HaProzdor

Matzos because of Haste

2011-01-08T19:51:00.000-05:00

At seudah shlishis today, a friend of mine asked why the reason given for Bnei Yisroel taking matzos with them is the lack of time necessary for the bread to rise brought about by the haste in departing, given the issur chametz. I tried to answer based on the Mishnah in the 9th perek of Pesachim (96), which states that Pesach Mitzrayim did not have the issur chametz kol shiv'a that Pesach l'Doros has, but forgot the conclusion of the gemara that aligns this mishnah with a drash of R' Yosei haGelili, that the issur still extended the entire first day.

After the fact, I wondered if there was any significance to the fact that the ba'al hashmu'ah of that (apparently accepted) shita is R' Yosei haGelili, who also holds by the unaccepted shita that there's no issur hana'ah by chametz at all (28b), so that in his mouth, the din would only be referring to an issur achila that spanned the first day, but it seems more likely that when the rabbanan accepted this drash, they interpreted it k'shitasam that even the issur hana'ah would have existed on the entire first day. At any rate, RYhG is coming to be meikil, so that even if we were to reduce the scope of his drasha, it would not achieve the desired result.

Although the drash of RYhG is based on the passuk "v'Lo yei'acheil chameitz", we hold like Chizkiyah (21b), who reads this passuk as referring to an issur hana'ah, so there doesn't seem to be a way out on that path, either.

To sum, then, it seems clear that there was an issur of owning chametz on the night of 15 Nissan until the end of the day. That being the case, why could we not say that the reason for their not carrying chametz with them was because of the issur, rather than using the practical reason of the haste that the passuk specifies?

R' Yitzchok Dovid Frankel asks a related question in Machat Shel Yad, and develops the idea that chipazon was an intrinsic part of Yetzias Mitzrayim, so that despite their ability to avoid the rush by anticipating the Yetziah earlier that day, there was a necessity that chipazon be associated with Yetzias Mitzrayim, based on HaShem's haste in taking us out at exactly the necessary time. This being the case, perhaps this could also serve as a reason for the Torah's pragmatic rationale for the matzos, rather than the latent halachic rationale.

Shtei HaLechem

2009-05-30T22:16:00.004-05:00

This afternoon, I spoke before mincha at the shul of my future father-in-law. The following is a brief summary of my remarks.

Shavu'os is the chag which is least obviously associated with any particular mitzvah. Looking at the pesukim, though, two of the three parshiyos on the chag discuss the shtei halechem, the "minchah chadashah" that was the first korban offered from the new wheat crop in the Beis HaMikdash. There are several interesting aspects to this korban. Firstly, it's one of the only instances (the korban todah being the other) in which chametz is incorporated into the avodah of the mikdash. Besides the mussafim of Shavu'os that are offered on the same day as the shtei halachem, the loaves also carry with them their own set of associated animal offerings, including 2 lambs that are offered as public sh'lamim, zivchei shalmei tzibbur, a category that has no other examples. I'd like to explore several different derachim to understand the significance of this mitzvah to Shavu'os.

The Ramban, picking up on the commonality of the usage of chametz, suggests that the shtei halachem is merely a special, communal, form of the korban todah, offered as thanksgiving for a successful agricultural season, the focal point of which is the wheat harvest that occurs around this season. He notes further that, although the avodas ha-mikdash usually eschews the extreme forms of gevurah and chesed represented by chametz and dvash, akin to ma'aseh bereishis that was accomplished through a fusion of gevurah and chesed, the korban todah (and, I suppose the bikkurim) is an exception to this rule, and it is for this reason that Chazal say that all korbanos will be beteilim during yemos ha-mashiach besides the korban todah. V'ha-maskil yavin, which is why I don't.

The Netziv, in Ha'amek Davar starts with a similar idea, but goes in the opposite direction. From Amos 4:5-8, he learns out the existence of an ancient custom to offer korbanos todah on Sukkos as a zechus for sufficient rain. So, too, he suggests that the shtei halechem serve as a communal todah to serve as a zechus against bad winds and bad dews. The Netziv's opinion can be supported by the fact that the shnei kevasim of the shtei halechem were the single korban that was hunaf both when they were alive and when they were shechted, and, in several places in Shas, the idea is expressed that the purpose of tenufah is precisely to prevent bad winds and bad dews.

The Kli Yakar finds in the minchah chadashah of the shtei halechem an allusion to matan torah, which must be viewed as a continually self-renewing event, rather than a delimited episode of our history (indeed, for this reason, the commemoration of matan torah is never openly limited to a single day within the torah). This being the case, the inclusion of chametz in the shtei halechem is representative of the yetzer hara, which bears a close relationship to kabalas hatorah in two senses. Firstly, the Torah serves as an antidote against the yetzer hara, so that by including chametz in this korban, we are indicating our security in the face of this threat. Additionally, the yetzer hara serves as the raison d'etre of matan torah, as per Moshe's argument against the mal'achei ha-shareis when he went up to Har Sinai, as, without a yetzer hara, one has no need for the mitzvos of the Torah.

R' Zalman Sorotzkin in Oznayim LaTorah, also sees an allusion to Matan Torah in the shift from the barley korban of the minchas omer to the wheat korban of the shtei halachem, in addition to the inclusion of shalmei tzibbur in the korban. The consumption of wheat is a distinction between humans and animals, while the consumption of meat is representative of an additional spiritual level, as per the proscription against an am ha-aretz eating meat. For this reason, the shtei halechem represents the humanizing process that we underwent through matan torah.

To summarize:

Ramban: Korban todah for past, safe extremism
Netziv: Korban todah for future, prevention of bad winds and dews
Kli Yakar: Matan Torah and the yetzer hara
R' Sorotzkin: Matan Torah and humanization

Mazel Tov!

