Human Security Gateway: All Updates

Revisiting the United Nations' Role in Afghanistan

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:45:54 -0800

As President Karzai begins his second presidential term, and the United States recalibrates its strategy on Afghanistan, it is important to understand whether the UN still enjoys enough goodwill and the credibility to lead an expanded civilian mission in the country and partner with the Afghans and the international community in stabilizing Afghanistan. Widespread irregularities and fraud in the election in August resulted into a political turmoil in Afghanistan with both domestic and international condemnation. This situation was exacerbated by the open disagreement between the two senior-most UN officials in Afghanistan over the election “process” and on the management of the political fallout. The election thus resulted in a serious dent to the reputation of the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Perceptions are crucial and the Afghans’ perceptions of the UN differ sharply from their perceptions of the other formal groups and institutions that play a prominent role in governing Afghanistan’s current transition – the Afghan government, the foreign forces (independently, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams) and the non-governmental organizations. According to author’s personal interviews in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009, a majority of Afghans, while not wholly opposed to the foreign military presence, increasingly resent military operations because of the large scale of civilian casualties and the subsequent waves of retribution, and misguided targeting of people to settle personal scores. The people’s trust in Afghan government institutions has deteriorated in the last three years – the government was never seen as credible but it had always enjoyed the legitimacy, which it substantially lost after the first round of election in August. The robust NGO commitments may be commended for the small successes, but for most Afghans, they also symbolize development programs and priorities that entail little, if any, consultation with the locals. SOURCE: Henry L. Stimon Center

India: Annual Casualties in Left-wing Extremist Violence in West Bengal

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:37:41 -0800

This datasource presents 2009 data (by month, until November 2, 2009) for the number of deaths due to left-wing extremist (Maoist or Naxalite) violence in West Bengal. The fatalities have been further disaggregated into the categories civilian, security forces, and insurgents. SOURCE: South Asia Terrorism Portal

India: Annual Casualties in Left-wing Extremist Violence in Orissa

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:36:44 -0800

This datasource presents 2009 data (by month, until November 2, 2009) for the number of deaths due to left-wing extremist (Maoist or Naxalite) violence in Orissa. The fatalities have been further disaggregated into the categories civilian, security forces, and insurgents. SOURCE: South Asia Terrorism Portal

India: Annual Casualties in Left-wing Extremist Violence in Maharashtra

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:35:25 -0800

This datasource presents 2009 data (by month, until November 2, 2009) for the number of deaths due to left-wing extremist (Maoist or Naxalite) violence in Maharashtra. The fatalities have been further disaggregated into the categories civilian, security forces, and insurgents. SOURCE: South Asia Terrorism Portal

India: Annual Casualties in Left-wing Extremist Violence in Jharkand

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:33:34 -0800

This datasource presents annual data from 2005 to November 2 2009 (by month and totals for each year) for the number of deaths due to left-wing extremist (Maoist or Naxalite) violence in Jharkand. The fatalities have been further disaggregated into the categories civilian, security forces, and insurgents. SOURCE: South Asia Terrorism Portal

South Waziristan: Blind Fury

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:26:50 -0800

The Pakistan Army is reported to have wound up the first phase of Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) this past weekend, having captured all major towns and villages in the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) stronghold of South Waziristan. According to the military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), 458 militants have been killed (till November 7) since the offensive began on October 17, 2009. 42 soldiers, including officers, have lost their lives and 142 soldiers were wounded in the fighting, the ISPR chief, Major General Athar Abbas, said in an interview with Radio Pakistan on November 6. According to the military, the second phase of the operation will focus, among other aspects, on hamlets and smaller outposts controlled by the TTP. Approximately 30,000 troops, assisted by military jets and helicopter gunships, have been deployed in the TTP stronghold and have moved in from three sides – "from Razmak in North Waziristan towards Makeen in South Waziristan, from Wana and Shakai towards Serwakai tehsil [revenue unit] on the way to Kaniguram, and from Jandola to Spinkai Raghzai, Kotki and Sararogha." On November 3, the Pakistan Army took control of Sararogha, the stronghold of the Hakeemullah Mehsud-led TTP. The capture of Sararogha adds to the significance of securing Kotkai, the home town of TTP chief Hakeemullah Mehsud and his trainer of suicide bombers, Qari Hussain, on October 24. Adding to its significance, Sararogha was where the TTP Shura (executive council) met to deliberate strategy. The political administration has claimed that Army troops were in control of major parts of Sararogha and Ladha, while they were moving to consolidate positions in Makeen town, described as the nerve centre of the Taliban in South Waziristan. The rapid pace with which the military has claimed capture of major towns and villages, including Sherwangi, Kotkai, Kaniguram and Sararogha, and locations such as Tarkona Narai, have fuelled much doubt and skepticism. SOURCE: South Asia Intelligence Review // South Asia Terrorism Portal

Analyzing Buddhadeb Bhattacharya's Soft Stand Towards the Maoists

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:18:55 -0800

A few days ago, the West Bengal Chief Minister, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya decided to release a woman who had been arrested for her involvement in Maoist activities, in return for the release of Atindranath Dutta, a police officer. The decision of the CM was criticized by a significant number of people. Firstly, did the Maoists deserve this soft treatment when they themselves had declined to negotiate? The recent action of the Maoists was in retaliation to the arrest of 14 tribal women by the West Bengal police. They abducted and held Atindranath Dutta captive for three days, following which the CM agreed to release the women on humanitarian grounds. The reaction of the West Bengal government towards the Maoists however, appears strange. Given the Home Minister, P Chidambaram’s recent statements concerning the growing Maoist threat in India, the West Bengal government’s soft stand demonstrated antagonistic action. Besides, the central government was not consulted before making the decision. Amidst the criticism, the CPI (M) General Secretary, Prakash Karat backed the stance of the West Bengal Chief Minister that the exchange did not constitute a soft stand on the part of the ruling government. In his interview with the Indian Express on 26 October 2009, Karat stated that the people who had been released were not Maoists, but only supporters of the Maoist movement in West Bengal. SOURCE: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Development Outreach Vol. 11 No. 2: Fragility and Conflict

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:15:53 -0800

Fragile and conflict-affected states are not new, but the challenges they pose have moved to the top of the development agenda in recent years. Experience has shown that the task of moving a poor, conflict-affected state out of fragility is a complex, difficult and long-term project. In many cases, like in Afghanistan, gains have been hard-won, slow and uncertain. Nonetheless, recent history offers grounds for optimism. Mozambique and El Salvador, once stuck in a downward slide of violent conflict and economic ruin, are now democracies enjoying growth and relative stability. Rwanda, Liberia and Angola have made rapid progress, especially given the conditions they faced when their conflicts ended. But Timor Leste and the Horn of Africa, while very different, remind us that progress can also be marred by setbacks. Paul Collier, who contributed an article to this issue of Development Outreach, has helped us understand the forces that keep states fragile, and how that fragility undermines development prospects. External assistance is essential to help solve the problems of what Collier calls the “Bottom Billion” states, many of which are fragile, conflict-affected or both. But this aid must be complemented by local leaders who fill the institutional voids that created the vulnerability in the first place. One of their first tasks is to build capacity in the public service and in key institutions of civil society. Sanjay Pradhan and Alastair McKechnie, respectively World Bank Vice President for the World Bank Institute, and Director of the Bank Group’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Unit, outline the challenges on these fronts. Elsewhere in this issue—which was developed with guidance from Henriette von Kaltenborn- Stachau and Erik Caldwell Johnson—analysts and world leaders offer lessons. Timor Leste’s Finance Minister Emilia Pires underlines the importance of long-term commitments by donors. At the same time, she cautions governments in fragile settings not to take on everything at once. Perhaps the most decisive element in success or failure is the kind of leadership that emerges in fragile situations. Harvard Professor Matt Andrews, defines this as, “individuals connected in networks [who] intentionally mobilize people, ideas,meaning and resources toward achieving a purpose.” SOURCE: The World Bank Group

