Human Security Gateway: All Updates

La responsabilité de protéger: Un nouveau concept pour de vieilles pratiques?

Thu, 09 Feb 2012 16:58:19 -0800

La communauté internationale, partagée entre le respect de la souveraineté nationale et l’impératif d’intervenir à des fins humanitaires, n’a pas toujours su comment réagir face aux atrocités de masse. Le débat relatif à l’action onusienne en situation de crise a connu de nombreuses évolutions mais une étape fondamentale a été franchie en 2000 avec le concept de responsabilité de protéger, permettant de concilier ces deux principes. Adopté par les États membres des Nations unies en 2005, ce principe a été appliqué pour la première fois en Libye et en Côte d’Ivoire en 2011. Pourtant, cette mise en oeuvre pose question quant à savoir si elle résulte d’un nouveau consensus plus large au sein de la communauté internationale ou si elle reflète finalement la simple poursuite des intérêts nationaux. SOURCE: Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité)

Disaster Risk Management for Insecure Contexts

Thu, 09 Feb 2012 14:37:18 -0800

In insecure contexts there is often a self-reinforcing spiral: conflict creates more vulnerability to disaster and more vulnerability to disaster creates further conflict. This is compounded by climate change, environmental degradation, market fragility, economic marginalisation, migration and unplanned urbanisation. Aid is currently too disjointed to address this spiral effectively. Each agency has disparate policies, teams and operations for disaster risk management [DRM] and for insecurity programming [IP]. However, the common objectives and the combined impact of the various approaches to DRM, IP and relief and recovery operations can be harnessed to develop a long-term strategy promoting peace and resilience to all forms of threats and hazards. Such integration would lead to more streamlined operations and a more efficient use of funds. SOURCE: Action Contre la Faim

“No Safe Places”: Yemen’s Crackdown on Protests in Taizz

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 16:38:34 -0800

When Yemenis took to the streets in January 2011 to demand an end to Saleh’s 33-year rule, Taizz, 250 kilometers south of the capital, Sanaa, became a center of both peaceful and armed resistance – and the scene of numerous human rights abuses and violations of the laws of war. “No Safe Places”is based on more than 170 interviews with protesters, doctors, human rights defenders, and other witnesses to attacks in Taizz by state security forces and pro-Saleh gangs from February to December 2011.

SOURCE: Human Rights Watch

Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal Ambivalence

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 16:34:55 -0800

Despite growing concerns across the Sahel and Maghreb over the increasing potency of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the diffusion of heavily armed mercenaries from Libya, the expanding influence of arms and drugs trafficking, and the widening lethality of Boko Haram, regional security cooperation to address these transnational threats remains fragmented.

Algeria is well-positioned to play a central role in defining this cooperation, but must first reconcile the complex domestic, regional, and international considerations that shape its decision-making. SOURCE: Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Post-conflict Peacebuilding and Prospects for Democracy with Reference to Africa

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 16:08:58 -0800

The destructive conflicts that plagued much of Africa including those still lingering in the Horn and the Great Lakes Regions are presently moving to the postconflict stage. This phase has its own particular characteristics that need renewed analyses and understanding of the realignment of actors and their behaviour, as well as the nature of incompatibilities and the reformulation of strategies and methods, in order to meaningfully respond to the urgent needs of consolidating the peace process. Democratic transition is a pronounced aim in every case.

This paper, based on earlier research and lectures by the author, argues that sound representative institutions, based on the principles of democracy and human rights and creatively integrating traditional values and wisdom of each society, have a good chance to usher in a hopeful system where future violent conflicts can be averted and peaceful mechanisms prevail. The discussion highlights the challenges of democratic transition in war-torn conditions, weak or shattered political institutions, economic underdevelopment and confusing identity complex. Besides these hurdles, external unfair economic exchange and global relations play a negative role. Briefly examining the prevailing theoretical discussion on the issue, the paper suggests an analytical tool for clarifying the complex entanglement between transitional democracy on one hand, and identity/ ethnicity, on the other. SOURCE: Life & Peace Institute

Divine Disputes? Exploring the Religious Dimensions of Armed Conflicts

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 15:57:45 -0800

A growing literature has started to explore the relationship between religious dimensions and the escalation, duration and termination of armed conflicts. This study examines the conditions for negotiated settlements. The author argues that if the demands of the belligerents are explicitly anchored in a religious tradition, they will come to perceive the conflicting issues as indivisible, and the conflict will be less likely to be settled through negotiations. Utilising unique data on the religious demands and identities of the primary parties, all intrastate conflictdyads in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1989-2003, are examined. The study finds that if governments or rebel groups have made explicit religious claims, these conflict-dyads are significantly less likely than others to be terminated through negotiated settlement. By contrast, whether the primary parties come from different religious traditions does not affect the chances for negotiated settlement. SOURCE: Life and Peace Institute

Heroes and Villains: Ijaw Nationalist Narratives of the Nigerian Civil War

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 14:52:58 -0800

Numerous explanations of the failure of the Biafran enterprise highlight the absence of legitimacy and support for the Biafran effort among the Niger Delta ‘minorities’. In the aftermath of the Civil War, popular narratives among the Ijaw, arguably Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group, tended to tie them closely to the Federal side. In this paper, we examine the transformations of the relationship between Southern minorities and the Biafran cause, with a particular focus on the Ijaw.

The fiscal centralization of oil resources that followed the war and the persistence of minority exclusion within the Nigerian polity have encouraged Ijaw elites, and other southern minorities, to review their commitment to Nigerian federalism. Conflicting tales of the Ijaw nationalist hero Isaac Boro testify to a growing ‘revisionism’ in interpretations of the Biafran War. Today the resurgence of militant forms of Ijaw ethnic nationalism, against the backdrop of oil community protests which have been taking place since the early 1990s, has given rise to new interpretations of the war, and the creation of new political linkages between Ijaw nationalists, other Niger Delta minorities and Igbo pro- Biafra movements. While resistance to Biafra catalyzed Ijaw nationalism in the fighting and aftermath of the Civil War, Biafra has now become a symbol of contemporary Ijaw nationalism. By drawing on new ‘revisionist’ histories of Biafra, this paper considers the complex interaction of ethnic nationalism, oil and secessionist conflict in Nigeria. SOURCE: Africa Development // Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa

Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons not Learned

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 14:26:26 -0800

In African contemporary history, Biafra is not only remembered as one of the worst humanitarian crises on the continent, but also as a tragedy that gave rise to the concept of ingérence or the international responsibility to protect. Unfortunately, the controversies about the impact of aid during the conflict have been forgotten. Today, the humanitarian legend of Biafra celebrates the saving of starving children and the birth of the famous NGO Médecins sans Frontières, but it does not acknowledge the military impact of relief operations that helped the secessionists continue the war for over a year after it was lost militarily. As it prolonged the suffering of local populations, relief was a matter of discussion during and just after the war. Since then, this strategic debate has been ‘lost in translation’.