2009-05-24T23:56:00.003-05:00

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The Parameters of the Mitzvah of Sefiras Ha-Omer

2009-05-23T22:54:00.002-05:00

There are two major machlekos rishonim that come up in discussions of the parameters of the mitzvah of sefiras ha-omer. The first machlokes is whether sefiras ha-omer is one mitzvah or 49 mitzvos. In this machlokes, Tosefos, the Rosh and the Shibbelei HaLeket hold that each night is its own mitzvah, while the Behag holds that the entire 49-day period constitutes one long mitzvah. The second machlokes is whether one can fulfill the mitzvah of sefirah during the daytime. In this machlokes, the Rambam and the Behag allow a person to count by day, while Tosefos and the Shibbelei HaLeket hold that if he does so, he is not yotzei (the Rosh advises him to count without a bracha). The popular practice is to be machmir in both machlekos individually by counting without a bracha, if necessary. The kula at the conjunction of the two (i.e., relying on a daytime counting to continue a 49-day count) is, at first glance, sefeik sefeika, but is also the result of either of the opposing combinations of shittos of Tosefos/Shibbelei HaLeket and the Behag.

Mori v'rabbi HaRav Shlomo Wahrman, in Oros HaPesach (78), suggests that the two machlekos are connected, based on a Meiri in Rosh HaShanah (6a). The Meiri explains the apparent contradiction between bal te'acheir (delaying the offering of a neder), in which he's oveir every day on which he is delinquent, and bal talin (delaying the consumption of said korban), in which he's oveir only once, by noting that for the latter issur, the time of the consumption of a korban is a single uninterrupted period, while for the former issur, the time for the offering of a korban is interrupted by the end of each day. Hence, while he's oveir on each new day on bal te'acheir when the issur becomes relevant again, the issur of bal talin never loses its relevancy, so that once he's oveir immediately following the deadline of the korban's consumption, he never incurs any additional violations.

So, too, the Behag holds that the permitted time for counting the omer is not interrupted by nightfall. Hence, it can be viewed as being one long mitzvah, whose interruption by a missed day breaks it up. Tosefos and the Shibbelei HaLeket, on the other hand, hold that there are 49 distinct periods for the performance of the mitzvah of sefiras ha-omer, and each is independent of the others.

Tribal Encampments

2009-05-22T13:02:00.003-05:00

The beginning of this week's parsha discusses the arrangement of the shevatim as they encamped in the midbar, following the census that was taken in the second year of their sojourning. Why is it that this arrangement of the tribes was first set up in the second year of their travels, rather than immediately following Yetzias Mitzrayim?

R' Yaakov Kamenetsky notes in Emes L'Yaakov that the division of the nation into tribal camps highlighted the different skills and special characteristics that made each tribe unique and that were essential to the functioning of the nation as a whole. However, such a division carried with it the danger of encouraging a tribalism that could ultimately divide the people. Hence, the tribal camps were not set in place until the Mishkan was built, which, by standing in the middle of the camp, served as a reminder that the tribes, despite their differences, all have the same focus to their activities, and should find unity in this, as opposed to separation.

One Small Flask

2008-12-25T01:02:00.003-05:00

A poster on a discussion list asked why the flask of oil of the neis of chanukah is referred to as a kad katan, being that the volume of 3.5 log that was necessary to fill the 7 lamps of the menorah each night is approximately equal to 1.5 L, hardly a small k'li. One respondent suggested that on an entire mountaintop, a soda bottle would, indeed, be considered small and easy to miss.

I don't understand the basis for this question, as Shabbos 21b (as well as Meg. Ta'anis) merely refers to it as a "pach", with no adjective attached to it.

Is there an alternative source on the matter (besides our collective memories of kindergarten)?

From the Inbox...

2008-12-18T15:38:00.000-05:00

FWD: TERRIBLE TRAGEDY!

A 17 yr old bucher from Israel was kidnapped by arabs. pls B mispalel 4 "YOSEF ben ROCHEL". please fwd to 10 people don't break the[...]

[I received the text last night, but didn't "get" it until a little while ago. Funny, I suppose, but still remarkably bad taste in the current environment.]

The Use of a Shalsheles

2008-12-01T14:03:00.004-05:00

One of the rarest of the ta'amei ha-mikra used in Tanach is the Shalsheles. Shalshelaos[1] are used in only seven places in the 21 books of Tanach[2] (excluding the "Sifrei Emet" - Iyov, Mishlei, and Tehillim - which use a different system). Someone on a discussion list that I subscribe to asked why it is that all 7 instances are on the first word of a passuk. Answering this question requires a very brief summary of the use of ta'amei hamikra in the 21 books of Tanach.[3]

Despite the interesting derashos that are often brought on ta'amei ha-mikra[4], their primary purpose is the rather prosaic one of providing punctuation to the pesukim, in order to aid in their translation by indicating which modifiers are connected to which clauses.

Most pesukim are divided into two parts, each of which expresses a complete thought. The first part is concluded with an Esnachta, while the latter is concluded with a Siluk (colloquially known as a "Sof-Pasuk"). These two te'amim are the primary disjunctive te'amim, which indicate the primary breaks in the reading of the passuk.

Each of these two parts are subdivided into additional sections using te'amim, depending on their structure:

The secondary disjunctive te'amim, which are used to subdivide primary phrases in a passuk, are zakeif[5], tipecha (which is always the last disjunctive ta'am before a primary disjunctive ta'am), segol (which is often used at the head of a string of secondary disjunctive te'amim, more commonly as the string gets longer), and shalsheles (which I'll discuss at the end).

The tertiary disjunctive te'amim, which are used to subdivide secondary phrases within a passuk, are pashta (and its variant, y'tiv), zarka, revi'a[6], and t'vir[7].

The quaternary disjunctive te'amim, which are used to subdivide tertiary (or higher degree) phrases within a passuk, are geresh (aka azla-geresh), gershayim (which replaces geresh under situations that escape my memory), munach l'garmeih (the one that has a vertical bar that looks like a p'sik but isn't immediately following, which is associated with revi'a), pazeir, telisha gedolah, and karnei fara.

The conjunctive te'amim, which do not indicate breaks but rather flow directly into an immediate or remote disjunctive ta'am, are kadma, mahpach, munach, meircha, meircha chefulah, darga (associated with tevir), telisha ketanah, yerach ben yomo (associated with karnei farah).

