Human Security Gateway: All Updates

The War on Terror and the Crisis in Pakistan

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 13:55:35 -0700

Ever since the shocking, saddening events of September 11, 2001, U.S. policy has been dominated by an array of initiatives known collectively as the “war on terror.” Though enacted with good intentions, the “war on terror” has generated more controversy than it has palpable results. It has embroiled the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has left it increasingly isolated in international affairs. It has undermined the foundations not only of American ideals but of American law as well. All the while, Islamic extremism has arguably gained in popularity, and the very groups that are responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks - Al Qaeda and the Taliban - have eluded destruction and are more powerful than ever. How ironic it would be if the most direct consequence of the “war on terror” was the overthrow of a government by Muslim extremists and the destabilization of a nuclear-armed country. With the Taliban gaining full control of the Swat Valley in Pakistan last February and advancing to within 60 miles of Islamabad just a few months ago - moving much faster and over a wider area than in any of their previous incursions - such a catastrophe seems to be looming just over the horizon. Pakistan has long been the geopolitical thorn in the side of the “war on terror.” The South Asian Muslim nation had been the Taliban’s most valuable supporter prior to the September 11th attacks, and after the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the remnants of the Taliban were able to avoid total destruction by migrating across the porous Afghan-Pakistani border and finding refuge in the mountainous, loosely governed regions of Pakistan’s northwest. Although the United States was able to coax an ambivalent Pakistan into supporting its “war on terror,” the Pakistani Army was unwilling and unable to launch a concerted offensive to eradicate the Taliban once and for all. As a result, Taliban militants were able to regroup and begin their expansion inside Pakistan that now has brought them within 60 miles of Pakistan’s capital. SOURCE: E- International Relations

Understanding the Disturbances in Xinjiang

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 13:51:46 -0700

The underlying factors behind the events of July 5, 2009, in Urumqi include cultural, economic and political dimensions. Urumqi (a city of 2 million people) is the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in People’s Republic of China. The Uyghur speak a Turkic language, use a modified Arabic Script, and are Sunni Muslims. Their cultural identity is quite distinct from the ethnic Chinese, the Han. Over 75% of the city’s population is Han. In contrast, Xinjiang is 46% Uyghur and 40% Han. (These are the official figures and do not include the floating population of migrants). Xinjiang is economically and geopolitically important to China. Xinjiang is the number three oil producer in China. Xinjiang is one-sixth of China’s territory and borders onto Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Given the significance of oil and the role of China in Central Asia, stability in Xinjiang is key to the Chinese state. There are historical precursors to the current disturbances. On December 12, 1985, all Uyghur students from Xinjiang University boycotted classes and some 5000 students from all colleges marched to People’s Square in Urumqi. Similar demonstrations occurred across Xinjiang. The demands articulated in the demonstrations included: no nuclear testing in Xinjiang, no resettlement of criminals in Xinjiang, more support for education for minority nationalities, and no one-child-policy for Xinjiang minorities. After the demonstration, all students were required to attend extra sessions of political study. The school authorities also received criticism from the regional leaders. A similar march happened on December 22, 1985 in Beijing. Government officials explained in meetings with Beijing students that testing was done in Lop Nor as it was uninhabited, that reform through thought inmates would be sent back upon completion of their sentences and that family planning policy is not applied to minority nationalities. This political demonstration occurred during the heady days of reform after the Cultural Revolution and before the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989. The tactics of the students were those of intellectuals and political expression. This was a non-violent protest. SOURCE: E-International Relations

Af-Pak Strategy: A Survey of Literature

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 13:47:51 -0700

This survey of literature aims to analyze the ongoing debate on the Af-Pak strategy. The existing literature can be broadly categorized into the following themes. Firstly, from the US perspective – most articles and reports see the strategy as harmful to US interests. Some see it as beneficial and very few focus on the motivations of the administration in linking Afghanistan and Pakistan. Second, with regard to Pakistan – most articles and editorials opine that the strategy is against Pakistan’s interests. Very few praise it, while some explore why the US should concentrate more on Pakistan. Third, from Afghanistan’s viewpoint – numerous articles focus on how the Af-Pak strategy is a deterrent to peace and development in Afghanistan, and very few praise the new strategy. Lastly, the Indian viewpoint does not see the Obama administration’s strategy as beneficial for Indian interests. SOURCE: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Testimony of Robert Mcbrien Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 12:24:31 -0700

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important role ofthe Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") in countering the threat that Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose to our country and our Mexican neighbors, including our common border. In particular, I will describe the use ofthe Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, commonly known as "The Kingpin Act," in responding to this threat and in supporting not only other agencies ofthe U.S. government, but also the law enforcement authorities of the Government of Mexico. A significantpoint that should be made at the outset is that OFAC is not new to the battle against the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. We have been using the Kingpin Act authorities against significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their networks around the world, including Mexico, since the first set of drug kingpins - what we call Tier I's -were named by the President in June of 2000. The Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC, administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. OFAC acts under Presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under US jurisdiction. SOURCE: The United States Government // Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Testimony of Kumar Kibble Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 12:20:07 -0700

As the primary investigative agency in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE protects national security and upholds public safety by targeting transnational criminal networks and terrorist organizations that might exploit potential vulnerabilities at our borders. Partnerships are essential to this effort, and ICE works closely with its domestic and foreign partners at the federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal level to create a united front to secure the border and dismantle transnational criminal organizations. ICE targets organizations that exploit legitimate trade, travel and financial systems, using all of our enforcement authorities to ensure that cross-border crime is attacked from every possible angle. Indeed, the recent escalation of violence by drug cartels and other criminal organizations just over our border with Mexico demonstrates the importance of this mission. As Secretary Napolitano recently testified, the violence in Mexico is not solely an international threat; it is a homeland security issue in which all Americans have a stake. The cartels that Mexican authorities are battling are the same criminal organizations that put drugs on our streets, fueling violence and crime. Illegal drugs, money and weapons flow both ways across our border and inextricably link U.S. and Mexico efforts to combat the drug cartels. Our two countries share a nearly 2,000 milelong border, billions of dollars in trade, a commitment to democracy, and the need to prevail against transnational organized crime. SOURCE: The United States Government // Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Testimony of Todd Owen Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 12:16:50 -0700