This paper will argue that the contemporary idea of humanitarian aid that advocates a right of intervention in order to save innocents confuses the issue for at least two reasons. First, it leads us to think wrongly that Biafra gave birth to the concept of an international responsibility to protect, something that had existed previously. Secondly, it overshadows the dark side of humanitarian aid, where international intervention often assists belligerents rather than civilians, prolongs suffering, and poses new threats to national sovereignty. SOURCE: Africa Development // Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa

Violence, Identity Mobilization and the Reimagining of Biafra

Wed, 08 Feb 2012 13:56:40 -0800

The events leading to the Nigeria Civil War marked the triumph of force and violence over dialogue and negotiation as a means of conflict resolution. The success of the Nigerian state in imposing a military solution on the preceding political crisis, and then suppressing the ensuing Biafran rebellion, has had a lasting effect on state–society relations. As a result, the state has not refrained from using violence at the slightest provocation against competing and conflicting ethno-religious groups. The tendency of the state to exercise domination through the deployment of violence implies an ongoing crisis of state hegemony rather than a resolution of civil unrest.

This article argues that state violence was more important than ethnic divisions in triggering the secessionist attempt of Biafra, and has continued to create rather than resolve ethnic divisions across the country. The emergence in post-Civil War Nigeria of regimes that perpetrated or permitted mass violence against restive social groups remains critical to understanding the contemporary rise of ethno-nationalist movements and waning allegiance to the Nigerian state, particularly among the Igbo. The aim of the article is to underscore the understated salience of state violence in the debates on identity and citizenship in multi-ethnic societies. SOURCE: Africa Development // Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa

La Côte d’Ivoire dans la dynamique d’instabilité ouest-africaine Les racines de la crise post-électorale 2010-2011

Tue, 07 Feb 2012 11:35:12 -0800

Le conflit en Côte d’Ivoire à l’issue de l’élection présidentielle du 28 novembre 2010 n’est pas un phénomène nouveau ni surprenant. Il s’inscrit dans la continuité d’une décennie de crise, qui trouve ses origines dans des causes internes diverses et qui s’est cristallisé autour du concept d’« ivoirité ». Par ailleurs, ces tensions internes ont été exacerbées par un contexte régional instable. Cette analyse sur les racines du conflit ivoirien est complétée par un rapport sur les impacts de la crise ivoirienne. SOURCE: Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité)

Iraq and the Challenge of Continuing Violence

Tue, 07 Feb 2012 11:30:42 -0800

The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 did not leave that country with a functioning democracy or effective governance; nor has it put an end to high levels of local violence, or ethnic and sectarian tension. In the wake of the developing leadership crisis between Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and Vice President Hashimi which began on December 17, 2011, the decreased U.S. presence in Iraq seems to guarantee future sectarian violence and instability.

In spite of the massive investment of U.S. and Coalition aid, Iraq continues to struggle with crippling levels of poverty and unemployment; its per capita income is 159th in the world; and Iraq’s population and armed forces continually come under attack from insurgents.

The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that Iraq’s wealth is likely to increase by less than half the production rate called for in Iraqi plans, as the country must deal with critical problems in health, education, local governance, and reforming its agriculture and state industries. The United States is seeking a new role in Iraq that can help that country deal with these issues and counter Iranian influence, but persistent ethnic and sectarian violence, power struggles among Iraqi leadership, the lack of strong governance at all levels, and continuing attacks by insurgents on Iraq’s population and security forces demonstrate Iraq’s significant security challenges in the face of continuing violence. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Civil Society and Peace Building in the Republic of Congo

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 15:15:13 -0800

The following report by Lindsey Weber is an English synopsis of three studies on the role of the civil society in the pursuit of peace and democracy in the Republic of Congo. The studies, based upon empirical analysis of surveys and personal interviews conducted with members of civil society, approach the issue of the role of civil society in the Republic of Congo from different but complementary perspectives. They explore the local understandings of the concepts of civil society and peace as well as highlight the role played by the civil society in the peace process and the complex and often-incongruous relationship between the state and civil society.

The first study, Congolese Civil Society: How does it Express Itself?, defines the presence of civil society in the Congo and presents an overview of its impact. The other two, Outcome of the Role and Means of Action of Female Civil Society in the Construction of Peace and Horizontal Solidarity and Civil Society in Perspective: the State of Horizontal Society in Brazzaville are appropriate case studies of the role of specific components of Congolese civil society. The former study describes the activities and role of female civil society in the peace process. It is written by a historian, and discusses developments in the entire country. The latter progresses beyond the contentious issue of ethnicity to explore the concept of circulation, or interaction, as a catalyst for the consolidation of civil society independent of state guidance. This study is authored by a sociologist, and focuses on the city of Brazzaville. Therefore, the perspectives and levels of analysis are different for each study. SOURCE: Life & Peace Institute

Russia's Line in the Sand on Syria: Why Moscow Wants To Halt the Arab Spring

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 14:50:52 -0800

Syria is often called Russia’s last remaining ally in the Middle East, and Moscow’s continuing refusal to support the United States, the European Union, and the Arab League in condemning the Assad regime certainly appears to support that claim. The reasons cited for Russia’s allegiance to Damascus are many: Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are said to have a sort of autocratic solidarity, with Putin afraid that the Arab Spring encourages challenges to his own rule; at the same time, Russia is thought to have major economic interests in Syria, including arms contracts, a Russian-leased naval base, and plans for nuclear energy cooperation.

There are elements of truth in all these assertions - but they offer only glimpses of the broader picture. Moscow’s position on Syria is shaped even more by the recent experience of Libya, strong doubts concerning the Syrian opposition, and suspicions about the motives of the United States. SOURCE: Foreign Affairs // Council on Foreign Relations

Girls and Warzones: Troubling Questions

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 14:45:38 -0800

In following the threads of war and its impact on the lives of girls globally, this study finds that - experientially - the plight of war-victims, of girls sold into sexual or physical labor, of street children, and of girls harmed in their own homes and communities is qualitatively similar in many respects. In looking at the actual lives of girls, it becomes difficult to draw easy lines between wartime and peacetime. What people tolerate in peace shapes what they will tolerate in war.

In following girl's stories, this study asks not only what girls in war and peace face, but why it is so difficult to gather information about girls at all. Limited studies and statistics are available, blunted by walls of silence over the state of the world's girls today. This silence hides a world of human rights abuses. It also obscures, however, an instrumental fact: girls are political actors and moral architects of their worlds. They fight and fight back, and many construct peaceful solutions for a better world. When we begin to listen to the girl's own stories, solutions begin to replace silence. SOURCE: Life & Peace Institute

Scenarios for Syria [Meeting Summary]

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 14:44:15 -0800

This paper is a summary of the discussions that took place during a small closed-door study group convened at Chatham House in December 2011 to discuss possible future scenarios for Syria.

The main findings of the meeting are as follows:

Predictions for the country's future vary considerably – and are often politicized. While increasing numbers of observers believe President Assad’s days are numbered, the timescale and endgame are still unclear.

The regime, like other Arab regimes that have faced uprisings, is trying to send the message that the only alternative to its rule is chaos and conflict. Yet so far most of the violence has come from the regime, which seems to be prepared to take the country into further conflict in a bid to preserve its power.

Overall, there is a serious deficit of provable, hard data on events in Syria, especially as the government is trying to block foreign journalists and NGOs from entering the country.

Western countries have called for Assad to leave but, lacking the appetite for an intervention, are hoping for a regional solution involving Turkey and the Arab League.