Each terminal-level phrase will contain in it one disjunctive ta'am and any number (including zero) of preceding conjunctive te'amim.

If a secondary phrase has only two words in it, it may be subdivided into a tertiary phrase (e.g., pashta-zakeif) or it may not be (e.g., munach-zakeif, often incorrectly referred to as zakeif katon). If a secondary phrase has only one word in it, it, of course, cannot be subdivided. The same goes for any level of division.

If a zakeif-terminated secondary phrase has only one word in it, the zakeif-katon that is usually used will be converted into a zakeif-gadol. If a segol-terminated phrase has only one word in it, the segol will be converted into a shalsheles.

Hence, given that segolim are only used at the head of a chain of secondary phrases, and that the segol is replaced with a shalsheles only when this initial secondary phrase contains in it only a single word, it follows logically that a shalsheles can only fall on the first word of a passuk.

The question remains why, within minhag Ashkenaz[8], the musically simple segol is converted into what sounds like a super-duper pazeir.

[1] Shalshelos in Hebrew, but most of the te'amim have Aramaic names.
[2] Bereishis 19:16, 24:12, 39:8; Vayikra 8:19; Yeshaya 13:8; Amos 1:2; Ezra 5:15
[3] Summarized from Joshua Jacobson's _Chanting the Hebrew Bible: The Art of Cantillation_.
[4] See this article by R' Mois Navon for an example of such a drasha on the shalsheles. And see this post of mine regarding this phenomenon.
[5] A zakeif katon is solely the colon that appears on top of a word, not the combination of that ta'am with the right angle that sometime appears below a previous word, which is actually a munach.
[6] Not revi'i, fourth, but revi'a, the Aramaic cognate of roveitz, crouching, indicating its pausal role.
[7] Yes, this means that in a t'vir-tipecha combination, there should be a longer break following the tipecha than preceding it.
[8] In a comment on my above cited post, R' Joshua Maroof noted that in the Yerushalmi style of leining, the shalsheles is a very short note, as would be more expected.

Eliezer's Role

2008-11-21T12:31:00.004-05:00

Eliezer is referred to by two different titles in the middle section of this week's sedra. Starting in passuk 2, he is referred to as an "eved". This description persists until passuk 21, while Rivkah is running back and forth from the well to draw water for Eliezer's camels, at which point Eliezer is suddenly transformed into an "ish". This latter epithet continues until passuk 52, following Lavan and Besuel's acceptance of Eliezer's request, where he reverts to an "eved", by which title he is called until the end of the section (with two exceptions). What causes the change and its reversal?

Rashi comments on the usage of the chaseir form of the word "ulai" in passuk 39, which can be read as "eilai", that Eliezer had harbored a desire that Avraham would want to marry Yitzchak to his own daughter, until Avraham noted that such a match could not work, as Yitzchak was blessed and the daughter of the Canaanite Eliezer was accursed. This being the case, why is ulai only written chaseir in Eliezer's retelling of the episode, while in the original version of the episode as it was occurring, the word ulai is spelled malei?

The Maggid MiDubna makes an additional observation on this passuk. Eliezer's inclusion of this detail in his retelling of the story is somewhat strange. The implication that Eliezer was concerned that a family would not want to marry their daughter to Yitzchak implies that there was something wrong with him that justified this concern. Why would Eliezer have attempted to sabotage his mission in this manner?

R' Yaakov Kaminetsky answers these questions by citing Bereishis Rabbah 60:7, which states that, although Eliezer was originally accursed, he became blessed as a result of his faithful service to Avraham, as seen from Lavan's referring to Eliezer as "b'ruch HaShem". At this point, he became worthy of the title "ish", representing his departure from his accursed servile character.

Although Eliezer originally accepted Avraham's explanation as to why his daughter was unfit to marry Yitzchak, once he had become blessed, the reason no longer applied. Hence, he again sought a pretext to marry his daughter off to Yitzchak, and sought to sabotage his mission in this manner. Once he did this, though, he no longer was selflessly fulfilling Avraham's instructions, so he lost his briefly elevated status, reverting to an eved.

This explanation presents a catch-22 that illustrates an important idea in a person's avodah. On Nedarim 55a, Rava expounds the conclusion of the shira of the well to describe the progress of a person's growth. "Umi-midbar matanah" - If a person makes himself like a wilderness, humbly teaching Torah to all, he merits that the Torah is given to him as a gift, until he reaches "Nachaliel", the state at which he is a possession of HaShem, and "Bamos", spiritual heights. However, "Mi-Bamos Ha-Gai" - if he becomes prideful, HaShem lowers him. It has been observed that it is better to be a rasha who recognizes that he's a rasha, rather than a tzaddik who recognizes that he's a tzaddik, as the former recognizes the imperative that he change his ways, while the latter will slip into complacency and lose his high level, as did Eliezer.

___

Rashi cites the medrash which explains the great length that the Torah devotes to Eliezer's blow-by-blow description of his actions compared to the numerous areas of halacha that are built upon a single passuk by noting that the conversation of the servants of the fathers is more precious than the teachings of the children. The Torah is not merely a skeleton of dry halachos, but rather also includes attitudes and ideas that can only be learned from close observation of role models. This is one of the primary roles of this sefer, as well as of NaCh. If the Torah never leaves the Beis Medrash, it is of no use.

The First Ramban

2008-10-23T09:18:00.003-05:00

One of the most well-known comments of Rashi is the first one that he makes on Chumash in the name of R' Yitzchak, regarding why HaShem saw fit to begin the Torah with Sefer Bereishis, rather than immediately jumping to the section that discusses the mitzvos that were given to Israel as a nation, which begins with the mitzvah of kiddush ha-chodesh. He answers by citing the passuk from Yeshaya of "Ko'ach ma'asav higid l'amo la-seis lahem nachlas goyim" - "He told the power of His actions to His nation in order to give them the inheritance of nations." In order that the Jews could respond to the complaints of the nations that they had stolen the land from the Canaanites, it was essential that they would have a grasp of the history of the world, so that they would understand that, as the Creator of the world, HaShem had the right to give the different portions of land to whomever he saw fit, and to replace one nation with another over time.