The primary goal of our strategy between the ports of entry is to gain effective control of our Nation’s borders. Effective control is achieved when a Chief Patrol Agent determines that agents deployed in a given area consistently: detect illegal entries into the United States, assess and classify any threats associated with the illegal entries, respond to the area, and bring the situation to a successful law enforcement resolution. During Secretary Napolitano’s congressional hearing a few weeks ago, she explained the importance of having a border security strategy that incorporates the elements of effective control. CBP establishes effective control through a balanced combination of technology, personnel, and tactical infrastructure allowing Border Patrol agents to confront the criminal element. Secretary Napolitano often refers to this strategy as the “three-legged stool.” One of these legs cannot provide effective control by itself. The mix of these three elements will vary depending on the challenges of the focus area. Technology allows us to detect the entries and to assess and classify the threat. Personnel provide the response to confront the criminal element. Tactical infrastructure supports the response by either providing access or extending the time needed for the response by deterring or slowing the criminal element’s ability to easily cross the border and escape. As of May 31, 2009, we have determined that 894 miles of border are under effective control. This includes 697 miles along the southwest border, 32 along the northern border and 165 in the coastal regions. Across the southwest border, we have made significant strides in increasing our situational awareness and tactical advantage over those seeking to violate our laws. With increased situational awareness, we can better understand where we have the highest threats and vulnerabilities, and assess where we need to apply our resources. Situational awareness also enables our agents to perform their jobs more safely and more effectively. This is especially critical during times such as these where we are experiencing higher levels of violence at our Nation’s borders. SOURCE: The United States Government // Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Testimony of Gil Kerlikowske Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 12:12:49 -0700

Just over a month ago, DHS Secretary Napolitano, Attorney General Holder, and I publicly released the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy in New Mexico. Prior to the public event, I asked the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Directors from the Southwest border to brief me on the border challenge and to stand with me when we presented the strategy. What the HIDTA Directors told me, and what I believe Members of this Committee already know, is that our frontline State, local, and tribal law enforcement partners are under enormous strain and are bearing a tremendous burden. Police and sheriff departments situated on or near the border, and their colleagues throughout their local criminal justice systems, face tremendous risk from the violent international drug trafficking organizations that move large quantities of drugs northbound and money and weapons southbound across the border. Although this strain is most acute on the border, clearly it is a national problem, with every state challenged with drug-related crime and violence and widespread availability of dangerous, addictive drugs. The Administration intends to get help to those who need it on the border and to maintain our intense focus on this threat for as long as it takes. The investments from the Recovery Act are going to make a real impact as those new projects get going, and there will be more support to follow. SOURCE: The United States Government // Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Testimony of Alan Bersin Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 12:00:24 -0700

On June 5, Secretary Napolitano—along with Attorney General Eric Holder and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director Kerlikowske—announced the 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. This Strategy lays out the Administration’s comprehensive, interagency approach for combating the drug trafficking organizations that operate along our border with Mexico. In doing so, the Strategy serves as the top-level framework guiding the Department’s efforts to stop guns and bulk cash from flowing south and illicit contraband from being trafficked north. The Strategy, including its general parameters, was developed pursuant to ONDCP’s Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-469). The Act asked the Administration to set forth the U.S. Government’s strategy for preventing the illegal trafficking of drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border, and to lay out the roles and responsibilities of the relevant National Drug Control Program agencies. The Strategy identifies the key elements needed to effectively combat the drug cartels. It provides recommendations—or “supporting actions”—for each agency to pursue toward common objectives, addressing nine primary focus areas in separate chapters that include Intelligence and Information sharing, Investigations and Prosecutions, Money, Weapons, and Technology, to name only a few. The recommendations in the Strategy were developed by a representative interagency team, taking into account input received from State, local, and tribal partners. The strategy also reflects our consultations and ongoing work with the GOM. SOURCE: The United States Government // Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

At Long Last: Finally Peace for Sri Lanka?

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 11:30:30 -0700

On 16 May 2009, the Sri Lankan government announced that it had overrun the last insurgent stronghold and that 26 years of civil conflict had finally come to an end. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had been vanquished, its leader had been killed and the military insurgency was finished. Many danced in the streets of Colombo and a stream of messages from world leaders congratulated the government on its successful victory over terrorism. But the humanitarian emergency continues. The underlying causes of the Tamils' demands—whether for autonomy or simply greater respect for their human rights—have yet to be addressed. The government has come under strong criticism for the way it handled its final assault on the Tigers and the high civilian casualties which occurred. In sum, it is still too early to tell whether the end of the war will usher in a new era of peace and stability or whether it represents just another pause in a conflict that has gone on for too long. Moreover the last six months of the war also bring into stark relief the challenges facing the humanitarian community in its work in places far from the small island nation of Sri Lanka. In fact, Sri Lanka's experiences these past few months could be a textbook on the breadth of the challenges facing the humanitarian community. Landmines, child soldiers, the militarization of aid, lack of access and insecurity for humanitarian workers—unfortunately, Sri Lanka has had it all. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution

A Guide to China's Ethnic Groups

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 09:04:22 -0700

Some of the deadliest clashes between ethnic groups since the founding of the People's Republic have erupted in China over the past week between the Muslim Uighurs and the Han Chinese. So far, at least 156 people have been killed and thousands more injured. However, this is not the first time ethnic groups in the country have come into conflict. Since the Communists gained power in 1949, minority ethnic groups have repeatedly come to odds with the dominant Han Chinese, which compose more than 90 percent of the Chinese population. Here's a look into some of the largest of the 56 ethnic groups that populate the biggest country in the world. SOURCE: The Washington Post

Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR

Fri, 10 Jul 2009 08:52:20 -0700

The joint Congo (DRC)-Rwanda military push against the Rwandan Hutu rebels has ended with scant results. Fifteen years after the Rwanda genocide and the establishment of those rebels in the eastern Congo, they have not yet been disarmed and remain a source of extreme violence against civilians. While they are militarily too weak to destabilise Rwanda, their 6,000 or more combatants, including a number of génocidaires, still present a major political challenge for consolidation of peace in the Great Lakes region. They must be disarmed and demobilised if the eastern Congo is to be stabilised. That requires a new comprehensive strategy involving national, regional and international actors, with a clear division of labour and better coordination, so as to take advantage of the recent improvement of relations between the Congo and Rwanda, put an end to the enormous civilian suffering and restore state authority in the Congo’s eastern provinces. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians - Pakistan: Semi-Authoritarian, Semi-Failed State

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 17:00:17 -0700

Pakistan has been in a permanent state of crisis since it was carved out of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Of the range of factors responsible for this state of affairs, the most important is the failure to establish a democratic system of governance. For more than half of Pakistan’s 62-year existence, the military has dominated politics and national life, stifl ing the development of credible democratic institutions. Even during the interregnums that have punctuated direct military rule, when civilian governments have been in power, the military has cast a long shadow over politics and the national agenda. Yet this overweening military presence has always faced resistance from the democratic forces in society, and the political agenda still revolves around representative government. The struggle between the military’s desire to dictate the country’s course and the people’s aspirations for self-rule is by no means resolved, despite the elections of February 18, 2008— one of the few relatively clean polls in the country’s history—which brought the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) to power following the assassination of its leader, Benazir Bhutto. Benazir’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, emerged as Pakistan’s most powerful politician in the wake of her death. Today he not only dominates decision-making within the PPP (and arguably wields overwhelming infl uence in the ruling coalition), he has also been elected to succeed General Pervez Musharraf as president. SOURCE: Freedom House // Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Post-War Sri Lanka: Concerns and Reservations

