As set out in the panel requests, the measures at issue are: (1) "quantitative restrictions such as quotas"; (2) "export duty rates, 'temporary' export duty rates, and/or 'special' export duty rates"; and (3) "other restraints on the exportation of the materials, administ[ration of] measures in a manner that is not uniform, impartial, and reasonable, ... excessive fees and formalities on exportation, and [failure to] publish certain measures pertaining to requirements, restrictions, or prohibitions on exports."

The claims are under various provisions of the GATT, and also China's Accession Protocol and the Working Party Report (incorporated into the Accession Protocol).

Press reports suggest that China may invoke the GATT Article XX environmental exceptions as a defense:

... China's Ministry of Commerce told AFP the aim of the "measures on some raw materials is to protect the environment and our limited resources".

Assuming China invokes this provision in relation to the claims under the Accession Protocol/Working Party Report, the panel will be faced with the question of whether Article XX provides an exception to these instruments.

If China's Article XX defense is strong and it meets all the Article XX(g) and XX chapeau criteria, the panel will be forced to decide whether Article XX actually offers an exception in this situation.  Unfortunately, there is the possibility the panel will simply assume for the sake of argument that Article XX can apply here, reject the Article XX defense on substantive grounds, and then find it unnecessary to decide whether Article XX applies outside the context of the GATT (which is essentially what happened in the China - Publications case).  This would be disappointing for those of us who would like to get some clarity on this issue, but would not be too surprising.  It all depends on how good China's environmental defense is, which is something I don't have a sense of from reading the press reports on the case.

The first lesson I would draw is the importance of the rule of law and that of enforceable commitments. Global governance must be anchored in commitments adopted by stakeholders, in rules and regulations with mechanisms which foster and promote its respect.

...

The second lesson I would draw for global governance is that of respect for the principle of subsidiarity. It is about performing functions at the level where these are more effectively carried.

...

The third lesson is that “coherence starts at home”. Coherence lies first and foremost with the members of international organizations.

...

The final lesson I would draw is that since the political “demos” remains essentially national, legitimacy would be greatly enhanced if international issues become part of the domestic political debate. If national governments are held accountable for their behaviour at the international level. The exercise of democracy at the national level needs to integrate an international dimension to foster legitimacy at the global level.

He concludes:

Among the many regional integration attempts, the European Union remains the laboratory of international governance — the place where the new technological frontier of international governance is being tested.

Regardless of your particular views on global governance and international economic integration, I think this speech is very well done and worth a read.  Here's one more excerpt:

The global economic crisis we are witnessing has accelerated the move towards a new architecture of global governance, in what I have called a “triangle of coherence”.

On one side of the triangle lies the G20, replacing the former G8, providing political leadership and policy direction. On another side lie member-driven international organizations providing expertise and specialized inputs, be they rules, policies or programmes. The third side of the triangle is the G-192, the United Nations, providing a forum for accountability.

In the longer term, we should have both the G20 and the international agencies reporting to the “parliament” of the United Nations.

Many stories and anecdotal evidence document doctors and patients travelling across the globe to give and receive medical and cosmetic surgeries, dental care and other kinds of treatments. But very little is actually known on the extent to which health services are traded internationally. In this new paper, Lior Herman maps and analyses trends in international trade in health services, drawing on a wide range of sources to provide a comprehensive and systematic picture. He finds high levels of movement of foreign health professionals between countries and significant presence of foreign healthcare firms in local markets. Cross-border services and patient travel remain low. Given the economic significance of the healthcare sector in overall economic activity, there is scope and unexploited potential for greater international trade in healthcare services.

And from the conclusion:

On the basis of the availability of data this paper finds that a great deal of variation exists within different segments of international trade in healthcare services. For the most part, international trade is conducted through the movement of foreign health professionals between countries, as well as the presence of foreign healthcare firms in local markets. International trade through cross-border activity, whereby healthcare services are provided and consumed in different territories, remains very low. Trade based on the travel of healthcare consumers to foreign markets is also very low but is significantly higher than cross border trade.

...

Given the economic significance of the healthcare sector in overall economic activity, and in particular the high levels of both total and private expenditure on healthcare, it seems that there is scope and unexploited potential for greater international trade in healthcare services. Trade is growing in cross border trade, consumption abroad, commercial presence and movement of professionals. But the greatest potential lies in cross border provision and consumption abroad of services.