The Ramban asks what seems to be a fundamental question. How could R' Yitzchak countenance the idea that the episode of ma'aseh bereishis could be left out of the Torah? The knowledge that HaShem created the world is one of the principal foundations of Judaism that everything else rests upon. If one lacks this singular point, he possesses nothing.

He answers that the entire first sedra is so filled with deep secrets and allusions that its simple reading is nigh useless in understanding anything about the creation of the world. Rather, everything that we know about the creation of the world is founded in our Oral Tradition. Being that the common people cannot properly understand the method of the creation of the world even with P' Bereishis in place, R' Yitzchak could validly ask why we need it, to which he responded that the illustrated path of history is the primary purpose of the sedra (and the book), not the specific mechanism through which this history unfolded.

Atzeres

2008-10-23T09:10:00.003-05:00

Why is the 8th day of Sukkos referred to as an "Atzeres", a stoppage?

The Netziv in Ha'amek Davar explains that the primary purpose of the mitzvah of aliyah l'regel is to become inspired by seeing the function of the Beis HaMikdash up close and coming in contact with the kohanim and the levi'im, who served an educational role within the nation. On Sukkos, it is easy to lose sight of this greater goal within the numerous special mitzvos and observances of the week - sukkah, lulav, aravah, and simchas beis ha-sho'eiva. On the 8th day, though, all of these mitzvos cease, and a person is able to stop and think deeply about everything that he's seen over the course of the week and to take out of it specific lessons and a general commitment to improve his avodah that will last through the entire year.

The Structure of Adon Olam

2008-10-12T21:42:00.004-05:00

I was recently encouraged to look closely at the piyut of Adon Olam. Despite having said it since kindergarten, I never realized until now that I had no idea what it was about as a complete entity (beyond the first line).

The first three lines form a set expressing HaShem's malchus in the past, present, and future - His activity (malach) prior to Creation, His status (melech) at the time of Creation, and the acknowledgement of His continued activity (yimloch) following the destruction of all Creation.

The fourth line appears to parallel the chronology of the first three, focusing on HaShem's eternal existence rather than His eternal kingship. At first glance, this seems to be logically inverted, as kingship is usually built upon the premise of existence. However, several midrashim (e.g., heavenly bodies, burning castle) imply that Avraham's knowledge of HaShem's malchus was, indeed, the prerequisite to his recognition of His metzius, mostly likely due to an inability to directly and unambiguously experience HaShem (save through prophecy, which only came later).

The fifth line expresses Yichud HaShem - an infinity orthogonal to that of the previous stich.

The sixth line seems to be similar to the fourth line in its chronological dimensionality, although utilizing the terminology of reishis and tachlis, which may be acknowledgements of HaShem's elevation over causation - that nothing causes Him and that He is independent of His effects (I'm not sure if my understanding of tachlis is correct).

Hence, once HaShem's complete malchus is established in lines 1-3, one can build upon this foundation the logical conclusions that He exists, that He is unique (as two kings cannot share a crown), and that He is completely independent (being that He is stronger than any other force).

At this point, the piyut changes its focus from a transcendental God to a personal One.

Lines 7 and 8 express that HaShem is Keili, Go'ali, Tzur chevli, Nisi, M'nusi, and M'nas kosi, which are all general concepts describing HaShem's interactions with us that are predicated on the postulates of lines 5 and 6.

Finally, lines 9 and 10 express a final thought, that every night I place my spirit in the stewardship of HaShem, with the fearless expectation that I shall again awaken, a confidence that follows from the postulates of lines 7 and 8.

It is interesting that we say this piyut upon waking up in the morning (in addition to sundry other points of the day), when we are as distant as possible from our future need to rely on HaShem in this manner, but perhaps it is precisely then that we need to remind ourselves of such as a means of influencing our actions over the course of the day.

SheHechiyyanu on a New Fruit

2008-09-04T19:11:00.005-05:00

There's a popular perception - which often comes into play on the second night of Rosh HaShanah - that one says a SheHechiyyanu on any fruit that one has not eaten in a year (however one defines such). I'm not sure where this idea comes from.

The Shulchan Aruch (OCh 225:6) states that any fruit that does not newly come into season each year (or part thereof), even if one has not eaten from it for a long time, does not carry with it the bracha of SheHechiyanu. Piskei Teshuvos (225:17-18) lists several rules governing the bracha on a new fruit:

- One does not say a SheHechiyyanu on a fruit, vegetable, or legume (!) that grows during all seasons of the year, even if it was seasonal until only modern times, but has now had its season extended through advanced technology, such as greenhouses, and is thus available in the market year-round, even if sometimes it is more expensive or uncommon.

- Seasonal fruits and vegetables that are stored in refrigerated containers, and that can thereby be acquired in the market year-round, are ineligible for the bracha of SheHechiyyanu, unless the fresh fruit that is available only during part of the year is clearly superior in taste or appearance than the refrigerated.

- One does not say the bracha on fruit that is pickled, preserved, or otherwise processed in any way through which it would not be recognizable that the fruit came from the new crop.

- Seasonal fruits that are out-of-season in one country but are imported from another country in which the fruits are now in-season are eligible for the bracha if 30 days have passed since he last ate this species of fruit. However, if the overall availability is such that the fruit is available throughout the year with no interruption, it has the same status as an aseasonal fruit.

These regulations would appear to make saying the bracha of SheHechiyyanu on a fruit more complicated.

Shim'on HaAmsuni

2008-08-17T10:59:00.003-05:00

Pesachim 22b (et. al.), in describing a tanna who recanted his method of expounding all instances of the preposition es in the Torah upon reaching the passuk describing fear of HaShem, "Es HaShem Elokecha tira", provides two versions of his name, Shim'on HaAmsuni and Nechemiah haAmsuni. Josh W. pointed out to me some months back that a similar sugya in the Yerushalmi (Y. Sotah. 25b) refers to him as only Nechemiah, while also arguing that the similar letters that appear in Shim'on and Amsun may suggest that the latter version may have arisen from a copying mistake.