Russia: Moscow and Grozny Evince Growing Nervousness Over Regional Security

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:02:55 -0800

Today, all Russia’s actions in the south are dictated by the increasingly active armed underground in the North Caucasus and Russia’s desire to oppose its growing influence on the region’s indigenous population. In the summer of 2009 alone 462 acts of violence were reported, while throughout the whole of 2008 only 265 incidents were registered. As a result, more than 442 persons died in the summer of 2009, while there were only 150 deaths reported in the entire year of 2008. In other words, the number of acts reported throughout the region by Russia has nearly doubled. That is why it is not surprising that despite the announced Russian troop level the opposite process is occurring. Troops are being redeployed to the region, in addition to the ones that have been there since the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999. For example, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on October 29 that additional military units are being redeployed to southern Russia from the Moscow area. The 474th detached motor transport battalion was deployed to the town of Millerovo (Rostov oblast) from the town of Dmitrov (Moscow oblast). An anonymous North Caucasus Military District source also told the newspaper that a major reorganization will take place on the basis of Vladikavkaz-based 58th army, where the formation of an operational command is being completed. Instead of two divisions, the command will be comprised of seven motorized infantry brigades and one tank brigade. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Eurasia Daily Monitor

Our Bodies - Their Battle Ground: Gender-based Violence in Conflict Zones

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:54:46 -0800

Armed conflicts led to the deaths of some 2.8 million people in 2000, according to the British Medical Journal on Conflict World Wide. While the majority of people who died as a result of war were men aged between 15 and 44, a quarter were women aged 15 to 29. The International Rescue Committee, a humanitarian organization that is very active in the area of gender-based violence (GBV), estimated that women and children comprised 40 percent of the 350,000 deaths in the five eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between August 1998 and April 2001. These figures only begin to tell the story of the effect of armed conflict on the female population of war-ravaged countries. While death and disability are the direct result of war, the breakdown of public health systems has a long-term impact on the population as a whole. Factoring in the impact of GBV on the war-affected female population means adding a new level of war-related health issues. SOURCE: Integrated Regional Information Networks // United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Vicious Circles: Sexual Violence Against Young People in Cambodia, Colombia and Northern Uganda

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:50:17 -0800

There has been an explosion of sexual violence in today’s armed conflicts. And reports from civil wars confirm what many fear – these violations are only increasing. Military groups have integrated sexual violence into their arsenal of weapons and found it to be an effective tool to achieve their objectives. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo villages are routinely attacked by rebel groups and all the females – young and old – are assaulted in the most brutal of ways. It is estimated that upwards to one million women and girls were raped during Rwanda’s genocide in 1994. Northern Uganda’s war, often described as a war against children, included the abduction of more than 40,000 boys and girls. Adolescent females over the age of 11 years were expected to serve as both soldiers and as the dutiful wives of commanders. In the past there was an agreement that children should be protected from adults’ wars. This is no longer the case. Just as the world has developed extensive protocols and conventions to protect children, there has been a counter trend to abuse any and all of their rights. It is no exaggeration to say that today’s wars are fought on the backs and bodies of young people. This study steps inside that world. The intention is to examine the nature, extent and impact of war induced sexual violence against young people. The research was based in Cambodia, Colombia and Northern Uganda. Each country and conflict has distinct characteristics that have shaped the vulnerabilities of young people inside combat and civilian situations. The fact that all three situations occupy a different point on the conflict-post conflict continuum has provided a useful point of comparison. SOURCE: Children/Youth as Peacebuilders // Canadian International Development Agency

Women, Peace and Security: The Role of an Arms Trade Treaty

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:38:04 -0800

This briefing paper argues that global standards for the international import, export and transfer of conventional arms and ammunition should prohibit transfers where there is a significant risk that the transfer will be used to violate women's human rights or perpetuate a pattern of gender-based violence. It argues that international law demands linking the norms of an Arms Trade Treaty with UN Security Council Resolutions 1325[1], 1820[2], 1888[3], 1889[4], and obligations under international human rights and international humanitarian law. The involvement of conventional weapons in facilitating violence against women is a cross-cutting issue that demands more attention. States have a duty to protect their citizens. To protect women's rights, the relevant binding international instruments covering rape and sexual violence must be applied in an arms transfer decsions, as well as relevant soft law. SOURCE: International Action Network on Small Arms

Baghdad Divided

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:33:06 -0800

Maps detailing the sectarian cleansing of Baghdad question the utility of the US surge in Iraq as a template for Afghanistan. Analysis suggests that the US surge in Iraq, and the troop increase in particular, did not bring about an end to Iraq’s civil war in 2006-2007. Rather, the surge dovetailed a series of converging dynamics on the ground, facilitating more so than engendering a cessation of hostilities. Iraq’s civil war was foremost about the country’s violent post-invasion shift from a Sunni minority-run state under Saddam Hussein to a Shia majority-run country. Maps developed by Dr Michael Izady for Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) Gulf/2000 Project, an information center on Persian Gulf countries, which have tracked the sectarian make-up of Baghdad in the post-invasion period illustrate this sea change. "Ethnic Groups in Baghdad" - a set of five maps – depict the all but complete sectarian cleansing and segregation of Baghdad during 2006-2007. SOURCE: International Relations and Security Network

The Sexual Violence Research Initiative Conference Report 2009

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:31:10 -0800

Sexual violence has long been neglected both as a public health problem and a violation of multiple human rights. Rape is a threat to global security, and constitutes a crime against humanity. No rape free societies exist today. In many settings, 20-30% of women report having experienced sexual violence at some stage in their lives. Women and girls who are additionally socially marginalised due to, for example, youth, poverty, mental incapacity or participation in sex work, are most vulnerable to sexual violence. Rape impacts on the health and well-being of women in many ways and developing high quality health care services for them is very important, as is developing interventions for prevention. Sexual violence is the least understood and researched form of violence against women. Research is critical in highlighting the extent of the problem, and strengthening public health services and prevention programmes. Lack of evidence hampers the development of good quality, evidenced based policies, services and programmes for women and children survivors of sexual violence. This in turn results in secondary victimisation, discrimination and human rights violations. The SVRI is a network of experienced researchers, policy-makers, activists, donors and others committed to the promotion of research on sexual violence in low and middle income countries and to generating empirical data to ensure that sexual violence is recognised as a priority public health issue and profound human rights violation. The SVRI was established in 2002, with the support of WHO, as an initiative of the Global Forum for Health Research. It is now hosted by the Gender and Health Research Unit, Medical Research Council, South Africa. The SVRI uses an innovative mix of evidence based information, communication and technology media, and capacity building workshops and events to promote and build capacity in research on sexual violence globally. SOURCE: Sexual Violence Research Initiative // Oxfam