The opinion is here.

No matter what Congress does with health care legislation in the next few weeks, one thing is already clear: the result will not do much to control the climbing costs of medical care in the United States.

And that is why many employers and insurance companies may seek savings by encouraging patients to travel abroad for treatment.

Offshore medical care is usually significantly less expensive than in the United States, and the wait times are often shorter. A heart operation that might cost $130,000 in this country could cost $18,500 in Singapore or $10,000 in India.

For more background on this conflict, see prior posts here and here.  In the latter post, Tomer commented:  "It would be better for the US if it could find a way to get a NAFTA panel to order Mexico to stay WTO procedures."  It appears they have taken up his suggestion.

What is really needed is an agreement that covers not just tariffs, but subsidies and government procurement as well.  But it's hard to imagine reaching agreement in these areas.  It seems clear that a lot of countries want to be the leader in the clean energy industry. Is it really possible that they would agree not to compete, or even to rein in their competition?  I see a great deal of trade conflict in clean energy's future.

It's interesting to hear that there is a consensus to give the WTO "jurisdiction" over exchange rates.  I'm curious about what this means exactly.  It could be (and has been) argued that the existing WTO rules already deal with various aspects of exchange rates.   But I think it is true that if the WTO is to address these issues effectively, some more detailed rules could be useful.

For more on exchange rate issues, Alan Beattie of the FT had this to say:

"The Americans get the toys, the Chinese get the Treasuries and we get screwed." Thus a European Union official once characterised the pattern of Beijing accumulating US assets by selling renminbis for dollars, while nothing stood in the way of a rapid and destabilising appreciation of the euro.

It was this routine that led to the US running a huge current account deficit with counterpart surpluses in much of east Asia (including China) and parts of Europe, and among the oil exporters of the Middle East. A shift in exchange rates is almost certainly a necessary part of rebalancing the world economy, shifting the burden of consumption towards those surplus areas ...

This paper suggests that many WTO member states are legally obliged to permit an unrestricted supply of cross- border Internet services. And as the option to selectively censor rather than entirely block services is available to at least some of the most developed censorship regimes (most notably China), there is a good chance that a panel might rule that permanent blocks on search engines, photo-sharing applications and other services are inconsistent with the GATS provisions, even given morals and security exceptions. Less resourceful countries, without means of filtering more selectively, and with a censorship based on moral and religious grounds, might be able to defend such bans in the WTO. But the exceptions do not offer a blanket cover for the arbitrary and disproportionate censorship that still occurs despite the availability to the censoring government of selective filtering.

And from the paper:

... although the dispute settlement mechanism of neither the WTO nor other trade instruments could be used to eliminate Internet censorship, they might limit the use of its more commercially damaging forms. For businesses, trade with countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, or with countries where the concept of the rule of law is still under development, will always be difficult – if not outright dangerous. Contesting arbitrary and disproportionate blocks on access to such markets will incrementally help to reduce legal uncertainty and therefore contribute in the long run to a regulatory environment where the risks and costs of market participation are foreseeable.

So how can we assist developing country exporters on these aspects?  Bown proposes an "Institute for Assessing WTO Commitments" (IAWC).  As he explains, "[t]he fundamental purpose of the IAWC is to provide a continually updated database of current WTO violations, with special focus on violations of potential interest to exporters in developing countries."  The IAWC would not do its own enforcement, but rather would make its information freely accessible for other groups (e.g., law firms, governments) to use.  As for how it would operate, he suggests the possibility of an online community of economists, lawyers and political science experts, using a "wiki" framework.

For those who want to hear more about this, check out the upcoming Brookings conference Could the WTO Better Serve the Poor?, where he will be speaking.

What this makes me think of is the issue of developing countries facing conditions for access to GSP programs.  They may be able to make a successful legal challenge to the conditions.  But could they enforce such a legal victory, that is, could they convince the rich country government to change the policy?  My sense is that it could take some very specialized expertise in the "post-litigation" phase to know how to achieve this.

Director, Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities, D-2
DEADLINE FOR APPLICATIONS:   29 Dec 2009
DATE OF ISSUANCE:   30 Oct 2009
ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT:   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
DUTY STATION:   Geneva
VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT NUMBER:   09-ECO-UNCTAD-422453-R-GENEVA (G)

...