Encyclopedia l'Chachmei HaTalmud v-ha-Geonim identifies Nechemiah haAmsuni with Nachum Ish Gamzu. This is supported by the close phonetic similarity between the two names, their both being well-known for darshening all the esin in the Torah, and the fact that NIG is known to be a rebbe of R' Akiva, who also plays a role in in the NhA story. This latter being the case, the parallel sugya in the Yerushalmi, which calls NhA a talmid of R' Akiva, is curious (and a little remniscent of a similar set of sugyos which conflict over whether R' Shimon ben Yochai was the father-in-law or the son-in-law of R' Pinchas ben Yair - I recall hearing a suggestion that there were two men of the same, latter, name).

On the other hand, R' Chaim Vital passes down separate mesoros from the Arizal regarding where each of NIG and NhA are buried. According to Sha'ar HaGilgulim, Hakdama 37 (cited in HaMekomos HaKedoshim, by R' Yechiel Mechal Stern), NIG is buried in Tzfas[1], while Nechemia haAmsuni is buried near Parod, approximately 10 miles south of Meron.

[1] At the entrance to Tzfas, continue on R. HaPalmach until the intersection, turn right on R. HaNasi, and then left on R. Gamzu. The marker is approximately 100 meters down.

The drasha of Shim'on HaAmsuni

2008-08-17T10:24:00.003-05:00

Pesachim 22b (et.al.) relates that Shim'on HaAmsuni used to expound upon every instance of the preposition "es" in the Torah as a means of including something beyond the simple reading of the verse. However, once he arrived at the passuk in this past week's parsha which begins "Es HaShem Elokecha tira", the commandment to fear HaShem, he recanted this entire method of learning, as how is it possible for anything else to be the object of a fear that is in any way analogous to that of God? Eventually, R' Akiva stood up to defend Shim'on HaAmsuni's original derech, arguing that fear of talmidei chachamim can be included by this inclusory exposition.

Why was this passuk is the first one that gave Shim'on HaAmsuni trouble? A few pesukim earlier, we are presented with the command to love HaShem, "V'ahavta es HaShem Elokecha". How is it possible to compare any other form of love to the love that we are required to have for HaShem?

The Torah Temimah argues that it is not possible that Shim'on HaAmsuni did not know the drasha suggested by R' Akiva, as there is a mishnah in Avos which clearly states that one's fear of his teacher should be akin to his fear of Heaven (uMora rabbach k'mora Shamayim). Rather, the objection of Shim'on HaAmsuni was to the continuation of the passuk, the commandment of prayer (v'Oso sa'avod), which would be anathema to Judaism were it to be applied to even talmidei chachamim, while R' Akiva held that the interceding direct object serves to split the two verbs, so that only yir'ah, not avodah, applies to talmidei chachamim.

I do not understand how this is implied by the wording of the sugya. The proof of the Torah Temimah is even more difficult for me to understand, as the mishnah that he cited was taught by R' Elazar ben Shamu'a, who was a talmid of R' Akiva.

Suggestions?

Kohanim in Cars in Cemeteries

2008-07-19T23:44:00.006-05:00

A poster on a discussion list, commenting on a psak a few years ago by R' Zev Cohen that it's prohibited for kohanim to travel along a certain block of W. Pratt Ave. in Chicago because of trees that overshadow a Jewish cemetery and one side of the street, wondered why the car would not insulate the kohen. Another poster suggested that perhaps the prohibition is only if one were walking, or if a window was open.

According to the Rambam, Hil. TM 20:1, there are only three things that can protect against tum'a transmitted by an ohel: Tzamid p'sil, Ohalin, and Belu'in.

Acc. to Ch. 21, Tzamid p'sil (a tight seal - which would be negated by an open window) only works by earthenware vessels or, by extension, vessels that are susceptible to tum'a at all. Hence, this would not work for most cars, except perhaps the ones that are made of plastic. The protection of ohel b'soch ohel (a tent in a tent) would not work because a moving car constitutes an ohel zaruk (movable tent) that is not halachically considered an ohel (11:5/6), while the hatzalah of balu'a (swallowed object) only works for something inside a living creature (20/5:6).

Hence, I don't see how being in a moving car would prevent a kohen from becoming tamei. Are any of these restrictions subject to machlokes?

Update, 7/20: There are numerous fascinating articles on the issue of kohanim in airplanes available online, including this one by R' Daniel Wolf of Yeshivat Har Etzion and an article in Tradition by R' JD Bleich (only available to subscribers). To summarize a few points: The Rashba paskens like the opinion on Eruvin 33b which says that an ohel zaruk is a valid ohel, but Rambam and Tosefos argue. The P'nei Yehoshua and Shevus Yaakov hold that even the opinion which says that it's not an ohel zaruk is only based on a rabbinical decree, so that there would be a basis to be lenient in a case of doubt, but there wouldn't seem to be any doubt to base such a leniency on. There's also an interesting discussion regarding whether or not the aluminum that comprises the bulk of most planes is m'kabel tum'a (machlokes Rashi and Rambam regarding whether the list of metals in this week's parsha is exhaustive) and, were aluminum not to be m'kabel tum'a, whether the steel bolts, rivets, etc. that hold together the plane (ma'amid) would still render it m'kabel tum'a and whether the plane's seal satisfies the requirements of tzamid p'sil.

Update, 7/23: Another poster asked if cars would be exempted from the laws of tum'a because they are keilim ha-ba'im b'middah, vessels which are larger than 40 sei'ah in volume (3 cubic amos), and hence are considered to be immobile.

K'li ha-ba'ah b'midah (aka k'li he-asui l'nachas - a vessel intended to be stationary) is only a law by wood, hide, or cloth, as is learned out from a juxtaposition to a sack (which is intended to be movable even when full) in Vayikra 11:32 - see Chagiga 26b and Rambam Hil. Keilim 3:2 and 3:3.

