We are moving to Burkina Faso in March. Katrin has scored a job there with a large German development organisation and I will try to make my living as a freelance journalist and communications consultant. This is coincidentally also the topic of my first post on my new blog: The what and how of my freelancing plans

If you are interested in how the whole journalism/consulting part works out, head over to www.peter-doerrie.de and follow me via RSS, Twitter, Facebook or Google+.

We will continue to sporadically post here on GoodDevelopments, so leave your existing subscriptions in place or drop by from time to time.

Thanks for reading!

My M.A. Dissertation about the Ivorian Presidential Elections 2010. Enjoy!

Abstract:

The post-conflict election in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2010 was meant to conclude the country’s transition from war-to-peace, to mark the beginning of a new era of peace and promote democratisation. Instead, the election triggered a military stand-off between the two major presidential candidates and and plunged the country back into civil war. The case of Côte d’Ivoire is not an isolated one; the ambiguous effect of post- conflict elections is an issue of debate for scholars and practitioners since the 1990s. Whereas some post-conflict elections indeed consolidate peace in a post-conflict coun- try, others, like in Côte d’Ivoire, lead to the resurgence of violence and civil war.

This dissertation analyses the factors which allowed for the post-conflict election in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 to ruin the country’s peace process. The analysis is based on the conceptual framework of Höglund et al., which brings together most of the major find- ings about post-conflict elections that have emerged in academic literature so far. The dissertation argues that a whole range of conflict-generating factors, including the con- tinuity of the major political actors, unfavourable institutional circumstances and the particularly high stakes of the election, were present. These factors influenced  and reinforced each other and ultimately created an unstable, high-explosive environment for the elections.

In this installment of the Africa Round-Up, I cover recent developments in Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan. Be sure to check it out!

Nigeria
As fuel prices skyrocketed after a cut in subsidies, Lagos and other cities were hit by huge protests. At least one protester died after being shot by police, but in most cases the marches remained peaceful. The price of petrol more than doubled at the pump after the government phased out a $8-billion subsidy at the beginning of this year. Despite being one of the world’s largest crude oil producers for many years now, Nigeria still has to import refined petroleum products, as it only has very limited refining capacities inside the country.

Meanwhile, the north of the country saw some of the worst violence ever over Christmas, when the terror group Boko Haram bombed churches and attacked security forces, leavingscores of people dead. President Goodluck Jonathan reacted by declaring an indefinite state of emergency in the northern states, while several Christian groups threatened toretaliate against future attacks. Despite heavy-handed efforts of the security services over the last few years, Boko Haram has been able to constantly launch more sophisticated attacks. While a new security doctrine now came into effect, which “puts security of Nigerians first,” it can be doubted that the authorities will be able to reduce the threat posed by religious extremism if they do not tackle the underlying grievances of the mostly young men who sympathize and fight for Boko Haram.

Find the complete round-up here.

There is a good post over at habanahaba on western journalism and writing about Africa. Another really good one is here at afrolens. Both posts make excellent points about how “ragtag journalism” produces stereotypes of an Africa ravaged by hunger, underdevelopment and murderous militiamen. I largely agree with both of them, but I would like to add to points to the debate:

1. It is true that many western journalists come to Africa (and not only the conflict zones) without the proper journalistic training and experience that these positions require. But I think what is even more dramatic, is the lack of historical and social knowledge that many media professionals have. I know few journalists, who have rigourously studied Africa before they start reporting on it. And let’s face it: once you start reporting and the deadlines come up, very few will strife to acquire the background knowledge that would be necessary to transform a “heart of darkness” story into an enlightening piece of writing.

2. While I agree that local perspectives are extremely important (and hence local journalists should be valued much more than they currently are), one should not forget the other side of the story: the reader. Your post kinda leaves the impression that all reporting should be left to the locals. I think that this would be problematic as well, as a good story needs to know its readers to have a real impact. While Somali journalists with will find it easier to get to the issues that really matter, they will find it extremely hard to make a story out of that, which matters for – let’s say – Germans, French or US people.

As there are very few people out there that really are “at home” in two cultures AND are good writers, I think the solution to this problem would be twofold: more preparation and more cooperation. Journalists from both cultural backgrounds should strive to gain a real understanding of the social mechanisms and history of the society they report on/to. And at the same time, they should seek as much cooperation from local professionals as they can get.

On the day of the Congolese elections, @kambale tweeted

Congo has half its population under 18 (more than 30 million). The youth wants to have a say in the decision-making process!

and I thought to myself: “The guy is right!” In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), over 40% of the population is younger than 15! I did not find any “younger than 18″ figures, but I think it is safe to say that depending on the country, another 10-20% of the population fall into this bracket. The consequence of this is that even if we assume that elections are free and fair, only a minority of Africans can take part in the political decision making process, as virtually every country has a legal voting age of 18 or above.

But lowering the voting age is not only important from a perspective of democracy theory. There are also quite practical benefits, that would come along with an overall younger voter population. One of these would be a higher level of voter education.