Responsibilities

This position is located in the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Under the overall guidance of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the incumbent directs, manages and provides substantive leadership to the Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities, including: -Developing policy approaches and proposals in the field of international trade, in consultation with the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD. -Defining and implementing the work programme of the Division, determining priority areas for the research, intergovernmental and technical cooperation activities. -Supervising and organizing the substantive servicing of intergovernmental meetings on areas of competence for the Division, including the clearance of policy papers. -Advising senior government officials on behalf of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD regarding issues and policies related to the work of the Division, and in particular those to be discussed and negotiated in the intergovernmental bodies of UNCTAD. -Oversees the administration and human resources management of the Division, including the preparation and management of the resources from the regular budget and extra-budgetary sources, PAS procedures and vacancy management. -Represents UNCTAD at high-level international meetings and contributes substantively to discussions and their outcome.

Competencies

Professionalism: In-depth knowledge of international trade issues, including of trade negotiations and their implications for development and for UNCTAD's work. Thorough knowledge of international economic issues and their implications for development. Communication: Excellent oral communication and drafting skills. Ability to communicate effectively with senior officials regarding substantive issues. Planning and organizing: Ability to plan and organize work, requiring an in-depth understanding of its strategic direction and ability to integrate the work of the Division into the work programme of the organization. Vision: Proven capacity to identify strategic issues, opportunities and risks in relation to international trade and the work of UNCTAD in this field. Leadership: Proven ability to provide strategic direction and ensure an effective work structure to maximize productivity and achieve goals. Demonstrated capacity to provide the managerial and intellectual leadership to the Division. Takes responsibility for incorporating gender perspectives and ensuring the equal participation of women and men in all the areas of work, and demonstrates knowledge of strategies and commitment to the goal of gender balance in staffing. Managing Performance: Ability to delegate appropriate responsibility and to ensure that goals, roles and reporting lines are clear to each staff member. Supports creativity and initiative, and is able to motivate staff.

For the most part, AD and CVD cases are completely separate.  Generally speaking, a case is brought against imports under either domestic AD law (targeting dumping) or domestic CVD law (targeting subsidies), but not both.  However, on occasion there are cases brought against alleged subsidies and dumping in relation to the same imported product.  Where this happens, the issue arises as to whether "double remedies" -- one for dumping and one for subsidies -- are being applied in relation to what is, in essence, the same concern.  The subsidies and the dumping may be completely unrelated, in which case there is no problem with imposing a remedy for each.  However, it may also be that the subsidies at issue have led to the dumping.  If this is the case, imposing two remedies could be said to "double count" the trade harm.

To illustrate this, let me use a simplified example.  Imagine there is a dumping calculation where export prices are being compared to home market prices (the way it is often done).  Let's say that, as a result of the subsidy, the recipient has lowered the export price (the subsidy allows it to do so by compensating for the lost revenues arising from the lower price).  This lower price can lead to a finding of dumping (because the export price is now lower in relation to the home market price).  Arguably, in this situation, if remedies are applied in response to both the subsidy and the dumping, a single activity is being targeted.

In practice, avoiding such double counting can be difficut.  The relationship between subsidies and dumping may be complex and varied, such that determining whether subsidies lead to dumping, and thus whether the problem of double-counting arises, is complicated.  Subsidies can be used in various ways by the recipients.  Certainly one use is to lower the price of the product.  However, other uses are possible as well.  For example, it may be that a producer keeps the price the same and uses the subsidy to invest in new equipment so as to improve quality.

The type of subsidy involved is also an important consideration.  Export subsidies are designed to help exports, so it may be more likely they will lead to a lower export price than would domestic subsidies.   However, it is not clear that export and domestic subsidies have such different effects that they should be treated as completely separate categories.  It may be that export subsidies are more likely than domestic subsidies to lower the export price.  But it is possible that export subsidies would not be used for this purpose, and it's also possible that domestic subsidies would.  Thus, presuming that export subsidies always lead to dumping, whereas domestic subsidies never do, may not make sense.  Instead, it may be better to require trade remedy authorities to examine the link between subsidies and dumping in each specific case.  Where the subsidies are found to result in the dumping, no double-counting would be permitted.  By contrast, if the dumping exists separate from the subsidies, remedies could be imposed on each.