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 16:56:43 -0700

President Rajapaksa and the armed forces of Sri Lanka are justifiably happy and proud of having “eliminated” (in mid-May 2009) the capabilities of LTTE to mount conventional military operations. I would, however, sound a note of caution that, while the militant leaders of a major terrorist group have been neutralized, terrorism as such cannot be eliminated till the basic grievances and deprivations of the Tamils are addressed and resolved. As long as the basic causes exist, there can be no guarantee that other similar groups/leaders may not emerge. It can be said without fear of contradiction that rehabilitation, reconciliation, development and restoration (of democracy) are the most essential measures to be taken. It is my view that there should be no rigidity in attempting these measures sequentially, and that efforts need to be made to attempt them almost simultaneously. War consists of a series of actions by the parties involved in the confrontation, but peace is a combination of a state of mind and harmony between all the different ethnic groups that populate Sri Lanka. Another potentially complicating factor is the announced expansion of the armed forces and the proposed regular military deployments in the north and the east – raising the possibility of the armed forces becoming another credible power center in Sri Lankan politics. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group

Jihad Ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi Challenges Jordan’s Neo-Zarqawists

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 16:54:17 -0700

Salafi-Jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi gave his first interview since his release from prison on March 12, 2008 to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood associated al-Sabeel weekly newspaper on June 4. Local media reported that security authorities in Jordan had set a condition that he would not give any press interviews after he was released. Al-Maqdisi’s interview comes in the shadow of increasing criticism directed at him by the neo-Zarqawists in Jordan (i.e. ideological followers of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq), who accuse him of renouncing his jihadi ideology. Several points were significant in al-Maqdisi’s interview. He told interviewer Wa'il al-Battiri he has not maintained that famous Salafi shaykhs such as Abdul Aziz bin Baz, Naser al-Din al-Albani and Muhammad Saleh al-Uthaymin were infidels, explaining that such accusations could be “due to certain strong expressions that I used against them.” Answering al-Battiri’s question about the legitimacy of blowing up an entire building just to kill one or two soldiers, al-Maqdisi replied, “One should not be lenient about the sin of shedding the blood of Muslims based on suspicion, jihad, or other things. Indeed, the blood and property of disobedient Muslims cannot be violated, even if they commit iniquities. It is our duty to call them into religion and try to bring them from darkness to light and not to engage with them in battles. I have written on this many times and I dissociated myself from the undisciplined operations that others commit outside the bounds of Shari’a - operations that result in thousands of victims and in which much blood is shed without any legitimate benefits to jihad or Muslims.” SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Global Terrorism Analysis

Alleged Iranian and Hezbollah Agents on Trial for Targeting Russian-Operated Radar Station in Azerbaijan

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 16:52:29 -0700

A trial of six people accused of terrorism and other serious crimes began on June 24 in Baku, Azerbaijan. Two Lebanese citizens, Karaki Ali Muhammad and Najmaddin Ali Hussein, were charged with treason, revealing secret information abroad, espionage, preparation of acts of terrorism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Four Azerbaijani citizens, Javid Mamadov, Vidadi Rasulov, Mushfig Amanov and Afgan Balashev all face similar charges. The alleged terrorist cell planned to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Baku as well as blow up the Russian-operated Qabala radar station. According to investigation records, the group was receiving orders from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Both Lebanese “had been trained and sent to Azerbaijan by terrorist organizations Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.”. The suspects allegedly planned to attract local people to cooperate with them in carrying out terrorist attacks in densely populated areas. After getting their instructions from Hezbollah, the two Lebanese arrived in Iran, where agents of the Revolutionary Guards helped them to cross the border into Azerbaijan. Once there, they are alleged to have established a group consisting of local citizens, convincing them to bomb the Qabala radar station. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Global Terrorism Analysis

Can Afghanistan’s New “Guardian” Militia Restore Security in the Provinces?

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 16:50:33 -0700

As the security situation in Afghanistan worsened, there was an increase in Taliban attacks in south and central Afghanistan, especially in Wardak province, 30 kilometers west of Kabul. The government and international forces decided to distribute arms to local people to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents in their respective villages and districts. The formation of the Afghan Public Protection Force (better known as the “Guardians”) is a pilot project operating in the Jalriz district of Wardak province and in Wardak’s provincial capital of Maidan Shar. Wardak Province is located in central Afghanistan and has a majority Pashtun population with a significant Hazara (Shi’a) minority. Recruits to the new militia are chosen by local elders before receiving Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles and three weeks of training from the Afghan national police. The militia is not intended to confront the Taliban in combat but is instead meant to serve as a kind of local watch. As such, they are equipped with radios and cell phones to call for assistance from American forces or the Afghan National Army when necessary. Most of the Wardak Guardians are loyal to Tor Gol, a former anti-Soviet mujahid. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Global Terrorism Analysis

U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority [updated 24 June 2009]

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 16:46:36 -0700

Since shortly after the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States has periodically provided assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for civil security and counterterrorism purposes. Following the death of Yasser Arafat in late 2004 and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as his successor as PA President in early 2005, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the office of U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to help reform, train, and equip PA security forces which had been personally beholden to Arafat and his political allies. Previous Israeli-Palestinian efforts at security cooperation collapsed during the second Palestinian intifada that took place earlier this decade. Since Hamas gained control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, head of the USSC since November 2005, has helped with the “gendarmerie-style” training of West Bank-based PA security personnel. As of June 2009, 400 Presidential Guardsmen and 1,700 National Security Forces troops have been trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) near Amman. All troops, new or already serving, are vetted for terrorist links, human rights violations, and/or criminal records by the State Department, Israel, Jordan, and the PA before they are admitted to U.S.-sponsored training courses at JIPTC. Approximately $161 million in U.S. funds have been reprogrammed or appropriated through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account for training, non-lethal equipment, facilities, and strategic planning assistance for the PA forces, and $109 million in FY2009 supplemental appropriations have been approved by Congress in June 2009. Another $100 million in INCLE funds have been requested by the Obama Administration for FY2010. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Law and Justice in Timor-Leste: A Survey of Citizen Awareness and Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice 2008

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 16:34:16 -0700

The variety of public perceptions of justice in Timor-Leste reflects the complexity of building a state from domestic and imported fragments of social, political, and economic order. After the official declaration of independence in 2002, Timor-Leste’s recovery has yielded notable improvements in the lives of ordinary Timorese. Yet the country continued to suffer from a number of characteristics of state fragility: a recent history of conflict; an increasing poverty rate; food insecurity; significant rural to urban migration; high unemployment in urban areas; increasing numbers of people without formal education; poor private sector growth and few new jobs created; poor road and communications infrastructure; rugged terrain and seasonal flooding; a high fertility rate; political violence; and a significant youth bulge. One of the main bright spots for the country, Timor-Leste’s newly-gained oil wealth (2008 revenues estimated at US$2.5 billion), has not translated into non-oil, private sector growth – the 80 percent of the population dependent on subsistence agriculture remains largely untouched by this bounty. In light of such pressing concerns and growing reports of official corruption, the citizens of the nation are left to hope that their elected government will soon rise to these challenges. SOURCE: The Asia Foundation // United States Agency for International Development

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1878 on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda [S/RES/1878]

