide valuable information on volume and trends within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. While the global reach of the Movement – based on its worldwide presence and its network of volunteers – is well understood, a more complete funding picture will enable a better assessment of the full financial scale and weight of the Movement within the delivery system, thus emphasising its influence. It could also lead to improved coordination across the Movement, enabling better programmatical decisions and more effective assistance for those in need.

The number of beneficiaries of the Humanitarian Appeal has almost doubled in the last seven years but the volume of funding sought has increased by more than 335%. In a similar way, the US$ requested per beneficiary has increased dramatically with a 128% increase in 2011 compared to 2005, but reaching as high as 265% growth in 2010. Such a dramatic increase in the appeal requirements has multiple explanations. The skyrocketing cost of commodities in recent years, specifically the rise in the price of food and fuel, increased operational costs and difficult access to beneficiaries in some of the traditional CAP countries, such as Somalia, may account for this trend. However, it remains very difficult to assert that the increase in costs for humanitarian delivery keeps pace with the increase in appeal requirements.

In 2011, 425 aid organisations are participating in projects for 14 consolidated appeals (note that the Djibouti appeal was launched already in October 2010), covering 28 countries. Additionally, there are three ongoing flash appeals still requesting funding in 2011 – the Pakistan Floods Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan (running from August 2010 until August 2011), Kyrgyzstan Extended and Revised Flash Appeal (June 2010 – June 2011), and Benin Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan (November 2010 – May 2011). All consolidated appeals in the 2011 CAP follow appeals for the same countries in 2010. However, there is also good news – 2011 will be the first year since 2000 that Uganda does not need a consolidated appeal, as the internally displaced persons (IDPs) resettlement work of many years is near completion and the country has moved out of a large-scale humanitarian crisis situation.

A review of the funding status for appeals in 2010 leaves us with conflicting feelings. On one hand, 2010 was the year that a record US$13.1 billion raised in humanitarian aid, largely driven by the two mega-disasters that affected three million people in Haiti and over 20 million in Pakistan. Natural disasters in 2010 raised the second largest amount in CAP history – US$5.4 billion. Thus the volume of humanitarian aid in 2010, as recorded by the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), exceeds even that raised in the year of the Tsunami and South Asia earthquake responses. Additionally, three weeks before the end of the year, the funding channelled towards projects included in the CAP is almost the highest ever and is very likely to reach a record amount by the end of the year.

FTS, 2005 – 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data ” src=”http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Total-humanitarian-funding1-444×277.png” alt=”" width=”444″ height=”277″ />On the other hand, 2010 was also the year of the lowest appeal coverage (i.e. appeal funding as a share of the appeal requirements) for the last 5 years, though it may even be the lowest for the last nine years if the funding for the appeals does not improve over the next few weeks. It seems contradictory that the appeal will remain over 40% unfunded in the year of the highest humanitarian funding ever, however this apparent contradiction is due to the large appeal requirements for 2010 and the fact that the unmet requirements are the largest ever.OCHA FTS data” src=”http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Appeal-funding-status-444×277.png” alt=”" width=”444″ height=”277″ />

OCHA FTS data” src=”http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Best-worst-and-overall-appeal-coverage-444×277.png” alt=”" width=”444″ height=”277″ />In terms of individual appeals funding, 2010 does not present great polarisation in the appeal coverage. Even the worst funded consolidated and flash appeals were funded at 44% and 46% respectively, compared to the previous year when they had received 37% and 32%. In fact, the worst funded appeal in 2010 (the Central African Republic consolidated appeal) has the highest funding levels ever. However, when we look at the best funded appeal in 2010 – the Haiti Revised Humanitarian Appeal, it’s 72% funding actually presents the lowest value since 2000.

Finally, funding for the CAP is also an invaluable source of information about the humanitarian donor scene. The United States and the European Commission, two of the usual suspects, have consistently been two of the top three donors for the past five years. A quick look at the largest CAP donors over the 2005-2010 period shows that contributions from individuals and other private sources experienced an upward trend even in the years of no major humanitarian crises. In 2005 private funding reached an unprecedented 9.7% of all funding for the CAP, clearly driven by the Southeast Asia tsunami. It made up 1.4% of all appeal funding in 2006 further increasing the following years and more than doubled its volume in 2009 when it contributed US$244 million to the CAP. The Haiti earthquake response mobilised vast support from corporations, as well as from the general public, raising US$285 million or 78% of all private contributions for 2010 CAP appeals. In fact, private sources are the third largest humanitarian donor to this years’ CAP.

Civil unrest has shaken Cap Haitien in recent days when clashes between UN peacekeepers and angry Haitians provoked the death of at least one man and resulted in a dozen more wounded. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that protests have slowed cholera prevention and treatment supplies from reaching the area, while the nearby World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse has been looted of 500 metric tonnes of food and subsequently burned. Many humanitarian organisations have been forced to halt their lifesaving assistance until the violence subsides.