With this general background in mind, I now turn to the relevant WTO law (well, one part of it, anyway).  As noted in an earlier post, GATT Article VI:5 provides: "No product of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of any other Member shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization."  Thus, under this provision, double remedies cannot be applied to the "same situation" of dumping and export subsidies, perhaps indicating an assumption by the drafters that export subsidies lead to dumping.  There is no similar provision excluding double remedies for domestic subsidies and dumping.

However, given the earlier discussion of how domestic subsidies could lead to dumping, the question arises as to whether there is some general principle that might prohibit double counting in the domestic subsidy context.  It certainly seems unfair, in some general sense, to allow authorities to impose remedies on both subsidies and dumping where the subsidies have led to the dumping.  But it is difficult to fit this concern within a specific WTO obligation, and the explicit prohibition in relation to export subsidies makes the argument difficult.  It may be that GATT Article X:3(a) could play a role here.  This provision states: "Each Member shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article."  This obligation to administer domestic laws in a uniform, impartial and reasonable way may require Members to take some actions to avoid double counting in situations involving domestic subsidies.

With regard to export subsidies, the earlier discussion suggests that they may not always lead to dumping.  In this regard, perhaps the "same situation" language in Article VI:5 could be interpreted to mean that authorities must determine, in each case, whether the subsidies have actually led to lower export prices.  That is, it is only where it has been shown that the export subsidies have led to the dumping that the "same situation" of subsidies and dumping exists.

Bringing this general discussion back to the cases at hand (the WTO case and the CIT decision), it is worth mentioning that in the proceedings at issue, all of these issues arise in the context of the treatment of non-market economies (NMEs) under U.S. CVD law.  Until recently, CVD law was not applied to NMEs.  However, this situation changed in 2007 when the Department of Commerce reversed its prior policy.  There may be special considerations that apply to all of these issues due to the fact that the economy in question is an NME.  This issue raises a number of considerations, one of which is that it can be particularly difficult to relate subsidies to dumping in an NME, as the market distortions make it hard to be precise about the dumping calculations.

As a final point, it will be interesting to watch the overlap between the WTO decisions and the U.S. court decisions.  They are likely to reference each other, and it will be worth watching how each body discusses the other, and also the substantive path each takes.

The Teaching Fellow in international economic law, business and policy will work with candidates in the LLM specialization in IELBP. The fellow will assume significant academic, advising and administrative responsibilities. He or she will be responsible for organizing and co-teaching a yearlong colloquium addressing current issues and scholarship in international economic law and business, and may also develop a lecture course in the field. The fellow will also organize and facilitate informal workshops, outside speakers, and academic and social events, be responsible for day-to-day administrative management of the LLM program, advise and counsel LLM candidates on academic and personal issues, respond to inquiries from prospective LLM applicants, and interact with our faculty in support of the LLM program goals and needs. The fellow will work with the Director of International Graduate Programs, and under the supervision of the Director of the IELBP program. The fellow will also fully participate in the admissions process, working under the guidance of the Associate Dean for Admissions to admit the new class. Although this is a full time position, the fellow should have a reasonable amount of time to conduct his or her own research, and will have ready access to affiliated faculty for that purpose.

 

For more information about Stanford Law School's LLM Program in International Economic Law, Business and Policy, see http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/degrees/advanced/llm_ielbp/

Candidates for this position are expected to have strong academic records and references. Professional experience in the area is also valuable. This position is intended primarily for people who expect to pursue an academic career in a field that is reasonably related to the specialization. Applicants are expected to commit to this position in one year increments, starting in August 2010, with a two-year commitment preferred.

Those interested should apply by letter (letters should be addressed to Professor Sykes), summarizing their complete educational qualifications and experience, as well as any other information that might help us in making selections. Each applicant should also send us an official law school transcript, a resume, copies of any publications, and three letters of recommendation (at least two from law professors) commenting on the applicant’s suitability for the position in terms of teaching ability, analytic capability, interpersonal skills, and writing ability.

Your application package should be sent to:

 

Stanford Law School

Attention:  Angela Arroyo

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305-8610

Applicants must also submit their resume electronically through the applicant tracking system at http://jobs.stanford.edu/find_a_job.html and reference job number 36257.