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 16:26:10 -0700

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which is based in the Tanzanian town of Arusha, is aiming to finish first-instance trials by the end of 2009. The Tribunal was created in November 1994 to prosecute people responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda that year. Some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered, mostly by machete, in just 100 days. The Council decided, among other matters, to extend the term of office of five permanent judges at the ICTR and 11 temporary judges until 31 December 2010, or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned if sooner. Reporting to the Council last month on their activities, officials from both tribunals stressed that the cooperation and assistance of Member States remains crucial if the courts are to successfully fulfil their mandates to bring those responsible for the most serious crimes to justice. SOURCE: United Nations Security Council

Equipping USAID for Success: A Field Perspective

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 15:32:12 -0700

PCR’s latest special report “Equipping USAID for Success” is an analysis of development aid in Afghanistan and an evaluation of its efficacy. The report casts a crucial eye on the process as a whole, examines USAID’s particular role, and finds that many development problems are caused by contradictions between USAID’s mandates and its granted abilities. Understanding this disconnect is a crucial part of correcting the discrepancy and recovering the United States development program. “Equipping USAID for Success” contains an analysis of overall development funding from the U.S. Government, and its distribution across agencies compared to their abilities and execution. It highlights USAID’s effectiveness by explaining fieldwork performed by the author, a USAID worker in Panjshir Province, Afghanistan. Finally, it combines the author’s experience with an understanding of overall development structure to offer suggestions about redistributing development resources and improving USAID’s agility. This complete analysis is an important contribution to efforts to improve America’s work in Afghanistan and other in-conflict, developing nations. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project is glad to sponsor its publication. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Well Oiled: Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 15:28:18 -0700

The government of Equatorial Guinea has set new low standards of political and economic malfeasance in handling its billions of dollars in oil revenue instead of improving the lives of its citizens, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. The 107-page report, "Well Oiled: Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea," details how the dictatorship under President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has used an oil boom to entrench and enrich itself further at the expense of the country's people. Since oil was discovered there in the early 1990s, Equatorial Guinea's gross domestic product (GDP) has increased more than 5,000 percent, and the country has become the fourth-largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, living standards for the country's 500,000 people have not substantially improved. "Here is a country where people should have the per capita wealth of Spain or Italy, but instead they live in poverty worse than in Afghanistan or Chad," said Arvind Ganesan, director of the Business and Human Rights Program at Human Rights Watch. "This is a testament to the government's corruption, mismanagement, and callousness toward its own people." SOURCE: Human Rights Watch

China’s Xinjiang Problem

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 15:21:31 -0700

It all started on 26 June in the toy factory owned by the Hong Kong-listed Lacewood International in China’s Shaoguan city of Guangdong province. An official news agency wrote "Six Xinjiang boys raped two innocent girls at the Xuri Toy Factory." It was found to be a hoax, but the rumour spread quickly through the Internet sparking a deadly clash between the Uighur workers and Han Chinese who fought each other with knives and metal pipes in which two Uighur labourers were reportedly killed and 118 injured. Authorities have found no evidence against the Uighurs for raping two Chinese girls but it has exposed China’s long-simmering ethnic discord between majority Han Chinese and the mostly Muslim Uighur ethnic group. Reports suggested later that thousands of Uighurs have fled Guangdong province to Xinjiang. Ten days later an intense ethnic clash occurred in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi which left about 160 dead and more than 800 injured. Independent sources suggested that over 600 people were killed. By all standards, it was a replica of Tibetan protests in Lhasa last March. It seems that the police had fired indiscriminately on a peaceful protest started by a few hundred people. The crowd later grew to ten thousand. Much like the Lhasa monks the Uighurs carrying knives, bricks and batons, torched vehicles and smashed shops, and fought against the armed police. The government has blamed Uighurs based abroad for orchestrating the attacks, especially the US based World Uighur Congress leader and a businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer for instigating the riot. For decades, the situation in Xinjiang has been worse than Tibet. The eight million Uighurs have showed deep resentment against Chinese rule since 1949. There have been serious violent movements against Chinese rule but they were all ruthlessly quelled by force. The Uighurs, like the Tibetans, have gone through a very tragic political history even in modern times. The Chinese have severely suppressed any form of political expressions and instead systematically diluted Uighur cultural identity, discriminated against them on religious grounds, and economically exploited them. SOURCE: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War

Thu, 09 Jul 2009 12:48:22 -0700

The Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War contains two thematic sections. The main theme highlights the challenges of ensuring security after the formal end of war; it comprises an overview chapter that surveys post-conflict armed violence and new strategies to address it as well as three case studies on Aceh, Afghanistan, and Southern Lebanon. The second thematic section explores different aspects of small arms transfers, including the value of the authorized trade, national export controls, and weapons and ammunition tracing. Rounding out the volume are chapters on recent developments in the United Nations small arms agenda, on civilian, state, and non-state disarmament programmes to date, and on the impact of armed violence on children and youth. SOURCE: Small Arms Survey // Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

Banning the Naxalites: What Next

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 17:12:37 -0700

On 22 June 2009, the Government of India banned the Communist Party of India (Maoist) through a notification of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Branding the CPI (Maoist) as a terrorist organization, the Government invoked Section 41 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act against it. This is a special act which enables the Central Government to declare an association as unlawful. It is too early to speculate on the impact of the ban; however, with this notification, the Naxal movement in India has entered yet another phase of revolution and counter-revolution. While the birth of the CPI (Maoist) in September 2004 proved to be a milestone in the history of left wing extremism, the ban is bound to have large-scale implications. Since its inception in 1967, the Naxal movement has presented a dilemma for Indian society, wherein policy makers, scholars and others are widely divided over the issue of the use of violence by Naxals as a political tactic. While detractors have labeled it as just another form of terrorism, Naxal groups have never dropped their slogan of ‘People’s War for People’s Government’. Today, as Naxalism looms large over at least twelve Indian states with Chhatishgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh being the worst affected, the following questions need to be addressed: What does the ban mean? Is it required? What are the major policy changes expected to follow from the ban? How will the CPI (Maoist) respond, under the changed circumstances? SOURCE: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Afghanistan: Understanding German Objectives and Strategies

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 17:09:55 -0700

When US President Barack Obama revealed the United States’ new Af-Pak strategy on 27 March 2009, it was received exceptionally positive by the American allies including Germany. A new momentum was given, to come up with comprehensive and sustainable solutions to the worsening situation in Afghanistan. Germany was pleased by the change of paradigm in the new US strategy. Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier said, “finally we are on the path to a joint strategy, which will bring us joint success” and that the new US strategy “provides a great number of openings for aligning our approaches”. The emphasize of strengthening civil reconstructions efforts, paired with military efforts to provide security and to wipe out terrorists and extremist elements in Afghanistan, while at the same time shifting the focus to a regional approach and working closer together with Afghan security forces and neighbouring countries, is perceived as a promising new change in dealing with the situation in Afghanistan and eventually improving and strengthening the country’s stability. SOURCE: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Towards a Security Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 17:03:25 -0700