However, it is hard to blame the Haitians for venting the full force of their anger and frustration. Regardless of whether the accusations against the Nepalese peacekeeping contingent for originating the cholera outbreak prove to be true, it is the lack of progress in the amelioration of the living conditions after the January earthquake that has been fuelling the frustration of the population. In spite of many success stories in both donor and implementing quarters the fact is that 1.3 million people are still living in tented camps in Port au Prince alone, with limited access to clean water, sufficient latrines or efficient waste management systems.  

For many international observers and Haitians alike, it’s hard to comprehend how so much influx of aid in the country has apparently added up to so little impact. For instance, only 15% of transitional shelters have been constructed despite 86% of funding requirements being met. The implementation of early recovery activities has also been particularly slow. It is true, however, that only a small proportion of the US$5.3 billion pledged for reconstruction and long-term development at the Haiti Donor Conference last March has actually been committed and even less has reached the country. It is also true that nobody had predicted a cholera outbreak in Haiti, where the illness has never been registered since health surveillance systems were put in place in the 1960’s. Even the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stated, back in March, that an outbreak of cholera was very unlikely to occur.

And yet I wonder whether a proper multi-sector nationwide assessment of needs, vulnerabilities and risks, from the very beginning of the crisis and throughout the emergency response operation, effectively linking with the recovery and reconstruction phase, would not have allowed a more coordinated and, ultimately, more effective planning and delivery of the aid. This approach might have prevented some of the response gaps that Haitians are currently forced to face.

For an analysis of how needs were assessed and how these assessments were used after the earthquake you can read our recent report:

http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/haiti-funding-according-to-needs.

Disaster Accountability Project (DAP) has recently published a report on the Transparency of Relief Organizations Responding to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. In a nutshell the report states that though many organisations were actively soliciting donations after the disaster, few were sharing regular, factual details of their work, such as how many people were served, where, how, etc. According to the report, this hindered coordination between organisations and also prevented donors from focusing donations on groups that had the greatest capacity to deliver. “It is infuriating that so many groups continue to violate the public trust with so much cash-on-hand donated to alleviate suffering on the ground. Shouldn’t we expect more from groups that are raising hundreds of millions of dollars from a public asked to generously donate, immediately after the earthquake?” said Ben Smilowitz, DAP Executive Director. The DAP openly criticises international NGOs for using large, three-month or six-month aggregate numbers to demonstrate the impact of their work, when yet they continue to fail to reveal the numbers representing the impact of their daily activities, on a daily basis. One can wonder how a daily account of activities can be, in any way, material to proving either the effectiveness or efficiency of given organisations work (NGO or otherwise), or how providing this sort of information actually constitutes an evidence of alliance with any accountability or transparency principles.

The accidental NGO and USAID transparency test guest post by Till Bruckner on the Aidwatchers blog is yet another example of recent pieces of research questioning delivery agencies’ transparency and has unleashed a wave of reactions from both the NGO community and the aid transparency community (see aidinfo blog on What is meaningful transparency for NGOs?).  Another blogger, Francis Bacon, described his attempt to obtain, two years in a row, information on detailed project expenditure from eight large international NGOs and NGO groupings. His requests were either ignored or received an indication to search the information in the organisations’ annual reports. The author openly questions what the point of NGOs signing the INGO Commitment to Accountability Charter is if “they won’t answer a simple query about spending”.

But are all these information queries really such a simple issue? I do not think so. Delivery agencies – NGOs, Red Cross and Red Crescent or UN organisations – have to deal with multiple tasks at any given time: they assess humanitarian situations; follow political developments in donor and recipient countries; analyse global trends such as climate change, epidemic threats, food and financial crisis, etc; they design operational plans, recruit staff, raise funds, liaise with other humanitarian and development actors, advocate for better aid, negotiate access to beneficiaries, write technical and financial reports for their donors, receive external auditors and evaluators who will assess their performance on the basis of the tens or hundreds of contracts, agreements, codes of conduct and best practice guidelines they have adhered to; and, moreover, they try to figure out how better respond to the ever increasing needs while competing for receding financial resources. I am sure that there must be exceptions to the rule, but in general, I do not believe that aid organisations are cynical about transparency and accountability to their donors (private or public), or that they must have something to hide if they do not provide every single piece of financial information that any member of the public requests.

In the midst of an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe, such as the earthquake that struck Haiti’s capital and virtually erased many of its national institutions and aid structures, aid organisations were struggling to reach affected people while dealing with all the financial, logistical and technical challenges that typically arise in these situations. Still, many of these organisations, attended coordination and information sharing meetings, helped develop consolidated appeals, contributed to situation assessments, fed into global response plans and supported real time evaluations of the relief operation. In the case of the Haiti response, 41 NGOs, members of InterAction, still managed to participate in a review of InterAction Members’ Use of Private Funds in Response to the Earthquake in Haiti. Some of these same organisations were amongst those labelled as not fully transparent by the DAP report on the Transparency of Relief Organisations Responding to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake for not responding to a satisfactory degree to the survey that must have been conducted at the same time as the InterAction review. This is just an example of how things when taken out of context and analysed in an isolated way can drive us to wrong impressions.