So would USTR take up this issue at the WTO?  Here's what I said on this a couple months ago:

It's a little hard to imagine the Obama administration filing a complaint on this issue.  I suppose you never know, though.

My view is pretty much the same now.  I'm skeptical that the Obama administration would press this issue, at least through formal channels.

"The United States per capita emission rate is four times as big as China's. Does that mean we can impose 400 percent tax rates on all imported American goods? If so, the result is a global trade war that is good for no one and no use at all in the fight against climate change."

And this, too:

"Frankly, if tariffs are being implemented unilaterally, they cannot be objective and cannot be non-discriminatory."

China is preparing to launch a trade investigation into whether US carmakers are being unfairly subsidised by the US government, according to people familiar with the matter.

...

General Motors and Chrysler have received about $60bn in government bail-out funds, though Ford has received nothing.

Washington has also provided substantial aid to US and foreign carmakers, as well as parts suppliers, to encourage investment in “green” technology.

The wildly popular “cash-for-clunkers” sales incentive scheme this summer was also a boon for both US and foreign manufacturers.

There's also an anti-dumping petition: "China has received an anti-dumping petition as well, which asks for investigation into whether US car exports are being sold at unfairly low pries."  Is it possible that actions like these will affect how the U.S. views AD/CVD?

Meanwhile, over in the EU:

European Union regulators said Thursday they would probe plans for Audi to receive a euro49.5 million ($73.19 million) subsidy from the Hungarian government to help the car maker upgrade a factory.

1.  In a policy paper about sustainability standards for biofuel products, economists Harry de Gorter and David R. Just make the following point:

28. Are there any issues regarding international trade law and biofuel sustainability standards?

There are several. A sustainability standard means nonsustainable ethanol is treated less favorably than sustainable ethanol. This is problematic because the WTO prohibits members from discriminating between domestic and imported products based on the processes or production methods used to produce them. Imposing a higher tax on imported nonsustainable ethanol, as compared to a lower tax (because of the tax credit) on domestic sustainable ethanol blended with gasoline—a domestic-like product—would seem to violate General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs Article III(2)’s first sentence. The ethanol products, qua products, are the same, but they are taxed differently.

Privileged treatment for the blender’s tax credit would probably also be discriminatory and violate GATT ’94, Article I, if ethanol imported from at least one other country qualified for the tax credit. The U.S. would then be guilty of discriminating between like ethanol imported into the United States from two different countries, a violation of the most-favored nation principle of Article I.

The biofuel sustainability mandate runs afoul of GATT Article XI, which prohibits all quantitative restrictions on imports. Because the mandate’s sustainability criterion would seem to be an internal regulation that discriminates against unsustainable ethanol, it might seem to violate Article III(4)’s prohibition on discriminatory regulations. Since the regulation (the sustainability criterion attached to the mandate) regulates the process of making the ethanol and not the qualities of the ethanol itself, however, WTO decisions have indicated that the discrimination provisions of Article III(4) do not apply. Instead, because the sustainability criterion would operate to reduce the flow of unsustainable ethanol into the United States, it would constitute a quantitative restriction on unsustainable ethanol imports and, accordingly, violate Article XI.

...

2.  A Vancouver Sun article on possible U.S. restrictions on "dirty" oil from Canada notes :

Attempts by U.S. politicians to curb imports of oilsands and "dirty" energy from Canada could face a challenge under World Trade Organization rules, the author of a survey into U.S. protectionism said Monday.

According to Helmut Mach, director of the Western Centre for Economic Research at the University of Alberta School of Business, American attempts to restrict imports of higher-carbon fuels such as oilsands could be illegal under international trade rules because it would discriminate against how a particular product — in this case oil — is manufactured.

In that sense, climate bills before the U.S. Senate and Congress could be construed as protectionist measures, Mach said in an interview.

"Normally, under international trade rules, how a product is produced is irrelevant," he said. "PPM's (process and production methods) are not supposed to be a determining factor in purchasing decisions. It has the potential to become very controversial and complicated factor in the climate-change debate."

The Secretariat of the WTO is seeking to fill the position of Director in the Legal Affairs Division. Serving staff members interested in the position are also invited to apply.