The Taliban's Political Program

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:30:22 -0800

At their core, insurgencies are about political power struggles, usually between a central government and those who reject its authority, where the objective of the conflict is the population itself and the political right to lead it. Thus, the center of gravity in this type of warfare is not the enemy’s forces per se, but the population. The centrality of politics to this type of warfare means that counterinsurgent forces must craft a political strategy that is sensitive to the needs of the population, seeks to secure its loyalty to the government, mobilizes the community to identify, expel or fight the insurgent, and extends the authority and reach of the central government. To achieve these goals, a government must have a political strategy that separates the insurgents from popular support so they can be killed or imprisoned. If a political plan is implemented poorly, or not at all, insurgent forces will capitalize on the grievances and frustrated hopes of the community to entice it away from the government. The community may then assist the insurgent with a safe haven to rest, re-arm, re-equip, recuperate and redeploy to fight another day. In the long run, because this conflict is not about how many casualties counter-insurgent forces impose on the insurgents but about the will to stay in the fight, foreign counterinsurgents tend to grow weary of the amount of blood and treasure they must expend. The insurgent could lose every military engagement, but still win the war if the government does not win the population over to its program, policies and plans. SOURCE: Armed Forces Journal

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A Partner for Stabilising Afghanistan?

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 16:41:20 -0800

In efforts to bring stability and security to Afghanistan, the international community of states may have overlooked a critical ally; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This paper argues that the Organisation should be considered a partner in the international stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan, and proposes that Australia is well-placed to be the facilitator for such a venture. On 27 March 2009 the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) met in Moscow to hold a Special Conference on Afghanistan. This conference injected China, Russia and four Central Asian republics into the international dialogue over Afghanistan, establishing the SCO as an increasingly important stakeholder in the security and stability of Afghanistan. Yet, at a time when Canberra was considering its future military commitment to Afghanistan, few Australians noticed this important event. This paper will address the SCO’s potential as a partner to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in stabilizing Afghanistan. It will contend that by leading SCO in such a partnership, China will further its position in the region and achieve recognition as a responsible stakeholder in the global community. The paper will propose that Australia, as a non‐NATO nation, is well positioned to facilitate NATOSCO security cooperation in Central Asia. SOURCE: Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College

Between Government and Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 16:34:05 -0800

Like Islamist parties across the Arab world, Yemen’s Islamist Congregation for Reform (Islah) has a religious ideology and platform. Islah participates in legal politics in hopes of accomplishing constitutional and socioeconomic reforms, and over time it has committed itself to upholding democratic procedures internally as well as externally. Yet Islah differs from most other Arab Islamists. The party combines tribal influences along with those of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood and more radical Salafi groups. As a result, it faces deep internal divisions on key issues, including its relationship with the ruling establishment, its role in the opposition, and the participation of women in politics. Moreover, Islah is not simply an opposition group; until 1997, the party was a junior partner in a ruling coalition. Under Yemen’s authoritarian regime, President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his General People’s Congress dominate political life, and there are no effective checks and balances among the different branches of government. Since its move to the opposition, Islah has had no choice but to cooperate with the regime in order to gain a degree of influence in key political choices. Yet its fractious composition prevents it from developing a clear parliamentary platform, forcing it instead to balance tribal and political interests, differing interpretations of the party’s Islamist platform, and both loyalist and opposition constituencies. As a result, no one knows where the party stands, and it has no clear path toward the reforms it seeks. SOURCE: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:36:14 -0800

This report inventories and analyses the range of international laws that protect the environment during armed conflict. With a view to identifying the current gaps and weaknesses in this system, the authors examine the relevant provisions within four bodies of international law – international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal law (ICL), international environmental law (IEL), and international human rights law (HRL). The report concludes with twelve concrete recommendations on ways to strengthen this legal framework and its enforcement. SOURCE: United Nations Environment Programme

Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:18:56 -0800

Following leadership changes in the United States and Israel in early 2009 and the Israel-Hamas Gaza conflict in December 2008-January 2009, the inconclusive final-status peace negotiations that took place between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the final year of the Bush Administration have not resumed. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama showed his commitment to a negotiated “two-state solution” just days after his January 2009 inauguration by appointing former Senator George Mitchell as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. In September 2009, Obama convened a trilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in New York and addressed the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. He indicated that final-status negotiations should not be delayed further, despite the lack of resolution on preliminary issues such as the possible freeze of Israeli settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem or the possible gradual normalization of ties between Israel and certain Arab states. It has now been 16 years since Israel and the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord. Yet, differences between the sides over core issues, such as borders, security, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and water rights, have not been overcome, despite the third-party involvement of various international actors—the United States, in particular. Previously when talks have faltered, the parties eventually returned to the negotiating table. Yet there are a number of key actors and observers expressing doubts that the very concept of a negotiated two-state solution can survive a process in which negotiations are put on hold and resumed an indefinite number of times without finality. These doubts have been exacerbated by geopolitical changes and by realities on the ground—including demographics, violence, Palestinian factionalism, Israeli settlements, and other impediments to Palestinian movement and territorial contiguity—that sustain tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Hamas's Ideological Crisis

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:15:21 -0800

Despite its success as the first Muslim Brotherhood organization to control and govern territory, and in part because of that success, Hamas today is under significant stress. In the West Bank, Hamas faces a severe security crackdown that has driven the movement underground. And in Gaza, Hamas has been forced to choose between engaging in acts of violence or attempting to effectively govern the territory it took over by force of arms. The result is an acute ideological tension within Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, which has been forced to suspend the resistance for which it is named and by which it defines itself. For some, the cessation of violence, however temporary, is a sign of moderation within Hamas. For others, Hamas’s actions, including continued radicalization and weapons smuggling into Gaza, better denote the movement’s true intentions and trajectory. To be sure, Hamas is not a monolithic movement. But the one constant among its various currents is its self-identification as a resistance movement. SOURCE: Hudson Institute

Is Iran Supporting the Insurgency in Afghanistan?