The decision to create a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission demonstrates the international community’s recognition of the need for further efforts to prevent the recurrence of conflict in fragile States. Indeed, there are still considerable gaps in the development of concepts, policies and practice that would facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding and make it more effective. One such gap lies in the security dimension of post-conflict peacebuilding. Applying a security governance approach to the range of security issues that must be addressed by both post-conflict societies and the international community provides a means to better understand the opportunities for more effective and coordinated international efforts to build up domestic capacity for the provision of security. SOURCE: Center on International Cooperation // New York University

Building a Better Relationship: Palestinian Refugees, Lebanon, and the Role of the International Community

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 16:54:23 -0700

In recent years, official Lebanese policy towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has undergone major changes. Increasingly, Lebanese officials have voiced their support for improved social and economic conditions for the refugees, while at the same time maintaining staunch opposition to their permanent resettlement (tawteen) in the country. These policy changes have been marked by the formation of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), by limited policy reforms in areas ranging from employment to the issuance of ID to unregistered refugees, as well as an unparalleled change in the tone of official pronouncements. The government has also been an essential partner with UNRWA in efforts to reconstruct Nahr al-Barid refugee camp (NBC), destroyed in fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the radical Fateh al-Islam jihadist group in 2007. Just as important, LPDC has sought to change the narrative of Lebanese-Palestinian relations in a way that holds out greater promise to all communities. These changes in policies have profound implications for the humanitarian circumstances of the refugees, as well as the economic and security interests of Lebanon. Improved Lebanese-Palestinian relations could also pay significant dividends for the region and international community too. The continuation and deepening of the reform process is far from certain, however. It could be derailed by political changes following the recent June 2009 elections, local and regional developments, and limited Lebanese government policy capacity. A failure to deliver on promises of NBC reconstruction (due to insufficient donor support) could prove especially damaging. SOURCE: International Development Research Centre

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1877 on the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [S/RES/1877]

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 16:48:03 -0700

The Security Council today extended the terms of the judges serving on the United Nations war crimes tribunals set up to deal with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, so they can complete remaining cases by the deadline set for the courts’ work. The Council, in two separate resolutions that were adopted unanimously, urged both tribunals “to take all possible measures to complete their work expeditiously,” and expressed its determination to support their efforts in this regard. The so-called “completion strategy” of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which is based in The Hague, requires it to finish trials of first instance by 2009, and then start downsizing in 2010. Among the decisions taken today, the Council extended the term of office of eight permanent judges at the ICTY and 10 ad litem, or temporary, judges until 31 December 2010, or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned. In addition, the Council decided, on the request of the President of the ICTY, that the Secretary-General may appoint additional temporary judges to complete existing trials or conduct additional trials. SOURCE: United Nations Security Council

United Nation Security Council Twenty-Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [S/2009/335]

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 16:40:33 -0700

The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1856 (2008), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 31 December 2009 and requested me to report every three months on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The report covers developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since my report of 27 March 2009 (S/2009/160). SOURCE: United Nations Security Council

Silence is Violence: End the Abuse of Women in Afghanistan

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 16:33:10 -0700

Afghanistan is widely known and appreciated for its rich history, culture, literature and arts as well as its magnificent landscape. It is also widely known that large numbers of Afghans die, or live wretched lives, because violence is an everyday fact of life. Such violence is not openly condoned but neither is it challenged nor condemned by society at large or by state institutions. It is primarily human rights activists that make an issue of violence including, in particular, its impact on, and ramifications for, women and girls in Afghanistan. It is also left to a handful of stakeholders to challenge the way in which a culture of impunity, and the cycle of violence it generates, undermines democratization, the establishment of the rule of law and other efforts geared to building an environment conducive to respect for human rights. The report seeks to put back on the agenda some of the issues pertaining to the enjoyment of all human rights by all Afghan women that are being increasingly ignored. The problems identified in this report require further discussion and public debate, with a view to informing appropriate legal, policy and awareness-raising measures. In this report, UNAMA Human Rights has focused on the following critical issues: (a) violence that inhibits the participation of women in public life; and (b) sexual violence in the context of rape. These issues are but two manifestations of the violence that confront Afghans. They are reviewed in the context of the prevailing socio-political culture whereby the rights of women are bartered to advance vested interests or issue-specific agendas. This report also examines how conservative political and religious forces play a role in restricting women’s rights. The controversy surrounding the Shi’a personal status law exemplifies both problems. SOURCE: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Anti-Piracy in Somalia: Models for Maritime Security Institutions

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 16:28:54 -0700

There is an emerging consensus on how to deal with piracy off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden: improve security on land and establish a strong national security apparatus in Somalia. Can the "Malacca Strait" approach be a model? The Kuala Lumpur International Conference on Piracy and Crimes at Sea was convened on 18-19 May 2009, organised by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was attended by government officials, as well as experts from inter-governmental organisations, shipping and insurance industries, and academics. The conference was to provide an update on the situation concerning piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. At the conference, two officials from Somalia reiterated the need for international support for the efforts of the coalition led by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. They urged more international support for Somalia to build up its security establishment to ensure order on land as well as good order at sea. If indeed there is a will to build up the maritime security institutions in Somalia, then some of the security measures and institutions established by the littoral states along the Malacca could be used as models. SOURCE: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies // A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along The Trigger Line

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 15:59:39 -0700

As sectarian violence in Iraq has ebbed over the past year, a new and potentially just as destructive political conflict has arisen between the federal government and the Kurdistan regional government in Erbil. This conflict has manifested itself in oratory, backroom negotiations and military manoeuvres in disputed territories, raising tensions and setting off alarm bells in Washington just as the Obama administration is taking its first steps to pull back U.S. forces. A lasting solution can only be political – involving a grand bargain on how to divide or share power, resources and territory – but in the interim both sides should take urgent steps to improve communications and security cooperation, run joint military checkpoints and patrols in disputed territories and refrain from unilateral steps along the new, de facto dividing line, the so-called trigger line. The conflict is centred on disputed territories, especially Kirkuk, which not only hosts a mix of populations – Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans and smaller minorities (which in some districts are dominant) – but also contains untold reserves of oil and gas. In the security vacuum of post-invasion Iraq, Kurdish forces rushed across the Green Line, the de facto boundary separating the Kurdistan region from the rest of Iraq between 1991 and 2003, to assert their claim to areas they deem part of their historic patrimony. A range of local and national actors challenged this claim, with the government of Prime Minister Maliki starting to push back against Kurdish influence in these areas since August 2008. The result has been a steady rise in tensions along a new, undemarcated line that in military circles is referred to as the trigger line – a curve stretching from the Syrian to the Iranian border, where at multiple places the Iraqi army and Kurdish fighters known as peshmergas are arrayed in opposing formations. The deployment of the army’s 12th division in Kirkuk in late 2008, in particular, enraged the Kurds and emboldened their Arab and Turkoman rivals. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Five Years of Illegality: Time to Dismantle the Wall and Respect the Rights of Palestinians