General Functions

The incumbent will head the Legal Affairs Division, which is responsible for providing legal advice and related services to the Office of the Director-General and the WTO Secretariat as a whole; to the Dispute Settlement Body and, upon request, to other WTO bodies; to dispute settlement panels and arbitral bodies; to delegations to the WTO; and, as appropriate, to the general public. Specific responsibilities will include the following duties:

1. Managing the overall operation of the division, including assigning and reviewing the work of the approximately one dozen other permanent lawyers in the division and ensuring that the Division's administrative practices conform with WTO rules and regulations.

2. Providing advice on WTO law and practice to the Director-General and other divisions of the WTO Secretariat; to the Dispute Settlement Body and, as requested, to WTO committees and working groups; to dispute settlement panels and arbitral bodies; to delegations to the WTO; and, as appropriate, to the public. Also responsible for reviewing, as the need arises, the advice given by others in the organization on the law of the international civil service and on privileges and immunities of the WTO Secretariat.

3. Overseeing participation of the division in the organization's extensive teaching and training programmes, with a particular focus on WTO dispute settlement; such oversight also extends to the preparation of teaching and training materials to this end, including for e-training.

4. Overseeing the preparation and updating of reference materials on WTO law and practice, including the WTO Analytical Index - WTO Law and Practice; WTO Status of Legal Instruments; WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries; as well as the preparation of inputs on WTO legal developments for other WTO publications.

5. Assisting the WTO Membership in giving legal effect to any agreements they may negotiate and conclude within the legal framework of the WTO.

6. Supervising the operation of the Dispute Settlement Registry.

7. Supervising the operation of the WTO Depository.

8. Overseeing the operation of the Division's extensive legal internship programme.

9. Representing the DG and the WTO Secretariat in various public and academic functions in Geneva and abroad that address WTO dispute settlement matters and legal issues of relevance to the WTO.

10. Undertaking any other tasks that may be assigned by the Director General.
 

REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS
 
Education:

In addition to a basic university degree, proven theoretical knowledge and/or professional expertise equivalent to an advanced university degree in law, with extensive knowledge of international trade law and solid knowledge of public international law. Should be licensed or be eligible to be licensed to practice law in at least one municipal jurisdiction.
 
Knowledge:

Excellent knowledge of economic and legal issues relating to the WTO. Knowledge of and practical experience with other dispute resolution mechanisms, at national or international level, would also be an asset.
 
Work Experience:

At least fifteen years as a legal practitioner in either the public or private sectors, including considerable practical experience in trade law. Extensive management experience with broad supervisory responsibilities over a dozen or more people is highly desirable, and a proven ability to interact and work with other highly qualified legal professionals is a must. Ability to work harmoniously with senior management and to cooperate effectively with one's peers in a diverse international setting is important.
 
Languages:

Fluent knowledge of English (including legal English) is essential, including a demonstrated ability to write accurately, concisely and quickly, and to review and edit effectively the work of other lawyers. A good knowledge of French and/or Spanish would also be an important asset.
 
Additional Information:

This position will be vacant as of 1 September 2010 further to the retirement of the incumbent.
 

The new Ontario requirement that grid-connected solar projects include a minimum amount of local content is causing a stir in Germany, where manufacturers say Canada is breaching its obligations to the World Trade Organization.

...

The new rules, which went into effect Oct. 1, require that small rooftop solar systems contain 40 per cent local content as a combination of labour and equipment.

Larger systems must meet a 50 per cent threshold. Starting in two years that target will rise to 60 per cent.

Energy and Infrastructure Minister George Smitherman established the rule to stimulate investment and green-collar job creation in the province, a benefit aimed at making electricity consumers more agreeable to paying a premium for solar and wind power.

The article doesn't explain the measure in much detail, but it seems likely that a local content requirement for equipment would violate GATT Article III:4.  The more difficult issue might be the defense.  The argument set out in the quoted portion of the article seems to be something like this: Due to the higher cost of solar/wind power, the only way the government can enact a policy favoring these power sources is to use protectionism to give some benefits to local companies, so as to generate support for the policy.

I see the point, but it's hard to imagine such a defense being accepted by a WTO panel under GATT Article XX, in part because it would be open to abuse (everyone would argue it and it would be hard to disprove).