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:07:54 -0800

Violence and instability in Afghanistan continue to rage in the form of an organic insurgency shaped by local identities, networks, and interests. Operating under the nebulous rubric of the Taliban, the insurgents in Afghanistan have evolved in sophistication, lethality, and geographic scope in recent years. While the presence of transnational radical Islamists led by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan augments the tactical and operational capabilities of the insurgents, myriad factors help fuel the violence that confronts the American-led Coalition. The reach of regional state actors, for instance, impacts the insurgency in Afghanistan. The machinations of Afghanistan’s neighbors, in essence, define its geopolitics. Pakistan’s impact on Afghan politics, society and the insurgency receives the most attention. Another influential actor in Afghanistan that is drawing more attention of late, however, but whose role in Afghan affairs is far less understood, is Iran. Iran’s interests and reach into Afghan society are well known. Official U.S. and regional sources, however, often paint a confusing picture of the nature of Iran’s activities in Afghanistan. Iran is frequently described as a force for stability in Afghanistan, with interests that largely converge with those of the U.S. mission there, namely their shared opposition to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Yet reports that Iranian-made munitions are finding their way into the hands of the Taliban coupled with allegations that Iran is actively providing insurgents with operational and material support are increasingly making headlines. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

Terrorism’s Trojan Horse: Vehicle-Borne Suicide Attacks Give Taliban Upper Hand in Pakistan

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:04:05 -0800

Suicidal Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) attacks have become a weapon of choice for Taliban terrorists in Pakistan due to the availability of dedicated and relatively young would-be martyrs and large numbers of easily hijacked vehicles such as SUVs, cars, trucks and bikes. The advantage provided by this tactic is the guided movement of a large amount of explosives by the bomber himself. Typically wearing a loaded suicide vest, the bomber can swiftly reach the intended target. Larger vehicles can carry a large quantity of explosives, which makes VBIEDs an effective terrorist weapon in causing maximum fatalities and structural damage. The Taliban have tested the effectiveness of these VBIEDs on soft targets such as crowded gatherings, taking inspiration from al-Qaeda’s 1998 attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and numerous attacks in Iraq since 2003. In Pakistan, the Taliban initiated mass-casualty suicide car bombings two years ago when a suicide car bomb hit Benazir Bhutto’s cavalcade in the port city of Karachi in October 2007. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

In Bangkok: Remembering the Tak Bai Massacre

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:51:53 -0800

The ghosts of past violations haunt Thailand. A particular case of mass death in the country's troubled south is emblematic of a bitter conflict in which peaceable, blameless civilians are the principal victims. A demonstration of around 1,500 citizens took place on 25 October 2004 in Tak Bai district of Narathiwat province. Those attending were protesting against what they believed was the unjust arrest of six villagers on charges of allegedly stealing guns from the local defence forces. The terms of martial-law in Thailand's three southernmost, Muslim-majority provinces (Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat) - in place since January 2004 - made this protest illegal. Everyone present was detained. They were then stacked, in horizontal layers, in trucks and transported to the Ingkayuthboriharn military base, six hours away from the vicinity of the Tak Bai police station where the protest had been held. Eighty-five people died in what became known as the Tak Bai massacre; seventy-eight of them by suffocation and crush injuries on the way to Ingkayuthboriharn. At an event commemorating the second anniversary of the massacre on 25 October 2006, one survivor recalled that in his truck, there were four layers of people and that everyone on the bottom layer had died. He survived because he was in the second layer from the top. Although he sustained back injuries that still cause him pain, he is alive. SOURCE: openDemocracy

Legitimacy and Coherence: A Recipe for Effective DDR in Uganda

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:48:43 -0800

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is a universal and essential part of any post-conflict peacebuilding process. However, when DDR is poorly planned it can undermine programming and work against reintegrating former combatants. Northern Uganda’s reintegration process demonstrates some of the unintended consequences of ad hoc initiatives that lack a coherent strategy. Since 1986 a civil war in northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government has displaced two million civilians and killed tens of thousands more. Both the LRA and the Ugandan Army committed widespread murder, rape and abuse of displaced civilians, and the LRA recruited the bulk of its fighting force by abducting an estimated 30,000 children into its ranks. The wide-scale use of abductions over a protracted conflict makes the reintegration process for northern Uganda even more complicated than usual. For instance, LRA leader Dominic Ongwen, indicted by the International Criminal Court, is notorious for his acts of brutality. Yet, he was also abducted at the age of ten, forced to kill loved ones, lead raids under threat of death, and suffer extraordinary abuse by senior commanders. Many child soldiers went through similarly horrific experiences, and their responsibility for violent crime is therefore riddled with ambiguity. The diverse experiences of “victim-perpetrators” such as Ongwen, largely abducted youth and children, needs to be thought about carefully in designing reintegration programs. There are three significant ways in which victim-perpetrators pose a dilemma to aid providers and policy makers on how to create a just and equitable reintegration process. SOURCE: Henry L. Stimson Center

The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 [updated 28 September 2009]

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:39:10 -0800

With enactment of the FY2009 Supplemental (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32) on June 24, 2009, Congress has approved a total of about $944 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Congress is currently considering the FY2010 War request that was submitted to Congress along with DOD’s baseline request. The House passed its bill on July 30, 2009 (H.R. 3326) and the Senate is expected to act on its version in late September 2009. This $944 billion total covers all appropriations approved by Congress for FY2001 to meet war needs through FY2009, the current fiscal year ending September 30, 2009. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $683 billion (72%), OEF about $227 billion (24%) and enhanced base security about $29 billion (3%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 5% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of July 2009, DOD’s average monthly obligations for contracts and pay were about $10.9 billion, including $7.3 billion for Iraq, and $3.6 billion for Afghanistan. Compared to a year ago when the surge ended but troop levels remained high, average obligations have fallen by about 12%. Decreases in costs as troops are withdrawn from Iraq have been largely offset by increases in costs for additional troops for Afghanistan. The FY2010 war request totals $139 billion including $130 billion for DOD for both wars, $6.4 billion for the State Department’s foreign and diplomatic operations, and $2.1 billion for VA medical costs for OEF and OIF veterans. Overall war funding is decreasing from the peak of $185 billion in FY2008 during the surge in Iraq to $150 billion in FY2009. This decline reflects primarily lower war-related procurement as DOD’s returned to a narrower, more traditional definition of war-related costs, rather than lower troop levels since increases for Afghanistan offset decreases for Iraq. Based on the current request, the cost of the Afghan and Iraq wars would fall by another 8% in FY2010, a decrease that is less than the currently planned 19% decrease in overall troop levels. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll: Palestinian Reconciliation Agreement

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:34:15 -0800

Following are the results of the Palestinian Public Opinion Poll no. 39 conducted by the Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies at An-Najah National University during the period from 22-24 October 2009. The poll explores the national reconciliation, the Goldstone Report to the UN Human Rights Council, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh in addition to political affiliations and other issues. The sample included 1360 persons whose age group is 18 and above and who have the right to vote. The enclosed questionnaire was distributed on 860 persons from the West Bank and 500 persons from the Gaza Strip. The sample was drawn randomly and the margin of error is about ±3%; still 3.7% of the members of the sample refused to answer the questionnaire. 40.8% of respondents saw that the one responsible for deferring the signing of a reconciliation agreement is Hamas; 22.4% saw that it is Fateh. SOURCE: An-Najah National University Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies

The Trajectory of Human Rights Violations in Zimbabwe

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:21:14 -0800

The history of human rights violations in Zimbabwe is complicated by the inheritance of a colonial system that, because of skewed racial considerations, did not universally respect and protect basic human rights. Just as religious societies justify their human rights stance through religious arguments, the post-liberation state of Zimbabwe has tried to justify its position through nonimperialist ideological arguments. This poses a problem on consensus of what should be the universal content of human rights. Various perceptions on what constitutes human rights are embodied in the United Nations charter and its various covenants, even though individual states attach different values and priorities to the many rights that guarantee individuals a decent standard of life. Th e United Nations’ instruments on human rights cover a wide range of rights and it is generally acknowledged that at times threatening situations can compel a nation to curtail them. The conflicts over land and intolerance for political opposition are at the locus of the violation of human rights in Zimbabwe. The arbitrary use of power by the state on these two issues has generally had a multiplier effect with regard to disrespect for citizens’ freedoms and autonomy. This paper analyses how the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front, has utilised a critical resource, land, to justify the abuse and violation of its citizens’ rights in its quest to maintain its hegemonic position in the post-colonial state of Zimbabwe. It also points to the importance of safeguarding human rights in states in transition. Zimbabwe committed itself to the International Bill of Human Rights, which covers three covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The charters are not self-enforcing even though the United Nations Commission on Human Rights is mandated with monitoring the implementation of the provisions. Each country bears the responsibility for incorporating these guiding provisions into its policies. The simple act of joining the United Nations implies acceptance of its charter as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the present government of Zimbabwe has failed to live up to these pledges just like its predecessor, the Ian Smith government. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies // L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité

Who is Supporting Jundullah’s Terror Campaign and Why?