Over the last ten years, the completion rate of primary school in SSA jumped to 65%, up by 15 percentage points. Teenagers and young adults are more likely to be able to read and write than their parents, which makes it easier for them to inform themselves about the programs and goals of parties and politicians. They do not rely on public speeches or local authorities to tell them who they should vote for, but can use the internet and newspapers to make up their mind. This offers the chance to move African politics away from the overwhelming focus on group membership to debates about issues.

But young people – especially in Africa – have not only the capability to participate in political decision making processes, they also have the moral right, as most problems that developing nations face confront especially the young members of society. Destruction of ecosystems, limited expenditure for education, high unemployment rates and rigid social structures all disproportionally affect the chances of young people to have a successful and happy life.

Adding to this is the fact that most African societies expect teens to bear high responsibility from a young age. They are expected to contribute to the family income, marry and start a family at a young age and take up arms to protect the security and interests of their group. It is the basic foundation of democracy, that rights and duties go hand in hand (“No taxation without representation”). Why should this be different when it comes to the question of voting age?

One may raise the question, if teenagers can show the necessary responsibility needed to make good use of the power to vote. But if one follows this argument to the end, we would have to introduce an upper limit to the voting age as well – and maybe ban all men from voting. After all, probably over 90% of autocratic rulers are at least 55 years of age and virtually all are male. Especially in Africa and in the light of the Arab Spring the argument can be made, that older generations in general are more likely to support the old élite in fear of loosing their status.

Unlike other questions of social participation the issue of the voting age is easy to rectify: just introduce legislation to lower the age from 18 to 16, 15 or even 14. Which age exactly should be debated for each society individually, based on the specific demographics and cultural considerations.

What do you think? Would a lower voting age make sense in your country and what would be the ideal age?

I recently published a critique of an article on GOOD, which touted the sale of ridiculously expensive jewellery to finance buy-up programs for guns in Central Africa (especially the DR Congo). Others seem to have a problem with “gun trafficking for good” as well, so GOOD obviously felt the need to respond. They did this yesterday, by giving the founders (Peter Thum and John Zapolski) of Fonderie 47, the company that is behind the project, a chance to address the issues raised by the commentators. I am still not convinced.

Thum and Zapolski start out by claiming that even if Fonderie 47 injects money into the weapons trade in Africa, people will find it hard to replace their guns, because new ones would cost at least $340 more on the international market than Fonderie 47 pays for the old African ones. They do not give any references as to where they got their numbers from, but it doesn’t really matter, because their argument is wrong anyway. It relies on the assumption that merchants selling guns in Eastern Congo have the same cost of procurement as, say, the government of Congo.

If you want to buy a new gun in Eastern Congo, you don’t ring up an international weapons dealer. You talk to the friend of your uncle, who is a (badly paid) officer in the national army. For this officer, the costs of selling government guns to you is of course not what the government originally paid for them. Instead, he has just to bribe a few fellow officers and officials and factor in a profit margin for himself. In a country, where the national income per capita (adjusted for purchasing power) is $320, the $230 Fonderie 47 seems to pay locals in return for their guns is going to buy them quite a few new ones.

The GOOD article then goes into details on how Fonderie 47 works to get the weapons. This bit is a bit confusing, but I take that Fonderie 47 at least partly destroys weapons that have already been collected (by the UN or the government) and which lie around waiting to be destroyed:

If the NGOs that governments hire to destroy these weapons don’t have the resources to do it, they wait around for the next group of people to come take them. Destroying them eliminates that possibility, making the reemergence of conflict more costly.

In this case it seems like Fonderie 47 is not buying the guns, but merely covers the costs of destroying them (providing labour and machines). That is actually a completely different approach from buying guns and a strategy that finds my approval. I ask myself, why Fonderie 47 does not simply ditch the whole gun running thing they have going on and concentrate their resources on projects of this (uncontroversial) type.

I am bit unsatisfied with the GOOD article on the whole, as it does not address any of the following questions: Is consumerism really a good way to tackle problems? Are the “leaders” who Fonderie 47 wants to reach with these exclusive pieces of jewellery really the right target group, or are they (and their money) not part of the problem? Are the guns really the source of conflict in Eastern Congo and not merely a symptom?

Don’t get me wrong, I am convinced that disarmament is an important part of peacebuilding. But doing disarmament right is probably one of the most complicated things you can do and it is certainly not “conflict prevention” (if arms are there and are used, you already have conflict). Fonderie 47 clearly does not appreciate these problems.

This time, I cover recent conflict developments in the DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, the Sahel region and Somalia.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Monday saw the first presidential and parliamentary elections since 2006 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Stakes were high in the single-round elections, with eight presidential and 18,000 parliamentary candidates on the ballots. The run-up towards election day was tense, with frequent clashes between security forces and supporters of UDPS candidate Étienne Tshisekedi in urban centers. On the final campaign weekend alone, up to 10 people died in the capital of Kinshasa.