The value of China’s currency, unlike, say, the value of the British pound, isn’t determined by supply and demand. Instead, Chinese authorities enforced that target by buying or selling their currency in the foreign exchange market ...

And then he complains:

U.S. officials have been extremely cautious about confronting the China problem, to such an extent that last week the Treasury Department, while expressing “concerns,” certified in a required report to Congress that China is not — repeat not — manipulating its currency. They’re kidding, right?

To be clear, he doesn't think that all manipulation is bad.  As he notes later in the piece:

Cuba is ready to ship 1 million cases of rum to America if Washington eases its 47-year-old embargo, but would hold off exporting its flagship Havana Club brand because of U.S. trademark battles, one of the island's top rum executives said Wednesday.

...

Cuban rums can't be sold in the United States, but they are available in more than 120 countries, Gonzalez said, noting that the company sold 4 million cases in 2008. Of that, Havana Club counts for all but about half a million cases.

...

He said that the first wave of Cuban rum to hit the U.S. likely wouldn't include Havana Club due to an fight in U.S. courts with Bermuda-based rum giant Bacardi Ltd., which produces its own Havana Club, made in Puerto Rico and sold in Florida since 2006.

If Cuba could sell its rum in the United States, would that create renewed interest in the U.S. - Section 211 WTO dispute, which has been lingering on, unimplemented, for years?  The basic issue there was a U.S. trademark dispute over the name "Havana Club" -- between a Pernod/Cuban government joint venture, on the one hand, and Bacardi, on the other hand -- and related legislation.   It may not have been worth pursuing the WTO case if there was no possibility of the Pernod/Cuban venture selling Havana Club rum in the U.S. (due to the embargo).  But if there is now a chance the embargo will be lifted, maybe someone will be more active in pushing the case.  (I should point out that my knowledge of the facts of the case is based on what was going in 2002 -- a lot may have happened in the meantime).

The article notes that U.S. textile producers are considering filing a Section 421 complaint.  If that happens, it will be interesting to see the Obama administration's reaction.

Using trade as a strategic tool makes the global trading system hostage to endless political posturing and negotiating games. Governments should grant trade preferences on simple, fair criteria, largely based on the poverty and vulnerability of trading partners. Trade deals should be a means for poor countries to haul themselves out of poverty, not a tool of foreign policy manipulation by their richer counterparts. Sri Lanka’s exporters have used their access to the European market well. They should keep it.

Arguably, what the FT advocates is pretty close to what WTO rules require.  (Although, as with most laws, there are counterarguments as well.)

The ELSA Moot Court Competition on WTO Law

 

North American Regional Round

March 18-20, 2010

Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa

 

   

 

The ELSA Moot Court Competition on WTO Law is an international moot court competition on WTO dispute settlement organized by the European Law Students Association which includes teams of students around the world.  Information is available on the ELSA website at:  www.elsamootcourt.org .  Regional Rounds will be held in Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America in March and April, with the Final Round being held in the Dominican Republic.  This competition is supported by the WTO and co-sponsored by the World Trade Institute and IELPO.

 

This year, the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law is pleased to host the North American Regional Round, which is open to teams from universities in Canada and the United States.  It will be held from March 18-20, 2010 in Ottawa, Canada.  Information about the North American Regional Round is available at: www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/wtomoot.

People in other regions, feel free to email me with your details as well.

These are the highlights of his latest update of global trade remedy measures, available at the World Bank web site.

However, the point was made in a different context and it was not emphasized much.  As a general matter, there does not seem to be much of an effort to address the policy issues involved, aside from occasional tough talk by one side or the other.

The Korea-U.S. free-trade agreement should be ratified before tariffs on goods from the European Union get cut in Asia's fourth-largest economy, president of the American business lobby group here said yesterday.

"I don't want to see tariffs on EU goods reduced before goods on U.S. goods are reduced," Amy Jackson, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, said at her inaugural press conference in Seoul. The former director of Washington D.C.-based C&M International, an international trade and investment consulting firm, assumed her new post on Aug. 31.

She stressed the importance of the Korea-U.S. FTA for both sides and underscored the urgency for passage of the deal by both legislatures, especially following the initialing of the FTA between Korea and the European Union on Oct. 15. This step paved the way for the official signing of the accord targeted for the first quarter of 2010.