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:11:34 -0800

On October 18, 2009, a suicide attack killed 42 people in the province, including members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and injured another 150. Jundallah - the rebel Sunni organization, claimed responsibility for the attack which was confirmed by the Iranian intelligence agency. The group is fighting for the rights of Iran's roughly 4 million Balochs, who, it claims, have been suppressed by the Shi’ite regime in Tehran. The October 18 attack was the second largest attack carried by Jundallah this year. Earlier, on May 28, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside the Ameer al-Momenin mosque in Zahedan, capital of Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province, killing 25 people. This attack was to protest against a regime-imposed festival to mark the martyrdom of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima - an ancient dispute between the Shias and Sunnis. The Zahedan attack itself followed months of other subversive activities by Jundullah inside Iran's Sistan-Balochistan, including the kidnap of 21 Iranian truck drivers in August 2007 into Pakistan, the kidnap of Iranian border troops 16 of whom were executed on camera in December 2008, and the first suicide bombing in Iran's history in December 2008. Jundullah’s hand was also suspected in the November 2008 kidnap of an Iranian diplomat in Peshawar. Iran has accused Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States of engaging in covert funding of the Jundallah. Iranian Interior Minister Heydar Moslehi has said that Iran has given credible proof of the ISI’s involvement in the attack carried on October 18. Evidently, Pakistan would benefit from fuelling Sunni sectarian violence in Sistan-Baluchistan for three reasons. One, though Iran and Pakistan have maintained friendly official ties, Pakistan’s Sunni Taliban extremists have long resented the Shia regime. The Shi’ite-Sunni sectarian divide between Pakistan and Iran, which was obvious during the Afghan civil war in which both sides supported their respective proxies (the Taliban by Pakistan and the Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks by Iran), persists to date and Pakistan’s support for Jundullah is seen by Iran as an extension of this game. SOURCE: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Building a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Recovery and Growth

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 12:48:49 -0800

Despite setbacks, the Juba peace process has created a momentum which most hope is irreversible. The job of peacebuilding is not over with the signing of an agreement however, even assuming that a Final Peace Agreement (FPA) for Northern Uganda should materialise. Addressing structural issues, drivers and consequences of the conflict is also critical in order for the 22-year-old war to end. Through 2008, a renewed sense of possibility has emerged regarding the rebuilding of the Northern Uganda economy, with government, development partners and the private sector all planning either to make the most of the opportunities that may present themselves in the north’s post-settlement economy, or to contribute to peace through revised programmatic interventions. This report is particularly concerned with these economic dimensions of peace in Northern Uganda, recognising both the political economy of the conflict, and the failure of peace processes globally to deliver ‘peace dividends’ that address structural economic imbalances and contribute meaningfully to peace. The attention and interest of the various stakeholders in rebuilding Northern Uganda’s economy as part of peace and recovery present critically important opportunities for positive change and a move to sustainable peace in the region, following years of economic decline and underdevelopment during the decades of conflict. But how strategic are these plans, given the challenges that persist, and when seen from a peacebuilding perspective? Are the opportunities to address root causes, immediate consequences, and ongoing threats of war being seized? What are the unforeseen risks of a re-emergence of conflict posed by some approaches? And how can these best be mitigated? SOURCE: International Alert

Cooperating for Peace and Security

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 12:43:24 -0800

Cooperating for Peace and Security is a new volume of essays by CIC staff, alumni and collaborators, edited By Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman and Richard Gowan. It is a comprehensive survey of multilateral security cooperation since 1989. With essays by leading experts on topics from peacekeeping to nuclear security, it goes beyond theoretical discussions of the value of cooperation to show how the operational activities of international organizations meet the security needs of states. In particular, it explores the complex relationship between multilateralism and American security concerns. Covering the UN, NATO, and regional organizations, the authors show that U.S. interests have often shaped institutions. But, more strikingly, other states have also driven institutional change without U.S. support or even in the face of American opposition. This raises important questions about how the balance of power shapes international institutions. In a period of shifting power dynamics, the empirical evidence on security cooperation gathered in this volume is a unique resource for scholars and policy-makers concerned with the future of international institutions. SOURCE: Center on International Cooperation // New York University

Pakistan: The South Waziristan Migration

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 11:38:06 -0800

Pakistan has been a busy place over the past few weeks. The Pakistani armed forces have been conducting raids and airstrikes against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other foreign Islamist fighters in Bajaur Agency, a district inside Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), while wrapping up their preparations for a major military offensive into South Waziristan. The United States has conducted several successful missile attacks targeting militants hiding in areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border using unmanned aerial vehicles. Threatened by these developments -- especially the actions of the Pakistani military -- the TTP and its allies have struck back. They have used larger, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in attacks close to their bases in the Pakistani badlands to conduct mass-casualty attacks against soft targets in Peshawar and the Swat Valley. They have also used small arms and small suicide devices farther from their bases to attack targets in the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad, the respective seats of Pakistan's military and civilian power. SOURCE: STRATFOR

Iraq: A Rebounding Jihad

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 11:33:18 -0800

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) is not a single entity but a coalition of groups that includes al Qaeda's Iraqi franchise. This coalition was formed as a result of a conscious decision by jihadist leaders to put an Iraqi face on jihadist efforts in the country rather than have the movement characterized by foreign leaders such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This transformation was illustrated by the fact that an Iraqi named Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was named to lead the ISI and that Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the Egyptian leader of al Qaeda in Iraq who succeeded Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, pledged his allegiance to al-Baghdadi and the ISI in November 2006. This change enabled the ISI coalition to build stronger ties to the local Sunni tribal elders and to expand its support network in the Sunni-controlled areas of the country. This link to the local Sunni leadership backfired when the Awakening Councils composed of Sunni Iraqis -- many of whom were former militants -- helped clamp down on the ISI. Because of this, large suicide attacks are less common then they were at the peak of the insurgency (and of overall violence) in 2007. But the Sunni elders never allowed the ISI to be totally dismantled. They saw the coalition as a useful tool in their negotiations with the Shia and Kurds, to ensure that they got what they saw as their fair share of power. SOURCE: STRATFOR

Chechnya: Again the Epicenter of Insurgent Violence in the North Caucasus?