[…]

Read the rest here.

Scuffles broke out at various polling stations (photo: Azad Essa/Al Jazeera)

by Peter Dörrie

The easy part of the elections in the DR Congo is over. The voting day was chaotic, marred by violence and irregularities, as was the run-up to the elections. But only after the last ballot was cast, the really dangerous part of the elections began.

Even if there is little or none tampering with the vote counting process – which can be doubted – the loosing parties will cry foul. And most impartial observers will agree with them, that the campaign and election process was hardly a level playing field.

The government of president Kabila left little to chance. First the electoral law was changed to avoid a situation like in Ivory Coast, were the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo saw himself beaten by his challenger in a tense run-off round, that resulted in a resurgence of the civil war and ousted him from power. In the DR Congo, there is no run-off round any more, the winner of the simple majority in the first round takes it all.

There are also widespread allegations of ballot-box stuffing, phantom polling stations and of hundrets of thousands of fake names on voter lists, which were not presented in public in many places.

The opposition, especially the supporters of long-time opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi, will take these points up with gusto. Tshisekedi, a 78 year old politician who confronted every Congolese regime starting with Mobutu, has already declared himself winner days before the election even started and seems to be bend on seeking the ultimate confrontation with the current regime. His supporters already have repeatedly clashed with security forces, especially in Kinshasa.

While this opposition has little in terms of military supplies and structures, they could turn most urban centres of the country into war zones. Make no mistake: the security forces have the capacity to regain control pretty quickly, except maybe in the areas (like the Kivus) were they are weak anyway. But the ensuing conflict would be very bloody and filled with atrocities.

Should this happen, there is little hope that the West would intervene. Both the US and the EU have reduced their commitment since the elections in 2006, when a German-French mission patrolled the streets of Kinshasa. There is a UN mission in the country – wit a relatively robust mandate to protect civilians – and it would do their best to stem the flow of violence, but MONUSCO is already unable to effectively police the vast east of the country, where in many places militias still rule the ground, or put an end to the continuing incursions of the LRA in the north-east. Should both the opposition and the government be willing to slug it out on the streets, there is little the UN could do about it.

The only way a violent turn of the events could be avoided, is if one of the actors involved takes the responsible decision to back down and try to resolve their issues by non-violent means. This could be either the opposition, who could take a cue from the Arab Spring and start a non-violent protest movement. While deaths and injuries are virtually guaranteed by taking this path as well (over 800 people died in Egypt since January), the potential of escalation would be heavily reduced.

Or the government (maybe under pressure from the UN and other international partners) acknowledges the concerns of the opposition and finds a way to include them into the political process.

In all of these cases, the international community carries a great responsibility. It is up to the UN, the EU, the US and last but certainly not least the African states to exert pressure on their various allies inside Congo to reduce the potential for conflict. Especially the position of other African governments gives some hope this time around, as many of them (like South Africa) have huge economic interests in the DR Congo, which could be put into jeopardy, if the country sinks into chaos again.

Development aid wonks from around the world will converge in the South Korean city of Busan the coming week, to attend the Fourth High Level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness. In the run up to this event, keyboards around the world run hot, as important people hammer out op-eds and articles. On of these keyboards obviously belonged to former prime minister Tony Blair.

Mr. Blair published his optimistically titled “The end of foreign aid” in the Washington Post today. The piece is remarkable, but not so much for its innovative thinking (which is limited). Instead, it is remarkable that the spectre of “Growth”, more precisely “Economic Growth” still seems to dominate much of the development discourse.

“while the West has experienced a decade of sluggish growth, emerging economies have taken up the slack […]”.

“Development”, the reader is told, depends on (you guessed it) “growth”. While governance also features quite a bit in Tony Blairs rhetoric (he is the founder of the Africa Governance Initiative after all), it seems to so uniquely important only because he sees it as a prerequisite to attain acceptable growth rates.

It is time for a new paradigm

Now, I don’t dispute the need for growth in many developing nations. You need to have a cake to be able to distribute it. What I question is the logic that seems to be so popular with people like Mr. Blair, that if we generate growth, the rest will fall more or less into place on its own. This argument is used to elevate growth creation to the top of every agenda.

To my best knowledge, there is little evidence that would suggest that the primacy of growth holds true in the real world though. Rather, examples like Nigeria (where the well-being of a great part of the population is arguably very limited despite its “middle-income” status) suggest, that the growth on its own has little influence on what most people around the world would qualify as “development”.

Instead of focussing so much attention and resources on “growth” it would make indefinitely more sense to choose another variable. Which one is of course the topic of an intense debate and maybe the subject of a future post on this blog, but from the top of my head I would argue that “well-being”, “human security” and “equality” (complicated as these terms are) would be all better suited to serve as paradigms for development than “economic growth”.

Hi everybody! We have just finished moving Good Developments from Posterous to WordPress.com and are quite happy to be here. We hope you continue to enjoy our posts.

Best, Katrin and Peter