The Arab League is placing increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on Syria, but its members have mixed feelings about regime change. The Arab League's position may influence China's stance in efforts to deal with the crisis through the UN.

The regime is assuming that there will be no international military intervention, but the situation remains deeply unpredictable. A massacre could yet trigger international action. SOURCE: Chatham House

Analyse des Dynamiques Locales de Cohabitation avec Groupes Armes FDLR a Bunyakiri, Hombo Nord, Hombo Sud et Chambucha

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 14:05:19 -0800

Ce rapport est le fruit d’un travail de terrain réalisé par le Life & Peace Institute en collaboration avec son partenaire, l’ONG locale PADEBU, dans les territoires de Kalehe (Sud Kivu) et de Walikale (Nord Kivu) au cours du dernier trimestre de 2006. Basé sur des entretiens menés avec des acteurs locaux à Bunyakiri, Hombo Sud, Hombo Nord et Chambucha entre octobre et décembre 2006, il a pour objectif d’aider à la compréhension des dynamiques locales de cohabitation entre autorités civiles et militaires, populations civiles et groupes armés FDLR/FoCA1 telles qu’elles se dessinent à l’aube de la mise en place des institutions congolaises au niveau national. Le rapport explique les différentes stratégies mises en place par chaque groupe d’acteurs pour assurer leur survie dans un contexte politique, social et économique complexe, ainsi que les différents équilibres auxquels ces stratégies sont susceptibles d’aboutir. Au-delà de la volonté de mieux comprendre l’un de ses milieux d’intervention clés et de dégager des pistes d’action concrètes pour l’avenir de son programme de transformation de conflits à l’est du Congo, l’objectif du Life & Peace Institute est ici de partager l’information recueillie avec les autres acteurs du milieu, tant locaux qu’internationaux, dans l’optique d’un plaidoyer pour l’amélioration de la situation sécuritaire et humanitaire des populations de Bunyakiri et environs. SOURCE: Life & Peace Institute

Au-delà des Groupes Armés: Conflits locaux et connexions sous-regionales, L’exemple de Fizi et Uvira (Sud- Kivu, RDC)

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 13:53:16 -0800

Adepae, Arche d’Alliance, RIO et Life & Peace Institute sont fiers de vous présenter le rapport de recherche portant sur les conflits intercommunautaires en Territoire d’Uvira et Fizi, Sud-Kivu, RD Congo. Ce rapport, qui est le produit d’une Recherche Action Participative menée pendant plusieurs années, avait initialement été finalisé en 2010. Depuis là, il a fait l’objet de plusieurs enrichissements par les communautés en question. Le fait de bien expliquer les différents points de vue des communautés était plus important pour LPI et ses partenaires qu’une publication rapide, à fin de ne pas perturber le processus de transformation de conflits en cours. SOURCE: Action pour le Développement et la Paix Endogènes // Arche d’Alliance // Réseau d'Innovation Organisationnelle // Life & Peace Institute

ACAS Bulletin 85: US Militarization of the Sahara Sahel: Security, Space & Imperialism

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 12:57:24 -0800

Despite this commitment from the US government to the Sahara-Sahel, there is no consensus among policy makers, observers, regional governments and locals on-the-ground as to the ultimate rationale for these security initiatives. The primary justification for the US militarization of the Sahel is the existence of a small number of self-proclaimed ‘Islamist’ groups operating in the deserts connecting Mauritania, Mali, Burkina, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia, Chad and Libya, not to mention groups already active in northern Morocco Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Debate has focused on whether or not these armed groups, individually or taken as a dis-articulated whole, present a potential and significant threat to local and international interests. It is hoped that this collection of essays sheds new light and, eventually, brings fresh eyes to a series of securitizing practices occurring on the ‘margins’ of empire, generally, and US hegemony specifically.

Articles in this issue include:
1. From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian islamist terrorist group into an Al-Qa‘ida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel region | Stephen Harmon

2. War on ‘terror’: Africom, the Kleptocratic State and Under-class Militancy in West Africa-Nigeria | Caroline Ifeka

3. Counterterrorism and democracy promotion in the Sahel under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama from September 11, 2001, to the Nigerien Coup of February 2010 | Alex Thurston

4. Western Sahara and the United States’ Geographical Imaginings | Konstantina Isidoros

5. The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Repercussions | Yahia H Zoubir

6. Sahelian blowback: what’s happening in Mali? | Vijay Prashad

7. All quiet on the West Africa front: Terrorism, Tourism and Poverty in Mauritania | Anne E. McDougall SOURCE: The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

ACAS Bulletin 68: The Warri Crisis, the Niger Delta, and the Nigerian State [Fall 2004]

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 12:20:43 -0800

Warri is a strategic city in the Niger Delta. As the second major oil city after Port Harcourt, Warri is the center of scores of oil installations and the nerve center of the operations of oil companies in the western Niger Delta, particularly the U.S. major, Chevron-Texaco. Since colonial times, control of Warri has been the principal casus belli in a lingering conflict among the three ethnic groups (Itsekiri, Ijaw and Urhobo). Although initially the conflict was over land, fishing rights and cultural differences, oil has become the highly charged political issue, as a huge oil economy has grown around the city. The insecurity produced by the Warri crisis has repeatedly led to the shut down of oil installations, leading many to believe that Warri is now the litmus test for measures to resolve the problems of the Niger Delta.

This issue of the ACAS Bulletin is the result of preparatory work done with Michael Watts, Okey Ibeanu and Ike Okonta for a workshop to address the crisis in Warri. The meeting, now postponed, was to have taken place in May 2004 at Blue Mountain Center in New York State. The workshop’s aim was to address the need to understand fully the political dynamics of the contemporary struggles over Warri in order to provide a framework within which government, local communities and the oil transnationals can all be held accountable; we also hoped to lay out some dimensions of a just and responsible political machinery for the governance of Warri. The meeting would bring together a group of participants from the three main ethnic groups who are in regular contact with the communities in the Delta and who could reflect the sentiments of people; as well, representatives of two of the most important and central NGOs operating in the Niger Delta — Leaders of Our Niger Delta and Environmental Rights Action — were to participate. Working with other Nigerians who could contribute their related experiences and a team of conflict resolution specialists from Rutgers, we hoped the outcome would be a new frame for a solution to the crisis.

Articles in this issue include:
1. The Political Economy of Oil and Violence in the Niger Delta | Ben Naanen

2. Is it the Warri Crisis or the Crisis of the Nigerian State? | Daniel A. Omoweh

3. The Rhetoric of Rights: Understanding the Changing Discourses of Rights in the Niger Delta | Okechukwu Ibeanu

4. The Warri Crisis – A Case of Three in One | Kayode Soremekun

5. Death-Agony of a Malformed Political Order | Ike Okonta

6. Violence Used Against Unarmed Women in Peaceful Protests Against Oil Companies | Environmental Rights Action, Nigeria

7. African Women, Oil and Resistance | Terisa E. Turner and Leigh S. Brownhill SOURCE: The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

ACAS Bulletin 83: Sexual and Gender Based Violence in Africa [Fall 2009]

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 12:00:12 -0800

This Bulletin began in response to news reports of “corrective” and “curative” gang rapes of lesbians in South Africa. These were then followed by news reports of a study in South Africa that found that one in four men in South Africa had committed rape, many of them more than once. We wanted to bring together concerned Africa scholars and committed African activists and practitioners, to help contextualize these reports. We wanted to address the ongoing situation of sexual and gender based violence on the continent, the media coverage of sexual and gender based violence in Africa, and possibilities for responses, however partial, that might offer alternatives to the discourse of the repeated profession of shock or the endless, and endlessly reiterated, cycle of lamentation.