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 11:25:25 -0800

In recent months, federal operations in Ingushetia and Chechnya, as well as punitive security measures in Dagestan have gained momentum. Official announcements indicate that these operations have hampered the ability of the insurgents in the North Caucasus to sustain large-scale attacks in the “year of the offensive” announced by rebel leader Dokka Umarov in May. Nonetheless, while local sweep operations have led to the deaths of a considerable number of so-called militants, daily attacks in Chechnya, as well as low-level violence in parts of Dagestan and Ingushetia indicate that inter-generational change along with repressive federal policies have created the conditions in which support for attacks against federal authorities has not diminished. In a recent announcement by Chechen Interior Minister Ruslan Alkhanov, he noted that nearly one hundred and fifty members of illegal armed formations were killed in federal operations since April. Reportedly, the majority were killed in Chechnya. In a similar press statement in September, the Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov announced that scores of militants had been killed in a series of sweep operations. While human rights organizations have long expressed doubts over official data on alleged militant activity, far from illustrating that local counter-insurgency sweeps have been successful, the number of deaths attributed to counter-terrorist operations in Ingushetia and Chechnya indicates that the insurgency retains a measure of localized support. Moreover, the sophisticated clandestine support network now includes a hitherto limited capability to conduct attacks within Chechnya, bolstered by a younger generation of volunteers who have now joined the ranks of the insurgency over the last few months SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Eurasia Daily Monitor

Violence in Chechnya has Spiked Since Counter-Terrorist Operation’s End

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 11:23:34 -0800

November 3 marked the 200th day since the Russian government formally ended the "counter-terrorist" operation it launched in Chechnya in September 1999, and statistics collected by the Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) website show that more blood has been spilled since the April 16 announcement of the operation’s end than during the 200 days leading up to it. According to the website, 208 people were killed and 157 wounded in Chechnya between April 16 and November 3, and particularly noteworthy was the rebels’ revival of the use of suicide bombers. During that 200 day period, there were at least 92 shootouts between the rebels and security forces, in which reportedly 120 rebels were killed, 110 were captured and six surrendered. By way of comparison, in the 200 days before the counter-terrorist operation regime in Chechnya was lifted, there were 42 shootouts in which 32 rebels were killed, 87 were captured and 13 surrendered. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Eurasia Daily Monitor

UN Report Misleading on Afghanistan's Drug Problem

Fri, 06 Nov 2009 09:52:50 -0800

As President Obama and his advisors debate future troop levels for Afghanistan, a new report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) muddies the water on one of the most important issues in the debate — the effects of Afghanistan's drug production. The report, entitled "Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium," gives the false impression that the Taliban are the main culprits behind Afghanistan's skyrocketing drug production. It also implies that drugs are the main reason why the Taliban are gaining in strength, absolving the United States and NATO of their own responsibility in fomenting the insurgency. In fact, the United States and its Afghan allies bear a large share of responsibility for the drug industry's dramatic expansion since the invasion. Buried deep in the report, its authors admit that reduced levels of drug production would have little effect on the insurgency's vigor. UNODC states that a decade ago the Taliban earned $85 million per year from drugs, but that since 2005 this figure has jumped to $125 million. Although this is pitched as a significant increase, the Taliban play a more minor role in the opium economy than UNODC would have us believe and drug money is probably a secondary source of funding for them. Indeed, the report estimates that only 10-15% of Taliban funding is drawn from drugs and 85% comes from "nonopium sources." The total revenue generated by opiates within Afghanistan is about $3.4 billion per year. Of this figure, according to UNODC, the Taliban get only 4% of the sum. Farmers, meanwhile, get 21%. SOURCE: Foreign Policy in Focus

A Risky Gambit: The Pakistani Army Campaign in South Waziristan

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:33:23 -0800

South Waziristan, a remote mountainous region bordering Afghanistan, is the home base of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and is considered to be a global hub for Islamic militants. The Pakistani army’s historic coddling and cultivation of militants has ended by creating a Frankenstein monster, which the military is now desperately attempting to control. The insurgents’ increasingly apparent goal is to destabilize and ultimately overthrow the state, as evidenced by the spate of recent terrorist attacks. While the attack on the Mehsud Taliban and the TTP movement was welcomed by Nato members, the campaign’s goals are still uncertain. The general view is that win, lose or draw, this battle will be tougher than the operations in either Swat or Bajaur, and may be the army’s biggest challenge yet in their confrontation with home-grown jihadists. After a two-week spate of terrorism in late September and October 2009, which killed at least 166 people, the Pakistani army launched Operation Rah e Nijat (Path to Salvation), a retaliatory ground offensive in the Taliban-controlled area of South Waziristan. The operation captured the global media’s attention, as it exemplified the country’s deteriorating security and stability and highlighted the dramatic stakes involved. Over 28,000 Pakistani soldiers initiated combat executing a pincer movement to encircle the homeland of the Mehsud tribe which lies inside a ring of government-held towns. The Mehsud are reputed to be among the fiercest fighters in Pakistan and the army faces 10,000 of them, plus an additional 2,000 or so fighters from Uzbekistan, al-Qaeda and the Punjab. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are living a perilous moment. Afghanistan, besides its ongoing war and violence, confronts a governance crisis and a president who stands accused of stealing the election. Pakistan has embarked on a high-risk military campaign to combat the escalating terrorism that is destabilizing the state. Both situations at this moment are cliff-hangers, but the Pakistanis may have been dealt an even more difficult and complicated hand than the government of Hamid Karzai. SOURCE: Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre // Noref

Arms Transfers to the Middle East

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 15:30:47 -0800

United Nations member states are currently discussing the feasibility of an arms trade treaty (ATT), which would seek to create better controls on international arms transfers. To support this process, the European Union (EU) is funding a series of six regional seminars, organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), to increase the awareness of an ATT among UN member states, regional organizations, civil society and industry, and to promote international discussions about the proposed treaty. This paper is part of a series of region-specific Background Papers produced by SIPRI to inform discussions during these meetings. Specifically, this paper provides background information for the regional meeting on the Middle East.1 Section II gives a general overview of international arms transfers to, from and within the Middle East in recent years. Section III discusses a number of issues raised by arms transfers: use of arms in conflicts, small arms and light weapons (SALW), and transparency. Section IV includes brief conclusions. SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Marginalisation and Violence: Considering Origins of Insurgency and Peace Implementation in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 15:26:43 -0800