RJDBleich in his article on airplanes that I previously mentioned (Tradition 36:4) mentions several other reasons why this heter would not apply to a vehicle, including that it has wheels (so is movable) and that it is used for seating (as excepted by Tos' Shabbos 44b DH Mucheni).

Why is the Parah Adumah Here?

2008-07-05T22:02:00.005-05:00

OK, it's open mike time.

Parshas Chukas is perhaps most well-known for its opening section, which includes the laws of the parah adumah and tum'as mais. Why are these halachos inserted at this point, though? The question is amplified by the fact that parah adumah is known to be one of the three (four?) halachos that were taught at Marah before Matan Torah.

Rashi (20:1), citing Mo'ed Katan 28a, notes that Parah Adumah is juxtaposed to the subsequent death of Miriam to teach that just like the parah adumah is mechaper[1], so, too, is the death of tzaddikim.

The previous Rashi expounds on the passuk's use of the term "kol ha-eidah" to learn out that all of those who were condemned to die in the midbar had already died at this point, leaving only those who were designated to enter the land. Hence, perhaps the inclusion of a halachic parsha about death and purification serves as the Torah's summary of the thirty-seven years between the rebellion of Korach and the death of Miriam, which were entirely devoted to the deaths of the failed dor ha-midbar and nothing else (as indicated by HaShem's silence towards Moshe during these years).

Any other suggestions?

[1] Tosefos there quotes one of the numerous ma'amrei Chazal which indicate that the Parah Adumah was mechaper for the sin of the eigel, although it's interesting that the Yoma 2a specifically rejects the idea that the Parah Adumah is for kaparah, instead spending the next daf-and-a-half suggesting a whole litany of korbanos that
could instead be exegetically alluded to by the use of the word "l'chapeir" in a passuk, before finally settling upon the avodah of Yom Kippur. A variant text of Rashi compares the death of tzaddikim to korbanos, but as the Parah Adumah was not a korban, the basis for this comparison is difficult to me.

Terumah Tidbits from the Rambam

2008-07-05T21:23:00.004-05:00

1) "Because of my grandson the kohen gadol, I can't eat terumah. Who am I?"

A kohenes is allowed to eat terumah. If she marries a yisroel, she is no longer allowed to eat terumah. If her husband dies, she is again allowed to eat terumah, unless she bore a child to her yisraeli husband. If the child dies, also, she is again allowed to eat terumah, unless the child already produced a child of its own.

Hence, a kohenes marries a yisrael and bears him a daughter. The daughter marries a kohen and bears him a son, who is chosen to be kohen gadol. Even if the original kohenes loses her husband and daughter, and even though her only living descendant is a kohen, she is still prohibited from eating terumah, because her living descendant causes her to maintain a connection to her deceased yisraeli husband (unless she gets remarried to a kohen).

Interestingly, if the daughter were still alive but lost her husband, the existence of her son the kohen gadol would be the sole reason that she would still be allowed to eat terumah. See Rambam Hil. Terumos 6:11.

2) "I can eat terumah nowadays. No, really. Who am I?"

Although terumah min ha-torah is only in Eretz Yisroel, the nevi'im decreed that it also be observed in Bavel, because it is close to Eretz Yisroel and has frequent travelers to and fro, and the chachamim ha-rishonim decreed that it also be kept in Egypt, Amon, and Moav, which surround Eretz Yisrael. (Rambam 1:1)

Since this terumah is entirely rooted in a gezeirah d'rabbanan (as opposed to, I suppose, terumah in Suria or terumah bizman ha-zeh in Eretz Yisroel, which are perhaps gezeiros d'rabbanan that have a stronger connection to the din d'oraisa), the prohibition for a kohen who's tamei to eat terumah only applies to one who's intrinsically tamei - ba'al keri, zav, zavah, nidah, yoledes, or metzora - and not to one who extrinsically tamei - i.e., through maga, masa, or ohel. Hence, if a kohen (or kohenes) were to acquire terumah that grew in certain sections of Jordan, Egypt, or Iraq, he would be allowed to eat it once he was tovel to remove any intrinsic tum'ah that he might have. The Ra'avad, though (and the Rambam could perhaps also be read this way), states that this heter only works for a katan or a ketana who has a chazakah of tahara from tum'os keri and nida, because of a gezeirah on gedolim metuharim because of gedolim who are intrinsically tamei (Rambam 6:8-9).

The Meraglim and the Nesachim

2008-06-22T22:26:00.005-05:00

A dvar torah that I gave at the auf ruf of my cousin Dov this past Shabbos.

The primary episode in this week's parsha is the sin of the meraglim. Immediately following is what appears to be an anticlimactic segue into the parsha describing the nesachim, the flour- and wine-offerings that had to be brought with all korbanos once the Jews entered Eretz Yisroel.

The Ramban and other commentaries explain that the reason for the juxtaposition of the two parshiyos is that once HaShem decreed upon the current generation that they would not live to enter the Land, He wanted to console them that although they would not enter the Land, their children would one day do so, and therefore it was still relevant for them to learn laws that would only take effect in the Land. Based on this reason, though, the Torah could have as easily jumped to the more exciting parsha immediately following that of the nesachim, that of challah, which also took effect only once the Jews entered the Land.

Nesachim provide an interesting contrast to the korbanos to which they are attached. The default formulation of a vow is a statement that one will bring a given offering, or a given type of animal as an offering. Nothing is said explicitly about the nesachim that need also be brought with the specific korban. The korban itself has no regulations (beyond a few basic parameters) regarding the size and quality of the animal that need be brought to satisfy an open vow; the nesachim, on the other hand, are strictly regulated in the quantity of each of their components that must be brought: three isaron of flour and a half-hin of wine for a bull, and so forth. In this way, the nesachim appear to reflect the two sides of the paradoxical ahavah/yir'ah dichotomy that are mandated to frame our relationship with HaShem. A person expresses love towards another by going above and beyond what he is strictly required to do. Fear (for lack of a better word) is expressed by the exercise of great caution and a general lack of creativity, so as to ensure that one does not fall short of his basic obligations. The nesachim show both the tight regulation that is characteristic of fear and the open-ended desire to give and connect that is characteristic of love.