To that end, we have brought together writers of prose fiction (Megan Voysey-Braig), lawyer-advocates (Salma Maoulidi, Ann Njogu), poets (Chinwe Azubuike), trauma scholars (Sariane Leigh), human righs and women’s rights advocates (Michelle McHardy), gender and transgender advocates (Liesl Theron), activist researchers (Sasha Gear). Methodologically, the authors argue for the importance of respecting the multiple intersections and convergences, the multiple layerings, that underwrite and comprise any single event of sexual or gender based violence, and that necessarily complicate any discussion of these at a broader level.

Articles in this issue include:
1. Sexual and gender based violence: everyday, everywhere, and yet… | Daniel Moshenberg

2. Untitled | Megan Voysey-Braig

3. Zanzibar GBV advocacy: important lessons for future legal reform strategies | Salma Maoulidi

4. Searching for the will to conscientiously prosecute sexual crimes in Zanzibar | Salma Maoulidi

5. Post conflict recovery in Sierra Leone: the spiritual self and the transformational state | Sariane Leigh

6. To be a woman in Kenya: a look at sexual and gender-based violence | Ann Njogu and Michelle McHardy

7. Trans-hate at the core of gender based violence? | Liesl Theron

8. Manhood, violence and coercive sexualities in men’s prisons: dynamics and consequences behind bars and beyond | Sasha Gear SOURCE: The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

Demography Is Destiny in Syria

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 10:32:16 -0800

Among the second wave of Arab Spring uprisings that followed Tunisia, Syria was the most spectacular "out of the blue" that suddenly arose in the face of the media and analytic community. Just days before Deraa exploded with protests last March, some analysts were still scrutinizing Syria's circumstances and declaring the country to be immune from the Arab Spring. Nor did reporters who visited the country spot signs of a brewing storm.

In fact, throughout the Arab Spring, the media and experts repeatedly fell into the same trap of confusing the capital city with the whole country. On the eve of the Islamist landslide in Egypt's elections various polls and informed individuals were putting the popularity of radical Salafis at between 5% and 10%. The Salafis have indeed won about 10% of the vote… but only in Cairo. Nationwide they took almost 30%, beating even those unrepentant pessimists who were betting on a Muslim Brotherhood spring. In some provinces they grabbed all of 50%.

This routine of the periphery ambushing the media and analysts during the Arab Spring and making a mockery of their reports and predictions has reached such grotesque proportions in Syria partly thanks to the media restrictions imposed by the regime, but mostly owing to the very peripheral nature of the Syrian uprising itself. This "peripheralism" has also laid waste to the best efforts of Iranian advisers who came to Syria to share with their Syrian colleagues the know-how accumulated by the regime in Tehran in crushing the Greens.

In truth, the escalation in Syria took by surprise only the people who never bothered to examine Syria's population pyramid. It was no "out of the blue" to anybody even slightly familiar with the basic facts on demography and climate in the region. In the Middle East's long list of hopeless basket cases Yemen is surely beyond competition. However, for quite a while Syria has positioned herself as a formidable contender for respectable second place. SOURCE: Middle East Forum

Roots of Violent Radicalisation

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 10:22:41 -0800

The Home Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons has released its long awaited report on “The Roots of Violent Radicalisation”. Based on nine months of hearings, site visits and numerous written submissions, the report provides a comprehensive overview of recent developments and trends. It highlights, in particular, the increasing role of the internet, the emergence of “lone wolf” terrorists, and the potential threat from far-right extremists. It also assesses the UK government’s revised Prevent strategy. SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // Home Affairs Committee

Zimbabwe’s Sanctions Standoff

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 10:07:32 -0800

Zimbabwe must hold elections before the end of June 2013, but the reforms needed to ensure appropriate conditions are critically wanting. The regional organisation – the Southern African Development Community – calls for the removal of sanctions, claiming they are a serious political impediment to reform. Those who have imposed the measures – in particular, the European Union and the U.S. – argue the reform deficits justify their continuation, though they have been more symbolic than drivers of change. The sanctions gridlock now reflects the broader paralysis that characterises Zimbabwean politics. Opportunity for a calibrated, full removal of sanctions before the next elections, geared to broad progress on reform, such as perhaps existed three years ago when the Global Political Agreement was fresh and the Inclusive Government formed, has probably passed. But a chance to promote progress and break the current deadlock still exists through a coordinated approach that distinguishes types of sanctions and focuses on specific reforms needed for those elections. It should be seized.

The political situation is fragile, with growing fears the country may be heading toward new repression and conflict as the era dominated by the 88-year old President Robert Mugabe comes inevitably closer to an end, and elections draw nearer. Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front [ZANU-PF] claims the GPA and subsequent negotiated reform process have run their course, and conditions are conducive to a free and fair vote. The Movement for Democratic Change [MDC] formations disagree but do not specify what they consider to be the minimum necessary reforms. SADC and most international observers believe the foundation for free and fair elections has not yet been laid. There has been some economic and social progress, but major deficits and deadlock persist on core reforms and implementation of some already agreed matters. Most significantly, ZANU-PF retains full control of the security apparatus, raising legitimate fears elections could lead to a repeat of the 2008 violence and refusal to accept the democratic will of the people.

In response to human rights and election-related abuses perpetrated between 2001 and 2008, the U.S. and EU adopted a variety of measures designed to promote reform. Some are targeted at specific individuals [eg, asset freezes and travel bans]; others involve policies that relate to the international financial institutions and government-to-government relations [eg, restrictions on loans, credit and developmental assistance and arms embargoes]. While there are exceptions within and distinctions between many of these measures, including for humanitarian aid and basic development cooperation, this briefing applies the generic term “sanctions” to them for the sake of simplicity, but also because this is how Zimbabwean and southern African political dialogue commonly addresses the concept. Those who have imposed and maintained them have not communicated their concept effectively, as linked to specific reforms or the broader struggle for democracy, and have never gained regional support for them. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Afghanistan: Annual Report 2011: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict

Mon, 06 Feb 2012 10:01:03 -0800

This annual report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan for 2011 was prepared by the Human Rights Unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and covers the period 01 January to 31 December 2011.

This report is compiled in pursuance of UNAMA’s mandate under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1974 (2011) “to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection, to promote accountability, and to assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a State party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights.”

UNAMA undertakes a range of activities aimed at minimizing the impact of the armed conflict on civilians including: independent and impartial monitoring of incidents involving loss of life or injury to civilians; advocacy activities to strengthen protection of civilians affected by the armed conflict; and, initiatives to promote compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, and the Constitution and laws of Afghanistan among all parties to the conflict. SOURCE: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

ACAS Bulletin 50/51: Health and Political Violence [Winter/Spring 1998]

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 15:59:07 -0800

This issue of the Bulletin on health and political violence continues the theme of intervention and conflict presented in issue no. 48/49 (Fall 1997), this time from the perspective of those who suffer the consequences. With conflict in Africa so pervasive--more than twenty countries have been or are involved in recent wars - there is growing recognition that the development business cannot go on as usual, that policy makers have vastly underestimated the extent of war damage, and that planners must take into account the psychic as well as the physical devastation of war.