Renewed interest in investigating the causes of conflict in Africa’s Sahel region can be partly credited to Homer-Dixon’s work, in which he links ‘environmental scarcity’ and violent conflict. This framework has led to a number of analyses on the causes of insurgencies in the Sahel, which have supported the role of natural resources in conflict. However, although natural resources are an important factor in local conflicts in the region, it is necessary to view them in the social and political context in which they acquire significance. This paper addresses two issues. First, it builds on an argument in earlier research on the Nuba Mountains that purely resource-based explanations are not sufficient to find comprehensive measures for conflict resolution, showing that any resource scarcity explanation needs to be incorporated in its prevailing socio-cultural and political context. It is further argued that the mere existence of resources is not necessarily a reason for conflict and that resources only gain prominence and become conflict-prone in the social context that dictates their desirability and value. For instance, in the case of the prolonged wars in Sudan’s periphery, resource-focused analyses alone cannot explain why conflicts have been triggered in these politically and socio-economically marginalised areas. An explanation incorporating resource politics in a broad state and governance-based analysis with a significant socio-political dimension does, however, allow a conceptualised interpretation of these conflicts. Second, the paper provides insights into the causes of conflict in the early 1980s and the current situation, which to an extent resemble each other. Whereas in the late 1970s and early 1980s economic, political and security conditions deteriorated sharply in southern Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains in conjunction with the failure of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, the current deterioration is linked to the exclusive and narrow base of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Both agreements were essentially exclusive power-sharing deals between the main rebel organisations and the government regime. Consequently, a broad-based analysis of the origins of war in the 1980s is necessary for a deeper understanding of the current situation and to provide well-founded policy recommendations to minimise the possibility of another large-scale conflict in the future. In an effort to implement any such recommendations, the extensive role of the international community is fundamental. The paper consists of six sections. The following section provides a brief historical background to the Nuba and their general relationship with neighbouring peoples and the Sudanese state in an attempt to highlight Nuba grievances against the state and the governing elite. Subsequent sections examine the process of conflict formation in the Nuba Mountains in the 1980s, provide insights on the conflict and the peace processes that culminated in the CPA, and analyse the current and possible future situation in the Nuba Mountains. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies // L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité

The Somalia Conflict: Implications for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Efforts

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 15:22:06 -0800

It has been 18 years since the eruption of the Somalia conflict following the demise of the government of Siaad Barre. During this period, the conflict fluctuated in terms of its intensity, the nature of actors involved as well as its dimensions and dynamics. Currently, the conflict is raging on between the militarily weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and their supporters on the one hand and al Shaabab and other fundamentalist groups on the other. While the TFG, which was expanded in early 2009 following the peace agreement between TFG and the moderate opposition group the ‘Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia’ (ARS-Djibouti), enjoys international legitimacy and the support of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), opposition forces particularly al Shaabab reportedly receive support from some countries in the region as well as others in the Middle East. Th e TFG with the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) controls only a small part of the capital Mogadishu. Large parts of south central Somalia, including parts of the capital, are in the hands of al Shaabab and other opposition forces. While in the past, clan politics and rivalry between various warlords fuelled and entrenched the confl ct, in recent times the conflict has increasingly taken the shape of a conflict between those that allegedly advance different forms of Islam. Another notable development is also the extension of the conflict from inland areas to the sea off the coast of Somalia. Th e coastal water of Somalia is now the most pirate-infested sea, posing a serious threat to maritime security and trade. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies // L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité

Summary of the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/8: A profile of Afghanistan

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 15:14:33 -0800

Nearly every second Afghan citizen is under 15 years of age – in numbers: 12 million or 49 percent of the population. Also, more than one out of three Afghans – some 9 million people or 36 percent of the population – lives in absolute poverty and cannot meet his or her basic needs. On the positive side, the proportion of primary-school age children that is attending school has increased from only 37 to 52 percent in just over two years time. These are only a few of the numerous figures of the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/8 conducted by the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The assessment is based on statistical data collected during a one-year period from August 2007 through August 2008 – making it the most extensive statistical venture of its kind in Afghanistan. 156 enumerators were involved, male and female interviewers travelled to 395 districts in 34 provinces, collected data from more than 20.000 households with over 152,000 Afghan citizens. SOURCE: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

International Engagement in Fragile States: Lessons from Southern Sudan

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 15:12:03 -0800

Southern Sudan has been seen as a testing ground for effective international engagement in fragile states. International efforts on the ground have however been hampered by assumptions that the transition from conflict to peace is linear and logical, and by the lack of creativity in programming for the transition. As a result, the people of Southern Sudan have yet to see the tangible, visible improvements in their lives that are essential to safeguard the already volatile peace process. It is clear that the conventional aid architecture is ill equipped to cater for a situation that spans humanitarian and development needs. As in many ‘post-conflict’ countries, Southern Sudan still needs support for direct service delivery, alongside support for the building of government capacity. SOURCE: Humanitarian Policy Group // Overseas Development Institute

Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 15:05:23 -0800

It is an oft-cited maxim that in all the conflicts of the past century, the United States has refought its last war. A number of analysts and journalists have mentioned the war in Vietnam recently in connection with Afghanistan. Perhaps fearful of taking this analogy too far, most have backed away from it. They should not—the Vietnam War is less a metaphor for the conflict in Afghanistan than it is a template. For eight years, the United States has engaged in an almost exact political and military reenactment of the Vietnam War, and the lack of self-awareness of the repetition of events 50 years ago is deeply disturbing. The Obama Administration deliberately took ownership of the Afghanistan war in its first days in office by sending more troops and ordering multiple strategic reviews. In October, as this article is being written, the Obama Administration is engaged in a very public strategic review following both a grim assessment from the President’s hand picked theatre commander, General Stanley McChrystal, and an embarrassing election fiasco in Afghanistan. President Obama certainly knows, as Presidents Johnson and Nixon did in similar circumstances, that the choice of alternatives now is between bad and worse. There is general agreement today, as indeed there was before the Diem Coup in 1963, that the war is going badly. Attacks of all types in Afghanistan have increased each year since 2003 and are up dramatically in 2009, the deadliest year yet for American forces. The Kabul government is so corrupt, dysfunctional, and incompetent that even its election rigging is buffoonish. The U.S. troop commitment has escalated steadily, a pattern familiar from the Vietnam War, and now the President must contemplate a request for another 40,000 U.S. troops or, in the words of General McChrystal’s classified assessment leaked to the Cam Rahn Bay, no Mekong Delta, and no coastline, largely limiting the huge advantage of U.S. naval power to SEALs and Seabees. SOURCE: Military Review // United States Army Combined Arms Center

Maoist Major Incidents 2009

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 14:38:11 -0800

This factsheet outlines major Maoists incidents that occurred in 2009 in India. SOURCE: South Asia Terrorism Portal

The Marriage Market and Tajik Armed Conflict

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 14:25:18 -0800

This paper explores the relationship between the 1992-1998 armed conflict in Tajikistan, sex ratios and the age at first marriage for women. The findings suggest that there is substantial and robust negative effect of temporal and regional exposure to armed conflict on entry into their first marriages by females in Tajikistan. Women born in 1975- 1983, who lived in the conflict affected areas were about 30 percent less likely to enter marriage than women of the same age from the lesser affected regions. The period and region specific sex ratio has little effect on the age when women first marry. This limited effect of sex ratios in Tajikistan could be explained by the adherence to traditional marriage practices when grooms and brides are often related by a common ancestor and arranged marriage is a norm. SOURCE: Households in Conflict Network // Institute of Development Studies // University of Sussex

Does Terrorism Work?