The Yerushalmi near the end of Brachos (9:5) resolves this contradiction, instructing us:
עשה מאהבה ועשה מיראה. עשה מאהבה שאם באת לשנוא דע כי אתה אוהב ואין אוהב שונא. עשה מיראה שאם באת לבעט דע שאתה ירא ואין ירא מבעט
"Act out of love and act out of fear. Act out of love... for one who loves cannot hate. Act out of fear... for one who fears cannot rebel." When the people sinned by listening to the spies, their refusal to listen to HaShem was not merely characterized by allowing another fear to overcome their fear of HaShem (i.e., ki chazak hu miMenu), but rather went so far so as to indicate a hatred, RL, of HaShem, and a desire to appoint a new leader to lead them away from HaShem and back to Egypt. After HaShem decreed that the current generation would perish in the wilderness, the Ma'pilim refused to listen to Him, and instead persisted in embarking on an expedition into the Land, where they were slaughtered by the Amaleiki and the Kena'ani. They showed their love of HaShem by their readiness and zeal (as indicated by their use of the word Hinenu) to listen to the word of HaShem, but faltered in the requisite exercise of fear and caution, in that HaShem had made very clear to them that His will had changed. In this way, the nesachim can be viewed as a means of counteracting the causes of the two opposing sins of the meraglim and the ma'pilim.

At this point, I concluded my d'var torah, without extending it to what I thought was an obvious application (considering the occasion), but for the purpose of completeness: The ahavah/yir'ah dichotomy is also relevant to a marriage between a man and a woman. On the one hand, a relationship can only be built on a foundation of ahavah, expressed by forming a connection and sharing things with one another - in the physical sense, but even more importantly in the emotional and psychological senses. While ahavah can serve as a fence against hatred, it is not impervious to negligence, which can as easily destroy a relationship. The other side of a relationship is a wall of yir'ah - not the fear of one's spouse, but rather a fear of anything that can damage the relationship in any way by hurting one's partner. A relationship comprised solely of love is volatile, while one comprised solely of fear is dessicated. A healthy relationship must incorporate both the wondrous exuberance of ahavah and the delicate care of yir'ah.

Heaps of birds

2008-06-13T10:37:00.002-05:00

Regarding the quail that HaShem sent to the encampment of Bnei Yisroel, it says that the one who collected the smallest number of the quails collected 10 heaps (11:32). How is this number arrived at?

I heard an explanation this morning in the name of the Gra. We know from a variety of sources (e.g., Brachos 54b) that the size of the camp of Bnei Yisroel in the desert was 3 parsa'os by 3 parsa'os, approximately 12 km (7 mi) in each direction. Hence, the furthest that a person could be from an edge of the camp, where the birds fell (as per 11:31), was 1.5 parsa'os. The average foot speed of a person is 1 mil every 18 minutes, or 1 parsah in 72 minutes. 11:32 states that Bnei Yisroel gathered the quail "all that day and all that night and all of the next day". In 36 hours, a person could travel 30 parsa'os, which is the equivalent of 10 round trips to and from the edge of the camp for a person who lived as far away from an edge as possible.

Pesach recap, corrections

2008-05-22T22:47:00.006-05:00

Some corrections to my previous post:

1) Piskei Teshuvos 493:2-3 notes that although numerous authorities (including the Levush, Kaf HaChayim, and the encyclopedic-minded R' Ovadiah Yosef) state that the minhag that some have not to say a shehechiyanu during sefirah has no source in the poskim, the concept is brought down in Eliyah Zuta b'shem Rabbeinu Yerucham, who explains that the period of sefirah is one of din, and in the Olelos Ephraim, who explains that sefirah symbolizes the transience of man, and hence is an improper time to say this bracha.

1a) My accusation was not of a chumra ha-ba'ah liydei kula, but rather of a chumra ha-ba liydei kula, as chumra is not a feminine Hebrew word, but rather is a masculine Aramaic word. (Hence, the proper pluralization would not be chumros, but rather would be chumraya, although you'll probably get a lot of funny looks if you use proper Aramaic grammar.)

2) As commenter Barzilai noted, the practice of being yotzei kiddush b'makom seudah in the morning on fruit (or shehakol foods) is championed by R' Moshe Feinstein in IM OCh 4:63 (although he still requires one to make a second kiddush prior to one's actual seudah).

Pesach recap

2008-04-27T21:09:00.003-05:00

1) Interesting case of a chumra ha-ba'ah liydei kula - someone buying clothing on Chol haMoed due to the onset of sefirah. AIUI, the former is more problematic than the latter, as engaging in commerce on Chol haMoed is assur (with the exception of cases of davar ha-aveid or tzorech ha-moed), while the issur of saying she-hechiyahu on a new garment or the like is characteristic of the period of bein ha-metzarim, not of sefirah (which only has prohibitions against weddings and haircuts {and perhaps melacha at certain times)).

2) An old gripe: Shehakol kiddushim, most commonly found on Pesach. Being that "ein kiddush ela b'makom seudah" renders a kiddush said without a subsequent seudah void[1], and that the Shulchan Aruch says that one can only be yotzei this requirement of a meal[2] using bread or wine[3] (or, according to many poskim[4], mezonos), if one eats potato starch cake following kiddush, not only is one's kiddush invalid (and perhaps a bracha l'vatalah?), but the food that he ate would l'mafrei'a be assur because of his not having made kiddush beforehand.

However, the Mishnah Berurah[5] b'shem the Chayei Adam and Eliyah Rabbah notes that the Shiltei Gibborim holds that Shabbos itself is kove'ia any food into a meal (as seen by hilchos ma'aser), so that if one is feeling weak, he can be someich on this da'as yachid (although only in the morning) and fulfill his requirement of kiddush b'makom seudah even with fruit or minei targima, so I suppose that yesh al mi lismoch, but it still sounds a bit iffy.