Articles in this issue include:
1. Reconstructing Health in Post-War Mozambique | Julie Cliff

2. A Critical Comment on “Reconstructing Health in Post-War Mozambique” | Karim Hirji

3. Violence, Gender and Illness in Post-War Mozambique | Robert P. Marlin

4. The Uprooted and the Forgotten | Asma Abdel Halim

5. Women and Conflict in Africa | Meredeth Turnshen

6. Some Reflections Arising from “Women’s War Stories” | Karim Hirji

7. Removing Landmines - One Limb at a Time? | Warren “Bud” Day

8. The Photographer, His Editor, Her Audience, Their Humanitarians: How Rwanda’s Pictures Travel Through the American Psyche | Niranjan S. Karnik

9. Professional Accountability: Lessons from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission | H. Jack Geiger SOURCE: The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

ACAS Bulletin No. 48/49: Perspectives on Intervention and Conflict Resolution in Africa [Fall 1997]

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 15:33:46 -0800

Since the end of the Cold War, internal violence resulting from ethnic and sectarian conflict has erupted in a number of African countries, most notably Somalia, Liberia, Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo. The United Nations, other international and regional organizations, and interested foreign powers first responded to this explosion of internal violence by employing the traditional methods of conflict resolution that had been used with some success to resolve conflicts during the Cold War period.

Many of the leaders of multilateral international and regional organizations, foreign powers, and other interested parties quickly became frustrated by their inability to use these traditional methods to resolve internal conflicts. They therefore concluded that the traditional methods of conflict resolution were insufficient for dealing with internal violence and sought to develop and employ new methods of conflict resolution which involved the use of sanctions, investigations of human rights abuses, the imposition of legal penalties, and the use of military force.

This issue of the Bulletin presents the views of a wide variety of concerned scholars and activists who, although passionate and involved, seek to provide principled and practical perspectives on these questions. William Minter and Alex de Waal discuss the broad ethical and political issues raised by intervention in African conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Anna Simons, Joost Hiltermann, and Stephen Weissman explore the lessons to be learned from the attempts by the international community to intervene in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi. Herb Howe examines Executive Outcomes - the best known of a number of private security firm that are increasingly active in Africa - and its role in African conflicts. And Adekeye Adebajo looks at the potential for an all-African intervention force, an idea first proposed by Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s.

Articles in this issue include:
1. “Intervention:” The Folly of Formulas | William Minter

2. African Encounters | Alex de Waal

3. Hardly Innocent: Armed Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia | Anna Simons

4. Post-Mortem on the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) | Joost R. Hiltermann

5. Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Burundi | Stephen R. Weissman

6. Executive Outcomes and African Stability | Herb Howe

7. An African High Command | Adekeye Adebajo SOURCE: The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 14:23:28 -0800

The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) is an organization of scholars and students of Africa dedicated to formulating alternative scholarly analysis of U.S. government policy, mobilizing support in the United States on critical current issues related to Africa, developing communication and action networks among scholars in the United States and Africa, and collaborating with other organizations that share our concerns.

Our interdisciplinary approach supports rethinking conventional interpretations of social and economic policy, globalization, development strategies, media representations, and nation building. For three decades, the Concerned African Scholars Bulletin has been a centerpiece of ACAS’s work. It continues to provide timely, relevant and incisive analysis of developments in Africa while promoting alternative views and policies. SOURCE: The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars

Establishing an Early Warning System in the African Peace and Security Architecture: Challenges and Prospects

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 14:06:30 -0800

Conflict Prevention includes a wide range of actions, interventions, programmes, activities, mechanisms and procedures that address structural risks to prevent the escalation of tension into violent conflict, the continuation of conflict or the reoccurrence of armed conflicts in post-conflict situations.1 This in turn broadens and diversifies the purpose of early warning, which is a tool responsible for data collection, analysis and communication of the information for conflict prevention. In 2004, the African Union launched the Continental Early Warning System as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture. This was done in acknowledgement of the effectiveness of conflict prevention, which is proactive than the traditional reactive system in AU. Now the CEWS has been in place for almost half a decade.

This paper examines the progress and challenges of this system by looking at the African Union and other African regional organisations. Key issues to be discussed include a historical background to the CEWS and commonly contested issues in the system. Using different facts and the experiences of the regional organisations, this paper tries to show the challenges and merits of early warning systems in Africa. It also argues that the early warning systems should be included in every stage of conflict and explains that the core value of early warning should be the protection of individuals by the state or by the regional organizations if the state fails to do so. SOURCE: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Policing in Palestine: Analyzing the EU Police Reform Mission in the West Bank

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 13:59:43 -0800

Police reform in the Palestinian Territories has faced many challenges. Rebuilding the police force in a post-conflict environment is not an easy task, and must take into account the community’s needs in order to build legitimacy. In 2006, the European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support was established to support the short-term objectives of the Palestinian Civil Police and provide longer-term transformational change assistance. This issue paper discusses a number of questions to address gaps in the evaluation of police reform efforts. It concludes with a series of recommendations, but maintains that building legitimate and sustainable institutions will not be possible without a credible Palestinian-Israeli peace process. SOURCE: The Centre for International Governance Innovation

State-Civil Society Interface in Liberia’s Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 13:57:02 -0800

Post-conflict peacebuilding demands concerted efforts from all stakeholders to ensure its success; particularly, civil society must complement the capacity of the conflict-weary state. A successful peacebuilding, however, requires a harmonious relationship between the state and civil society. This paper analyses state-civil society relations at different phases of Liberia’s protracted post-conflict peacebuilding process. The paper argues that civil society groups have played and continue to play important role in the peacebuilding process in Liberia and therefore need the support of the Liberian state and the international community to continue their watchdog role. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the Liberian experience for other post-conflict states. SOURCE: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 13:51:16 -0800

The report we present here is the product of two years of effort by a group of former senior officials from government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations who came together as participants in the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative. Our agenda has been to address the future security needs of the Euro-Atlantic region. We set as our goal the development of an intellectual framework for our nations, societies, and peoples to build a security system that will meet the twenty-first-century security challenges that face our region.

Our report sets forth practical steps to begin building this future and calls upon our leaders, governments, and societies to act. As co-chairmen of the Euro-Atlantic Security Commission, we present this report with the endorsement and support of all commission members. We hope that our effort will lead to greater security for all in our region and to our region’s strengthened capacity for global leadership in the promotion of increased stability, safety, and progress in the world beyond. SOURCE: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace // Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

Liberia: A Briefing Paper On The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 13:45:59 -0800

The issues of national healing, reconciliation, truth and justice are crucial and significant for what happens next in countries emerging out of conflicts such as Liberia. Importantly, these issues constitute a real challenge as well as moral and political dilemmas for countries that are making a transition from war to peace. The real problem is that while Truth Commissions have the potential of creating an enabling environment for truth telling and forgiveness through amnesty, reparations and other things, there are doubts as to whether people and societies torn asunder by protracted period of war can easily be reconciled and healed through forgiveness and impunity.