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 14:20:18 -0800

This paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool to achieve political goals. By exploiting variation in terror attacks over time and across locations in Israel from 1984 to 2006, we show that local terror attacks cause Israelis to be: (i) more willing to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians; (ii) more willing to accept a Palestinian state; (iii) less likely to identify oneself as being right-wing; and (iv) more likely to have a favorable opinion of Arabs. These effects are especially pronounced for individuals from particular demographic groups which are typically right-wing in their political views. In addition, we show that terror induces Israelis to vote increasingly for right-wing parties. This pattern of results demonstrates that right-wing parties are becoming more accommodating to Palestinian demands for territorial concessions. Hence, this paper shows that terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of shifting the entire Israeli political landscape to the left. These findings may shed light on the causes underlying the spread of global terrorism in the last few decades. SOURCE: Households in Conflict Network // Institute of Development Studies // University of Sussex

Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 14:01:51 -0800

In March 2009, out of concern that the overall security situation in Afghanistan had not improved after more than 7 years of U.S. and international efforts, the administration completed a 60-day strategic review of U.S. policy and the security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan.1 Based on this review, and recognizing the vital U.S. interest in addressing security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration announced a strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating these extremists and eliminating their safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.2 Subsequently, in August 2009, the United States issued an integrated civilian-military campaign plan for support to Afghanistan.3 The strategy and campaign plan call for, among other things, the execution of an integrated counterinsurgency mission and continued efforts to build the capacity of military and civilian elements of the Afghan government to lead counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and provide internal security for the Afghan people. Accordingly, the focus for U.S. forces in Afghanistan will be to (1) secure Afghanistan from insurgent and terrorist threats and (2) rapidly train Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)4 to lead military and law enforcement operations. SOURCE: United States Government Accountability Office

The Sunni Divide: Understanding Politics and Terrorism in the Arab Middle East

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 13:22:14 -0800

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a bloody conflict broke out between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias. This conflict has led some observers to see the entire region through the prism of the age-old Sunni-Shia struggle. However, dividing the Middle East along sectarian lines is not an accurate way to assess the loyalties or predict the actions of various regional actors. For example, in 2006 Israel went to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon and in 2008-2009 with Hamas in Gaza. In both of these conflicts, Shias from Hezbollah and Iran sided with Sunni Islamists from Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood associated organizations. On the other side of the regional divide were Sunni Arab Nationalists, traditional Sunni monarchies, and Sunni Islamists with Wahhabist tendencies. These groupings are generally indicative of the political order in the Middle East. So a divide exists in regional politics, but it is not between Sunnis and Shias. While it is clear that the Shias fall on one side of the political divide and that they are generally opposed by the Sunni Arab nationalists and Sunni Arab monarchists, the sectarian divisions become blurred when considering Sunni Islamists. Divisions within Sunni Islamism run deep and are extremely important, both to the regional balance of power and to the United States’ efforts to combat terrorism, for example. In fact, the division that will shape the future of Arab politics is not between Sunnis and Shias but among various understandings of Sunni Islamism. SOURCE: Center on Terrorism and Counterterrorism // Foreign Policy Research Institute

The Role of Civil Society in Counterterrorism

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 13:06:50 -0800

Over the past three and a half years thanks to the generous support and cooperation we have received from many of you around this table, the Center has undertaken a number of projects aimed at improving cooperative approaches to countering terrorism, often in the context of promoting and raising awareness of the UN Global Counter‐Terrorism Strategy in different regions of the world. At nearly every stage of our work we have sought to organize activities in the field and involved a wide range of stakeholders beyond the usual crowd that tends to gather around discussions of terrorism and counterterrorism. We have paid particular attention to including local non‐government stakeholders, believing that they are critical, and often undervalued, players in the design and implementation of any effective long‐term strategy to address terrorism. In 2008, with the support of the governments of Germany and Sweden, we undertook a project aimed at raising awareness of the UN Global Counter‐Terrorism Strategy among civil society organizations (CSOs) around the globe. At the conclusion of this project, which included a workshop in NY involving some 25 CSOs from around the world, we produced a report, Civil Society and the UN Global Counter‐ Terrorism Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges, which is available on our website and explores the important and often overlooked role that civil society can play in combating terrorism (without compromising or relabeling its important ongoing work) and the challenges and the opportunities for expanding engagement between civil society and the UN system on counterterrorism and related issues. The report also looks at the impact that counterterrorism measures have had on civil society and the need for the United Nations to promote the role of civil society, including in the context of Strategy implementation. It concludes with a series of recommendations focused on concrete steps that the UN system, states, and CSOs should take, alone or in partnership with each other to, among other things, deepen engagement between the United Nations and CSOs on Strategy issues and stimulate more CSO involvement on Strategy‐related issues more generally. SOURCE: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation

Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian Revolution

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 12:16:47 -0800

President Hugo Chávez’s victory in the 15 February 2009 referendum, permitting indefinite re-election of all elected officials, marked an acceleration of his “Bolivarian revolution” and “socialism of the 21st century”. Chávez has since moved further away from the 1999 constitution, and his government has progressively abandoned core liberal democracy principles guaranteed under the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights. The executive has increased its power and provoked unrest internally by further politicising the armed forces and the oil sector, as well as exercising mounting influence over the electoral authorities, the legislative organs, the judiciary and other state entities. At the same time, Chávez’s attempts to play a political role in other states in the region are producing discomfort abroad. The December 2010 legislative elections promise to further polarise an already seriously divided country, while unresolved social and mounting economic problems generate tensions that exacerbate the risk of political violence. Taking advantage in 2009 of a non-electoral year in which he stands to lose little in terms of political capital, as well as of his undisputed control of the National Assembly, Chávez has pushed through a series of laws that have been unpopular with broad sectors of the populace. Continued targeting of the political opposition and the mass media, coupled with growing economic, security and social problems, are deepening discontent. Ten years in power have failed to produce significant and sustainable improvements in the living conditions of the poorer segments of society, which are also experiencing critical levels of insecurity and stark deficiencies in basic public services. Tense relations with Colombia may take a toll on the president’s popularity at home. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Another Go at India-Pakistan Dialogue

Thu, 05 Nov 2009 12:10:10 -0800

While the Indian prime minister is under pressure to reach out to Pakistan and has indicated a desire to resume peace talks, expectations are not great as Pakistan faces multiple crises. As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was visiting Pakistan to assuage growing concerns about the state of US-Pakistan ties, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir declaring that if Pakistan showed “sincerity and good faith,” India “will not be found wanting in its response. “The hand of friendship that we have extended should be carried forward. This is in the interest of people of India and Pakistan,” he said, underlining that terrorists “want permanent enmity to prevail between the two countries,” though he avoided mentioning the November 2008 Mumbai attacks or Kashmir. At a later press conference, Singh clarified that New Delhi’s demand that Islamabad put terror groups under “effective control” was “not a pre-condition” for the resumption of India-Pakistan talks, rather a “practical” way forward because “we are a democracy and if day in and day out terrorist attacks continue to take the precious lives of our citizens, we cannot create a mahaul [atmosphere] for meaningful negotiations.” And now, speculation is building that India-Pakistan dialogue is about to be rejuvenated. After the Mumbai terror attacks last year, India suspended dialogue with Pakistan, asking it to first dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in its territory directed at India. Though India still remains dissatisfied with Pakistan’s efforts to bring to justice all the perpetrators of last year’s assault on Mumbai, there is growing pressure on New Delhi to re-start the dialogue. SOURCE: International Relations and Security Network