In my own experience, access to information from aid organisations is challenging, although, when requested under sensible terms, is generally successful. Creating a common understanding of why and how the information provided is going to be used is essential. Persistency also pays off. Nevertheless, much remains to be achieved in that field and many improvements can and must still be done. Enhanced access to real time financial information from all parts of the aid system – from donors, to aid organisations, affected governments and non-aid actors involved in development and humanitarian assistance – is an absolute necessity. Initiatives such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) are not only promoting the values of aid transparency but also working to develop a platform that will make information upload and sharing easier and more accessible for all. In the meantime, however, we must keep in mind that access to information from aid organisations has associated costs that may drive them to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio of providing individually tailored data on a case-by-case basis, or may directly prevent them from replying to every query. And we should not be too quick to label them as under-achievers just because of that.

Humanitarian financing channelled through NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement naturally accounts for a huge proportion of humanitarian assistance. The funding these organisations receive, some of which they pass on to other organisations to implement and some of which they implement themselves, reached US$15 billion in 2008. There are however some marked differences in the funding profiles of the different delivery agencies. Whilst the NGO sector usually receives close to 60% of its funding from private contributions and the remainder from government sources, the UN organisations we have examined have received the vast majority solely from governments.

Funding sources as a share of total income in 2008

NGOs work in the front line of humanitarian programming and aid delivery, and it is natural to see them implementing the bulk of the humanitarian assistance to affected populations. A conservative estimate of the total funding NGOs received directly and indirectly from donor governments – including funds that have passed through multilateral organisations – would suggest that they have received US$2.3 billion, US$3.4 billion and US$4 billion in the years 2006 through to 2008. Whilst government donations are clearly of importance to NGOs, many of them actually raise significant humanitarian financing through their own fundraising and their own direct private contributions. The sums are quite substantial. We estimate NGOs to have raised US$2.2 billion, US$3.2 billion and US3.7 billion in each of the years between 2006 and 2008 – a total of US$9.1 billion. This is funding that they largely control themselves whilst humanitarian funding from donors is much more likely to be tied to particular interventions in particular countries and contexts.

The volume of humanitarian assistance financed by private sources also varies dramatically between organisations. Some of the big NGOs exercise decision-making over more money than government donors. MSF, for example, consistently contributes more humanitarian assistance than 20 of the 23 individual OECD DAC members. In 2008 the private contributions raised by MSF International reached some US$800 million whilst in the same year Germany, Sweden or France had humanitarian budgets of US$751 million, US$603 million and US$445 million respectively.

UN agencies, funds and organisations are collectively a big player in humanitarian assistance. With the World Food Programme (WFP) alone having approximately US$4.6 billion for humanitarian activities in 2008, the total of the five UN agencies we have analysed – the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) – have collectively reported a total budget of US$7.6 billion. Given that we estimate global humanitarian assistance for 2008 to be at least US$16.9 billion, the UN is therefore handling nearly half of total funding. The primary source of humanitarian funding for the UN is the government donors and only marginal amounts come from private sources. Although the proportion of private support for humanitarian assistance trough the UN accounted for an average of only 2% of the total humanitarian income for 2007 and 2008, it has doubled in volume over the same period. The increase in the share of private funding has however risen by only 0.5% since the volume of government funding has kept a similar pace of growth. Considerable variations can be observed between the different UN agencies. UNICEF accounted for the largest share of private funding with over 12% in 2008, while FAO showed the lowest proportion with 0.1% in the same year.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is perhaps the largest world disaster response organisation with an unmatched global presence, with a unique network of 186 national societies and therefore a presence in almost every country in world. The IFRC’s funding patterns place it closer to the NGO group than to the United Nations we have examined. In 2008 it raised 65.5% of its humanitarian income from private sources, US$191 million. But while other delivery agencies receive private funding mainly from individuals, charities, and private companies and corporations, it is, in fact, the national societies that provide the larger share of IFRC funding both from private and government sources. The IFRC’s federal body, the Secretariat, raises very limited funding directly. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has quite a different pattern of funding. Over 90% of ICRC financing comes from government donors and the European Commission, and a mere 2%-3% comes from private sources. This places the ICRC closer to the group of UN agencies than to NGOs. In monetary terms private funding amounted to US$26.3 million in 2009, US$32.7 million in 2008 and US$18.6 million in 2007. These amounts are a very small percentage of the total $3.7 billion that ICRC has raised over the last four year.

Delivery agencies have managed the staggering volume of more than US$36 billion of humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2008, a budget exceeding the gross domestic product of many developing economies. However, even more important than tracking the volume of resources allocated to humanitarian delivery is disentangling the complexity of the delivery system itself and understanding the implications of channelling resources through each one of its components. Because each one of them will determine the path the funding flows down, empowering some organisations to the loss of others, and each choice about who does what will determine what a beneficiary might receive.