Liberia is no exception to the above. When the decision to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was made at the Accra peace talks and the Commission was subsequently established in May 2005 by an Act of Legislature, it was clear that the country was bent on seeking the truth in order to create an enabling environment for national healing and reconciliation but without necessarily burying justice.

. The main purpose of this policy brief is to critically examine, and provide a capsule analysis and nuanced understanding of the context, mandate, reactions and key issues emerging out of the TRC report and recommendations. Subsequently, the essay puts forward some recommendations for immediate actions by the Government and people of Liberia as well as the broader international community of state and non-state actors in order to facilitate dialogue and informed social debates around the issues emerging out of the report. SOURCE: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Historical Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts

Fri, 03 Feb 2012 13:41:59 -0800

One of the fundamental impediments to molding the Euro-Atlantic nations into a more unified and workable security community, as became apparent early in the deliberations of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, is the lingering distrust that poisons too many of the region’s key relationships. For this reason we organized a working group to explore deeper solutions to the challenges of achieving historical reconciliation between countries divided by deep-seated historical grievances and of breaking through the long-standing impasse in resolving a number of protracted conflicts within the region. The two problems have as a common base the pernicious influence of that underlying mistrust of the other side. In this report, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative’s Working Group on Historical Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts offers an approach that goes beyond traditional diplomacy to get at the root causes of the problem and urges a broader strategy for engaging society at large, the level at which solutions must be found. SOURCE: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace // Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

Violent Islamic Uprising in Northern Nigeria: From the "Taleban" to Boko Haram II

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 16:36:46 -0800

There is a tradition of Islamic radicalism in northern Nigeria, but this has mainly been non-worldly, advocating a purer way of Islamic life. This changed at the turn of the millennium with the emergence of the so-called “Taleban” groups, which were not only more coherent in their worldview, arguing for the establishment of an Islamic government in Nigeria, but were willing to use violence to further their objectives. These groups were crushed by the Nigerian state in 2004, but Boko Haram, which had been established in 2002, continued to exist, as initially it was seen by the government as an unthreatening religious organisation. However, when it turned violent, its original leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was arrested and killed in 2009.

At the time this was seen as putting an end to the organisation, but this was not the case. Boko Haram has re-emerged from the ashes of the death of its original leader as an avant-garde organisation embracing the strategy of hyperviolent, spectacular and deadly terrorist attacks. The question is how this could happen. The marginalisation of the north and the inequality between the north and south of Nigeria and how this may have alienated some of the inhabitants of the north is one factor that must be taken into consideration.

However, this article attempts to place Boko Haram into a broader context by exploring not only the historical factors leading to its emergence, but also issues concerning internal collusion between Boko Haram activists and wellconnected Nigerian “Big Men”, as well as the question of external support for the organisation through emerging African jihadist networks. SOURCE: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre

Nigeria's Boko Haram Militants Remain a Regional Threat

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 15:21:48 -0800

The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram conducted a series of bombing attacks and armed assaults Jan. 20 in the northern city of Kano, the capital of Kano state and second-largest city in Nigeria. The attacks, which reportedly included the employment of at least two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), targeted a series of police facilities in Kano. These included the regional police headquarters, which directs police operations in Kano, Katsina and Jigawa states, as well as the State Security Service office and the Nigerian Immigration Service office. At least 211 people died in the Kano attacks, according to media reports. SOURCE: STRATFOR

Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 15:19:18 -0800

Mali has experienced perhaps the most significant external repercussions from the downfall of the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. Stratfor has discussed the impact of the conflict in Libya on the wider region since international intervention began in March 2011. Instability in Libya due to that country's deep internal fault lines meant that re-establishing a government would prove difficult. As we pointed out, that instability could spread to neighboring countries as weapons and combatants flow outward from Libya.

Reports now indicate that thousands of armed Tuareg tribesmen who previously served in Gadhafi's military have returned home to Mali. The influx of this large number of well-armed and well-trained fighters, led by a former Libyan army colonel, has re-energized the long-simmering Tuareg insurgency against the Malian government. These Tuareg insurgents have formed a new group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In mid-January, they began a military campaign to free three northern regions of Mali from Bamako's control.

The government of Mali has claimed that the MNLA is aligned with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). MNLA, however, has strongly denied any link to the group and said it will serve as a bulwark against AQIM. Given the U.S. and European interest in preventing the strengthening of AQIM, both sides have considerable incentive to take their respective positions. These developments make it an opportune time to examine the MNLA, its current offensive and the potential implications for Mali and the region. SOURCE: STRATFOR

Negotiations Between the Two Sudans: Where They Have Been, Where They Are Going

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 15:16:41 -0800

The last round of negotiations between the government of Sudan, or GoS, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Republic of South Sudan, or SPLM/RSS, saw significant concessions made by the SPLM/RSS and a lack of political will to negotiate on the part of Khartoum. Although the two parties remain far apart in their positions, the SPLM/RSS proposal put forward in the last round paves the way for a comprehensive deal going forward. By virtue of the dynamics between the two parties, a package deal inclusive of a transitional financial arrangement for the North, Abyei, and the border is still the only feasible endgame. SOURCE: Enough Project

De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 14:44:52 -0800

This report is part of a larger project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will be published by Routledge in early 2012. The Report examines the approaches of eight Muslim-majority states1 known to have developed ‘soft’ strategies to counter this problem, and demonstrates how all of these countries have developed varied approaches, strategies and processes. For example, some focus more on countering and preventing further radicalisation in their societies (what we refer to in this report as ‘counterradicalisation strategy’). Countries that fall in this category include Morocco and Bangladesh. Others, such as Yemen and Egypt, focus more on rehabilitating and counselling those who have already become radicalised (De-radicalisation). Some have developed well-structured official programmes (Saudi Arabia), while others rely more on individual initiatives (Jordan). Finally, some have experienced collective deradicalisation, whereby a group of former radicals decide to take a collective decision to denounce violence, admit their mistake and rejoin society. Such collective de-radicalisation can, and has taken place inside prisons (e.g. Islamic Jihad and Jihad Organisation in Egypt in 1997 and 2007, respectively) and outside prisons (e.g. the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army in 1997).

By studying the counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies implemented in our eight Muslim-majority states, the report identifies certain key factors which can be considered as conducive to successful de-radicalisation programmes. These include the following: the role of popular support combined with a committed, charismatic, political leadership; the role of families; the role of civil society; and the role and quality of the clerics and scholars involved. The political and developmental strength of the state is also important, as is the relationship between national counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts on the one hand, and external factors and interventions on the other.