Wed, 08 Jul 2009 10:34:36 -0700

After five years of illegality, it is time to dismantle the Wall and respect the rights of Palestinians. In an advisory opinion, rendered on 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice stated that Israel’s construction of the Wall in the occupied Palestinian Territory was illegal and called for its immediate dismantling. Five years later, the advisory opinion has been met only by inaction: Israel continues constructing the Wall and the international community remains silent. Oxfam International underscores the urgency of addressing this situation in a compilation of testimonies that is published today In this report, Five years of illegality, Oxfam International presents testimonies of fifteen Palestinian men and women who recount their daily problems, arising from the construction of the Wall and its associated regime of land confiscation and permits, and the construction and expansion of settlements. Tragic consequences: farmers separated from their fields, workers without access permits, pregnant women unable to reach the hospital, villages without adequate access to water. The UN estimates that in the north of the West Bank approximately 80 per cent of Palestinians who own land on the other side of the Wall have not received permits from the Israeli authorities, and hence cannot cultivate their fields. It is a similar story in other parts of the West Bank. In this report, Oxfam International calls on the international community to effectively challenge the construction of the Wall in occupied territory and its associated regime, together with the construction of settlements and the confiscation and control of natural resources (land and water), which all de facto contribute to the altering of the demographic composition of the occupied Palestinian Territory and are in violation of international humanitarian law. SOURCE: Oxfam International

Somalia: Conditions Worsen as More IDPs Flood into Kismayo

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 15:40:20 -0700

As more internally displaced persons (IDPs) flee fighting in Mogadishu for the southern coastal city of Kismayo, conditions for thousands already living there are deteriorating sharply, local sources said. "There are about 29,000 of us [IDPs] in Kismayo and we are living in very bad conditions; no one is helping us," Mahamud Ali, an elder in one of the IDP camps, told IRIN by telephone from Kismayo, 500km south of Mogadishu. "The last time any assistance was provided to the displaced was in April this year. People are in a desperate situation." There are no aid agencies operating in Kismayo, he said. The militant Islamic group al-Shabab took control of the town in August 2008 from a clan militia. The UN World Food Programme told IRIN it last distributed 321MT to 36,000 IDPs six months ago, but following the deaths of four employees earlier this year, it was still seeking security commitments from the authorities before resuming operations. SOURCE: Integrated Regional Information Networks // United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Terrorism Near and Far, Strategic and Symbolic: The Origins, Intentions and Future Threats of al Qaeda and Hezbollah

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 15:30:25 -0700

This essay makes a comparative study of al Qaeda and Hezbollah, considering their ideological origins, justifications for terror, and overall objectives and tactics. The author finds that al Qaeda’s ideological groundings strongly influence the global, symbolic nature of the group’s objectives. In contrast, Hezbollah’s origin as a resistance front against Israel has left room for ideological flexibility, resulting in goals that are regional and pragmatic. The different natures of each group should strongly affect counterterrorist policy; however, the US and Israel have not responded to either group in a persistently effective manner. Al Qaeda’s reliance on a rigid anti-Western ideology means that the US must focus its effort on resolving lingering problems in the Middle East that perpetuate Western resentment. In contrast, Israel should develop unambiguous policies of deterrence and cooperation because Hezbollah is a rational actor that is accountable to the Lebanese public as well as the government. SOURCE: E- International Relations

Nine Chechen Policemen Killed in Rebel Ambush

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 15:24:43 -0700

In one of their deadliest recent attacks, rebels in Ingushetia on July 4 ambushed a convoy of Chechen policemen in a wooded area on the road between the villages of Chemulga and Arshty in the republic's Sunzha district, killing nine policemen and wounding ten others. Agence France-Presse quoted an Ingush security source as saying that 45 members of Chechnya's police force were returning from a joint special counter-insurgency operation with Ingush police near Ingushetia's administrative border with Chechnya when their six-vehicle convoy came under fire. One of the vehicles reportedly burst into flames in what an Ingush security source told RIA Novosti appears to have been a "well-planned ambush" in which militants fired from at least three different points with machine guns and grenade launchers. Newsru.com reported that all of the victims were members of the police department in Chechnya's Achkhoi-Martan district. The head of the administration of the village of Arshty was also travelling in the convoy but was not hurt in the attack. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Eurasia Daily Monitor

Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 - Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 15:05:56 -0700

On December 12, 2007, the North Atlantic Council decided to develop common concepts and a Policy Directive on UN Resolution 1325. As part of this process, eight independent experts from four countries have conducted this study, identifying best practices and lessons learned from the implementation of Resolution 1325 in NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. Practices and lessons relate both to effectiveness and the process to integrate Resolution 1325 in operations. An analytical framework has been developed and applied on five different PRTs; the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt, the Italian PRT in Herat, the New Zealand PRT in Bamyan, the Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh and the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif. The analytical framework is based on a model in which the content of Resolution 1325 is broken down into representation (male and female participation) and integration (the use of the content of Resolution 1325) in the process to achieve a desired output). These themes are analyzed internally (how NATO Operations are organized) and externally (how Operations address the situation in the area of responsibility to obtain the desired output). Using this model, a set of work areas are identified and analyzed. SOURCE: Swedish Defence Research Agency

The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 14:46:26 -0700

A misunderstanding of the insurgency is at the heart of the difficulties facing the International Coalition in Afghanistan. The Taliban are often described as an umbrella movement comprising loosely connected groups that are essentially local and unorganized. On the contrary, this report’s analysis of the structure and strategy of the insurgency reveals a resilient adversary, engaged in strategic planning and coordinated action. The Taliban are a revolutionary movement, deeply opposed to the Afghan tribal system and focused on the rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate. Their propaganda and intelligence are efficient, and the local autonomy of their commanders in the field allow them both flexibility and cohesion. They have made clever use of ethnic tensions, the rejection of foreign forces by the Afghan people, and the lack of local administration to gain support in the population. In so doing the Taliban have achieved their objectives in the South and East of the country, isolating the Coalition, marginalizing the local Afghan administration, and establishing a parallel administration (mainly to dispense Sharia justice and collect taxes). In recent months, a more professional Taliban have succeeded in making significant inroads by recruiting from non-Pashtun communities. These developments, and the strength of the insurgency makes the current Coalition strategy of focusing its reinforcements in the South (Helmand and Kandahar) risky to say the least. The lack of local Afghan institutions there will require a long term presence and therefore a need for even more reinforcements in the coming year. Meanwhile, the pace of Taliban progress in other provinces far outstrips the ability of the Coalition to stabilize the South. The Coalition should change the priorities of its current strategy, shifting resources to stop and reverse the Taliban’s progress in the North, while reinforcing and safeguarding the Kabul region or risk losing control of the entire country. SOURCE: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector [updated 26 May 2009]