[1] S.A. O.Ch. 273:2
[2] Although not the requirement of the evening or morning meal as two of the shalosh seudos, which specifically require bread.
[3] S.A. O.Ch. 273:5
[4] Including the Mishnah Brurah b'shem the Magen Avraham, although IIRC, R' Akiva Eiger argues.
[5] 273:26

Dagesh question

2008-04-09T11:45:00.004-05:00

Miriam at The Floating Bear asks whether the proper pronunciation of a term is "Darchei Shalom" or "Darkei Shalom"

I'm not a dikduk nerd, but I occasionally pretend to be one, and I've wondered about similar questions, myself, so decided to look into the issue.

Usually, a letter is degusha when it appears at the start of a word or the start of a syllable following a closed syllable. This is one of the exceptions, though.

When most masculine plural words are nism'chim, a sh'va is put under the penultimate letter of the root and the last letter of the root is given a tzeireh. Hence, d'rachim would become d'r'chei. Due to the awkwardness of two consecutive sh'va'in, the first sh'va is changed into a tenuah ketana and the second sh'va is known as a sh'va merachefes, which is unsounded like a sh'va nach, but does not make the letter immediately following degusha, like a shva na does. Hence, the proper pronunciation would, indeed, be darchei (as the word appears in Mishlei 3:17).

There are probably some errors in this analysis, but I think it covers the gist of the issue accurately.

B'rich Sh'mei

2008-04-09T11:38:00.003-05:00

Someone on a discussion list inquired about the line near the end of B'rich Sh'mei which states "Lo al enash rachitzna v'lo al bar elohin samichna ela b'Elaka dishmaya", the middle clause of which appears to imply the existence of a son of God, in whom we merely do not rely.

I noted that the Rambam[1] (Y"hT 2:7) states that one of the levels of angels (immediately below Elohim and above Keruvim) was called B'nei Elohim. The "Pirush" on the side of my Choreiv Rambam (anyone know who this is?) notes that Elohim is the level of angel that rules over the world. Hence, perhaps the author of this line used the term Bar Elohin to refer to an angel in this general range rather than the more equivocal "Elohim" to express that not only do we not trust in man, but we do not even rely on more powerful spiritual beings, but rather only on HaShem.

However, according to MiPninei HaRav cited in Hanhagos HaRav in the beginning of the Machzor Masores HaRav, R' Joseph Soloveitchik stated that his grandfather R' Chaim was makpid not to say this line precisely because of the implication of "bar" mamash. (I recall reading that eventually RYBS stopped saying B'rich Sh'mei altogether, but can't find the source for this - maybe it's in the RH edition which I don't have handy.)

[1] who, in Moreh Nevuchim 2:6, states that interaction between angels and man only occurs in prophetic visions, not in the physical world, but that they still definitely exist, to oppose the words of the counterclaimant.

Bava Kamma 95 - Shinui koneh

2008-04-05T22:16:00.004-05:00

Very exciting sugya.

A beraissa on 95a states:
"If one stole a ewe and sheared it or it gave birth, he pays the value of it and its shearings or offspring, according to Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yehudah says the stolen animal is returned 'b'eineih', as it is.
Rabbi Shim'on says we view it as if it were monetarily evaluated."

On 95b, there is a machlokes amora'im regarding the difference between the two latter shittos:

According to Rav Zevid, they argue over appreciation in the value of the animal that is still attached to the animal.
Rabbi Yehudah holds that attached appreciation belongs to the robbed, as the animal as it is *right now* is returned to the robbed, while Rabbi Shim'on holds that the attached appreciation belongs to the robber, as the robber need only return the value of the animal when it was originally stolen.
Both opinions argue with Rabbi Meir, who says that even detached appreciation is returned to the robbed.

According to Rav Papa, they argue over the deduction to the compensation that the robber keeps.
Rabbi Yehudah holds that attached appreciation belongs to the robber, as the animal as it was *at the time of the robbery* returns to the robbed, while Rabbi Shim'on holds that the attached appreciation belongs to the robbed, with the exception of a fraction (dependent on local custom, e.g., a third) that reverts to the robber as compensation for his expenditures on the animal. According to Tosefos DH Mani, Rabbi Shim'on's opinion is more akin to that of Rabbi Meir than to that of Rabbi Yehudah, in that the robber also keeps only this fraction of the detached appreciation.

To provide an example that shows all of the various shittos in action - if one stole a recently shorn animal, allowed it to grow a full coat of wool, sheared it, and allowed it to grow a second coat of wool, at which case he confessed his crime before the court (to avoid the convoluting issue of keifel penalties that apply only to the principle and not to the appreciation):

Rabbi Meir would say that the robber returns the loaded animal plus the first shearings.
Rav Pappa's Rabbi Shimon would say that the robber returns the value of the loaded animal plus the first shearings, less one-third of each.
Rav Zevid's Rabbi Yehudah would say that the robber returns the loaded animal in its entirety and keeps all of the first shearings.
Rav Pappa's Rabbi Yehudah would say that the robber returns the loaded animal in its entirety, but the robbed must then reimburse the robber for the appreciation of the animal in his custody, and the robber keeps the first shearings.
Rav Zevid's Rabbi Shimon would says that the robber returns the value of the unloaded animal that he originally stole to the robbed, while keeping both the now-loaded animal and the first shearings.

Despite the title of this post, there does not seem to be any dispute over whether or not the changes that the animal undergoes as a result of its wool growth (and subsequent shearing) constitute a shinui that allows the robber to legally acquire the animal (and hence have his legal obligation to the robbed frozen in place at the time of the robbery), as even R' Meir was proven to hold that a shinui effects this change of legal status, only that he holds that Chazal imposed a penalty on the robber to prevent him from profiting from his crime (although admittedly, the gemara doesn't discuss the views of Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shim'on on this theoretical concept).

I haven't had this much fun since the seven-way battle royale regarding the order of kiddush and havdalah on Yom Tov that falls out on Motza'ei Shabbos, found in Arvei Pesachim.