Finally, no single formula can deal with all cases of violent extremism, even within a single region. Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts must take account of the culture, mores, traditions, history, and rules and regulations of each country. SOURCE: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation

Timeline for Negotiations between the Two Sudans [Factsheet]

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 14:21:54 -0800

Since June 2010, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, or AUHIP, led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, has facilitated “Post-Referendum Arrangements Negotiations” between the Government of Sudan, or GoS, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, and the Government of Southern Sudan. Following South Sudan’s declaration of independence on July 9, 2011, negotiations have continued between the GoS and the SPLM/Government of the Republic of South Sudan, or RSS.
The AUHIP-facilitated negotiations have largely been an opaque process, leading to much speculation in the press and elsewhere regarding the current status of talks between the two parties. As discussed in a December 2011 Enough Project report on the negotiations, the process has also undergone a number of structural iterations, adding to speculation concerning the negotiations’ status and results.
In an attempt to shed light on what has occurred in the negotiations to date, as well as to inform future discussions concerning the process, and the AUHIP’s contribution to it, Enough has compiled the following timeline. This timeline provides an overview of the negotiations to date, and reflects the various changes to the process’ structure. SOURCE: Enough Project

Ensuring Success: Four Steps Beyond U.S. Troops to End the War with the LRA

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 14:15:56 -0800

The deployment of U.S. military advisors to central Africa is potentially the most significant step in a decade to end the war against the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA. The comprehensive strategy to end the LRA that U.S. forces should help develop as a result of their deployment will only have a chance of being successful if American forces are supplemented by four additional ingredients from the United States and other supportive countries: troops, transport, intelligence, and a defections strategy, or TTID for short. This includes additional special forces troops, enhanced transport and logistics, upgraded intelligence capacities, and a more effective strategy to increase LRA defections.

If the mission is to succeed, it is essential for the U.S. advisors to stay in the field for a significant amount of time and be buttressed by TTID support. The LRA has decreased its attacks by two-thirds over the past six months in an effort to reorganize and lie low.1 But this is not a sign of LRA weakness. It is part of the group’s historical pattern of waiting out military incursions and then launching attacks. The LRA are among the best survivors on the planet—and they could simply be playing a waiting game for the departure of the U.S. soldiers. If the advisors withdraw prematurely and TTID support is not given, the LRA will likely reemerge and resume its attacks on civilians.

Despite the U.S. deployment and a new African Union, or AU, initiative, which essentially is a rehatting of the military operation by the four countries involved under AU auspices, there is a serious danger of the LRA reorganizing for attacks because of disturbing trends on both the military and civilian side. On the military side, Uganda is the main force undertaking operations against the LRA, but its current capacity and troop numbers—approximately half of what they were in 2010—are inadequate to be able to pin the group down in the vast territory within which it operates, roughly the size of Arizona and extending into four countries. Moreover, Uganda’s best soldiers are deployed as peacekeepers in Somalia. Some 90 percent of LRA attacks over the past six months have taken place in Congo, but Uganda does not have bases there at the request of the Congolese authorities. The shortage of troops is also hurting civilian protection efforts, which are in urgent need of a boost. And the existing deployment is hampered by a lack of mobility and intelligence capacity over the large territory. SOURCE: Enough Project

Implementing a Negotiated Settlement on the Palestinian Refugee Question: The International Dimensions

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 13:36:35 -0800

Today there are an estimated six million Palestinian refugees. Resolving their plight has been a core part of the peace agenda in the Middle East since 1948. While considerable diplomatic effort in the past two decades has centred on reaching a bilateral Israeli–Palestinian permanent status agreement, implementing any such agreement will present an equally massive challenge.

Any permanent status agreement that would see the end of conflict would have to address the moral, legal, and material aspects of the refugee question, including the provision of durable solutions to ensure permanent national protection and socio-economic development for the refugees. The vast scale and complexities involved in implementing a solution for some six million persons residing in more than five geographical areas following more than 60 years of conflict would render implementation a major operational task.

Third parties and international agency representatives will be especially critical for lending political, financial, and logistical support and needed technical expertise in seeing through the implementation process. Such support and expertise are likely to be channelled through an ‘implementation mechanism’ (or agreed institutional arrangement).

The implementation mechanism should account for both dimensions of a comprehensive solution to the refugee question: repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation and reparations (i.e., restitution and compensation), with the former likely to require significant international resources, policy engagement, and monitoring and oversight.

Early preparations by the international community in consultation with refugees, refugee-hosting governments and the parties would benefit an eventual implementation phase. The contributions of the international community will be influenced by the agreed design and mandate of the institutional mechanism for implementation. Preparations should avoid prejudicing any future agreement to be decided by the parties while anticipating measures that the international community may need to take in order to facilitate implementation and the policy options with respect to them.

This paper outlines possible international contributions and their implications based on wide consultations and reflection on existing technical preparatory activities produced through Track II initiatives. SOURCE: Chatham House

Social Mobility in Times of Crisis: Militant Youth and the Politics of Impersonation in Cote d'Ivoire (2002-2011)

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 12:16:45 -0800

This paper explores critical aspects of the agency of youngsters in situations of crisis. Throughout the political-military conflict in Côte d‟Ivoire (2002-2011), the patriotic militias were the locus of extensive networking and, to the extent that this was informed by political or ideological choices, vast enterprises of civil society building. In this paper, I focus on the performative and social dimension of youth militia activity: (a) the sustained attempts by youngsters to insinuate themselves into the armed forces by „impersonation‟, and (b) the wider and often intricate processes of networking and hierarchism within which these persistent pursuits of social mobility took place. Rather than to capture the wider transformations triggered by these processes in narrow analytical concepts such as „brutalisation‟ and „militianisation‟, this paper considers them to be the contingent outcome of competencies, mobility, and creativity of youngsters whose performative, social, and physical trajectories transform public life. This paper thus seeks to make the point that the long post-war (post-2002), or rather pre-peace, multiplication of militias and their growing impact on social and political life, constituted a protracted, multifaceted and multisited process which we can productively begin to disentangle in terms of social mobility albeit of a juvenile and subaltern kind. SOURCE: MICROCON

Displacement in Post-War Southern Sudan: Survival and Accumulation within Urban Perimeters

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 11:16:46 -0800

This paper is about Southern Sudanese IDPs and refugees who, after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, chose not to return to their areas of origin, but instead to resettle elsewhere. Rather than exploring the push and pull factors of this decision, this paper documents the ways in which they have organised their lives in their places of post-war resettlement. More particularly, it explores their selfemployment strategies in an institutional context characterised by weak state regulation and high reliance on self-governance institutions, especially social networks. One observation in particular intrigued us: the fact that some displaced were more successful than others in making a living in their places of resettlement. Consequently, uncovering why some individuals and groups were wealthier than others inspired and structured the research. In order to understand the difference between “networks of survival” and “networks of accumulation” – a twin phrase we borrowed from Meagher (2006) – it was imperative to comprehend the economy as a political terrain and to explore the structural position of groups. To this end it was necessary to complement a social capital perspective with a political economy approach. SOURCE: MICROCON

Forced Migration, Female Labour Force Participation, and Intra-household Bargaining: Does Conflict Empower Women?