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 14:37:10 -0700

Damage to or destruction of the nation’s water supply and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack or natural disaster could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. Interest in such problems has increased greatly since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Across the country, water infrastructure systems extend over vast areas, and ownership and operation responsibility are both public and private, but are overwhelmingly non-federal. Since the attacks, federal dam operators and local water and wastewater utilities have been under heightened security conditions and are evaluating security plans and measures. There are no federal standards or agreed-upon industry practices within the water infrastructure sector to govern readiness, response to security incidents, and recovery. Efforts to develop protocols and tools are ongoing since the 2001 terrorist attacks. This report presents an overview of this large and diverse sector, describes security-related actions by the government and private sector since September 11, and discusses additional policy issues and responses, including congressional interest. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Terrorist Watch: 23 Plots Foiled Since 9/11

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 14:33:31 -0700

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 23 terrorist plots against the United States have been foiled. This report updates a November 2007 report from the Heritage Foundation that described 19 plots that had been foiled to date since 9/11. Less than two years later, the U.S. has foiled four more plots aimed at Americans. While some trials have ended in mistrial and charges against some suspects were dropped, significantly more individuals have been convicted and sentenced for their crimes. These victories make the case for continued U.S. vigilance against terrorism around the globe. While these particular attacks have been disrupted, the threat remains. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Congress should not construe the successes over the past eight years as a signal to reduce U.S. counterterrorism efforts. America is truly in a long war against terrorism. To win this war, the U.S. must constantly adapt to ever-changing terrorist threats. Congress and the DHS will need to work together to provide continued support for terrorism-fighting tools, to increase information sharing and collective security efforts around the globe, and to expand vital law enforcement partnerships with local and state law enforcement and cooperation with the governments of other countries. These relationships have enabled the U.S. to disrupt the flow of money and resources to terrorist groups. SOURCE: The Heritage Foundation

Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests [updated 28 May 2009]

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 12:53:10 -0700

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited regional support to counter Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq. About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. basing rights in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon. Kyrgyzstan rescinded U.S. basing rights in 2009, allegedly because of Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease payments. U.S. policy has emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian “front-line” states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms and drug trafficking. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of east-west and Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what various U.S. Administrations have considered to be responsible members of the international community rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that threaten international peace and stability. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Pakistan Report: Comprehensive U.S. Policy Needed

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 12:15:09 -0700

Pakistan faces dire economic and security threats that threaten both the existence of Pakistan as a democratic and stable state and the region as a whole, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Given the tools and the financing, Pakistan can turn back from the brink. But for that to happen, it needs help now. Such a reversal demands far greater and more urgent support and assistance from the international community in general and the United States in particular. And it needs to be based on focused policy changes and disciplined implementation by the Pakistan government, with adequate oversight to ensure that Pakistan can do the job. First, this report sounds the alarm that we are running out of time to help Pakistan change its present course toward increasing economic and political instability, and even ultimate failure. The urgency of action has been brought home by the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in late November that set Pakistan and India on a dangerous collision course. Simply put, time is running out for stabilizing Pakistan’s economy and security. As Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari told the Atlantic Council during our December 2008 trip to Islamabad, “we – [the United States, Pakistan, NATO and the world at large] – are losing the battle” to keep Pakistan stable, at peace and prosperous. Unlike Afghanistan - where the international community is losing the struggle because of its failure to reform the civilian sector - Pakistan has the manpower and infrastructure to win its battles. But Pakistan can only do so if it gets the necessary support urgently. And it is self-evident that a secure, stable, and prospering Pakistan is in the best interests of the international community. We – meaning Pakistan and its friends – can and must win collectively. The starting point must be a full and objective understanding of today’s Pakistan and the fact that it is on a rapid trajectory toward becoming a failing or failed state. That trajectory must be reversed now. Second, this report provides a conceptual framework, strategy, and specific actions that are needed to begin the long process of bringing peace, prosperity, and stability to Pakistan and to the region. The issue is not Pakistan alone or Pakistan and Afghanistan. The issue is broader and is inextricably linked with India, the Gulf, and Pakistan’s other close neighbors. As a senior Pakistani military officer told us: “If Pakistan fails, the world fails.” Third, this report outlines the possible short-and long-term consequences of inaction: some of these, such as the breakup of the country, civil war or an all-out war with India, could be catastrophic for the country, for the region, and for U.S. interests. SOURCE: The Atlantic Council of the United States

Aid and Violence: Development Policies and Conflict in Nepal

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 12:03:46 -0700

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN (M) launched its “People’s War” in 1996. At the time, the Maoists were no more than a small fringe party with hardly any weapons, few active members, and a support base limited to small pockets in remote hill areas. Yet, their ten-year armed insurgency transformed them into a powerful political force capable of standing alongside, and even overshadowing, Nepal’s major, established parties. The rise of the Maoists in Nepal is impressive by any standard. After a successful showing at the polls for the Constituent Assembly in April 2008, they came into power. To the astonishment of the world, this happened “at a time in history when Maoism appears to have been repudiated in the land of its birth, and when the entire spectrum of Marxist- Leninist doctrines stands ostensibly disgraced by the failure and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, and China’s enthusiastic embrace of capitalist globalization, on the other.” At the same time, foreign aid has been a fixture of Nepal’s development efforts since the 1950s. Currently, around seventy percent of the country’s development expenditure is financed by external sources. Clearly, the donor community has been the key partner in Nepal’s development successes and failures. How did these two realities – the insurgency and foreign aid – interact? This report aims to explore this question through a retrospective analysis of the development/conflict nexus in Nepal. It looks at the underlying causes of the Maoist success story in relation to donors’ development policies and assistance activities in Nepal and at their interplay with the conflict environment in which aid actors found themselves operating. The report focuses on the last decade (1996-2008), the period of the Maoist insurgency and of the subsequent largely successful peace process. SOURCE: Feinstein International Center // Tufts University

Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy [updated 9 June 2009]

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 11:46:40 -0700

After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process consisting of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon achieved mixed results. Milestones included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, providing for Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim Self-Rule in the West Bank or Oslo II accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, Israeli-Syrian negotiations were intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000. Israeli-Lebanese negotiations also were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. President Clinton held a summit with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status issues that July, but they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel, and rejected steps taken at Camp David and afterwards. Congress is interested in issues related to Middle East peace because of its oversight role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and keen constituent interest. It is especially concerned about U.S. financial and other commitments to the parties, and the 111th Congress is engaged in these matters. Congress also has endorsed Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, although U.S. Administrations have consistently maintained that the fate of the city is the subject of final status negotiations. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq [updated 2 June 2009]

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 11:42:23 -0700

The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq has been relatively peaceful and prosperous since the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, the Iraqi Kurds’ political autonomy, and territorial and economic demands, have caused friction with Christian and other minorities in the north, with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other Arab leaders of Iraq, and with neighboring Turkey and Iran. Despite limited agreements allowing for new oil exports from the Kurdish region, the major outstanding issues between the Kurds and the central government do not appear close to resolution. Tensions have increased now that Kurdish representation in two key mixed provinces has been reduced by the January 31, 2009 provincial elections. Some predict the disputes could erupt into all out violence between Kurdish militias and central government forces, potentially undermining the stability achieved throughout Iraq in 2008. The Obama Administration has not, to date, indicated that the Kurdish-central government disputes would derail or delay a major drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq between now and August 2010. However, many Kurds believe that the drawdown will reduce the U.S. political influence over the Kurds and the central government that is needed to contain these disputes. At the same time that it is at odds with the central government, the Kurdish region itself is in political ferment. One of the major factions, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, has seen many senior members resign and there is popular grumbling about the purported stranglehold that the major Kurdish parties have over politics and the economy of the Kurdish region. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Colombia: Crisis Bubbling Over