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 11:12:24 -0800

Civilian displacement is a common phenomenon in developing countries confronted with internal conflict. While displacement directly affects forced migrants, it also contributes to deteriorating labour conditions of vulnerable groups in receiving communities. For the displaced population, the income losses are substantial, and as they migrate to cities, they usually end up joining the informal labour force. Qualitative evidence reveals that displaced women are better suited to compete in urban labour markets, as their labour experience is more relevant with respect to certain urban low-skilled occupations. Our study uses this exogenous change in female labour force participation to test how it affects female bargaining power within the household. Our results show that female displaced women work longer hours, earn similar wages and contribute in larger proportions to household earnings relative to rural women who remain in rural areas. However, as measured by several indicators, their greater contribution to households’ earnings does not strengthen their bargaining power. Most notably, domestic violence have increased among displaced women. The anger and frustration of displaced women also increases the level of violence directed at children. Because the children of displaced families have been the direct victims of conflict and domestic violence, the intragenerational transmission of violence is highly likely. SOURCE: MICROCON

Conflict Through a Gender Lens

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 11:04:24 -0800

This brief suggests that those seeking an in-depth understanding of the social and political world need to apply a feminist curiosity – that is, a curiosity about the roles gender plays at all levels of human life, including politics. In other words, since gender is central to all inter-personal relationships and influences much of human activity, it clearly needs to be integral to all attempts to understand these. This includes not only situations on the ground but also at the top level of global politics. Finally, the brief demonstrates the important policy implications of using a gender lens in conflict analysis and suggests the penalties for failing to do this may be severe. SOURCE: MICROCON

"All the Information I've Given You, I Faced It Myself": Rural Testimony on Abuse in Eastern Burma Since November 2010

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 10:58:24 -0800

Human rights abuses faced by ethnic communities across rural eastern Burma have continued since November 2010, and are consistent with patterns KHRG has documented since 1992. Drawing from a dataset of 1,270 oral testimonies, sets of images and documentation written and collected over the last year by villagers trained to monitor human rights conditions in their own communities, this report presents information on 17 categories of abuse and quantifies their occurrence across KHRG research areas. By placing recent testimony from villagers in the context of twenty years of abusive practices, this report should make clear that developments since the 2010 elections have neither expanded villagers' options for claiming their human rights, nor addressed the root causes of abuse in rural eastern Burma. External assessments of developments in Burma that ignore local perspectives on continuing human rights abuse thus exclude the input of the most knowledgeable and engaged stakeholders – who also stand to lose the most from inaccurate conclusions drawn without their participation. The testimony presented in the report should thus function as a critique of any attempt to assess changes in Burma that ignores local perspectives, and a call to heed the concerns of rural people who are gauging, on a day-to-day basis, the way past, present and continuing abuse impacts the future for communities in eastern Burma. SOURCE: Karen Human Rights Group

Attacks on Health and Education: Trends and Incidents from Eastern Burma, 2010-2011

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 10:53:58 -0800

This report presents primary evidence of attacks on education and health in eastern Burma collected by KHRG during the period February 2010 to May 2011. Section I of this report details KHRG research methodology; Section II analyses general trends in armed conflict and details a loose typology of attacks identified during the reporting period. Section III applies this typology to 16 particularly illustrative incidents, and analyses them in light of relevant international humanitarian law and UN Security Council resolutions 1612, 1882 and 1998. These incidents were selected from a database detailing 59 attacks on civilians documented by KHRG between February 2010 and May 2011. SOURCE: Karen Human Rights Group

Definitional Ambiguity and UNSCR 1998: Impeding UN-led Responses to Attacks on Health and Education in Eastern Burma

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 10:51:14 -0800

This paper highlights impediments to effective international responses to attacks on health and education in eastern Burma presented by lack of clarity regarding the meaning of "attacks" within the monitoring and reporting framework established by UN Security Council resolutions 1612 and 1998. In order to address this definitional ambiguity and enable recent developments in the UN Security Council to potentially provide support to communities facing attacks in eastern Burma, this paper argues for interpreting "attacks" in a fashion that is consistent with applicable international humanitarian law. The analysis below concludes that UN-led monitoring, reporting and response pursuant to UNSCRs 1612 and 1998 should include acts by parties to armed conflict that both: a) violate relevant international law; and b) attack or threaten to attack personnel related to schools or medical facilities and/ or destroy, damage or force the closure of a school or medical facility. SOURCE: Karen Human Rights Group

International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t We Do Better?

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 10:37:17 -0800

The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations [FSFSPs] provide a framework to guide international actors in achieving better results in the most challenging development contexts. In 2011, the Second FSP Monitoring Survey was conducted in 13 countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo. This followed a baseline survey in 2009 covering six countries [Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste]. This synthesis report reflects the overall picture that has emerged from the second survey. International performance against these Fragile States Principles is seriously off-track. Overall, in the thirteen countries under review in 2011, international stakeholder engagement is partially or fully off-track for eight out of ten of the FSPs.

The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations seem to have stimulated relatively limited change in international engagement at the country level since their endorsement by the OECD Development Assistance Committee [DAC] member countries in 2007 and their validation by both development partners1 and partner countries in Accra in 2008. According to the 2011 Survey, development partner practice has not improved significantly to achieve better results. The main message of this report is that a significant gap still exists between policy and practice. The findings of this survey challenge development partners to complement their focus on results, effectiveness and value for money with a focus on the field-level organisational and paradigm changes necessary for achieving better results. In addition, partner countries have underlined the need for stronger mutual accountability frameworks to guide and monitor joint efforts between them and their international counterparts. Such frameworks should be mutually agreed and results-oriented, reflecting the specific and changing needs and priorities of countries in situations of conflict and fragility.

The variation among the countries surveyed means that findings for individual countries may differ significantly from the overall picture. A distinction also needs to be made between the findings for the five countries that volunteered to monitor FSP implementation in 2009 and the eight countries where the monitoring was carried out for the first time in 2011. SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Kosovo and Serbia: A Little Goodwill Could Go a Long Way

Thu, 02 Feb 2012 09:54:40 -0800

A violent standoff in northern Kosovo risks halting Kosovo’s and Serbia’s fragile dialogue and threatens Kosovo’s internal stability and Serbia’s EU candidacy process. Pristina’s push to control the whole territory of the young state, especially its borders with Serbia, and northern Kosovo Serbs’ determination to resist could produce more casualties. Belgrade has lost control and trust of the northern Kosovo Serb community, which now looks to homegrown leaders. The international community, especially the EU and U.S., should encourage Belgrade to accept the government in Pristina as an equal, even if without formal recognition, but not expect it can force local compliance in northern Kosovo. All sides should seek ways to minimise the risk of further conflict, while focusing on implementing what has been agreed in the bilateral technical dialogue. They should build confidence and lay the groundwork for the political talks needed to guide a gradual transformation in northern Kosovo and eventually lead to normal relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

The current flare-up of tensions began on 25 July 2011, when Pristina sent police to two customs gates along the border with Serbia. Local Serbs surrounded the police and forced them to retreat; one officer was killed in an ambush, and a border post was burned. On 16 September, EULEX, the EU rule of law mission, started to airlift Kosovo officials to the border. All roads leading to the customs points were barricaded by Kosovo Serbs intent on obstructing deployment of Kosovo officials. While the roadblocks have generally been peaceful, violence ensued on at least three occasions during the last months of the year, when NATO’s peace enforcement mission (KFOR) attempted to dismantle the barricades, and Kosovo Serbs pushed back. It is perhaps some testament to the general commitment to limiting casualties that while there have been many injuries, only two persons have died. SOURCE: International Crisis Group