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 11:31:07 -0700

The impact of Colombia’s internal armed conflict on Ecuador and Venezuela is destabilizing border regions while thousands of Colombians continue to flee their country in search of sanctuary. Because of the growing presence of Colombian guerrilla and reorganized paramilitary groups engaged in trafficking narcotics in border areas, host governments have militarized these regions with security forces to combat violent spillover. In this context, humanitarian agencies and local administrations are struggling to assist more people in need, and providing documentation for asylum seekers is a crucial first step to enhance their physical protection and freedom of movement. Donor governments should urgently support policies of documentation and socio-economic integration for Colombians in their host communities. Patterns of violence in Ecuadorian and Venezuelan border areas are starting to mirror Colombian trends where illegal armed groups are conducting criminal activities, terrorizing local populations, and exercising social control over entire communities. Death threats, selective assassinations, kidnappings and extortion are on the rise and now also affect communities that are hosting refugees. In both Ecuador and Venezuela, there are reports of domestic citizens being forced to leave their areas of residence because of these threats. The scope of this new and worrisome phenomenon should be investigated. Bilateral diplomatic relations, which are currently severed between Colombia and Ecuador and frequently tense between Colombia and Venezuela, can provide little resolution to the region’s spillover problems. As a result, a multilateral regional effort to address the humanitarian and protection dimensions of the Colombian refugee crisis is indispensable. This would include supporting and facilitating the exchange of analysis and refugee policy discussions between Ecuador and Venezuela, increasing the international humanitarian presence in border areas and dedicating resources to sustainably integrate refugees into host communities. SOURCE: Refugees International

The Challenge of Building Sustainable Peace in the DRC

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 11:23:05 -0700

August 2009 will mark ten years since the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that ended the second Congo war. It also marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Yet, the violence persists at an enormous cost, access to land in eastern DRC remains contested, and control over revenues from natural resources remains in the hands of a few. Armed groups, both foreign and domestic, continue to operate with impunity in the eastern DRC and are the source of much of the insecurity in the region. And state institutions remain weak and resource-starved. Over the last decade, the Congo has witnessed an extraordinary number of attempts by regional and international actors – individuals, states and institutions – to resolve the largest conflict that Africa has seen since independence. The most that these attempts have achieved are several partially respected ceasefire agreements. They have failed to end the violence or to re-establish central government authority throughout the DRC. Today, the DRC transition is at a crossroads. Despite elections two years ago that aimed to complete a peace process started in December 2002 during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue at Sun City, many Congolese feel disenfranchised by a government increasingly reliant on strong-handedness, as its authority rests on weak national and local institutions – a crisis of governance that the elections did not solve. In the last two years, little progress has been made on the disarmament and reintegration of Rwandan-backed rebel groups or Mai Mai militias1, and efforts to dismantle and repatriate the Rwandan Hutu FDLR (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) militia have yielded few results. SOURCE: Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications [updated 12 June 2009]

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 11:03:17 -0700

Human rights has been a principal area of U.S. concern in its relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), particularly since the violent government crackdown on the Tiananmen democracy movement in 1989. Some policy makers contend that the U.S. policy of engagement with China, particularly since granting the PRC permanent normal trade relations status in 2000, has failed to produce meaningful political reform. Others argue that U.S. engagement has helped to accelerate economic and social change and build social and legal foundations for democracy and human rights in the PRC. This report analyzes China’s mixed record on human rights – major human rights problems, new human rights legislation, and the development of civil society, legal awareness, and social and political activism. This report discusses major areas of interest but does not provide an exhaustive account of all human rights abuses or related incidents. Fear of social unrest, particularly during times of economic uncertainty, appears to motivate the PRC government’s resistance toward major political reform. The PRC government has attempted to respond to public grievances and popular calls for redress while subduing activists who attempt to organize mass protests and dissidents who openly call for fundamental change. This approach has both produced incremental improvements in human rights conditions and allowed for continued, serious abuses. Major, ongoing problems include excessive use of violence by security forces, unlawful detention, torture, arbitrary use of state security laws against political dissidents, coercive family planning policies, state control of information, and religious and ethnic persecution. Tibetans, ethnic Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong adherents have been singled out for especially harsh treatment. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress [updated 11 June 2009]

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 10:56:06 -0700

In its May 2009 budget request for FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested $96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI was established in mid-2004 as a five-year program with intended annual funding to total $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. (Actual funds allocated to the GPOI program from FY2005 through FY2009 totaled, as of April 2009, some $480.4 million.) The centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s efforts to prepare foreign security forces to participate in international peacekeeping operations, GPOI’s primary purpose has been to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. In October 2008, the National Security Council’s Deputies Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI’s mandate. Congressional approval of the FY2010 budget request would provide funding for the first year of this extension. To date, GPOI also provides support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an Italian “train-the-trainer” training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI promotes the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and encourages information exchanges to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises. Through GPOI, the United States supports and participates in a G* Africa Clearinghouse and a G8++ Global Clearinghouse, both to coordinate international peacekeeping capacity building efforts. GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997 to FY2005, the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI’s predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration’s African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (ACOTA is now GPOI’s principal training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten African nations were trained under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some $33 million was provided from FY1998 to FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account’s Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Why Should Mediators Consider the Economic Dimensions of Conflicts?

Tue, 07 Jul 2009 10:51:11 -0700

This article summarises the case for mediators giving greater consideration to the economic dimensions of conflicts – particularly those concerning natural resources. It also looks at some of the ways in which mediators might address this issue. The recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) publication, From Conflict to Peacebuilding – the Role of Natural Resources and the Environment provides some arguments for giving this area greater attention. The UNEP report finds that: 40 per cent of all intrastate conflicts since 1960 have a link to natural resources; less than a quarter of peace agreements for conflicts with links to natural resources address the management and governance of natural resources; intrastate conflicts linked to natural resources are twice as likely to relapse within five years. These findings provoke questions about the links between natural resources and conflict, the apparent reluctance of mediators to engage with the issue and the potential risks of ignoring it. In other words, what lies behind the figure of 40 per cent mentioned above? Academics have developed a range of typologies of wars related to natural resources. For the purposes of this snapshot overview, however – and reflecting on the cases discussed during the African mediators’ Retreat 2009 – resource-conflict scenarios can be loosely grouped into two overlapping categories: those where contest for resources has a bearing on the start of conflict, and those where ‘lootable’ resources are used during conflict by one or more warring parties as a source of financing. SOURCE: Center for Humanitarian Dialogue